

DCA22LA133

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

Attachment 1

Flight Crew Interview Summaries

November 10, 2022

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INTERVIEWEE: FIRST OFFICER LARA DELLARIPA-HOSKING

Date: June 29, 2022

Location: Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) United MEC Office Conference Room 1049

Time: 1300 CDT

Present: Shawn Etcher - NTSB, Michael Gillen - United Airlines; Gregory Lipinski - United Airlines - ALPA; Alessio Ventriglia - Boeing

First Officer Dellaripa-Hosking was represented by John T. Hanson - Senior Labor Relations Counsel Air Line Pilots Association

During the interview First Officer Dellaripa-Hosking stated the following¹:

She was 51 years old and a first officer at United on the 737. She was a line pilot

She has ATP² CFI³ Instrument, Type rating on B737⁴, BA-3100⁵. Has about 5,500 hours total time, about 3,500 of those were in the 737. Class 1 medical with a limitation for reading glasses.

Last training event was a CQLOE⁶ in January 2022.

She had never flown with the incident captain previously.

She was the pilot monitoring on the incident flight and had never been involved in an accident or incident.

Flight instructor in Lake of the Hills for about 2 years flew for Chicago Express out of MDW⁷ for 2 ½ -3 years and then came to United Airlines and was hired into the 737. March of 2000 was her date of hire and furloughed in 2003 and took a little longer leave and was furloughed again and then came back in October 2018 and came back into the 737 fleet again.

¹ The first officer, when asked, declined to be recorded and the recording transcribed. When explained that our interview summary will be part of the docket and may not be 100% accurate she stated she would still like to decline being recorded and understood the limitations of the interview summary.

² Airline Transport Pilot.

³ Certified Flight Instructor.

⁴ The Boeing Company 737-100, 737-200, 737-200C, 737-300, 737-400, 737-500, 737-600, 737-700, 737-700C, 737-800, 737-900, 737-900ER, 737-8, 737-9. Source: FAA Order 8900.1, Figure 5-88, dated July 15, 2019

⁵ British Aerospace Corporations HP.137, MK.1, Jetstream Series 200, Jetstream 3101, Jetstream 3201. Source: FAA Order 8900.1, Figure 5-88, dated July 15, 2019.

⁶ Continuous Line Operating Evaluation.

⁷ Chicago Midway International Airport, Chicago, Illinois.

Staffing she thought they were “kind of short” as she has been given some scheduled changes and line times have gone up. It used to be 67 hours as the bottom and now it is about 75-78 hours per month.

They have FSAP⁸ and she has used it and filed one for this incident. She felt it was very helpful.

She doesn’t feel any pressure from management, and they don’t get questioned, she felt that they get a lot of support.

It was a 730 departure with a 0630-report time in flight ops. They went over the paperwork and the flight plan; weather was good, and it was a short flight. The dispatch flight planned for a runway 28L arrival. The captain signed off the flight plan and they went to the airplane, and they did their preflight checks. Everything checked ok and they loaded the FMC and briefed all the normal 1st of the day briefs. Pushback, taxi out and takeoff all “normal.” The flight was an hour block to block, and they were pulling up ATIS⁹ and looking over the arrival. Prior to top of descent they brief the RNAV¹⁰ 28C as they assumed that was what they would get. They loaded everything into the box and got landing data. When they checked in with approach, they were given a descent and told to expect runway 32 ILS¹¹. She changed the FMC¹² and [the captain] briefed the airport diagram on how to get to the gate. Continuing the descent, they were asked by ATC¹³ if they could take the visual to 28C and they said they could. She went and changed the approach in the box and rebriefed the turnoff but they already had the data. They discussed the approach a little and they were being vectored. About 4,000 feet or so they got a check landing altitude flag on the PFD¹⁴ and they were sure what that meant. She then noticed the AP was in control wheel steering pitch. The captain reselected the autopilot A and it worked. The captain was slowing to 210 knots and configuring. While on the downwind turning to base and getting cleared for the visual she went to select go to SUPPR and the FMC all went blank. They only had an ACARS¹⁵ prompt and no FMC prompts. The captain kept turning toward the field as the weather was good. They turned on what they thought was the final approach course and they had run all the checklist. The FMC came back and they had a lot of “DISCON” and they were around 1000 foot but no magenta line and they were cleared to land. The airplane was configured and on target speed. They both saw the PAPI¹⁶ for 28L she could not

⁸ Flight Safety Awareness Program.

⁹ Automated Terminal Information System.

¹⁰ Area Navigation

¹¹ Instrument Landing System.

¹² Flight Management Computer.

¹³ Air Traffic Control.

¹⁴ Primary Flight Display.

¹⁵ Aircraft Communication and Reporting System.

¹⁶ Precision Approach Path Indicator.

recall if they saw one for 28C. They didn't have a magenta line to tell them they were off. At 500 feet they were stable and landed on speed in touchdown. Once they landed and ATC told them to hold short of 28C as they were exiting. They held short of 28C and were given a number to call and they crossed the runway and taxied to the gate. There were no other airplanes they saw in the pattern or taxiing. They did all the checklists and shut the airplane down. Everything was working normally as they taxied in and it was all operating normally so they did not write it up. They called ATC and discussed the navigational issues.

She recalled looking at the FMC and not having any other waypoints but could not recall if the nav screen totally blanked. She was looking intently at the FMC. She had never had the FMC do that before. She thought she had heard of FMC failures but nothing she knew for sure.

After she saw the ACARS prompt, she did not touch any of the buttons. The captain had said he was turning off the flight director.

They had to select the arrival page select the approach make sure the other pilot agrees and then go back and reload the approach on the arrival page. They had all the landing data, so it was no big issue. She estimated that 30 seconds to do it as you have to select and execute it. She had no issues getting it programmed.

When they were descending coming down to 4000-5000 feet somewhere to "check landing altitude."¹⁷ That went away "right away" and then went to control wheel steering pitch. At that point the autopilot was engaged, and she could not recall if the captain had his hands on the controls. She did not have her hands on the controls. She looked up at the overhead panel because she never saw a message like that, there were no lights on the panel that were out of the normal. There were no abnormal amber lights. She thought the message went away about 30-60 seconds as it was on long enough to get their attention and then went away. The captain was using heading select and flight level change. They were cleared for the visual and she went to select SUPPR and blanked out. It didn't take the go direct and she spun the heading and then the FMC was gone.

There might have been cabin issues but nothing operational issues and no log history of FMC issues before the flight.

She felt as they were getting vectored she felt they were busy and they are doing checklists and radio calls and with hand flying it gets even more busy. She felt that when the [FMC] screen blanked it was busier and very abnormal. She felt the captain did a great job and it was all stable.

¹⁷ LDG ALT amber alert was what would be displayed.

She thought she was looking inside and outside about half the time but not exactly sure.

They always had the airport in sight. It was clear.

She thought the runway and the PAPI caught her eye first on final approach. She usually looks at the diagram to make sure it looks normal if they don't have something backing them up visually and she was busy from 1000 feet on to make calls and figure out the issue.

Normally at 500 feet they call stable and make sure flaps and gear is down and that no one is on the runway. Which there was no one departing 28L at the time. She does look at the painted numbers she normally looks for the L but didn't recall why she didn't notice it. She estimated that she saw the 28 about 200 feet agl. At that point she is still monitoring their descent and that there is no gain or loss on the airspeed.

Touchdown was normal no abnormalities and estimated that the [FMC] screens came back about 700-800 feet agl and they had some discontinuities in the FMC page. It was too late to mess with that.

To remove the "discon" they would have to bring the waypoint to the top of the page and execute it and she wasn't sure where they were in relation to those waypoints and didn't want to get a direction from the computer taking them to a waypoint behind them.

She recognized the wrong runway after ATC cleared them to hold short of the center.

As far as NOTAMs¹⁸ she said the ATIS reported PAPI on 28L was out of service. But it was operating. She felt the PAPI was giving them correct guidance.

She had not flown to Pittsburgh International Airport (PIT), Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania often. The last time she flew to PIT was in 2018 on OE¹⁹.

They did not even think of writing up the FMC as they were "frazzled." They weren't sure what to write up as it restarted, and it was working properly. She thought they might be able to do an engineering note to let the other crews know but not sure.

An engineering note she is not sure of what that means and if it can be used to let other crews know or not she thought it might be an informational write up.

She never used route 2 on the incident flight.

¹⁸ Notice to Air Mission

¹⁹ Operating Experience.

She never got the data link full message and that there are bulletins on that but setting it up everything seemed normal.

On final she could only recall seeing the one PAPI.

It was the first leg of the pairing and that they both felt rested and good. They mentioned that they don't see the MAX often in Chicago O'Hare International Airport (ORD), Chicago, Illinois and she may have flown it 10-15 legs total.

She programmed 28C then 32 then 28C. And she programmed the approach only because they were getting vectored and there were no altitudes such as a descend via clearance.

They chose the RNAV GPS 28C as it was reporting on the ATIS as the approach.

The landing message she thought was in the PFD and not in the scratchpad. She recalled it was an amber message. And then an amber control wheel steering pitch which was unusual.

The landing checklist was fine in its placement but every now and then they get busy and it adds a lot of work.

They never considered going around with the message since it was visual and clear with the airplane being stable.

She was not aware of any dual FMC failure issue.

There was no difference in colors of the runway and that they were very close together.

She recalled the STAR²⁰ was the Jesey 4 and it had CUTTA in the route.

They were getting vectors when they started having the messages. The STAR she wasn't sure if it had a vector on it or not but ATC was vectoring them for the approach.

She thought ATC asked them to give them a phone call before they crossed 28C but wasn't certain.

When they went into control wheel steering pitch she thought they were on VNAV/LNAV²¹ but not sure.

When they went to control wheel steering pitch, the captain went and reselected command mode on autopilot "A." The flight directors did not start giving "bad

²⁰ Standard Terminal Arrival Route.

²¹ Vertical Navigation/Lateral Navigation.

guidance"²² until close to the final approach. She thought at that point they were in flight level change. Once they turned on final outside of Supper when they turned final.

She did not press Recall on the glareshield after the LDG ALT alert.

She had only flown the MAX a handful times. She felt it takes a little bit to get your mindset around where the gauges are and they are different than the NGs.

Normally they brief the entire instrument approach and that they start at the top of the plate and go through the entire plate although the way to MAP and brief that. They brief VASI and PAPI and what side. Then they brief the runway and the airport and where the plan to turn off and the gate and how they would taxi to the gate and the threats. They brief the configuration and autobrakes. Then if the FO is pilot flying they discuss the handoff on rollout. They could build a visual approach by backing the runway out but typically they use the preloaded approach. She doesn't normally see that since they have an instrument approach to load.

She thought the lights were the same and that the PAPIs were on the left.

	6/21	6/20	6/19	6/18
Wake up	0410	0700	0700-0730	
Duty hours		0	0	
Flight hours		0	0	
Eat Breakfast	No but coffee in the car and on the airplane	NA	NA	On the flight
Eat Lunch	NA	1200		
Eat Dinner	NA	1800		
Go to bed	NA	2130	2130 not a late night person	Likely 2130ish
Get up in the middle of the night	NA	no	Normally does not so probably not	

The last trip she worked was on Saturday the 18th when she deadhead to Montego Bay and flew back. And she worked the two-day trip prior starting on the 16th. She could not recall but thought she flew from Montego Bay. And it was not in a MAX.

²² Note: MCP modes were not determined and likely providing expected guidance with mode selected.

The incident trip was a 3-day trip. The next day she thought but could not recall for sure was PIT to Denver International Airport (DEN), Denver, Colorado to San Francisco International Airport (SFO), San Francisco, California to Portland International Airport (PDX), Portland, Oregon with a layover. It was a high time 3-day trip. But not sure as she normally does a 2 or 3 leg day at the most.

She thought she should have pulled up the airport diagram to verify it looked right. Thought they should brief that they were close runways and that she will add that to her brief in the future. They do brief into ORD and SFO about the staggered approaches but in PIT they don't usually do close parallel approach. She had no definition of close runways but now if they are parallel to her they are close.

They were going to use the ILS on 32 as a backup but when they chose the 28C she made sure both radios were back and they went to VOR mode.

They were visual with the airport when they accepted the visual approach. As they turned, they had the runway and she felt they saw the PAPI and pavement. The captain could also see the airport and she did not want to accept it unless he had it in sight.

Usually when they fly a visual approach, they will have the ILS or RNAV loaded to back them up to make sure they are doing the correct approach [runway] but when cleared for the visual they use instrument approach as a backup.

When asked about differences on the MAX she stated that the gauges for the autobrakes, flaps, and gear handle are in different places and the gear is not off its either up or down. She felt it was a bit of a threat because if it's not the norm they would have to search for the gauges. They did talk about it in the briefing room as it was a MAX and to take their time to locate everything.

They did have RAAS²³ and it worked in ORD.

Concluded at 1433 CDT

FIRST OFFICER LARA DELLARIPA-HOSKING WRITTEN STATEMENT

United Airlines Flight 2627 21 JUN 2022 ORD-PIT 737 MAX 9 aircraft N37513/7513

I met the captain in ORD Ops to go over our flight plan. The flight was scheduled to depart at 0730L (CDT). My report for duty time was 0630L (CDT). This was day 1 of a 3-day pairing. It was not an extremely early report time and I felt rested and fit for duty upon arrival into flight ops.

²³ Runway Awareness Advisory System.

The captain and I reviewed the flight plan. We looked over the fuel, weather at the departure airport (ORD) along the route and at the destination airport (PIT), airport information, routing, maintenance status of the airplane, etc. We were flight planned to land on 28L by dispatch and decided the captain would be the flying pilot and I would be the pilot monitoring.

We headed to the gate to start our preflight checks, walk around of the airplane and meeting and briefing the flight attendants. Everything appeared to be operating normally. Push back, taxi out, take off and climb were all normal.

This was a short flight, so we started setting up for the arrival and approach. We reviewed the ATIS and were expecting the RNAV GPS Y 28C approach. Before the top of descent, we pulled up landing data and loaded and programmed the FMC.

We were handed over to PIT approach control and they told us to expect the visual to 32. So we pulled up landing data for runway 32. We briefed the approach, programmed, and loaded the FMC for the ILS 32 to back up the visual approach. We were descending and approach asked us if we could accept the visual to 28C. The weather was clear, and the winds were 250/4 knots, so we accepted that. We again set up for the RNAV GPS Y 28C to back up the visual approach.

Descending now about 4000 feet we got a check landing altitude message on the FMC and then the message went away. The autopilot reverted to control wheel pitch. The captain was able to reengage the A autopilot. We were now being vectored on downwind about to turn base and the FMC dropped everything and went blank. The CDU only showed the ACARS prompt no FMC prompt. The captain used heading select and level change on the MCP panel. We were cleared the visual approach to 28C. Our display screen said time out/reselect and all the waypoints dropped out.

We had the airport in sight and continued. We tried to reselect LNAV and VNAV, but it would not select because there were no active way points. At this point, the captain was hand flying. He turned off his flight director since it was not giving him any guidance. He continued to slow and configure the airplane for landing. The airplane was slowed to target speed and flaps 30 by approximately 1500 feet. We were stable at 500 feet. Around 1000 to 500 feet the FMC came back. There were no active way points displayed and no magenta line.

We were visual but with everything going on we had lined up on Runway 28L and did not realize it. We were on the PAPI for vertical guidance, but it was the PAPI to 28L. I do

not recall seeing the PAPI for 28C. (The arrival ATIS we looked at when we got to the gate had 28L PAPI OTS, but it was operating when we landed.)

We landed stable, on speed in the touchdown zone. We did not realize our mistake until turning off the runway, tower told us to hold short of 28C.

At the time there were no other airplanes operating at the airport. No separation was lost, no aircraft were holding short, in a protected area, or even taxiing. 28L was open and operating. 28L and 28C look very similar and are situated very close together.

We proceeded to taxi to the Gate A2 as instructed by ATC. After landing the FMC was working correctly. As we taxed and pulled into the gate, all the FMC anomalies seemed to have cleared up and it was operating normally.

Lara Dellaripa-Hosking

INTERVIEWEE: CAPTAIN CRAIG MUNTER

Date: June 29, 2022

Location: Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) United MEC Office Conference Room 1049

Time: 1507 CDT

Present: Shawn Etcher - NTSB, Michael Gillen - United Airlines; Greg Lipinski - United Airlines - ALPA; Alessio Ventriglia - Boeing

Captain Munter was represented by John T. Hanson - Senior Labor Relations Counsel Air Line Pilots Association

During the interview Captain Munter stated the following²⁴:

He was 52 years old and a Captain at United on the 737. His date of hire was November 6, 1995. He was a line pilot.

He has an ATP, A&P, 737, 757²⁵, 767, 777²⁶, A320²⁷. Instructor certificates.

²⁴ The captain, when asked, declined to be recorded and the recording transcribed. When explained that our interview summary will be part of the docket and may not be 100% accurate, he stated he would still like to decline being recorded and understood the limitations to the interview summaries.

²⁵ The Boeing Company 757-200 Series, 757-200PF Series, 757-200CB Series, 757-300 Series, 767-200 Series, 767-300 Series, 767-300F Series, 767-400ER Series, 767-2C Series. Source: FAA Order 8900.1, Figure 5-88, dated July 15, 2019.

²⁶ The Boeing Company 777-200 Series, 777-300 Series, 777-300ER Series, 777-200LR Series, 777F-Series. Source: FAA Order 8900.1, Figure 5-88, dated July 15, 2019.

²⁷ Airbus SAS A-318 Series, A-319 Series, A-320 Series, A-321 Series and includes all models on TCDS

Total time 19,000 to 20,000 total hours. 8,500 in the 737, about 1800-2000 as PIC in 737. Been a captain since January 2022 and was his second time around. He was a captain on the 737 in 07 or 08 for about 2 years. He had a first class medical with corrective lenses present does not have to wear just present. He was not wearing the glasses, but they were present with him at the time of the incident.

Does take medication and it was disclosed on his FAA medical.

His most recent training event was in January of 2022 for his re-upgrade to the 737. Had IOE²⁸ in February 2022, which ended in a line check, and nothing since.

He was the pilot flying on the incident flight.

He was general aviation near crystal lake airport, flight instructed, went to two commuters then 727 flight engineer at United.

Used FSAP for the incident flight. Felt it was valuable and allows flow of information freely both ways.

Never felt pressure to complete a flight.

It was a normal regular day had a good flight plan from the dispatcher, no maintenance issues. The flight over to PIT was fine. Enroute they did the briefs before top of descent. Briefed the expected runway after ATIS, briefed 28C RNAV GPS Y. Checked on with approach was told to expect visual to 32 and shortly thereafter was given the visual to 28C. The first unusual thing was below 10000 feet and they had the land altitude flag on the primary flight display and disappeared after a few seconds and assumed a nuisance message. At that time the autopilot was on command mode and shortly after the FO noticed control wheel steering pitch and the amber was highlighted on the FMA. Selected a new pitch mode and all was normal. They were on level change north of the field heading east of the field on the downwind descending. Turned base leg descending to 4,000 feet outside of SUPPR about 2 miles. They had the field in sight and was cleared the visual 28C. Turned the heading select to a 45-degree intercept. He asked the FO to extend the line from SUPPR. He was not sure it was ever extended but she said the FMC blanked. FMC screen only said ACARS and the screen was black both FMCs blanked. The time out reselect was not common and they usually came back on their own. He said that always know not touch them and usually they will come back. At that point they were still descending. He reported he had the PAPI in sight from about 6 miles out. The FO was working on the FMC coming back and configured the airplane. They were stabilized and he was using the PAPI for vertical guidance. There was no ILS for 28C so nothing tuned in. About 1,000 feet the FMC came back up with no activate waypoint per the FO. He was flying and everything

A28NM. Source: FAA Order 8900.1, Figure 5-88, dated July 15, 2019.

²⁸ Initial Operating Experience.

was stable. The FO had more going on and he was flying the airplane following the PAPI.

He was not sure when they programmed for 28C the first time. The flight plan had 28L but more as a flight plan placeholder. He could not recall who loaded 28C, but it was loaded before the top of descent. It would be normal for him to load it, but he could not recall.

He would brief the approach based on the approach plate starting at the top of the page. Inhibit the DME²⁹ and check the two GPSs and then went through starting to brief the approach. They had already done the landing data with flaps 30 and brakes 2, then brief the missed approach and then brief the turn off from the runway to taxi to the gate. Inhibit the DME is normal, and it was because of updating. To determine the active GPS menus and page 2 on the nav.

Normal descent and passed off to PIT approach about 25 miles northwest of the airport which was the JESEY 4 arrival. They were on the arrival when they first talked to PIT and was told to expect 32 and he loaded the ILS 32 for the approach. They did brief the ILS 32 and pulled landing data for it just as they finished that, they were offered the visual to runway 28C. Somewhere after, on the arrival he gave them a heading to fly but it was after they were reissued expect 28C. He selected heading select, which was a mode, and he went to level change as they could see no one on TCAS³⁰ as he expected to be turned at a specific point. After being turned back in he would arm LNAV/VNAV for backup. They never armed LNAV/VNAV because there was nothing active to arm it to. Thought it was 6000 feet on downwind and then 4000 on base leg when asked if they had the field in sight. He had the field and could make out the concrete shape of the runways.

The FMCs were blank except for the ACARS prompt the displays never blanked out. He has had one FMC go out and give the message and 5-10 seconds later they will come back. It has not happened very often not even once a month maybe every few months. he has never had it happen on an active approach and it is usually uploaded something or requesting new winds. Definitely has never happened on an RNAV approach. He clarified that it was when they change something it might happen but not frequent and it is only one of the FMC's going out. He has never seen a dual FMC failure and he assumed it was going through the same restart as if single. He thought if it was a single failure he could select things on the working one but was afraid to touch anything. He knows they have checklist but thought there was a bulletin at some point. When he had the single failure it always came back. Somewhere

²⁹ Distance Measuring Equipment.

³⁰ Traffic Collision Avoidance System.

between 500-1000 the FMCs came back but he couldn't verify as he was looking outside flying the airplane.

When he had a single failure, he never wrote it up. He felt it was so benign and recovered quickly he just thought it took a bit to talk to the other one. He did not write up the dual failure also. Since it was fully operational it became a question of how to write it up. Maintenance he thought would come out and say it is working normally. An engineering note might have been appropriate, but he was distracted. If it was still blank, he would have written it up.

An engineering note doesn't break the MRD³¹ and makes maintenance and the next crews aware of it happening. He has never seen one written up before. He looks at the log history with every plane change. He thought the notes were displayed for a few days but mostly used for maintenance. There was nothing that stood out in the log history for the airplane. Cabin writeups, tire changes, etc. but normal items.

When the FMC came back, he could see the airport and the PAPI as it was a clear weather day. They were configured, prior to that they were a little rushed or distracted because of the FMC.

Tower cleared them to land inside SUPPR. Could not recall it was 28C but assumed it was. He normally listens to hear 28 "Center" but not sure why he could not recall hearing it. Both FMCs had failed when they switched to tower.

PAPIs looked like a normal descent and perfect. He touched down in the touch down zone. Made the first highspeed he became aware of the wrong runway when hold short clearance was given by tower. Followed by a phone number to call the tower.

He recalled NOTAMs for PIT but nothing that affected him was all he could recall. He knew 28R was closed for construction but nothing to affect them.

The last time he went to PIT was on a Chicago Cubs charter maybe a year or two ago. But has not been since he re-upgraded. He was flying the charter as a 737 FO, which he was before his re-upgrade for 5 years or more.

No audible alerts going into PIT. RAAS gives audibles on taxiing but not in the air.

No data link full message nor did he think he had ever seen that message. Neither of them saw any messages that "that seems weird" when on the ground at ORD.

Route 2 nor lateral offset was not used. Route 2 is not authorized.

³¹ Maintenance Release Document.

He only saw one operating set of PAPI lights.

There was no ILS guidance showing on the display the frequency was parked.

He still had heading information and the speed tape was still there just the FMC was blank. The NAV display was there but with no waypoints. He could not recall if SUPPR was there when he flew over it.

He did not do any trouble shooting on control wheel steering pitch. He never uses control wheel steering pitch and unless he selected it or bumped the yoke. He assumed the FO had bumped the yoke as he had not.

He thought he was in A command level change and heading selected when the control wheel steering pitch occurred.

They did discuss threats such as personal they were fine, the technical was that they do not see the MAX in ORD often. He estimated he flew between 30 and 50 segments since they came back none prior to that.

Does not do trips back-to-back prior to that the Saturday prior 18th with a Cancun turn.

	6/21	6/20	6/19	6/18
Wake up	0400 with a 90 minute drive	0530 which normal	0530	
Duty hours		Off hanging around the home maybe cutting the grass		Released 1830 home by 2100
Flight hours		off	Off	7.8 - 8 hours
Eat Breakfast	He ate something before he left the house but on the flight but could not recall. Did have caffeine.			
Eat Lunch		Noon to 1300		

Eat Dinner		1800	1800	
Go to bed		About 2100 fell asleep about 2200	About 2230	Not sure but before 2300
Get up in the middle of the night		Probably once	At least once	

To fly the MAX it flies nicer than the NG control wise. Its new and it is kind of nice. There are nuisances between the max and other 737 most minor things usually dealing with muscle memory. Still going along the same standardization.

When asked if there was anything that might have helped differentiate between the two runways he stated, the PAPI being on the same side the same length of runway didn't help. He thought he tunneled in and they had a higher workload. He only saw the one PAPI and no other lights. He estimated that he saw the PAPIs 7 miles out.

He does look at the painted numbers and he doesn't know why it didn't register. Not sure if it was higher than normal workload and they had visual guidance. He did not brief the approach lights because it was day and CAVU.

He was not sure how much heads up and heads inside the FO was. He stated that the FO was very busy. There was some distraction up and down.

The ATIS after they landed reported the PAPI on 28L was out of service. He thought the FO pulled it up because there was concern could it have been the closed runway. The PAPI definitely was illuminated. Not sure if the PAPI would have been off if it would have helped hoped it would have but not sure.

He had turned off the Flight directors on a visual approach. When asked if the nav display was blank he said he still had heading info but no waypoints. There was always something on the screen.

Concluded at 1637 CDT

CAPTAIN CRAIG MUNTER WRITTEN STATEMENT

Statement regarding United Airlines Flight 2627 (ORD - PIT) June 21, 2022

I served as Captain and pilot flying on United Flight 2627 ORD to PIT on 6/21/2022 which was a Boeing 737 Max 9 aircraft.

This was the first flight of a three-day trip with a departure time of 0730 from ORD. Met First Officer in flight operations for flight planning. Weather was VFR and light winds at both cities. Aircraft maintenance status was also good. I accepted the flight plan produced by the dispatcher as filed. No issues during preflight, taxi, take off and cruise.

We were flight planned to land on runway 28L in PIT. Before descent I briefed Jesey4 RNAV arrival and RNAV/GPSY 28C as per PIT ATIS. Upon contact with PIT approach was told to expect to visual runway 32. Proceeding to load ILS 32 into FMC and began to brief it as a backup to the visual. Reassigned the RNAV/GPSY 28C. We reloaded that approach to the FMC.

While on radar vector downwind and descending had a check landing altitude message displayed briefly then extinguished. Shortly after that, with A autopilot engaged, aircraft reverted to control wheel pitch mode. I selected level change and reselected A autopilot to command mode. While on base leg radar vector with A autopilot on in heading select and descending in level change, was cleared by ATC for visual approach to runway 28C.

Approximately 2 miles from SUPPR on intercept heading and descending both FMC displayed screens displayed a timeout/reselect message. The lateral and vertical guidance on the map displays went blank. There is no ILS approach to runway 28C, so nothing was tuned into NAV radio for a backup. I disconnected the autopilot and auto throttle and continued visually with the field in sight. No other aircraft traffic noted at the airport at this time. Crossed SUPPR approximately 200 feet high with flaps 15/gear down and slowing. Continued to configure aircraft for landing. FMC continued to display timeout messages, followed by no active way point message. Transitioned to the only visible PAPI for additional vertical guidance not realizing it was 28L PAPI. Check list completed on schedule. Aircraft landed in touchdown zone on speed on runway 28L. Both runways are similar in length and closely spaced. Exited runway 28L at F5 and taxied to Gate A2. FMC and map displays returned to normal before arriving at the gate. After arrival, next hour's PIT ATIS listed runway 28L PAPI out of service.

Craig Munter