Boeing 777 incident near Kahului, Hawaii, December 19, 2022
On December 19, 2022, a 2000 Boeing 777, registered N212UA, was involved in an incident during enroute (climb to cruise) near Kahului, Hawaii. It was flown under scheduled airline rules (Part 121). No one was hurt; 281 people were on board or involved. The weather was instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The flight crew’s failure to manage the airplane’s vertical flightpath, airspeed, and pitch attitude following a miscommunication about the captain’s desired flap setting during the initial climb.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- December 19, 2022
- Place
- Kahului, Hawaii · map
- Type
- Incident
- Injuries
- No one was hurt; 281 people were on board or involved.
- Weather
- instrument conditions (cloud, fog or low visibility)
- Aircraft
- Boeing 777 222, built 2000 · all 777s on the register
- Registration
- N212UA · registry record · serial 30218
- Damage
- Not recorded
- Flight
- Flight · scheduled airline rules (Part 121)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
United flight 1722 lost altitude about 1 minute after departure while in instrument meteorological conditions, which included heavy rain. The airplane descended from 2,100 ft to about 748 ft above the water before the crew recovered from the descent. No injuries were reported, and the airplane was not damaged. The NTSB was not originally notified of the event, since it did not meet the requirements of Title 49 Code of Federal Regulations Part 830.5. However, the NTSB learned of the event about 2 months later and chose to open an investigation. By that time, both the cockpit voice and flight data recorder durations had been exceeded. The investigation utilized flight crew statements and other records as information sources. The captain (who was the pilot flying) reported that he and the first officer had initially planned for a flaps-20 takeoff (flap setting of 20°) with a reduced-thrust setting, based on performance calculations. However, during taxi, the ground controller advised them that low-level windshear advisories were in effect. Based on this information, the captain chose a flaps-20 maximum thrust takeoff instead. He hand-flew the takeoff, with the auto throttles engaged. During the takeoff, the rotation and initial climb were normal; however, as the airplane continued to climb, the flight crew noted airspeed fluctuations as the airplane encountered turbulence. When the airplane reached the acceleration altitude, the captain reduced the pitch attitude slightly and called for the flap setting to be reduced to flaps 5. According to the first officer, he thought that he heard the captain announce flaps 15, which the first officer selected before contacting the departure controller and discussing the weather conditions. The captain noticed that the maximum operating speed indicator moved to a lower value than expected, and the airspeed began to accelerate rapidly. The captain reduced the engine thrust manually, overriding the auto throttle servos, to avoid a flap overspeed and began to diagnose the flap condition. He noticed that the flap indicator was showing 15°, and he again called for flaps 5, and he confirmed that the first officer moved the flap handle to the 5° position. The first officer stated that he “knew the captain was having difficulty with airspeed control”, and he queried the captain about it as he considered if his own (right side) instrumentation may have been in error. He did not receive an immediate response from the captain. Both pilots recalled that, about this time, the airplane’s pitch attitude was decreasing, and the airspeed was increasing. The first officer recalled that that the captain asked for flaps 1 soon after he had called for flaps 5, and when the first officer set the flaps to 1°, he then noticed the airspeed had increased further, and the control column moved forward. Both pilots recalled hearing the initial warnings from the ground proximity warning system (GPWS), and the first officer recalled announcing “pull up pull up” along with those initial GPWS warnings. The captain then pulled aft on the control column, initially reduced power to reduce airspeed, and then applied full power to “begin the full CFIT [controlled flight into terrain] recovery.” The first officer recalled that, as the captain was performing the recovery, the GPWS alerted again as the descent began to reverse trend; data showed this occurred about 748 ft above the water. After noting a positive rate of climb, the captain lowered the nose to resume a normal profile, ensured that the flaps and speed brakes were fully retracted, and engaged the autopilot. The remainder of the flight was uneventful. Figure 1 shows a perspective view of the flight track. Figure 1- Flight Track with Annotations As a result of the event, United Airlines modified one of their operations training modules to address this occurrence and issued an awareness campaign about flight path management at their training center.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
What happened, in order
- Altitude deviation during enroute (climb to cruise) defining event
The NTSB's findings
- Personnel issues › Task performance › Use of equip/info › Aircraft control › Pilot
- Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Identification/recognition › Pilot
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor, flight engineer
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 19,600 hours in all; 5,000 in this make and model; 100 in the last 90 days; 30 in the last 30 days; 10,900 as pilot in command; 900 on instruments
- Last flight review: April 8, 2022
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
- Seat: left
- Injury: no injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot, flight instructor
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 5,300 hours in all; 120 in this make and model; 120 in the last 90 days; 30 in the last 30 days; 2,395 as pilot in command; 1,323 on instruments
- Last flight review: February 7, 2023
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (without waivers/limitations)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: no injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 74,017 hours
- Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, August 14, 2021
- Maximum gross weight: 545,000 lb
- Seats: 381
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine 1: P&W PW4077 (turbojet); 80,434 hours total
- Engine 2: P&W PW4077 (turbojet); 83,876 hours total
- Operator: United Airlines INC
The flight
- Departed from: OGG Kahului HI
- Destination: SFO San Francisco CA
- Flight plan: IFR
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: daylight
- Wind: from 140° at 10 knots
- Visibility: 3 statute miles
- Sky: broken clouds at 900 ft
- Temperature: 66°F (19°C), dew point 64°F (18°C)
- Altimeter: 29.78 inHg
- Observation at 2:50 pm from PHOG
Weather report (METAR): PHOG 190050Z 14010KT 3SM +RA BR BKN009 OVC020 19/18 A2978 190 93 800 130/10 RMK AO2 SLP088 P0018 T01940183
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Flig | 10 | |||
| Passengers | 271 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number DCA23LA172.
