



February 16, 2026

Brice Banning
Investigator-In-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board
490 L'Enfant Plaza SW
Washington, DC 20594

NTSB Investigation DCA24LA318 – Envoy Flight 3936 ORF to ORD 25 SEP 2024

Dear Mr. Banning:

The purpose of this letter is to provide Envoy Air's Party Submission of proposed findings and recommendations to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) regarding the accident investigation and final report in the matter, in accordance with Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Section 831.14. Envoy Airlines Inc. (Envoy) appreciates the opportunity to submit these comments, as well as the professional and collaborative environment amongst all parties throughout this investigation. These cooperative efforts demonstrate our common commitment to aviation safety.

I. INTRODUCTION

On Wednesday afternoon, September 25, 2024, at approximately 1526 Central Daylight Time (CDT)/2026 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), Envoy Air (ENY) Flight 3936, an Embraer ERJ 170-100 LR aircraft, N772MR, landed on Runway 10 Left (10L) after being cleared to land on Runway 10 Center (10C) at Chicago O'Hare International Airport. Weather conditions at the time were Visual Meteorological Conditions (VMC). The landing did not interfere with any other aircraft's operations. There were no injuries to the sixty-eight passengers and four crewmembers onboard, or damage to the aircraft during the event.

The flight was operating under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 121 as a regularly scheduled passenger flight from Norfolk International Airport (ORF/KORF) to Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD/KORD).

II. ANALYSIS

Flightcrew

The Captain had a total of 7,112 flight hours at the time of the event, including 585 hours in the Embraer (ERJ) 170/175 aircraft at Envoy Air. The Captain completed Captain Initial Operational Experience (IOE) training on September 13, 2023. The Captain had flown 112 hours in the past 90 days and 30 hours in the last 30 days.

The First Officer had a total of 1,619 flight hours at the time of the event, including 75 hours in the EMB-170/175 aircraft at Envoy Air. The First Officer completed IOE on July 26, 2024. The First Officer had flown 71 hours in the past 90 days and 30 hours in the past 30 days.

Both pilots were properly trained, qualified, and current for the flight on September 25, 2024.

Aircraft

A regularly scheduled maintenance two-day check was completed at Envoy's Heavy Maintenance Base at Sawyer Regional Airport (KSAW/MQT), Marquette, Michigan, on September 23, 2024. No discrepancies relating to any navigation device were noted before or after the flight. The flight crew did not report any mechanical discrepancies during preflight activities, enroute during the flight, or after landing.

One Minimum Equipment List (MEL) item was listed on the flight release. MEL 24-24 was listed for Seat 1A and 3 F/D electrical outlets. No Configuration Deviation List (CDL) items were noted on the flight release. The Aircraft Maintenance Log (AML) did not list any other discrepancies.

The aircraft was in an airworthy condition, without any navigational system discrepancies, upon dispatch from Norfolk International Airport (ORF/KORF) through the landing at Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD/KORD), Chicago, Illinois.

Weather

ORD METAR observation at 1951Z reported winds variable at 5 knots, visibility 10 statute miles, few clouds at 5,000 feet Mean Sea Level (MSL). The temperature was 24°C, and the dew point was 11 °C. Altimeter setting of 29.92 in HG.

The weather was not a factor in this event.

NOTAMs

The flight release listed multiple NOTAMs for ORD. Most of the General Runway NOTAMs were for pavement markings being obscured. The Hold Short and Centerline markings for Runway 10C were reported as being obscured.

NOTAMs were issued for Runway 10C Approach Landing System (ALS) being unserviceable (U/S), and the Instrument Landing System (ILS) Category II for Runway 10C was not applicable (NA).

No other NOTAMs were listed, which would have affected the Instrument Landing System (ILS) for Runway 10C.

Technical Performance Record (TPR) Workbook

A review of the Technical Performance Record (TPR) Workbook for Runway 10C at ORD indicated that the instrument landing system was in compliance with FAA specifications before, during, and after the event.

At no time prior to landing did Envoy 3936 report any navigational deficiencies to ATC.

Air Traffic Control

Upon initial check-in with the C 90 TRACON Kokomo feeder radar (KF) controller, Envoy 3936 was advised to expect Runway 10C.

After Envoy 3936 was handed off to the C90 TRACON final controller, Envoy was cleared for the ILS Runway 10C. The flight crew acknowledged the ILS approach clearance and did not report any ILS anomalies or concerns.

Upon checking in with ORD Air Traffic Control Tower (ATCT) South Local Control (SLC), Envoy 3936 reported they were on the visual approach to Runway 10C. The controller did not question or correct the type of approach clearance reported by the flight crew.

According to the FAA Mandatory Occurrence Report (MOR) filed by ORD ATCT, the SLC controller observed Envoy 3936 lined up for Runway 10L when the aircraft was on short final. The SLC controller did not advise Envoy 3936 that they were lined up on the wrong runway.

The SLC controller then verbally coordinated with Local Control Three (3LC) controller, the controller responsible for Runway 10L, to ensure Runway 10L was clear of other aircraft and available for Envoy to land.

At no time did any controller advise Envoy 3936 that they were lined up on the wrong runway.

According to the MOR, "The ATC services provided by the SLC controller were deficient in accordance with FAA directives. Specifically, the SLC controller did not advise the crew of ENY3936 that they were aligned to the wrong runway and did not issue control instructions to prevent the wrong surface landing."

FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, Air Traffic Control, states in 3-10-5. LANDING CLEARANCE, "b. When you become aware that an aircraft is aligned with the wrong surface, inform the pilot and: 1. Issue control instructions/clearances, or 2. If time permits, verify the pilot is aligned with the correct runway. Issue control instructions/clearance as necessary."

Flight Crew Statements

Both pilots stated the flight had multiple runway changes based upon ORD reporting changes to the landing direction. The Captain, the Pilot Monitoring (PM), reported that every runway change was made in the Flight Management System (FMS), confirmed by both pilots, and that it was activated. He also acknowledged that there were no NOTAMs affecting the ILS 10C localizer.

The Captain reported that they never received the localizer signal, even though it was properly set. The First Officer reported that the localizer did not auto-tune.

In preparation for the approach, the Captain stated he placed a 1 NM ring around the Final Approach Fix (FAF) of RAYYY. This was briefed during the approach brief. Both pilots reported relying on the 1 NM ring around RAYYY to identify the FAF.

The ATC replay of the arrival indicated that Envoy 3936 was north of the final approach course to Runway 10C and more aligned with Runway 10L. The distance between the two runways is less than 1,125 feet.

Both pilots stated that the Captain, the PM, was heads-down attempting to determine why the localizer failed to tune during final approach.

Neither pilot reported advising ATC of the inability to tune the localizer in accordance with 14 CFR §91.187(a).

Quick Access Recorder (QAR)

Envoy reviewed the aircraft's Quick Access Recorder (QAR) data after the event to assist in identifying the problems tuning the ILS frequency.

Lateral Navigation (LNAV) was identified as the primary Flight Director Lateral Mode enroute until reaching 5,000 feet on the arrival when HEADING mode was selected. Heading mode remained the Flight Director Lateral Mode selected through landing.

Data indicates that the autothrottles had been engaged on the ground at ORF just prior to departure and remained on until touchdown at ORD. The autopilot was engaged on departure at approximately 4,400 feet MSL and disengaged on the approach at approximately 5,000 feet MSL.

Data indicates that on right downwind to Runway 10C, heading mode was selected on a heading of 270° magnetic heading. The aircraft then commenced a right-hand turn to 360° and finally to 060°. Soon after selecting 060° heading, both pilots' navigation sources changed from FMS to VOR/ILS and remained in VOR/ILS through the landing.

Data indicates that the #1 VOR frequency was set to 108.95, the ILS frequency for Runway 10C at approximately 6 ½ minutes prior to landing. This occurred on Right Base

to Runway 10C, while at 5,000 feet MSL on a heading of 360°. Data indicates that once tuned, the localizer and glideslope indications became valid, indicating deviations from center.

Four seconds after being tuned, the #1 VOR frequency was changed from the ILS frequency to 108.4, the DuPage (DPA) VOR/DME frequency. At that time, both VOR frequencies were the same, 108.4. Twenty-eight (28) seconds later, the #2 VOR frequency was changed to 113.0, the Northbrook (OBK) VOR/DME. The VOR frequencies remained 108.4 and 113.0 for the rest of the flight, approximately six (6) minutes until landing.

The OBK VOR frequency of 113.0 would be used as a backup to identify the Final Approach Fix (FAF) RAYYY, and fix ZURSO on the ILS to Runway 10C at ORD.

The #1 VOR was only tuned to the Runway 10C ILS frequency of 108.95 for approximately 4 seconds, 6 ½ minutes prior to landing. The #2 VOR was never tuned to the Runway 10C ILS frequency.

Note: the DuPage VOR (DPA) frequency at the time of the event was 108.4. The DuPage VOR frequency has since been changed to 114.55. The current Jeppesen chart for the ILS or LOC Rwy 10C, dated 6 JUN 25, lists one of the changes as the “DPA frequency change.”

Flight Data Limitations

Data does not record whether the frequencies were manually or automatically tuned.

The data does not record the selected standby frequencies of the VORs.

Frequency Confusion

Data indicated that the localizer frequency was tuned for 4 seconds while on Right Base to Runway 10C. Both pilots stated that the ILS frequency was “properly tuned”. On the FMS RADIO Page, the Active frequency display is immediately above the Standby frequency.

The assumption is that due to confusion, the flight crew inputted the localizer frequency in the Standby frequency vice the Active frequency. Neither pilot recognized the error. The error could have been easily corrected by pushing the Line Select Key (LSK) to swap STANDBY and ACTIVE frequencies.

III. Findings

- The flight crew was qualified and current in the ERJ-170/175 aircraft on September 25, 2024.
- The aircraft was in an airworthy condition from the time of dispatch through the landing and rollout.
- No aircraft or navigation system malfunctions were identified during the NTSB investigation process.
- The Technical Performance Record (TPR) Workbook for Runway 10C at ORD indicated that the instrument landing system was in compliance with FAA specifications before, during, and after the event.
- Envoy 3936 was cleared for the ILS to Runway 10C at ORD.
- Envoy 3936 acknowledged the clearance for the ILS to Runway 10C at ORD.
- Both pilots stated that the localizer frequency, although “properly tuned”, was never received.
- Envoy 3936 never reported any navigation failures to ATC prior to landing as required by 14 CFR §91.187(a).
- The localizer frequency for Runway 10C at ORD was never selected as the active frequency for both VORs at any time during the approach.
- The Captain as Pilot Monitoring (PM) failed to properly tune and identify the localizer frequency.
- Pilots relied on a 1 NM circle around the FAF to identify RAYYY.
- Upon check-in with ORD ATCT, Envoy 3936 reported on a visual approach to Runway 10C.
- The ORD ATCT SLC controller did not question or correct the type of approach clearance reported by the flight crew.
- The ORD ATCT SLC controller observed that Envoy 3936 had lined up on the wrong runway.
- The ORD ATCT SLC controller never advised Envoy 3936 of the line-up error.
- The ORD ATCT SLC controller did not issue control instructions to prevent a wrong runway landing.
- The ATC services provided by the ORD ATCT SLC controller were deficient in accordance with FAA directives.
- Envoy 3936 landed on Runway 10L at ORD contrary to the ATC clearance.
- No aircraft discrepancies were recorded in the Aircraft Maintenance Log by the Captain after the flight.

Envoy greatly appreciated the opportunity to participate in this investigation and hopes the attached Findings and Recommendations will be of assistance as the NTSB concludes this investigation.

Respectfully submitted,

A black rectangular redaction box covering the signature of Captain Scott P. Trepinski.

Captain Scott P. Trepinski, Ph.D., FRAeS
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