

DCA22LA126

OPERATIONAL FACTORS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE

Attachment 1: Interview Summaries

Interviewee: First Officer William "Bill" Robert Sauerland Jr.,
Representative: Eric Iverson – Senior Labor Relations Council, ALPA

Date/Time: June 10, 2022 / 0902 CDT
Location: 3131 Democrat Rd, Memphis, TN, Conference Room C-202
Present: Dujuan Sevillian, Ph.D. (NTSB), Shawn Etcher (NTSB), Sabrina Woods, Ph.D. (NTSB), Todd Johnson (FedEx), John "Max" Clark (FedEx Airline Pilots Association), James Hobart (FAA)

During the interview First Officer William "Bill" Robert Sauerland Jr., stated the following:

First Officer (FO) Sauerland was a 50-year-old line pilot for FedEx, based in Memphis and had approximately 4,400 total flying hours. He was a second year first officer and had started working for FedEx on 18 June 2020. Prior to work with FedEx, FO Sauerland worked very briefly at United Airlines, and was an aviator in the United States Navy (3,300 hours total) with experience flying various rotorcraft and the AV-8B Harrier II. He held an airline transport pilot (ATP) rating, and multi-engine land (MEL), single-engine land (SEL) commercial ratings, rotorcraft and powered lift commercial ratings, and was type rated on the A320 and Boeing 757 (730 hours total) and 767. At the time of the incident, FO Sauerland held a first-class medical dated 24 May 2022, with no limitations.

In the month prior to the incident flight, FO Sauerland was scheduled for sick leave from 25 May 2022 to 3 June 2022. When asked, he stated his last crew pair was probably 21 May 2022 and that he was actually on vacation with his family during the time that indicated sick leave. FO Sauerland stated that in the days preceding the incident, he flew from his home near Denver, CO to Indianapolis (IND) in order to start the set of flights consisting of five legs before concluding in Salt Lake City and then a scheduled deadhead. He arrived just before 1600 ET on 6 June 2022. That night, he said he slept approximately 4½ hours prior to his 0225 ET crew show for the flight from IND to Ontario, CA lasting 4 hrs 15 mins in duration and arriving at 0500 PT. He stated he ate breakfast and then went to bed until approximately 1130 PT, got up to exercise, and was able to take an additional two-hour nap before the crew's 1850 show for the next leg of the flight to Alliance Fort Worth, TX (AFW) where they arrived at approximately 0030 CT. He procured a crew rest room where he was able to get about 30 min of rest prior to the next leg which was the incident flight.

The FO said he met with the captain, and they proceeded to check the Notice to Air Missions (NOTAMS) and the weather and conducted a preflight of the aircraft. He said he did not note anything unusual. The crew departed AFW for the less than one-hour long flight to Tulsa, OK (TUL). The captain was the pilot flying and the FO was monitoring. When they started their descent, the FO said he picked up the weather and started running performance data and setting up the frequencies for the instrument

landing system (ILS). He stated their decent was normal and that he and the captain talked about the landing. He stated the weather was instrument meteorological conditions (IMC) during the decent. As the aircraft broke through 10,000 ft, he stated they switched to approach and were given a 360° downwind vector. When they broke through the cloud layer, he said he could not see the runway yet but looked over and saw the beacon. They were cleared for the approach and to land. At that time, he noted it "looked like a normal downwind" and they flew past the normal approach fix and started the turn. The captain asked to extend the line in the flight management system (FMS) so he had a reference. The FO stated that the captain started commanding a right turn, dialed in 2400 feet final approach fix, and started slowing the aircraft. Once the aircraft got below flaps one, they started to configure for landing. He stated their approach speed was 120kts. They did the enroute checklist. Below the clouds the FO had the navigation system identify the approach frequency for runway 18L. They did turn to final, before landing checklist, rolled out on final at flaps 5, increased flaps, final approach fix, gear down, flaps 20, and then flaps 30, and then verified the before-landing checklist was complete.

The FO felt that on final, the aircraft appeared low visually and he said he pointed this out to the captain. He indicated the glideslope was normal but the deviation bar was off to the left, and visually he felt it appeared low. He said he again noted they were low to which the captain assumed manual control of the aircraft. He said the captain acknowledged, corrected to two red, two white on the precision approach path indicators (PAPIs), and then asked the FO for gear and the start of the landing checklist. He stated he felt something "wasn't right;" that the glideslope seemed right but confirmed that at the time, he was more focused on their altitude. He also said that once the aircraft was being flown manually, his workload as the pilot monitoring and in readying the aircraft for landing, increased. The FO stated the captain said, the "glideslope was not coincident with ILS." He reiterated that the crew was on a visual approach and that they were on the PAPIs, but that he did not recall hearing a callout for which runway they were lined up for, nor did he see approach lights. He stated when the aircraft landed, there was a callout for 3,000 feet [of runway] remaining and they were over 100kts which was his first indication that something was wrong. He stated they activated the thrust reversers and when the aircraft stopped, the captain verbalized they were on the wrong runway. The crew then proceeded to contact air traffic control to notify them of the aircraft's status, and to await further taxi instructions. FO Sauerland stated this was his second time to Tulsa as a pilot with FedEx and his first time being paired with the captain. He stated that he felt it was "a pretty routine trip" other than the 3-4 hours of sleep he did not get in IND. He did not get a lot of sleep in AFW because he couldn't get to sleep. He said he would not have flown being fatigued. He did not feel tired on the incident flight because it was a quick flight, and he was very busy doing calculations and running performance numbers.

When asked to elaborate on the runway awareness and advisory system (RAAS) callouts, FO Sauerland said that typically when the aircraft is within 750 ft of the runway,

they will receive callouts indicating they are approaching "runway x." He stated that "I may have been tired but I didn't hear it. I also don't remember seeing other runway lights. I don't know that I heard anything." When asked if he tends to listen for left versus right in the annunciators, he said that he does listen for the distinction, and that the callouts are "very distinguished and clear." He then stated that "what I am unsure of is if I was task saturated to the point I just didn't hear it." He said he did not know if he would have been able to pick up the difference between the auditory 18L/18R. He said that his workload at the time, he was not really listening to RWY L/R, he was focused outside the aircraft on altitude.

When asked if he communicated with the captain about the runway lights, FO Sauerland said "no" and that it was something he remained frustrated about. He stated his expectation was to see the runway and he had, that he did not take a full scope, and that he was focused on them being low. When asked about what it would take for him to initiate a go-around, he stated "I am asking myself the same [question]." He said that he believed they had fixed the issue with being too low, but that he did not pick up on the issue with the flight director.

When asked about the overall safety culture at FedEx, FO Sauerland stated the company did a good job of managing pilot safety and he would rate it an 8 or 9 [on a 10-point scale]. FedEx' training was such that if he felt the need to call a go-around, he was able, and the company would not question or fault him for that action. He felt "you could do what you needed to do" and there be no punitive action. He said his interactions with FedEx' safety management system (SMS) was from a training perspective when they redid their crew resource management (CRM). Regarding FedEx' flight operational quality assurance (FOQA) program, he said that he had used it in the past and had received written feedback once the FOQA team went through the incident and it was debriefed. He stated he liked the aviation safety action program (ASAP) because "it allows users to input stuff without worrying..." and that "you get the god's honest truth." He said he felt FedEx gets good data from the ASAP because it is more honest data and that he had previously submitted a report on three different occasions at FedEx and once at United Airlines. In addition, He stated that FedEx has a "no harm, no foul" fatigue policy and that "you just have to say you are tired and they will accommodate."

Interview concluded at 1047 CDT

Interviewee: Captain Jeffrey Louis Crow
Representative: Eric Iverson – Senior Labor Relations Council, ALPA

Date/Time: June 10, 2022 / 1059 CDT
Location: 3131 Democrat Rd, Memphis, TN, Conference Room C-202
Present: Dujuan Sevillian, Ph.D. (NTSB), Shawn Etcher (NTSB), Sabrina Woods, Ph.D. (NTSB), Todd Johnson (FedEx), John “Max” Clark (FedEx Airline Pilots Association), James Hobart (FAA)

During the interview Captain Crow, stated the following:

He stated that he was a 57-years-old captain that flew the 757 at FedEx, since March 5, 2012. Based in Memphis, TN. He was a captain for 3 years and a line pilot. He had an air transport pilot (ATP) with a commercial airplane single engine land (ASEL)

He had greater than 10,000 hours of total flight time and about 3,000 hours in the 757 with about 800 hours as a captain. He had a first class medical, and January 2022 was his most recent training event. His could not recall his last line check but thought it was in 2022.

Went to the Air Force and was a 1987-1988 graduate and flew KC135 AWACS¹ and 707 for 20 years, went to the airlines, then went to North American and then came to FedEx with 7 years on the Airbus.

He said that his show time was about 1848 PT and flew to Fort Worth Alliance Airport (AFW) which was an unremarkable flight, and everything was normal. He arrived in AFW, had dinner, and was unable to sleep. He briefed the flight to Tulsa International Airport (TUL) and flew to TUL. It was “great until the very end.”

The crew had a plane change and he tried to lay down in the sleep room, and after about 30 minutes he knew, he was not going to get some sleep. So, he got up and when the first officer (FO) came out of the sleep room he asked if he got sleep. The FO said he was tired but not to the point of unsafe.

The captain said he pushed back 7-8 minutes early he was the pilot flying for the incident flight. The captain started the trip in Indianapolis International Airport (IND) he felt the FO was an outstanding FO. They departed on 16L “purple 3” departure and got a right hand turn with direct to the destination. They climbed to FL310² briefed the descent and the expected approach and then started down.

¹ Airborne Warning and Control System.

² A level of constant atmospheric pressure related to a reference datum of 29.92 inches of mercury, stated in three digits that represent hundreds of feet. Source Aeronautical Information Manual “Pilot/Controller Glossary.” FL310 is the height above mean sea level (msl) at standard atmospheric pressure measured in hundreds of feet (i.e., FL310 is about 31,000 feet msl).

While descending into TUL they set up a point 30 miles from TUL for 11,000 feet for VNAV³. Talked about the approach, minimums and briefed as a visual backed up by the ILS⁴. The FO did the landing data and they both independently verified the data. He thought the Vref was 123 knots. He briefed the approach lights but did not verify it visually when on final. The lights for runway 8/26 were normal. He had been to TUL at least a hundred times and had recently flown to TUL about 2 weeks prior. He could not recall if he tuned the approach [frequency].

The head-up-display (HUD) has a localizer like an horizontal situation indicator (HSI). Initially the HUD was showing slightly off to left. In hindsight it would have been a cue to put that point with the runway, it was not a strong enough cue to alert. The nav display was on the smallest scale.

Initially, when the flight was on the glideslope it was low on the VASI⁵ and he transitioned visually to the VASI and intercepted the visual glidepath, he was focused more on the VASI's. The captain said that he used no autobrakes since he wanted to roll out long he left the autobrakes off. After touchdown, the RAAS⁶ said 3,000 remaining. The RAAS is supposed to announce when approaching the runway and it is loud enough. He came on the brakes and came on them harder initially because he was confused. After rolling out he looked at the buildings and stated "yep, we landed on the wrong side."

When asked if the airplane's light shine far enough to illuminate the painted runway numbers, he stated he thought they did but it was nothing he typically looked at.

He said he was on the "dog leg to final" when he turned off the autopilot and asked the FO to speed follow him. He asked the FO to select flaps the 30, which was full flaps.

Descent checklist was done at 18,000 feet, there was an approach checklist which he did on downwind after a good identifier for the localizer frequency, when gear down flaps 20 before landing checklist.

He said that, although he and the FO were tired, there was no point that the flight was unsafe to fly. If they do call in fatigue, they call the duty officer and they are given a hotel. They do have a fatigue report but no repercussions.

Starting Sunday night, he said he was at home went to bed at 2300 CDT got up at 0400 CDT went to the airport to deadhead to IND. Got to the hotel took a nap, went to dinner, went to bed at 2000 EDT⁷, woke at 0100 EDT as he had a 0225 EDT showtime

³ Vertical Navigation.

⁴ Instrument Landing System.

⁵ Visual Approach Slope Indicator.

⁶ Runway Awareness Advisory System.

⁷ Eastern daylight time.

He flew to Ontario International Airport (ONT) got to hotel about 0545 PDT⁸ had breakfast went to bed about 0700 PDT, got up about 1300 PDT. He went for a walk and had an In-N-Out burger before their showtime at 1848 PDT, on the 7th. Flew from ONT to AFW and had sleep rooms there went and tried to take a nap but not able to fall asleep.

He stated that the company had an ASAP⁹ program and he had submitted about 2-3 in 2022. The report was filled out online and goes to the ERC and if expected they do the investigation, if they need anything they will contact him but otherwise will provide feedback.

There were no issues with the auditory of the RAAS and thought it was "loud enough you would hear it." It comes through the overhead speaker, "when I do hear it, it has always told me the runway I expect to hear." I don't remember hearing anything this time.

On landing rollout tower said taxi to the end and taxi to the ramp, which was what would be expected if on runway 18L. After they stopped, they informed the tower and were given instructions from 18R. When the RAAS went off the captain stated they landed on the right side. Once they stopped, he verified that they landed on the right side.

As soon as the nose came down, the speed brake deployed, and he deployed the thrust reverser. When RAAS said 3000 feet he came on the brakes hard because he was confused and did not want to runoff the runway fast.

He said he was fit for flight and that he takes three medications, which he disclosed on his FAA medical certificate. He and the FO got along very well, they met at the hotel in the IND and got to know each other, as they had never flown with each other previously. The FO did it all very well and he felt there would be nothing for him to work on.

He said that he always lands in the touchdown zone, on this flight he landed about 1,500 ft down the runway. He was sure, if there was a required callout, they do call it out. They did get GS capture, but they did not capture the localizer. He never turned off his flight director.

He started in IND flew to ONT and then ONT to AFW and then to TUL. On this trip it would have been the last leg that was IND to Salt Lake City International Airport (SLC) and last month it was IND to Rickenbacker.

⁸ Pacific daylight time.

⁹ Aviation Safety Action Program.

He was about 2 miles from OWASO and put a dog leg in there to make it easier. The last time he looked at the Nav Display was after he spun the heading and he saw the runway lights.

He stated that the RAAS was helpful.

He said that he gets paid for fatigue calls.

He stated that before the approach they did an approach briefing, which included altitude, minimums, missed approach point, minimum safe altitude for the sector they are coming in from. The glideslope was 2.75 degrees with MALSR¹⁰ and PAPI¹¹ on the left if IFR and brief the minimums.

He said it was a single controller in the air traffic control tower.

He said he turned off the weather radar on down-wind.

He stated that the HUD was easy to see through for him and he did not pay attention to the glideslope because they were on a visual approach.

The HUD would have showed that he would have been to the right of the localizer. There are stable approach criteria. When on a visual approach it does not matter what the localizer was saying. At the time of the incident, he was focused on the visual to the runway. When they were descending, he captured the glidepath about 6 miles from the airport which took him too low on the PAPIs.

He said that the FMA¹² shows up on the HUD.

He said that the lights at the airport have different settings and that he never landed on 18R before. The lights for runway 18R were significantly brighter than runway 8/26 but he did not see the lights to runway 18L.

When asked if he knew the distance between runways 18R and 18L, he was not sure and had to reference the airport chart to estimate the distance.

Interview concluded at 1206.

¹⁰ Medium Intensity Approach Light System with Runway Alignment Indicator Lights.

¹¹ Precision Approach Path Indicator.

¹² Flight mode annunciator.