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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

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ALASKA AIRLINES BOEING 737-9 *

MAX LEFT MID-EXIT DOOR PLUG * Accident No.: DCA24MA063

SEPARATION NEAR PORTLAND, *

OREGON ON JANUARY 5, 2024 *

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Interview of: EDWIN J. CLARK, JR., former Vice President and General
Manager, 737 MAX Production Line Boeing

Boeing
Renton, Washington

Wednesday,
October 2, 2024

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I N T E R V I E W

(9:09 a.m. PT)

DR. WOODS: All right, we are going to get ready. Good morning, the time is 9:09, it is October 2nd, 2024 and we are currently on Pacific time. My name is Dr. Sabrina Woods and I am a human performance investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board. I am one of the lead investigators currently investigating accident investigation number Delta-Charlie-Alpha-2-4-Mike-Alpha-0-6-3 involving Alaska Airlines Flight 1282.

Currently, my co-lead isn't able to be with us, that is Pocholo Cruz, heading up the manufacturing side of this working group that you see at the table. However, we do have other people here at the table that I'm going to have them introduce themselves to you so you can know who it is that you'll be talking to throughout the course of today.

The National Transportation Safety Board is an independent federal agency charged with determining probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation nor are we part of the FAA, we have no regulatory or enforcement powers. At this time, I'm going to have everybody introduce themselves to you, I'm going to start off to my right with one of my coworkers from the NTSB, Nils.

MR. JOHNSON: Hi, Nils Johnson, NTSB, I'm an aviation accident investigator and my specialty is maintenance.

1 MR. PETRUZZELLI: John Petruzzelli, I represent the
2 International Association of Machinists union and when I'm
3 working, I work at North Boeing Field.

4 DR. WOODS: Matt.

5 MR. RIGSBY: Matthew Rigsby with the FAA's Office of Accident
6 Investigation.

7 CAPT ANDERSON: Good morning, Ed. Bjorn Anderson, captain
8 with Alaska Airlines and representing the Air Line Pilots
9 Association.

10 MR. LEVANEN: Good morning, I'm Troy Levanen, I'm the
11 Director of Maintenance and Engineering Safety for Alaska
12 Airlines.

13 MR. MILLER: Good morning, John Miller, Boeing air safety
14 investigation and I'm based out of the Seattle area.

15 DR. WOODS: So with that, that's everybody that's going to be
16 asking questions of you going throughout today. Today we will be
17 using a digital recorder, you see the recorder is here in the
18 room, after the interview we're going to send those recordings out
19 for transcription to an independent company that transcribes and
20 certifies the copy. A copy of the transcript will go forward to
21 be a matter of public record in the docket for this case. Ed,
22 we're here simply for you to share your insight and experiences,
23 having dealt with Boeing's processes in the past and, of course,
24 our ultimate goal is to prevent future accidents and incidents.
25 Each of these group members will have a chance to ask questions,

1 we're going to ask questions one at a time, so each person is
2 going to go one at a time and there will be an opportunity for
3 each person to have follow up after they've asked their first
4 round of questions. Please answer the questions to the best of
5 your recollection, however, if you don't know the answer to a
6 question or if you don't understand, just ask for clarity, we'll
7 try to clarify, we're going to do the same if we don't understand
8 one of the answers.

9 If you don't know, "I don't know" is a perfectly acceptable
10 answer and if at any time you realize you misstated or you want to
11 add on or you want to clarify something, while we will be
12 respectful and go one at a time, you can feel free to bounce back
13 and forth to the person, if you need to. You are always entitled
14 to have one representative of your choosing with you to assist you
15 during this process, I see now it looks like you have counsel with
16 you, I want to confirm that the counsel that's by your side is the
17 one that you have selected.

18 MR. CLARK: Yes.

19 DR. WOODS: Okay, with that, counsel, if you would please,
20 for the record, state your name.

21 MS. HAYNES: Sure. McKenzie Haynes, M-c-K-e-n-z-i-e
22 H-a-y-n-e-s.

23 DR. WOODS: Thank you for that. Just please remember at this
24 time this is just a safety interview, this is not a deposition, so
25 please refrain from answering on behalf of your client or

1 objecting to the interview process. Given that, however, if at
2 any time you would like to take a break, please feel free to do
3 that for any reason, if you want to get some water or just step
4 out or if you would like to talk to counsel, just let us know, we
5 will go off record, you will hear me say that we're going off
6 record and then once you're ready to go, we will resume again. So
7 with that, at this time, do you have any questions?

8 MR. CLARK: No.

9 DR. WOODS: Okay. Anybody else have any questions?

10 MR. JOHNSON: No.

11 INTERVIEW OF EDWIN J. CLARK, JR.

12 BY DR. WOODS:

13 Q. All right, we're going to start with, hopefully, the hardest
14 question you'll be presented today and that is, for the record,
15 would you state and spell -- sorry, state your full name and spell
16 your last name?

17 A. Yeah, Edwin, E-d-w-i-n, middle initial J for John, J-o-h-n,
18 Clark, C-l-a-r-k, Jr.

19 Q. Okay. So with that, Ed, from let's say January of 2023 to
20 February of 2024, could you please state for us what was your
21 title and position at Boeing?

22 A. I was the vice president and general manager of the 737
23 programs.

24 Q. Okay. And with that, who did you have a direct line to?

25 A. Reporting up or --

1 Q. Reporting up.

2 A. I reported to Elizabeth Lund.

3 Q. And what is that position?

4 A. Elizabeth Lund was the senior vice president of airplane
5 programs for The Boeing Company.

6 Q. Okay. And who had a direct line to you, who were your
7 subordinates?

8 A. I had a vice president of manufacturing, Manuel Tiggs; had a
9 vice president of delivery and storage, which was Katherine
10 Ringgold; also had a director responsible for China operations,
11 and his name just went out of my head really quick; also had a
12 director responsible for re-modifications of the airplanes and
13 that was John Annes, because we had a bunch of airplanes in
14 storage that we were remarketing to different airlines out of
15 storage, those were my four direct reports.

16 Q. Okay. Would you please give us, I guess, a high-level
17 overview of what that position, what you were responsible for,
18 what did you do day in and day out?

19 A. Day in and day out, I coordinated and integrated all the
20 functions responsible for executing statement of work to, you
21 know, design, build, certify, test, and deliver 737s.

22 Q. So it was a bit too high, so bring you down a couple thousand
23 feet, what did a given day look like, when you showed up to work,
24 what were the things -- what were the meetings that you had, what
25 were the things that you had to tackle, who were the people that

1 you conferred with?

2 A. So on a daily basis we had a series of tier meetings in the
3 factory, there were four tiers of meetings in the factory, so from
4 the first-line leader all the way up through their senior leaders
5 and eventually the director, which was the Tier 3 meetings. I
6 would attend one of those meetings and, you know, there's dozens
7 of those meetings, so I couldn't attend all of them, I would pick
8 one to attend on one of the various flow days in the factory.

9 And then we had a factory meeting where every function, so
10 engineering, quality, manufacturing, and then all the support
11 organizations that supported them or supply chain logistics, we
12 had several suppliers there, as well, they would report out to
13 myself and the vice president of manufacturing the status of the
14 factory as of that day, so what happened yesterday, what are we
15 doing today, what are the things we need help with, why can or
16 can't we be successful today, and what happened.

17 About a half an hour later I would have a Tier 5 meeting,
18 which was the rollout, fly, delivery, and storage meeting, so I
19 would have the Renton factory in the room, I would have Renton
20 preflight on the phone, I would have Seattle delivery center on
21 the phone and their entire team, and then we would have our
22 storage facilities and that was up to three storage facilities at
23 one time and we've got that down to just Moses Lake, Washington,
24 where aircraft were stored as we were reactivating airplanes out
25 of storage. And we would talk about the plan of the day, the plan

1 of the week, what we had set up in our business plan and what was
2 going to deliver or not because then that rolled up right after
3 that to the customers and gave them a status at the delivery
4 center of what was coming, what the flows were, where the
5 airplanes were showing up. So that was my first three hours of
6 the day, every day, six days a week.

7 Q. What are some of the products that you would look at that
8 were -- that are developed and brought to you at your level?

9 A. Can you clarify products?

10 Q. Sure, were there any sort of reports or metrics or analyses
11 that you use as tools to make your decisions throughout the day?

12 A. Yeah. I mean, the basic metrics in the factory were we had
13 our industrial engineering team, who would essentially lead the
14 meeting because industrial engineering runs all of the operations
15 in the factory shoulder to shoulder with the manufacturing and
16 quality team, and so they would look at what jobs were assigned to
17 what various flow days; were they being accomplished, yes or no;
18 what shortages they had, so it reports on shortages; and then we
19 had reports on quality, reports on defects generated by the
20 mechanics in those stations, and then engineering was there from
21 an engineering liaison standpoint and they would address any of
22 those anomalies and have a takt time or a reporting time, they
23 were solving issues in two-hour blocks. So if there was an issue
24 that came in, two hours later, they would have a solution to keep
25 the factory running.

1 Q. At what level were you involved in providing those solutions
2 for things like shortages or defects? Or were you just receiving
3 the information?

4 A. I'm a receiver of the information, then it was my role to
5 clear any hurdles if there were any issues with particular
6 suppliers or defects, provide resources, whatever they needed, I
7 was there to ensure that there were no roadblocks so everybody had
8 what they needed.

9 Q. Were there any sort of roadblocks in, again, given that year
10 time frame that I established earlier, that seemed recurrent, what
11 was a common theme, if any?

12 A. Common theme coming after the pandemic was part shortages,
13 part shortages and supplier defects.

14 Q. Um-hum. So two different things, let's go to supplier
15 defects, what avenue does an issue like that travel through you
16 and then past you?

17 A. Could you clarify that a little bit, what do you mean when
18 you say travel?

19 Q. So it sounds like you're notified that, through this process
20 that you already established, let's say that there's a supplier
21 defect of some sort, so now it's up to you but it persists, it
22 seems to be a recurring issue, now what happens?

23 A. Yeah, there's two paths, the daily tactical path, what are we
24 going to do that day, what resources do we need again to have what
25 they need, people, paper, tools, process, that means very tactical

1 in the factory, raise up a level, we had a weekly business plan
2 review which I chaired with every function and that happened on
3 Tuesday every week, and all those metrics from the dailies would
4 come in there and we would look at trends, recurring issues, and
5 we would assign action items to the various functions that were
6 responsible for those.

7 Q. At what point do you have to elevate it up beyond you, if
8 beyond your capability?

9 A. So we had a weekly meeting with the CEO and the senior vice
10 presidents, including Ms. Lund, and our supply chain team, and
11 they would see all the metrics every single week and they were
12 meeting with the CEOs of the major suppliers to the company, so it
13 would be immediate escalation and not even escalation, it would be
14 immediate reporting in to those suppliers.

15 Q. Can you give us an overview of, again, during the time frame
16 previously established, of Boeing's QMS process under your
17 purview, under your position?

18 A. Can you -- I don't understand your question.

19 Q. How did the functionaries that fall under you manage QMS?

20 A. So in the QMS, the quality team, essentially the quality
21 director on my program, Earnie Reddic, working with his team, had
22 a series of inspection points throughout the factory, we would
23 look at defects generated by manufacturing across every flow day
24 and then to validate the QMS on a weekly basis, we had a quality
25 leadership review where we would look at defects across the entire

1 factory, including the wings production facility and the P-8
2 operations because we had that under our purview, as well, and we
3 would look at recurring defects in those areas by, what they call
4 in the factory, control code, is it codes where the work is
5 executed throughout the flow days, and then there's installation
6 plans that have the engineering with them to see if they were
7 executing correctly and if they weren't, then corrective action
8 plans were put in place, we would monitor those on a weekly basis
9 to make sure that we were keeping within control limits.

10 Q. How did you know, because you said you were monitoring the
11 corrective action process, how do you know when it's done, it's
12 solved, it worked?

13 A. Well, I think it's not a "one answer" to that, you know, to
14 me, it's a continuous improvement and you're looking at trends on
15 all these, it's not -- you're not looking at one dot and say fix
16 that one dot, you're looking at trends, so we would look at all
17 defects across all control codes to make sure they were coming
18 down. In that time period that you described, we saw double-digit
19 improvements in quality across every control code across the
20 factory as we were hiring new employees, so we were watching that
21 very, very closely.

22 Q. You said double-digit improvement but as compared to what?

23 A. Compared to, you know, previous, where we started out in 2021
24 when we started the factory back up.

25 Q. So who's ultimately responsible for monitoring, like, that

1 time period after startup in its entirety?

2 A. I mean, each function has their own set of responsibilities,
3 so the functions didn't report, they were on the leadership team
4 but they didn't report to me, and those functions, we held them
5 accountable to hit their performance, you know, improvement plans
6 and we really drove, you know -- I'll just go back to -- there's
7 three words that led that factory, that I implemented day one in
8 2021, and that is you have to drive quality, you have to drive
9 stability, and you have to drive flow and you don't get flow
10 without driving quality and stability throughout the factory.

11 So all those metrics were around those three words and that's
12 not anything new, that is from decades of experience of building
13 this airplane of when we were at the very, very high rates, that's
14 the focus that we drove, everything we did, it was around those
15 three words.

16 Q. Who determines what the acceptable and desirable limits are?
17 Were.

18 A. Well, the functions have historical data, right, we've been
19 building this airplane for a number of decades, and you look at
20 the historical data of where you started, where you were in the
21 past, and then what are you doing to drive those down to
22 acceptable and are there controls in place, that's what they do on
23 a daily basis and report that in to the leadership team, like I
24 said, on a weekly basis, it all rolls up.

25 Q. But again, who determines what's acceptable? What is

1 acceptable?

2 A. So, like I said, historical norms or historical averages is
3 what we would look at. Each function would present what was in or
4 out of the control limits, they had established control limits,
5 each function established the control limits and we made sure we
6 were staying, you know, in those control limits and making
7 improvements as we were going through, so they were -- each
8 function was responsible for setting their bands.

9 Certainly, when we had defects that would travel, for
10 example, a defect that would travel all the way to the delivery
11 center, that was totally unacceptable. So one of the things that
12 I put in place almost immediately is to take all those defects out
13 of the delivery center and just keep driving it back to the point
14 of origin, whether it was in the factory or the point of origin
15 was back at the supplier.

16 Q. In the analysis that's done for kind of determining those
17 limits and whether exceeding or if you're on track or maybe even
18 you're doing better than what the established norms are, is it
19 just the end result that's taken into consideration or is it -- or
20 is there anything else that feeds into -- that's taken into
21 consideration? Who looks at, for instance, the manpower, the
22 supplier, the training, the experience?

23 A. Let me break that down a little bit. So when you're looking
24 at, you know, labor, manpower, we were staying ahead, we had a
25 plan to stay always ahead of what we needed in the factory and we

1 started out ahead and we just kept that buffer of head count
2 coming in because we were in a hiring cycle. And then we watched
3 it very closely of the manufacturing function, watched it very
4 closely as when the employees came out of foundational training
5 and then when they went out to the floor with supervised -- what
6 they call 10 touches on the floor, they had to perform 10
7 operations on the floor for the installation plan that they were
8 assigned to in a supervised way before they were allowed to work
9 on their own. That was something that the manufacturing function
10 had put in place day one when we started the program back up.

11 So that's from a labor perspective, and touching on a little
12 bit of training, we watched the training as the employees were
13 coming in to make sure they were -- the foundational training that
14 was determined by the manufacturing function was complete before
15 they got on the floor, so that was something that the
16 manufacturing vice president reported in to the leadership team as
17 far as training. And then could you repeat the -- I think there
18 was a third part of your question and I don't recall.

19 Q. Well, I mean, I was giving examples, I'm just trying to
20 figure out when you go back, when you're tracking one of these,
21 like let's say something is out of limits, something is out of the
22 norms, I'm trying to search backwards, essentially reverse
23 engineer it as to how do you figure out what's making it go out of
24 norms and then I was giving some examples of supplier, could be a
25 training issue, could be a manpower issue.

1 A. I mean, it could be all of the above, but when something's
2 going outside of norms, that would come in on our quality
3 leadership review and you would say, "Hey, we've got defects being
4 generated here that we have not normally seen, why?" and then we
5 would get into a problem solving method where we would assign
6 workplace coaches, we had a whole Lean team, we brought back the
7 Value Stream teams in the factory and a Value Stream team is
8 comprised of every person that touches that operation, so supply
9 chain, engineering, quality, manufacturing, and any other support
10 organizations like ergo and things of that nature, so you make
11 sure you're also not inflicting something that would hurt your
12 people, too.

13 So every one of those, when you had an issue, that said hey,
14 we're having a lot of defects for this particular job, we would
15 look at those and the director, three directors in manufacturing,
16 two in final assembly and one in wings, they would assign a team,
17 which employees were engaged in, and to go problem solve why is
18 this defect being created and then it could be one of many things,
19 it could've been a tooling issue, could've been needed a new tool,
20 could've been "I was getting past a defect from the previous
21 operation," it could be one of many and you would put in
22 corrective actions for those issues around that one defect.

23 Q. We've touched on supplier quality a couple of times now, at
24 what level was your position responsible for interfacing with the
25 supplier when it came to the issues of quality?

1 A. Yeah, so we would have the same quality leadership review and
2 we would invite suppliers in, not all of them at the same time
3 because they never want to be in the same room at the same time,
4 but we would invite the suppliers in. For example, we had issues
5 with a particular component, so we would invite -- if that
6 component was manufactured by Honeywell, let's just say,
7 theoretically, we would invite them in and say we removed X number
8 of these components, they should've shown up fully certified with
9 an 8130, fully tested, and I should bolt it on and it should work
10 first time, it didn't and here are the reasons, they would be
11 responsible to come back to us with a corrective action plan in
12 their factory and then for every piece of inventory we had on site
13 they would also have to correct before we installed it.

14 So we would go through pretty elaborately with each supplier,
15 some were easier than others because it was just a component,
16 Spirit certainly was more challenging than that because it was
17 multiple issues going on with Spirit at the time.

18 Q. Can you give us examples of multiple issues and what they
19 look like?

20 A. So, for Spirit, the first defect that I had to deal with, and
21 two years prior to the time period you spoke about, was a
22 significant amount of skin defects, so defects in the skin where
23 our customers would find them very late in the process because
24 they're very easy to see once the airplane is painted, they're
25 very difficult to see when the airplane has that aqua plastic coat

1 on it, it's called Spraylat, it's a protective coating for the
2 aluminum, but it's very, very dull, so it's hard to see if there
3 are issues, and what there would be is either skin protrusions
4 where the skin would be bulged out or it would be kind of
5 broad-end and you have these dimples, and there's limits on that,
6 that we -- that our engineering team and quality teams set
7 forward, but you can imagine the size of the fuselage and the
8 human eye to go and inspect this, that was a real challenging
9 problem for us to get over because we didn't want that to travel
10 from the point it got painted and now you have a problem, now
11 you're taking the airplane back apart, so in this whole litany of
12 maintenance issues that we didn't want.

13 So we worked to work those back and we worked very, very
14 diligently to get them back as close to the factory and back into
15 Spirit's factory by using a lot of technology, to look at the
16 skins with all kinds of scans and high-speed cameras because you
17 had to give the naked eye more than that to understand it, and
18 then we put quality projects back in place back at Spirit with the
19 Boeing inspectors that are on site in Spirit to look for certain
20 areas and look for certain conditions, so it didn't even make it
21 to the factory and that was the largest thing that we were trying
22 to overcome. We had very few, a handful of defects out at the
23 delivery center and some of them would be subjective, a customer
24 "I don't like this," it may have been within limits, but we want
25 to make it absolutely perfect for the customer to fly away, so we

1 would, you know, work on those areas and then we had a team of
2 people that could -- to work the structure and get it back to
3 where the customer desired, but that would certainly cause
4 challenges with getting the airplane delivered on time or to the
5 expectations. But we were very successful, I thought, getting it
6 down to a handful, I'd say, you know, count them on one hand,
7 number of defects that we had outside of Renton preflight and then
8 Renton preflight, we were down in the -- you know, low dozens and
9 then we were trying to stop the defects prior to joining the wings
10 on the airplane, that was our goal, is if any of them impacted
11 joining wings, we would stop the factory.

12 So we had to make sure that everything around that wing body
13 joint area was clean, most of the defects were on the front 41
14 section and 48 section where there was compounding curves, more
15 difficult to build areas.

16 Q. About what flow day is wings on?

17 A. Flow Day 4.

18 Q. Okay. So essentially, you're trying to trap it in Flow Days
19 1 through 3.

20 A. Yeah. And I even added -- I added a day of flow in the
21 factory, so I added a Flow Day 0 so the fuselage would get loaded
22 until we would spend one whole day inspecting and correcting, if
23 we could, and we also added a day of inspection when the fuselage
24 was on the transporter -- it's called tricycle, but it was a
25 transporter that held the fuselage from the rail car into the

1 factory, that's when we would have our research and technology
2 engineering team come in with some new methods to try and see
3 these things that we couldn't see with the naked eye so we could
4 stop them. So we were on, you know, a real journey to make that
5 happen.

6 Q. So for this skin issue, is -- this is an example of when, in
7 your corrective action plan, that you would've pulled the supplier
8 and then had those conversations --

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. -- once it was identified that it was a supplier-fed issue?

11 A. Correct. And that was also fed to the CEOs on a weekly
12 basis.

13 Q. That's a great example of, I guess, kind of a reactive --
14 were there any processes in place for being more proactive in
15 identifying what the next thing, big thing, is going to be that
16 we're going to have to deal with?

17 A. Yes. So it's like I stated, those three words that every
18 time we spoke to the team, every time we worked programs and
19 projects, it was around quality, stability, and flow. And our
20 industrial engineering team, along with our manufacturing quality
21 team and our engineering team, we developed or reinstituted, I
22 would say, Value Stream teams where you engage the people and the
23 people are engaged in these projects to improve their work areas.
24 And we knew where the areas of either high defect or extremely
25 high flow, meaning the jobs were taking way longer than they

1 historically had taken, we accomplished these jobs thousands of
2 times, so if something is taking historically longer, you got to
3 figure out why, and it would be either there were quality issues
4 coming in to them and they didn't have the right parts or tooling
5 or the paperwork, so you would look at that from a proactive
6 perspective because that's the only way, by solving those two
7 first words, that's the only way you can get flow out of the
8 factory either in hours or days.

9 Q. At what point, if at all, did your position, during that
10 time, interface with Boeing's safety management system?

11 A. So the safety management system, I couldn't remember the
12 date, but it was early on the program where it was just starting
13 to get going, it was in the very infancy of evolution into how we
14 would execute it in the programs. I had been involved in past
15 roles and responsibilities and jobs outside of the Boeing Company
16 heavily with safety management systems, especially EASA.

17 (Noise interference.)

18 MR. CLARK: And so we were trying to figure out how this
19 operates, how does it -- because it's -- it doesn't replace the
20 QMS, it doesn't replace the engineering, it's another program to
21 put on another layer of assuredness, if you want to call it, or
22 an umbrella over those things so that you can have a true safety
23 management system. And I was the co-chair of our safety review
24 board with our chief project engineer, Rich Ptacin, and we would
25 look at all of the Speak Up items that were raised on a weekly

1 basis by our employees and if a Speak Up item was raised within
2 the shift or certainly within 24 hours, one of my executives was
3 speaking to that employee and we instituted that immediately for
4 immediate interaction with our employees. And then we would look
5 at those same trends for Speak Up items that we were receiving and
6 match them with our improvement plans to see if there was
7 something that we couldn't see, which is something else we can
8 learn to see in the production system that we couldn't see,
9 because somebody else was opening our eyes to something that
10 wasn't in the metrics.

11 And then the last piece of that is on a weekly basis we
12 review all programs, reported out to the CEO, Stan Deal at the
13 time, our corrective action for any of those items raised by our
14 employees in the Speak Up system, you know, what immediate
15 containment to be put in place, you know, we spoke to the
16 employee, we had a feedback loop with the employee and then what
17 was the long-term plan to put a corrective action in place because
18 a corrective action on one program may undo something on another
19 program, so you had to make sure there were no interactions and
20 the functions were responsible for that.

21 BY DR. WOODS:

22 Q. One of the foundations of SMS is safety assurance. How would
23 you say, during your time, how were hazards properly identified
24 within the factory floor?

25 A. So prior to going -- I don't recall which rate break it was,

1 I believe it was 26, but it was either 26 or 31 a month, I asked
2 the safety management team to perform a safety risk management
3 review and that was, you know, some of my interactions, I
4 interacted with the senior leaders for the top 10 airlines in the
5 world on a weekly basis and just garnering their insights of how
6 they were using safety management systems.

7 And I asked the SMS team, the SMS core team, to put together
8 a process to do an SRM on the rate because what I was trying to
9 ensure is that is there something that we can't see in our current
10 operations and how do we engage the people in every one of those
11 functions, not just their leaders, like down to the lead level and
12 so forth, so when we went up in rate, was there something that
13 could have introduced a hazard.

14 And we did that successfully, we did it shoulder to shoulder
15 with the FAA, it was the first time in the company's history that
16 we had shared excruciating details around our rate plans and the
17 customer demand, those are usually very coveted, we brought the
18 FAA and all of our FAA inspectors out of the certificate
19 management office involved into that process so they could see
20 exactly what we're doing transparently. And then I had just like
21 a first flight review, which was -- it's really great practice at
22 The Boeing Company, you bring every function in with all their
23 peers and they basically say they're either ready for rate or not
24 and if they're not, what help do they need, and you'd stop and
25 everybody would help them fix that, it was a known process, and I

1 think one of the greatest processes that Boeing had to make sure
2 the airplanes were safe before they flew for the first time, we
3 put that same process in place. And then we were to report that
4 up to my leader, Elizabeth Lund, and her and her entire leadership
5 team, including all the rest of the program leaders, would view
6 what we had done as far as work product and then they had
7 instituted it on their programs, as well, and we did SRMs, and we
8 got better and better at it and brought more tools to the table to
9 ensure you're asking why, why, why, giving them five "why's" at
10 least into every one of the areas of the program.

11 Q. In the last, well, I guess, let's see, four years since
12 startup, how has that rate changed?

13 A. Production rate?

14 Q. Um-hum. How has it fluctuated, if at all?

15 A. So when we started, we were certainly at zero, we were
16 producing no airplanes out of the factory and we had a significant
17 amount of airplanes in storage, over 455 airplanes in storage, so
18 we had three full, if you want to call it MRO-type operations, one
19 in California, one in San Antonio, and one in Moses Lake, and
20 they're responsible for storing those airplanes per all the
21 guidelines and then waking them back up and then running them
22 through the same exact testing that we would run a brand new
23 airplane through. The other nuance is that if there was anything
24 in the QMS found as part of the production certificate, say if I
25 found a scratch on a piece of material and it created a

nonconformance,

1 that nonconformance had to be looked at on that airplane that was
2 in storage. So you had about eight to ten thousand hours' worth
3 of work on every one of those airplanes to pull them out of
4 storage. So it was about 90 to a hundred and 20 days on every one
5 of those storage airplanes. I share that as it's important
6 because rate versus delivery is two different things, it's
7 something that we don't share publicly because it's all about
8 deliveries, because that's what's tied to the financials, rate, we
9 talk about rate but we don't tell you exactly how many airplanes
10 come out of the factory. But from a rate perspective during that
11 same time, you were delivering a significant number of airplanes,
12 but they were coming out of storage.

13 At the same time you were bringing the factory up and the
14 wings factory, which is even more challenging because that has a
15 much longer supply chain, the wings are a hundred percent built by
16 The Boeing Company in Renton, and bringing that supply chain up to
17 speed, and the wings are always ahead of final assembly because
18 their flows are longer, so we started, you know, at rate, about
19 rate three, three a month, on one line in final assembly. We
20 brought up a second line because COVID, at that time, when I took
21 over in '21, we were full-blown in COVID and masking and all the
22 social distancing, if one person had a positive on that crew, it
23 took out the whole crew and I stopped the factory. So we had to
24 quickly, at that second lineup and up and running, and we did have
25 all the head count on board, one of the things the company had

1 done during the pandemic is we went down to about 21 airplanes a
2 month production for head count, so we had all the people there to
3 build up to 21 airplanes per month in the factory. So we were
4 trying to build into that, so we went up to three and I don't
5 remember all the steps in between, in the teens, you know, double
6 digits, for quite a while you would hold, make sure you could
7 produce at those rates and you would look at the total flow from
8 fuselage load to rollout and then put those quality improvement
9 plans in place to get that flow down to be acceptable.

10 And then utilizing that, you would use all the business
11 systems, create a total bottoms-up effort to give the customers
12 the visibility to say it's taking me about this many airplanes to
13 build it, it's taken me about this many days to test it and fly
14 it, and it's taken me about this many days to deliver it, and all
15 those had quality improvement plans to get those to a repeatable
16 -- because you couldn't just start building more airplanes because
17 you run out of places to park them pretty quick, I had a lake in
18 front of me that I couldn't overcome. So you just had to know
19 what you could put out and what you were consuming in those other
20 stations and watch that very, very closely, that was, you know,
21 Day 6 and Day 7 and the office is looking at that for the next
22 week to figure out what we could build.

23 Q. So during all that process, as you were slowly cleaning out
24 and ramping up at the same time, is that where the SRM -- was
25 there an SRM taking place during those, as well?

1 A. The SRM, like I said, you know, the whole SMS program was in
2 a very juvenile state, it was very, very early and, you know, the
3 biggest thing that the company had made direction on, and I
4 certainly had input on it, was first you get the Speak Up system
5 running; secondly, was to train the people on it and there was a
6 litany of training modules that went out to all employees that we
7 required to have everybody take, and then our -- the 3-7
8 leadership team, I'd say it was rate 26, I can't remember if it
9 was 26 or 31 because those rates, historically, when you start
10 getting to 26 and 31 a month, the factory's moving along at a
11 pretty good pace.

12 And I led engineering, back in 2009 to 2014, I led a large
13 section of the 3-7 engineering team, where we went from 28 to 47 a
14 month, so I knew what good looked like, I knew how we did it the
15 first time, I was one of the few people that were on the team that
16 had been there to do that, so I knew what good looked like and I
17 had brought in senior leaders that had been retired for, you know,
18 decades to come in and look at our plans to see we weren't -- you
19 know, missing anything. I had third parties in there, too, like
20 consultants like McKinsey and such, looking, as well, to make sure
21 I can put all this together and have a solid plan to execute.

22 Q. I want to touch on something you just said about what good
23 looks like, what does good look like?

24 A. Oh, in 2013, 2014 we were producing 42 airplanes a month on
25 two lines and that's a 10-day flow through the factory, you know,

1 as far as what the quality is required, what parts are showing up,
2 you know, you had part shortages, less than 10 part shortages in
3 the factory and you could produce airplanes out of the factory
4 every day, you were rolling two airplanes out of that factory
5 every single day. And so knowing that that pace is -- you're
6 capable of that pace, now you had to figure out if the team you
7 have right now and the supply chain and the entire Value Stream,
8 is that capable of getting back to that.

9 Q. So good equates to product?

10 A. No, good equates to like I told you before, the right
11 quality, the right stability, and the right flow to be able to
12 produce 42 airplanes a month and you have to go after those tenets
13 to get a production system to run like it once ran back in 2013,
14 2014.

15 Q. As the receiver of the information that's coming up, that's
16 being stacked up to you from your functions, how confident are you
17 in the data that you're receiving? That you were receiving,
18 sorry.

19 A. You know, first, I would say, from a confidence perspective,
20 we had a great team, there was nobody that had any -- anything but
21 doing the right thing always on their mind, nobody had any
22 ulterior motives to play with data. We saw the data that would
23 come directly out of the systems, we certainly had a business team
24 that would put it into a dashboard so it could be consumed because
25 you had so many different systems, so it was put into a system and

1 then the validation of that, like I said, I had, you know, some
2 very senior advisors come in looking at this data and then I did
3 have a third party, I had a consulting group that would -- that
4 had direct access to the data and they could run their analytics
5 to the data and it was a one-for-one match. Now, I didn't go and
6 validate every one and zero that came out every system but there
7 was enough evidence and enough people looking at it that there was
8 -- you were seeing the data coming out of the systems.

9 Q. Could you please, for us, define what traveled work is and
10 how that fluctuated over that 2023 time frame?

11 A. Yeah, in the 2023 time frame we had significantly reduced
12 traveled work from the time, like I said, Flow Day 1, from when
13 the fuselage came in until rollout in about -- the 10 days to
14 rollout. What we were seeing was about -- total time was about 26
15 days to build the airplane throughout the factory before we handed
16 it off to preflight over in Renton.

17 And we had many things that caused traveled work, you know,
18 pandemic effect from parts shortages out of China, for example,
19 were plaguing us and we had to stand up suppliers and the supply
20 bases to build electrical wiring. There was some electrical that
21 we would -- we decided to flow out and then park those airplanes
22 outside the factory where we had about 200 mechanics that we had
23 brought from the entire enterprise that were -- had all their
24 qualifications and certifications to be on that ramp and work
25 those airplanes and they would finish the airplanes outside the

1 factory. The traveled work, from a standpoint it was work that we
2 didn't travel, an example, we'd put constraints in the factory, if
3 anything impacted wings being joined in Flow Day 4, there was no
4 work that traveled beyond Flow Day 3, they had wings so we would
5 stop the factory. In 2023, if I had to pick a number, it would be
6 a number between 50 and 60 times we stopped or paused the factory
7 and paused the lines because we had a defect that came to us that
8 hit one of those constraints.

9 The next constraint was if we couldn't put power on the
10 airplane, either electric or hydraulic, we stopped. And we
11 stopped until that was solved. Because you couldn't do the rest
12 of the operations in front of you because they were all functional
13 tests, so you would stop. The other one was floors, that was a
14 particularly troubling one because the floorboards come in with
15 holes predrilled in them and then there's holes drilled by Spirit
16 and they've got to line up and if they don't line up, big problem,
17 I can't build the cabin, and so you got to stop there.

18 And then the last one was really about interiors. We had a
19 significant amount of supply chain issues from our interior
20 suppliers, galleys, lavatory seats, and we would have to make a
21 choice, do we build the airplane without seats, for an example,
22 because there's a significant amount of shortages of that around,
23 also, the in-flight entertainment systems were problematic. So we
24 would make the decision to travel that package of work, industrial
25 engineering would say okay, here's these number of installation

1 plans that install that work, they would package that, we would
2 run the airplane through production as long as we could hit the
3 critical milestones, and the last critical milestone was flight
4 controls. If the flight controls couldn't be fully tested because
5 of a litany of reasons, the airplane would be brought back into
6 the production line, we had a third production line, we would
7 bring airplanes back in and the airplanes would be tested inside
8 the factory, and then no airplanes rolled outside the factory
9 without engines, so we would stop if we did not have an engine in
10 Flow Day 8 and 9, where we installed engines.

11 So that's how traveled work was controlled and on that weekly
12 basis in that meeting, we watched every flow day for the work
13 packages that were being traveled and engineering quality and
14 manufacturing would sign up to we can travel it or not travel it,
15 we have people to execute that work in another workstation or we
16 have enough people that we can move people from a flow day to a
17 different flow day to accomplish that work package.

18 Q. Who is responsible for saying stop?

19 A. So my leaders had gates or limits for when they would -- you
20 would say stop. I monitor that, my whole leadership team
21 monitored that on a daily basis, so it was very visible of what
22 work was traveling and, you know, we would all look at it and say
23 hey, you're not traveling that work, we're going to stop and not
24 travel that job, especially when the defect couldn't be contained
25 in that area or you couldn't roll the airplane, for an example,

1 outside of Renton and preflight, we took that down to a certain
2 number of jobs and they would not hand off the airplane until they
3 got down to that certain number of jobs.

4 Q. So to be clear, though, that the answer -- the person calling
5 stop is below you?

6 A. I would say it was the team, the whole team, I was involved
7 in it, the whole leadership team would look at that and say yeah,
8 we got to stop. But the constraints were put in clearly by trying
9 to run the factory and they were not able to go past those
10 constraints.

11 Q. How was that being communicated to the touch labor?

12 A. I mean, I would assume, it would be an assumption on my part,
13 I mean, we had directors on two halves of the factory and they had
14 factory generals that were working with industrial engineering and
15 I don't know the communication methods for that.

16 Q. Do you have any idea what the perception would be if a stop
17 were to occur amongst the factory floor?

18 A. Depends on the duration. You know, we had to stop the
19 factory significantly for some major defects that came to us where
20 we had to do some major structural rework. In that case, people
21 would see it because their jobs would get completed and then they
22 had no work, so we would get into alternate work, what alternate
23 work could they accomplish, most of the time they would be
24 assigned, you know, our training modules, go and do, you know,
25 future training modules that they were assigned to, to stay up on

1 their qualifications and certs, so it would be really clear
2 because fuselage would stay in position for way longer than it was
3 necessary.

4 Q. Was there any pressure or perceived pressure to get it done,
5 what's going on here, why is this being delayed, that's what I
6 mean by asking about communication is, how is it communicated down
7 the chain to the touch labor?

8 A. If you had a certain amount of jobs assigned for that day for
9 that team and, you know, the team had certain published times to
10 complete those jobs and if they were completed, you know, that's
11 when the supervisors were engaged and said, you know, I had to do
12 50 jobs today and I only got 25 done, "why not."

13 Of course there's going to be, you know, peer pressure at
14 that point to why didn't you get the 50 jobs done, we always do
15 those 50 jobs, what's preventing you from doing that work, is it
16 -- you know, it goes back to is it parts, is it people, is it
17 tooling, is it process, those are the questions that we've asked
18 every day in that Tier 4 meeting of you're assigned 50 jobs,
19 you're always able to do these 50 jobs, "why not," and then we'll
20 figure out how to problem solve on those issues. But to your
21 question about the communication, you know, unless I was in that
22 flow day, standing in that flow day, there was a standup in that
23 flow day every day and that's where it should've been communicated
24 at the start of the shift every single day, but certainly, I could
25 not have been at every meeting every day.

1 Q. Are those conversations that were had at your level, are
2 those where the information was brought up to you?

3 A. Yeah, we talked those metrics every single day. If I wasn't
4 there, it was one of my delegates.

5 Q. Metrics are a little bit different from perceptions, though.

6 A. But the metrics show what had happened and then the
7 conversations would be just like we're having a calm conversation
8 right now, "Why wasn't it done, what help do you need?" The first
9 thing always was, "What help do you need?"

10 Q. So you told me the break points for stopping for the big
11 issues like wings on, engines on, that sort of thing. What about
12 the smaller traveled work that doesn't necessarily detract from
13 other major jobs getting done and is afforded the opportunity to
14 travel from Flow Day 1 to 8, for instance, or to even rollout?

15 A. Um-hum.

16 Q. Because in this specific case, bringing it back to this
17 incident, that seems like it was something that occurred. Smaller
18 issue, got some rivets to deal with, now that work is traveling,
19 traveling, and then the aircraft is -- or the frame, sorry, the
20 fuselage is stalling out for a matter of time and that information
21 is being communicated, how should that process be managed?

22 A. Well, the way the process was managed is if there's a defect,
23 a documented defect, the industrial engineering team would look at
24 all the jobs that that affected and just travel that work package
25 throughout. Because again, whether the package is completed in

1 the flow days it's assigned to, that's the most optimal place or
2 someplace else, it's still the certified engineering that gets
3 executed on. So every day industrial engineering would work to
4 move those packages accordingly and place them in areas and then
5 make sure they had people, again, process and tooling to execute
6 it in the new location that they were assigning them to.

7 Q. Just one last set of questions, I know you've been talking to
8 me for about an hour, so I'm going to pass it on. Going back to
9 that time from startup, so like the 2021 time frame up until,
10 let's say, January of this year, 2024, how -- in your position and
11 in your experience, how has the demographics of the touch labor
12 changed? And by demographics, I mean skill level, experience,
13 previous experience in the industry outside of Boeing, that sort
14 of thing.

15 A. I mean, it changed significantly. Like I said, we had all of
16 our staff for roughly -- to execute 21 per month when we started.
17 So through the pandemic, The Boeing Company retained that head
18 count for people that, you know, didn't retire, didn't take other
19 things, and that was quite significant to have that amount of
20 touch labor, to start with. And as we went up in -- went up in
21 rate, you know, the demographic of people coming on board who we
22 were able to attract and run through foundational training was
23 significantly lower, you weren't getting, you know, significant
24 experience, it was being drawn by their industries and things of
25 that nature. So that's what we relied on, on the foundational

1 training that they were receiving, to bring them on board and then
2 that tactic around the 10 touches and like I said, we watched all
3 defects generated in the factory by every employee and watched
4 that they were continuing to come down, not spike up or go up in
5 any one of the areas of the factory.

6 Q. So given that, what you just said and kind of the monitoring,
7 I still find that reactive. So for a proactive point back to a
8 safety management system, back to a safety risk assessment or
9 safety risk management, back to change management, was any of that
10 done given this is this new work force you're having, this is what
11 you have now to work with and this is the production rate that you
12 want to maintain, did anything occur, to your knowledge, to
13 determine what hazards might be introduced or what other
14 additional training or whatever you needed to help mitigate the
15 potential?

16 A. Like I stated earlier, we -- if you go all the way back
17 outside of the time period you're talking about, the program was
18 in its infancy. If you went to January of '23, up until that
19 point my team had put in place those two SRMs and manufacturing as
20 a function, quality as a function, engineering as a function, went
21 back to their home organizations, which included all the rest of
22 the programs, and went through their safety risk management on a
23 proactive basis before we went to those rates. That was the first
24 time we had ever done that in our company's history, to look at it
25 from a safety risk management perspective and from that, I don't

1 recall, I can't recall sitting here, what activities and actions
2 were taken or what they looked at, but it was quite exhaustive --
3 it was something totally new for us to try and figure out how do
4 you avoid hazards, that was our whole goal there was how to avoid
5 hazards and going up in rate and production.

6 DR. WOODS: Okay. With that, I'll shut up for now. I'm
7 going to hand it out to my right here to Nils.

8 MS. HAYNES: Do you think we can take --

9 MR. CLARK: Yeah.

10 DR. WOODS: Absolutely.

11 MR. JOHNSON: I was just going to ask --

12 (Crosstalk)

13 DR. WOODS: Good call, good call, thank you for that. We are
14 going to go off record at 10:08 Pacific time.

15 (Off the record at 10:08 a.m. PT)

16 (On the record at 10:21 a.m. PT)

17 DR. WOODS: Okay, we are back on the record at 10:21 Pacific
18 time.

19 Nils.

20 MR. CLARK: So before we start, so when you said, you know,
21 to clarify things, I'd like to clarify a point --

22 DR. WOODS: Sure.

23 MR. CLARK: -- that you were just making on proactive
24 measures.

25 DR. WOODS: Okay.

1 MR. CLARK: You know, one thing I brought up is, and I didn't
2 want to glaze over it, it was around Value Stream teams, you know,
3 so when we first took the program over, Value Stream teams were a
4 big part of what made the program very cohesive and what a Value
5 Stream team is, is you have a cross-functional team in a specific
6 area, so I'll pick on one, electrical. Most of the electrical on
7 the airplane is installed in the first three days, that's when the
8 bulk of the electrical work is done.

9 And, you know, due to the -- you know, incoming folks with
10 lower skill, we put together a Value Stream team and I instituted
11 and supported that where we had essentially workplace coaches
12 which are like maintenance training instructors, we had people
13 that were experts in electrical out of the electrical engineering
14 department and out of the various functions.

15 And so what they would do is they would work with that team
16 on a daily basis, so "hey, yesterday you did this work and you
17 passed this defect down," that immediate feedback loop would come
18 in to the team and in their tier meeting, so that the first-line
19 leader, they would see that data and then work with that
20 electrical corrective action team to keep putting proactive
21 methods like well, where else on the airplane could you have a
22 terminal block issue, where else could you have a connector
23 misconnected. And so they would go across the entire -- and they
24 think about how much wiring is in the airplane, they would go
25 across that entire airplane and then put together plans and say

1 oh, engineering, we need this installation plan revised because we
2 got to clarify this or clarify that. So we did that based on
3 looking at the entire program, how it was running, and saying
4 where's the highest number of defects and then how do we get ahead
5 of those, so we built these -- and I directed this back because
6 this was just a secret sauce to the program that was lost from
7 years past and it's all about employee engagement, right, the
8 people, on their own, have to recognize there's a defect and they
9 also have to recognize that they can correct that defect and get
10 help.

11 And also, we had line-side training centers that we had
12 started putting in place on those, so like this is the way the
13 wire needs to be routed and they could practice off line because
14 some of the jobs are very difficult ergonomically in tight areas.
15 So I didn't want to go past that, we also had that in the wings
16 team, the wings team was very mature, it was down to the senior
17 manager level, leading their Value Stream teams on the various
18 stations within wings, again, looking for trends of defects in the
19 quality management system and then figure out what corrective
20 methods, if I could drill a hole wrong here using this tool or
21 this particular drill, I could drill a hole wrong here, as well.
22 So that was a big part of the proactive-ness that got put in, you
23 know, year one, you know, three years ago, and we were building
24 that up because you can't just flip a switch and turn that on, you
25 have to build that into the culture and then get people on board

1 and on-board them to that process.

2 And we had many, what we called Leanfests, that we would
3 bring the teams together and we'd give the people on the program
4 an opportunity to come to Leanfests and see well, what were they
5 doing with tank closure, what were they doing with pressure
6 seal installation and it would be an incubator, saying wow, that
7 tool, I could use that over here and if I use that, I could get
8 better and we'd have hundreds of people show up and do these very,
9 very proactive immersive learning experiences so we could drive it
10 across, and was one of my stated goals to the team is bringing back
11 Lean into the program and reinstituting that because that's what
12 really got the people involved. So I just wanted to make sure that
13 I give you a little bit more explanation of what that was around a
14 proactive standpoint.

15 BY DR. WOODS:

16 Q. Did those Value Stream teams exist prior to the shutdown for
17 the pandemic or that was more -- that was just something that
18 was --

19 A. I don't --

20 Q. -- after the fact?

21 A. I don't know.

22 Q. Oh, okay.

23 A. I don't know. I can only go back and tell you what it looked
24 like when I left for services in 2013-2014.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. I worked in a different division of the company. I don't
2 know what transpired. I know what I picked up and what I picked
3 up, it was very centralized into a particular function, so like a
4 control center, if you want to call it, and then they would work
5 on -- go out and work projects, so like the people weren't
6 engaged, they were looking at data and saying oh, yeah, we'll work
7 here. You had to get it down into the teams and decentralize it
8 out to the actual factory floor.

9 DR. WOODS: All right. Thank you for the clarification.

10 MR. CLARK: Yeah.

11 DR. WOODS: Nils?

12 MR. JOHNSON: For real this time?

13 DR. WOODS: I would hope.

14 BY MR. JOHNSON:

15 Q. Sorry. Thank you for spending the time with us. When did
16 you start at Boeing?

17 A. I started with Boeing in August of 2006.

18 Q. Okay. And you had mentioned 2009, 2014, I was just kind of
19 curious when --

20 A. Two thousand six is when I started. I started as the chief
21 mechanic for airplane development.

22 Q. Okay. When did you depart Boeing?

23 A. February of this year.

24 Q. Okay. What other positions have you held at Boeing? You've
25 talked about the VP position and you've also -- the GM and you've

1 also talked about the chief mechanic, what other positions have
2 you held?

3 A. I came on board in 2006 after 10 years at Southwest Airlines
4 in the maintenance and engineering staff where I was an
5 engineering leader at Southwest Airlines. I came on board as the
6 chief mechanic for new airplane product development where, at that
7 juncture, the 787 was starting to evolve and the company was going
8 to build a brand new narrow body and I came on board to be the
9 chief mechanic for that program; the program never happened for a
10 myriad of reasons and that's -- there's a lot of books that will
11 be written around that, not for me.

12 After being a chief mechanic on the new airplanes, I went
13 back to the 737 as the chief mechanic of the 737 NG, so working
14 closely with the customers, the fleet chief, the factory, delivery
15 operations, and Renton field, I was the voice of the mechanic, had
16 been a former A&P mechanic and a degree engineer, as well, just
17 being able to put all that together with our liaison team.

18 After doing that for a period of time, I was promoted to the
19 director and chief engineer of airplane systems. So quick
20 explanation, I didn't have the structure, I didn't have
21 propulsion, I didn't have the interiors, I had everything else, so
22 flight deck, flight controls, mechanicals, everything around the
23 entire plane except for the exclusions I gave you. So a pretty
24 big job, 550 people, 24/7 job, or 24/5, we worked five days
25 planned across the program, so everything from inception through

1 design, tooling, manufacturing, engineering, and then execution of
2 the statement of work into installation plans and then all the
3 manufacturing, engineering, and industrial engineering and deliver
4 that to the factory floor and build a jet. So I was responsible
5 for that for a number of years. Then I moved over to the airplane
6 integration office, which airplane integration is where all of the
7 functions now, somebody has to pull all that together to make sure
8 all the interfaces and the wiring and everything connects in the
9 interiors.

10 So I had safety certification and performance for engineering
11 for the 737 NG for a number of years where I was also involved
12 with all of the activities to be able to introduce the number of
13 customers we needed to introduce over the time frame to go to 42
14 airplanes a month and go through all of our engineering execution
15 plans, including -- and that was a lot around certification, there
16 was a lot around our, at that point, ODA at that point and all the
17 AR staffing.

18 And I also had a factory liaison, engineering from the
19 delivery center, Renton preflight, P-8, wings and final assembly.
20 I had all that liaison team reporting to me, as well. After that,
21 I was -- for about a year I was acting vice president of
22 engineering for the 737 program due to a retirement, a natural
23 retirement. I believe our leader had done 30-plus years with the
24 company and decided to retire, I was in that role for a little
25 less than a year and then I was asked to move over to the services

1 side, at that time it was commercial aviation services. Then
2 there was a program that The Boeing Company had on the 787 called
3 GoldCare where Boeing was doing all of the integrated maintenance
4 and engineering and daily execution of operations for 787s
5 operated by Norwegian Airlines and Singapore Airlines. I went
6 over as director of engineering and got that functioning and led
7 that program, including -- and that was air operating certificates
8 in Ireland, England, Norway, Singapore, and Sweden, so five air
9 operating certificates including five different SMS's that I was
10 the accountable manager for in those countries.

11 At the same time we put together a joint venture with
12 Singapore Airlines in Singapore performing the same function,
13 using the same four airlines' maintenance and engineering
14 organization. Shortly after that I became the vice president of
15 that program, so vice president of essentially Fleet Care, it was
16 called then. We had brought on the 737 MAX at Norwegian Airlines,
17 introduced the 737 MAX at Norwegian under a fully integrated
18 Boeing-led Fleet Care operation. Essentially all Norwegian
19 Airlines did was fuel, catering, pilots and flight attendants, we
20 did everything else. They had their own dispatch team, but we had
21 our own fully operated integrated maintenance operations center
22 outside of London, England and I had a fully integrated operations
23 center in Singapore at the airport there.

24 Q. So you were running maintenance control for them?

25 A. Yes. We had our own maintenance control. And it was fully

1 audited and met all of the EASA requirements for Part M, we had a
2 fully delegated Part M authority there and we had a fully
3 delegated Part M in Singapore and the Singapore regulations,
4 little different hybrid FAA Part M, it chose pieces of it. So I
5 ran those two operations for a number of years. Shortly
6 thereafter, I moved over to the vice president of all commercial
7 programs, so when I went over to all commercial programs, I not
8 only had the integrated fleet operations, I had freighter
9 conversions for 767 and 737 freighters, I was the program leader
10 for the 737 Boeing converted freighter.

11 We ran that full certification program, fully certified the
12 airplane, got FAA cert followed by every other regulatory cert
13 that we needed to fly, about seven regulatory bodies that we ran
14 it to and got the airplane fully certified and then stood up MRO
15 operations and five different MRO operations in three different
16 countries and at the time of my departure from that operation, we
17 had built 50 Boeing converted freighters and today there are over
18 250 Boeing converted freighters built in that operation.

19 Q. STC or --

20 A. No, it's --

21 Q. -- was it TC?

22 A. It's a TC.

23 Q. Interesting.

24 A. It's a TC. It's TC. So after we -- it's amended TC, ATC.

25 So after we completed that operation, I moved over and at the

1 time, Boeing Global Services was being created as a third division
2 of the company and I moved over to the vice president of
3 engineering, maintenance, and modifications, so I had about 10,000
4 employees, about 6,000 in engineering, about 4,000 in maintenance,
5 hands-on touch labor, essentially doing maintenance and
6 engineering functions for every air vehicle that Boeing produced,
7 it was about 85 percent U.S. military and U.S. weapon systems,
8 global missile defense program and things of that nature.

9 And so I managed that for a period of time and then we had
10 decided, as engineering cored up their functions, as you've seen,
11 over time, we broke that into two, so instead of having both, I
12 had just -- I took the maintenance function, another leader took
13 the engineering function, amongst other things, and I created the
14 first all-maintenance function within Boeing for services.

15 So I had -- at that time it rolled up to about a little under
16 6,000 touch labor Boeing employees around the world, so I had over
17 60 programs running in 70 locations around the world. The largest
18 that would be notable would be San Antonio, all of Air Force One's
19 operations and the new Air Force One modifications, as well as all
20 the C-17 depot maintenance. And then in Cecil Field in -- outside
21 Jacksonville, Florida, I had F/A-18 operations including QF-16
22 drone operations, we took F-16s, turned them into drones in that
23 full operation, and then F-15 modifications across the entire
24 globe for the U.S. Air Force were the biggest programs and then,
25 like I said, global missile defense program was a big one, along

1 with -- the biggest one was Air Force One, [REDACTED]

2 [REDACTED]
3 [REDACTED]
4 [REDACTED] So that was
5 the last role that I had prior to being asked to come back and
6 resurrect the 737 program. Just a caveat, about 19 years at the
7 U.S. airlines in various functions, at two airlines before coming
8 to Boeing.

9 Q. I was going to ask that, but you pretty much covered it, so I
10 was -- we're good.

11 A. I was going to abridge for you.

12 Q. You said you had four direct reports, how often did you meet
13 with your team, your directs?

14 A. Every day. Every day we had a standup -- every day that Tier
15 5 meeting, that was kind of my meeting where we would have every
16 function, everybody to run the machine that day at a leadership
17 level, directors and higher; of course, we would have other people
18 and guests and things of that nature, but there was certain roles
19 that had to be in the room to speak to their area, the various
20 functions, every day. We did that five days a week and we did it
21 Saturday mornings and then we had a touch-base on Sundays for the
22 -- well, what needs to happen on Monday. We tried to stay off of
23 Sundays to give everybody at least one day off.

24 Q. Your team was able to bring up issues that they saw while
25 doing -- surveilling their jobs and get resolutions on how that

1 worked?

2 A. Yeah, the culture and leadership style that I drove was a
3 help-needed culture. One of the things that I put into place
4 right out of the box, it's a silly process but it's a simple
5 process, and I learned it working very closely over a number of
6 years and it's called the kind issue process and what that kind
7 issue process is, is everybody has a lot of ideas, everybody has
8 challenges, but you've got to be able to write it on a 3 x 3 Sticky
9 note, it's got to be succinct, it's got to be what the problem is,
10 what you need from who and by when and you need to put your name
11 on it so there's ownership.

12 And we would have that running every single day, that any one
13 of my leaders could raise an issue in any one of the meetings and
14 then we had a team that would just go through and make sure we had
15 continued closure on those and running that, and you can see my
16 demeanor today, this is just who I am, this is the way I led my
17 team and making sure that everybody had a voice at the table.

18 Q. What kind of time frames were involved in rectifying issues,
19 I mean, is it real quick or was it -- did they prolong, did you
20 have to carry items over?

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. It sounds like you met every day.

23 A. It depends --

24 Q. Right.

25 A. -- because it's on a severity issue, you know, if it's

1 something that's quality or safety driven, personal or product
2 safety, it's an immediate, like we're going to go do something
3 now. And again, it's gauging that to make sure you're not
4 whipsawing the team for something that may be a long-term
5 corrective action and it's like hey, we're not going to focus on
6 that right now or that's not a priority focus.

7 And, you know, from the timing perspective, so anything on
8 the factory floor, one of the things that I reinstituted, which
9 was back from -- you asked earlier what good looks like, well, I
10 led liaison engineering and I knew the systems that I put in place
11 to get a factory mechanic a two-hour response, a qualified
12 two-hour response from the right engineers and pulling everybody
13 together, we had systems in place to do that.

14 But when we first started, there was a lot of atrophy out of
15 not running for a number of years, the pandemic, "I don't want to
16 be near you," those were all things that nobody figured out how
17 you can get over and they were just, "How do I solve this," and
18 when we started, it was "I'll take an action item and I'll get
19 back to you in a week." Well, you can't run a factory with a
20 four-hour takt time for every job, I need action item back in a
21 week, you need to answer in two hours. So it's one of the things
22 I put back in place was getting engineering back to the two-hour
23 takt time for a return to work so you can continue working, you
24 weren't having a work stoppage.

25 Q. And the feedback was -- I mean, did you provide collective

1 feedback and how was that communicated back to, I guess, staff and
2 even below staff, so the workforce, how would they get the answer?
3 Not the engineering answer, obviously that's going to come
4 directly to the worker, but I'm saying when you made fixes to
5 programs, how did that communicate back down?

6 A. There's a couple different ways and it's not a one size fits
7 all because every area of the factory is just a little bit
8 different, but those Value Stream teams were a big part of
9 communicating that. Also, the tiered meetings that I talk about,
10 you know, the Tier 1 meeting every day was the supervisor, first-
11 line leader, a supervisor with their leads and with their teams
12 starting up the factory and the first thing at startup, they had a
13 script that we scripted all of them.

14 Now, I can't tell you if everybody did it correctly every
15 single day, I did go down to a Tier 1 every day and they didn't
16 know I was coming, so it was just show up and see how they were
17 doing and if they needed coaching or training or help. They would
18 basically start the meeting off with -- well, I'll make up some --
19 yesterday we needed to complete 50 jobs, we only got 40 done. The
20 10 we didn't get done, okay, five were for parts, five were on us,
21 like why -- why did we miss these hand-offs, why didn't you ask
22 for help sooner, you know, the jobs are set up in specific block
23 times, I said we've got thousands of operations of these jobs, so
24 how could Employee A be able to complete the job in four hours but
25 Employee B couldn't, was there an issue, did you need more

1 training, did a tool break, you know, all those type -- that's
2 where, like, the initial problem solving was to start and people
3 would see that. And then from an overarching perspective, I held
4 monthly all-manager meetings across all sites, so it was five
5 meetings, a couple virtual and a couple me in person, and we would
6 go across, again, what are we doing around quality, stability, and
7 flow, where are we at, where do we need to go, because again, you
8 can't just speed up the factory because you run out of places
9 quickly to park airplanes if the rest of the operations upstream
10 and downstream of you aren't working, so it's a -- it's quite a
11 bit of a balance to get all of those operations right.

12 Q. What was your understanding of the Boeing vendor assist
13 process, are you familiar with it?

14 A. Yes. You know, Boeing vendor assist, we had a number of
15 vendors on board that would have their own people that were
16 qualified, that I believed to be qualified and certified because
17 we had -- our supply chain team would manage that, so people
18 should not have been allowed on site unless it went through a
19 particular process. So I was trusting that those teams were doing
20 their roles. Now, vendor assist, that was really created about --
21 well, I'm not going to fix your issue and you're the experts at
22 the issue, my people may not be the expert at the issue where you
23 have a defect, you have experts that come in and it really started
24 years ago around the -- really, around avionics, you know,
25 somebody brought in a box that performed a function and the test

1 didn't work right. Our test mechanics went through the script and
2 said it's failing step 9, you would bring in the expert from name
3 it, Collins, Honeywell, Panasonic, whoever, and they would come in
4 and say oh, it's failing step 9, that has to be something
5 interrelated in the box or yeah, there might be a mis-pinned wire,
6 like we got to go troubleshoot and then we'd start all the
7 troubleshooting like you do in any maintenance and engineering
8 organization, you would bring in those troubleshooters, so that's
9 where the vendor assist came from.

10 Now, as the vendors created more defects, certainly the case
11 with Spirit, I needed them to fix their own issues, I needed them
12 to see and feel the issues that my employees were seeing and
13 feeling and getting frustrated with, so they had a team of people
14 there on site solving those issues because I certainly didn't want
15 to deploy my most talented people there and that would be our AOG-
16 like mechanics, which we don't have, you know, thousands of them,
17 we have hundreds of them and they have a role to play. So it
18 started there and then when vendor assist doesn't work, in the
19 case of Spirit, it was challenged, I brought in, you know, 20
20 really talented mechanics and then another 25 on top of that in
21 Flow Days 1 through 3 because they weren't getting the work done
22 in the time frame that we thought we were providing to them
23 because our own mechanics could get it done.

24 Q. Were vendors allowed to gain access to previously completed
25 assemblies?

1 A. I'd be speculating, I don't know.

2 Q. Okay. Do you know what the process to gain access was, if
3 they needed access?

4 A. You know, again, I'd be speculating, just -- I'm too far away
5 from it for too many years before I -- if I was back in
6 engineering in 2013, I'd be able to quote it to you, but it's been
7 a couple years.

8 Q. Okay. This is very broad, so what kind of systemic issues
9 were you seeing in regards to the manufacturing process for the
10 Boeing 737 MAX? I know it's broad.

11 A. That's pretty broad. For the time period that you stated,
12 you know, if I just broke it down into kind of a couple of buckets
13 that I was really focused on, number one was Spirit defects,
14 notice of escapes coming into my factory. That was like my number
15 one because they were highly disruptive and they would just stop
16 us dead in our tracks because they were nonconformances, you just
17 stop, all lines stop with a nonconformance.

18 Secondly was part shortages, we certainly had -- in the
19 beginning of the year we had part shortages from CFM/GE, so we
20 were actually moving engines from Moses Lake that were good
21 engines, there was nothing wrong with them, and taking them off
22 airplanes and moving them to Renton to not ever blow that gate of
23 rolling an airplane out without an engine. We never rolled one
24 out without an engine. And then you had a lot of Honeywell
25 issues, avionics, airplane systems, that sort of stuff. And then

1 the kind of third bucket would've been the interior suppliers, we
2 had a significant amount of shortages around pandemic-type items,
3 electrical wiring, chips, you've seen that, everything in those
4 little infotainment systems or even the in-seat power systems have
5 chips in them and we were rolling airplanes out without in-seat
6 power and the customers weren't happy about it but, again, that
7 was trying to figure out how to pull it together and get the right
8 solution for our customers and the quality that we know we needed
9 to deliver.

10 So it was kind of in those three buckets that I managed the
11 defects and then inside of those buckets there was, you know,
12 tiers of things, like Spirit, like I said earlier, it was stop the
13 notice of escapes, we had some real big ones that were extremely
14 painful, and then the second one was skins followed by floors
15 because I couldn't get floors down in time, followed by foreign
16 object debris, FOD, found in the fuselage when it arrived.

17 Q. What team or group at Boeing Renton would be responsible for
18 opening or removing an MED plug?

19 A. So again, like I said, in the factory, people are qualified
20 to do certain jobs. You know, we had a team that was responsible
21 for doors, you know, I would've assumed that the door team would
22 be responsible for that operation but again, I wasn't there, but I
23 would assume the door team would get called in or the people that
24 have the quals and certs to work on doors.

25 Q. Okay. Were you aware of any MED plugs being opened in the

1 factory while you were the VP of the 3-7 line?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Okay. One second, because a lot of these have been asked,
4 I'm trying not to duplicate.

5 A. Thank you.

6 Q. What is the function of the AOG or SST teams at Renton, what
7 do they do?

8 A. Yeah, so the SST team, a subset of the AOG team but one and
9 the same, the SST teams were created so that when the vendor
10 assist doesn't work or defects were created by ourselves or
11 generated, I should say, the SST team had a -- they were more
12 talented in specific areas, so you had SST mechanics that were
13 very, very adept to functional tests, you had some that were
14 really good on electrical, but predominantly structures, like they
15 would -- you know, if somebody mis-drilled a hole or they had a
16 drill start issue, they would be able to go and say hey, I can
17 correct that, you go back and do your regular job and they would
18 be able to take it through.

19 They were up-skilled, if you want to call it. The AOG team,
20 I would only use them because it would be a big imposition on the
21 company because the AOG team is predominantly outward facing,
22 their whole purpose in life, and I managed them when I was in BGS,
23 is to support our customers. So when a customer has an incident
24 or an accident with an airplane, they're there to do some pretty
25 amazing repairs and put airplanes back to factory spec. So every

1 time I'm pulling the AOG team, I'm pulling them away from their
2 primary goal and that's to support our customers, so we were very,
3 very careful in doing that. We did have to pull them in on some
4 of these NOEs because they were the talent we needed to correct
5 these notice of escapes, not SST and not, certainly, the people in
6 the factory who weren't qualified to do that.

7 MR. JOHNSON: I think I'm good for now.

8 John.

9 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Ed, it's been a short while since I've see
10 you.

11 MR. CLARK: It's been a long time. Probably around Christmas
12 when I was out there running the choo choo train.

13 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Yeah, we (indiscernible).

14 MR. CLARK: Yeah.

15 MR. PETRUZZELLI: And for the record, I'm not a pleasant man
16 at 5:30 in the morning to anybody, so --

17 BY MR. PETRUZZELLI:

18 Q. A couple things, you talked about the vendor assist related
19 -- can you talk about the Partnering for Success perim with the
20 vendors and what your knowledge of it was?

21 A. Yeah, so I wasn't directly involved in Partnering for
22 Success, that was a supply chain-led program and really, what that
23 was and it was companywide, it was really looking at the
24 commodities that were being built, either by Boeing spec or their
25 design, and being put on our airplanes and then going in and

1 understanding the costs associated with those commodities and were
2 they reasonable or not based on, you know, what we were seeing as
3 far as build costs of the airplane, market price and things of
4 that nature, it was really trying to rectify some of the things
5 that we were seeing in supply chain that were -- we thought they
6 were unacceptable as far as what The Boeing Company was being
7 charged for those components.

8 Q. But from your seat -- you, specifically, or your team wasn't
9 really involved in it or did you provide any input at all?

10 A. No, we weren't involved in that at all, that was years prior
11 to me taking this job.

12 Q. Sure, sure. Relating to inspections, it's been pretty well
13 noted that the number of actual inspection points and IPs over the
14 last 12 to 13 years, and I'm talking every operation used to
15 require an inspection point and that's obviously gone down, did
16 you or your team, did you have any -- or describe the input your
17 team had in eliminating some of those inspections and what types
18 of inspections would you assert that were taken out.

19 A. Yeah, I'd just go back to there were some things done prior
20 to me coming back to the 737 program that I wasn't involved in
21 with quality and inspection, and from my time until I left the
22 program over the three years, at no time did I direct to remove
23 any inspections or anyone on my team. Matter of fact, we kept
24 adding inspection and a good example of that would be is, you
25 know, the challenges that we had, John, around torque, ensuring

1 the torque, we went back to a hundred percent monitored torques,
2 every torque in the factory was a hundred percent monitored, you
3 know, and we did the same thing for bond and ground, electrical
4 bond and ground, because we couldn't meet our own internal audit
5 criteria, so talk about proactive, there was internal auditing to
6 make sure you're making it happen and it wasn't, and we ran that
7 back and if I remember correctly, it was somewhere between 50 and
8 60 inspectors we had to add to the production system in just the
9 factory just to oversee that operation.

10 Q. For torque and bond and ground?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Yeah, that was --

13 A. But to answer your question directly, I was not aware and we
14 did not remove any inspections, we kept adding inspections because
15 if you recall, during the pandemic, one of the things that the
16 engineering team did was went through every one of the
17 installation plans on all programs, so this was -- people were
18 still employed, we weren't delivering airplanes, and they enhanced
19 all the work instructions and some of that was adding back
20 inspections that had been previously removed, I don't know how
21 many, but that was part of the stated goal of that enhanced work
22 instruction project.

23 Q. So the verification authorization stuff was happening pretty
24 much before you jumped into that role.

25 A. Oh, a long time before I was there, and those leaders have

1 since left the company and such.

2 Q. Being along the inspection line, you talked, when Sabrina was
3 asking questions, about the control limits and can you give a
4 little specificity as to when I say who sets it out, I mean by
5 individual, Matt Rigsby set that number or totality, how did that
6 look or what group did that?

7 A. Yeah, so with respect to quality, you know, like my quality
8 director and his team, and he had a whole analytics team that
9 would look ahead at hey, where do we need to be because again,
10 like I said, around quality, stability, and flow, I was driving
11 them to get defects out of the system because you can't go up and
12 rate without getting quality and stability, just -- I didn't give
13 you a definition, but stability means you have parts, people,
14 tooling, process all ready to go to execute and parts was the
15 biggest issue. So that stability you needed so that when you
16 issue the installation plan to the floor, they can execute within
17 the appropriate time.

18 So John, back to your question, to me it was all around that
19 quality piece of what goals we were trying to get to with factory
20 production and they had put some control limits and some bands
21 around it, some upper and lower control limits with some
22 statistical process analysis to say we needed to stay in this band
23 and if you kept within this band and we were seeing that
24 improvement week over week, month over month, year over year, then
25 you could achieve this rate out here, a factory rate.

1 Q. Yeah, because I think we actually hit 57 in wings right
2 before the crashes.

3 A. Yeah, wings was up at 57 and, you know --

4 Q. For a very short period of time.

5 A. Yeah, yeah. But, you know -- yeah, that's what they were up
6 to.

7 Q. You talked about two airplanes moving at the end, remember,
8 in an eight-hour shift, those wings would move four times in an
9 eight-hour shift was amazing.

10 A. Um-hum.

11 Q. Where was the moving line at when you came into the program?

12 A. Moving line hadn't run since I was in engineering in the late
13 2010-2011, we were not utilizing a moving line.

14 Q. Did it come -- when did they come back in, roughly?

15 A. Well, it's never come back in since 2014, we were doing a
16 pulse line.

17 Q. Pulse, okay. A better word.

18 A. We would do a pulse line every 24 hours, everything in the
19 factory moved one position. But with the defects, like I said,
20 some would stop, some would start, it was -- but we would -- we
21 were in a pulse line since I took over.

22 Q. Pick a time frame period that you think is okay, how many
23 times in a given time did you see a line was actually stopped on a
24 -- a month, two months, six months, whatever?

25 A. In 2023 it was over 50 times, it was like 58, 60 times we had

1 paused the factory because of either incoming defects, part
2 shortages, all the constraints I talked about earlier. Matter of
3 fact, right in the beginning of 2023 we couldn't put wings on the
4 airplanes because we had a defect coming to us from Spirit on the
5 fuselage and we make the wings and they weren't lining up, so the
6 factory was stopped for almost nine or ten days consecutively,
7 which was really hard to make back up.

8 Q. Outside of the wing ones, the other stoppages, were they days
9 or hours?

10 A. Days. Now, you had some hourly "hey, we paused it for a
11 little bit because this part's coming late" and we had that with
12 the interior, certainly, because they had a lot of stuff getting
13 -- a lot of the interiors are made in Mexico, so we had a lot of
14 issues getting it across the border in Mexico and with all the
15 issues on our borders for the past number of years, we certainly
16 felt it because we couldn't get the trucks across the border to
17 deliver product, so it would be they would be delivering to the
18 actual flow day and sometimes they would miss it and we'd have to
19 hold the airplane for a shift until the galleys or the lavatories
20 would show up.

21 Q. Can you give a general overview of your understanding of the
22 BPI, the removal BPI-1581?

23 A. So yeah, I can't sit here and quote 1581, I haven't looked at
24 it in a number of years but, you know, to me, 1581, which controls
25 the -- you know, the removal of parts, you know, step one, just

1 like my previous roles and when I was trained as an A&P mechanic,
2 step one is you got to document anything outside of the routine
3 work you're assigned and to me, that's like step one of any one of
4 the processes. As far as the rest of the process, John, I
5 couldn't sit here and quote it to you.

6 Q. Skin defects, you talked about being a big issue from Spirit.
7 What were you seeing as the root cause, was it manufacture or the
8 transport or the -- and I say manufacture, was it Spirit or was it
9 here in Renton or was it at the SDC?

10 A. Oh, it was certainly -- the origin of the defects were at
11 Spirit, there was nothing -- there was no statement of work for us
12 on the fuselage, the fuselage showed up as an end item, just like
13 this water bottle, it's a part number, it showed up, it's supposed
14 to be able to hold 16.9 ounces of water and move to the next
15 position, it was a conformed article. It's not what showed up.

16 And what we were finding on skin defects predominantly, in
17 Section 41, the nose of the airplane and the tail of the airplane,
18 Section 48, because of the complexity of compounding curves and
19 angles, they -- our engineering, and I rely on engineering because
20 I'm not in engineering anymore, was saying it does not conform and
21 quality said it did not conform. Now, what we found was a litany
22 of things, you know, sometimes it was not shimmed appropriately,
23 right, because there are a series of shims in there --

24 Q. Next question, yeah.

25 A. -- and sometimes there were too many shims or we would find

1 FOD in the joint that would keep it bulged out and when our
2 customers would walk the airplane at the delivery center, it was
3 very easy to see when it was painted, very hard to see when it had
4 the Spraylat coating on there. So like I said earlier, we
5 instituted a significant amount of countermeasures to try and
6 drive that all the way back in and I thought we were pretty
7 successful because when we started we had over -- over 250 defects
8 at the Seattle delivery center in 2021 when we took over and we
9 had less than five when I departed.

10 Q. Yeah, they really show up on dark blue airplanes.

11 A. Yeah, especially one particular customer.

12 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Yeah. I think that's good for this round
13 for me.

14 DR. WOODS: Okay. Matt.

15 MR. RIGSBY: Ed, you good?

16 MR. CLARK: Yeah.

17 MR. RIGSBY: Okay.

18 MR. CLARK: Keep going.

19 MR. RIGSBY: Okay. Just a few.

20 BY MR. RIGSBY:

21 Q. When the FAA would come in and audit --

22 (Noise interference.)

23 BY MR. RIGSBY:

24 Q. -- were those results shared directly with you?

25 A. Yeah, I mean, the past audit prior to the post-accident

1 audit, which happened over the summer, I went to the in-brief in
2 person every day, I went to the out-brief either in person or
3 virtually if I got pulled to another site because I had five sites
4 I was running between, but I was on that every day and after those
5 out-briefs and in-briefs I would sit down with my engineering
6 leader, quality leader, and manufacturing leader and talked about
7 what happened the day before, what are we seeing, you know, some
8 of them were, you know, I would call blown short putts like why
9 didn't the person know where the spec was, that's basic, like do
10 we need to get different help into those teams and help them with
11 this and some of which is how you answer a lot of questions.

12 And then after the fact, you know, I drove my quality team to
13 work those corrective actions and then I would -- it should be
14 something else I brought in to my business plan reviewer, seeing
15 what we need to see what progress you're making to knock those
16 corrective actions back because, to me, the transparency and the
17 partnership that we had over the summer with the FAA, I thought
18 was some of the -- some of the best that we had had in a long time
19 and it was post-pandemic, so now we could get people on site and
20 no masks and all that, you know, craziness, it was -- you could
21 get a really good audit because, to me, I welcomed audits, I want
22 people to come and look at it from a different light.

23 Q. Sure. Was the tri-party agreement established under your
24 watch, I guess, it would be?

25 A. Can you clarify which agreement you're speaking to?

1 Q. Well, the agreement that -- I understand it's pretty new,
2 came up out of Speak Up --

3 A. Oh.

4 Q. -- that there would be an ERT or event review team that would
5 look at Speak Ups or select Speak Ups --

6 A. Um-hum.

7 Q. -- and then IAM, the FAA, and Boeing would work those issues.

8 A. Yeah, what I'd speak to on that, I talked about the SMS
9 program and how it was very -- in its infantile stages, that came
10 up very late, I would say in, if I recall correctly, and you guys
11 can go look at it, but it was late in '23 that that ever got
12 signed. So you had a Speak Up program that was working, but you
13 didn't have an agreement with all parties of how it was going to
14 function.

15 So, you know, it functioned and we did get -- you know, quite
16 a number of Speak Ups, we've seen more Speak Ups on 3-7 and I was
17 really driving that hard from my leadership seat, if you asked
18 Boeing to produce any one of my monthly leadership videos, because
19 I'm trying to communicate to 13,000 people, right, so I did videos
20 like, they went like, I'd say TikTok videos, really short, this is
21 what's happening, this is what happened, you did a great job last
22 month, we had these challenges and I ended every single one is
23 that we can't see the issues unless you speak up, so I encourage
24 you all to use the Speak Up site, I personally see the Speak Up
25 items, we will react on them and, you know, get facilitated, they

1 got up to like dozens, you know, it wasn't -- it wasn't hundreds
2 that I've seen before, but it was dozens, I mean, that was more so
3 than the other program, so I looked at that as some progress, now
4 that tri-party in place.

5 Q. Sticking with Speak Up, you mentioned that when Speak Ups
6 come in that you encourage the people to go down and talk to the
7 employee, what if it's -- I guess, who would do that, who would do
8 the talking to the employee?

9 A. It was more than encouraged, it was required.

10 Q. It was required.

11 A. It was required, so I had an executive on my leadership team,
12 that was one of the directors of the function, so like if it was
13 -- if it was an issue raised by an engineer, I'd have the
14 engineering director do it; if it was an issue that was
15 complicated and challenging, I would have the director assigned to
16 that area.

17 So the factory is broken back to front, meaning like Flow
18 Days 1 through 5 had a director and Flow Days 6 through 10 had a
19 director because it was just too much for one person to have. And
20 that director would be present and, of course, the people in the
21 flow day and then anybody that helped, so that if there was a
22 Value Stream team assigned, we'd have a Value Stream team there,
23 too, to say okay, what are we not seeing, what do we need to go
24 do. And then within -- I drove within a short period of time,
25 like we need immediate corrective action, like 24 hours, like if

1 there's an issue, I don't want to roll another airplane with that
2 issue or we can put it in right now and a lot of them, if you were
3 to pull up the metrics and Boeing were to give you the metrics
4 right now, you'd see hundreds of days on them, but we didn't
5 "close them" close them, "done" done, until all the command media,
6 meaning all the processes and procedures were changed because
7 again, something on 3-7 could affect any one of the other programs
8 and it may affect it in a negative way, I don't know, I'm not an
9 expert in that production system or that airplane build.

10 So we had to validate it and that's where the core function
11 teams would come in ensuring quality manufacturing predominantly
12 and validating all that, but we would have immediate corrective
13 action and then we would hold it open until it was "done" done.
14 And that got reported to the CEO every week, myself or a delegate
15 talked to every one of the ones that were responsible for 3-7.

16 Q. Okay. And was there an anonymous feature in Speak Up?

17 A. There was, those were the hardest. We got very few
18 anonymous.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. I mean, very, very few anonymous.

21 Q. One of the things that we've learned, particularly from the
22 door crew, is that they seem to have or indicate to us that they
23 got a lot of turnover, I think they said 17 managers in three
24 years directly over them. Is turnover something that is looked at
25 either by quality within your organization when you were there and

1 was there ever and was there an SRM performed on turnover?

2 A. I'll answer it backwards, no, there wasn't an SRM, to my
3 knowledge, on turnover. Second piece of that is we did have a
4 people meeting every week, we talked about all things people,
5 notice I didn't call it an HR meeting, it was our people meeting,
6 like what do our people need to function and that could be
7 anything.

8 Q. Sure.

9 A. In a people meeting, we'd look at our attrition, we did have
10 a big turnover in -- and I would call it less turnover as we did,
11 we brought more managers on than we had ever had before because we
12 recognized that they had lower skill so we didn't give them as
13 large of a breadth of responsibility, so we had more managers that
14 we broke down into smaller chunks.

15 At the time I left, and I don't recall the numbers, but we
16 had more management, managers, directors and so forth than we'd
17 ever had in the program before because we were trying to break it
18 into smaller pieces so we could train. Along the lines we did not
19 do an SRM but we did have a two-week first-line leadership
20 training that we ran them all through and then we brought a lot of
21 our leaders, including myself, to go in and teach certain
22 leadership modules as leaders teaching leaders to those first
23 lines as they were indoctrinated.

24 Q. That training, is it more management training or is it, say,
25 job-specific training? For the door crew.

1 A. Well, for the door crew manager, he would be -- it was -- it
2 was leadership training, it was how the production system ran, how
3 to ask for help, those -- like the fundamentals of being a
4 manager, as far as door training, I don't know what training the
5 individual would have gotten.

6 Q. Does Boeing have a formal apprentice program that you're
7 aware of?

8 A. Well, so we had a program that I was involved in called Core
9 Plus, it was created many years ago by one of our retired CEOs,
10 Ray Conner, and you know, Ray started out as a mechanic like I did
11 and it was like how do you facilitate people coming into the
12 industry and retire as a CEO. And there is a number of schools
13 across all Washington state, high schools, where individuals can
14 take certain courses above and beyond the courses around, you
15 know, manufacturing, building, electrical, that sort of stuff,
16 plumbing.

17 And then when they successfully graduate Core Plus in those
18 high schools, we pretty much look very favorably to bring them
19 right on board at Boeing Company at 18 years old and then run them
20 through the foundational training and put them on the factory
21 floor. So it was very much a community, very much towards
22 Washington state, it was a little bit in Oregon, but pretty much
23 Washington state to create that feeder pool, if you want to call
24 it, of touch labor. That was the program that was in place, but
25 it's called Core Plus, you can look it up, it's been pretty wildly

1 successful. My involvement in that, you asked, was --

2 Q. Yeah.

3 A. -- I did go out and speak to the students in three of the
4 local high schools here and kind of show them the way, saying hey,
5 I started as an A&P mechanic on the flight line and, you know,
6 here's all the education I received along the way and this is what
7 a path could look like for you.

8 Q. Um-hum. And kind of along with that, does -- and I know you
9 said you did the videos, the Speak Up videos on it, is that -- do
10 you think that most of the employees down on the floor, do they
11 realize the criticality of their job?

12 A. You know, to me, it's the criticality of the quality, right,
13 because if the quality of the job was executed to the installation
14 plan, which has the approved engineering behind it, all that rolls
15 up to an inherently safe product. So I drove quality really,
16 really hard, you know, people recognize it, some do, some don't,
17 you know, and that's a maturity level situation.

18 Q. One of the other things that has been identified, that we
19 talked about, is the -- kind of the culture down on the floor
20 between the contract employees and the Boeing employees and it
21 seems like there's been some discontent among the two. Is that
22 something that has been prevalent?

23 A. When you say contract employees, could --

24 Q. Like the employees that are hired by Spirit --

25 A. Oh, oh, oh, oh.

1 Q. -- to do repairs.

2 A. Oh, yeah, yeah. Yeah.

3 Q. And then the mechanics that are in the facility.

4 A. Yeah, yeah. You know, when I did my walks, like every single
5 -- we do several walks in the factory, that was another thing I
6 reinstituted was like leadership walks, we'd do what we called the
7 gemba, go to the gemba a very Lean term, you'd go to where
8 somebody made a major improvement and thank them or you go to an
9 area where there was challenges and you'd go say what help do you
10 need and, of course, you know the way that goes, you show up and
11 nobody wants to tell you anything.

12 But my point is that, you know, we spent a lot of time in
13 Flow Days 1 through 3 because that was some of our biggest areas
14 of challenge. In order to run a successful factory, you got to
15 start on time, right, and we weren't starting on time. And yes,
16 there was always a bit of tension between all the teams in Flow
17 Day 1 through 3 and the Spirit mechanics, but it was around a
18 level of frustration, you know, "hey, I asked you to correct this
19 condition, I came back, I wouldn't sign that off," so they'd call
20 inspection, they'd write a pickup on it and it would just -- there
21 were some recurring themes that went on that the teams were trying
22 to continue to problem solve, so they didn't even show up from
23 Spirit. So we would meet and we had a quality leadership review
24 with Spirit and they saw all the defects, they had people there
25 and then where did it happen in the factory, so trying to map

1 their build plans and engineering to our build plans and
2 engineering, that happened routinely. Now, was it efficient, did
3 it happen fast enough? Probably not. So that's why I believe
4 there was always frustration between our folks because they would
5 say oh, I could do my job only if --

6 Q. Sure.

7 A. -- you know.

8 Q. Has there always been, like, from the supplier, have there
9 been Boeing QA or engineers at Spirit or is that something --

10 A. Well, since --

11 (Crosstalk)

12 MR. CLARK: Well, since the divestiture years ago, there was
13 always a team of people at Spirit, couldn't tell you what the
14 construct of it was, but during my tenure, at least in the three
15 years, that team, we added more and more and more and more. At
16 one point in time the supply chain team had hired a vice president
17 down there, so we actually had a vice president that sat in
18 Wichita and sat on Spirit's leadership team and added a
19 significant amount of resources, there were several managers down
20 there from a supplier quality perspective, so that organization is
21 -- they're part of the quality core team, but they reside inside
22 the supplier management team and they were forward deployed and
23 when I left, I know we had a director of supplier quality housed
24 there full time living in Wichita and it was, I'd say, 70 to 80
25 Boeing employees. Now, some of them were Boeing contracted

1 employees, but they were, you know, Boeing employees, not Spirit
2 employees.

3 Q. Okay. Who would make the decision on when an item elevated
4 high enough to bring in the SST team or the AOG team to do repair?

5 A. You know, our manufacturing team would know their limits, so
6 you know, engineering would see the defect and quality would --
7 certainly, whenever a defect occurs, you know, a nonconformance
8 record is created and at that point engineering quality work in a
9 cell, if you want to call it, they have a cell where they -- the
10 quality and the initiators and the engineering liaison folks work
11 together to determine how do they write the tag, because they're
12 all about trying to get the tag out on the right speed so they can
13 get the process moving, it's a handoff process and you get a week,
14 I get a week, they get hours.

15 It's kind of like maintenance control in an airline. And
16 once they determine what the level of defect is, the manufacturing
17 team, ultimately by the vice president of manufacturing, are going
18 to make the decision, do I have the capability, do I have the
19 people with the right certs and quals to do this work and they --
20 and they execute it. And then at that point in time, like I said,
21 hey, I need SST or I need AOG or -- predominantly we start with
22 SST and the SST team was great for like 95 percent of the stuff we
23 had in the factory, they could correct anything, they were pretty
24 good. They were instituted right prior to me taking this role
25 over by the previous manufacturing leader to have that kind of

1 boots-on-the-ground AOG OEs in factories, so we weren't disturbing
2 the AOG teams because, again, that was taking away from their
3 mission supporting the customers worldwide.

4 BY MR. RIGSBY:

5 Q. Okay. And then my last question is -- it's kind of open, but
6 what changed from the 2012, 2013 time when you said it was good to
7 today and some of the issues?

8 A. That's a really hard question.

9 Q. I know.

10 A. If I broke it down in its most simplest instance, again, the
11 things that I put back in place were, again, engaging the people,
12 right, I'm just a people-centric leader, like people have to be
13 involved in their own destiny, you can't just tell them do A, do

14 B. And it was all about looking at our whole focus, again, around
15 quality, stability, and flow, like those pieces were broken up and
16 not looked at uniformly and things were pushed back into some of
17 the functions and they were doing a good job, but it wasn't being
18 received, so you had to integrate, so I had to integrate all that.

19 And then the last piece, I had to integrate all the customer
20 operations, so I started an intense campaign where I was speaking
21 to the customers because we were shut down for a number of years,
22 it was -- had all that -- those challenges, you got to get them
23 behind you and build those customer relationships because having
24 been a former customer and took over 300 airplanes from The Boeing
25 Company when I was at Southwest, I knew what good looked like from

1 a customer perspective, I knew it had to show up on my ramp, I
2 knew when the airplane would show up, I knew the condition it
3 needed to show up in and I felt like I needed to get involved as a
4 leader because, again, I owned the whole thing, I was responsible,
5 I felt a deep sense of responsibility to fix that and repair those
6 customer relationships, so -- like Alaska, I spent a lot of time
7 with your leadership team and a lot of time with the M&E team and
8 your senior leaders and just transparently tell them this is
9 what's going on because they're trying to plan a business plan
10 based on what we do.

11 And so I do that with every airline, I wouldn't say every
12 airline, but the top 10 airlines that were receiving airplanes, I
13 can't do all 56. But really getting that piece back, because that
14 feedback loop from the customers was vitally important because you
15 had to take that and operate on it really fast, so we had a whole
16 fleet chief office that did that, but that was -- it wasn't -- it
17 wasn't homogenously working.

18 So getting everybody together, and I'd just say the biggest
19 thing that I had to do was say there was no boundaries, it was
20 just you worked on the program, I really -- it was interesting
21 that you might've worked in a function but you worked for the 737
22 and your goal was to deliver the highest quality airplane to the
23 schedule we committed to, to our customers, and then how do we
24 work that from the customer all the way back to the first hole we
25 drill in the spar. And to me, that was a piece that was missing

1 because it was happening fragmented-ly and that's why I put the
2 effort I put into it to try and put that back together again.

3 MR. RIGSBY: Okay. That's it for me.

4 DR. WOODS: Thank you.

5 MR. CLARK: Thanks.

6 DR. WOODS: Bjorn?

7 BY CAPT ANDERSON:

8 Q. Just a question about the foundational training, has the
9 demographic of touch labor coming on board changed drastically
10 since, say, 2019? Did the foundational training change at all for
11 those employees coming on?

12 A. Yeah, I -- I didn't get directly involved in the details on
13 training so I just -- I don't have a good answer for that. I
14 would assume so because that's what was being shared with me and
15 what activities they were putting in place and the length of time
16 people go in training, but I can't speak to the details of it.

17 Q. And then with -- you were saying -- if a stop for production
18 is called from, say, a team leader, is there the ability then for
19 leadership above them to reject that stoppage or just continue the
20 work or push it to traveling work and if so, how common was that?

21 A. If there was a stop at the factory floor where somebody said
22 I got to stop, like 99.9 percent of the time it was real, they
23 were seeing something and we just -- we'd pause and reassess and
24 figure out could you move or not, and at that point in time you
25 brought in the two people that could make the decision, it's the

1 design engineers and the quality team, like that wasn't being made
2 from a leadership level going "oh, just move the airplane," you
3 brought in the experts and said can we move the airplane with
4 that, like that wing, that wing example, I had a fuselage stuck in
5 the tool and I only have two tools to put wings on, I had a
6 fuselage stuck in the tool and I can't put the other wing on, it's
7 like can I move the airplane because I don't want to block the
8 rest of it, engineering and AOG would have to give us a solution
9 and if they said no, the plane would just sit there until we
10 figured it out.

11 So again, that was trusting and relying on the experts that
12 sat on your team to give you that north star that you needed to
13 drive to and then clear all the roadblocks to try and make it
14 happen as expediently as possible.

15 Q. And with the Speak Up program, if somebody was interviewed
16 following one of the reports that were put in, what was the follow
17 up with that employee and then also do other employees learn from
18 what the corrective action was following from that Speak Up?

19 A. Yeah, the feedback for that individual employee, I mean, it
20 was clearly documented, spoke to this employee on this date,
21 director or a manager would come back and say yeah, we had the
22 conversation, it's real, it's not -- or hey, that really was a
23 misunderstanding, you know, needed clarification, that sort of
24 stuff. As far as communications, we had employees, again, on the
25 infancy side of this thing and that feedback loop, I didn't think,

1 was in place at the time of my departure.

2 Q. Um-hum. And then the last one is regarding SST. Pardon me
3 for botching the flow a little bit.

4 A. Um-hum.

5 Q. If SST is called in to help facilitate a problem that's on
6 the assembly line with -- are they going to be following the same
7 IPs or the same removals or would they be working with the current
8 team that is working that IP or working removal or do they
9 initiate their own?

10 A. Okay, so that's a hard one. It depends, right, it depends on
11 the severity of the problem. If it's a -- had they missed and
12 there's a drill start issue and they got to go correct the piece
13 of structure, they're going to correct the whole piece of
14 structure and it's going to be like go finish your job, they're
15 not going to finish that job for a person.

16 If there's a really complicated job like the -- I know the
17 most complicated one that I ever had to solve was the vertical fin
18 attach fittings that we had to go and replace, you know, you had
19 to say full stop, you got to turn it over to the SST and the AOG
20 team because they need to go do a bunch of removals and work their
21 project and restore it back to the point where the airplane needed
22 to be built from that point, so they would handle all their own
23 removals and their own quality team, they're assigned to them. We
24 had liaison engineers assigned to them so they could go in and do
25 that surgical removal of that fitting and put it back together

1 again. If it was a fully built airplane, so like I was ferrying
2 airplanes out to Moses Lake, I had -- we stood up, just for
3 context, in 45 days we stood up 18 lines of maintenance, so think
4 about 18 hangar bays, 18 fully staffed crews, so like take your
5 hangar bay you have over at SEA-TAC, we stood up 18 of those in 45
6 days to do that project. And so those are like fully contained
7 teams, so if I took a jet and ferried it out to Moses Lake to that
8 hangar, that team would completely take it apart and do their own
9 removals and do all their installations and restore it back to
10 exactly the way it was when they picked it up, the conforming
11 article that they picked up. Does that help explain it?

12 CAPT ANDERSON: Yeah, it does, thank you. And -- that's
13 good. Thanks, Ed.

14 MR. CLARK: Thank you.

15 DR. WOODS: Troy.

16 BY MR. LEVANEN:

17 Q. Picking up where you left off on the SST, did you say they
18 have their own engineer, so that like represents just them so they
19 have a straight pipeline to engineering?

20 A. It depends. SST, when they're fixing defects throughout the
21 factory, there's liaison people assigned to those sections of the
22 factory on each shift, so they would use that liaison team to
23 support them. When they get into the large fixes, like I
24 explained, this AOG one or if SST was doing a large fix, you would
25 have people that work indirectly with them, so it was continuity

1 on the job on each shift, so there was carry-over and such, you
2 wouldn't lose anything.

3 Q. Um-hum. Then jumping, kind of, to our event with the door
4 plug, did -- you mentioned that in 2023 you paused the line like
5 58 or 60 times, was that an example when they had to wait for
6 repairs there, when it was kind of starting to hold up the line,
7 was that an example of it stopping the line or are you talking
8 more big stops, like where the whole operation stops or something?

9 A. There were big stops in there, but I can't speak to -- I
10 don't -- I don't remember how many days it took to go through the
11 factory, I just don't. You know, there may have been pauses for a
12 shift or two, but we're watching kind of what's going in, what's
13 getting loaded, and what's coming out and then we do have hospital
14 (ph.) positions that we pull our planes off to the side and then
15 there's hospital positions outside that we would move it to and
16 that would be the total flow of build before it got handed off to
17 Renton to fly it for the first time, but on that particular
18 airplane, I couldn't tell you if that was a major stop or not.

19 Q. So with that said, just kind of jumping, stayed on that, it
20 was Flow Day 9 when they worked the -- I think it was about Flow
21 Day 9 when they worked the repairs when Spirit contractors did the
22 rivet repairs and I think it was Day 18 and 19, so were those like
23 -- Day 18 and 19, would those be like clock days, like calendar
24 days?

25 A. Manufacturing days, so days that we actually put touch labor

1 on the airplane. So our manufacturing days are five days a
2 week --

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. -- and then if we work on the weekend, we would count that
5 but we don't plan weekends in, although we were working some
6 overtime on the weekends, so play catch-up.

7 Q. Um-hum.

8 A. So that would've been -- that would've been manufacturing
9 days that it took us to get to that point. So just reading into
10 it, not -- 18 days means from, you know, that Flow Day 0 that we
11 added in there, that's considered a flow day, so we say is 10
12 positions or flow days in the factory, it may hold in a position,
13 so when it was up in the tool on Flow Days 1 through 3, it may
14 have stayed in one position for multiple days, I don't know,
15 Boeing would be able to provide the records of what positions it
16 stayed in then.

17 Q. Okay, so then did you -- in 2023, did you say it took 26,
18 basically, calendar days or factory days to do a 10-day --
19 10-flow day build?

20 A. Our average in 2023 was about 26 days. We had some better,
21 some -- and it depended. A lot of times it was interiors late
22 from certain suppliers, so if you had a Brand X airline in front
23 of an Alaska airplane and they had no interior in it, I'm going to
24 flow them through an interior because your airplane had all your
25 parts and we wanted to get it out and we pushed that off to the

1 side and then waited for interiors. Of course, when we did that,
2 it took way longer to get the airplane built because of how you
3 are moving people and parts out of sequence, it was very painful
4 to do that, so we watched those. But to your point around the 26
5 days, that's what we based our business plan on, my business plan
6 wasn't based on 10 or 15, it was trying to improve to get to that,
7 but we were at 26 and when I picked up the business plan in 2021,
8 we were at 44 days to build the airplane. Just the factory time.

9 Q. Okay, that gives me an idea. And then -- I had one question
10 around that, but -- so whenever you went for the rate increase,
11 you did the -- they did SRMs around it and I was going to ask a
12 little more about did you get to join in on any of those SRMs?

13 A. Yes, I was personally involved in them because it was a new
14 thing, so we were trying to facilitate the team and show them that
15 they had all the leadership support to take the time they needed
16 and they went through a process and it evolved over time,
17 obviously, because we -- I can't remember if it was 18 or 26 was
18 the first one and then we did another one, we did 31, we did one
19 for 30, it was 30-something, then 38 and then we had never done
20 the 42 one, so we were progressively going through them and then
21 we would revisit the previous SRMs to say well, what did we say
22 there, what did we do differently, what have we learned since that
23 point and then participating in those was -- I felt was crucial
24 because I had knowledge from my previous roles and operating in
25 SMSs to help the team get through that, a little bit less

1 textbook, a little bit more real world.

2 Q. So on that theme, did they identify hazards, then, and do you
3 have an example of the type of hazard you might find there, you
4 know, were the SRMs, do you feel like they were effective, you
5 know?

6 A. Yeah, I mean, again you're starting off, it's -- you got to
7 teach people to learn to see what a potential hazard is and I
8 think we're in that very beginning infantile stage of learning
9 that, we certainly had good facilitation from our core teams
10 teaching people what they were looking at, but I know there were
11 issues identified, I know we put mitigation plans in place, but
12 it's been a long time, I'm sorry, I can't quote them.

13 Q. That's okay. A quick question on when you did those videos
14 to reach -- to reach the front lines, did those go to all the
15 front lines, too, or what level did those go to?

16 A. Yeah, so there was multiple communication paths, video was
17 just one. I did weekly like, call them, just for the sake of
18 essence, roundtables. So we would take a flow day and you'd take
19 35 people, 40 people out of that flow day and spend an hour with
20 them and talk about what's going on in their world, we take a
21 bunch of action items and work them, did the same thing out at the
22 SDC, did the same thing in Renton preflight, same thing in Moses
23 Lake, San Antonio, and in California. So we get out there and get
24 all my leaders doing it, so myself and my directors were all doing
25 that to engage. That was one engagement point. Second engagement

1 point was I did these videos to try and get people a "this is
2 what's going on," give them just a really quick -- tried to keep
3 it to like two to three minutes, but give them a really quick hey,
4 what happened last month, where are we going. We had a big
5 challenge with that because the videos would obviously make it to
6 the media and you were trying to be very, very careful in what you
7 said because it would be misconstrued by social media and such.
8 But really, given like hey, we're doing a great job, we had this
9 big win, we won this big deal from X-Y-Z airline, and we delivered
10 a hundred to this airline, like you give them all those pieces and
11 then we would put it up on all the video readers.

12 Your question about did it go to all the employees, it went
13 to all 13,000 employees assigned to the program and that was
14 everything from sales and marketing all the way to the factory
15 floor, recognizing that not everybody reads e-mail every day,
16 especially our mechanics, right, that's not their primary
17 function, and pilots, you don't read e-mail every day, either.

18 But what I did know from analytics that I had our
19 communications team apply, we had somewhere between 60 and 70
20 percent of that 13,000 viewed the video within the first week of
21 the video coming out, so we were seeing 60 to 70 percent hit and
22 from the social media stuff, and we were trying to -- we didn't
23 have names, we weren't tracking people, we were just seeing how
24 many people opened it and -- actually opened it and it was open
25 for two to three minutes, that they might've watched it, it was a

1 pretty big impact across the team, people were watching it, and
2 then my all-manager meetings and my all-employee meetings, so like
3 when we had these major defects like the challenge with the
4 vertical fin attach fitting, I did 18 all-employee meetings in
5 three days across seven sites on three shifts. Yes, that was
6 20-hour days.

7 Q. I'm sure.

8 A. And that was just getting up in front of the team, no slides,
9 no graphs, just what you're seeing right now and telling them this
10 is what happened, this is what we're doing, it's not -- because
11 you just don't want the team to be upset about something else that
12 somebody's doing to us and here's our plan to go through it and we
13 got through those things and I think the team rallied pretty
14 amazingly around it.

15 Q. Then, you know, you mentioned the 60 or 70 percent, you know,
16 did you say the video showed on the reader boards, like in the
17 break rooms --

18 A. Yeah, we had them running, looping on the boards, but it was
19 on the *Boeing News Now*, we had a micro-site for *Boeing News Now*.
20 We encouraged all employees and we had only about less than 4,000
21 employees get downloaded on their phone, so you get it on your
22 phone, you get to see constant news, so if there was an issue that
23 popped up, it would get immediate, like, text alerts like hey, new
24 news or -- you know, so -- so you're trying to hit every --
25 because not everybody receives information the same way.

1 Q. Yeah, so it's possible that you had a higher percentage than
2 60 or 70 because some of those people might have said well, I got
3 this off the reader board.

4 A. Yeah, yeah.

5 Q. Okay. And then along the chain that you mentioned with the
6 directors, so that -- is there -- directors are tier, you
7 mentioned Tier 3?

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. And then VPs are Tier 5, is there a Tier 4?

10 A. Yeah, so I'll just -- I'll lay it out for you really clearly,
11 so Tier 1 is the first-line leader with their employees; Tier 2
12 was the first-line leaders assigned to a senior manager, so you
13 have a senior manager over a number of employees; Tier 3 was the
14 directors along with what we call factory generals, which manage
15 the senior managers and the first-line managers because it was --
16 I'll just give you a round number, it was roughly about 780
17 managers across the whole program.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. And then the Tier 4 is -- that was the vice president of
20 manufacturing's meeting and I would attend that one as a "hey, the
21 boss is showing up to see what's going on," and then all of the
22 leaders would show up at what we called Tier 5, which was the
23 rolled-out fliers, delivery and redelivery for Moses Lake report
24 every single day and then that would make our delivery forecast
25 for the week of what we thought we could hit for the company and

1 that would roll in to the CEO on Wednesday saying we said we were
2 going to deliver seven, we're only going to deliver six and we
3 have this problem, you know, and what help do you need and then
4 that would roll in to the help needed on Fridays with any of those
5 suppliers, hey, we're not delivering your jet because we had this
6 issue, what are you going to do about it, can't have it happen
7 again. So that cycle happened every single week and I was pretty
8 much instrumental in starting all that back up back in 2021.

9 Q. Um-hum. So then the people, the core director reports that
10 you had, those were Tier 4 people?

11 A. They would have their own Tier 4's because, obviously, the
12 field and delivery would have their own Tier 4, the factory would
13 have their own Tier 4 and then at the Tier 5 they would all come
14 together and we would look at the entire Value Stream from wings
15 all the way through to delivery to the customer, including paint
16 because some of the paint was also off-loaded to a third party.

17 MR. LEVANEN: Um-hum, okay. All right, I think that's good
18 for me, thank you.

19 DR. WOODS: John, you're up.

20 BY MR. MILLER:

21 Q. Okay. I'm last and hopefully the least here. I think most
22 of the questions I had were asked. Just one thing to circle back
23 on, so on the Value Stream teams, the outcome of those activities,
24 were those outcomes reported locally to the leadership team
25 overseeing that specific activity or did you see that roll up to

1 your level in terms of all the Value Stream activities that took
2 place?

3 A. Large majority of the work that happened, again, people on
4 their own have to recognize there's an issue and work to solve
5 that issue and give them the right tools and time. That was
6 happening constantly within those flow days and the directors for
7 those flow days would be ultimately responsible, that would roll
8 up to me on a periodic basis to say we're making this -- we had
9 hundreds of projects in those Value Stream teams and then they
10 would roll those up to me at the hundreds and then we would share
11 those with the rest of the employees through the Leanfests, as we
12 put back in place, that everybody could come and see what was
13 happening across the whole program.

14 Q. Understood. And then just during your tenure, were you aware
15 of any particular Value Stream activities that flowed up from the
16 door team, specifically?

17 A. No, we didn't -- I don't recall a specific door stream, door
18 Value Stream team.

19 Q. Okay, okay.

20 A. We were starting the Value Stream teams based on the area of
21 need, around the areas of quality that we needed to improve.

22 Q. Understood. Okay. And then, I think, just one last question
23 for clarity, again, on the topic of SST work, would it be correct
24 to say that the governing documentation to initiate the SST work
25 would still lean back on the nonconformance record that would be

1 generated in the first place, so any subsequent activity would tie
2 in to that nonconformance record until it got closed out when the
3 work was completed?

4 A. Absolutely, the defective condition was documented first and
5 foremost on a nonconformance record, whether that was from
6 external or internal, and then that would all tree up in a
7 parent/child relationship to that nonconformance record to give
8 you the conforming article to be able to perform aircraft
9 certification eligibility and ticking.

10 MR. MILLER: Okay, very good. That's all I have. Back to
11 you, Sabrina.

12 DR. WOODS: Okay, that's round one. We're well over two and
13 a half hours, how do we feel, do we need another break?

14 MS. HAYNES: I think a break would be good.

15 MR. CLARK: I certainly want a break.

16 MS. HAYNES: Five minutes.

17 DR. WOODS: Okay. All right, not a problem. With that, we
18 are going to go back off the record again at 11:45 Pacific time.

19 (Off the record at 11:45 a.m. PT)

20 (On the record at 12:04 p.m. PT)

21 DR. WOODS: Okay, we are back on the record at 12:04 Pacific
22 time.

23 BY DR. WOODS:

24 Q. I'm going to follow up with just a couple questions about --
25 these are more -- like your perception questions. First thing I

1 want to ask is that in the world according to Ed, what does safety
2 culture mean to you? How would you define it to somebody else?

3 A. Well, safety culture is where people can recognize hazards
4 and understand that they can raise any issues so that you can stay
5 ahead of anything that turns into a possible quality or safety
6 issue. The other portion of a safety culture is that -- to me,
7 the quality is what drives the number one into a safety culture is
8 (1) my own personal quality; (2) the quality of the product and
9 when you see those two not working, that could be a hazard, which
10 could lead to a safety issue and it's about raising those issues
11 up before they become a safety issue.

12 Q. In your perceptions, let's say the last couple years prior to
13 you departing Boeing, how would you describe the safety culture on
14 the factory floor?

15 A. To me, it's a multiple-pronged answer because there are
16 people on the factory floor that recognize safety, safety issues,
17 and I think it goes back to your earlier question around tenure
18 and having to re-invigor (ph.) that, but from an airplane safety
19 perspective, I would say, you know, from our engineers and our
20 quality team members, they clearly understand what airplane safety
21 is and know how to raise an issue and the continued operational
22 safety program which monitors all the defects in the factory and
23 monitors all the fleet defects, roll those up to the appropriate
24 folks in airplane safety and chief engineer's office and they know
25 what safety is and know how to make sure that the issues that are

1 being raised are addressed for airplane-level safety.

2 Q. In your opinion, what is the technician's role in that
3 process, what you just described?

4 A. I think the technician's role, again, is to execute the plan
5 as written and execute the engineering as delivered to the
6 technician through the installation plan and if they cannot
7 execute that, they're trained to stop and ask for help and if it's
8 executed to the plans that have been delivered to them, you will
9 deliver a high-quality product which is inherently safe.

10 Q. So that begs a good question is do you believe that if
11 something conforms to the plan that it is inherently safe?

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. I want to be careful with this because I do not want to put
14 words in your mouth, but do you feel that quality equals safety?

15 A. Because you have so many people involved with building an
16 airplane, you need everybody executing the quality and when that
17 quality is executed, that conforms to the type-certified
18 documentation which demonstrated the overall safety of the
19 airplane.

20 Q. Do you feel that there's -- or do you think that in any
21 situation there could be something that conforms, because quality
22 is about conforming, but it might not be safe?

23 A. I can't think of an example or even offer an opinion on that
24 because I don't -- I don't -- I just don't see it.

25 DR. WOODS: Okay. Review my notes real quick. Yeah, I think

1 that's all I have, so thank you for that. I have two concluding
2 questions that I always ask, but it will be after the final round,
3 so I'm going to go on and pass it back off to Nils.

4 MR. CLARK: Okay, great.

5 BY MR. JOHNSON:

6 Q. So I have two questions for you. One of them was when you
7 were discussing with Bjorn the Moses Lake scenario with SST and
8 you said generating removals, wouldn't the airplane have an
9 airworthiness certificate at that point and if so, would it be
10 removals that were generated or it would be non-routines? I'm
11 just trying to -- I thought once it crossed the line of having an
12 airworthiness certificate it no longer fell under the production
13 certificate paperwork, which is why I'm asking the question.

14 A. Yes. So those airplanes were produced, we would fly -- go
15 through their whole preflight profile at Renton field, the
16 airplanes would get a B-1 flight and usually on that B-1 flight it
17 would go to Moses Lake or to whatever area we needed it to go to.
18 At that point in time the airplane had not been given its aircraft
19 certification eligibility, the ace of the airplane, which then
20 would go to the country of registry and go to ticket and the FAA
21 was ticketing at that time. So the answer is it's still under the
22 production certificate.

23 Q. Okay. Last one, we were talking about reoccurring themes and
24 the FAA shared this with us, so I'm just curious what your
25 thoughts are about it, how prevalent were undocumented removals,

1 in other words, they failed to produce paperwork but they took
2 something off the airplane, was that on your radar, was that a --
3 kind of a big hitter item?

4 A. I was aware of it from previous audits and aware of the
5 corrective action in those areas where it occurred, but I was -- I
6 was not -- it was not on my radar as far as undocumented removals,
7 so it wasn't something that we looked at.

8 MR. JOHNSON: Okay. That's it for me, thank you.

9 John.

10 BY MR. PETRUZZELLI:

11 Q. Just a question, a little closer to what I do. In years that
12 you were VP/GM of the program, can you touch on your perceptions
13 of the relationship we have -- have had with the FAA ASIs,
14 obviously, and our ODAs?

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. In your knothole (ph.).

17 A. Yeah, I mean, day one we were under -- ticketing authority
18 was removed from The Boeing Company because of the previous
19 accidents. On day one, even though we're in pandemic and a lot of
20 it was go, you need that relationship with the CMO (ph.) and that
21 was day one as my team, with the certificate management office, and
22 making sure we were aligned on what we were doing, and matter of
23 fact, I assigned a specific executive, Harry Ayubi, I brought him,
24 you remember Harry.

25 Q. I do.

1 A. I brought Harry in from my days on 787 and Boeing Global
2 Services, he ran my London operation center, I brought him in to
3 bring that knowledge of how do you transparently work with
4 regulators ticketing the airplane and then making sure our ODA was
5 with them hand in hand and then give them the repeatability and
6 the forecast of what needed to be ticketed so the manpower and
7 everything would line up. So I thought our relationship with the
8 FAA from that perspective was very good, I worked closely with Jim
9 Phoenix, I was out with -- every Christmas that I was out there,
10 FAA works during that week.

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. We don't, I was out with Jim Phoenix ticketing airplanes on
13 the flight line.

14 Q. Just to follow on to that, what was the -- what was your
15 perception of where our -- where and how our ODAs were, and their
16 leadership, were feeling about where they were in the process and
17 -- or was there --

18 A. Well, I think it's difficult when somebody else is
19 essentially doing the role that you signed up for.

20 Q. Right.

21 A. I think the ODA did a good job over the period of time of
22 evolving and helping and turning in to more teaching because there
23 was a lot of teaching going on where the ODA was helping the
24 mechanic saying hey, this is what an airplane needs to look like
25 when you bring it to ticket. I think there was also a lot of good

1 working relationships with the FAA on partnering for ticket.
2 Matter of fact, I think, John, a lot of the tickets that happened,
3 you know, the Boeing ODAs were flagging as many pickups as the FAA
4 inspectors were picking up and between the two of them, we were
5 getting a really, really high-quality airplane. So I think it was
6 trying to make the best situation and then we were certainly
7 headed towards a good place of gaining our ticketing authority
8 back because the parametrics that we set forth with the FAA agreed
9 to a set of metrics, we were hitting all those metrics plane over
10 plane over plane over plane of showing repeatable airplane ready
11 for ticketing and having a very low number of defects at
12 ticketing.

13 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Yeah, we were darn near hitting that second
14 phase --

15 MR. CLARK: Um-hum.

16 MR. PETRUZZELLI: -- real close. That's all I have.

17 DR. WOODS: Matt.

18 MR. RIGSBY: I'm done. The only other question was already
19 asked.

20 DR. WOODS: All right. Bjorn.

21 CAPT ANDERSON: No more questions, Ed. Thanks.

22 DR. WOODS: Okay. Troy?

23 MR. LEVANEN: Just one more.

24 BY MR. LEVANEN:

25 Q. When you referring earlier, talking about the defects in the

1 skin in the fuselage, you know, and that they're harder to see,
2 you know, until you get the paint on and I'll agree with that,
3 let's just say you find them and they're identified to be
4 something that came from Spirit, but now it's already post-paint,
5 do the Spirit contractors do those repairs or is that like SST or
6 what team would do those structural, like fuselage skin
7 deformation repairs?

8 A. All of the above. So it was who you had available, right,
9 it's like anything else, it's a resource pool and, you know,
10 whoever was qualified. We did have some full-time folks at the
11 Seattle delivery center that were really, really talented, it was
12 a small number of people, it was less than -- less than five
13 people that were super talented, that could go in and, you know,
14 perform a fastener removal or repaint it and get it up to the spec
15 so the customer would accept it, so those were the first and
16 foremost.

17 SST worked with them but if you had an airplane that had more
18 than that and we had to take days to pull it out, we would also
19 have the Spirit mechanics out there working with us, too, so --
20 and we got the defects down, we could get it down to just our
21 people handling the defects that made it through.

22 Q. And then on Flow Day 0, did you feel like we were -- you
23 know, I know they've changed now to where they're inspecting the
24 planes before they leave Spirit versus when they come in to Flow
25 Day 0, did we see a progression of improvement in Flow Day 0 for

1 the initial shake, basically, in like 2023, for example, was it
2 improving or what kind of -- what was the defect level looking
3 like there?

4 A. We saw improvement, it was a downward trend of defects being
5 found, but the problem was we would see spikes, like, so you're
6 down with trend and then one airplane would come in with a
7 significant amount of defects and it's trying to figure that out,
8 it was sporadic, from what I recall, and then from where I left it
9 in February to where it is today, I couldn't comment, I don't
10 know.

11 MR. LEVANEN: No problem, thank you. That's all I have,
12 appreciate it.

13 DR. WOODS: John?

14 MR. MILLER: No further questions, thank you.

15 DR. WOODS: Okay, well, the second round went really fast,
16 then.

17 BY DR. WOODS:

18 Q. So I typically ask a couple of concluding questions of
19 everybody that we ask to come speak to us and one of which I'm
20 going to modify because I know that you're no longer in the
21 position and that is like during the time that you were in that
22 position over the 737 line, I call it kind of the magic wand, if
23 you could wave a magic wand and like, this is the thing that kept
24 you up at night, this is the thing that you would love to fix and
25 have addressed and everything would be perfect, what would that

1 have been during your tenure?

2 A. You know, I've had a lot of time to think about that, given
3 the events that have occurred, and I can't say that there's
4 anything that I would've done differently. I put every ounce of
5 my being into that program, I put every piece of knowledge and
6 pulled on every person and outside entity that could help me see
7 things differently to make sure I was looking at everything and at
8 this juncture, I just don't have anything else to add.

9 Q. Um-hum. It doesn't have to be something that you would have
10 done, it's just like if you had this thing, if somebody gave you
11 this magic bean that could fix it, that would be the thing that
12 you've identified that this is what we would need to make it
13 perfect, not necessarily of yourself, it could be a tool, it could
14 be an enterprise, it could be a process change.

15 A. Well, defect free from the suppliers and parts on time.

16 Q. Okay. And then the second question is more of just you had a
17 little time to know we were coming and that we wanted to talk to
18 you as a part, you know, directly in conjunction with this case
19 and we appreciate your time and being here, especially being that
20 you are no longer employed by Boeing, but you've taken the time to
21 come out and talk to us and we appreciate that to help inform so
22 we can make things better going forward, is there anything that we
23 haven't discussed or that we haven't talked about that you thought
24 for sure we would bring up or that you would like to just add,
25 like your parting words to us as we go out and still try to work

1 this case to its fruition?

2 A. No, I don't have anything to add.

3 DR. WOODS: Okay. All right. Well, with that, anybody else,
4 any last re-attacks?

5 (No response.)

6 DR. WOODS: Looks good, looks good. Okay. With that, we are
7 going to go off the record at 12:19 Pacific time.

8 (Whereupon, at 12:19 p.m. Pacific Time, the interview
9 concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: ALASKA AIRLINES BOEING 737-9 MAX
LEFT MID-EXIT DOOR PLUG SEPARATION
NEAR PORTLAND, OREGON
ON JANUARY 5, 2024
Interview of Edwin J. Clark, Jr.

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA24MA063

PLACE: Renton, Washington

DATE: October 2, 2024

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Karen D. Martini
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *
Investigation of: *
*
ALASKA AIRLINES BOEING 737-9 *
MAX LEFT MID-EXIT DOOR PLUG * Accident No.: DCA24MA063
SEPARATION NEAR PORTLAND, *
OREGON ON JANUARY 5, 2024 *
*
* * * * *

Interview of: AMY WALTHALL, General Supervisor, Second Level
Boeing

Boeing
Renton, Washington

Thursday,
October 3, 2024

APPEARANCES:

DR. SABRINA WOODS, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

NILS JOHNSON
Aviation Accident Investigator (Maintenance)
National Transportation Safety Board

JOHN PETRUZZELLI, Representative
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM)

MATT RIGSBY, Air Safety Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

CAPT BJORN ANDERSON, Representative
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)

TROY LEVANEN, Director of Maintenance and
Engineering Safety
Alaska Airlines

JOHN MILLER, Air Safety Investigator, Seattle
Boeing

MARK BARTLETT, ESQ.
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
Counsel for Ms. Walthall

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I N T E R V I E W

(8:44 a.m. PT)

DR. WOODS: Good morning. It is 0844 Pacific Time. The date is October 3rd, 2024. My name is Dr. Sabrina Woods. I'm a human performance investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board. I am one of the lead investigators co-leading the manufacturing and human performance working group for Accident Investigation Number DCA24MA063 involving Alaska Airlines Flight 1282.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not a part of the Department of Transportation, nor are we part of the FAA. We have no regulatory or enforcement powers.

We are a small agency and with that, when we do investigations, we have parties to the investigation that help inform the process. What you see here in the room are parties to that investigation. I'm going to take a moment out and have all these group members here introduce themselves to you so you have an appreciation and understanding of who you're talking to. Starting with my right, with Nils.

MR. JOHNSON: Hi. Nils Johnson, NTSB. I'm an aviation accident investigator. My specialty is maintenance.

MR. PETRUZZELLI: I'm John Petruzzelli. I represent the IAM here. I am an AMTI at Boeing field when we're working.

1 MR. RIGSBY: I'm Matt Rigsby with the FAA's Office of
2 Accident Investigation, and FAA primary coordinator for the
3 accident.

4 CAPT ANDERSON: Bjorn Anderson. I'm a captain with Alaska
5 Airlines and representing the Air Line Pilots Association.

6 MR. LEVANEN: I'm Troy Levanen. I'm the director of
7 maintenance, operations safety, for Alaska Air Group.

8 MR. MILLER: John Miller, Boeing air safety investigation in
9 the Seattle area.

10 DR. WOODS: So that's it. That's everybody that's going to
11 be asking you questions today. Today, we will be using a digital
12 recorder. After the interview, we will send the recording out to
13 a professional transcription service, and the party members
14 afterwards will have an opportunity to review the transcription
15 just to correct for typographical or like copying, editing types
16 of errors. Once that transcription is recertified, it is what
17 will go forward to be a matter of the public record in the docket.

18 Once again, the purpose of this investigation is to determine
19 probable cause and prevent reoccurrence. You're here because you
20 have a certain subject matter expertise for what you do and your
21 involvement and what you do for work at Boeing. And so we want to
22 help capture that.

23 Each of these group members will have a chance to ask
24 questions. We usually go in two rounds. We will ask questions
25 one at a time, and then there will be an opportunity for a second

1 round for all the group members to ask follow-up questions.

2 Please answer the questions to the best of your ability, to
3 the best of your recollection. However, if you don't understand a
4 question, please ask us to clarify it. We will do the same if we
5 don't understand an answer. If you don't know the answer to a
6 question, I don't know is a perfectly acceptable answer.

7 If at any time you realize you misspoke or you just want to
8 elaborate or you want to correct something, feel free to do so and
9 you can move from person to person make that happen. Just because
10 we will go one at a time does not mean you have to follow that
11 same linear timeline.

12 You are always invited -- or, I'm sorry, entitled to have one
13 representative of your choosing. I see that you have a
14 representative here with you and that you've retained counsel. I
15 want to make sure that the person who is sitting with you is
16 someone that you have chosen to serve as your representative.

17 MS. WALTHALL: I do.

18 DR. WOODS: Okay. With that, thank you, counsel for being
19 there and for supporting Amy for this process. If you would
20 please for the record state your full name and spell your last.

21 MR. BARTLETT: Sure. It's Mark Bartlett, B-a-r-t-l-e-t-t,
22 and I'm a partner with Davis Wright Tremaine here in Seattle.

23 DR. WOODS: Excellent. And thank you for that. Just
24 recognize, counsel, please this is just a safety interview at this
25 time. This is not a deposition. So please refrain from answering

1 on behalf of your client or for objecting to the questioning
2 process.

3 Given that, however, if at any time either of you need a
4 break, please do not hesitate to ask, and we will go off record.
5 We'll pause the recording. You can go attend to whatever it is
6 that you need to attend to, and come back and we'll go back on
7 recording when you are ready.

8 With that, are there any questions at this time?

9 MS. WALTHALL: No.

10 DR. WOODS: No. Okay. Is everybody ready?

11 MS. WALTHALL: Um-hum.

12 INTERVIEW OF AMY WALTHALL

13 BY DR. WOODS:

14 Q. Okay. All right. We're going to get started with hopefully
15 the hardest questions. We'll knock those out first, and the first
16 is, if you would please for the record state your full name and
17 spell your last.

18 A. It's Amy Marie Walthall. That's W-a-l-t-h-a-l-l.

19 Q. Thank you for that. And then what is your duty position
20 currently at Boeing?

21 A. I am a general supervisor, second level manager. So I am --
22 I supervise other managers. Pretty much a manager of managers.

23 Q. Okay. And how long have you held that position?

24 A. August was 2 years. This August of 2024.

25 Q. Okay. So since 2022 essentially --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- you've held that position. Have you done anything
3 previous for Boeing? What other -- I guess what other positions
4 have you worked in across your tenure here at Boeing?

5 A. I started as a mechanic back in 2008. I worked assembling
6 interiors. So I was an assembly mechanic, a 30304. I also worked
7 for shipside support after that for a short period of time where
8 we did this shipside action tracker. We maintained -- like I was
9 in charge of the airplane that was in front of me, and I
10 maintained any non-conformances and stuff and I worked with the
11 people on the floor to get engineering or whoever out there with
12 build issues on the aircraft. And then I became a manager in like
13 2014, a first line leader they called it. And I worked my way up
14 to second level manager which I did in 2022.

15 Q. Okay. And I'm presuming for the --

16 A. Oh, yeah, I do want to clarify something, too. I am the
17 second generation Boeing employee. My father worked for the
18 company for 40 years, and my son also works there. He's an IAM
19 member. He works third shift there at expediting parts.

20 Q. Okay. And I'm assuming at this point, but I'll have you
21 clarify for me, what shift do you typically work? Is that a
22 dayshift operation?

23 A. I work on first shift, yes, dayshift.

24 Q. Okay. And is there an equivalent of your position on any
25 other shift?

1 A. Yes, there is.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. All three shifts.

4 Q. Okay. They also have a general supervisor -- a manager of
5 managers?

6 A. Yes, they do.

7 Q. Okay. Can you please give us I guess a high level overview
8 of what do you do? What's your day in and day out look like?

9 A. So, I currently right now I'm in -- I work the feeder line in
10 the empennage part of the aircraft. So I'm at the very beginning
11 of the flow, and my responsibility is we build subassemblies that
12 we feed to every single flow day. And then I also work the
13 empennage where we roll the vertical stabilizers and the
14 horizontal stabilizers as well. So two departments and then I'm
15 also have the ECAT which is the electrical correction action team.
16 They go out on wiring issues with the aircraft. They go and do a
17 quick review on that. And then I also have the skin burnishers
18 that they call them that they go out and any imperfections that
19 are found on the aircraft, they go work those.

20 Q. So is that your -- what you currently do or is that over two
21 years?

22 A. That's my scope of work that I do each day is that I --
23 because you asked me -- please clarify what I am responsible for
24 each day.

25 Q. Well, I am. So that was my next question, but I just want to

1 know, throughout the 2 years that you've been in this position,
2 has it been the same or have you -- has there been other
3 responsibilities that you've had?

4 A. It's been pretty much the same.

5 Q. Okay. So then yes, please. So actual day in and day out, I
6 show up to work. What happens next?

7 A. So when I show up to work, I review tie ins from the previous
8 shifts to see status of the business at the time to ensure things,
9 you know, are scheduled, ready to go for the day. I conduct a
10 kickoff meeting with my team. They discuss any status, any help
11 needs that they do. I work in the elevated stuff that they're
12 unable to get -- like I pull my peers in to help with it. I
13 attend -- we attend three different meetings in the morning to
14 ensure that the factory is ready to go and -- let me take a minute
15 here. I'm just trying to think. My responsibility is to ensure
16 that my team has everything they need in order to do their job
17 successfully, and they do that by tier meeting. We have a tier 1
18 and tier 2 and tier 3, to get all the information for the day. I
19 help remove any roadblocks that may impede the build. And then I
20 also work with my managers one-on-one to help train them, to
21 ensure that they understand what their job duties are, that
22 they're following the processes and procedures as well. When they
23 have questions, I help them find the right information that they
24 need in order to be successful. And I apologize. I've been
25 dealing with my throat thing for like 6 weeks, and it's

1 frustrating to me. So that's probably why you're seeing some of
2 my frustration right now. I feel like I'm not getting my words
3 out like I should.

4 Q. You're good. Take your time in speaking if you need to. Who
5 so you have a direct line to? Like who do you report to? Who's
6 your boss?

7 A. My boss right now is Steven Lacy (ph.).

8 Q. What is that position?

9 A. He is a director.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. And then also Earl Guyton. I report to both of them.

12 Q. And what does that position do?

13 A. He is like the third level. He oversees five different flow
14 days.

15 Q. Okay. And so who directly reports to you? Who do you have
16 -- who are your subordinates?

17 A. I have -- Kevin Baragen (ph.) is my senior K. He's like --
18 he backs me up. When I'm out, he takes my position. And he also
19 helps with the daily business with the various lines. And then I
20 have Courtney Westmoreland. She has that -- she's responsible for
21 the empennage. I have Phil Long (ph.). He's first shift, feeder
22 line and I have Mark Litzenberg (ph.), he's second shift feeder
23 line, and then I have Darrell Hunter (ph.) who has the ECAT team
24 and the skin burnishers that work for me. And then I have an
25 extra manager right now that kind of a floater that's getting

1 ready. He's job transitioning. His name is Ash -- I can't
2 pronounce -- he goes by Ash Bodarity (ph.).

3 Q. The first person you mentioned, you said is kind of like your
4 right hand. What did you call him?

5 A. Kevin, my right-hand man. He is the senior K. So he is like
6 -- because we have a host of meetings that we have to go to. And
7 he's also like the lead supervisor within the team. Each area has
8 it. Like my peers all have a senior K manager that kind of --
9 when we can't be there focused in the business, they're also
10 focused in the business on what we're doing. They're kind of like
11 an assistant to us.

12 Q. I'm struggling. I'm sorry. What -- a senior K, like the
13 letter K.

14 A. Yeah, that's -- they call them senior Ks. He's just a first
15 line leader --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- but like a lead, kind of like you're lead in your job.
18 He's a lead. So he also works with the supervisors to ensure that
19 they're following the right steps and process and procedures and
20 helping with removing roadblocks.

21 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Sabrina, K level is the pay level. She's
22 an L level.

23 MS. WALTHALL: I'm a L level.

24 BY DR. WOODS:

25 Q. I get it. I see. Okay. That's what I was trying to figure

1 out. What is K.

2 A. I am so sorry.

3 Q. What does K stand for?

4 A. Yeah, because I'm like a L, he's a K and --

5 Q. I get it.

6 A. -- my manager is a M.

7 Q. It makes sense. I'm sorry. I was trying to think of what K
8 could be an acronym for.

9 A. I am so sorry.

10 Q. You're good.

11 A. It's Boeing terminology.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. We actually have a senior K meeting, and they call it
14 official K.

15 Q. So that's the day in and day out. What kind of products do
16 you use for those sorts of meetings? I guess -- I understand that
17 you're kind of looking at the build and how it's going, but are
18 there any specific tools that you use to make decisions? How is
19 the information packaged and brought to you?

20 A. So, I would -- we have a -- it's called DFK, digital kit -- I
21 can't remember exactly the whole acronym right now, but it's
22 similar to like a tie in tool. It shows each area, what's going
23 on in the area, how much, you know, what traveled work there is,
24 what's loaded for the day, what's, you know, scheduled for the
25 day, just kind of your whole day in one view, so you can see. The

1 team leaders and managers both fill information where each of the
2 status of the jobs are so you can see at a glance if there's
3 something there that's kind of got a red flag. This one has a
4 tag. What's going on with it? And that's stuff that I usually
5 review. I usually get there at like 4:30 in the morning to review
6 all that so I'm aware of what's going on. And then when I have my
7 meetings, I'm prepared, with my managers in case they miss
8 something, I'll ask a question, are you sure that's where you want
9 to go with that, you know, to make sure that they're up to date on
10 what's going on with their business. It's one of my expectations
11 is to understand what's going on with your packages and what help
12 is needed.

13 Q. Okay. So --

14 A. And then we have a whole series in this meeting where we look
15 at that. We go through safety first, and then we go through -- we
16 usually have the safety team will come in, share a safety moment.
17 Then we go into -- LSCC will bring up any shipside action tracture
18 (ph.), things that we need attention. And then we go through our
19 parts, shortages that's needed and then we go into what's going on
20 with the build process for each of the managers. And then they go
21 through their status on how many, you know, what their status is.
22 How many people are here, how many -- what their job count, how
23 much they're going to complete and what help they need and what
24 they can't get and reasons why. So pretty much kind of what their
25 plan is for the day.

1 Q. It sounds like you've kind of touched on it already but you
2 mentioned earlier, and we've heard the term roadblock before.
3 What does a roadblock look like? What does a typical roadblock
4 look like and then what tools do you have at your disposal to
5 remove it?

6 A. So in order to -- I have to review it first, what the
7 roadblock is. So, for example, let's say that we came in and we
8 had received from a supplier -- we had a bracket that was not
9 placed properly on the aircraft. Well, we're going to have to go
10 get that fixed before we can proceed on. So we have to go through
11 initiation with quality. We have to have quality go write that
12 up. We have to have initiation which is the second part of
13 quality. They come out and they write up an NCR, and then it has
14 to go through engineering. Once it goes through engineering, then
15 it comes back out and we get a tag disposition that tells us what
16 we have to do in order to go do it. So I call that a -- we call
17 that a roadblock because we can't proceed on with the build until
18 that is, that is resolved.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. And it has to be resolved in per engineering with the correct
21 documentation that tells us how to do it. And so then we kind of
22 evaluate this. If this is a bracket that's not correct, we're
23 going to have to wait and see what engineering tells us to do in
24 order to fix it. Once it's fixed, then we can proceed on with the
25 flow. And then we have to account how long it's going to take us

1 to do that. And then we have to report that up, say, hey, we're
2 going to miss this, and this is why because we have to follow the
3 process and make sure we get the right engineering documentation
4 before we proceed with the build.

5 Q. This day in and day out tasks, do they look the same now as
6 they did prior to the accident occurring or has your job changed
7 at all in that time since?

8 A. My job hasn't changed. I've always followed the company
9 policy and procedure. It's always been part of our protocol at
10 the beginning of the day, to go through the day before, you know,
11 what's planned for the day and then anything will be traveled for
12 the next day or can even travel more than a couple of days. How
13 -- you know, what is the plan and how we're going to resolve those
14 issues.

15 Q. So then let me refine the question. Have the policies and
16 procedures changed at all since before the accident?

17 A. Some of them have changed, yes, especially around quality and
18 how they write stuff up.

19 Q. Can you give us an example?

20 A. So, one of the changes that they made was removals, for
21 example. Only team leaders can write removals, and they made it
22 to where it's not just anybody can go write a removal, that they
23 had to go through training. And we had to ensure that the team
24 leaders all had training prior to writing removals and stuff like
25 that.

1 Q. When changes like that are made, at what level are you
2 involved with making those changes?

3 A. I'm not part of those changes. I can put in a request for a
4 change if I want to make a change, but certain ones -- someone
5 else may have that already put into the pipeline saying that, hey,
6 we need to make a change here.

7 Q. What is your responsibility for communicating those changes?

8 A. I've got to flow it down. Usually -- it goes both ways. It
9 can flow up or it can flow down, right. So it came out. There's
10 emails that say, hey, we're making these changes. Everybody got
11 it and these are the changes. So let's go through them before
12 they actually put it out on the floor to the people. We do and
13 discuss it. We learn about it, and then we go train.

14 Q. Okay. Do you have a process for soliciting feedback from
15 your managers below you and from the touch labor below them?

16 A. During one-on-ones?

17 Q. I don't know what a one-on-one is.

18 A. So, it's kind of like have a one-on-one with -- throughout --
19 sit down and have a candid conversation, how am I performing and
20 how they are performing and it's always -- like I said, it flows
21 both ways. I may need feedback on how I communicate to them as
22 well they have feedback to me on how well they -- I mean I have
23 feedback to them on how well they communicate to me.

24 Q. What about broader issues like things that they're seeing or
25 frustrations that they have or suggestions that they might have?

1 Not so much one-on-one like the interrelationship, but more about
2 the process and procedures of what they're doing a day-to-day
3 basis.

4 A. So, I have a weekly staff meeting where we discuss stuff like
5 that, and then we also have a weekly -- it's called a BPR,
6 business process review, and that's where we talk, like things in
7 the shop or things that people have brought up, and then we also
8 have an employee involvement team that happens every -- that's one
9 of the changes that's been made. Every Tuesday at 9 a.m., we shut
10 down operations and we let the mechanics talk about issues on the
11 floor. We're one of the first teams that initiated that. So we
12 listen to what the employees think, what help they need and
13 whether it be for safety equipment that they need or they have bad
14 equipment that needs to be replaced or they've identified
15 something that might be better.

16 Q. For your position, how involved are you with Boeing's QMS
17 process?

18 A. The quality management system, we review that every day in
19 our meetings, not exactly the system but through the quality --
20 how do I want to put that. Can you repeat the question? I just
21 want to make sure I've got it right.

22 Q. For your position, to what level are you involved with
23 Boeing's QMS program?

24 A. I think I'm very much involved in it in different ways
25 without realizing that I am involved in it.

1 Q. Let's break the question down.

2 A. Okay. Because I know I use it in several different ways.

3 I'm just think of a way --

4 Q. For the metrics that are generated as a product of the QMS
5 program, do you receive and look at those?

6 A. I receive them daily, yes. So it shows me for my specific
7 area, my quality defects that I have in the area, any second issue
8 parts. A lot of it's right there and the reasons why. I can look
9 it up and then I also work projects with a lot of them that are --
10 you see it repeating over and over again. Well, why it this
11 repeating? Let's go take a look at that. So there's several
12 different layers to use that, and I'm just -- because I know we
13 use it every day. It's just hard to explain it, define it, in a
14 way that I think you would understand it other than I receive an
15 email from every day. It's autogenerated. I have it set up for
16 just my -- well, my staff analyst sends it to me every morning,
17 and I pull that up and I see what's going on. And then also in
18 the BPR meetings, we get them for the month, and sometimes we --
19 well, let's go back and look six months, let's see if there's any
20 trends in there. So it's a system that you can go it. It shows
21 you everything from NCRs to pickups to stuff that you can even get
22 CAR data and stuff like that.

23 Q. And do you get to be the primary decision maker on those
24 things or are you just kind of staffing data up and down?

25 A. No, I let my team make the decision, and I back them. I

1 approve -- I let them write within reason because I have a lot of
2 experience and a lot of knowledge, and I transfer it to them but,
3 yes, I let them tell me. They present to me what they are -- how
4 they're going to go about to fix certain things and then they
5 perform it within -- perform it the way and with the system.

6 Q. Okay. So it's all about you being the receiver of data.

7 What about data that you generate to push up the chain from you?

8 A. So that would be in my BPR file that we work weekly.

9 Q. What kind of information is in there?

10 A. That's all -- it's all the projects that we're working
11 around, safety, quality and defects and any permits that we didn't
12 get out, projects that are coming from the floor up.

13 Q. With your experience and where you've been, what metrics or
14 data points do you feel are the most important to look at that you
15 really know that you need to keep on top of in order to ensure a
16 smooth production?

17 A. It would -- quality is pretty important.

18 Q. Quality is a very broad topic.

19 A. Yeah. So all around the fit, form and function of the build.

20 Q. What kind of metrics are indicators of fit, form and
21 function? What can you look at to know that you're achieving
22 those things?

23 A. It would be the quality.

24 Q. What does quality mean?

25 A. Quality means that you do it right the first time. If

1 there's any type of non-conformances, they have to be addressed,
2 and we have to fix them correctly. So if -- I'm trying to think
3 of a good way of wording this. Give me a second. So, for
4 example, if you are -- I'm not going to use an airplane for this.
5 If you go to a fast food restaurant, and you order a hamburger
6 with no onions and a salad instead of French fries, and they bring
7 you the wrong thing consistently every time, you've got to figure
8 out why they're not getting the order right. So, when it comes to
9 aircraft, the same thing. If you're receiving something that
10 someone passed on to you, and it's not correct, are you just going
11 to accept that and fix it, or are you going to write it up and go
12 trace that back to where the defect started to get it completed.

13 Q. So it sounds like a non-conformance is an indicator of you
14 not achieving the level of quality that you want.

15 A. Correct.

16 Q. So that's going by like what things you look at --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. -- what tools you have.

19 A. So a lot of times it's not what you think. You've got to go
20 back. You've got to investigate because if you don't get back to
21 exactly what's creating that defect, you're just, you're just band
22 aiding yourself, and it's not resolving what the true issue is.

23 Q. So in your experience, what have you seen -- let's go up to
24 the point of the accident. So let's go up to before January of
25 this year. You've been in the position since August of 2022. So

1 let's go August 2022 to January -- well, December, December of
2 2023. What are some of the routine things that you were seeing
3 that are issues that are holding up and being -- inhibiting
4 quality on your production?

5 A. Things being rushed.

6 Q. Rushed by who?

7 A. Leadership.

8 Q. So let's explore that further. Leadership is rushing in
9 their day-to-day operation?

10 A. Well, they're wanting to move to the next flow day, to push
11 it to the next flow day to get it through the system but it's not
12 always ready.

13 Q. And how is that desire communicated?

14 A. Usually it's face-to-face.

15 Q. In these meetings that you have each day?

16 A. What's holding you up? How come we haven't got that resolved
17 yet?

18 Q. So how do you deal with that question?

19 A. I said it takes time. You have to let people go do their job
20 and some of these things you can't rush.

21 Q. And how is that received?

22 A. Not very well.

23 Q. So what are your recourse to --

24 A. Can I take a moment?

25 Q. Sure.

1 MR. BARTLETT: Let's take a break.

2 DR. WOODS: No problem. Let's go off the record at 9:16
3 Pacific Time.

4 (Off the record at 9:16 a.m. PT.)

5 (On the record at 9:23 a.m. PT.)

6 DR. WOODS: Okay. We're back on the record at 9:23 Pacific
7 Time.

8 BY DR. WOODS:

9 Q. Going back to kind of the line of questioning and about
10 essentially rushing might be the biggest issue that you've seen
11 leading up to the accident, dealing with supervision --
12 supervisory levels higher than you, so then how do you deal with
13 that when communicating those desires to the people below you? So
14 the managers are below you and the touch labor below them.

15 A. We're going to follow process. We can't change it if
16 something needs to be fixed. It's just like sometimes this, you
17 know, they're wondering why it taking so long.

18 Q. Okay. So when you communicate, hey, this is the issue, this
19 is how long it's going to take, per the manual essentially, to get
20 it sorted, does that -- does it end there or is there still
21 pushback?

22 A. There's pushback, but you explain that you have wait for the
23 process to go through.

24 Q. And have you ever provided feedback that, hey, sometimes
25 there's pressure when there's these constraints. There's nothing

1 we can do.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Who has that feedback been provided to?

4 A. To my -- the person asking me why it's not ready yet.

5 Q. What about beyond that person?

6 A. I talk to my team, too, that we're going to do it right, and
7 I'll let them know that I'm getting pressure but I'm trying to
8 take the pressure for them. I'm letting them know that I'm here
9 for them and that we're going to fix it right. We have to.

10 Q. Who do you talk to if you have an issue that you want
11 addressed?

12 A. Usually I would HR.

13 Q. For a production issue?

14 A. Oh, no, no. I thought you -- for a production issue, no, I
15 would go talk to the shipside support team. Sorry, I thought you
16 were going a different way there.

17 Q. So if you have -- I guess more of a procedural issue with
18 production like, hey, this process has a problem because of
19 whatever, several non-conformances. Maybe there's a supply issue.
20 You have concerns. Who are you talking to?

21 A. I'm talking to quality because if I'm seeing it, your guys
22 should be seeing it, too.

23 Q. Okay. And is that, is that person in quality, is that a
24 commensurate level with you in terms of duty and position or --

25 A. No.

1 Q. Are they higher, lower?

2 A. Lower.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So I have a first line leader that -- a QA that's assigned to
5 my team that he attends my tier meetings, and I will talk to Terry
6 that, hey, we need to go take a look at this and let's have a
7 gemba and let's get engineering and everybody out there so we can
8 go find out what's going on. Let's get everybody out there at
9 once and try and get to this instead of me trying to guess it.

10 Q. So anyone higher than that, above your position that you can
11 go to and say, hey, boss, I got a problem.

12 A. Yeah, actually I can elevate it to Terry's manager which is
13 my peer, and then I can also elevate it to my boss and have them
14 all out there during the -- I'm a big believer in the gemba.
15 Let's go get this ironed out. Let's get everybody there that
16 needs to be, the TEs. Let's get the MEs. Let's get quality, the
17 initiator and also the LEs out on the floor. I want everybody
18 there that can be part to go solve this. So we're not going back
19 and forth.

20 Q. What percentage of your time would you say arguably that you
21 have to work doing that sort of thing, getting those -- bring
22 everybody, problem solve?

23 A. I'll skip meetings to be out on the floor to do that. I
24 would say right now the percentage of my time spending on that
25 time is about 60 percent of the time I'm on the floor working

1 known issues that need help.

2 Q. And has that decreased over your time in this position or
3 increased or stayed steady?

4 A. Stayed pretty much steady.

5 Q. So what about since the accident? Have there been any
6 procedural process changes that have affected how those
7 interactions work? Are you still seeing the same amount of rush,
8 the same amount of pressure?

9 A. No.

10 Q. So what do you think changed?

11 A. There's a lot of changes in our leadership.

12 Q. And with that leadership change, has there been a change in
13 philosophy or have there been process changes?

14 A. There's been some process changes, yes. I can't name them
15 all but, yes.

16 Q. What about a change in philosophy?

17 A. Understanding, yeah, understanding that it takes time to fix
18 certain things.

19 Q. A couple of more questions about production. Now, dealing
20 with touch labor. I know you're a step above but because you have
21 been with the company for so long, I'm sure you've seen some
22 things come and go. Over the last 5 years, can you give me an
23 understanding of how your workforce demographic has changed? And
24 by demographic, to give you some examples, what I mean is level of
25 experience, training, longevity with the company, coming from

1 other industries commensurate with aviation production, that sort
2 of thing, how has that changed?

3 A. Well, it's changed -- I can't really say 5 years. If I go
4 back like 10 years ago is when I started -- well, it's been about
5 5 years. The whole interview process has changed. It was one of
6 the processes I saw changed. Prior to me becoming a manager, I
7 interviewed seven times in order to get the position. The process
8 that I saw change is how they interview first line managers. A
9 lot of the questions are not there that I had to answer which made
10 the interview easier to pass.

11 Q. What are some of the considerations where they -- what were
12 the questions focused on? Is it like -- there's different
13 buckets, right? So you have like, I don't know, maybe production
14 experience versus like interpersonal relationships versus, you
15 know --

16 MR. JOHNSON: Soft skills.

17 DR. WOODS: Yeah.

18 MS. WALTHALL: Yeah, it pretty much -- the whole -- the
19 hardest question was completely removed. Tell us what's prepared
20 you for this position. It's one of the toughest questions and the
21 first time that I volunteered for the interviews, I couldn't
22 believe we weren't asking that question. It was more about, tell
23 me a time when like the STAR, you know, one around safety, one
24 around quality, one around diversity, one around culture.

25 BY DR. WOODS:

1 Q. So why do you think the removal of such questions has done
2 for now the most recent applicants going on to be managers? How's
3 that affected the output?

4 A. Not getting people with the right qualifications. That first
5 question is telling what's prepared you. It's about your
6 experience, what has led you to this position.

7 Q. Um-hum. And you don't feel that's captured other ways in the
8 interview process?

9 A. They would let them like at the end if you had anything you'd
10 like to add. But they now reverted to the old way that they used
11 to in the recent year.

12 Q. What about the mechanics themselves? Has there been any
13 changes you've seen essentially since the production line started
14 back up in 2021 as to what they -- what your labor force looks
15 like? Where they're coming from? What experience did they have?

16 A. I'm not really part of that, but what I have seen is the way
17 training themselves -- itself. It used to be like a 6 week thing.
18 Now, it's a 3 month thing. Recently, but prior to the -- it
19 wasn't as -- it was like a 6 to 8 week training before they come
20 out on the floor and a lot of times, they didn't have all the
21 training that needed. So you'd have to put them back in classes,
22 and they'd have to shadow people before they could actually begin
23 to do their job.

24 Q. And that's no longer the way it is?

25 A. No, they spend 3 months in training.

1 Q. When was that change made?

2 A. I can't remember exactly when that change was made.

3 Q. Okay. Have you seen a difference in -- because you're the
4 second level. You were reviewing again when I asked you about
5 data, what tells you that the quality is going right or it tells
6 you that something's off. Have you seen fluctuations in that over
7 the last 5 years when tracing back the source, it leads back to
8 the touch labor?

9 A. Yeah. Yeah.

10 Q. So how has it fluctuated?

11 A. They're coming out more prepared to work on the aircraft.
12 Before, they didn't have all the skills they needed. You'd have
13 to send them over to the workplace coaches to get brought up to
14 speed or put them into more training.

15 Q. So how would you say your quality has changed over the last 5
16 years at your level, what you're seeing for the production itself?
17 Increase, decrease, stay steady.

18 A. It stayed steady. My statement of work is so small compared
19 to the rest of the line. I have a pretty good team that follows
20 through to get stuff. They track it.

21 Q. Do you interact at all with the other YOU's (ph.) across the
22 rest of the build?

23 A. Yes, daily.

24 Q. Are their perceptions? Do you know? I mean this is a more
25 perspective questions, but are their perceptions the same? Are

1 they having the same issues you are or are they having more
2 issues, less issues?

3 A. I would say depending on the area, they probably have more
4 issues than I do.

5 Q. Okay. Moving slightly into a different category, and they
6 I'll -- I've been talking for a while. So I'll move on. What is
7 your -- for your position, your level of involvement with Boeing's
8 safety management system?

9 A. I am the safety champion for final assembly on first shift.

10 Q. What does that mean?

11 A. I, weekly, do a safety walk with all the safety focals (ph.)
12 and we walk different areas. Safety is very important to me. We
13 go do spot checks in different areas, and we give advice on things
14 with the -- I work with the IAM members, but also the EHS team is
15 part of that, and I also have joint programs that walk with me.

16 Q. How do you identify -- how do you go about identifying
17 hazards?

18 A. By observing, watching people work, talking to people in the
19 area about safety, if they have any safety concerns.

20 Q. And then once a hazard is identified, what happens next?

21 A. It's put into the safety management system as either a hazard
22 -- as a hazard, and it's reviewed by EHS, and we share that
23 information daily in our safety -- in our tier meetings, all the
24 way, tier 1, tier 2, tier 3, and then I also product with my team.
25 Once a week on Wednesdays at approximately 9 o'clock, I do a

1 safety walk with my first line managers and the safety focals for
2 the area are invited as well, too, and we walk our area and look
3 for -- and talk to our people about safety, things that can be
4 changed.

5 Q. Can you help me out with the acronym, EHS? What is that?

6 A. It's our safety team, environmental --

7 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Health and safety.

8 MS. WALTHALL: Yeah. I couldn't even say that. I just
9 completely drew a blank, but it's our safety team. EHS is
10 environmental -- I can't --

11 BY DR. WOODS:

12 Q. That's fine.

13 A. Yeah, team. I don't know why I just totally drew a blank.

14 Q. So, what you described does sound quite a bit like
15 occupational safety, like occupational health and safety.

16 A. Yeah, it is.

17 Q. What about product safety?

18 A. Same thing.

19 Q. How so? How so walking around, help identify product safety,
20 hazards with product safety?

21 A. Okay. So I'll ask an employee how they do their job and how
22 they function in it, and if they're having difficulties doing
23 something and they may not be able to achieve the job without
24 either creating damage to the product or to themselves as well.
25 So putting themselves at risk in order to get the job done. So

1 how do we go get some type of ergo thing for them to do it or
2 something that may prevent from damaging the product like a new
3 type of tool or something.

4 Q. How confident are you that the managers under you and the
5 touch labor under them, if they see something wrong, if they see
6 an issue, regardless where it falls in our occupational safety or
7 maybe a problem with the build itself, that they will relay that
8 information up?

9 A. They do. I feel very confident.

10 Q. How do they do that?

11 A. They report it in the safety management system as a hazard
12 and we review it.

13 Q. Who is we?

14 A. We go out to where the issue is and we do a gemba.

15 Q. I said who is we?

16 A. Like my managers, the environmental safety group and any type
17 of like MEDE that could potentially help with a solution to -- can
18 help with a solution as to what's going on.

19 Q. Have you ever had concerns that people might overlook things
20 or hide things or just ignore things because it's just too much
21 trouble to report or they might get in trouble for reporting?

22 A. Can you repeat that again?

23 Q. Have you ever had a concern that the people under you or the
24 touch labor under them might be unwilling to report for any
25 reason?

1 A. Well, I think there's always concern, but I'm not aware of it
2 happening.

3 Q. Okay. All right. I'm going to go on and pass it off because
4 you've been talking to me for a bit. So I'm going to go to my
5 right with Nils.

6 BY MR. JOHNSON:

7 Q. Good morning.

8 A. Good morning. How familiar are you with the vendor assist
9 process?

10 A. With the who?

11 Q. Vendor assist process.

12 A. Oh, I understand it.

13 Q. Can you describe how it works?

14 A. So for vendor assist, usually they would put in a shipside
15 action tracker saying that they need assistance from the vendor,
16 that barge (ph.) would assist with getting the vendor out there
17 once everything was ready to go. You've got to have people, parts
18 and a plan.

19 Q. Are vendors allowed to gain access or undo previously
20 completed assemblies?

21 A. No.

22 Q. So what is the process to gain access if access is needed an
23 area by a vendor?

24 A. They usually work with a Boeing representative that is --
25 will help assist them get the access to that area.

1 Q. Okay. What has a messaging been for management to production
2 regarding the generation of pickups and removals?

3 A. Can you rephrase -- can you say that again? I'm sorry.

4 Q. What is the messaging been from management to production to -
5 - regarding the generation of pickups and removals? In other
6 words, are they encouraged to write things up if they see defects?

7 A. Yeah. That's the process.

8 Q. But you're reinforcing that?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. Similar question. Are team members encouraged to
11 write up anything they see wrong with an aircraft?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Okay. Have you ever told a team member not to write
14 something up?

15 A. No, I never did that.

16 Q. As a manager -- have there been cases where you've had to
17 remind personnel to document their work?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Is that a lot of people or just a few individuals? How does
20 that -- is it systemic or is it --

21 A. No --

22 Q. -- just a few ducks?

23 A. A few ducks, yeah.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Just a few.

1 Q. That's the same question. I won't ask it again. What team
2 or group at Boeing Renton would have responsibility for opening or
3 removing an MED plug?

4 A. That would be either the door crew or the door masters.

5 Q. Okay. Are there any other groups or teams at Boeing Renton
6 that would open a plug?

7 A. Maybe the traveler's team that the expertise, but I would
8 think it would be the team.

9 Q. What kind of paperwork is generated when a MED plug needs to
10 be opened?

11 A. Well, there should be some type of quality written up. There
12 should be a reason why, and there should removals written.

13 Q. What happens to the hardware if removed from a part as part
14 of a removal?

15 A. It should be all documented and put into like the used bags
16 for fasteners and stuff like that, and they should put work in
17 progress stickers on them with the identifying NCR pickup or
18 whatever engineering documentation tells them to do so.

19 Q. Where are those bags stored?

20 A. It should be on the work in process rack that's for that
21 aircraft.

22 Q. I remember you said you used to work on the LSCC. So I'm
23 sure you're very familiar with that process. Is hardware ever
24 reused?

25 A. Sometimes, yes. It depends on if what the engineering

1 documentation tells you to do.

2 Q. Okay. Should there be any issue opening and closing removal
3 or rig with a MED plug? Are the door personnel typically the ones
4 that work the issue? If not, who else can -- who else at Boeing
5 could work a MED plug? It's kind of a duplicate question, I'm
6 sorry.

7 A. That's okay. It would most likely be the door crew.

8 Q. All right. So what are the functions of the both the AOG
9 team and the SST group at Renton?

10 A. Yeah, those two teams could. You're correct. So SST, if
11 they were requested to go do that, it would pretty much be
12 documented, and similar with the AOG. You have to call to get
13 permission to use those people, and they have -- it's an online.
14 They call it AFFOS, A-F-F-O-S, board that they use when any of
15 that is documented.

16 Q. A-F-F-O-S.

17 A. They call it AFFOS. It's an online factory -- I can't
18 remember but usually you call the SST manager and through the
19 barge, write a SAT, the barge would contact them. They would put
20 it on the board if they're going to look at it.

21 Q. Okay. I've got some very specific questions about 8789 --

22 A. Okay.

23 Q. -- the incident -- accident -- the incident airplane. So you
24 said you were very familiar with SATs being a former member of the
25 LSCC. So have you reviewed the SAT related to the removal or the

1 five fasteners being replaced due to tooling marks?

2 A. Back in September, when somebody asked me to go take a look
3 at it.

4 Q. Okay. Good. So, on September 17th, which was a Sunday at
5 4:44 p.m., it says LSCC FLL Sue Li (ph.) had spoken with first
6 shift general, Amy, who was going to help opening the mid exit
7 door. It says manager, Daniel Durham (ph.), will assist as well.
8 ECD will be set for the 18th for a status update. There is a
9 later update. I'm just trying to kind of refresh your memory. So
10 there's a later update at 6:15 on that same day that said, update,
11 senior manager, Amy Walthall, worked with door crew manager, [REDACTED]
12 [REDACTED] and/or Vincent Jessie to determine if the door can
13 merely be opened or it needs removal. If removal needs -- if a
14 removal is needed, then a new removal needs to be written first.
15 And doing this, I really want to understand kind of the thinking
16 because it seemed like in reading the SAT that there was confusion
17 whether it was a door, a plug, you know, if it was just being
18 opened like a L1 door is just opened or if it was -- you had to
19 take out fasteners and lay it open onto a tool. So can you kind
20 of walk me through the thought process at least at that point in
21 time on the 17th?

22 A. Yeah, I think there is some confusion there because I was
23 contacted and asked if I could help with that, and I said, let me
24 go investigate and find out what's going on. And, I never said I
25 was going to open it because I needed to see who -- for number 1,

1 how am I going -- I'm going to be very clear on this. So I am a
2 manager for the feeder line in the empennage area. Every
3 Thursday, we have -- so I represent the whole factory on the
4 weekend. Every Thursday, at 10 a.m. all the general supervisors
5 get together and we talk about our weekend plan. This was not
6 brought up in the weekend plan that help was needed, that they
7 needed this done during the weekend. I had recently just returned
8 to work from a LOA because I had my knee replaced. So before I
9 did anything, I wanted to make to sure it was something that could
10 be done. So they asked me if I could go take a look at it because
11 they were trying to update the SAT system. And I said I would go
12 take a look at it. I think they took it as I was going to go do
13 it, but I said I would go take a look at it. I looked at it, and
14 I realized that I did not have the skilled labor there, and it
15 wasn't part of the weekend plan. So I told them we needed to wait
16 until the proper people are here during the week.

17 Q. Okay. So we know that the door plug was opened on the 18th
18 between 7 and 10 a.m. roughly.

19 A. That's Monday.

20 Q. Yeah, that's Monday. In your written statement you said that
21 you escalated the issue to Wendell and Christopher, and Cristoff
22 Joseph (ph.) on September 17th, 2023. What was that
23 communication?

24 A. I was just letting them know that we had a build issue, and
25 it was -- it didn't seem like it had been properly followed. And

1 I was like this is a red flag to me. There's something not right
2 here.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. So when they asked me to go take a look at it, I looked at
5 it, and I said I don't think that it's anything that we can solve
6 until people are here during the week.

7 Q. Okay. Also in your written statement you suggested you had
8 two employees, I won't list their names, but you had two employees
9 that could provide support to open or remove the plug. Do you
10 know why those two were --

11 A. We had two employees that were from the door crew that I was
12 going to go talk to, to see if they had the expertise and they did
13 not.

14 Q. So the two you listed were door crew personnel?

15 A. I believe so. They were here because when you're the duty
16 supervisor, you -- they're not door plug guys. They work from
17 that team, but they don't all work the same -- like they could be
18 working the galley doors and have nothing to do with that door
19 because there's several different doors on the aircraft. So I
20 didn't have the people that -- to my knowledge at that time, I
21 don't think we had ever taken one of those out before.

22 Q. Okay. So I think you've answered this. I ask it directly.
23 On September 17th, did you personally go down and look at the
24 left-hand MED plug on 8789?

25 A. I can't remember for sure. I think I did, but I can't

1 remember for sure if I did at this point.

2 Q. Okay. And on September 17th, did you know it was a plug and
3 not just a mid exit door?

4 A. I realized that later, yes --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. -- once I (indiscernible) because I hear different things
7 from people.

8 Q. The phone game. On -- in your written statement on September
9 18th, you spoke with a member of the door team to explain that the
10 team present on the weekend could not open or remove the left-hand
11 MED plug prior to handoff. Do you recall whom you spoke to?

12 A. I can't recollect at this time. I can't really remember.

13 Q. And my last question for this round is was the door crew then
14 supporting the MED plug opening/removal at that point, they took
15 over for your -- the issue that had been handed to you over the
16 weekend, did they take ownership of that issue on that Monday
17 morning?

18 A. Correct. At that time, I moved on back to my area. I didn't
19 have a say on that at all.

20 Q. And you mention that because you had all group coverage for
21 the weekend. That's really how this --

22 A. From feeder line all the way to ramp.

23 Q. But that's how this ended up in your lap over the weekend is
24 because --

25 A. Right.

1 Q. -- you had everything? Your area didn't sound like the right
2 area. So I was trying to figure out how you got kind of pinged
3 with this.

4 A. I don't even think I had employees in that weekend, but we
5 were set up to work weekends, and you have to be there to elevate
6 stuff.

7 Q. Thank you very much.

8 MR. JOHNSON: John.

9 BY MR. PETRUZZELLI:

10 Q. Have you always worked on 37 program?

11 A. Correct.

12 Q. Okay. And always in Renton?

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. Okay. You have 30304. What other jobs do you have?

15 A. I mainly have 30304s and a few electricians.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And a couple of sealers.

18 Q. Okay. And how many -- I listened to how many -- or the names
19 of your direct reports, five or six today direct reports?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Including ECAT. That's --

22 A. Yeah, we have the whole factory. Any electrical issues,
23 yeah.

24 Q. Let's see. And you report to a director and not a third
25 level?

1 A. I -- both of them are on my -- I roll up to Steve Lacy but
2 Earl signs my time.

3 Q. Okay. You talked about removals, the change of the team
4 leads and you -- what's the status now of who can write removals?

5 A. Now, it's back to if you've been through the training, you
6 can write removals.

7 Q. Okay. Do your -- when I say your folks, not the quality
8 people, but your mechanics, do they write removals as well?

9 A. The team leaders still do it.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. They just like to do it that way.

12 Q. Right, and what I'm poking at is it's not necessarily a
13 quality person has to write the removals?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Okay. Good. Sabrina was asking you about roadblocks, and
16 there was -- you were talking about NCRs and roadblocks. Do you
17 consider all NCR activity roadblocks?

18 A. No.

19 Q. Can you give an example of what you're --

20 A. Some are pretty well spelled, you know, bracket turned
21 backward, right. So you just remove, you know, remove the bracket
22 and put it in the right configuration. But then you have your
23 other ones when you have damage or something and it's going to
24 take longer.

25 Q. Gotcha. Coming from -- and you had a background you said in

1 interior installation, right?

2 A. Um-hum.

3 Q. How familiar are you with the VPIN (ph.) removals, and you
4 can even compare and contrast it from 2000-ish to today?

5 A. Well, it's changed quite a bit. In 2008, when I first
6 started there, we -- when you wrote a removal, usually the team
7 lead did it, and you'd have to get quality inspection to come out
8 to say, okay, you can remove that. Then it reverted about 2014,
9 maybe sooner, where it was just go ahead and remove it. You can
10 write the removal and remove it. You don't need quality to look
11 at it. But quality looks at it at the very end, but not when you
12 remove it. Since they've changed that back into the process
13 quality goes and looks and tells you if it's okay to remove or
14 not.

15 Q. And going back to your experience in interior. So I'm just
16 making a story up here. You're pulling a galley out, for example.
17 There's other things you have to pull out. The people that report
18 up to you, they understand the complexity, the complex removals?

19 A. Yeah.

20 Q. It's something we deal with in the field, but I don't
21 always --

22 A. So I have the skin burnishers. A lot of times in order to
23 get to the skin, we have to remove a lot of components.

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. So we do not touch the aircraft until it's been properly

1 documented and removals have been made. We don't do the removals.
2 We're like a support team that comes in and we'll go fix the skin
3 if it's -- but we will go out and walk with the team and tell them
4 everything that needs to be removed and once the removals are
5 done, and it's ready for us, give us a call and we'll come out and
6 we'll do our part.

7 Q. How many burnishers do you guys have?

8 A. I have six right now.

9 Q. Wow. And --

10 A. Well, we've got some that are getting ready to retire. So we
11 want to make sure we've got the other ones trained.

12 Q. Through the whole factory?

13 A. Yeah. We also go out and help the field all the time, too.

14 Q. Yeah, okay. What --

15 A. Sometimes we go all the way to SDC.

16 Q. We've seen the guys there. Going to where you're shifting
17 the pushback and the pressure, in the previous questions, is -- it
18 sounds like since the accident that you're not getting quite the
19 pushback you used to on issues. Can you talk about that a little
20 bit? From leadership. You talked about airplane moving to the
21 next position. That used to be a real driver.

22 A. Yeah. It seems like the urgency is not the pressure from the
23 urgency to get things done is not there. I'm just a messenger
24 most of the time telling them that, hey, this is the situation,
25 but it felt like that wasn't a good enough answer. So you get

1 beat up for that. Even though you're telling them that this is
2 where we're at and this is why we're there, it's still not good
3 enough. We're doing the best we can.

4 Q. Understood. And what I'm kind of poking to is, is that
5 pushback? Is it less now than it was pre-accident?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Okay. Significantly?

8 A. Yeah.

9 Q. Okay. You brought something up about interviews. It sounded
10 like you were talking about structured interviews.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. And you were talking specifically about interviews for
13 managers?

14 A. Um-hum.

15 Q. Okay. Gotcha. And you -- but you're kind of reverting back
16 to actually finding out if people are qualified?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Good. That's actually good to hear --

19 A. Well, it's --

20 Q. -- telling us about a time and how did it make you feel --

21 A. Sure. Sure.

22 Q. -- when you struggled with those?

23 A. Yeah, those are tough questions but they need to be answered.

24 Q. Yeah. I think I'm good for this round. Thank you.

25 A. Okay.

1 DR. WOODS: Matt.

2 BY MR. RIGSBY:

3 Q. At your level, when the FAA comes in, when our ASIs come in
4 and do their audits, are -- do they interact with you all?

5 A. I'm out there on the floor with my team.

6 Q. You're out there on the floor. Okay. Are you a primary
7 contact for them or do they have somebody else with them?

8 A. They usually have someone else. They have a representative.
9 That person will (indiscernible) them.

10 Q. Okay. And when they -- I guess when they're contacting you
11 for an area that they want to inspect and if nothing's going on in
12 that area, are you the person that says, that area's -- they're
13 not doing anything. It's not going to do any good to do an audit?

14 A. Yeah, I would let them know what the schedule is for the day
15 or what time a procedure's going to be done.

16 Q. Okay. Do you have any interact with the contract employees
17 that do work, like the Spirit employees that -- doing the repairs
18 that the Boeing mechanics can't do? Do you interact with them?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Do you -- are you part of that scheduling process?

21 A. No, I'm not part of that scheduling process.

22 Q. Okay. If there's a problem with Spirit employees, that's
23 reported up to the mechanics, would that come up to your level?

24 A. No.

25 Q. No. Okay. How do you think the information flow from the

1 mechanic level up to your level is? Is it open communication?

2 A. For me it is.

3 Q. Okay. Is it a culture that you've established, kind of an
4 open door policy, you see something wrong. Have you people come
5 to you with stuff and you say, hey, that's what speak up's for?
6 Do you report it up through speak up?

7 A. Yeah.

8 Q. Good. Have you got feedback from on the speak up program?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Okay. Positive?

11 A. Yeah.

12 Q. Okay. In your opinion, is it -- is speak up a positive
13 culture establishing that positive culture?

14 A. It is. It's just getting there to -- because a lot of people
15 were afraid to use it at first but over the last year, I've
16 convinced even a union steward to use it one time, and he came and
17 thanked me later. He's like -- because they thought they were
18 going to get in trouble, and I said, no. I'm like, you're not
19 going to get in trouble.

20 Q. Okay. Is that -- I mean it sounds like you have the
21 generational background for a lot of the Boeing stuff. Is that a
22 change that you've seen from the time that you started as a
23 mechanic --

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. -- until today?

1 A. Yep.

2 Q. Okay. Sorry. Some of my questions have already been asked.

3 A. Yeah, you're fine.

4 Q. Since you kind of have some of that generational knowledge of
5 the workforce in general, do you feel that there's been either a
6 positive or a negative change in how an employee use the
7 criticality of their job and how -- I mean they're doing the same
8 thing day after day after day, but do they realize that what
9 they're doing, if they don't do it good or do it in accordance
10 with the procedure -- process and procedures and downstream
11 affects some potential accident. Has that changed?

12 A. I think it's changed in a couple of different ways, yes.

13 Q. Okay. Well, what are those ways?

14 A. I think that one time it was very brought up, and then we
15 went through a period of time where people weren't bringing it up
16 and started bringing it up again.

17 Q. Okay. Since you have a background with the SATs and
18 everything, in the past, in a SAT when they put -- are describing
19 a process or something that needs to be done, and they put dollar
20 signs before the event, do you know -- does that mean anything?

21 A. I know about the stars, I'm not too sure about the dollar
22 signs. Usually that brings attention that, hey, this is --

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. -- like kind of attention.

25 Q. Um-hum.

1 A. This is pretty important.

2 Q. Okay. But the dollar signs, you don't know.

3 A. I'm not sure. They have meant to use the stars because I
4 know the stars are usually what they use.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. It could have been a typo.

7 Q. Do the quality managers report to you or is that a separate
8 chain?

9 A. Separate change (ph.).

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. They support.

12 Q. Okay. So if quality sees a persistent issue, would they
13 report it up to an equivalent of you or would they come across
14 lines and say, hey, Amy, we're seeing this?

15 A. It's an equivalent of me that they would report it up to, but
16 sometimes it's the guy he communicates it to me, what's going on.

17 Q. And I think you've answered this, but I'm just trying to make
18 it clear, that door crews do not report to you, right?

19 A. No, they do not.

20 Q. Have you heard of discontent between the mechanics and Spirit
21 employees?

22 A. I'm actually not aware of any of that if that's happening.

23 Q. Okay. The rest of mine have been asked and answered. Thank
24 you.

25 DR. WOODS: Bjorn.

1 BY CAPT ANDERSON:

2 Q. Thanks, Amy.

3 A. Um-hum.

4 Q. The speak up program, how has the company promoted that to
5 the employees?

6 A. Well, all through training, flow down. Right around -- just
7 after the end of COVID, it was introduced to the company to where
8 we -- in training, we reviewed it, and then we went out and we
9 trained our employees on it, and we did it in steps. We didn't
10 like blast it all to them. We kind of took steps, but at the time
11 I think there was still a lot of like we're not sure about this.

12 Q. And when you have new employees that come, how are they being
13 introduced to the program?

14 A. That's a good question. It's something I should be aware. I
15 believe it's through their functional training, but I'm going to
16 go check that out because I'm not sure.

17 Q. And would you say that the trends of reporting have increased
18 or decreased since January of this year?

19 A. Now, I don't see that metric. So that's another one that's a
20 good question that I'm going to have to go look into and find out.
21 I know we talk about it, speak ups, but we don't -- because it's
22 an anonymous thing, they don't talk about how many's been turned
23 in and how many have been resolved pretty much, you know, because
24 it's all anonymous but I think resolved, I think it would be nice
25 to know that number.

1 Q. I'm going to ask some questions about the shipside action
2 tracker. We've got a lot of information over the last few months
3 on it. So we understand it's not an official build document, but
4 what are the -- what's the training and what's the process for
5 using it? And what I mean by that is when is it required to
6 document on the shipside action tracker?

7 A. So any known build issues that may need elevation or help
8 from other support teams. So it's a communication tool to say,
9 hey, we have a beacon here. We've got a problem, and the people
10 who maintain the SAT system, the LSCC, they're supposed to draw
11 those people together into the area to help with the issue.

12 Q. Okay. And if information is put on the SAT incorrectly, how
13 can that be corrected?

14 A. You can't. Any updates that are made, I don't think you can
15 hid those, at least you couldn't when I was, you know, we were
16 called pit bosses by then. You could not edit that, but the
17 initial statement, you could actually go in and put the correct
18 information, update it, like if a part number was off or whatnot,
19 you know, on, you know, just make corrections.

20 Q. Gotcha. And what level of leadership has access or monitors
21 the SAT? Like how high would leadership go that would monitor --

22 A. All the way to the top, (indiscernible) could go up a SAT.

23 Q. Okay. And that historical data that's stored, is it still
24 accessible?

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. Okay. And how far back would that data go? Do you know?

2 A. It would go back as far as from the beginning of time, or at
3 least when I started. When they started that.

4 Q. Good to know. Let's see. That was asked. One of the
5 questions you responded about getting some rushing pressure from
6 leadership and that's changed recently. Does leadership listen?

7 A. Not always.

8 Q. Okay. And --

9 A. I think they listen, but they -- if they don't like what they
10 hear, they get upset.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. I'm just being honest.

13 Q. And how are they receptive to challenges in the production?

14 A. Can you clarify that?

15 Q. So if pressure is being put on you from leadership and you
16 are providing information about what is going on during the
17 operations, challenges of what might be leading towards slowdowns
18 or just a hurdle that might need to be addressed, if it's
19 something that is not going to be addressed quickly or can't be
20 rushed, how do they receive information that's not going to solve
21 a problem quickly?

22 A. They usually show up in my area and find out what exactly is
23 going on so they can understand better, but not all the leaders do
24 that.

25 Q. Okay. And do you find that helpful when they show up?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. Those are all my questions.

3 A. Okay.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 DR. WOODS: Troy.

6 BY MR. LEVANEN:

7 Q. I'm going to continue with a couple that were previously
8 asked. On the speak ups, do those roll down to you? I know you
9 say you do a weekly walk. Do any of the speak ups get assigned to
10 you, like here's a speak up we got? Can you please follow up on
11 it?

12 A. Yeah. I've been assigned a couple of them, yes, and I do
13 look for a resolution on that, bring everybody together on it.

14 Q. My questions are kind of spread around here, but on the door
15 plugs, there's a door crew and door masters. Is that what you
16 referred to?

17 A. Um-hum.

18 Q. And it doesn't sound like they directly report to you, but in
19 your mind, is it the door crew or the door masters that open the
20 door plugs?

21 A. To be honest with you -- we never open door plugs. We open
22 doors, but this was an one off weird situation that we never seen
23 before, you know, that they had to take it off. That's why on the
24 weekend I was like we don't have the right people here. Those
25 usually don't get opened.

1 Q. But if they are opened, they would be opened by either the
2 door crew or the door masters?

3 A. One of those teams, yeah.

4 Q. But you're not sure which one?

5 A. I'm not sure which one, no.

6 Q. You mentioned the pressure that you get from above, and then
7 when you get that pressure, do you think it's coming from VP level
8 or from the directors or some combination thereof?

9 A. I'm not sure where it's coming -- I feel like it's coming
10 from the director level because they have to report up. I'm not
11 sure where it's coming from.

12 Q. And is it -- maybe it's been asked a couple times probably
13 but do you feel like the current leadership is better at not
14 applying that pressure than the previous? I know there's been
15 some leadership changes since the accident.

16 A. Yeah, I think it's more understanding.

17 Q. On the -- before the accident, there was a continuing -- we
18 understand there was a continuing pressure to increase production,
19 like more per month and kind of it. It was a build to a higher
20 level of production, you know, coming out of COVID and they're
21 ramping up. And as they did those steps, we understand that there
22 were SRMs performed to identify hazards that would come along.
23 Were you ever a part of any of those SRMs?

24 A. Yeah.

25 Q. Were you?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. How did that go?

3 A. Just like really coming on the floor. They would assess what
4 their concerns were and everything and how we should be report, if
5 we could or could not, and then if it was something we couldn't
6 do, they would make sure that it was done if it was something we
7 couldn't do in order to go faster.

8 Q. Did you ever get an opportunity to list hazards when they
9 were asking what were the hazards with ramping up and other
10 things, whatever? And if so, what would be an example of like a
11 hazard that you might have offered up?

12 A. So, one of them would have been around the KuKa (ph.)
13 antenna. It would travel out of their normal flow day down into a
14 different area where we would have to get scaffolding in order to
15 make it stay safe. So we made that change that if the antenna
16 cannot be installed in position, they were going to have to stop,
17 either hold the airplane back and wait until the end or if it
18 moves down line, they'd have to call out and put scaffolding
19 around it to make it safe for the employees.

20 Q. Thank you for that. So you mentioned that after the
21 accident, they modified the remove process so that the leads or
22 only certain people could initiate a removal. And it sounded like
23 you mentioned it had loosened up a little bit since then, but my
24 question around that was do you think it could create an
25 environment where people would be frustrated with it, not being

1 able to generate removals and just do undocumented maintenance
2 instead of going to try to track down the correct person to
3 generate the removal or have you not seen that at all?

4 A. So actually it was the kind of question that she asked, too.
5 So I'm talking to you, too, because now I couldn't talk before I
6 came back. So there has been another process and, yes, I have
7 seen that happen. And what they have been doing is immediately
8 when they identify those, they drive a CAR right to the first line
9 manager. Well, I would get the CAR saying that you need to go
10 answer this because your employee just undocumented a removal, and
11 immediate action has to be done on that right away to correct this
12 situation.

13 Q. Has that started to clean up a little bit now or do you still
14 get those sometimes?

15 A. We're still in infancy of that process. So I haven't been at
16 work for almost a week. So I can't tell you. But we do see those
17 daily in our tier meetings.

18 Q. Okay. Thank you. Did Bill Brown or [REDACTED] so they
19 never worked for you but you worked with them maybe when you just
20 had the weekend duty or how was your relationship with them?

21 A. I know both of them. I've known [REDACTED] for quite a
22 few years from when I was a mechanic. He's been there a long
23 time, and I've known Bill Brown for about a couple years as a
24 peer.

25 Q. And then just from a work perspective, you didn't -- neither

1 of them ever reported to you though?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Did you ever have any interactions with [REDACTED]

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. You did. How did that go? What were your thoughts?

6 A. He was very passionate about his job and wanted to make sure
7 stuff got done right. At one point they were talking about giving
8 me the door crew, but they never actually transferred them to me,
9 just for like a few seconds, but Tim would talk to me from time to
10 time.

11 Q. Was that before or after the accident?

12 A. Before.

13 Q. Before. I have a bunch of questions about the SAT and a lot
14 of them were asked already. I'm going to see if I have any other
15 ones. Actually I think I'm good for this round. Thank you.

16 A. Okay.

17 DR. WOODS: John.

18 BY MR. MILLER:

19 Q. Let's see. On the topic of engaging with SST, AOG, using the
20 AFFOS --

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. -- board

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- and specific to your coordination over the weekend on
25 realizing that the MED plug is something that you didn't have the

1 team to help perform the work to get it open, based on your
2 knowledge, it sounds like you had coordinated with a shift tie in
3 to [REDACTED] and team for Monday. Is the assumption correct
4 that you don't recall any engaging with meeting SST or talk of
5 getting those folks in to help support?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. Okay. Very good. And sorry, this still be a bit scatter
8 shot because I think most of my questions were answered. So I'm
9 just going back through my notes here. On your gemba walks and
10 working those collaborate efforts with design engineers, the
11 mechanics, et cetera, when you have an issue identified, you said
12 you'd initial a gemba walk, go out with that team, look at the
13 issue. Just off the top of your head, how long would it take you
14 to resolve some of those types of issues? I'm sure some are very
15 complex. Some are very straightforward and it's a quick moving
16 environment in the production world, but typically what would you
17 say when guys have an issue that you need to address? How
18 quickly? Would it be something accomplished in a shift, in a day,
19 over the course of a few hours?

20 A. It depends on what the defect is.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. Some can be resolved within an hour or 2, where others could
23 take days.

24 Q. Okay. Very good. And, I think that -- at least I noted a
25 few times where we had some acronyms in the production environment

1 shared, such as like a NCR, or nonconformance record or a pickup.
2 I think this team's talked about that before. You had
3 specifically mentioned a CAR, and I want to make sure when talking
4 to Troy, you had mentioned the CAR. CAR, is that from a like a
5 drawing change perspective or are you talking about a different
6 process?

7 A. CAR could be all different. It could be owned by
8 manufacturing. It could be owned by engineering. And, it could
9 be owned by a supplier. So a CAR, what a CAR is like we've -- for
10 example, you have an unauthorized rework. They generate you a CAR
11 that's owned by manufacturing, and QAI which is quality
12 investigation team, will go out and investigate that, and then
13 they'll tell you, you have to go answer this CAR, the employee and
14 the manager all the way, and I'm the one that owns that unless I
15 decide to hand it off to my manager and work with them and teach
16 them how to answer it, and that's what we do. So CARs are very
17 important.

18 Q. Understood. Okay. Very good. Thank you. And then one
19 other question that I know you had talked about the interview
20 process changes and your experience there, and just for clarity,
21 that means -- you're speaking from the perspective within the 737
22 production environment, correct? And these first line or K level
23 managers as we talked about, these are specifically production
24 managers that oversee mechanics in the Renton --

25 A. Correct.

1 Q. -- factory in manufacturing. Very good. And one last
2 question. I know there were questions about vendor assist and
3 specifically with Spirit. In your domain with the empennage, do
4 you have interactions with Spirit in that part of the build
5 process?

6 A. Not within the empennage, but in the feeder line, yeah.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. They deliver our -- certain parts for us --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. -- like the TRs from Spirit. Tailcones come from Spirit.

11 Q. And in your experience, are you aware of any particular level
12 of quality that come out from those spirit products where they do
13 need to call on vendor assist, is it a constant thing or is it
14 something that you're just relatively not aware of?

15 A. It's not a consistent thing, no.

16 Q. Okay.

17 MR. MILLER: All right, Sabrina. No other questions.

18 DR. WOODS: Thank you. That's it for the first round. How
19 are we feeling? Are we in need of a break? I'm getting we need
20 eyes. So we're going to go on break. It is 10:28 Pacific Time.

21 (Off the record at 10:28 a.m. PT.)

22 (On the record at 10:39 a.m. PT.)

23 DR. WOODS: And we are back on record at 10:39 Pacific Time.

24 BY DR. WOODS:

25 Q. I'm going to continue with a couple of follow-up questions to

1 start this round. I want to go back. When you were with Matt
2 earlier, and you've talked to a couple of other people, too, about
3 this speak up process, but you mentioned something along the lines
4 of one of the people you encouraged to use the process, you know,
5 maybe there was some reservation there, some apprehension about
6 using it. Can you talk a little bit why a person would be
7 apprehensive about using a program such as speak up?

8 A. That specific person felt like, it's not going to get fixed,
9 they don't care. It doesn't matter anyway. So why should I speak
10 up.

11 Q. Have you -- is there any truth to that. Have you see it in
12 the past?

13 A. The way that I felt is -- the way the person was portraying
14 is I'm still not going to get what I want if I put it in there.
15 So why even bother. So sometimes people have certain -- they want
16 stuff done a certain way, and if it doesn't get done the way that
17 they wanted, they feel like it hasn't been addressed even though
18 it may have been addressed.

19 Q. Have you ever seen it to where something was just -- that was
20 raised was just flat out ignored or otherwise the person was
21 retaliated or reprised against?

22 A. Through speak up?

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. No, never seen that.

25 Q. Okay. What about any other form of feedback, formal or

1 otherwise?

2 A. I'm trying to -- nothing I can recollect at this time.

3 Q. Okay. Have you yourself ever submitted a formal feedback
4 through anyone of the different feedback processes Boeing has
5 offered?

6 A. I don't think I can. It's just for my performance review I
7 would put in stuff that I've done that I need to get feedback on.

8 Q. But not like a speak up or Ethics report or anything like
9 that?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Okay. So this is now like the world according to Amy. How
12 would you define safety culture? So again, disconnect yourself
13 from Boeing. How do you define safety culture?

14 A. Safety is -- it doesn't matter where you're at. You want to
15 make sure -- safety's very important to me because in a second at
16 any time you could be walking across the street, driving your car,
17 can be completely -- just be aware of your surroundings and do you
18 have the right tools and -- the right tools in order to do the job
19 right or get from point A to point B.

20 Q. What kind of behaviors are in your idea -- in a positive
21 safety culture, what kind of behavior should people exhibit?

22 A. Be aware of your surroundings, understand whatever you're
23 doing, if you have everything you need to do it right like if you
24 need to go up on a ladder, don't grab a chair, you know. Make
25 sure you have the right tools to keep safe.

1 Q. Those are more actions than behaviors.

2 A. Oh, behavior. Okay. I'm sorry.

3 Q. So what kind of behavior, what kind of mindset.

4 A. Just think -- just to have a behavior, thinking of how you
5 can do things better and do them safely.

6 Q. Okay. So now comparing to -- this is an overlay, your idea
7 and your concepts, into what you see day in and day out in your
8 job. How does it compare?

9 A. I'm trying to do the same thing that I do at work. Like when
10 I'm cooking at home, I clean as I go. I don't wait until I'm all
11 done and clean it all at once. When I'm done with something, I
12 wash it and put it back away in the refrigerator, not leave stuff
13 out.

14 Q. So that's you. What about the people that you work with and
15 surround you?

16 A. I bring it to their attention, that safety is very important.
17 That's why I am the safety champion, and that's why I do the
18 safety walks with my team. It doesn't have to be on the day that
19 you do, if someone brings something up safety oriented, let's go
20 take a look at it right now.

21 Q. Do you think that continues to happen when you're not there?

22 A. I would hope it does but I'm not aware if it does or it
23 doesn't.

24 Q. What is your perception though?

25 A. I think it is like that when I'm not there, and you can

1 evidence it in the safety management system and the hazards that
2 are written through 24 hours a day.

3 Q. Okay. Going back to -- I want to touch on the CAR process,
4 and you were talking about like different CARs, corrective actions
5 are written for different things. What -- I guess what is -- for
6 your position, what level are you involved in creating a CAR?

7 A. I don't create CARs. Well, I could possibly request a CAR to
8 be created if I felt like something was being done incorrectly.
9 If they were getting a lot of defects that are coming from a
10 different area, you can request supplier quality come out and give
11 that supplier a CAR to address it.

12 Q. But you don't create them yourself?

13 A. No.

14 Q. If the CAR directly involves any who is under your team, I
15 guess what happens next? So now, your team, your managers under
16 you, they're the recipients I guess of a CAR. What happens next?
17 Can you walk me through that real quick?

18 A. Well, I actually have an expectation on that, that I shared
19 with my team, once a CAR is received, we have 24 hours to review
20 it and come back to the panel and start working on how we're going
21 to come to the resolution, what steps need to be taken.

22 Q. And is that a you thing or is that a Boeing thing?

23 A. That's a me thing.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Just because it's one of those things that you have a certain

1 amount of time -- you have 14 days to answer it. So as soon as we
2 get it, we should, we should address it right away, and let's take
3 care of this situation with a proper function.

4 Q. I think that's all I have. So far I have, since I always
5 conclude the interviews, I have two concluding questions that I'll
6 ask after everybody's gone through a round, but yeah, I think that
7 all I have for now.

8 DR. WOODS: So I'm going to pass it back off to Nils again.

9 BY MR. JOHNSON:

10 Q. All right. Have you been through removal training?

11 A. Yeah, I have been through removal training.

12 Q. Is that training -- do you think that training is effective?

13 A. For me, since I don't write the removals, I still had to go
14 through the training as I'm a supervisor. Last time I wrote a
15 removal, to be fair, the review, had the removal training. I had
16 two team members bring it to my attention that they refused to do
17 any removals until they had more formal training. So I sent it up
18 to where they -- workplace coaches came over and actually took
19 them through it step by step to ensure that they could write a
20 good removal.

21 Q. I've reviewed a lot of them on this specific tail and I saw
22 varying degrees of quality is what I'll call it.

23 A. Yep.

24 Q. So I wanted to know what you thought of the training. Have
25 you ever received a CAR for undocumented removals by your team?

1 A. Yes, I have.

2 Q. Good. What was the root cause for the undocumented removal?

3 A. The root cause they were told by me that a quality inspector
4 is going to take it apart even though they didn't have the
5 removal. So they were confused. It was a new employee.

6 Q. Last question. Do you have any knowledge of who opened or
7 closed the MED plug on 8789?

8 A. No, I do not.

9 Q. Thank you.

10 MR. JOHNSON: John.

11 BY MR. PETRUZZELLI:

12 Q. Two questions. You talked about leadership when you're given
13 feedback, and I think you were talking, sometimes they listen and
14 sometimes they don't hear it or whatever. Can you talk a little
15 bit about that from your perspective and maybe the frustrations
16 that go with that?

17 A. I'm the messenger.

18 Q. Understood.

19 A. And I'm giving them the solution that I have that's been put
20 in front of me, and it's not good enough. And I should have done
21 better. That's what I meant by it.

22 Q. And how do you deal with that? It's got to be frustrating.

23 A. I don't lose face in the meeting, but I usually leave, and
24 most of the time I go in the bathroom and completely lose it.

25 Q. Gotcha. That's tough to hear. When that happens though, do

1 you circle back at some point to try and get a better resolution
2 or close?

3 A. Yeah, sometimes depending on who the person was, I would
4 circle back and after -- and say this was my reasoning behind
5 this. This is why I don't understand why, and I'll tie questions
6 to them.

7 Q. Last question. You mentioned [REDACTED] You said he was
8 passionate and does the right thing. Can you expound upon that
9 statement with your -- how long you had known him and what your
10 as a second level, in general, what your perception of he as a
11 worker, as a person was?

12 A. For the short period of time that I knew Tim, which I know
13 they took my phone because I had several text messages from him,
14 he just wanted to do the job and get it done right. And sometimes
15 he wasn't always set up for success. So I was trying -- that
16 short period of time I was working with Tim, I was trying to help
17 with him getting the right tools out to the aircraft. They had
18 moved his jobs to a different area. He didn't have the right
19 stuff. So I was trying to help him with that.

20 Q. And when you say set up for success, can you expand on that a
21 little bit?

22 A. So they changed the way that instead of having -- they put in
23 two I call them hospital bays, and where his roll out position was
24 on the other lines, is where he did his work. So they took that
25 away from him, and they would roll his airplanes outside where you

1 can't work the jobs that he needs around the doors. So the work
2 would travel, and he was getting pressured to go get this work
3 done. So I was like at least if we could get some type of stand
4 up there that had a cover over it because you don't want the doors
5 to get wet when it's raining. We live in Washington. In order to
6 do it properly, but when I brought that up, [REDACTED] I took him to the
7 different industrial engineers and said, hey, you changed this on
8 his team, and now they can't be successful in getting their job
9 done. How are you going to fix this for them so they can get
10 their job done on time in position like it should be?

11 Q. From your perspective, second level, is he a problem
12 employee?

13 A. I didn't see him as a problem. I saw him as a frustrated
14 employee not getting what he needed to do his job.

15 Q. Okay. That's all I have. Thank you.

16 DR. WOODS: Okay. Matt.

17 BY MR. RIGSBY:

18 Q. I just have -- Amy, first of all, thank you. You mentioned
19 something a minute ago. You said you were a safety champion.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Is that an official -- I guess, what is that? Is that
22 something within -- I mean I --

23 A. So what it is, is I've always had a record for safety in my
24 job, and they wanted to improve the safety focal culture and stuff
25 because there wasn't a lot of safety focals.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. So they -- on all three shifts, they said that they -- the
3 leadership wanted a safety champion. There was a meeting, and I
4 showed up to it, and they asked me if was willing to be safety
5 champion, to where I would work with all the safety focals. Once
6 a week we do these walks in the different areas, and we go help
7 other teams identify, you know, a different set of eyes in the
8 area may see something that they don't see.

9 Q. Okay. How often do you have those meetings?

10 A. Every Wednesday at 9:00 when the employees are at work.

11 Q. Okay. Are you -- when you do those safety champion, do you
12 have recurring themes that you go through. I mean as we've been
13 looking at stuff, that seems to be some of the recurring themes
14 that keep getting brought up, FOD control, tool control, things
15 like that. Is that something that you guys just continually push?

16 A. Yeah, we actually have a checklist that we break up into
17 either four or five different groups, and we end up with the
18 checklist and we check all the different areas, and then we report
19 back and we go over what everybody found and then we talk about,
20 you know, was it fixed immediately, was it not, or did you bring
21 it to the manager's attention.

22 Q. Why do you think those are recurring themes? I mean just
23 something in people's nature that's hard to change or --

24 A. Well, it all comes down to accountability and understanding
25 what's in your area and everybody should be paying attention to

1 the same things and sometimes when it's recurring, maybe they're
2 not focused in on that when they should be.

3 Q. Okay. When managers go down to the floor, do they have to
4 badge in or, you know, barge on or barge off the aircraft?

5 A. In certain areas, yeah. So from where they (indiscernible)
6 on, they're called power capable aircraft, and you have to check
7 in the shield, and if you go in the area where LOTTO may be, in
8 fact, you have to sign into the log sheet as well.

9 Q. But before those flow days, you don't necessarily have to do
10 that?

11 A. No, the airplane hasn't had any -- they're not power capable.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. All the systems have not been put together yet more or less.

14 Q. I know one of the things that has been a recurring thing on
15 here is quality of the aircraft coming from Spirit. Since this
16 event, have you seen an improvement in that or is it status quo?

17 A. I don't directly deal, but from the meetings I have been in,
18 I hear that there has been improvement. There's a whole team down
19 there working with the Spirit team.

20 Q. That's all I have.

21 DR. WOODS: All right. Bjorn.

22 BY CAPT ANDERSON:

23 Q. One question about the removals. Since they've changed the
24 policy now and have leads being able to write removals, has the
25 training for the leads writing removals, has that training changed

1 since before for anybody to be able to write a removal? Is it new
2 training? Is it enhanced?

3 A. They had a new training come out that was online training for
4 each individual to take, but like I mentioned earlier, my -- which
5 my team means a union steward, and he said before he signs off on
6 this, he wanted more formal training. So I think the workplace
7 coaches are going out, but I don't the training has changed since
8 recent training.

9 Q. And is the online training that's occurring now, was that in
10 place prior to January of this year?

11 A. Not that I'm aware of, no, because it was something that we
12 had to take.

13 Q. [REDACTED] was he one of your managers in the past?

14 A. No, I've only worked with him as a peer.

15 Q. Okay. And how would you say his leadership style is?

16 A. To be honest, he just wants to get the work done.

17 Q. And would you -- so how is that leadership style received by
18 the employees, by the mechanics?

19 A. That's a tough one. I never really talked to any of the
20 employees about it. So I don't know how to answer it.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. I just have my, you know, my own personal perspective.

23 Q. Yeah, that's good. Thank you.

24 A. Um-hum.

25 DR. WOODS: Troy.

1 BY MR. LEVANEN:

2 Q. Do you guys ever get video clips that would go out to the
3 front lines? We heard that there might be some videos that came
4 out from like the leaders, like on a weekly or monthly basis where
5 there's like women through your team or through your leaders that
6 would go out to the front lines that maybe had safety messages or
7 other messages in there? Ever recall seeing any of those?

8 A. I know we have safety daily in our meetings but a lot of the
9 training would have like a leadership in the beginning of the
10 training if you're taking safety training, and they would -- I'm
11 trying to think of the last leader that, you know, like I can
12 remember ones with (indiscernible), that he would start, the
13 reason why we're doing this training, blah, blah, blah. And then
14 there's been a couple with the prior, Calhoun (ph.), but usually
15 they do have some type of video in the beginning, but I don't --
16 I'm not sure of the weekly or whatever safety videos going out. I
17 know there's a PowerPoint that goes out.

18 Q. How about when you -- during the time of this door plug
19 event, so I guess going back to last year, who was your vice
20 president at the time that you reported to? I know there was a
21 director in between it sounds like.

22 A. Campbell -- not Campbell. Why did I say that? Ed -- I can't
23 think of his name.

24 Q. Ed Clark.

25 A. Ed Clark, yes.

1 Q. And then so who's your vice president now?

2 A. Katie.

3 Q. Katie Ringgold?

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. So, going back to what Bjorn was asking about, leadership
6 styles, how -- what would you say about their leadership styles or
7 maybe you can compare their leadership styles in terms of how it
8 translates to what you see and how you work?

9 A. I see Katie out on the floor every day. I see her
10 interacting with the people on the floor, talking to them and
11 helping them out quite a bit.

12 Q. Does she help you put out fires? I know you said you spend
13 about 60 percent of your time putting out fires.

14 A. She has, yes.

15 Q. And then did Ed -- how about his style? Did he help you put
16 out fires?

17 A. Not like Katie, no. He came and did a couple gembas in my
18 area, but nothing that we requested. Something that he wanted to
19 come see.

20 Q. Um-hum. Okay. All right. I think that's all for me. Thank
21 you.

22 DR. WOODS: John.

23 MR. MILLER: No further questions.

24 DR. WOODS: All right. And Nils has got one.

25 BY MR. JOHNSON:

1 Q. I have one. You mentioned that [REDACTED] wanted to get the job
2 done. Was that without regard for process? I'm just keying in on
3 the words, get it done. But when you said you want to get the job
4 done, but you want to get it done right and safe. And you didn't
5 include that in your description?

6 A. I would have to say yes.

7 Q. Without regard for process?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. That's all I have. Thank you.

10 DR. WOODS: Anyone else?

11 (No response.)

12 DR. WOODS: Okay. So I have Matt dying up here.

13 BY DR. WOODS:

14 Q. So I always kind of conclude with the same style questions,
15 and the first is that, like given your experience, you've been in
16 this position for some time, I'm going to call this like my, you
17 know, queen for a day or maybe magic wand question, and that is
18 from what you see now, what is the one thing that you would like
19 to see changed, and I mean it can even be outside your purview,
20 just like you can wave a magic wand, and it would be changed, that
21 would make your process, your product better. What is the thing
22 that you need -- you see that needs to be fixed?

23 A. We need to train our employees so they know how to do their
24 jobs, and I'm not just talking in the manufacturing area. I'm
25 talking all the way up.

1 Q. All the way up. Where does up stop?

2 A. All, make sure that everybody understands what their roles
3 and responsibilities are and how to perform their jobs.

4 Q. You see that as a little bit lacking right now?

5 A. It's getting better, but it has been lacking in the past.

6 Q. How long has it been getting better? Can I get a timeframe?

7 A. The last year.

8 Q. Okay. So relatively recent?

9 A. Yeah.

10 Q. Okay. And then the last question I have is again, thank you
11 so much for being here. This is a big part of helping us identify
12 what's going on and how they can hopefully make recommendations in
13 the future so something like this doesn't happen again, and we
14 can't do that without being informed by people such as yourself.
15 Given that you knew, you had a heads up that we were coming, what
16 is the one takeaway that you want us to have that you think will
17 help us on our investigative process? What do you want us to walk
18 out of here knowing from Amy's point of view?

19 A. That's deep.

20 Q. That's what I do.

21 A. That's good. From my point of view, I would hope that
22 everybody would take the same precautionaries that I do and before
23 you do anything, make sure you investigate and understand what the
24 whole situation is before you act.

25 Q. Who's that directed towards?

1 A. My team, anyone that would do anything. At Boeing. I mean
2 we're all -- I mean even as a mechanic, when I first walked into
3 the company, I remember it was like yesterday, and they said any
4 changes that you make to the aircraft as a mechanic is your
5 responsibility to do it right the first time and if it's not
6 right, to raise your hand because people fly in these things every
7 day. I fly in these things. My family flies. A lot of people.
8 We're putting a lot of lives at risk.

9 Q. And do you feel that same sentiment is throughout Boeing
10 right now? Let's just talk about the people under you. Do they
11 have that same sentiment?

12 A. (No audible response.)

13 Q. Okay. Now, people outside of you that are working in
14 conjunction your people, do they have that same sentiment?

15 A. I believe so.

16 Q. Okay. And with that, it looks like that is it.

17 MR. BARTLETT: Thank you all.

18 DR. WOODS: I appreciate it. We are going to go --

19 MR. BARTLETT: If you need to talk to Amy or get anything,
20 just give me a buzz. You have my email, you have my phone.

21 DR. WOODS: -- off the record at 11:09 Pacific Time.

22 (Whereupon, at 11:09 a.m. Pacific Time, the interview was
23 concluded.)

24

25

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: ALASKA AIRLINES BOEING 737-9
MAX LEFT MID-EXIT DOOR PLUG
SEPARATION NEAR PORTLAND,
OREGON ON JANUARY 5, 2024
Interview of Amy Walthall

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA24MA063

PLACE: Renton, Washington

DATE: October 3, 2024

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

ALASKA AIRLINES BOEING 737-9 *

MAX LEFT MID-EXIT DOOR PLUG * Accident No.: DCA24MA063

SEPARATION NEAR PORTLAND, *

OREGON ON JANUARY 5, 2024 *

*

* * * * *

Interview of: TED BISHOP, First-Line Supervisor/Former Door
Manager Boeing

Boeing
Seattle, Washington

Thursday,
October 3, 2024

APPEARANCES:

DR. SABRINA WOODS, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

NILS JOHNSON
Aviation Accident Investigator (Maintenance)
National Transportation Safety Board

JOHN PETRUZZELLI, Representative
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM)

MATT RIGSBY, Air Safety Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

CAPT BJORN ANDERSON, Representative
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)

TROY LEVANEN, Director of Maintenance and
Engineering Safety
Alaska Airlines

MATTHEW DIGGS, Esq.
Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
Counsel for Mr. Bishop

I N D E X

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I N T E R V I E W

(1:23 p.m. PT)

DR. WOODS: Good afternoon, it is 13:23 Pacific time, the date is October 3rd, 2024. My name is Dr. Sabrina Woods, I'm a human performance investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board. I am one of the lead investigators leading the manufacturing and human performance working group for accident investigation number Delta-Charlie-Alpha-2-4-Mike-Alpha-0-6-3 involving Alaska Airlines Flight 1282.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and we have no regulatory or enforcement powers. We are a small organization, however, so we invite parties in to help us with the investigative process. Who you see here in the room are members of this manufacturing and human performance working group that are parties to the investigation. So at this time I'm going to have them introduce themselves to you, starting here at my right with Nils.

MR. JOHNSON: Nils Johnson, NTSB, I'm an aviation accident investigator and my specialty is maintenance.

MR. PETRUZZELLI: John Petruzzelli, I am here representing the IAM, I actually -- when we're not on strike, I'm an AMTI at the North Boeing Field.

MR. RIGSBY: I'm Matt Rigsby with the FAA's Office of

1 Accident Investigation, I'm the FAA coordinator on this accident.

2 CAPT ANDERSON: Bjorn Anderson, I'm a captain with Alaska
3 Airlines and I'm representing the Air Line Pilots Association.

4 MR. LEVANEN: I'm Troy Levanen, I'm the director of
5 maintenance operation safety for Alaska Airlines.

6 MR. MILLER: John Miller, Boeing air safety and investigation
7 here in the Seattle area.

8 DR. WOODS: So that's it, that's everybody that's going to be
9 chatting with you today, we're going to be asking you questions.
10 We're going to be capturing all of this information on a digital
11 recorder, you see a digital recorder is here in the room. After
12 the interview, we'll send the recordings out for transcription, we
13 use a transcription company in the Washington, D.C. area, and once
14 we get back that transcription, all the parties members here will
15 have a chance to review it just to correct for any typographical
16 errors, things of that sort, and then a certified copy of the
17 transcript will go forward to be a matter of public record in the
18 docket that is assigned to this case.

19 Each of these group members here will have a chance to ask
20 questions, we usually go in two rounds. We will ask questions one
21 at a time so you only have to focus on one person at a time.
22 After the first round, everybody will have a chance to kind of do
23 cleanup questions and follow up. Please answer all the questions
24 to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a
25 question, please ask for clarity. We will do the same if we do

1 not understand the answer. Recognize that "I don't know" is a
2 perfectly acceptable answer if you don't know something. And if
3 at any time you realize you misspoke or you just want to correct
4 or elaborate on anything that somebody else said, it's your
5 discretion, please feel free to do so whenever, you know, it comes
6 to you and the mood strikes. While we will go one at a time, you
7 can feel free to bounce back and forth amongst the group in order
8 to get the information across.

9 You are always entitled to have one representative of your
10 choosing to support you throughout this process. I see now that
11 you have retained counsel and counsel is sitting next to you. I
12 just want to ensure for the record that this is the representative
13 that you chose and you are okay.

14 MR. BISHOP: Yes, I've chosen him.

15 DR. WOODS: Okay, thank you. With that, counsel, if you
16 would, please, for the record, state your full name, spelling your
17 last.

18 MR. DIGGS: Matthew Diggs, D-i-g-g-s.

19 DR. WOODS: Thank you for that and thank you for being here
20 to support Ted.

21 So if at any time you feel like you need a break for any
22 reason, please let us know. That includes to talk to counsel, to
23 go out -- whatever you need, we will go off record, you'll hear me
24 audibly say that we are going off record and then once you're
25 ready, we can resume. So with that, are there any questions about

1 this process so far?

2 MR. BISHOP: No.

3 DR. WOODS: Okay. Does anybody else have any questions?

4 (No response.)

5 DR. WOODS: Okay, we're going to get ready to go and we're
6 going to start here to my right, but right before we start, I'm
7 going to ask you if you would, please, for the record, state your
8 full name and spell your last.

9 MR. BISHOP: Ted Bishop, B-i-s-h-o-p.

10 DR. WOODS: Thank you for that, Ted.

11 And Nils, take it away.

12 INTERVIEW OF TED BISHOP

13 BY MR. JOHNSON:

14 Q. Ted, thank you for talking to us this afternoon. What is
15 your current position with The Boeing Company?

16 A. First-line manager.

17 Q. And what groups do you manage?

18 A. I'm co-managing lower -- Flow Day 3 lowers, which is Skyhawks
19 and -- like it's Jet Hawks and Skyhawks. Yeah, I've only been
20 shadowing for about a week before the strike, so it's very new to
21 me.

22 Q. Okay. So you've been in your current position for one week?

23 A. Plus the strike, so that's what, approximately almost three
24 weeks.

25 Q. Okay. And you work out of the Renton facility?

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Okay. Did you previously work for the door crew? Were you
3 the previous manager of the door crew? I'm sorry.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. How long did you work in that position?

6 A. Approximately 10 months. Wait, because we're right about
7 there right now, so -- so it was less than that. Because my
8 one-year anniversary is November, so that probably -- it was in
9 the summertime, I don't know, I don't have the math, but it was
10 approximately three or four months ago that I ended my time as
11 manager of the door crew.

12 Q. Okay. What previous positions have you held at Boeing?

13 A. I started in 2011, I've mostly been a mechanic for my time at
14 Boeing. I was a mechanic for about 10 years in Everett. Then
15 after that I became an inspector, QA, down in Renton for one year,
16 oh, maybe a little bit over a year, and then became a manager.
17 That's my recent -- present role.

18 Q. Okay, so total time, is it roughly 12 years?

19 A. Yeah, I just had my 12-year anniversary.

20 Q. Can you briefly describe your professional background prior
21 to Boeing? What did you do before you came to Boeing?

22 A. I was a self-employed general contractor, construction,
23 residential construction for about 27 years.

24 Q. Okay, what were your duties and responsibilities as a door
25 crew manager?

1 A. Running the crew, knowing what issues there were, making sure
2 that the work was done efficiently, removing roadblocks that
3 employees may have, making sure everything was in order, like
4 certified tools or their certifications, taking roll, assigning
5 their time, things of that sort.

6 Q. Okay. Do you hold any licenses or certificates? A&P?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Okay. Who was your supervisor when you were the door crew
9 manager?

10 A. Seth Bentley.

11 Q. And you said you grew up in the mechanic ranks. What kind of
12 training did you receive to become a manager?

13 A. None prior to becoming a manager, just an interview. Once I
14 became a manager, I was in a week course, weeklong course, and I
15 was on -- put on second shift and at that time, about midway
16 through, they gave me a call telling me that I was going to move
17 to first shift and be a door crew manager. After that no, like,
18 classes but I did online courses, various generic online courses
19 for management.

20 Q. What days and shifts did you work?

21 A. Monday through Friday, first shift.

22 Q. And did you receive a turnover from the former manager of
23 that department?

24 A. I don't know what a turnover is.

25 Q. Baptism by fire, you just stepped in and went.

1 A. I just stepped in and went, yes.

2 Q. Can you describe the organization under you as the door crew
3 manager?

4 A. Can you clarify --

5 Q. Did you have leads, how many groups did you have, how many
6 people?

7 A. Approximately 25 people on the door crew. I also managed the
8 door masters, there were approximately, I think, six people on
9 that crew. Each crew had their own lead, team lead.

10 Q. Okay, they were all full-time employees?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So no contractors, I won't go into that. And the duty and
13 responsibilities of both the door crew and door masters, can you
14 describe what that was?

15 A. Yeah, so that's a very unique package. Door masters is more
16 at the end of the build, from rollout of the factory at the door
17 and out to ramp, where the door crew is Flow Days 1 through 3 at
18 the beginning of the build. They had various things that they did
19 during those three flow days.

20 Flow Day 1, there were a few doors to remove and that's all
21 they did with those doors. Also a big part of Flow Day 1 was the
22 installation of the over-wing doors, AOE doors. And also another
23 few jobs were installing the doorway liners or the door liner
24 brackets of the doors. Flow Day 2 is rigging the passenger doors.
25 Also in that, depending on the customer, like Ryanair, for

1 instance, there would be mid-exit doors for them to rig. And
2 every once in a while a door plug.

3 Q. Our favorite topic.

4 A. Um-hum.

5 Q. What are the training requirements to work on the door team,
6 are there any?

7 A. No, you have to be a Grade 5 -- 6 -- I think it's 5. Yeah,
8 through this incident, I have been trying to get or they are in
9 the process of having certifications to be on the door crew, which
10 I believe is the case up in Everett, that is not the case or was
11 not the case in Renton. So you just have to be at the right grade
12 level.

13 Q. Are there any qualifications required to work on the door
14 team? Bond and ground --

15 (Crosstalk)

16 MR. BISHOP: Oh, yeah, there's seal and bond and ground, yes.

17 BY MR. JOHNSON:

18 Q. All right, is there structured OJT for door crew members?

19 A. Structured, not on paper, but there was an aspect where the
20 more senior people would train the newer people. Usually it would
21 start on Flow Day 1, where -- on the liners, which wasn't as
22 complex, and then they would graduate, from there, depending on
23 their ability, skill set, things of that sort, and progress to rig
24 doors.

25 Q. You said everyone was on first shift, so you didn't really

1 have -- did you have a shift turnover process if you ended a job
2 that didn't get complete on the calendar day?

3 A. There was no second shift for doors. So they may work late,
4 but they would just pick it up the following day, there's no
5 second shift.

6 Q. Okay. How often did you meet with your team?

7 A. Probably, let's see -- not probably, but one, two, three,
8 four times a day.

9 Q. And what subjects did you cover?

10 A. I covered second-issued parts, JBS or behind -- work behind
11 schedule, if there was any kind of changes in any kind of
12 certifications like bond and ground, something like -- of that
13 sort, remind them to keep track of their time and ETS and -- what
14 else? Various things that would come up in the company that they
15 needed to know about.

16 So I had a kickoff meeting first thing in the morning and
17 just went over all the metrics from the day before and what needed
18 to be done and if there was anything that -- some sort of NCR or
19 something that we needed to deal with, just to prioritize things.

20 Q. Were your team members welcome to bring up issues to you
21 during those meetings?

22 A. Yes, they were. I actually had a fairly good relationship
23 with all of them prior to becoming their manager because I was
24 their QA for about nine or ten months before, so I had a
25 relationship with them already.

1 Q. How did their -- it's broad, I know. How did their issues
2 get rectified, did you give them formal communication back that
3 they said "hey, this doesn't work for us," you worked in the
4 background and you came and then how did you communicate back to
5 your team what the resolution was?

6 A. Yeah, if it's -- depending on the issue, if it was very
7 significant, then it would be in e-mail form. If it was something
8 more of correcting their time or something, it would be -- well,
9 it could be in e-mail form then, too, but it's -- maybe if it
10 weren't as in depth, then it would be verbal. I liked to meet
11 face to face with them as much as I could.

12 Q. Are you familiar with the Boeing vendor assist process?

13 A. No, I'm not.

14 Q. So you never worked with Spirit?

15 A. No, I have not.

16 Q. Okay. I won't ask those questions. Did you see systemic
17 issues that were affecting your manufacturing of the airplanes
18 during Flow Day 1 through 3?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Who did you inform of those issues?

21 A. Well, I did a Speak Up once when I was quality, just before I
22 became a manager. We receive a lot of product from Spirit with a
23 lot of defects and I'm fairly new to Renton, I mean, I've been
24 there, at this point, just under two years. I'm used to Everett
25 build, but I was having a little bit of difficulty understanding

1 why we were receiving fuselages with so many defects, which seemed
2 to pass through the entire build or -- it's a struggle, quite a
3 struggle.

4 Q. Okay. And when you communicated those up, how was that
5 received?

6 A. They would listen, it seemed to me, and that we were
7 addressing these issues at Boeing, as a company, and doing the
8 best we could do with what we had. I did talk to Troy Enzi (ph.)
9 after my Speak Up, he -- he came to me to speak to me about my
10 Speak Up and I -- this was before the incident with the door plug,
11 and I suggested maybe we needed a Flow Day 0 or something to
12 resolve all of the issues before they got to Flow Day 1 where it
13 impacted us. He gave me some answers about what -- I think they
14 were doing some things at Spirit to improve that process and there
15 were some thoughts about doing a Flow Day 0 at that time.

16 Q. Did you see an improvement in the product?

17 A. There was some improvement, yes. I would say after the door
18 plug incident there was and it was more of a focus, you could see
19 that there has been more improvement, yes. Not a hundred percent,
20 but improvement, yes.

21 Q. What is the messaging from management to the floor about
22 generating pickups and removals, do you guys pound that into their
23 heads, do you -- I mean, do you have to reinforce it continually?

24 A. I think, for door crew specifically, we had to pound it -- I
25 wouldn't use those words, but frequently remind them that that was

1 the process. Actually, before the door plug incident, I was
2 quality, my team lead was really pushing removals. His door crew
3 had the understanding that the rigging document was their
4 coverage. So there weren't as many -- the removals weren't common
5 or the common day work, but before the door plug incident, it
6 started to become common and then, of course, once the incident
7 happened, I think factory-wide is my understanding that it's just
8 been more of making sure that that process is implemented. Pickup
9 side, I've always seen the pickups at the same level where it's
10 always been a lot of pickups, that's part of doors because there's
11 so many adjustments that have to be done.

12 Q. Okay. Have you ever told a door team member to not write
13 something up?

14 A. No.

15 Q. As a door manager, have there been -- and I think you
16 answered this, but as a door manager, have there been cases where
17 you needed to remind door personnel to document their work?

18 A. Yes. Yeah.

19 Q. Were there certain individuals on the door crew that
20 habitually disregarded documenting their work?

21 A. Yes, now that I think of it, there were a few individuals
22 that complied, but they were not happy with that process.

23 Q. All right, let's talk about MED plugs. What team or group at
24 Boeing Renton would have the responsibility for opening or
25 removing a MED plug?

1 A. My understanding before this incident happened was we did not
2 open up plugs, ever. It was a very simple check, it was just the
3 miss fair gap check, but they were never opened and not meant to
4 be opened unless something significant was happening.

5 Q. So inside the Renton factory there were five in 2019, eight
6 in 2020, and two in 2022.

7 A. Being opened?

8 Q. Being opened. Different tails, each different tail. Are you
9 aware of any other team or group at Renton that opened --

10 A. No.

11 Q. -- MED plugs? What kind of paperwork was generated when an
12 MED plug needed to be opened?

13 A. Well, I was not a witness of any of those events, so I can't
14 really speak to that. You know, a removal should be written. And
15 remember, I've only been -- not even a year being a manager and a
16 lot less than that for doors.

17 Q. But you were also QA, right?

18 A. Yeah, but I never inspected that portion of the plane.

19 Q. Okay. So what area were you QA in, was it doors?

20 A. Yes, but all QA have their specialty in what they inspect and
21 also the mechanics have their specialty in what they work on. The
22 mid-exit doors and the plugs were very, very specialized and I
23 only know of two QAs that were inspecting those. So I rotated
24 everywhere except I never got to that part.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Now I feel fortunate, but my specialty -- I was on rollout,
2 too, but my specialty was Flow Day 1 AOE doors or over-the-wing
3 doors and the brackets on the doors, the liner brackets.

4 Q. Okay. So I think you've answered this, but I'll ask it
5 anyway, are you aware of an MED plug ever being opened without
6 removal paperwork being generated?

7 A. No. I mean, I've learned after the incident, but no.

8 Q. And I'll use this hypothetically since you didn't see it.
9 What happened or what would happen to hardware if it needed to be
10 removed as part of a removal? Even a bracket, if you had to take
11 a bracket off and you took bolts out of the bracket and you
12 weren't going to be able to put it right back, what happened to
13 that hardware?

14 A. You would write a whip sticker and put it in the whip rack or
15 traveling warehouse, along with the removal paperwork.

16 Q. Okay. And was that -- was hardware typically reused in a --

17 A. No.

18 Q. -- MED plug or anywhere?

19 A. Meet standards?

20 Q. Yeah.

21 A. Standards, no.

22 Q. But nuts, bolts, washers, cotter pins? Okay.

23 A. No.

24 Q. What is the function of the AOG and SST group when they're
25 used at Renton?

1 A. If it's more complex work that needs a higher skill set, then
2 they are brought in to do the work.

3 MR. JOHNSON: That's what I have for this round.

4 John.

5 BY MR. PETRUZZELLI:

6 Q. You have the unique position of having worked in Everett and
7 Renton, so your first -- how long were you in Renton for, you
8 said?

9 A. It's almost been two years.

10 Q. Okay, so --

11 A. Actually, August was two years. I'm sorry.

12 Q. All right.

13 A. August.

14 Q. You were on the 4-7, I'm guessing the 6-7, too?

15 A. No, not the 6-7.

16 Q. Just the 4-7?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Okay. What area?

19 A. Final body joint.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. So the next place back from the door.

22 Q. Right.

23 A. Yeah.

24 Q. I got a picture of where it's been so many years.

25 A. By Tully's (ph.).

1 Q. Okay, got you. Which isn't there anymore, right?

2 A. Right.

3 Q. Just to help the frame of reference, can you, in a few short
4 sentences, compare and contrast the work and the culture between
5 Everett and Renton?

6 A. Yeah, sure. That might be skewed because of the pandemic and
7 things like that, you know, right? But 747, the people that
8 worked there usually, for the most part, their whole career was
9 there, very skilled labor. Any kind of rework, the mechanics
10 would do their own, they wouldn't pass it off to another
11 organization. Very knowledgeable and competent people.

12 Now, when I came to Renton, again, there's a pandemic and
13 other issues involved there, but I think that the skill set -- I
14 think people left, is what I think, because the skill set, I
15 didn't see it as -- it wasn't as good as what I saw in Everett,
16 but I think most of that was the pandemic.

17 Q. With that -- kind of dovetailing into that -- is, over, say
18 the last five to six years, I hate to steal Sabrina's thunder on
19 this, but the demographics of our people that are coming in and
20 out, can you speak to the difference of what was --

21 A. Sure. I --

22 (Laughter.)

23 MR. BISHOP: Is everything okay?

24 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Yeah, I asked that question, you're going
25 to hit me.

1 MR. BISHOP: Well, I believe that the culture of the world
2 has changed in that regard, but back in the day, not -- I'd say
3 five years and beyond ago, people were more hands on and maybe
4 helping their father or something in the garage, on a car, where I
5 feel the culture is a bit different these days, where they're more
6 into electronics and not as hands on with things and I think the
7 expectations are more in line with not doing as much or trying to
8 prove themselves when you're getting handouts, but that's --
9 that's my personal opinion.

10 BY MR. PETRUZZELLI:

11 Q. Yeah, you've got one of those backgrounds like 27 years as a
12 GC, for example, in residential.

13 A. Yeah.

14 Q. Can you see people with that type of background, say in a
15 construction background, coming in as much as it was 12 --

16 A. Not as much.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. A few.

19 Q. Thank you for that. Yeah, I just want to kind of highlight
20 the difference in the culture because in Renton we're going so
21 much faster, right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Oh, where was it. A couple things, you talked about
24 second-issued parts, is that one time they replace the part or are
25 you talking the second after -- do it twice?

1 A. One part, one time.

2 Q. Okay, got you. You talked about jobs behind schedule. How
3 long ago, in your mind, you mentioned that the rig document was
4 covered to do their work, removal-type stuff, how long ago did you
5 see that change to where it is today, was it right after the
6 accident or was it before?

7 A. No, it was before. My team lead at quality, he felt the need
8 to really push the fact that we needed removals written for
9 everything, loosening a bolt that had been completed at the Spirit
10 factory, if we had to loosen it, there should be a removal on it.
11 So he started to implement that three to six months before the
12 incident. It was in steps, he didn't go full blast, he was trying
13 to correct a pretty major issue.

14 Q. Do you remember roughly how long he had been with the
15 company?

16 A. Roughly 27 years.

17 Q. Okay, so he'd been around the block, then.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. The last question for this round, you said there were two QAs
20 on the doors?

21 A. Mid-exit doors.

22 Q. Mid-exit doors.

23 A. And plugs, yes.

24 Q. Can you tell us who those were?

25 A. I don't know her full names, [REDACTED] (ph.). I don't know his

1 last name, and I know her as [REDACTED] (ph.), she's Filipino, so
2 [REDACTED] (ph.), I think, is her first name.

3 Q. Yeah, okay. And they're first shift, both, right?

4 A. Yes. Doors is always first shift.

5 Q. Right, that's right.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. And when you were doing the QA, were you a 51406 or did you
8 hold another --

9 A. I was a seven.

10 Q. Five-one or which job title?

11 A. I was functional test QA. We all were sevens. All door QA
12 are sevens.

13 Q. Okay, I did not know that.

14 A. Yeah.

15 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Okay. I think I'm good this round.

16 DR. WOODS: Okay. Matt.

17 BY MR. RIGSBY:

18 Q. Ted, thank you. Did I understand, you said if any plug had
19 to be opened, the door crew would not do it?

20 A. No, I did not say that.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. I said that their typical check of the door, it would never
23 be opened and you would -- my understanding is the door, the plug
24 would only be opened if there was some major issue going on, where
25 it had to be opened, but other than that, they did not want to

1 ever open them.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. So the check was -- there was never an opening of the plug
4 during their normal check --

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. -- of the plug.

7 Q. But if it did need to be opened, would it be the door crew
8 that handles that, that have --

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. -- a work order would be put in?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Okay, okay.

13 A. Typically, one individual who's just retired, but he's been
14 there for quite a while, was the master of all the doors, kind of
15 a guru, so typically, it would go to him.

16 Q. Okay. And who --

17 A. Mike, Michael -

18 Q. Mike.

19 A. -- or [REDACTED]

20 MR. PETRUZZELLI: He retired?

21 MR. BISHOP: He did.

22 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Wow.

23 MR. BISHOP: Yeah, about a week or two before the strike.

24 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Been there a long time.

25 MR. BISHOP: A long time.

1 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Yeah.

2 MR. RIGSBY: Okay.

3 (Crosstalk)

4 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Yeah, a lot longer than me.

5 BY MR. RIGSBY:

6 Q. And, I guess, say that order came down to -- or a request
7 came in to open the door, what would be -- what would be your
8 expectations on what the door crew would do? Do they go pull
9 documents, do they pull IPs to figure out how to do it or is it
10 kind of --

11 A. That would've been a learning curve for me --

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. -- to be honest with you, because I never had that
14 situation --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. -- in front of me. I learned more about the door plugs after
17 than before. [REDACTED] was a wealth of knowledge for me and
18 typically, I would go to someone like him than others, perhaps,
19 you know, to figure out --

20 Q. Sure.

21 A. -- what was needed, but a removal should take place --

22 Q. Should be generated?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. Okay. So you're familiar with the SATs and --

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. -- all that.

2 A. My wife is a manager for LSCC.

3 Q. Okay. On a SAT, is there any indication what the dollar
4 symbol means?

5 A. Yeah, I don't know what that --

6 (Crosstalk)

7 MR. BISHOP: I don't know what that is. There's a lot of
8 things I still don't know.

9 MR. RIGSBY: Okay. No worries.

10 MR. BISHOP: I think it's to elevate it, but I'm not certain.

11 BY MR. RIGSBY:

12 Q. Okay. The interactions with the Spirit employees, what have
13 you seen in your short time there? I mean, is it a good
14 relationship, is it a -- I hate to use the word hostile, but is it
15 a complicated relationship between the two?

16 A. I don't have a whole lot of experience in witnessing the
17 relationships, my sense is that it's complex and the fact that
18 they can't buy out the final stamp, you know, with their QA, you
19 need a manufacturing QA and a manufacturing stamp, they can't
20 write their own removals. We put packages together for them, for
21 the fasteners and things of that sort, they -- I think it's
22 probably not warranted, but there's probably some frustration and
23 strain in the relationship because we're at their -- we're on
24 their schedule and I -- personally, I believe they were
25 overwhelmed with the amount of work that they had in the factory

1 and some of it they would turn down just because it wasn't as much
2 of a priority as all the other work they had and they had too
3 much.

4 Q. Okay. When you were a QA, did you -- did they have their own
5 QA people as well?

6 A. Well, for some of the operations, but not the final, yeah,
7 so --

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. -- no.

10 Q. Okay. And Speak Up, you used Speak Up, you said, right?

11 A. Yeah, one time, yes.

12 Q. Okay. And you encourage your --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- employees working, okay.

15 A. Definitely.

16 Q. Have you ever had the opportunity to participate in any FAA
17 audits when our ASIs come in?

18 A. We have the -- an FAA conformity on the door plug and so I've
19 witnessed that, but --

20 Q. You witnessed that, okay.

21 A. Also, when the Triple Seven X started, FAA would come in and
22 I was in the feeder line for that work and they would come in and
23 watch me perform my work.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Bench work on the feeder line.

1 Q. Okay. Was it generally positive interaction?

2 A. Yes. Yeah.

3 Q. Okay, good. As a manager, do you have the barge in when you
4 go get on an aircraft to, you know, witness work or observe work
5 or is it just certain flow days you have to badge in?

6 A. Badge in? I heard you say barge in.

7 Q. Barge.

8 A. Oh, yeah. Oh, definitely. If it's down line with power on,
9 so Flow Day 6 -- well, any of those planes down there, yeah,
10 there's a barge and --

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. -- you shield in or LOTTO in, yes. Yeah, and all the
13 employees, all the mechanics do --

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. -- as well as myself.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. Always.

18 Q. How do you know when to bring in the SST or an AOG team?

19 A. I suppose I'd say I don't think there's any documentation to
20 tells me, but if I feel that it's above the door crew's skill set,
21 then I would ask for that, for help.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. The door crew, they just adjust doors, so if it's drilling or
24 filling, something like that, then they wouldn't do something like
25 that. It would just create more risk of damage to the plane if

1 you don't have someone that's normally used to doing that type of
2 work.

3 Q. Okay. And I think you may have answered this, but in your
4 time there, have you seen a MED plug opened?

5 A. No.

6 MR. RIGSBY: Okay. Okay, that's all I have. The rest of
7 mine have been asked.

8 Bjorn.

9 BY CAPT ANDERSON:

10 Q. Who is your supervisor or who's above you?

11 A. Seth Bentley.

12 Q. Seth Bentley. Do you feel any pressure from leadership for
13 you to do your job?

14 A. I don't know if pressure's the right word, I feel that the
15 expectations are set pretty high for someone like myself with no
16 prior Boeing management experience and trying to learn all -- what
17 all the meetings are and all the things that I needed. I was
18 learning probably more on failure than instruction, like ooh, that
19 hurt, I don't want that to happen again, I've learned from this.

20 There were a lot of meetings, and I actually became a manager
21 probably at the worst time, you know, and I was put in a place
22 that had a lot of focus and a lot of issues going on, so I felt a
23 lot of pressure in that way. I don't know if that was from upper
24 management, you know, because that's your question. I was working
25 14, 16 hours a day just trying to figure things out and learn and

1 stay on top of it so I wouldn't fail. It was pretty tough.

2 Q. Um-hum.

3 A. But I'm not seasoned enough, I haven't been there long enough
4 to really know the real process of how upper management deals with
5 my level of management because it hasn't evened out, you know, and
6 we had the door incident, the plug incident, and then we had the
7 quality stand-down and we've been trying to regroup and there's
8 been other issues that have come up and it's been a lot in the
9 last year.

10 Q. And then just to touch on the experience level that was
11 talked about with employees coming in, the experience is less and
12 now hearing that [REDACTED] retired, being somebody that was
13 training you and giving you some insight, as he's left, who is
14 there to train or do we have somebody in the process that trains
15 the doors team or the doors masters?

16 A. There's a few employees left on the door crew team that have
17 been there for quite a while that could fill in for Mike's place a
18 bit. There's also workplace coaches, they're contracted people
19 that worked on a door crew prior, so there are some people in
20 place.

21 Q. And how is that training tracked, because it's been described
22 as on-the-job training, is it tracked or is it formally recorded
23 in any way to be able to track or follow progress for different
24 members of those teams?

25 A. There wasn't anything in place on paper, there's a lot of --

1 that process is being implemented right now. I haven't been part
2 of that process yet, but that's part of the staffing and so on and
3 so forth, and they're implementing a lot of documentation to make
4 sure that they can track and that's covered, so that's in process
5 now.

6 CAPT ANDERSON: I think that's all for me.

7 MR. BISHOP: Okay.

8 CAPT ANDERSON: Thanks, Ted.

9 DR. WOODS: Troy.

10 BY MR. LEVANEN:

11 Q. So I did have a few more questions on the part about being
12 the door -- most of mine are around the door manager position. So
13 did they come to you and ask you to put in for the door manager or
14 was that something you -- they posted and then you bid for it or
15 what made you decide to go from QA to being a manager?

16 A. A little bit of nudging from my wife and nudging from Troy
17 Hensey (ph.), that I've known for quite a while, he was a
18 director, he's in Everett now. The fact that I had my own
19 company, my wife's position, in fact, I had my own company for
20 quite a while.

21 Q. Um-hum.

22 A. I also was at one time heavily involved in a church as an
23 elder and so I kind of have that background of being good with
24 people. Both of them thought I would have some good qualities
25 that I could give back to people in leadership and help.

1 Q. When you have those qualities, you can run but you can't
2 hide, right?

3 A. Right.

4 (Laughter.)

5 BY MR. LEVANEN:

6 Q. But on that, so you started out, like you say, in potentially
7 one of the hardest manager jobs to do, then you were there for a
8 period of time, why did you stop -- as you were coming up to
9 speed, why did you change?

10 A. I would like the answer to that. I don't know for sure the
11 "why," but I can say that once the door plug issue happened, after
12 -- right after that we had a lot of green lines, a massive amount
13 of green lines come hit us, it was very troubling to me and I had
14 a one-on-one with Katie Ringgold, that we would not be able to
15 sustain that and that there would be a time when it would be
16 affecting deliveries and things of that sort, that it was going to
17 really impact the factory's build tremendously.

18 They heard that, upper management heard that, they gave us
19 some Grade 4 people to do a lot of these tags or green lines that
20 weren't around rigging doors and that was a help, and they also
21 split up door masters and door crew, so there were two managers,
22 one for each. And then the other manager that had -- I had door
23 crew and she had door masters and we both were still not
24 sustaining and not doing as well as we should have been doing.
25 She reached out to a few -- she's been with Boeing for quite a

1 while as a manager, she reached out to a few upper management
2 people that she knew to get help. So we had a second level come
3 in to help or I don't know what the terminology -- rescue or I
4 don't know, to help fortify, let's say, door crew and door
5 masters. I've been so new I'm not really familiar with recovery
6 plans and things of that sort.

7 So at that time we had Rachel Malone come in as a second
8 level and she reorganized the management of door crew and door
9 masters and brought in additional managers to manage parts, like
10 let's group these green lines together and this manager, take them
11 and run with those, and so kind of organized it in a better format
12 for recovery.

13 At that time they wanted me to look at toolkits for the doors
14 and just be communication of what's going on for the FAA
15 conformity for the door plug, for that work, so that's what I did
16 for quite a while. But I can't tell you why. I would guess it's
17 because I'm a greener manager and they really probably needed
18 someone more seasoned.

19 Q. So they kind of moved you or they restructured it so you were
20 still around the doors, you just weren't --

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. But is that where you're at currently, then?

23 A. No, no.

24 Q. And then what?

25 A. So then I'm not sure what happened with Rachel Malone, but I

1 was no -- I don't know what happened, but I went to feeder line
2 for about three weeks to fill in because there was a manager out
3 and then right after that I moved into the position I'm in now for
4 Flow Day 3 lowers.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. Well, you're pretty good at this. We will have you right
8 here. Okay. And then back to the time when you were -- before,
9 when you were by yourself with the door crew and at that point it
10 wasn't fully door masters, right, it was just one door crew?

11 A. No, it was -- there's always been two crews, yeah.

12 Q. But you were in charge of both?

13 A. I was in charge of both in the beginning, yes.

14 Q. Tell me a little bit more about that, like interacting with
15 those teams and just how well they got along with each other,
16 maybe how long you got along with -- how well you got along with
17 them.

18 A. I was also inspector for door masters, you know, prior, so I
19 knew them, also. It seemed as though they take the best mechanics
20 from door crew and put them on door masters. They have a lot of
21 work to do and there's very few of them. They do the final rig or
22 the final rig check of the doors at rollout, after the build is
23 all done. The doors can only be rigged at a certified rig
24 position, which would be either Flow Day 1 through 3 up on the
25 tool or be at rollout with the engines on, down-jacked, all the

1 seats installed. So that's what door masters does is a final
2 check of those doors. And it seems like it would always go out of
3 tolerance because of high blow in Flow Day 6, perhaps, or maybe
4 other reasons, but they were always working very hard. I think
5 there's a little bit of tension between the two crews, that was
6 something that I was trying to remedy and rotate people around
7 from crew to crew so they could see what was going on in the
8 others' eyes

9 Q. Um-hum.

10 A. -- because there is sometimes blame that maybe door crew
11 wasn't doing their job as well as they should because they were
12 finding chronic issues down at rollout. I don't know if that's
13 necessarily true, but I -- I heard that, you know, so but they
14 also got along, too. If there was help needed, I saw a lot of
15 communication cross lines, you know, to the other crew to ask for
16 help or guidance. And [REDACTED] was always all over the place
17 helping, helping, and he helped at airports and delivery center
18 and everywhere, if there was ever a problem, they always -- people
19 always called him.

20 Q. And then he retired.

21 A. Yeah.

22 Q. Okay, thank you for that. And then -- well, one last
23 question on that, I guess. Who was your lead, when you had it,
24 who was the lead of the door masters?

25 A. Tim Goodwin.

1 Q. [REDACTED] And who was your lead of the door crew?

2 A. That was [REDACTED]

3 Q. [REDACTED]

4 A. Yeah.

5 Q. And then one other -- a different topic. We've heard about
6 SRMs or SRAs that they put in place to increase production, you
7 know, like to get more planes per month and slowly ramp back up
8 maybe coming out of COVID, that kind of thing. You know, I was
9 curious, did you ever get invited to sit on any SRAs or SRMs
10 related to increasing production or any SRAs for that matter?

11 A. I was in a work -- none of those two, but I was in a workshop
12 after the plug, they used a bowtie configuration to figure out
13 what are the risks and what barriers were in place and what
14 barriers should be implemented so something like that doesn't
15 happen again, so I was a part of that.

16 MR. LEVANEN: All right. Okay, that's good for me right now,
17 thank you.

18 MR. BISHOP: Okay.

19 DR. WOODS: John.

20 MR. MILLER: Thank you.

21 BY MR. MILLER:

22 Q. On the topic of green lines --

23 A. Um-hum.

24 Q. -- in terms of -- what I understood, as you said, this was
25 post-accident activity where the work started to increase for the

1 team, specifically within that effort, did that include the
2 inspections that were related to the plug specifically, the
3 nonconformance records that were getting generated for every
4 aircraft that were essentially equivalent to our in-service
5 inspections?

6 A. Can you ask that again?

7 Q. Sure.

8 A. I'm not sure I'm tracking --

9 (Crosstalk)

10 BY MR. MILLER:

11 Q. Yeah. In order to meet the FAA's requirements for a return
12 to service and return to delivery --

13 A. Oh.

14 Q. -- there was required inspections for every fuselage and it
15 continues to be, as it's being built, for the MED plug as it's
16 delivered --

17 A. Um-hum.

18 Q. -- from Spirit, was that part of that green line activity?

19 A. Not so much. Preflight did most of that work.

20 Q. Understood, okay.

21 A. Right? So no, but they did -- for the plug, in particular,
22 there is this big FAA conformity where you have ODA come out and
23 there's probably about five people that witness a good portion of
24 the work for the plug, but that's new fuselages coming in, it's
25 not -- I think you're asking about planes that have already been

1 worked on and maybe delivered and things like that. So we weren't
2 a part of that, no.

3 Q. Okay, okay. Very good, thank you. And then on the topic of
4 your time in QA and your team lead stressing about the removal
5 process and then transitioning into your managerial role, was that
6 something that you carried forward to the door team and the crew
7 and the masters, I guess, equivalently --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- saying that removals are important here, it's something
10 that was stressed on the QA side and trying to bring that forward
11 to that team?

12 A. Oh, sure, yeah. So, implemented a lot of meetings with
13 mechanics and quality, even second levels coming in, discussing
14 the whole process and why it should be done and that it must be
15 done and quality wouldn't have let the mechanics get away with not
16 -- it was a "must" thing, you know. So if that wasn't done, if a
17 removal was not performed, there would've been a process failure,
18 so there's no way around it.

19 Q. So the primary vehicle for communication was in these team
20 meetings. Was there also distribution of information through
21 e-mails, for example?

22 A. After the incident there was quite a few things in e-mail
23 form from quality, yes.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Yeah. And then they implemented something where only team

1 leads could write removals. There's been quite a few processes
2 like that to make sure that things are proper, procedures are in
3 place and being done.

4 Q. And then on the topic of training, I think you had mentioned
5 that post-accident, that now there's -- for the door team there's
6 a certification requirement that's being implemented.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Does that mean that team, do the individuals get pulled out
9 and have to do additional training, as well, for -- to get their
10 certification or that's something that's still --

11 A. I don't know.

12 Q. -- being developed?

13 A. It's being developed.

14 Q. Got you, right.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Okay. And then a final question on the training. Since you
17 spent time up in Everett and I think, to Mr. Petruzelli's
18 discussion there, the differences between Renton and Everett, do
19 you have awareness for the Everett teams that work on doors, do
20 they go through any specific training that would be different
21 from, say, the Renton team, for example?

22 A. I've been told that they have door-rigging certifications
23 that they have to acquire. I don't have any personal interaction
24 with the doors in Everett at all, but --

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. -- I -- my understanding is that they're -- it's a totally
2 different animal, so to say, you know, that they have motors and
3 things like that in Everett and the doors on the 737 are more like
4 the old 707, you know, it's like an older design that hasn't
5 really been updated for complications, getting it certified and
6 so --

7 Q. Yeah, understood. Okay.

8 A. Yeah.

9 MR. MILLER: Okay. Sabrina, that's all I have.

10 DR. WOODS: Okay.

11 BY DR. WOODS:

12 Q. I want to go back earlier to something you had said about you
13 felt, especially being new, relatively new, that, you know, it's a
14 fairly high bar that was set for yourself to achieve from your
15 supervision. I'm wondering, was that similar high bar -- what is
16 your perception for that for the touch labor that was under you?
17 Did they have that same high bar to achieve or did they feel the
18 same way?

19 A. For the mechanics under me?

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. I don't believe it was the same, no. I think that -- I think
22 they had everything they needed to accomplish the work in a day,
23 you know. I think that probably everybody had some stress, if
24 that's what you're talking about, but stress isn't necessarily a
25 negative, so what I would -- you're saying pressure, I think. The

1 pressure for me is learning the managerial job, the ins and outs,
2 the meetings, you know, what is Kamishibai, what is a Kaizen card,
3 what are all the things that have to be inputted in the computer
4 every day or weekly or monthly, things of that sort. What about
5 the toolkits? You know, just learning, I didn't shadow anyone, so
6 that's what I meant by a high bar. I didn't have the expectation
7 set and I think the mechanics do.

8 Q. Okay, okay. So it's different circumstances.

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. Because you were there for, I recognize, a short amount of
11 time prior to when the accident happened, can you capture, I
12 guess, in a few sentences, how did the job change from before to
13 after?

14 A. For the plug or for managers?

15 Q. For your manager role --

16 A. Role?

17 Q. -- in totality.

18 A. Okay. Yeah, I was there for about a month before and we were
19 just inundated, as I said before, with the green lines, the amount
20 of meetings that I had to go to was significantly more, and
21 workshops and things like that, just things I had to answer to as
22 far as with regard to the plug, after the incident. Before that,
23 it was fairly calm in comparison and I think that if the plug
24 issue had not happened, that I probably would've been fine and
25 learned it all and would've been very comfortable in that position

1 because I already knew the package very well from being their
2 quality.

3 Q. Is that typical, do you think, in our purview, that a person
4 who is at least -- who is a part of that particular, like, job
5 specialty or even tangential, for instance, you coming from QA and
6 now becoming a manager, do you see that often across the
7 production line?

8 A. Well, I haven't observed at all and I try to figure it all
9 out in a such a way, a scientific way, but just from the little
10 I've seen, I -- what I see as a good example of what happens is
11 someone that's interested in becoming a manager would first be a
12 temp manager, try it out, learn a little bit and then progress
13 into that, into a full-on permanent manager.

14 I know that some managers have never worked on a plane and I
15 think some of the attraction for me to be door manager was that I
16 knew the package, I came from quality, I was -- I worked on planes
17 before and I was a mechanic before, so I think those are all
18 benefits to being a manager and working on a plane, knowing the
19 processes.

20 Q. I know, I recognize you haven't seen everything, but what is
21 your perception of the managers that are commensurate with your
22 level that are out there, do they have that same "I came from
23 this, I have been a mechanic on this, I understand this process"?

24 A. It's a mix. I've seen some like that, yes, and others, no,
25 others that have not worked on the plane. No.

1 Q. Do you think there's value added in having had been on the
2 production line in some capacity prior to taking a management
3 position?

4 A. I think there is a huge advantage.

5 Q. In the absence of not having that experience, what do you
6 think would be a good way to bridge that gap in -- you know, from
7 those who've had the experience in the past?

8 A. A mentor. Someone to guide, you know.

9 Q. Okay. You said that there have been notable process changes,
10 obviously, an accident has taken place, we can't stay at status
11 quo, things have changed. How are some of these bigger processes
12 communicated to you? How did you receive this information?

13 A. Various ways, either through e-mail from top management or
14 quality management sometimes, or in our Tier 2s, which is our
15 Level 2 manager that's above us and "us," as first-line managers,
16 things were spoken to us from our second level.

17 Q. Um-hum. Were you ever solicited for your feedback once
18 you've had those conversations about what these process changes
19 are going to be?

20 A. We have the opportunity to ask questions and talk about
21 concerns, is that --

22 Q. Yes.

23 A. During those meetings, yes.

24 Q. How comfortable are you in that if you had a concern to raise
25 or address, that it would be taken seriously, it will be taken

1 into account?

2 A. I think that it's emphasized by upper management that we
3 should speak up whenever we have any kind of question or see
4 something that we feel is wrong or off. I think that's one of the
5 major focuses, is that they are trying to get people to speak up.

6 Q. Focus as of when? Has it always been that way?

7 A. It's been more that way since the incident, but before that,
8 there was -- the Speak Up was implemented before, before the plug
9 door.

10 Q. Um-hum.

11 A. Yeah, in fact, I did my Speak Up before that incident.

12 Q. So I recognize you've moved around a little bit, it's been a
13 little turbulent over the last year for you, so it's hard to kind
14 of capture to the point where you're comfortable in your current
15 role.

16 A. Um-hum.

17 Q. That being said, what's good? What right now, going on that
18 you see -- not right now, let's go back three weeks ago, right now
19 is going on that you see that is good and that you think is going
20 well across the production?

21 A. Well, I think that just the fact that the company realizes
22 that there are things, we need to regain trust of the customer and
23 the public and what does that entail. Traveled work, there's a
24 big focus to eliminate traveled work. I think there's a focus on
25 mechanics feeling pressured, or I think they did feel pressured

1 before the incident, to work at an uncomfortable rate. And so I
2 think all of those things, those are some of the things being
3 addressed right now that I see improvement and people really
4 trying to address, management trying to address those things,
5 those aspects.

6 Q. Do you think that these changes, these addressings, these --
7 awareness, is it sustainable?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. Okay. So conversely, what still needs to be looked into,
10 what haven't we quite gotten right yet?

11 A. Gosh, that's a tough one. Well, I think -- I think trust is
12 a big one, I think that's going to take time. It may not be
13 something you get quite right, but it's just going to take time
14 gaining the trust back of the customers and the public and the
15 mechanics, I believe. I think, for instance, they're on strike
16 now with the last two contracts having extensions and the pension
17 taken away and things like that, you know, there seems to be a
18 conflict between the company and the mechanics.

19 That needs to be resolved. I think mechanics need to feel
20 more pride in their work, more caring and more pride and not so
21 much what -- I sound like Kennedy, not so much what the company
22 can do for them, but for them doing their best and understanding
23 the importance and the severity if something goes wrong, you know,
24 what could happen. So, you know, when this incident happened with
25 the plug, I felt literally sick on my stomach, it's just horrible.

1 So I think -- I think pride, I think getting a sense of pride back
2 would go a long way.

3 Q. That's a great segue into my next question, which was do you
4 feel -- let's say prior, prior to the incident occurring, so prior
5 to January of this year, what is the sentiment on the factory
6 floor, do people understand the criticality of their job, do they
7 understand what it is they actually do?

8 A. I can't get into their heads, but I think that could be
9 improved, I think -- yeah, I think there needs to be more
10 awareness or ownership of what they do and how critical it is,
11 yes. Before, I think -- I just see a culture out there that seems
12 to be trying to take the easy way and not putting in the extra
13 effort to better themselves and better the company.

14 Q. And since the incident have you seen a change?

15 A. Well, it's been pretty chaotic since the incident, so it
16 never got back to just normal work, so that's a difficult one to
17 answer, but I think -- I think the awareness is heightened because
18 I think that's what all the talk is about right now and has been
19 since the incident.

20 I personally took the crew, door crew, up to the war room,
21 which is where all the FAA findings are and they had everything
22 plastered on the walls of what all the findings were, because I
23 wanted them to understand the reality of what was really happening
24 and that this wasn't just another thing that was going to be
25 brushed off and we were going to move through and get back to

1 normal but that it was pretty critical. So I tried to make them
2 understand. I think observing all of that and listening to the
3 gal talk about it all, that it hit their hearts, I think they
4 understand it more.

5 Q. When I say the word safety culture to you, and this is you,
6 not Boeing, but you, what do you think of, what does that mean?

7 A. I think that means that if you find something that's amiss or
8 that seems wrong, that you speak up, that you're looking for
9 things that may be wrong, looking for things to improve, you know,
10 what can we improve, how can we improve it, those sort of things.
11 First-time pass, you know, quality, doing the best you can every
12 time, that this is a very expensive plane with a lot of people
13 flying on them and just always doing your best. So that's what it
14 means to me, a little bit.

15 Q. So given your view of safety culture, now let's overlay the
16 production, how close are they to your view of what safety culture
17 is?

18 A. You know, you look at that as a whole or if you look at it as
19 individuals, there were some individuals that there were HR issues
20 and things that I had to address, but I would say on the whole,
21 the majority of them, I think they were taking pride in their
22 work. I feel that as soon as they pulled me from the manager of
23 the door crew, that what I saw was a team working together, which
24 I hadn't seen before, I think I developed that, that they were
25 trying to help one another, that they were communicating well with

1 me any kind of issues, missing parts, anything like that and we
2 were starting to really gel as a team very well, so I saw
3 improvement.

4 DR. WOODS: That's all I have.

5 MR. BISHOP: Okay.

6 DR. WOODS: That's the first round done there. We are almost
7 to an hour, how are you feeling?

8 MR. BISHOP: Good.

9 DR. WOODS: Does anybody need a break?

10 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I do.

11 DR. WOODS: I've got one vote for a break. Two votes for a
12 break. Let's go on and do that, then, please. We're going to go
13 off record at 14:33 Pacific time.

14 (Off the record at 2:33 p.m. PT)

15 (On the record at 2:41 p.m. PT)

16 DR. WOODS: Okay, we are back on record at 14:41 Pacific time
17 and we're going to start off with our second round, usually again
18 much shorter, with Nils, do you have any follow-up questions?

19 MR. JOHNSON: I do, I have a few here.

20 BY MR. JOHNSON:

21 Q. You talked about removals, so I assume you're familiar with
22 BPI-1581. How has 1581 changed over the years?

23 A. Over the years, I can't answer that. I really wasn't that --
24 or I was not familiar with it until I became quality.

25 Q. Okay. Have you taken the removal training?

1 A. Yeah. Wait, no. I apologize, I have not.

2 Q. Okay. From your seat, is the removal training effective
3 today?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. How would you describe managing the door crew/door masters'
6 personalities, difficult employees?

7 A. Yeah, there's -- there's some difficult personalities, I
8 think that's factory-wide, everywhere. The ones that have been
9 there longer seem to have more -- or they do have more influence
10 on the other mechanics and I think they just feel -- what's the
11 right word -- they feel -- I don't know, I don't know what the
12 right wording is, I'm sorry.

13 They feel just more knowledgeable, I would say, they feel
14 more knowledgeable than maybe even the managers, feel there's a
15 slight, I could say, almost -- no, I'm not going to say that.
16 They just feel more knowledgeable, let's point it at that.

17 Q. Okay. Last question for me, do you have any knowledge about
18 who opened or closed the MED plug on 8789?

19 A. No, I don't.

20 MR. JOHNSON: John.

21 BY MR. PETRUZZELLI:

22 Q. [REDACTED] Goodin was one of your team leads?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. How long did you have him? Roughly.

25 A. Roughly five months.

1 Q. Were you his QA as well?

2 A. Yes. For short periods of time because we did rotation.

3 Q. Okay. What was his -- work ethic isn't the right word, but
4 what was his work ethic?

5 A. I never got to know him really well, very well, but I felt
6 that he was -- for me, he was -- as a manger, he was difficult to
7 communicate with, he seemed defensive whenever I asked him
8 questions, I needed information for my meetings and he seemed to
9 push back a lot, like in a defensive way, like I didn't trust him
10 or something because I'm asking him questions. So there was some
11 difficulty.

12 Q. Did you feel like he generally did the right thing, though?

13 A. I think he -- he did his part for the team, they had him
14 writing removals, ordering stands, doing more administrative stuff
15 rather than working on the plane.

16 Q. You talked about having to remind people about documentation
17 and you used the words "you had to frequently remind people of
18 documenting work performed," can you talk a little bit about that?

19 A. Well, that was just -- that was to implement the removal
20 process, to get that going, that took a while, change is typically
21 difficult.

22 Q. Turning a battleship?

23 A. Yes.

24 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Okay, that was documenting. I think you
25 answered everything else I had, yeah. Thank you.

1 DR. WOODS: Okay. Matt.

2 BY MR. RIGSBY:

3 Q. Just a couple, Ted. And I apologize if you answered this,
4 but have you ever seen a mid-exit door plug opened?

5 A. No. Well, not before.

6 Q. Not before.

7 A. After, yes.

8 Q. Okay. As a first-line manager, do you get to -- any say on
9 who you get to hire?

10 A. No.

11 Q. Okay. Would you want a say on it?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Okay. How does that process work now?

14 A. There's a job opening -- I'm hoping it will change because of
15 the certifications that they're going to implement, but as up to
16 now, to this point, there's a job opening, they turn on. If
17 they're already a Boeing employee, they turn on their green lights
18 and then they apply for it and -- and get the job.

19 So therefore, I feel that the door crew needs a unique
20 mindset, you need to be able to -- you need to be a problem solver
21 because if you adjust one thing, let's say, up in the upper right
22 corner, it may throw off six or so other things on the other part
23 of the door. So if you don't have that kind of a mentality, which
24 not everyone does, you're not going to make it, you're going to
25 struggle.

1 Q. Okay.

2 A. So a lot of times, like I had one individual, towards the end
3 he came on board and he -- he was a Boeing employee for quite a
4 while in the wire shop and he had problems just threading a little
5 fastener in a hole and torquing something to 15 pounds. So we
6 always test them out on the door liner brackets because that's the
7 simplest job and it's not rigging the door and see how they -- how
8 well they do and then we try to place them in the proper place
9 where they'll be comfortable with what they do.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. That individual is no longer with the door crew that I talked
12 about, so that's an example.

13 Q. When you have an employee like that, are you allowed to go to
14 your next level and say hell of a nice guy, but he just ain't
15 working out, doesn't have the tactile skills to do this job?

16 A. Yeah, no, it's more of getting a workplace coach. They also
17 want to implement the 30/60/90-day thing where you do a review.
18 We're also --

19 Q. To try to fix it.

20 A. Yeah, we're doing other things like trying to get the bar
21 chart in order so that -- before I came, the mechanics were
22 working two IPs, not the bar chart, so it's hard to hold people
23 accountable to their bar. So there's been a lot of changes that
24 have been implemented for that.

25 Q. Okay. So now that they're going to a certification for these

1 people, is that an improvement, in your eyes?

2 A. Yes, definitely. It's a great improvement to have someone
3 knowledgeable on how to rig a door before they become part of the
4 crew.

5 Q. Sure. I guess, you know, Sabrina had brought up the question
6 on criticality, is that something with your crews that you -- you
7 know, you said you see them four times a day or talk to them
8 regularly during a meeting, that you remind them of on a fairly
9 regular basis?

10 A. Fairly regular, not every day, but yes.

11 Q. Would you do that on a newer -- say a newer generation
12 than --

13 (Crosstalk)

14 MR. BISHOP: Yes, yes. I remember when I was first hired at
15 Boeing and this is -- this is something I think that should
16 change, I believe that -- I don't know how it is right now, but
17 recently, I know the instructors are more contracted where, when I
18 came on board they were -- they used to be mechanics. So I heard
19 all of the horror stories, so I've gotten this, you know, finger
20 because you used -- he had gloves on when he was drilling.

21 They showed videos of the 747 that went down, you know, with
22 the pressure dome that blew out, showed other videos of things
23 like a loose -- well, let's say too much CIC blocks a drainage
24 hole, that creates ice, then the rigging or something goes bad.
25 That all scared me to death right away when I was going through

1 training and I feel like every employee should have that sense of
2 fear and respect.

3 MR. RIGSBY: Okay, I think that's it for me. Thank you, Ted.

4 DR. WOODS: Bjorn.

5 BY CAPT ANDERSON:

6 Q. Continuous training. So those videos that you were saying
7 that were shown, do they not show those anymore?

8 A. I don't believe so. I don't know for sure, I don't know.

9 Q. Does Boeing have a dedicated training department that
10 develops the training for employees?

11 A. Yes, I think so, yes. I haven't seen documentation, I don't
12 -- I'm not that knowledgeable about it.

13 Q. Well, as a manager, if you're working with a crew and you see
14 there's deficiencies or areas that your employees could benefit
15 from more training, where would you take recommendations to
16 suggest that training be covered?

17 A. I would get the workplace coach in right away and start
18 training them on the job, by the workplace coach.

19 Q. And is there anything that you could make recommendations or
20 make changes for their foundational training?

21 A. Well, there's -- there's been changes implemented since the
22 quality stand-down and I know that the onboard training is quite
23 extensive now and they made it longer. They also were testing
24 people on the floor, mechanics on the floor, with surveys and they
25 had to take classes, people who I think had been there for two

1 years or less, I think it was, made sure they knew how to -- the
2 stamping processes, CMES, go online, do all of that sort of thing,
3 but also I think they had some -- I don't know, they had some
4 testing to gather information and try to figure out where the
5 holes are of what they need to do to fix things. So that's in
6 process, yes.

7 CAPT ANDERSON: Okay. That's all for me.

8 MR. BISHOP: Okay.

9 CAPT ANDERSON: Thanks, Ted.

10 DR. WOODS: Troy.

11 BY MR. LEVANEN:

12 Q. A couple follow-on questions. On the removal process, you
13 were talking about implementing the changes when John was asking
14 about it. Were there actually changes to it or was it just more
15 of a reemphasis on it, on the removal process, that you were
16 trying to -- when you were talking about it being a ship to turn?

17 A. In the beginning it was just to make it a regular process
18 when it's needed. Basically, when it's needed, write a removal.
19 And that's the significant -- that's -- that's what needed to be
20 implemented or conveyed or taught.

21 Q. (Indiscernible)?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. It was that these are processes that we need to follow and
25 you need something to write the removal against, like a pickup,

1 and you must write the removal. If there's anything that's
2 disturbed, that was completed prior to your work, it needed a
3 removal.

4 Q. And that was one of your early challenges as a manager,
5 right, you were saying that's when you were seeing that more, not
6 when you were in QA, but when you were a manager?

7 A. Well, both, actually. When I was QA, we were implementing
8 that at the end of my time as QA and then it transferred over when
9 I was a manager.

10 Q. Got it.

11 A. That was a little bit of a difficult time for me because I
12 was their QA, then their manager, trying to get this thing
13 implemented, so --

14 Q. Um-hum. Okay.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. You mentioned that [REDACTED] was the lead, it was about five months
17 that you worked with him, what -- can you just, crudely (ph.),
18 just for my timeline in my head, what months was it that you
19 worked with him?

20 A. Well, I worked as his QA before that time, that five months,
21 but I became door QA at the end of November, I believe, and then
22 -- then I stopped this last summer and I can't remember, at some
23 point in time he -- well, at one point in time they divided the
24 two crews, so that's when I stopped working with him.

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Yeah, another manager took on the door masters.

2 Q. Got it, okay.

3 A. Yeah.

4 Q. Got it. So it was before the accident, though, that you
5 worked with him?

6 A. Well, no, I must have been his manager after the accident,
7 also, because the accident was in January and that was shortly
8 after I became a manager, so yeah, I was his manager after the
9 accident.

10 Q. Okay. That's good enough, thank you. You mentioned the
11 certifications that they're bringing on and I know you mentioned
12 them before, I know they're going to be in-house certifications
13 where they train people to be certified to say rig this door, that
14 door --

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. -- you know, whatever.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Not like A&P license requirement?

19 A. No.

20 Q. Okay. As far as the leaves that are currently happening
21 right now, are you -- do you have one -- is it -- are you on leave
22 right now?

23 A. Furlough?

24 Q. Yeah, furlough.

25 A. Last week was my first furlough, yes. Now I'm working, I'm

1 working.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. You're working, okay, thank you.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. And the last one I had for you is more around the management
7 training program that you talked about and I was curious, in my
8 mind it was past, current, and future, so our past, present,
9 future. So you mentioned that you didn't have a real formal
10 management training program when you started, it was like OJT, is
11 that what we got?

12 A. For my manager training?

13 Q. Yeah, when you started as a manager.

14 A. No, there wasn't -- you mean someone beside me that I
15 shadowed?

16 Q. Or even you go in a classroom for a week or two weeks.

17 A. I went into a classroom for a week, yes.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And then when you hit the floor, you were kind of on your
21 own?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And then currently, you don't have any active management
24 training programs going on with what you're doing now, right?

25 A. For myself, no.

1 Q. Yeah.

2 A. Well, there are -- there are learnings that they put out for
3 online things and so on and so forth, periodically, that I've been
4 taking, yes.

5 Q. Um-hum.

6 A. But no -- no formal onboarding, if that's your question.

7 Q. Yeah, or like a development, continuous development program,
8 leadership.

9 A. Not that I know of, no.

10 Q. And then the last part of that was the future state, like in
11 your mind, what would that look like if you were -- started from
12 scratch again, what would your recommendation be for an
13 interactive leadership training program?

14 A. Yeah, I think something that sets expectations, that tells
15 you that this is how your day looks, these are the things that are
16 going to be expected from you, here's the things that you need to
17 perform, here's the resources to -- that you have in case you have
18 any questions or you need -- need anything for these various
19 things that you're going to be doing.

20 Q. Be set up for success, huh?

21 A. Yes.

22 MR. LEVANEN: Okay, that's good. Thank you for all the
23 information.

24 MR. BISHOP: Yes.

25 DR. WOODS: John.

1 BY MR. MILLER:

2 Q. Okay, I think just one question, Ted. So with the door team,
3 when the safety/quality stand-downs occurred, did you receive any
4 feedback from the team after that, did they feel that was a good
5 activity, for example?

6 A. I didn't hear much positive feedback.

7 Q. Okay. They did not raise any specific issues to you from
8 those stand-downs?

9 A. Well, we -- at the same time, we had EI that was implemented,
10 re-implemented, you know, employee involvement meetings, which is
11 their meeting which is -- it is a continuation of the stand-down
12 and it's to identify any issues or if they have any complaints or
13 concerns or anything at all, that they would write a card, write
14 it on a card called a Kaizen card. We got a tremendous amount of
15 support for that.

16 In the beginning we kicked it off, Flow Day 1, and I was one
17 of the first managers to kick that off. I was a part of that
18 prior on the 747, so I had a little bit of understanding of that
19 meeting. So then we had a lot of support groups from different
20 organizations during those meetings to resolve the issues that are
21 brought up.

22 Q. And how often do those employee involvement meetings take
23 place?

24 A. They're once a week, on Tuesdays, 9 o'clock.

25 MR. MILLER: Okay, Sabrina, no further questions.

1 DR. WOODS: Okay.

2 BY DR. WOODS:

3 Q. I just have really one category for questions and that is the
4 corrective action process, at what level were you involved as --
5 coming out of QA as a manager, at what level are you involved with
6 the CAR process?

7 A. I would have to -- I gave out a few corrective actions, a few
8 CAMs.

9 Q. Um-hum.

10 A. So what --

11 Q. Are you the one who develops them and then gives them out or
12 is it something that is handed to you to then give out or
13 communicate?

14 A. It was handed to me to give out, yes. I'm not that
15 knowledgeable in that process --

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. -- to employees, yeah.

18 DR. WOODS: Okay, all right. Well, that was the only
19 question that I had for the follow-up, but I always conclude with
20 two questions, so before I get to that, anyone else?

21 MR. PETRUZZELLI: To clarify what you were just talking
22 about, you were asking about CARs?

23 DR. WOODS: Yes.

24 MR. BISHOP: Oh, CARs.

25 DR. WOODS: Yes.

1 MR. PETRUZZELLI: You were talking about CAMs.

2 MR. BISHOP: Yes.

3 DR. WOODS: Oh.

4 MR. PETRUZZELLI: Corrective action memos.

5 MR. BISHOP: Yes. Yeah, I did quite a few CARs, yeah.

6 DR. WOODS: Yeah, I'm sorry if I wasn't clear, I was --

7 MR. BISHOP: Sorry about that.

8 DR. WOODS: -- talking about CARs, C-A-R.

9 MR. BISHOP: Okay.

10 BY DR. WOODS:

11 Q. So I guess then, as a frontline supervisor, are you a part of
12 the development process or implementation? What's your interface?

13 A. There was -- when a CAR is written, then I would have to
14 answer it.

15 Q. Okay. On behalf of your -- some of your mechanics or --

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. Yes. Yeah, so I -- there's three questions, I can't remember
19 what they are offhand, it's something like, you know, what
20 happened, what -- what's in place now so it doesn't happen again,
21 what kind of corrective action was taken by the mechanic.

22 Q. And did you serve in that role as a frontline manager for the
23 door crew and the -- the door crew and the door masters during
24 your --

25 A. I don't remember any incidents with the door masters, but the

1 door crew, yes.

2 Q. So I guess when you receive something and you have to answer
3 to it, what was your process, what did you do?

4 A. Well, in the beginning I went to a higher-up, the compliance
5 second level, for help because I didn't know what direction to go
6 in, so he helped me with that. Again, there's an operation and
7 there's, I think, three questions to ask and I would have to
8 answer those questions. And so it would be in text form, put into
9 the operation, into the CAR. Does that --

10 Q. Sort of. I guess what I'm saying was like how do you know
11 what to put, then, what is your -- do you go -- do you go
12 investigate on your own to figure out what happened and then after
13 that, how are you determining that third question of, you know,
14 how are you making sure it doesn't happen again?

15 A. Right. Well, there are things implemented like -- usually
16 there was a process failure before the CAR, so then there's a
17 stand-down and you get the whole team together talking about what
18 the occurrence was and what -- why we can't do this and so and so
19 -- what the processes are that we need to follow, things of that
20 sort. Usually, they -- I haven't seen anything that was really
21 complex or extensive. You know, one that stands out in my mind
22 was somebody that put some paint on the plane and -- what did they
23 do -- without a pickup, that's what it was. They refinished
24 something without a pickup. I think there was some confusion that
25 they blended something, that would've been an issue, but anyways,

1 something of that sort.

2 Q. Okay. I guess what I'm trying to walk back to is what is
3 your process for determining true root cause, why it really
4 happened and not just oh, somebody did this thing, but what are
5 the fundamental reasons why somebody did this thing? So that was
6 my way of just trying to tease that out because --

7 A. I haven't been in anything in depth or involved that needed
8 something of that sort.

9 Q. For a root cause assessment?

10 A. Yes.

11 DR. WOODS: Okay, okay. That's it, then --

12 MR. BISHOP: Okay.

13 DR. WOODS: -- for me. Any last re-attacks?

14 (No response.)

15 BY DR. WOODS:

16 Q. Okay, so my last two questions I always end with is -- the
17 first one I jokingly call it like the king for a day, magic wand
18 question, and that is you've got some experience, you've now
19 worked through your experiences as a -- particularly as a
20 frontline manager, if there was something you could change and I
21 don't mean something that you have to do, it's just like you could
22 wave this magic wand and you could change and the product, the
23 process, everything would be for the better, what would that be?
24 In your opinion, what needs to be changed?

25 A. Boy, that's a good question. I think for the Renton factory,

1 for the 737, I would slow the program down. I think I would get
2 the quality in order first and the traveled work and then I think
3 speed things up after that. I would get the training dialed in
4 and I'd knock down the traveled work.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. I would also like to try to create an atmosphere where the
7 mechanics feel like they're heard and they're important.

8 Q. Do you feel that atmosphere is lacking at the moment?

9 A. I think it can be improved, I think there has been
10 improvement. But I think this has been a long process over
11 decades that we've come to this point, you know, and I just think
12 that -- get back to an engineering-type company would be
13 beneficial. Worry about more the quality than the dollar.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. Even though there has to be a balance because finances are
16 important.

17 Q. And the last question that I have, then, you had some time --
18 thank you, by the way, for being here and for sharing your
19 experience is very helpful to us that are not obviously
20 knowledgeable about what goes on inside the Renton factory. You
21 had a little time to recognize that we were coming, that we wanted
22 to chat with you, what is the one thing that you want this
23 investigative team to take away? What is the thing that you --
24 like this is what they need to know as they walk out the door and
25 continue on their journey investigating this incident?

1 A. Well, I think I feel appreciation that this is being looked
2 into. I think, personally, I don't think that it should have come
3 to a door plug issue, to all of a sudden create knowledge that
4 there's issues, pressure with quality, you had a quality
5 stand-down because of the result of this door plug. So I think
6 this is all very good and we need it, so that's -- I guess
7 appreciation is what I would like to convey.

8 DR. WOODS: Okay. All right. Thank you for that.

9 Anybody else? Again, last chance.

10 (No response.)

11 DR. WOODS: All right, sir, with that we will conclude this
12 interview at 15:08 Pacific time.

13 (Whereupon, at 3:08 p.m. Pacific Time, the interview
14 concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: ALASKA AIRLINES BOEING 737-9 MAX
LEFT MID-EXIT DOOR PLUG SEPARATION
NEAR PORTLAND, OREGON
ON JANUARY 5, 2024
Interview of Ted Bishop

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA24MA063

PLACE: Seattle, Washington

DATE: October 3, 2024

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.

A solid black rectangular box used to redact the signature of David A. Martini.

David A. Martini
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

*

ALASKA AIRLINES BOEING 737-9 *

MAX LEFT MID-EXIT DOOR PLUG * Accident No.: DCA24MA063

SEPARATION NEAR PORTLAND, *

OREGON ON JANUARY 5, 2024 *

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* * * * *

Interview of: BILL S. BROWN, JR., First Level Manger Flow Day 3
(Current) Door Crew Manager (2022) Boeing

Boeing
Renton, Washington

Wednesday,
October 2, 2024

APPEARANCES:

DR. SABRINA WOODS, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

NILS JOHNSON
Aviation Accident Investigator (Maintenance)
National Transportation Safety Board

JOHN PETRUZZELLI, Representative
International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers (IAM)

MATT RIGSBY, Air Safety Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

CAPT BJORN ANDERSON, Representative
Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA)

TROY LEVANEN, Director of Maintenance and
Engineering Safety
Alaska Airlines

JOHN MILLER, Air Safety Investigator, Seattle
Boeing

MATTHEW DIGGS, ESQ.
Counsel for Mr. Brown

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I N T E R V I E W

(2:03 p.m. PT)

DR. WOODS: Okay. We are on the record at 1403 Pacific Time.
The date is October 2nd, 2024.

Good afternoon. My name is Dr. Sabrina Woods, and I'm a human performance investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board. I am one of two leads investigators that are working with a manufacturing and human performance working group for Accident Investigation Number DCA24MA063 involving Alaska Airlines Flight 1282.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining probable cause of transportation accidents and significant incidents and with promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is a not part of the Department of Transportation, nor are we part of the FAA. We have no regulatory or enforcement powers.

We are a very small organization, however. So what you see here in the room is we have parties that we work with to help aid in the investigative process. So at this time, so you have an understanding of who you're going to be talking to throughout the course of this interview, I'm going to have each of these party members introduce themselves starting with a coworker to my right, Nils.

MR. JOHNSON: Hi. Nils Johnson, NTSB, aviation accident investigator. My specialty is maintenance.

1 MR. PETRUZZELLI: John Petruzzelli, representing the
2 International Association of Machinists, and I work at, when I'm
3 working, at the Seattle Delivery Center.

4 MR. RIGSBY: I'm Matt Rigsby. I'm with the FAA's Office of
5 Accident Investigation.

6 CAPT ANDERSON: Hi. I'm Bjorn Anderson. I'm a captain for
7 Alaska Airlines and representing the Air Line Pilots Association.

8 MR. LEVANEN: I'm Troy Levanen. I'm the director of
9 maintenance and engineering safety, for Alaska.

10 MR. MILLER: Good afternoon. John Miller, Boeing air safety
11 investigation in the Seattle area.

12 DR. WOODS: So that's it, Bill. That's everybody that's
13 going to be asking you questions today. Throughout this process
14 today, we will be using a digital recorder that you see there in
15 front of you. After the interview, we will send that recording
16 for transcription, and the party members will have an opportunity
17 to review the transcription to correct for like any sort of copy,
18 editing errors, typographical errors. We do not change content.
19 We just look for any sort of grammatical errors, and we try to fix
20 those.

21 Once again, this is just a safety interview. We would like
22 to learn more about the processes and your insight and what your
23 experience is working at Boeing. Our role is not to assign fault.

24 Each of these group members will have a chance to ask
25 questions. We will go one at a time, and I will call out the

1 order. There will be an opportunity for them to ask one round,
2 and then we will follow up with a second round that's much
3 shorter.

4 If at any time you don't understand a question, please ask
5 for clarity and we will do the same if we don't understand an
6 answer. If you don't know the answer to a question, I don't know
7 is a perfectly acceptable answer.

8 And, if at any time you realize you misstate something or you
9 want to re-clarify or if you remembered something, we will be
10 respectful and go one at a time. You can go back and forth in the
11 order and talk to whoever you want whenever you feel you need to.

12 MR. BROWN: Okay.

13 DR. WOODS: You are always entitled to have one
14 representative of your choosing in the room. I see here that you
15 have retained counsel. I just want to make sure and get on record
16 that the person that is sitting to your left is the representative
17 you have chosen.

18 MR. BROWN: Yes.

19 DR. WOODS: Okay. With that, counsel, if you would please
20 introduce yourself for the transcription stating your full name
21 and spelling your last.

22 MR. DIGGS: Sure. Matthew Diggs, D-i-g-g-s.

23 DR. WOODS: Okay. Thank you, sir. Just recognize that this
24 is not a deposition. This is just an interview. So if you would
25 please refrain from interrupting the process or trying to speak on

1 behalf of your client, we would appreciate that.

2 That being said, if at any time, Bill, if you need a break
3 for any reason, just let us know. We will go off the recording.
4 We'll let you know. You'll be able to hear the audible cues, and
5 take the time that you need, and then once you're ready to go,
6 just let us know, and we'll get started again.

7 With that, are there any questions at this time?

8 MR. BROWN: No, I'm good.

9 DR. WOODS: Okay. Any other questions around the room?
10 Everybody ready to go?

11 INTERVIEW OF BILL S. BROWN, JR.

12 BY DR. WOODS:

13 Q. All right. I'm going to ask you one question, and then I'm
14 going to hand it off to Nils. The hardest question in the game is
15 would you please state for the record your full name and spell
16 your last.

17 A. Sure. My full name is Bill Shelton Brown, Jr., B-r-o-w-n.

18 Q. Excellent. Thank you.

19 DR. WOODS: Nils.

20 BY MR. JOHNSON:

21 Q. Good morning -- or good afternoon. Sorry. Thank you for
22 speaking with us. What is your current position at Boeing?

23 A. I'm a currently a first level manager.

24 Q. What area do you oversee?

25 A. I over see flow day 3, the third day of the build at the

1 Renton factory. I have electricians and mechanics that work for
2 me.

3 Q. How long have you been in this position?

4 A. With this particular team?

5 Q. Yeah.

6 A. Probably 6 months.

7 Q. Which Boeing facility do you work in?

8 A. Renton, the Renton factory.

9 Q. Okay. How long have you worked for Boeing?

10 A. I've worked for Boeing for over 30 years.

11 Q. What previous positions have you held at Boeing in 30 years?

12 A. In 30 years.

13 Q. You can, you can brief. It doesn't have to be a --

14 A. Yeah. I might have a paragraph there. So I started with the
15 Boeing Company in the employment office which was at SeaTac Towers
16 across from the airport. I worked there in the HR generalist
17 role. I worked as an EEO investigator, also disability
18 management. I've been in the facilities management as a first
19 line leader and I'm also tank line. TDRC is at the Tube Duct
20 Reservoir Center. And then I've worked up in Everett with the
21 horizontal build layout, HBL (ph.). And so -- and then I just
22 recently in '21, 2021, I came down to Renton and worked in the
23 Renton factory managing electricians and mechanics.

24 Q. Okay. When were you a door crew manager in Renton?

25 A. I believe in 2022.

1 Q. All right. How many door crew managers were at Renton at
2 that time?

3 A. How many door crew managers, managing with me or -- okay.

4 Q. Yeah.

5 A. Just myself.

6 Q. It was just one?

7 A. Yeah. Yes. And then towards the end, we were transitioning,
8 [REDACTED] into the group. And so for a short bit of time it
9 was [REDACTED] and myself but for the most part when I had the team, it
10 was just myself.

11 Q. So what were your duties and responsibilities as a door crew
12 manager?

13 A. To be sure that they move all the roadblocks they have.
14 Mainly those guys are pretty self-efficient. The team leader
15 directs a lot of crew members who have been on the team for a
16 while. So, just to communicate with them. Usually we huddle like
17 3 times a day, start off the day with a kickoff meeting, go over a
18 safety moment, take attendance to see where we had any issues as
19 far as needing resources and things like that. After that, we
20 move roadblocks to make sure that they get the work done.

21 Q. When you were door crew manager, who was your supervisor?
22 Who was your boss?

23 A. Well, Hong Li (ph.) for sure. And then it might been Vince
24 Rogers. I'm not sure if he was there, but Hong Li is my manager.

25 Q. How many people did you have working for you as a door crew

1 manager?

2 A. I believe it was -- it had to be like close to 15.

3 Q. And did you have -- sorry. I'm going by prior interviews.
4 Did you have both the door crew and the door masters reporting to
5 you?

6 A. No. Another manager managed the door masters, Josh
7 Pendleton.

8 Q. Okay. So you said 15 people. All of them full time?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. No contract?

11 A. I don't believe, no.

12 Q. Okay. What were the duties and responsibilities of the door
13 crew personnel?

14 A. So the door crew personnel. They're part of the group that I
15 work in, flow day 1, 2, 3. So their job is that they receive and
16 their bar charts or IPs are to be worked those first 3 days of the
17 build. So they're job, they check the fit and fair of the door,
18 the doors because as they travel on the train there, the front
19 entry and the rear entry doors, sometimes they are off. So they
20 have to make sure those are correct. And then they also put on
21 the over wing doors, the AOE's, automatic open entry. And so they
22 put those doors on, and they also do a couple other things, like
23 the planes that have doors called a slide, door slide, but they
24 work on that but they also put some other small doors. They take
25 off that and they go back on later on in the build down the line.

1 Q. Okay. What shift do your door crew work or what shifts and
2 days does the door crew work when you were the manager?

3 A. They only work first shift.

4 Q. First shift.

5 A. Monday through Friday.

6 Q. What were the training requirements to be on the door team?

7 A. I'm not sure if there was any particular training
8 requirements. We received -- interviewed them. They go through
9 training before they get to the shop, and then most of it's just
10 OJT, on-the-job training. Part of that is that they did have to
11 read the rig document and know that, but for the most part,
12 everything else was OJT.

13 Q. Was the OJT structured and documented or --

14 A. Not formally.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. No. Not that I was aware of. That's all I can say.

17 Q. What was your shift turnover process? I take it you only had
18 one shift. You just documented the job, the work for the day and
19 then picked up the next day and started all over again?

20 A. Pretty much. There was no one to hand it off to other than
21 ourselves.

22 Q. You said you held meetings three times a day. What subjects
23 did you cover?

24 A. Most of those are huddles. So we just come back together, to
25 see how things are going, make sure everyone was staying busy for

1 the most part. And then like I said, if there's anything that we
2 do need to report up for the rest of the team, flow day 1 to 3
3 would need to know if we were able to get a certain job done or if
4 that job was going to travel, then we needed to know who we needed
5 to contact down line. A lot of times, the work that travels for
6 the door crew because it has to be in the rig position in flow day
7 1 to 3. The tool that we have the fuselage on isn't in the true
8 rig position. Most of that stuff is going to travel all the way
9 down to what we call flow day 8 or 9 because that's when they put
10 the engines on and the planes back on weight on wheels.

11 Q. Okay. Could your door team members bring up issues that they
12 saw while performing work or ways to improve what they were doing?
13 Is that something they could bring up during meetings?

14 A. Yes, definitely. At the time we didn't have what we call the
15 employee involvement, EI, meetings. Right now they have those
16 every Tuesday, but we're always looking for information from
17 employees as to what else they can do, how we can do it better,
18 and any -- like I said, any roadblocks that they're having. So we
19 do some work with that. Engineering, the barge sort of brings
20 people together, the right people so that if they have an issue,
21 we can discuss those things and go through that where it's at with
22 QA, engineering or design engineering, things like that.

23 Q. How's feedback provided? So once a corrective action was
24 made or something got fixed, how is that communicated back to the
25 team members on the floor?

1 A. Usually in one of those huddles they discuss some of the
2 things that happened the prior day or any new information that
3 came through.

4 Q. Okay. Can you describe the Boeing vendor assist process?

5 A. Boeing vendor assist with Spirit.

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. Not thoroughly.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. They, of course, work in the same areas as us. Most of the
10 team is familiar with them. We -- usually if we have a request,
11 there's representatives that we have and we go talk to them and
12 see if they can assist us in certain things. And a lot of times
13 where there used to be a SAT, we provided packets, like say I need
14 this bracket changed. And so you would have to provide them the
15 IP and usually the bracket and everything else. And you kind of
16 give them a full packet and give it to them so they can do those
17 things.

18 Q. Okay. Were vendors allowed to gain access themselves to
19 areas or was that done by your team?

20 A. I'm not sure what you mean by gain access.

21 Q. If a door plug needed opened, could Spirit just open a door
22 plug on their own or did that have to be done by you guys?

23 A. No, they would need to follow the full process for removals
24 if they said that. When you said access, I thought you meant
25 escort. It's just entering the plant or coming up on tool.

1 Q. Yeah. So, they would have to come to a Boeing employee to
2 write a removal or could they write a removal themselves?

3 A. I don't recall if Spirit has people that can write the
4 removals. Typically, we've had Boeing employees write removals.
5 So, either way, a removed would need to be written, but --

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. -- I'm not sure if Spirit can.

8 Q. While you were the door team manager, what systemic issues
9 did you see regarding the work that was being accomplished by your
10 crew?

11 A. Can you repeat that?

12 Q. While you were the manager for the door team, what systemic
13 issues did you see while they were performing their work scopes?
14 Did you see systemic issues? And if so, who did you inform?

15 A. Not really. Most of the work, they were capable of doing.
16 Some of it was just about newer employees coming on board and
17 learning and the speed of them picking it up. It being a grade 5
18 job, below a grade 6, most of that's believed to be able to be
19 taught within a 3 month period or so. And so not being fully
20 structured by the training as you mentioned before, people would
21 come in and we'd decide where they would go, whether they would
22 start with liners or if they would start following a door with
23 certain other employees. So it depends on where they went and how
24 would they pick that up. I didn't see any true systemic issues.
25 I know one thing, we used to have a person on the team that was

1 very skilled, and a lot of times people, preflight would call him
2 or other people down the line would call him because of his skill
3 and knowledge. So he was, he was higher than a grade 5 as far as
4 his knowledge and skill, but was still classified as a grade 5.
5 So if you compared him to other people, that would be the only
6 issue that I saw.

7 Q. Okay. What was the messaging from management to production
8 regarding the generation of pickups and removals? I mean how did
9 you guys communicate those things that needed to be done and
10 reinforced?

11 A. This is with management as far as the pickups.

12 Q. So what I'm trying to figure out is did you guys encourage
13 people to write pickups and removals when they saw defects?

14 A. I'm not sure I understand your question. As far as
15 encouraging them, so the process, if we did have something that
16 needs to be fixed, we needed to go through that process. As far
17 as encouraging the follow-up process or encouraging them to find
18 things.

19 Q. Encouraging them to find things and write up defects is what
20 I'm looking at.

21 A. No.

22 MR. DIGGS: Sorry. What was your answer? What did you say?
23 I didn't hear what you said?

24 MR. BROWN: No, we didn't encourage them to find things. If
25 things are there, yes, we need to correct them, fix them, the

1 follow-up process, we fix it.

2 BY MR. JOHNSON:

3 Q. Have you ever told a door team member not to write something
4 up?

5 A. I'm not sure what that -- no.

6 Q. Okay. As a door manager, were there cases where you had to
7 remind door personnel to document their work? Generate removals,
8 for example.

9 A. Not -- I don't recall myself. I know, like I said, I had
10 pretty good team leaders with background and all, [REDACTED]
11 (ph.) in particular. And so he kind of would help people through
12 the process of, you know, getting removals or things they needed
13 to do, make sure that they did it properly.

14 Q. Okay. Were there certain individuals within the door crew
15 that habitually disregarded documenting their work? In other
16 words, did they not generate removals and you had to coach them?

17 A. No.

18 Q. All right. How about MED plugs? What team or group at
19 Boeing Renton would be responsible for opening or removing a MED
20 plug, mid exit door plug?

21 A. What team would be responsible? It would have been the door
22 crew. I wouldn't know of any other people --

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. -- that did that.

25 Q. While you were manager of the door crew, did any of your team

1 members ever open or remove a MED plug?

2 A. Yes, plug, the whole door.

3 Q. Yeah.

4 A. Um-hum. We had to reallocate the door to another plane, and
5 so we pulled that out and went through that full process to
6 reallocate another door.

7 Q. Okay. Are there any other groups or teams at Renton that
8 would open a MED plug, AOG (ph.), SST?

9 A. There might be some flight line people, AOG (ph.), or other
10 people like that, none that I managed.

11 Q. Okay. Are you aware of a MED plug ever being opened without
12 removal paperwork being generated?

13 A. No.

14 Q. What happens to the hardware if a removed part is removed?
15 Where does the hardware go?

16 A. It would go on the WIP rack or to the MRC --

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. -- depending on if the WIP rack --

19 Q. Does it get bagged?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Okay.

22 A. It could be bagged, but it could be in a containment tray as
23 well.

24 Q. Okay. So nuts, bolts, washers, were they typically reused or
25 did you guys put your new hardware?

1 A. They should have looked for new hardware to put back in.

2 Q. Okay. I already asked you about SST. So I won't. All
3 right. I think I'm good for now.

4 MR. JOHNSON: John.

5 DR. WOODS: Thanks.

6 BY MR. PETRUZZELLI:

7 Q. The direction, you actually went from HR back into
8 operations. It's usually other way around. And you're dating
9 yourself by working in the Twin Towers over there.

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. People rarely do that.

12 A. Not many people fill out paper app have cases any more.

13 Q. In kind of looking at your paragraph that's provided here,
14 most of your work prior, again putting aside the HR part, it looks
15 like you spent some time in crane maintenance and facilities.

16 A. Um-hum.

17 Q. What kind of challenges did you face coming from that support
18 type management organization to operations? That's quite a
19 change.

20 A. Um-hum. From the HR or from the cranes.

21 Q. From the crane maintenance to operations.

22 A. Yeah. So from -- and it's all done in Auburn. So coming
23 from Auburn and going to Renton and Everett working, the
24 difference -- the biggest difference is a lot of people, they work
25 on the bar (ph.) in Renton, you know. And so -- in Auburn, we

1 just have work that needs to get done. And so we usually assign
2 work and they go out and do it. The bar's a little more difficult
3 to manage. Sometimes people, they're capable of more than just
4 that, but they only work to that, and then others are struggling.
5 And so, I think it was able to have people help out more and work
6 as a team to get the work done versus each individual has a bar in
7 the factory.

8 Q. Staying with that theme, did you see -- obviously like in
9 crane maintenance, safety, big, huge deal right upfront. Did you,
10 as -- when you made that transition over into ops, for example,
11 did you see get the job done, getting pushed to a higher priority,
12 not necessarily higher than safety, but I mean the pressure part
13 is what I'm kind of poking at?

14 A. No, I can't say I did. I mean obviously in crane
15 maintenance, safety is paramount especially when you have guys
16 working with 480 and up in the air and things like that. Here
17 we're working on the tool. The safety issue is more further down
18 line as far as what's going to happen if I don't do this. What's
19 going to happen if I do that, right. And so, yeah, that's it.

20 Q. Can you give just an overview, from your understanding, what
21 BPI1581 removals is? What is -- what are the high points for you
22 that you work with your teams to ensure they do?

23 A. Again, mainly I work with the team leaders. The employees on
24 the floor kind of understand they work to that (indiscernible) and
25 usually ask for support to help from those team leaders when they

1 have an issue that requires them to remove a part. So they see an
2 issue, something's we call buried, that's been built over --

3 Q. Sure.

4 A. -- something like that. They know that they can't go in
5 there and just grab it and pull things back. It's a little more
6 difficult. So a lot of times, I think they go to team leaders
7 because the team leader will have to write out exactly what level
8 of build they need to write in order for the removals to happen.
9 So, I haven't really had to struggle with people understanding
10 that they need to write removals for the things.

11 Q. Okay. Do you have a pretty good understanding yourself of
12 the level of specificity in the BPI?

13 A. Yes, as far as -- especially on this situation here as has
14 been brought up. It's just kind of us documenting everything that
15 happens in the build. And so that removal is just one part that
16 to make sure that everyone knows what's happening and we can be on
17 the same page, and we can backtrack to find out exactly what
18 happened.

19 Q. Has that BPI chain -- I'm trying to picture how long you've
20 been in ops. BPI's changed half a dozen times probably since
21 you've been in ops, something like that?

22 A. Yeah, I'm not sure how many times, but definitely --

23 Q. Revisions, not changed.

24 A. Yeah. It's been heightened, you know, with this issue in
25 that we pulled it back to make sure that only team leaders were

1 allowed to write removals for a period of time, and then recently
2 I think they've had some training and said, okay, if you've gone
3 through this training, then you can also write removals. So they
4 kind of pulled that back for a while because before it was that
5 anyone who was capable of writing it, could write it versus the
6 team leader writing it.

7 Q. Yeah. If you had CMES (ph.) access, you could write.

8 A. Um-hum.

9 Q. And you haven't -- have you -- you haven't had any issues
10 with people knowing they need to write removal though?

11 A. No, I haven't had an issue. Like I said, I think at times
12 people, they'll ask a question sometimes. They will get with a
13 QA, hey, do I need a removal here? Did they sell (ph.) this job?
14 Like a blanket job, did they sell that or am I able to go ahead
15 and do something beforehand? So the job before is not fully sold
16 (ph.) or something like that. So they kind of question that. Do
17 I need to write a removal at that point?

18 Q. Okay. So like in that case, for example, will they pull
19 final acceptance say on the job and put the removal on there? Do
20 they put the removal on a shake (ph.) job further down? That was
21 something I recall happened.

22 A. Yeah. So --

23 Q. Let me clarify. Final stamp on an IP.

24 A. Okay.

25 Q. You've got 72 hours afterwards, you can removal final

1 acceptance and you can add that.

2 A. Right.

3 Q. If it's after 72 hours, you have to go down to quality
4 planning and they have to re-sequence.

5 A. On the (indiscernible), right.

6 Q. So, I had seen in my experience instead of doing that, they
7 would just go put a removal on a shake job further down the line.
8 It was the easy button -- has that trend gotten down where you're
9 at?

10 A. No. In a sense that we think that we can improve that
11 process because sometimes people do put removals on someone else's
12 job who hasn't been worked yet, and then they come in like, hey,
13 what's this on my job, and I can't sell my job because that
14 removal's on there or something else.

15 Q. Right. That's what I was talking about. Okay. How many
16 team leads do you have when you had that crew?

17 A. When I had that, just the two, yeah.

18 Q. What were their -- what was your impression of their, for
19 lack of a better term, their work ethic, professionalism, whatever
20 you want to say?

21 A. So [REDACTED] seemed to be kind of the go to guy, kind of for the
22 whole team, a little more steady, had a lot of, I think,
23 background in more of the build as far as both in door crew and
24 sort of door masters and what happens down there. [REDACTED] was kind of
25 an expert on the AOE doors, but he had a lot of personality issues

1 with people. A lot of it's kind of rubbed the wrong way, and then
2 -- yeah, he just had some -- didn't work as well with all the
3 people as a team leader should.

4 Q. [REDACTED]

5 A. [REDACTED]

6 Q. [REDACTED] Okay. That's what I thought. So you, as first
7 line, you have a tier 1 meeting, and did you go to the -- probably
8 went to tier 2, but not tier 3.

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. Did the subject of we have a removal, you shared that say at
11 the tier 2 meeting. Was that something you guys regularly talked,
12 if there was issues, so that it would -- because, you know, it
13 would impact the next flow day type thing?

14 A. Yeah. So, tier 1 is that first huddle with my team. And the
15 tier 2 is that meeting with our senior management and our support
16 group. So, at times, yeah, if we have issues, big issues, then
17 those are brought up. We also have QA in that meeting. And so if
18 there's some concerns of things that have been happening, those
19 will be brought up in tier 2.

20 Q. Last question. Was there a time you can remember where there
21 was a specific issue brought up and somebody wanted to clarify is
22 a removal require in that tier 2 meeting?

23 A. Not the specific incident but, yes.

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Like I said, QA is there and sometimes is a removal required

1 at that time, and that's a part of what I said, that as far as the
2 team members do as well, they come to the team lead and say, hey,
3 this is here. This has been sold. Is a removal needed for that?

4 Q. Okay. That's all I have. Thank you.

5 DR. WOODS: Matt.

6 BY MR. RIGSBY:

7 Q. Just a quick question. It's part of my own ignorance, but
8 it's one of John's questions. You said [REDACTED] works on AOE doors.
9 What's AOE?

10 A. Automatic over wing exit.

11 Q. Okay. Sticking with the line of questioning on the removals,
12 if a MED plug is opened, does that require for removal -- to be
13 removed?

14 A. I would think it does.

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. You walk up to something and it's not in the CMES, and you're
17 unaware that it's been removed but it's removed, then yeah,
18 someone needs to document that for unauthorized removal or
19 something, so that we can document it and move forward.

20 Q. Okay. Do you -- also, do you review SATs, shipside action
21 trackers?

22 A. Do I review SATs?

23 Q. Yeah.

24 A. Um-hum.

25 Q. Have you ever seen dollar signs on the SATs that's describing

1 like, you know, install seats and dollar sign, dollar sign, dollar
2 sign?

3 A. No, that's something I'll have to look into. I'm not sure
4 what the dollar signs mean.

5 Q. Okay. That's the question. Okay. In another answer, you
6 became the door crew manager in 2022. Do you have any like a
7 turnover from the previous manager that was working it or do they
8 just -- I don't know, if you apply for the job or --

9 A. I was working with the group, now I can't recall who was
10 there. I believe Jake Demascal (ph.) might have been the prior
11 manager.

12 Q. Okay.

13 A. Jake Demascal and I think Trish -- Theresa Hudson (ph.) who
14 was a temp manager, and so she had door crew and sealant, I
15 believe. I kind of inherited it from her.

16 Q. Okay. When you become a manager, do you get training on what
17 a mechanic's job is?

18 A. No, I didn't. You could, but as a manager, you kind of spend
19 a little more time out on the floor looking over a shoulder,
20 talking with the team leads, trying to get a feel for what they're
21 doing.

22 Q. Okay. So you kind of get OJT as well then basically?

23 A. Um-hum.

24 Q. When you -- when they hire a new door crew person, do you get
25 involved in that process? Like review a resume and say, hey, this

1 guy's got an A&P or he would be a good guy or do you just --
2 somebody shows up and says, I'm your newbie?

3 A. A little of both. So, I was doing interviews flow day 1
4 through 3, and then so one of the skills that we interviewed for
5 at one point was for 30605 which was a door crew mechanic.

6 Q. Okay.

7 A. And so that was kind of during COVID time, and those are kind
8 of difficult interviews because you've got a 15, 20 minute
9 interview with someone and then you're trying to make a decision
10 over the phone --

11 Q. Yeah.

12 A. -- over there, facing some of their background, and so, you
13 know, we look for people with the energy, some mechanical aptitude
14 and background but a lot of times it's -- we believe we can train
15 people with that ability. I don't want to say Southwest Airline,
16 not Affinity, Alaska, but, you know, we can train if they have
17 some type of attitude that they -- aptitude that they brought to
18 the table. So that's what we look for.

19 Q. Okay. While you had been the manager, have you participated
20 in any speak up submittals or done a speak up submittal for your
21 crew?

22 A. I've reported out some that I heard, but I haven't
23 participated in any specific one that I was involved in.

24 Q. Okay. I know in your tier meetings that you have in the
25 beginning of this shift --

1 A. Um-hum.

2 Q. -- if speak up comes out with a video or something, are you
3 required to show that video to the tier -- to your crews?

4 A. They usually send out the manager talking points. We kind of
5 share that with them. As far as videos, we're just not set up
6 that great a tool where we have a huddle around a TV and say like
7 that. We did have occasional training that we bring people to
8 with a TV and we have those.

9 Q. As a manager, where do they assign you? Are you on the floor
10 or do you have an office in the overhead?

11 A. Yes, we have an office off the tool, but again we need to
12 spend a certain amount of time out on the floor --

13 Q. Sure.

14 A. -- to make sure that the team is moving forward and we're
15 removing roadblocks for them.

16 Q. And the name just left me, but when you wand onto the
17 aircraft, what are you --

18 A. Badging.

19 Q. -- badging.

20 MR. JOHNSON: Shield.

21 BY MR. RIGSBY:

22 Q. Shielding on, do managers shield on and off when they go on
23 an aircraft?

24 A. Not in our area.

25 Q. Not in your area. Okay.

1 A. So part of that is down the line from LOTTO (ph.), making
2 sure that people are checked in on the power plane. So you'll
3 know some of the dangers or you don't go in the area where you're
4 not supposed to be in, things like that. So in our area, it says
5 all visitors are supposed to badge in or shield in on our barge,
6 but our planes aren't powered. It's just the fuselage and you're
7 putting in wires and stuff.

8 Q. Okay. And, you mentioned that you hadn't seen MED plugs
9 opened in the past during your time there?

10 A. No, I mentioned that they did have a plug door removed.

11 Q. Okay. Do you recall on that case, the hardware that they
12 removed, what they did with it?

13 A. I don't specifically recall.

14 Q. Okay.

15 A. I know we were -- yeah, we were able to do that reallocation
16 in a timely fashion where it wasn't held up. So I'm not sure
17 exactly what was going on.

18 Q. Okay. Last question. Have you -- as a door crew manager,
19 have you felt pressure from above to push an aircraft, to get it
20 done, you know, or to move it the next flow day?

21 A. No.

22 Q. You haven't felt pressure?

23 A. Yes. But it kind of -- and you say the next flow day. So I
24 recall one particular situation where we had to get basically the
25 right-hand front entry door removed, and we needed to get that

1 door to paint by the weekend -- the end of the weekend. So it was
2 a matter of, hey, what's your plan? Do you have people coming in
3 and things like that. So, yeah, we get that kind of pressure. So
4 we have to go manage it, try to manage the crew, make sure that we
5 have the resources, make sure we have that, because we have
6 dedicated door crew QA, make sure we have that support on the
7 weekend and things like that, so we can get those -- that job done
8 or those jobs done.

9 Q. I guess as a manager, can you approve the door crew coming in
10 on a weekend?

11 A. Um-hum.

12 Q. Okay. Or does someone above you, do they say, get them here
13 on the weekend, that type of thing?

14 A. They have --

15 Q. Okay.

16 A. -- but people have declined.

17 Q. Sure.

18 A. They know their rights and that they can just not show up and
19 that gets taken as a hit, and we've tried -- we have designated
20 people.

21 MR. RIGSBY: Okay. That's it for me. Bjorn.

22 DR. WOODS: Bjorn.

23 BY CAPT ANDERSON:

24 Q. What are the requirements or qualifications to be a door
25 crew's team manager?

1 A. There aren't. If you're a manager, you can be a door team
2 manager, yeah.

3 Q. How long were you the door team's manager?

4 A. A year.

5 Q. And [REDACTED] was just after you?

6 A. Um-hum.

7 Q. And was -- if you finished and did he take over the very next
8 day or was there a gap?

9 A. Yeah. So there wasn't a gap. He was kind of working with me
10 towards -- as I transitioned out. So he was already there. So in
11 that particular situation, there wasn't a gap.

12 Q. And when a new manager comes in, is there a level that you're
13 working with them for a period of time to kind of give them the
14 pass down or brief them on how the team works or what projects
15 you're working on or just shadowing if they have questions?

16 A. There can be. [REDACTED] said -- like I said, [REDACTED] already had been
17 in the area and was kind of working with us. And so he knew the
18 crew. I was there if he had any questions about anything in the
19 past. I know there was one particular -- I forget what it was. A
20 quality issue where one of our guys used the wrong tool, and I
21 know I helped finish that, answer that question, that issue that
22 we had there. So I'm still in the area, still working with them.
23 So we had a good transition. It wasn't like he was just brought
24 in brand new and not knowing the team and everything else.

25 Q. Um-hum. Over the course of the investigation, we've noticed

1 that there's been what seems to be a high frequency of changeover
2 in the doors manager position. I'm just curious if you know, is
3 that common for management positions or is it something you unique
4 to the door team?

5 A. Something unique for the door team.

6 Q. Why would that be?

7 A. I think it's just some of the structure, the way the teams
8 are set up. So you mentioned that there's door masters and
9 there's door crew. There's the team down the line. They both
10 have 30605s on both teams but they've grown to say that only one
11 knows this job and only one knows the other job, but in actuality,
12 they're both 30605s and they should be able to learn and go do the
13 other job. And so there is a lot of pushback from that particular
14 team. I'm not sure if that's what's driven the changes in
15 management, but there's a lot of pushback from that team.

16 Q. Um-hum. If you say there's pushback from the team, is it
17 pushback to management? How would you say the relationship is
18 between the manager and the doors team?

19 A. The manager and the door team. I mean for the most part, the
20 managers I've seen, they try to work with the team. It's been --
21 that particular team has grown where they like to work in a tool.
22 As things start falling behind, whether it's resources that cause
23 it or just the manner of the people, some work starts getting
24 further down line. So then you're chasing a whole bunch of work,
25 and it's a matter of now people being uncomfortable, having to

1 work down line. So then you're pushing on your team more and
2 more, and that's where the struggle of pushback comes in. So, now
3 these mechanics who had the luxury of working inside all the time,
4 now they're having to be like the door masters, and they have to
5 go outside to chase planes and work out in different conditions.

6 Q. Can you think of a time when the doors team worked overtime
7 to work in the second shift?

8 A. Some, but not much. I know we've done switches on overtime
9 one particular team lead said, hey, I'll do it as long as I get
10 paid for it, but I'll work the 2 hours over. We got switches.
11 Most of the work they do, because they actually start earlier than
12 the rest of the teams. The general start time for flow day 1
13 through 3 teams was 6 o'clock and the door crews start time is 5
14 a.m. So they already have an hour up on the people, and so they
15 haven't worked a lot of overtime.

16 Q. Um-hum.

17 A. They haven't worked a lot of time into second shift. Sorry.

18 Q. Okay. And I know with light regulations, we've got
19 limitations on duty time. Is there a limit how far an employee
20 can work, say if they started at 5 a.m. How late could they work
21 into the day if they have overtime they were given?

22 A. I'm not sure there is a limitation. We've had people who
23 work 16 hours. There was always a question as to should there be
24 8 hours before they start again, and that's more of a, more of a
25 consideration than a rule.

1 Q. Okay. Can you think of a time when that occurred?

2 A. No, I can't.

3 Q. Okay. That's all I've got. Thanks, Bill.

4 A. Um-hum.

5 DR. WOODS: Troy.

6 BY MR. LEVANEN:

7 Q. A lot of my questions were around kind of the same kind of
8 questions that these guys are asking. So, the door masters team,
9 is that -- that's a small group, right?

10 A. Um-hum.

11 Q. Does it have a lead as well, a separate lead or no?

12 A. So, when I got there, there was one person who was really
13 doing almost all the work for door masters, Troy Maloney (ph.) and
14 then -- so then I think we added on person to his group for a
15 while, was working with him. So he may have been considered a
16 lead and a working person. And then part of what happened, just
17 before I left, was that I said when Troy left the door masters, we
18 needed to staff that group. And so we sent [REDACTED] down line,
19 and he was the lead.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. For door masters.

23 A. For door masters.

24 Q. And then just kind of tracking back from when you were there,
25 you say [REDACTED] then would have, based on what you said, he

1 would have stayed as the door crew leader, right?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. And then did you have to -- at that point would you -- maybe
4 it was before -- it was after you left, but did they have to pick
5 up another person to have another lead of the door crew or did
6 they just run with one lead?

7 A. There was some temporary team leads, [REDACTED] (ph.) and
8 then I think when I was [REDACTED] (ph.) went down as we increased
9 the staff, the crew down in door masters, [REDACTED] was a team
10 lead for door masters.

11 Q. For masters.

12 A. Yeah, for door masters.

13 Q. Got it.

14 A. So also [REDACTED] (ph.) because of his skill who was
15 helping train, we gave him a temporary team lead role as well.
16 So, it would have been [REDACTED] as the true team lead and then
17 maybe [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] as temp team leads.

18 Q. I suspected that [REDACTED] was when you were referring to
19 that travel down line to help people out along the way.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I was guessing. Okay. That helps clear that up for me a
22 little bit. We have a few more questions. Some of those were
23 about what you were saying I was going to ask you. Does the door
24 crew primarily work -- I'm not sure what the tool is, but does the
25 door crew primarily work in doors 1 through 3?

1 A. Um-hum.

2 Q. Or in flow days 1 through 3?

3 A. Yeah, the system tool, it's just a metal tool that holds nine
4 fuselages.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. And so we're able to -- half the team, they work upstairs and
7 the other half works below. And so it's kind of split.

8 Q. And that's where the door crew does the bulk of their work,
9 right?

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And the masters might be spread around 8, 9, whatever?

12 A. Yeah, masters, their work doesn't start until I think flow
13 day 7 or 8.

14 Q. And that makes it more clear for me. Perfect. And then I
15 was going to ask you, these guys kind of asked it already but I
16 was going to ask you if flow day 3 where you're at now, was it an
17 upgrade from the door crew? Was that an upgrade or was a lateral
18 move or was that seniority?

19 A. It's a lateral move.

20 Q. Okay.

21 A. Yeah, so all the -- yeah. So all the managers are basically
22 the same. If we put you over the door crew, then you're still
23 part of flow day 1, 2, 3 team. You just happen to have the door
24 crew.

25 Q. Do you like the flow day 3 better than the door crew?

1 A. Better than the crew at that time, yes.

2 Q. Okay. Got it. Thank you. That helps. And then I have a
3 couple of other questions here. Actually I think that's good
4 enough for now. Thank you.

5 A. Um-hum.

6 DR. WOODS: John.

7 BY MR. MILLER:

8 Q. Just one question. Going back to -- I'm sorry. I think I
9 have a couple of questions. Going back to in terms of issues
10 raised by the door team --

11 A. Um-hum.

12 Q. -- as the manager at that time with the work culture I think
13 Mr. Petruzzelli brought up, did you feel confident in that team
14 that it was able to raise issues to you when issues were present?
15 You had confidence that, for example, you cited an individual who
16 may not have worked particularly well with others. Would other
17 team members be comfortable coming to you as their first line
18 manager and raising those types of issues?

19 A. Personality disfunction or just --

20 Q. Personality or process-wise, if they had an issue with a
21 particular person or job, for example, on like a given IP and they
22 say, hey, this isn't working out.

23 A. Um-hum.

24 Q. Was it commonplace during your time on that team to see them
25 raise those issues to you and feel comfortable talking to you

1 about them saying like in your huddle settings, in your tier 1
2 meetings, for example?

3 A. I'm not sure if they brought them all to me. They worked
4 well with [REDACTED] as far as bringing those things up or
5 sometimes they would go directly to the QA if it was that kind of
6 process issue. So I would hear about some of the things or ask
7 what are we working, what's this issue that we have going here,
8 and then try to follow up on that but I can't say that they didn't
9 bring them to me, but I know that they work with their team
10 members, [REDACTED] and some of the old timers, like Willie and Reno,
11 to kind of figure out what have we done in the past, what do we do
12 here in these situations, like that.

13 Q. And in one of those instances, on of the more experienced
14 employees, if they felt like it was necessary to bring it to your
15 attention, they would do so and you would have a conversation with
16 [REDACTED] for example?

17 A. Yes. And, I kind of counted on [REDACTED] to let me know some of
18 the things that were happening on the floor because he would take
19 on the responsibility to kind of work those things with those
20 issues, and I tried to stay out of his way and let him work and
21 just ask if he needed any additional help in pushing it or
22 something like that.

23 Q. Okay. Understood. Thank you. And then circling back on one
24 of the topics, I think that Matt brought up in terms of feeling
25 pressure, for example, just to find some clarity in there. Is

1 that, of course, from a build process there's going to be schedule
2 pressures associated with building an aircraft and at any point in
3 time though during those conversations about we need to do this
4 additional work, for example, on second shift or come in on the
5 weekend --

6 A. Um-hum.

7 Q. -- where is your level of confidence in terms of, well, if
8 the team sees it from a safety or quality perspective that it was
9 okay to push back on any sort of pressure, for example, coming
10 from scheduled driven activities, for example?

11 A. I'm not sure how to answer. So, a lot of times like I
12 mentioned, sometimes the reason they've fallen behind is because
13 of resources and other things. And their pushback would be, you
14 know, the reason why we're behind is because Spirit did this or
15 Spirit didn't put that bracket in. Now, how come I've got to stay
16 over and do this and things like that. And we all know that we're
17 there. We have a bar chart. The bar chart is assuming that
18 you're going to get that job done that day within eight hours.
19 When you don't, then that becomes a priority, and we need to
20 figure out how to get that done to make sure that everything else
21 continues to get done and this doesn't hold up everything else.
22 So that's what we try to share with them, say this is work we
23 have, this is what we missed, this is what we've got to come in
24 early and do or stay over and get it done. And it's kind of known
25 that, you know, we try to put in other areas, say, hey, you've got

1 to put at least 10 hours on it to get it done, you know. If you
2 can't get it done in 8 hours, look to stay 2 more hours and then
3 we'll make a plan as to how else -- what else we need to do in
4 order to get that done. So that's, that's the pressure that the
5 manager's going to get because we're going to have to report out
6 to say, okay, what's your plan to get that done and get that
7 caught up, where did you leave your team and what's your team's
8 plan.

9 Q. Understood. Okay. And I think and then the one last
10 question, I think this was on the topic of handover to Ken -- the
11 next manager, that that handover process, Ken, was he in flow day
12 1 through 3 before he took on the door team or was he working
13 another manager position close by? At what point did you start
14 engaging with Ken and how long before he took over the door team?

15 A. I'm not sure if you guys interviewed Ken. So [REDACTED] been in
16 the factory way longer than me and he was working down in flow day
17 4 which is close to us. And then they finally brought him up to
18 assist us in different areas. And so one of the issues I was
19 having with the door crew, the masters, John -- I'm sorry, [REDACTED]
20 came in and started assisting me, and that's when we made the
21 transition. So he was already in flow day 1 through 2 with us and
22 then as far as when we transitioned, he was already there as well,
23 and he had some issues and concerns and then just took that on.

24 Q. Okay. Very good. All right. Thank you.

25 MR. MILLER: No other questions.

1 BY DR. WOODS:

2 Q. You mentioned a couple times now removing roadblocks,
3 removing roadblocks. I guess what does a roadblock look like and
4 can you give me an example and what you would do to help remove
5 it?

6 A. Yeah. And so it's just like sometimes if you don't have the
7 resources, if you're missing a part, we don't know when this
8 part's going to get here. QA's pushing back because they don't
9 have access to buy off your job or get something. Someone needs
10 to takes them up to the lift, down line and things like that. So
11 I just need to know what is holding them up doing their job, and
12 that's what I see as a roadblock. So it can be a multitude of
13 things.

14 Q. So then who are you -- what do you do with that information?
15 At what point do you get activated?

16 A. So once I learn about that, like I said, a lot of times I
17 rely on [REDACTED] to let me know if he needs additional assistance on
18 anything. Then I escalate that to either my management or
19 directly to that particular crew that is sort of holding this up.
20 Sometimes like we mentioned removal of the door. We have to find
21 out when's the next door coming in? Do we have one? Can we wait
22 or do we need to reallocate? And so that we work with
23 fulfillment. Those are the people who bring the parts, this and
24 that, and find out what we need to do and what we can be allocated
25 and from where.

1 Q. Okay. I'm hopping around a bit because like others, a lot of
2 questions have been answered. So, kind of along the same thing as
3 fulfillment, we talked a little bit earlier about like what
4 happens, for instance, to hardware when a part is removed. You
5 said, you know, it could get bagged. Sometimes it goes on the WIP
6 rack, you know, it could get bagged or it can go in like the
7 bucket. But I guess what is the process for procuring new
8 hardware if that's determined to be the path forward?

9 A. Aside from that part. So, yeah, you would just make the
10 request of fulfillment that I need this particular hardware
11 because that one's bad, and then they would order that. Sometimes
12 it's in the -- what do we call it? It's in the storage nearby.
13 Other times it may need to come from Spirit. And so, we make that
14 request, but [REDACTED] Protcham (ph.) is typically our fulfillment
15 person that we work with, and then they let us know when and where
16 they can get the part.

17 Q. So what kind of associated paperwork and document tracking
18 goes with that process?

19 A. Sometimes we utilize the SAT. SAT says this part we received
20 from Spirit was damaged or don't have it, and then we give that
21 SAT number to the barge or [REDACTED] Protcham in fulfillment and they
22 will look for a MPR, material process request, something like
23 that, and then they would write that in the system and then that
24 tracks it and let's us know -- it actually gives a date as to when
25 that part should be there.

1 Q. And at what interval is that information looked at at your
2 level or previous level for instance?

3 A. Usually we're in contact with some of the people who are
4 helping that process, but definitely the following morning I'm
5 checking to see where we are if it's not there or if it's been
6 changed. Also with SAT, it will let us know a date's been
7 extended when it is to arrive.

8 Q. Does that information that you can look at on the SAT, does
9 it ever go away?

10 A. I'm not sure. I've seen old SATs. So I'm not sure that it
11 goes away. I couldn't tell you what's the retention processes for
12 that.

13 Q. You talked a little bit about pressure and sometimes there's
14 pressure, of course, to get, you know, to get the part moving, to
15 get the fuselage moving. What about the converse? What about
16 incentives? Is there any sort of incentive program in place to
17 keep the tool moving, keep the fuselage moving?

18 A. That's a good question. I'm not sure. There's recognition,
19 but as far as incentive --

20 Q. Um-hum. Like is there any sort of like, hey, we got -- we
21 cranked this many widgets in this short amount of time. Here's a
22 bonus. Here's a day off pass.

23 A. Or you get a Friday off if you get it done in time.

24 Q. Yeah.

25 A. No, there's not a formal incentive process for that.

1 Q. And I mean that for the crews or for management level?

2 A. Definitely not the management level.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. The crews, they reward themselves with pride points and
5 things like that. Occasionally we do take them out for,
6 especially in Renton, they either go to the Landing or bring food
7 this restaurant right nearby.

8 Q. Can you tell me more about the -- during your time as the
9 manager for the door crew, and even now, what sort of formal
10 feedback processes are in place for your people and for you?

11 A. Well, I think you mentioned speak up is something that's --
12 somewhat new. It's not too new, but there's always been that. A
13 lot of managers have open doors and I know our second level and
14 leadership is typically on the floor, talking with the people and
15 getting information. So, I mean there's always that, and then we
16 recently moved a HR generalist into the area because they used to
17 be off in a different tower from where we were. As far as
18 management, feedback is just kind of the same with the open look,
19 looking at your leadership and talking with them.

20 Q. Are you comfortable with how the feedback process works right
21 now?

22 A. I don't notice there -- I think the individual that I dealt
23 with in this situation, sometimes that open door needs not shut
24 the person off, but they need to bring that person in and try to
25 figure out why that particular individual is coming to them so

1 often because a lot of times in the situation I'm talking about,
2 the person doesn't really follow the chain of command, and then
3 this causes a lot of busy work for people to kind of backtrack and
4 answer those questions because that person felt comfortable going
5 to higher leadership, all the way up to like the VP of the area,
6 things like that instead of trying to go through the chain of
7 command and getting the answer at a lower level.

8 Q. In your assessment, how does that affect the process for the
9 whole then?

10 A. Like I said, I think it just adds more time to resolving that
11 issue, and it also -- yeah, changes the attitude around it.

12 Q. Are you comfortable providing feedback for your leadership?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. How would you define for yourself, so this is not Boeing,
15 this is you, your opinion, how would you define safety culture?

16 A. Safety culture? Just the whole attitude that -- safety
17 culture working right, you go home in the same condition or better
18 then you come, but it's also -- it's the mindset of that person
19 because the person that I had to tell them to put their safety
20 glasses on or do this, they're not looking at it as -- they
21 haven't accepted it as a culture. They're not accepting it as
22 themselves, right. So me myself, you'll see me out on the floor.
23 I have a bump cap on. I don't work on the plane, but part of the
24 rule of the bump cap is that if you're underneath the shadow of
25 the plane, and I go in and out the door, and you guys fly on a

1 planes. So you come in on the left side. You don't realize until
2 you're working on the fuselage the right side is lower, right.
3 And so every day I hit my head, right, and I'm like -- it feels
4 like -- I know wear a bump cap because I know it's going to
5 happen. And, I look out for my own safety. And so my safety
6 culture, what I've adopted is I look out for myself. I'm looking
7 for other people to do the same, and we warn them a lot, but they
8 really should look to take it on themselves.

9 Q. Previously as a manager for the door crew and even today, how
10 -- I guess what is your assessment as to whether or not your --
11 the crews under you have that see it, say it mentality, that they
12 can recognize that something is right, and that they would do
13 something about it or find a way to fix it?

14 A. Yeah, I don't think it's 100 percent. I think there's a lot
15 of people that do see and take action. There's other people just
16 skip over it. And even in the group I had -- I have now, yes,
17 sometimes people build things, like why did you go ahead and build
18 that when you noticed that something was missing, right. The one
19 thing that was supposed to be there isn't there but you assumed
20 that, hey, I'm just coming to do my job, right. And it's that
21 kind of mentality, look at the big picture and say, hey, maybe
22 something is wrong here. Maybe I need to stop and back up. Yeah,
23 I might not be able to get it done today but I can stop and ask
24 the question, you know, and I don't put that much pressure -- I
25 don't think we put undue pressure on people and say that, hey,

1 you're going to have to get this done no matter what. We will
2 stop. If there is an issue, we will stop and take time to fix it
3 and look at it.

4 Q. You've got years of experience doing multiple things. How do
5 you fix a problem like that? How do you help an individual who
6 might not have that right mentality?

7 A. Yeah. That's a question I have for myself because being at
8 work for a long time, I've seen some of the new generations come
9 in, and just question like are they going to get it? Are they
10 going to change? I know it's a struggle for teachers. I know
11 it's struggle for others, and then they get to the Boeing Company,
12 and it's like, hey, you know, we've written it out. We've put you
13 through the 4 weeks of training and you're still not good. And
14 so that's part of why they call it corrective action. Sometimes
15 you just have to break down to that point like give them a
16 corrective action because like I said, we warn a lot of people,
17 and how long are you going to warn them until they get it, and
18 sometimes the only time they're going to get it is when you
19 actually put some paper in front of them to make them understand
20 this is how important this is to us, you know. We can walk on the
21 floor, and keep preaching to them in our huddles and our tier 1s
22 and things like that. Like there are some people who are going to
23 take a little more pushing in order to change.

24 Q. What is your assessment of your corrective action process?
25 Is it effective or is it falling short of being effective?

1 A. It falls short of being effective because I don't think we, I
2 don't think we do enough of it. I don't think we do it as -- for
3 my particular team, I don't think we work altogether. I've worked
4 in smaller groups, smaller buildings, and I think the managers
5 were more on the same page. I think one of the things I skipped
6 over, I worked in janitorial, janitorial management and those
7 managers usually switched every 6 months or so. But we have a lot
8 of meetings, manager meetings where we're kind of on the same
9 page. So when I went to the next site, it wasn't a shock to the
10 people that, oh, that's him. He's going to make you do this or
11 he's not going to do this. We were closer to being on the same
12 page than I see in the area that I am right now.

13 Q. So that brings up my next question is do you feel that the
14 management across the flow days, do you all have the same mindset?

15 A. No, not truly. And I'm not sure it's always because -- so I
16 didn't work on the floor. So a lot of the managers I work with
17 came from the floor. A lot of them came from nearby groups or
18 that particular group that they're managing now. So, I think
19 there's some of those familiarization issues that they have to
20 work through. But, yeah.

21 Q. So you see the process day in and day out, working with the
22 current flow you do. What do you perceive as going right? What
23 have you got down pat?

24 A. In the group I'm in right now, they get their work done
25 pretty much. They know when we hit the floor, they're already

1 attacking what they know have to get done. Some of them can get
2 their jobs done by lunchtime, and then the rest of the day is
3 pretty much theirs because they're on a bar. So that was their
4 bar to complete, and they were able to complete it. That's --
5 when you talk about incentive, they have an incentive because they
6 have kind of that free time. If they don't have training or other
7 things to get done, the rest of the day is theirs. They humped
8 all morning and they got done. So, that in -- those guys will let
9 us know right away, hey, I'm missing a stub beam. I'm missing
10 that. So, we're able to kind of hit it fast, early in the
11 morning, make sure that we can get everything going and get the
12 job done that day.

13 Q. So it sounds like communication is solid for that?

14 A. For that.

15 Q. Conversely, what could be better? What's just not going as
16 efficiently or effectively as it should be?

17 A. So this is me personally, it's just that in the Renton
18 factory, in the area that I am, it's just kind of the overtime.
19 We're kind of free with it, the way the people put in overtime.
20 Down in Auburn, we were more to the point, military, you didn't go
21 over 8 hours without getting approval. You didn't put in the 8.1
22 because you thought you came in a little early and started looking
23 at your paperwork or something like that. In Renton, I find that
24 the overtime is not as -- we're not real strict on it.

25 Q. And how does that lead to ineffectiveness or inefficiency?

1 A. Considering that can allow people to sort of stretch out
2 their time when they don't need to. Sometimes something -- now
3 you're there more for you than for the bar, and like I've told
4 people in other groups that I've been in, if you want the
5 overtime, the money, if it's that, don't put it on your job. Get
6 your job done. I'll go find you overtime. I'll go find work
7 somewhere else, but there's no need to put a 10 hours on a job
8 that's taking 7 hours. I can go get you double.

9 Q. Okay. I think that's all I have for this round.

10 DR. WOODS: We have gone a little over an hour. So how are
11 we feeling? Are you interested in a break?

12 MR. DIGGS: I am.

13 DR. WOODS: Okay. With that, we are going to go off record
14 at 1518 Pacific Time.

15 (Off the record at 3:18 p.m. PT.)

16 (On the record at 3:24 p.m. PT.)

17 DR. WOODS: We are back on the record at 1524 Pacific Time.
18 Nils.

19 BY MR. JOHNSON:

20 Q. I've got two follow-up questions. Did [REDACTED] ever approach you
21 line number 8789, getting a door plug open because it's based on
22 the SAT, he didn't seem to know what to do to get it open or
23 whether it was a plug or whether it was a door or whether it was,
24 you know, what needed to be done or a removal needed to be written
25 or not? So do you recall if he ever approached you on that?

1 A. I don't recall him questioning me on that.

2 Q. And the last thing for me is do you have any knowledge of who
3 opened the MED plug on 8789?

4 A. Not beforehand, just after the fact, just rumors and stuff
5 that I've heard.

6 Q. No knowledge?

7 A. No.

8 Q. Okay.

9 MR. JOHNSON: John.

10 MR. PETRUZZELLI: You just to 50 percent of my workload.

11 BY MR. PETRUZZELLI:

12 Q. You mentioned Ken came over when he was transitioning into
13 the role, that he was going to help you with [REDACTED] you were
14 referring to him and you alluded to, he didn't play well with
15 others, I'm paraphrasing what you said.

16 A. That's good.

17 Q. Can you help me understand a little better? The reason I
18 ask, looking back at your experience again, you have a significant
19 amount of experience in HR and stuff.

20 A. Um-hum.

21 Q. Can you kind of walk me through that, maybe help me
22 understand that?

23 A. Yeah. So, some of the times, you know, that team doesn't get
24 along together but sometimes they'll come together to go against
25 the management, right. That's one that they come together on. So

1 we got in the situation where we needed to staff door masters,
2 needed staff down line. And so, you know, I looked at the two
3 team leads that I had, and so trying to decide with my manager's
4 help that let's go ahead and put [REDACTED] down line. So [REDACTED] was in an
5 uproar about that, that he shouldn't be the one to be moved and
6 wasn't going to go down. And so I started getting pushback from
7 the team, found some -- a little cartoon about a manager
8 disparaging image and words, up on the floor. So I pulled that
9 down and things like that. And, one of the things that I did hear
10 from [REDACTED] and his union support, they called my manager, and told
11 him that, hey, if you don't send [REDACTED] down line, I will put a case
12 on Bill Brown. So, during the investigation. The investigator
13 asked a question, hey, did you remove his pay? I said, no, he's
14 still a team lead. He's still getting team leader pay. Well,
15 then she said, well, there's not a problem there. You have a
16 right to move him to a different location as long as he's still in
17 the team leader role. And that's exactly what we did.

18 Q. Clarify what you said about if you did get him moved, the
19 union was going to put a case on you. Is that what --

20 A. Right. If we didn't, if we retracted it, if we didn't send
21 him down, then they wouldn't put a case on me.

22 Q. And can you define what you mean by put a case on you?

23 A. Go to HR and submit a complaint.

24 Q. Okay. Do you remember who that union person was?

25 A. The HR person?

1 Q. The union person?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And his or her name is?

4 A. It would be our BR down there now, Kim.

5 Q. Gifford (ph.)?

6 A. I don't recall her last name.

7 Q. She was a steward then?

8 A. Yes. She's the Auburn BR now.

9 Q. Renton?

10 MR. DIGGS: Did you mean Renton or Auburn?

11 MR. BROWN: Renton.

12 BY MR. PETRUZZELLI:

13 Q. Renton.

14 A. Um-hum.

15 Q. And so again her clarification was if you don't retract this,
16 you're going to --

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Did you have other problems with [REDACTED] Again, going back to
19 your comment thatg he didn't play well with others.

20 A. I had issues where I had -- I know he was complaining about
21 someone else in QA or something like that, and I had tried to
22 intervene, and that was even before I became the door crew
23 manager. Other times he was -- it was a lockwire issue and him
24 and the QA person kind of had different views of it. He was mad
25 because they wouldn't accept the way he put his, and so he

1 wouldn't have got support from workplace coaches and some other
2 people, and one thing I told him, I says, [REDACTED] you have dedicated
3 QA, dedicated QA to door crew. No matter what you find, we have
4 to get back together and work it out. We have to find a way to
5 work together. So, and that was kind of a struggle.

6 Q. Okay. Did you have any suggest kind of getting that --
7 trying to get him back in the fold or --

8 A. In that situation, the success was that he was able to find
9 the workplace coach some documentation that supported his side,
10 but instead of, you know, having a team victory, it was more of
11 his victory, right. So, you know.

12 Q. Okay. That's all I have then.

13 DR. WOODS: Matt.

14 BY MR. RIGSBY:

15 Q. You mentioned a couple of times about temporary promotions I
16 think for [REDACTED] Was one of them to team lead?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. Does that come with compensation?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. It does. Okay.

21 A. Yeah, it -- that's probably the only reason why it's a
22 temporary promotion. Kind of like finding a different way to
23 recognize that person for their work. They didn't go through the
24 full interview process that the other team leads would have gone
25 through in order to get that job full time. So, Mike's been known

1 to be helpful and one way to recognize it is to give him team
2 lead.

3 Q. What about the door masters compared to the rest of the door
4 team? Are they paid differently?

5 A. No. They're both like I mentioned 30605s. They're all the
6 same grade.

7 Q. In your time as a manager there, did you ever participate or
8 witness any audits performed by the FAA in your section?

9 A. No, not that I recall.

10 Q. Okay. What about since then? Have you ever participated in
11 a FAA audit --

12 A. No.

13 Q. -- when they come and visit the plant?

14 A. We have like toolbox audits, area audits, things like that,
15 and I've been there when FAA's been there, yes.

16 Q. Okay. And I have it on here, but I think you basically
17 answered it, but why did you leave the manager job of the door
18 crew?

19 A. My boss didn't feel comfortable leaving me there, and that's
20 his way of dealing with it, and then also we also were looking at
21 that time to go ahead and bring together the door masters and door
22 crew. And so we had talked and [REDACTED] had -- sorry, [REDACTED]
23 had a little more experience and understanding of the door teams,
24 and so he was going to be in charge of that.

25 Q. Okay. That's all I have, sir. Thank you.

1 DR. WOODS: Bjorn.

2 BY CAPT ANDERSON:

3 Q. Just a follow up on one of Nils' questions. When he said did
4 you have any knowledge of the MED exit door plug removal and he
5 said 8789 at the time I think you said. You just heard rumors
6 since then. And what rumors did you hear or who did you hear that
7 may have been involved with removal of that MED exit door plug?

8 A. So, the team leader kind of told the plane number and that
9 they knew who touched that plane and things like that. I had
10 assumed that they were referring to [REDACTED] but I'm not sure down
11 line that they know who had touched it as well. But they said
12 like after the incident, they knew how to research and go back
13 through paperwork and things like that, and kind of find the
14 information of who was on the plane.

15 Q. Okay. That's all. Thank you.

16 DR. WOODS: Troy.

17 MR. LEVANEN: Yes, he asked my question. Thank you.

18 BY MR. MILLER:

19 Q. Just one follow-up question for the non-Boeing folks in the
20 room. Maybe help define what the bar is because you talked about
21 the bar and sequence, you know, of work and I think maybe it will
22 help clarify that for folks to bring in the standard language.

23 A. Okay. The bar is, it's just part of the bar chart, and so
24 it's -- IE has gotten together with the work that needs to get
25 done. They usually do it only at -- it's part of that what we

1 call almost like 68 percent. So it's not even, when you look at
2 it on paper, it's not even the full 8 hours, but we've given the
3 people 8 hours. Some of the time when they look at the bar chart,
4 it's separated out by the IPs, the individual jobs within their
5 bar, and sometimes there will be an area, a little chart there
6 that says for 60 minutes, report back to supervisor or DSV. So,
7 it's the way that they've broken up the work there so that we can
8 divide it amongst the people and make sure that it all gets done
9 within a timely fashion. And so that person needs to follow the
10 bar chart and make sure they get that done every day, and that
11 helps us get -- move the plane a little farther.

12 Q. And so when you would say when they get their bar complete,
13 that really essentially means they got their job completed on a
14 given day.

15 A. Yeah.

16 Q. Okay.

17 A. And so -- yeah, that's the bar.

18 Q. Very good. Okay. Thank you.

19 MR. MILLER: No further questions.

20 BY DR. WOODS:

21 Q. Okay. I just have a couple more. As part of the previous
22 position, as the door commander and even now, is there any part
23 where you are responsible for evaluating performance metrics? And
24 if so, what are those performance metrics?

25 A. I don't recall having any performance evaluations. For the

1 teams?

2 Q. For the teams and for the product.

3 A. So that's kind of with our quality metrics, right. They come
4 down to that. So you're looking at second issue parts. Are we
5 getting the job done the first time? How many times are we
6 building it? So, first pass quality and things like that. So
7 those are things that come up to serve for quality health and then
8 who's helping performing it. Do we evaluate those? I'm not sure
9 what you mean by evaluate?

10 Q. Evaluate might have been a stronger term. Do you look at
11 those? Does that information come to you in any way?

12 A. Yes. So those -- the labor on those become your -- what's
13 your high hitters, your highest defects, how many times are you
14 going to replace this snubber on a door? How many times do you
15 have this issue? Some of that issue for the door crew, I speak
16 of, is they're concern was again how is Spirit saying that they
17 put a perfectly good fuselage on the rail when we get it, and
18 we've got to do all this work, you know. And so we've sent people
19 back there. We sent [REDACTED] like I mentioned and some other
20 people, to just see how they're doing it, but still we have that
21 rework that we constantly have to do once the plane is here. And
22 so that's kind of a little bit our high hitters and one of the
23 things that we've looked at to say, hey, what can we do better?
24 How can we fix this?

25 Q. And as a manager, do you communicate the results of that

1 information to the touch labor or is it just kind of absorbed at
2 your level?

3 A. No, we communicate that. A lot of times, there's some things
4 in there that the people who are bringing it up to us, and then
5 when we've sent people back, we've sent other hourly employees,
6 mechanics. And so they kind of come back and they're sharing that
7 with their team directly.

8 Q. Okay. When do you know it's working?

9 A. When do I know it's working? It's hard to say now when the
10 people are out on strike, but I think for the most part, people do
11 enjoy working at the Boeing Company. They realize it is a good
12 company, and they have great benefits and things like that. You
13 know, at this time, they're -- like most people are wanting more,
14 looking for the future and things like that. And so it's just a
15 matter of us getting back to business and hoping, you know, that
16 we can come to an agreement and compromise that is good for
17 everyone because I'll benefit from that just as well, and
18 definitely the people working for us.

19 Q. I guess how do the people express to you, I know given the
20 circumstances today are a little unusual, how do the people relate
21 to you though that it's working, this is good, we're doing good?
22 How can you tell? How can you tell it's working as a manager?

23 A. You know, I think everyone has a different motivation as to
24 why they come to work. Usually I kind of look at it within their
25 attendance. I usually have pretty good attendance with people

1 coming to work, you know. When the environment is really toxic,
2 then you start getting all that absenteeism and you're kind of
3 wondering why they're not here, and you start looking at issues
4 around the floor, as to what it could be and what you can change.
5 And, I really haven't seen that problem other than where we're at
6 today.

7 Q. Okay.

8 A. Obviously one of the things I can say in our flow day 1
9 through 3, you asked me about that, one of the things that people
10 would like to see is what we call flow day 0, and that is when we
11 receive the plane from Spirit, the fuselage is sitting there, it's
12 a flow day where all those things can be fixed by Spirit before it
13 gets -- jumps into the actual build which is flow day 1 because
14 our flow day 1 people, I think they struggle the most because they
15 really don't know what they're going to get when they open those
16 doors. And so they're tasked with fixing that problem, changing
17 that bracket, finding those issues, not skipping over anything,
18 and then doing their full bar chart which is blankets and other
19 things like that. So I always think that they have the toughest
20 time.

21 Q. Okay. If you see something, if you have a concern or a
22 complaint or just like some reason to give, how confident right
23 now are you that what you have to offer will be considered and
24 taken seriously by your leadership?

25 A. I'm pretty confident that they will listen to what I have to

1 say.

2 Q. Okay. That is all have for my usual questions. I always
3 have two concluding questions that I ask ever person who comes and
4 talked to us before I do that, I want to make sure that there are
5 no other questions in the room.

6 We have one. Troy, go ahead.

7 BY MR. LEVANEN:

8 Q. One quick one. You mentioned kind of a wish list for the
9 flow day 0 for the people in flow day 1, would like to see the
10 Spirit discrepancies cleaned up before they start.

11 A. Um-hum.

12 Q. Have you seen an improvement of that over the course of I
13 guess since January 5th or in the last 6 months on the number of
14 discrepancies at flow day 1 that carry from flow day 0 I guess so
15 to speak?

16 A. Very small improvement. According to the feedback I get from
17 my people I work with and we have Katie Ringgold who comes up on
18 the floor and she's a senior vice president. She walks through a
19 lot of times, and one of the things, you know, you send groups of
20 people back to Spirit, and she promised, you know, that the plane
21 would get better, we would get a more perfect plane. And we're
22 still running into a lot of issues. We did try to build in I want
23 to say a fluff day but a day before we push the plane over into
24 the rest of the factor. So after flow day 3, we added another
25 day, PV day they call it, where we can have an extra day to catch

1 up or correct problems that were in flow day 1.

2 Q. Okay. Thank you. Appreciate that.

3 DR. WOODS: Anyone else?

4 (No response.)

5 BY DR. WOODS:

6 Q. Okay. Seeing none, the first question is I kind of call it
7 like the king for a day, magic wand question. That is as of
8 today, I think I've got some insight. You've already dropped some
9 hints along the conversation, but if you were king for a day and
10 there was one thing that you could change right now to make, you
11 know, the product, the process, everything better, the way it
12 should be in your mind, what would that be?

13 A. Yeah. So, anyway, that's difficult, but a lot of time when I
14 feel like I'm at work it almost should be piecemeal work. So,
15 everyone comes to work for a different reason with a different
16 attitude but I've got to get something out of you. And, you know,
17 like I didn't pick berries, but when I heard about kids picking
18 berries, you only got paid for whatever you brought back, right,
19 the berries you delivered. So if you come to work and you can't
20 get anything done, fine. Today, you didn't get anything done but
21 you're not going to get paid for it, right. We've got to get
22 people's mentality that the whole reason why you come to work is
23 we're going to get something done. You're going to produce what
24 we have in front of you, and then in the factory, like I
25 mentioned, people have a bar. So we have three different lines,

1 central, west and east, and sometimes your build on the east line
2 isn't happening today. So you have a PD day and, you know, those
3 guys will get on their phones. They will find out the night
4 before if when they come to work they have a build because they
5 come to work with an attitude that, hey, I won't have a bar today.
6 So I don't have anything to do, right. And I think for the
7 company's sake, we've got to change that attitude, and we've got
8 to get people to come into work, wanting to help out. If you
9 don't have a bar today, then what is it that you're going to do to
10 help the company. What are you going to help flow day 1 through 3
11 get caught up on jobs behind schedule, JBS, other things like that
12 because we can all help each other out and make it easier. I
13 always believe that no one should have it easy on the team. Let's
14 all get the work done, then let's all sit down and relax, but not
15 just one of us, you know. So that's what I would do.

16 Q. Who do you think should be responsible for allocating those
17 resources across the board like that? If you could change it
18 tomorrow so that that was the case --

19 A. Who would be responsible?

20 Q. -- what position should be responsible for allocating those
21 resources across the board?

22 A. Well, it's already there at the higher level. They believe
23 that they're doing it. It's just not happening at the lower
24 level, right. Dave Baker and those guys say, hey, I know flow day
25 1 through 3 isn't building today, how come they're not out there

1 helping flow day 6. And so that's on the managers, the lower
2 level managers. Try to get the people's mindset that we're all
3 one Boeing, we're all in it together, let's help each other out.
4 And the biggest thing I see and it happens up in flow day 1
5 through 3, it's like, well, everyone that believes that they can't
6 be the first to help out, but I believe, you know, flow day 1
7 didn't help us when we were down, when they were down, how come,
8 you know. I'm like, hey, that might not have happened but today,
9 let's go do it.

10 Q. Do you think there's a transparency issue from the upper
11 level management to where you are as to what's really going on on
12 the floor?

13 A. I'd like to think so. I'd like to think so.

14 Q. So to clarify, do you think that they truly understand and
15 appreciate what's actually happening on the floor?

16 A. Yes. Because the ones I know, they actually worked on the
17 floor there, and they're now in senior management. So those guys
18 for sure know exactly what's happening on the floor, and I've
19 heard them make comments about it. So I know they understand the
20 struggle, but as far as how to change it and change that mindset,
21 it's difficult.

22 Q. Okay. I extended my first question out a bit, sorry. So, my
23 last question is you had some time to consider, we had asked you
24 to come in here. We appreciate that by the way. You've given us
25 wonderful insight as to kind of the day in and day out that we

1 wouldn't otherwise know. With that, is there anything that we
2 didn't ask you that you thought we would or is there anything that
3 you want us as an investigative body to go forth with, the thing
4 you want us to know the most walking away from here?

5 A. No, I think you guys have. And like I said, I wasn't truly
6 managing the team at the time when this particular incident
7 happened. I think the other insight would come from the other
8 managers but you did have some questions that I knew about --

9 Q. Okay.

10 A. -- things that I knew.

11 Q. All right. Okay. Well, again, we most definitely appreciate
12 your time.

13 DR. WOODS: We are going to conclude this interview at 1549
14 Pacific Time.

15 (Whereupon, at 3:49 p.m. Pacific Time, the interview was
16 concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: ALASKA AIRLINES BOEING 737-9
MAX LEFT MID-EXIT DOOR PLUG
SEPARATION NEAR PORTLAND,
OREGON ON JANUARY 5, 2024
Interview of Bill S. Brown, Jr.

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA24MA063

PLACE: Renton, Washington

DATE: October 2, 2024

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Transcriber