

IRO's Statement
UAL 924 IAD-LHR
August 3, 2023
Dept: IAD 0207Z/2207L
Position: Pilot Monitoring

I was the IRO on United 924 on August 3, 2023, from IAD to LHR, which ultimately diverted back to IAD. During taxi and takeoff, everything seemed normal, but just after departing IAD, upon gear retraction, we got a GEAR DISAGREE EICAS message with GEAR DOORS displayed beneath it. I pulled up the Non-Normals (757)(767) GEAR DISAGREE procedure on my EFB, and the Captain requested a level off at 5,000 from ATC. We ran through the procedure up to step 6, and then the captain asked me to inform the Purser that we would most likely be returning to IAD. I notified the Purser that we still had some procedures to complete and had to coordinate with the company. However, we would return to IAD within 15 minutes and that we were not expecting an evacuation. The captain then transferred the controls to the flying First Officer and contacted Dispatch. I listened to the conversation with Dispatch and TOMC while monitoring the flying First Officer and assisting with radio calls. After discussing the situation with Dispatch and TOMC, we decided a return to IAD with an overweight landing was the best course of action and declare an emergency.

As we began diverting back to IAD, the Captain took control of the aircraft, and I continued with the (757)(767) GEAR DISAGREE procedure, but when we went to lower the landing gear, we received no down and locked indication for the right main gear. Per the procedure, we performed an alternate gear extension, which did not give us a down and locked indication on the right main gear. However, the GEAR DISAGREE EICAS message blanked and was replaced with a R SIDE BRACE EICAS message. We broke off the approach and then requested vectors to give ourselves more time to continue troubleshooting the issue. At this point, the captain once again transferred control to the other First Officer and contacted dispatch. During this second discussion with Dispatch and TOMC, they directed us to the proper procedure for R SIDE BRACE, which we accomplished but still have yet to resolve our issue. I also began reviewing the Partial or Gear Up Landing Procedure.

At this point, the FODM and Boeing Engineering were patched in on the call, and we were told to try several maneuvers, including speeding up and slowing down, as well as steep turns to attempt to lock the gear in place. These were all completed with the captain acting as the Pilot Flying, but nothing resolved the issue. We were advised to conduct a tower fly-by and after completion, were told that ground crews could see all the landing gear extended but there was still no way to confirm that it was locked. After the fly-by, we contacted Dispatch and TOMC for a final time to report that the gear appeared to be down, and the decision was made to burn off as much fuel as practical and then return to IAD for landing. During this time, the Captain and I reviewed the Partial or Gear Up Landing Procedure together to prepare for the possibility of the right main collapsing on touchdown.

About 30 minutes before landing, the captain briefed the flight attendants to prepare for an emergency landing and possible evacuation. Once we were informed that the flight attendants were ready, we requested vectors for an ILS approach to 19L. Approximately 200 feet AGL, I gave the brace command over the PA, made sure that all the deferred items were completed and monitored the landing. We safely landed without further incident on 19L. After coming to a stop, fire personnel requested that we start the APU and shut down the engines so they could approach and evaluate the aircraft. After fire personnel and company maintenance evaluated the aircraft, they determined it was unsafe to move the aircraft with passengers on board. We were all deplaned via mobile lounges.