



Internal Memorandum

Date: 2/18/2025

To: Captain Brian J. Cink, Director & Chief Pilot - SLC CPO
From: Captain S. Joyce
Subject: II25-043 Aircraft Damage
DL1921 2/5/2025 SEA-PVR 3737 N3737CB-737-832
CAP: JOYCE, S.S. **FO:** DA SILVA, F.A.

This statement is provided at the request of the Chief Pilot's Office.

I was Captain of Delta Air Lines Flight DL1921 2/5/2025 SEA-PVR.

We had completed all tasks routinely, including the preflight and pushback checklists. We were waiting for pushback out of gate A 11. The frequency was very congested, and my impression was we had to be careful. I 'd estimate that we waited at least 10 minutes for a pushback clearance. We complied with the initial clearance of 'push tail South'. The push clearance changed, and I forwarded that to the ground crew. They were unable to comply because of a safety concern. The ramp controller acknowledged.

Disconnect was normal and we started the number two engine as I wanted to conserve fuel and had no knowledge of how long the deice process would take. Taxi out was slow but routine. We completed all checklists, and we were both heads-up during taxi. Our instructions from the ramp were taxi to spot 88, turn left on Whiskey and hold short of spot 99. We complied and contacted deice. We were told to follow the preceding aircraft to the South deice area. I had the First Officer start the second engine approaching the deice area as I expected to be assigned a spot for deice. Neither of us had deiced in Seattle.

We had both engines running and the preceding aircraft stopped. I stopped the aircraft abeam spot 1 in the South Ramp as it provided a safe distance behind the 220 in front. There were no holding points identified on the ramp, on the charts or otherwise. The preceding 220 received instructions and moved forward and was marshaled into spot 3. I remained stopped, with the parking brake set awaiting further instructions from deice and marshallers. The uncontrolled, nonmovement area was close quarters, busy with vehicle traffic and slippery with snowfall and deice fluid. The 3 deice spots identified for the 737 were all occupied.

From where I sat, I saw multiple vehicles crossing 'safety lines'. I had no marshallers, no wing walkers and no further directions from a controlling entity. The note, "Plan taxi into alleyway West of Delta Hanger with marshallers. Pad commander will marshal in aircraft," on Company page 20-7D made absolute sense. The text from the Port of Seattle's Schedule of Rules and Regulations N0.5 A. 1.d that says, "No aircraft shall be taxied between a gate, building, another aircraft, or pushed back across a roadway or a taxi lane except under the guidance of a ground marshal with sufficient wing walkers to ensure safe clearance with other aircraft vehicles or equipment and shall maintain visual contact with push-back operator and wing-walkers," seemed like the best solution. I complied with those written directions and did not believe it was safe to move the aircraft without a ground crew.

I had no indication that my tail was an obstruction or that I was not stopped and parked in a safe position. I had no view of an aircraft encroaching from behind. I had no reason to believe a taxiing aircraft would not see my aircraft or for that matter, be unable to stop safely. We were then struck from behind by a taxiing aircraft, while parked, with the parking brake set awaiting further instructions to safely move the aircraft to deice. I never saw the aircraft that collided with us, it was outside my field of view.

After the collision, I was shocked. I wasn't certain what had happened. It could have been anything: an external explosion as we were adjacent maintenance facilities, a tire explosion, a catastrophic engine failure, anything. The First Officer said we had been in a collision. My recollection is poor regarding sequencing and time in the subsequent events. I remember looking carefully to see that both engines were operating normally and that we had no warnings or cautions.

I remember looking at the doors annunciator. I remember looking carefully outside only to notice that we had moved to the right a few feet. I remember thinking the radio was silent and I expected a cacophony of sound. I remember thinking that despite everything appearing normal, something was wrong.

I believe we called the Flight Attendants next to confirm that everyone was OK. I believe I made a PA and said that I thought the aircraft had been in a collision with another aircraft and to remain seated with seatbelts fastened. I am confident that I made a number of public announcements like this to convey calm and progress to a solution. I remember telling the First Officer to contact the ramp and tell them we had been hit and we needed emergency equipment to make an assessment. I remember thinking that surely this had already been done by the other aircraft. I remember telling the First Officer to call the Duty Pilot and tell him we may have been in a collision while parked in deice in Seattle.

I remember opening the cockpit door so I could assess the cabin. I talked to the lead flight attendant (Danika) directly to assess her mental state and tell of any cabin needs. At some point I became alarmed at a lack of activity outside of the aircraft and told the First Officer that I would contact ground and request emergency equipment to assess the aircraft. I called ground control and gave them our position and said we needed emergency equipment to assess the damage to the aircraft.

I remember thinking we are all safe inside the aircraft and had no apparent need to evacuate or declare an unknown emergency. The first person I saw outside the aircraft was a maintainer I believe. With no radio contact he was signaling me to cut engines. I pulled open the side window and I asked, why? He said that there was fuel leaking out of the aircraft wing that had struck us and that both planes were stuck together at the tail. I remember making a PA and then going through the shutdown checklist. We did not start the APU out of fire concern and went to emergency lighting.

I remember having conversations outside the aircraft and on the radio with multiple people. An external stair was outside, and I had the attendants disarm the doors. The front 1 L door was opened and after collaboration we began to deplane. I remember leaving the aircraft to maintenance and I was in a state of shock or disbelief

I acknowledge release of this statement to the [Delta's Flight Safety and the National Transportation Safety Board](#).

Regards,

Captain S. Joyce
Employee # [REDACTED]
(Signature on file)



Internal Memorandum

Date: 2/07/2025

To: Captain Brian J. Cink, Director & Chief Pilot - SLC CPO
From: First Officer Fabio Da Silva
Subject: II25-043 Aircraft Damage
DL1921 2/5/2025 SEA-PVR 3737 N3737CB-737-832
CAP: JOYCE, S.S. **FO:** DA SILVA, F.A.

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I was First Officer of Delta Air Lines Flight DL1921 2/5/2025 SEA-PVR.

We pushed back from gate A11, taxied to spot 88, turned left on taxiway W to hold short spot 99 and contact deice. We were number two for the south deice pad behind an A220. We were sequenced into the deice pad behind the A220. Captain stopped the aircraft and set the parking brake abeam the IW line since the A220 was waiting for a spot to deice just ahead of us. A few moments later the A220 got a spot to accomplish aircraft deicing.

While monitoring the deice frequency for further instructions, and scanning around the area, I noticed a heavy Japan Airline aircraft wing appeared to be relatively closer than what I have usually observed to be a safe distance over a decade of airline ground operations and flying, approaching the tail of our parked aircraft. I immediately told the captain we need to move forward because Japan Airlines was getting too close to us. The captain looked ahead and saw deice trucks moving in and out of the safety area so he told me "I'm unable to move forward". Seconds later our aircraft was struck from behind by Japan Airlines aircraft. I told the Captain, Japan Airlines had hit the tail of our aircraft.

Without hesitation I called ramp control and requested for ARFF to come to the deice pad, then we were told on ramp frequency by another aircraft that they did not see any fire. During this time the Captain was checking on the passengers and the Flight Attendants (FAS). Moments later there was no sign of ARFF, so the Captain called ground and requested for ARFF again. While we were waiting on ARFF, airport operations vehicles arrived at the place of occurrence and via hand-signals directed us to shut the engines down. They plugged into the headsets and communicated with the Captain. We decided not to turn on the APU because we weren't sure if we still had one. The Airport OPS connected the GPU cart few minutes later after ARFF arrived and confirmed that there was no fire.

Once we received the reports from the FAS that no one was injured and everyone was safely seated, the Captain instructed me to open the cockpit door and confirm with the FAS that the aircraft doors were disarmed. Maintenance personnel came to the cockpit and told us what had happened and pulled some circuit breakers, checked the hydraulic fluid quantities, then the SEA Chief pilot arrived to check on us with his team. About 3 buses arrived to safely deplane the passengers while we waited in the cockpit with the Seattle chief pilot. After all the passengers had deplaned safely, all crew members were escorted to the terminal for a conference call to explain what had just happened, followed by an alcohol and drug test.

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Regards,

First Officer Fabio Da Silva
Employee # [REDACTED]
(Signature on file)