



## **Preliminary Event Summary**

### **N247BZ / ANA JA986A Ground Collision CHS**

**Event Type:** Aircraft Ground Damage

**Event Date:** 7/18/2025

**Airport:** CHS

**Time:** 21:41 EDT / 01:41 UTC

**Damage:** Substantial

**Injuries:** 0

**Aircraft Type(s):** A220/B787

**Aircraft Reg:** N284BZ/JA986A

**Location:** RON Pad/Taxiway M

#### **Executive Summary**

On the evening of July 18, 2025, the tail of aircraft N247BZ that was parked at CHS RON pad spot R6 following the weather diversion of Breeze flight 509 was struck by the lefthand wing of an ANA Boeing 787-10 (JA986A) as it taxied behind and past on taxiway M. N247BZ sustained substantial damage to the vertical stabilizer, rudder, and rear cone (see reference photos). The ANA B787-10 sustained damage to the outer section of the left-wing (see reference photos).

At the time of impact, the parking brake of the Breeze aircraft was engaged and the seatbelt sign was illuminated. Due to fluid spilling onto the ramp from the tail of the Breeze aircraft after impact, a significant ARFF and airport response was initiated. All passengers were deplaned from the aircraft normally using airstairs and bused to the terminal. EMS evaluation was also readily offered during deplaning and two passengers requested additional treatment that were transported to a local urgent care facility for further evaluation. Both were subsequently released without any injuries being reported.

#### **Full Event Details**

Breeze Flight 509 was scheduled to operate from LAS to ORF and was legally dispatched with a planned alternate of CHS due to forecast weather. The flight departed LAS six (6) minutes ahead of schedule at 1933z. At 2245z, the pilots began a conversation with dispatch over ACARS that there was weather on the route requiring deviation but that there appeared to be a clearing for the flight to get through. At 0022z another conversation was held with dispatch over ACARS and ARINC phone patch that weather had deteriorated and the flight was holding for arrival into ORF. At 0045z, the pilots and dispatch made a joint decision that a diversion to CHS should be initiated. At 0047z, Unifi station personnel were notified by IOCC that flight 509 would be diverting to CHS for a refueling stop before continuing to its originally planned destination of Norfolk (ORF). Upon notification from Unifi, CHS Airport Operations advised to park the aircraft on spot R1 on the RON pad for refueling, in line with the airport's "fuel and go" policy (Figure 1). It was also relayed by dispatch via ACARS to the pilots at 0100z that spot R1 could be expected and that CHS was "very busy" so a parking delay could be expected.

Breeze flight 509 landed in CHS at 0130z based upon ACARS transmitted aircraft data. The aircraft was met and marshalled into spot R6 by one Unifi agent (Figure 2a). The marshaller indicated for the aircraft to stop short of the "stop bar" on the J-line for spot R6 and the pilots complied with his signals. The aircraft was parked at 0136z and remained in this position through the remainder of the event (confirmed by Figure 3). Approximately one minute later, at 0137z, a CHS Airport Ops vehicle approached the aircraft from the opposite side of the ramp and verbally

notified the Unifi ground agent that a Boeing would be taxiing through the area and that the aircraft “needed to be moved immediately.” The Airport Ops vehicle then left the area (headed in the direction of the passenger terminal) at approximately 0138z. During this time, the flight crew was in the process of securing the aircraft and briefing passengers on the planned “gas and go” operation. The flight crew completed the aircraft shutdown checklist and momentarily left on the seatbelt sign. Recognizing that airstairs would need to be connected for refueling, the seatbelt sign was turned off in preparation for refueling procedures. The PIC then left the cockpit to brief the passengers regarding the planned refueling.

After the conversation with Airport Ops, the Unifi agent reapproached the aircraft and repositioned out of the immediate area a GPU cart that had been pre-staged in front of the aircraft and in the vicinity of the stop bar for spot R6. The agent then connected via headset to the aircraft to discuss repositioning options with the pilots (whether to re-start engines and taxi or connect the tug and tow forward). The joint decision was made to have the tug connected and the aircraft towed forward. The crew reactivated the seat belt sign and the PIC monitored the aisle to ensure that all passengers retook their seats. The Unifi agent began making preparations to connect the aircraft to the tug (the tug was a “towbar-less” type). At 0141z, as the Unifi agent was in the process of connecting to the aircraft, the crew felt a sudden impact, heard unusual noises, and perceived sounds resembling tires screeching. The PIC believed the tug may have been engaged improperly, causing unintentional aircraft movement. The UNIFI agent then used the headset and informed the crew that the aircraft had been struck by a Boeing aircraft. Post-event video and picture review confirmed that an ANA B787-10 on taxiway M made contact with the Breeze aircraft when taxiing through the area (taxiway located immediately adjacent to the RON pad) and its left wing impacted the rudder/tail section of N247BZ at approximately 21:41 EDT when attempting to pass behind the aircraft, (refer to visual aids for impact areas). Approximately five (5) minutes elapsed from time of parking to the time that the collision occurred.

The PIC could not confirm whether the tow bar had been connected at that time of collision. Immediately prior to the collision, the PIC stated that they had been scanning the aisle to ensure that passengers were seated but had not yet released the brakes in preparation for towing. The PIC confirmed they were monitoring the tower frequency throughout the event. The PIC noted that the tug driver did not have a headset connected during the planned repositioning (tow forward). After the collision occurred and notification from the Unifi agent, the PIC made a passenger announcement about the occurrence and began coordinating immediately with company dispatch, maintenance control, and technical operations. Airstairs were brought to the aircraft and the L1 door was opened at 0143z (based upon transmitted ACARS data). A Breeze Tech Ops manager on duty and at the airport at the time of the event boarded the aircraft and advised for the hydraulic pumps be turned off. Shortly thereafter, law enforcement boarded for debriefing. Due to the presence of a liquid spilling from the tail of the Breeze aircraft onto the ramp, ARFF and Airport Ops responded to the scene. Deplaning was coordinated with IOCC and began shortly thereafter.

Multiple shuttle buses were required to move passengers away from the aircraft to designated terminal areas. Two passengers (described by personnel on scene as an “elderly couple”) were moved to urgent care for monitoring, however later released without any injuries being reported. Two inflight crew members filed injury reports via Breeze’s safety reporting system, however no immediate treatment was sought by either. A post-flight review and walk-around inspection was

conducted by the PIC. The last guest was reported to be off the aircraft at 0305z. The crew stated that all aircraft shutdown procedures were completed and that they arrived at their hotel at approximately 11:30 p.m. Eastern Time on the day of the event (0330z).

The Unifi agent involved in the event was sent for drug testing on Monday, July 21 (soonest available opportunity); results are pending.

### **Post Event Findings**

1. **N247BZ was parked on spot R6 instead of R1** – The decision to change the parking position was made by the Unifi agent that met the aircraft. The agent, a Unifi Performance Manager assigned to CHS and cross-trained as “floater” to support where needed on the airport, stated that their decision to change the parking to R6 was “due to the grass and distance for the fuel truck...” and without knowledge of plans for an aircraft taxi from the Boeing facility.
2. **Parking Spot R6 is not intended for use by A220 type aircraft** – The only approved A220 parking spots in CHS (reference Figure 1) are “tail-in” spots such as R1. The stop bar painted for spot R6 only depicts a parking position for CRJ and ERJ type aircraft. Further, Unifi indicated that R6 has been previously used on multiple occasions for “gas and go” diversion type operations of A220 type aircraft without incident so its usage had become accepted as common practice.
3. **N247BZ was parked using non-standard procedures and with its tail protruding into Taxiway M** – No wing walkers were used during parking, a pre-arrival huddle was not conducted, and an equipment restraint area (ERA) was not setup prior to aircraft arrival. Additionally, a GPU was located near the J-line of spot R6 which prevented the aircraft from being parked fully forward. The aircraft was parked approximately 40-feet short of the stop bar painted for spot R6 and the tail was protruding approximately 10-feet over a “clearance line” on the RON ramp. For background, this clearance line exists to provide visibility on where parked aircraft must clear to ensure adequate taxiway separation.
4. **Unifi ramp staffing was below the expected level for regularly scheduled operations** – Unifi and the Breeze CHS Base Manager confirmed that there were seven ramp qualified agents on duty at time of event, supported by one terminal-based operations agent, working to support 3 scheduled aircraft turns and 2 scheduled RON aircraft prior to the diversion.
5. **Breeze pilots were unfamiliar with the CHS RON Ramp** – During the post-flight debriefing, the PIC stated he had never parked at either remote position in CHS. A review of the company and airport information pages (Jeppesen 10-7 & 10-9 charts) indicated that beyond general indication of where the RON ramp was located, no guidance is currently available to pilots regarding RON positions or ramp usage procedures.
6. **ANA B787 JA986A was under the direct operation of ANA, not a Boeing test flight** – Additional information has been requested from ANA Safety regarding pilot familiarity/previous operation into the airport. The NTSB and ANA have confirmed that the ANA aircraft was operating as a delivery/ferry flight.

7. **Taxiway M and the RON Ramp are uncontrolled** – CHS Airport Ops indicated that there is an LOA in effect with the FAA allowing Taxiway M to be an “uncontrolled” area of the airport (aircraft do not require ATC/ground control clearance to operate on it). No dedicated ramp or airport ops frequencies are used for this area; any comms are with ATC.
8. **CHS Airport Ops has no visibility on planned Boeing aircraft movements** – During a post-event debrief with the CHS Manager of Ops and Supervisor of Ops, both stated that Boeing does not provide flight schedules to the airport for advance notice. Their indication of impending aircraft movement from the facility is when the Boeing controlled gate at the beginning of Taxiway M is opened.

## **Follow Up Actions**

### **Immediate Actions:**

- Event reported by both Breeze and ANA to the NTSB due to suspected substantial damage
- Event reported by Breeze to the DOD as required under DOD contract
- Investigations initiated by Breeze, ANA, Unifi, and CHS Airport Ops
- N247BZ removed from service for technical inspections.
- Preliminary debrief and follow-up conducted with UNIFI on 7/19
- Pilot debriefing conducted on 7/20
- CHS ops restriction communicated by Breeze DOS to Stations leadership that A220s are prohibited from parking at any “nose-in” spot on the RON ramp (R6, R7, R8)

### **Comprehensive Actions:**

#### **Unifi Actions (provided via Unifi investigation):**

- Brief expectations on use of rated RON parking space with all team members. Only R1, R2 and R3 shall be used.
- Unifi CHS STM Document failures by the supervisor in the employee file (use of nonapproved RON spot, performing a task without the minimum team size, failure to complete huddle and failure to move equipment out of equipment restraint area).
- Unifi CHS STM Reset arrival and parking team requirements with all team members via briefings. Unifi CHS STM Conduct a comprehensive SRA of the RON parking Bridgeman – Unifi EHS Director Establish a diversion plan to include capacity, capabilities and processes to be agreed with Breeze leadership Pogonovich & Bridgeman
- Brief huddle expectations with all employees. Leadership team to observe adherence to huddle expectations before all arrivals and departures.
- Unifi CHS STM Incident Notification shared with network about incident and actions as a result.
- Unifi VP EHS System-wide blitz on towing and remote parking operations. Network training with all ramp leadership on the Unifi Tow Program elements and expectations

### **Breeze comprehensive follow-up actions are in work**

## Incident Visual Aids

## Zipper Parking RON Ramp




Figure 1 – CHS RON Parking Plan



Figure 2a – CHS Fuel Farm Camera Ramp View: Time of Parking



Figure 2b – CHS Fuel Farm Camera Ramp View: Time of Collision



Figure 3 – Ramp/Taxiway Wide View




Figure 4a – 247BZ RH Tail




Figure 4b – 247BZ RH Tail Close



Figure 5 – 247BZ LH Tail Close



Figure 6 – 247BZ Tail Teardown



Figure 7 – JA986A LH Wing Close Up



Figure 8 – CHS RON Ramp Spot R6 J-Line/Stop-bar