DCA21FA174

MAINTENANCE RECORDS

Group Chair's Factual Report – Attachment 7

Rhoades Aviation and Federal Aviation Administration Interviews

December 16, 2022

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174

Interview of: AARON "MICHAEL" JERNIGAN
Lead Aircraft Technician
Rhoades Aviation

Honolulu, Hawaii

Tuesday,
September 21, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Specialist
National Transportation Safety Board

POCHOLO CRUZ, Investigator, Maintenance Group Chair
National Transportation Safety Board

STEPHEN MUSE, Aviation Safety Inspector - Maintenance
Federal Aviation Administration

DANIEL MARCOTTE, Air Safety Investigator
Boeing

RONALD LENHART, Chief Inspector
Transair

HANK CHIAO, Senior Field Representative
Pratt & Whitney

ANTHONY DiCIOCCIO, Senior Manager, Customer Technical Services
Pratt & Whitney
(Via telephone)

COREY WRIGHT, Attorney
Wilson Elser
(Representative on behalf of Mr. Jernigan)

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I N T E R V I E W

(8:05 a.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. So today is September 21, 2021. It is local time 8:05 a.m. And my name is William Bramble. I'm a human performance investigator with the NTSB. I'm assisting the maintenance working group for accident investigation number DCA21FA174, involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810, led by NTSB investigator Pocholo Cruz.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I'd like to now have Mr. Cruz and each of the maintenance group members briefly introduce themselves.

Mr. Cruz.

MR. CRUZ: I'm Pocholo Cruz. I'm the maintenance group chairman for this investigation.

MR. MUSE: I'm Stephen Muse. I work at the Honolulu CMO, aircraft maintenance. I'm a aircraft maintenance inspector.

MR. CHIAO: Hank Chiao, with Pratt & Whitney.

MR. LENHART: Ron Lenhart, chief inspector, Rhoades Aviation.

MR. MARCOTTE: I'm Dan Marcotte from Boeing air safety investigation.

DR. BRAMBLE: And we'll introduce you in one second.

Okay. Is there -- oh, and one additional thing. I think there's a stand-in for the regular group member from Pratt & Whitney who couldn't be here today. And I believe the --

MR. CHIAO: Tony.

DR. BRAMBLE: I'm sorry. Tony, yeah Tony, the guy that's on the phone.

MR. CHIAO: Tony's on the phone.

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. So the plan is to have Tony, the regular maintenance group member, listen in on the phone, but I believe it's only going to be Hank that's going to be asking the questions; is that correct?

So are you okay with Tony being present by telephone?

MR. JERNIGAN: Yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. And -- all right. Anything else on that? Good.

Okay. Is there anybody that you object to being present for this interview?

MR. JERNIGAN: Uh-uh.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Okay. Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview we'll send that recording out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to review the transcription to correct it for any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our role is not to

assign any fault. We're here simply for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, however, we can't offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity. A transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the docket for this accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time and everyone's been instructed not to interrupt the person who's asking questions at the time. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person's had a turn. Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so. And if you realize you misstated something or want to correct something, please do.

You're entitled to have a representative of your choosing. Is there someone here that you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. JERNIGAN: Corey.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Corey, please identify yourself for the transcriptionist.

MR. WRIGHT: Certainly. Corey Wright with the law firm of Wilson Elser, here on behalf of the witness today.

DR. BRAMBLE: Thank you.

Okay. And Corey, as previously discussed, I believe with the investigator in charge, you can direct the witness to not answer a question, you can take a short break to confer with the witness if

you wish, but if you would please refrain from answering any questions the witness will be asked.

MR. WRIGHT: Understood.

DR. BRAMBLE: Does anyone have any questions?

MR. JERNIGAN: Yeah. So you said that this is going to end up in a public docket. That means anybody can get their hands on the transcript?

DR. BRAMBLE: Yes. Eventually it will be in --

MR. JERNIGAN: The news.

DR. BRAMBLE: Well, it will be in a large compendium of documentation but available to the public, yeah. So it's not a confidential conversation. Any other questions?

(No response.)

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. If everyone's ready, we'll begin. Mr. Cruz is going to begin with the first questions.

INTERVIEW OF AARON "MICHAEL" JERNIGAN

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. Aaron, please state your name and how it's spelled for the record.

A. My name is Aaron Michael Jernigan, A-a-r-o-n, M-i-c-h-a-e-l, J-e-r-n-i-g-a-n.

Q. Okay. And your date of birth, Aaron?

A. July 24, 1976.

Q. What certificates or ratings or licenses do you hold?

A. I am a certificated mechanic. I have an engine run and taxi,

a part -- engine run and taxi, and inspection, parts inspection certificate.

Q. Okay. And I guess briefly describe your professional background.

A. I've been a A&P since 2008. I've worked at a number of aircraft repair and maintenance. I worked for Go! Airlines, I worked for Hawaiian Airlines, I worked at ATAC (indiscernible), and now I'm at Rhoades.

Q. Okay. Is that all here in Hawaii?

A. Yes, all here in Hawaii.

Q. Okay. And how long have you been with Rhoades Aviation?

A. Approximately 5½ years.

Q. Five and a half years. Okay. And your current position or title with the company?

A. Lead aircraft technician.

Q. And as a lead aircraft technician, what are your duties and responsibilities in your current position?

A. Maintain aircraft, first and foremost, lead other mechanics as far as teaching, and assigning data tests.

Q. Okay. And since you've been here for about 5½ years, have you had any commendations or awards for any performance that you --

A. No.

Q. No. Okay. Have you had any reprimands regarding your performance while at Rhoades?

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Can you please expound?
A. Most recently I've had my RII and airworthiness release, they both were suspended.
Q. Okay. And when you say most recently, how recent?
A. In the last 3 months.
Q. Three months. And was there a reason given to you why that was suspended?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you please explain further?
A. I missed a sign-off and our CMT caught it.
Q. Okay. Is there a way that you can get your certifications back?
A. Yes.
Q. And what did they tell you, you needed to do?
A. Wait out the 180 days.
Q. Okay. Wait 180 days? Is there any training, retraining involved?
A. Yes. I had -- well, I had previously remedial training for RII.
Q. Okay. Was that inside the company?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And who keeps your records here at the company with regard to training records? Who keeps your training records at the company?

A. I believe it's the inspection department.
Q. Okay. Have you ever been terminated from a previous company?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And can you explain, please?
A. I was terminated at Hawaiian Airlines and I was terminated at ATAC.
Q. Okay. Is there a reason for your termination?
A. Hawaiian Airlines, I was terminated for -- there were not enough openings for the amount of mechanics that they had, and I was on probation, so --
Q. Okay.
A. And at ATAC I was terminated because I did not get along with my supervisor.
Q. Okay. So are you a full-time employee with Rhoades?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And what are the shifts and hours that you typically work?
A. I work day shift and I work 40 hours a week.
Q. Day shift, 40 hours a week. Okay. And is it typically -- what are your typical tasks and who determines what you do typically on a typical day?
A. Who determines what I do is usually the assistant DOM. Typical tasks would be assigning the work -- or determining what we need to put out on the schedule and then assign those different tasks.

Q. Okay. And typically -- you said you're a lead mechanic, so how many people do you lead as a lead mechanic per shift?
A. Typically on my shift there could be three or four A&Ps and two or three non-A&Ps.
Q. Two or three A&Ps and then an additional two or three non-A&Ps, right?
DR. BRAMBLE: I think he said three and four A&Ps.
MR. JERNIGAN: Typically three to four A&Ps.
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. Three to four A&Ps. Okay. And do you work with the same people at each shift or no?
A. Yes.
Q. The same people for 80 hours?
A. Well, yes, except for Wednesdays.
Q. What's special about Wednesday?
A. Two day shifts overlap.
Q. Ah. So could you please describe your workload typically on a typical day?
A. I come in the morning, I review logbooks, review write-ups, discuss a plan of action with the other A&Ps, assign who's going to address the write-ups and how they're going to address it, how they're going to troubleshoot it. Assign the daily inspections, try to get a grasp on what part of the daily inspections as far as -- well, what outside of the daily inspections need to be addressed. Also, take a look at our scheduled maintenance list,

our MEL list, and determine what priorities are -- what's due, what's the next due and assign priority to that, and also assign it to an A&P.

Q. Do you just -- do you typically just work on one airplane or how many airplanes that you work on, on a shift?

A. The fleet.

Q. Oh, the fleet? So it's not just one airplane that you guys are working on on your particular shift, it's multiple airplanes?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. So you said your supervisor is typically the assistant DOM?

A. Yes. He's usually the one that (indiscernible).

Q. Okay. So does he work there 7 days a week or is he -- you know, if he's not there, who do you -- who's there to take his place? Is there somebody else?

A. No. I mean, well, if he isn't there, I will go to the DO.

Q. The DO? Okay. So do you see your supervisor every day, every day you're at work?

A. No.

Q. No? Okay. Can you explain, if he's not there or you don't see him every day, how do you know which work needs to be done?

A. Well, that's part of my job, to determine what needs to be done.

Q. Okay. How are you trained to do that?

A. By him.

Q. By assistant DOM?
A. Yes.
Q. So how is your performance evaluated by the assistant DOM? Do you get like a formal performance evaluation or how does that work for you guys at Rhoades?
A. We get a yearly, a yearly evaluation.
Q. Okay. And any commendations, or do you get any bonuses or anything like that based off of your evaluation or how does that work?
A. No bonuses.
Q. No bonuses. Okay. Currently in your job, what is your biggest challenge?
A. Troubleshooting in a timely manner.
Q. Why did you say that?
A. I feel sometimes troubleshooting takes too long.
Q. Does management say something to you about troubleshooting, you're taking too long to troubleshoot or --
A. No.
Q. Are you not given -- do you think you're given enough time to troubleshoot?
A. Yes.
Q. But it still takes long?
A. Yeah. They're older aircrafts.
Q. So what happens if you don't finish troubleshooting the airplane prior to it having to go on mission?

A. If it's deferrable, we defer it. If not, it gets grounded.
Q. Okay. Have you ever grounded an airplane?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you cite a -- give us an example of when you did that?
A. We had a light that wouldn't extinguish for navigation and it wasn't deferrable, so we grounded it.
Q. Okay. Have you ever had to deal with chronic issues on an airplane?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you explain the procedure on how you were dealing with chronic issues on the airplane?
A. If they're continually troubleshooting and unable to fix it, we try to get it fixed within the deferral time period. And sometimes a plane continues to fly, but other times it comes back to the home base and we try to work on it. Sometimes it takes the full MEL (indiscernible) before it's found and -- or even if we had to get an extension for that MEL.
Q. Okay. Is there a number that the company has that says if it hits within 3 days, then it becomes chronic and you guys do a certain thing to it? Or is there such a thing? Is there such a thing as a chronic procedure, how to deal with it?
A. Well, I don't know what -- at what point do you call it chronic?
Q. A repetitive issue every other flight, every flight, every 3 days. Is there something in the Rhoades Aviation procedure that

tells you that if this issue reoccurs every four flights, every five flights, I don't know, you know tell me, is there something -- a procedure in place that determines when an issue becomes too repetitive and you see it more often than not?

A. I think what we do is call it a MEL procedure, so -- a MEL procedure, yeah, if it's 3 days -- 3 days.

Q. Okay. Have you ever had to extend an MEL?

A. Yes.

Q. How often? Or how many times are allowed to extend the MEL?

A. As far -- the best of knowledge we have one extension.

Q. Over-the-line extension? Okay. And what's your typical procedure for extending an MEL?

A. Typically I discuss it with the assistant DOM and then make a logbook entry, and we'll have permanent entries for an extension as far as the MEL trackers and MEL lists, you know, and --

Q. Are you the one that updates the MEL extension or is it the assistant DOM?

A. Updates the MEL extension as far as what? I mean --

Q. MEL listing or anything like that?

A. That'd be the A&P.

Q. The A&P does that? Is there a logbook that they -- in the maintenance shop or anything like that, that has a running list of all the MELs that are open?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. What concerns are occupying your working hours

recently? What concerns do you have recently in working?
A. How recently?
Q. Last couple days, 2 or 3 days, week?
A. No concerns. We're not flying. We're running out of work to do.
Q. Okay. That's what I was going to ask. What tasks -- since you guys aren't flying, what are you doing at work?
A. Visual inspections on our aircraft as far as just doing walkarounds, and we also do a weekly engine run for parked aircraft and extended parked aircraft. So we do both, that inspection. We do the AD that we're allowed to do. We assisted with a modification that was per an AD. That's about it.
Q. And that typically takes -- you're saying -- do you have work for 8 hours typically now that you guys aren't flying?
A. It is challenging to keep ourselves busy for 8 hours.
Q. Okay. What's the most satisfying aspect of your job right now?
A. Right now? The fact that I have a job.
Q. That's the most satisfying? But currently working for Rhoades or anything like that?
A. Top of my head, just still being able to turn a wrench.
Q. Okay. Fair enough. So if you could change anything about your job, what would it be?
A. If I could change anything about Rhoades or the whole aspect --

Q. Rhoades, aspect, your job, what would it be?
A. Our CMT.
Q. And explain why.
A. My personal opinion, you know, we didn't deserve to be grounded.
Q. Okay. Is it a personal issue with the CMT or is it the way he handles Rhoades Aviation that's the issue for you?
A. For me, I just feel that we're not getting a fair shake.
Q. Okay. That's what I was going to ask, if you think you're getting a fair shake from the CMT?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Okay. Have you had any issues specifically with that CMT?
A. I have not.
Q. Okay. Just in general is what you're saying? Okay.
How often do you see the FAA, since we're talking about the FAA, around Rhoades? Like let's say the past 6 months?
A. Once a week.
Q. So they come once a week? What do they do when you see them? Do you know?
A. Talk to my superiors.
Q. Okay. Do they talk to mechanics -- to you or the mechanics as well, or what?
A. They have not spoken to me.
Q. No? Okay. So I'd like to talk about how you were selected for your job as a lead mechanic. How long before you became the

lead mechanic since you started there?
A. About 2 years.
Q. Two years, and then you became a lead mechanic?
A. The time I started at Rhoades to the time I became a lead?
Q. Yeah.
A. About 2 years.
Q. Two years?
A. Roughly.
Q. And so how were you selected to become the lead mechanic? Did you apply for it? Was there an opening? How does that work?
A. It was called a working interview.
Q. Okay. So it was open to all the mechanics and everybody could apply for a lead mechanic?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did you receive any training to become a lead mechanic?
A. Formal training, yeah.
Q. Okay. What was it?
A. It was explained to me what my job duties and responsibilities were.
Q. Was that a big change from being a regular mechanic to a lead mechanic?
A. Yeah. I believe so.
Q. Did it entail more hours or more prep for you as a lead mechanic? Or why would you say that, it was more?

A. Well, I believe I have more responsibilities as far as prepping the day or projecting maintenance coming up and assigning duties and making sure those assignments were completed on time and correctly.
Q. Okay. Is there somebody that comes behind you that checks your work?
A. Yeah.
Q. And who would that be?
A. Assistant DO.
Q. Okay. So is all that stuff checked before you leave shift or after or when is it done? Or before airworthiness release or when does that all happen?
A. It's usually done before he goes home, and we talk -- we have a discussion about what's going on and what needs to be finished and how -- the product that we (indiscernible).
Q. Okay. And with all that, I know you only work -- is it typically 8 hours for you guys or 10, or how often do you guys work?
A. Ten hours.
Q. Okay. And is there -- what type of turnover is there? What kind of procedure -- turnover procedures are there?
A. We have a written turnover.
Q. Okay. And that's given to who on the next shift? Do you guys work three shifts a day or two shifts a day, or how does that work?

A. Two shifts.
Q. Two shifts. No midnight, just swings? Mornings and swings?
A. There's a day and night.
Q. Oh, day and night. Okay. When's the last time you had training -- Rhoades provided training for you?
A. Two months.
Q. And what was the training?
A. Remedial RII training.
Q. Oh, okay. Is that something you had to ask for or is that an annual thing?
A. It's annual.
Q. Annual. Are there other subjects besides that that's annual?
A. Yes.
Q. What -- do you recall what those are?
A. Airworthiness, engine run and taxi.
Q. Have you ever had formal Pratt & Whitney engine training?
A. You mean like sitting next to a Pratt & Whitney representative and -- no.
Q. Or have a class from Pratt & Whitney?
A. No.
Q. Did the company ever offer such a thing?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Okay.
MR. JERNIGAN: Can I use the restroom real quick?
MR. CRUZ: Oh, sure. Yeah.

(Off the record.)

(On the record.)

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. We're back on the record at 8:36.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. Has the company ever offered you or any mechanics basically engine or system maintenance training or airplane maintenance training in house?

A. Are you talking about from a rep or from Boeing or Pratt --

Q. Yeah. Yes.

A. -- or are you talking about Rhoades training?

Q. Both. Both Rhoades and also are you given the opportunity to get outside training?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Can you explain how that --

A. Well, I've had NDT training.

Q. Okay.

A. And I've also had in-house GENFAM and training on the engines in the Boeing aircraft.

Q. Okay. What about manual and procedure training; do you get that? Is that a yearly thing with Rhoades or is that -- does every mechanic get that or not get that or --

A. Initially we did that at indoc.

Q. Oh, just indoc, that's it? There's no recurrent training every year for procedures or any changes in procedures or anything like that?

A. I believe that's more ongoing. It's a daily and a weekly training that we just -- it's either discussed at our maintenance meetings or discussed as part of my job to help other A&Ps with their logbooks and their --

Q. Okay. Do you have any -- as a lead mechanic, before a shift, do you guys have like a daily briefing of what's going to happen? Do you call your crew together or how does that work?

A. Yes.

Q. You do have that before a shift starts, as far as what needs to be done and who's going be assigned to who?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Have you felt that you needed to ask for more training to do your job?

A. No.

Q. Does management ever give the mechanics any type of briefings or anything like that?

A. Yes.

Q. How often?

A. Once a week.

Q. Once a week? Is that at a certain time every day?

A. Yes.

Q. And is it done for each shift since there's two shifts, day and night? Is there one in the day and one at night?

A. No. It's just days.

Q. Just days? So what happens to the night shift? Do they get

anything?
A. They get turnover of the notes.
Q. Oh, get a turnover of the notes.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you have a counterpart that's a senior mechanic at night then?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And how many senior mechanics -- I don't even know. I need to ask you that.
A. Well, there are two leads.
Q. Okay. And when you say lead, is that considered senior mechanic?
A. I believe so.
Q. Okay. During those briefings, what subjects are covered typically?
A. I don't believe there's a typical briefing.
Q. Nothing like procedure issues or changes or anything like that with the way Rhoades conducts business?
A. I think all subjects are -- anything and all subjects that are pertinent are discussed.
Q. Okay. Are there issues that mechanics bring up to management, and what are they, if you know, and how do they typically respond?
A. I don't -- issues as far as -- can you clarify what you mean by issues?

Q. Yeah. Like if there's certain things that mechanics, that they see that could be done better, are they brought up to management? What does management do with that information?
A. Yeah. I believe management receives it and then discusses it and comes up with a plan of attack and implements.
Q. Okay. Is there an example you can cite?
A. Not off the top of my head.
Q. Okay. Has management ever told you or suggested to any mechanics anything with regards to writing things up in general as far as discrepancies are concerned?
A. I'm not sure what you mean.
Q. Have they mentioned anything to mechanics with regards to not writing up discrepancies on an airplane?
A. As far as -- you're asking me -- just to clarify, you're asking me has management ever said to us to leave something out of the logbook?
Q. Correct.
A. No.
Q. No. Okay. Are you familiar with a nonroutine worksheet and a nonroutine control worksheet? They're basically Forms 1401 and 1402.
A. Not off the top of my head.
Q. Okay. I was curious whether you saw those. Per your GMM, there's two nonroutine worksheet forms that you have in your procedures to fill out. So you're not familiar with that? You've

never filled out a nonroutine worksheet form?
A. I believe I have, but nothing comes to mind right now.
Q. Okay. How would you characterize your relationship, maintenance relationship with the pilots?
A. In general?
Q. Yes.
A. It's hard to say. The department relationships or my relationships?
Q. Both, personal with the pilots and departmental.
A. I think departmental is professional.
Q. Okay. Personal?
A. Relationship, professional.
Q. Okay. Do pilots verbally complain about maintenance issues with the airplanes?
A. Are you asking if they verbally express an issue with the aircraft verbally to maintenance or are you asking --
Q. Yes.
A. Yes, they have.
Q. Okay. Do they complain that maintenance isn't fixing the issue?
A. To maintenance?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And how do you react, or cite an example of something that happened most recently about it?

A. How do I react?
Q. Cite an example where a pilot complained to maintenance --
A. Verbally?
Q. -- verbally about an issue.
A. He's asked to put in the logbook and we address it.
Q. Okay. So that -- typically that's what happens, is that maintenance basically tells -- you told pilots to put it in the logbook and we'll address it at that time; is that correct?
A. Say if they have an issue with their aircraft, put it in the logbook.

MR. CRUZ: All right. I'll stop for now.

Bill?

DR. BRAMBLE: Thanks.

Michael, do you need a break or --

MR. JERNIGAN: No. I'm good.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Cool.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. Since you're the first from the maintenance department, there's a couple of just sort of general questions about maintenance that we don't know.

How many other lead mechanics are there? You said two. Are there --

A. Officially two total, myself and one other.
Q. And how many RIIs do you guys have?
A. I don't know the answer to that.

Q. Okay. And -- I may have a few pauses because I have to kind of check and see which of my questions have already been answered, so -- I don't want to ask you the same stuff over again.

Do you supervise anyone?

A. Yes.

Q. And who is that? Like what kind of positions do you supervise?

A. Well, just the A&Ps and non-A&Ps. I don't supervise sheet metal or tire shop.

Q. Okay. Do you write their performance appraisals or are you just typically directing them during shift?

A. Wait. That's two different questions.

Q. Yeah. I'm wondering -- well, let me start with the first part. Do you write their performance appraisals?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And I think you already stated that you kind of direct them on shift in terms of the tasks and so forth?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. You mentioned that you work 40 hours a week and I think you said during the day. Do you also work at night?

A. No.

Q. When are those hours during the day that you typically work?

A. I typically work from 8:30 to 7 -- 8:30 a.m. to 7 p.m.

Q. All right. Were you on duty the night -- or I guess you wouldn't have been on duty the night of the accident?

A. No.
Q. Okay. Were you on duty during the daytime preceding that night when the accident occurred?
A. I don't know what day that was.
Q. July 2.
A. No, but what day it was.
Q. Oh, you mean day of the week?
A. Yes.
MR. CRUZ: Friday.
MR. JERNIGAN: Then I was not working the day preceding it.
BY DR. BRAMBLE:
Q. And how well do you know Captain Henry Okai?
A. I've worked with him for -- since he came on board.
Q. What kind of person is he?
A. Generally a nice, a nice guy.
Q. And did he get along with the mechanics in the maintenance department?
A. I'd say yes.
Q. When was your last interaction with him before the accident?
A. I don't remember.
Q. And how about First Officer Greg Ryan? How well did you know him?
A. About the same.
Q. And what kind of a -- what kind of guy is he?
A. He's likeable.

Q. Did he get along with the mechanics in the maintenance department?
A. I believe so. Yes.
Q. Your last interaction with him before the accident, do you recall when that was?
A. No.
Q. All right. Let's talk about the accident airplane. Were you aware before the accident of anything unusual about the condition of the airplane?
A. No.
Q. Did it have any open maintenance items that you're aware of?
A. I only recall one MEL.
Q. Do you remember what that was?
A. I can't remember if it was actually still an MEL or -- I think it was a fuel quantity indication.
Q. Was there a problem with the fuel quantity indication?
A. I believe it was -- the write-up said it was inaccurate at some flights.
Q. Okay. Do you recall what had been done to address that issue?
A. Yeah. Some parts, yeah.
Q. Some parts?
A. I don't know of everything that was attempted to resolve that issue.
Q. Okay. Anything that you can recall?

A. I know we swapped indicators. I believe we tried to check the reliability of the indicators as far as sticking the tanks. I believe there may have been a power supply -- fuel indication power supply change.

Q. Okay. Anything else?

A. I believe the indicator was changed more than once. That's about it, that I can recall.

Q. Which tank did that apply to, do you remember?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Do you remember if that airplane had a history of any recurring maintenance problems?

A. No.

Q. No repeated write-ups that can you remember?

A. Well, I mean, how recent?

Q. Let's say within the last 6 months before the accident, I mean to the best of your recollection.

A. Not repeated, no.

Q. Okay. Are you aware of any issues with the airplane's engines in the weeks before the accident?

A. No.

Q. Have you heard anything about issues with high EGT indications on its engines during takeoffs with the rate of thrust?

A. No.

Q. No? So we heard from some pilots that they were observing

EGT indications routinely going up to the yellow range on the gauge or just slightly into the yellow range during takeoff. And I was wondering --

A. On 810?

Q. Yeah, on 810. Yeah. And I was wondering, if that was the case and somebody informed you about that, would that give you cause for concern about the health of the engines?

A. You're saying hypothetically would it give me?

Q. Yeah, just based on your knowledge of the engines, since I'm not an engine expert.

A. The first write-up, no. If there were multiple write-ups, then I'd start questioning the health of the engines.

Q. Okay. Why? Why would you be concerned if there were multiple write-ups?

A. I just believe that as far as the engine goes, when they start -- temperatures begin to rise for the same parameters, that there may be degradation of health to those engines.

Q. Have you ever seen that happen with any other airplanes before?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me more about that? Like how you found out and what happened?

A. We started to receive lots of repeated write-ups for warmer engine temps. And most of the inspections that we perform do not lead to anything until we do the borescope inspection.

Q. Which aircraft was that?
A. I want to -- I'm not 100 percent sure, but it wasn't 810.
Q. What did you find in the borescope inspection?
A. I believe it was a C7 disk found damaged.
Q. And what was the corrective action?
A. They changed that engine. They sent it in for overhaul.
Q. Do you recall roughly when that was?
A. I'd like to say a year and a half, maybe 2 years.
Q. And since then, have you observed any other or had reports of similar symptoms from other engines?
A. No. Not that I can recall.
Q. Okay. Before the accident, had you heard about any problems with hydraulic fluid leaking from the main landing gear wheel well on the accident airplane?
A. No.
Q. All right. All right, let's talk about some general maintenance issues. How confident are you about the quality of maintenance at Rhoades Aviation?
A. As far as like -- I'm confident on it, yeah.
Q. You feel confident? Okay. So in the course of our interviews with the pilots, we had a report from one pilot who told us that you had said that you refused to fly on the company's airplanes. Is that true?
A. No.
Q. Do you have any idea why somebody would say that?

A. Because I have a fear of flight.
Q. Okay. So your -- you have sort of a generalized fear of flying?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that like a lifelong thing or something related to a particular incident while you worked here, or --
A. No. It was developed at a teenager.
Q. Okay. Are you aware of maintenance log write-ups being coded "F" for flight crew maintenance item or "I" for informational item?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you see that sometimes in logbooks?
A. Yes.
Q. How often do you see "I" items, or did you before the accident? How often did you see those?
A. Not often.
Q. What kinds of issues did crews tend to write up with the "I" indication?
A. I can't remember exactly, but I believe if it was something that they couldn't describe, like if a light went off and they don't remember which light it was for a system.
Q. Okay. So they have kind of a nonspecific understanding of the problem?
A. Correct.
Q. And then how would maintenance typically address an "I" item?

A. We address it as an "F" item.
Q. Okay. So would it follow all the standard procedures and requirements for "F"?
A. Yeah.
Q. Are you aware of any instances of crews being asked to delay write-ups until they get back from a trip rather than before they leave?
A. I'm not aware of maintenance asking them to do that.
Q. Are you aware of anyone else asking them to do that?
A. No.
Q. Are you aware of any rejected takeoffs due to crews observing high engine EGT indications during the takeoff roll?
A. I believe there was some reports of that, yeah.
Q. Do you recall how that issue was handled?
A. If I recall correctly, it was because the pilot at the time didn't realize that they are mismatched engines and treated them as if they were matched.
Q. Okay. What's it mean to have a mismatched engine?
A. Like if you have a 15 and a 15A on the same aircraft.
Q. Okay. Was that the case in that particular --
A. I believe that's what -- that's the case that I'm referring to.
Q. And so how would they need to treat them differently if they were not matched?
A. You have -- during the takeoff roll, you'd have to match the

EPR settings; whereas, my understanding, they were matching fuel fill [sic] settings.

Q. Okay. All right. How about cabin pressurization? Are you aware of any recurring issues with cabin pressurization on any of the 73s?

A. Yeah.

Q. Can you elaborate on how long a period of time that might have been ongoing and whether you had any challenges with that?

A. I believe most of those write-ups are generated from the same pilot.

Q. Were you able to identify a cause of an issue -- of the issue?

A. In a number of cases, yes.

Q. Was it one particular airplane or multiple airplanes that had that issue?

A. Well, I think eventually all aircraft have issues with one system or another. But as far as loss of pressurization, there are so many components in that system that eventually the parts fail and, you know, all aircraft will have an issue with pressurization.

Q. And so you had complaints -- or you had write-ups about more than one aircraft dealing with pressurization?

A. I've had pressurization issues with all of our aircraft.

Q. Okay. Are you aware of any in-flight hydraulic system failures, say, in the last year or two?

A. I don't recall specifically, but yes, I believe we have had.
Q. Okay. But the details, you don't recall the details?
A. No, I don't want to speculate. Yeah. I know we have had hydraulic components fail, but right now I don't recall exactly which aircraft and which components.
Q. Okay. So we had a report from one of the pilots that we interviewed that said that this pilot -- this first officer found a damaged circuit breaker behind the FO seat, reported it to a mechanic, and the mechanic asked the captain to write it up when they got back, but the captain didn't write it up and the damage wasn't repaired in a timely fashion. Do you know anything about that incident? Like is there another side to that story or --
A. The only thing I know about circuit breakers behind an FO seat being damaged is why they get damaged, but I wasn't aware of any incident like that.
Q. Okay. Have you ever heard of a flight crew saying that they were afraid of being fired if they wrote up a maintenance issue?
A. No.
DR. BRAMBLE: All right. So that's it for some of the specific maintenance issues that we wanted -- I wanted to drill down on. There's -- I've got a few other topics about sort of generalized safety management and the company culture and so forth. Do you need a break? It's been over an hour.
MR. JERNIGAN: Oh, I just got to use the bathroom again, that's all.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Yeah, let's take a break.

(Off the record.)

(On the record.)

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. We're back on the record at 3- -- or I'm sorry. I cannot -- what time is it? 9:17 a.m.?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yes, sir.

DR. BRAMBLE: 9:17 a.m. Sorry, a 6-hour time change.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. Just in terms of sort of general workplace stuff, how was morale in the maintenance department before the accident occurred?

A. Pretty good.

Q. And did you feel staffing was adequate in the maintenance department?

A. Yeah.

Q. Was pay adequate or at least competitive with the other operators?

A. In my opinion?

Q. Yeah.

A. I don't believe it's -- we're able to compete with the other -- with the big airlines.

Q. Okay. So it's somewhat less than the mechanics at the big airlines get?

A. Pay, no.

Q. What aspect of it is not competitive or not as competitive?

A. In the medical benefits and the flight benefits.
Q. Okay. And how about the quality of the facilities where you perform the maintenance, how would you describe that?
A. Adequate.
Q. Do you feel that you have the equipment and resources you need to effectively do your job?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Any areas where you'd like to see improvements there?
A. Maybe better facilities.
Q. What would a better facility -- how would that help?
A. More room to perform maintenance in a more controlled environment.
Q. Okay. All right. Let's talk about safety management. Before the accident, who was responsible for managing safety at Rhoades Aviation, to your knowledge?
A. You mean as far as the SMS?
Q. Yeah.
A. I believe that falls under the chief inspector.
Q. Okay. Is there a director of safety for the operator?
A. Yes.
Q. Who's that?
A. I believe that's Orlando.
Q. Okay. And was there an accountable executive for the SMS?
A. I don't know.
Q. If you had a safety-related concern before the accident, how

would you communicate that to management?
A. Assistant DOM.
Q. How would you communicate that to him? Like verbally or --
A. Verbally.
Q. Verbally. Okay. Have you ever communicated a safety-related concern to him?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you give me an example?
A. I had a person in the company present a heat source too near a -- in my opinion, too close to a oxygen servicing station.
Q. Okay. What happened as a result of your communicating that?
A. I had to put it in writing, present it to the director of safety, and I believe there was changes made to where the oxygen servicing station was located.
Q. Was that issue resolved to your satisfaction?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you participate in the twice weekly safety meetings?
A. I have.
Q. Are you involved in the company CASS program?
A. No.
Q. Are you familiar with SMS maintenance audits and what they are?
A. Somewhat familiar.
Q. Do you participate in some fashion?
A. No, not unless the auditor is asking a question.

Q. Do you feel that these SMS audits are effective for identifying risks and improving safety?
A. Yeah.
Q. What kind of safety-related communications do you get from the company?
A. Sometimes it comes in the form of a companywide memo, written memo. Sometimes the director of maintenance mandates verbally to the department what he wants addressed or done.
Q. Okay. Do you get a safety-related -- do you get a safety newsletter or anything like that?
A. Not that I've seen, no.
Q. Do you get any kind of regular communications from the safety department?
A. Personally?
Q. Yeah. I mean do you receive it as an employee, like regular communication?
A. No.
Q. All right. Do you feel supported -- in your role as a lead mechanic, do you feel supported by management and able to make safety-related decisions without fear of repercussions?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you feel pressure from company management to do things that you feel are unsafe?
A. No.
Q. Do you have any safety-related -- before the accident, did

you have any safety-related concerns about the company?
A. No, nothing that comes to mind.
Q. And how would you describe the company's organizational safety culture? Are you familiar with that term?
A. I think it's improving.
Q. Say again?
A. I think it's improving.
Q. Okay. And what makes you say that it's improving?
A. Well, they -- we discuss safety a lot more than in years past. The SMS has been brought up in discussions a lot more, and given tips from management on how to be safe has been discussed a lot more.
Q. Who do those tips come from?
A. Typically the DOM or the assistant DOM.
DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Hard to believe, but that's it. That's it for me. Thanks, Michael.
MR. JERNIGAN: Okay.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Mr. Muse?
MR. MUSE: Once again, my name is Stephen. I'm from the FAA. I just have a few questions for you. Can you hear me okay?
MR. JERNIGAN: Yeah.
MR. MUSE: Okay.
BY MR. MUSE:
Q. Would you consider JRAA a hostile work environment?
A. No.

Q. The last one I have, have you ever felt pressured or rushed from your management team to get maintenance tasks accomplished to meet the flight schedule?

A. No. No.

MR. MUSE: Okay. Thank you. That's all I got.

MR. CHIAO: Hank from Pratt Whitney. I do have some questions --

MR. CRUZ: You may need to speak a little bit.

MR. CHIAO: Okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. So we have the recorders down here.

MR. CHIAO: Oh, okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: Your voice has to carry all the way down.

MR. CHIAO: Yeah.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. We know the engine was returned to service from the shop with limited EGT margin. So what was the plan to maintain the engine to ensure it did not exceed?

A. I didn't get all of that. I'm sorry.

Q. We're looking on the shop record, right? We know the engine was returned to service from the shop with limited EGT margin.

DR. BRAMBLE: Ah. So you're saying the engine was returned --

MR. CHIAO: From the shop.

DR. BRAMBLE: From the shop with limited EGT margin.

MR. CHIAO: Yes.

DR. BRAMBLE: And your question is?

MR. CHIAO: Yeah, what was the plan to maintain the engine to ensure the engine was not exceeding in operation?

MR. CRUZ: And what was the plan --

MR. CHIAO: (Indiscernible) operation.

MR. CRUZ: What was the plan to maintain the engine in acceptable margins?

MR. CHIAO: Yes.

MR. JERNIGAN: It was released from the overhaul shop or from our maintenance?

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. From overhaul shop.

A. I believe the plan was to monitor those parameters.

Q. Somebody was aware this (indiscernible)?

A. I'm sorry?

Q. Was somebody from your maintenance aware of this issue?

A. Of?

Q. The low EGT margins from the shop.

DR. BRAMBLE: So your question is, was maintenance aware when the engine was returned that it had low EGT margin?

MR. JERNIGAN: I'm not aware if anybody -- what anyone's knowledge was to that.

MR. CRUZ: Can I ask a real quick question?

DR. BRAMBLE: Oh, we'll get to you, yeah, right after.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Just add on that. Okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: And tell us -- if you can just sort of -- when it goes to the next person, call out their name for the transcriptionist?

MR. CRUZ: Yes. Yes.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. Do you know what is the interval for a BSI on compressor and the hot section?

A. Oh, I'm sorry. What?

MR. CRUZ: What's the --

MR. CHIAO: The interval?

MR. CRUZ: Interval is for the hot section --

MR. CHIAO: Hot section and the compressor.

MR. CRUZ: And the compressor.

MR. JERNIGAN: I don't know, I don't know the time limits on those.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. Okay. How many BSI inspectors you have?

MR. CRUZ: How many VSI [sic] inspections?

MR. JERNIGAN: Vertical speed?

MR. CRUZ: Yes.

MR. CHIAO: Yes.

MR. JERNIGAN: As far as -- what type of inspections are you asking about?

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. I mean for an engine BSI inspector. The BSI inspector --

A. Oh, BSI?
Q. Yes.
A. Or V?
Q. Borescope inspection.
MR. CRUZ: Borescope?
MR. JERNIGAN: Oh, borescope, how many do we have?
MR. CHIAO: Yes.
MR. JERNIGAN: For the JT8s?
MR. CHIAO: Yes.
MR. JERNIGAN: I think those are upon condition. I mean if we have an issue where we believe we need borescope. I'm not aware of any time limits for borescope inspections on JT8s.
BY MR. CHIAO:
Q. Do you know what is the equipment, BSI equipment you are using doing the BSIs?
A. No. I don't do those inspections.
Q. I mean what is it? Do you know what kind of equipment they use doing the BSI?
A. As far as I know, just a borescope. That's all I know.
Q. And how do you check on the SB and the AD status to a part going to the aircraft?
MR. CRUZ: How do you check SB, service bulletins --
MR. CHIAO: Yeah, service bulletins, if there was --
MR. CRUZ: -- and AD status for the part that goes to the aircraft?

MR. JERNIGAN: That would be most of the time -- well, as far as to my knowledge goes, indicated on 8130s. I'm not 100 percent sure.

MR. CRUZ: So he -- I guess he's asking how does Rhoades or you as a mechanic check the service bulletin and the AD parts that are going to the aircraft when it's installed, engine parts? How do you check whether --

MR. JERNIGAN: If the MM says that -- states that this part needs to meet SB such and such, then records department, I believe, gives us a -- whether or not these parts have met those service bulletins.

MR. CRUZ: Okay.

MR. CHIAO: That's it for me. Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: That's it?

All right. Ron?

MR. LENHART: Ron Lenhart, chief inspector. At this time I don't have any questions.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Dan?

MR. MARCOTTE: I'm Dan Marcotte from Boeing.

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. And I just have a couple questions around what you would expect a maintenance inspector to do on a couple logbook items.

A. Okay.

Q. The first one is, if there was a report of back-to-back compressor stalls in cruise and then the airplane lands and flight

crew writes it up, what would you expect a tech to do at that time? What would you think probably -- what do you think he'd do from the time he saw the logbook until he -- a good write-off?
A. Well, typically he would, well, bring the logbook back to me and discuss it with his lead. Refer to the MM or Pratt & Whitney's manual for troubleshooting. Then I'd do the proper inspections based on the description of what he was told and what he can find in the troubleshooting guide of the Pratty & Whitney manual.
Q. Okay. Would he typically write all those first steps in his sign-off? You know, like I troubleshot per AMM?
A. Yeah. On the sign-off it would say, troubleshot per Pratt & Whitney manual or AMM manual; ops check good per this or per that, and then what he found.
Q. For compressor stalls are you aware of any -- or any additional inspections, any Chapter 5 inspections for stalls, surges --
A. No.
Q. The next question, if he had written up backfires, takeoff flight power -- you know, takeoff or land and takeoff where it backfires, what would you think, you know, the tech would think or what would you expect him to do on that write-up?
A. Same procedure, refer to the manuals.
Q. Okay. Would he consider -- would most techs think, if it said backfire, would probably be an indication of a stall? If a

pilot just writes up a backfire?
A. Well, yeah, typically you would assume that the mechanic would come to that -- go towards that conclusion, yeah.
Q. Okay. And my last thing is about oil consumption. You know, you have, what, four, five 737s. You're probably pretty familiar with each airplane. So this airplane -- the event airplane, 810, did you have any opinion on oil consumption on this airplane? Was it using a lot more oil, less oil than typical of the rest of the fleet, or --
A. Not at that time. I don't remember anything that stood out as far as oil consumption.
MR. MARCOTTE: All right. Very good. I think that's it.
MR. CRUZ: That's it? I just have a couple follow-up questions.
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. Have you ever worked any of the backfire or anything like that on any -- on this particular airplane?
A. Backfire, no.
Q. No? No engine issues on this particular airplane?
A. On 810, not that I can recall.
Q. Okay. How about on other airplanes?
A. Yes.
Q. And can you cite the scenario of what the issues were that you found on those airplanes?
A. There's so many.

Q. Cite one of the many.
A. You're asking me --
Q. Like -- you said there was so many, right?
A. Right. So --
Q. So just cite one issue that you found. Any specific one, if you have one that's a low EGT margins or anything like that?
A. I think -- one that comes to mind, we were -- pilot reported a stall, a compression stall and a EGT margin was warmer than he was comfortable with. Upon inspection, I discovered a -- I believe it was a PT7 line that cracked.
Q. Okay. What would entail you to do a borescope on an engine? What were the symptoms that you would need to do a borescope on an engine?
A. I believe -- well, we follow the troubleshooting in a manual and every step that we took made no improvement, as far as going all the way to changing out the interstage bleed valves, where we had to bring someone in for that.
Q. Oh, you had to bring someone in for --
A. From the engine shop. Because we're not -- I don't -- we're not rated to work on internal parts as far as interstage bleed valves.
Q. Okay.
A. And at that point when we discovered the bleed valves were not the source of our problem, we decided it was best to do a borescope inspection. And per the Pratt & Whitney manual, I

believe it said to perform a borescope inspection.
Q. So if you have a compression stall or a backfiring, what I'm hearing from you is you don't necessarily do a borescope on those engines, right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. And you said you farm out what type of work? I'm sorry.
A. That was for interstage bleed valve removal and replacement.
Q. Okay. So you farmed that out to an outside vendor that could do that work?
A. Right.
Q. Do you use Pratt or do you use an outside vendor?
A. An outside vendor.
MR. CRUZ: Okay. I'll defer. I'm done.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. I have just a couple of general closeout questions, but before I do that, do you want to go around and call on everybody again?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No.
MR. CRUZ: Ron?
MR. LENHART: I'm good.
MR. MARCOTTE: I have one I missed.
MR. CRUZ: Okay. Go ahead.
MR. MARCOTTE: Sorry.
MR. CRUZ: Go ahead, Dan.
BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. Sorry. Sorry I missed this before. Just one question on the backfires. There was a report of backfire and then the mechanic, when the airplane came back --

MR. CRUZ: Go ahead.

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. -- when the airplane came back, found that the laminated panels from the inlet were missing. What would you expect that a typical mechanic would do? What would be the expectations for a mechanic when he saw that?

A. Ground the aircraft.

Q. Yeah.

A. Ground the aircraft.

Q. When the airplane was grounded, what type of maintenance do you think would take place?

A. Sheet metal the area and sheet metal department would have to do those repairs or we would change the whole inlet hub.

Q. Okay. Would there be any additional inspections of the engine?

A. Yes. We'd have to make -- you know, make sure that the liner, if it came apart, went through. And if it did, then we have to do a -- usually, I believe, Pratt & Whitney says to do a detailed visual inspection of fan blades and so on.

MR. MARCOTTE: Okay. Thank you.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. One thing I did forget to ask you -- I'm not familiar with

this particular issue, but would like to know what is a mismatched engine? What does it do? What -- can you explain a little bit about mismatch?

A. We're allowed to mismatch engines as far as a JT8 15A and a JT8 15, or 17A and 17. And those engines, the alpha engines' parameters, they perform a lot better than the non-alpha. They're cooler for the same rating, the fan ratings and speed ratings.

Q. So could a mismatched engine cause a backfire or a stall, compression stall or anything like that?

A. The engines themselves, no. But if they're operated incorrectly, then maybe yes.

Q. When you say operated incorrectly, can you explain?

A. If the pilot is not operating those mismatched engines -- if they -- if he's -- I found a lot that some of the pilots match the fuel flow ratings instead of EPR rating. When you have mismatched engines like that, it's always best to match the EPR ratings so your EGTs -- so your knob splits, your throttle splits won't be so -- you know, will be minimal and your EGT margins will be, on a non-alpha, wouldn't be so hot.

Q. Okay. And I'm assuming Pratt & Whitney allows that in their manuals to do it that way?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there a time that in those manuals that you need to make sure that they're matched properly? Like if you use a mismatch, if you had like 2 days, 1 day to try to match it, or they allow

you to just fly it that way?
A. Well, maintenance -- when we mismatch engines, maintenance does a high power run and we match it, we match for all settings and percents before we release aircraft for flight.
Q. Okay. Have you ever heard of pilots playing with the throttles?
A. Yes.
Q. And can you explain what you heard of that?
A. A number of our compression stall issues is because of operator error of pilots moving the throttles too quickly or fluctuating up and down too much.
Q. Do you know during climb, during cruise, during -- what stages of flight? Do you know or --
A. I've witnessed them just coming out of the block.
Q. Just coming out of the block?
A. You can hear the engines spool up too quickly just when you just come out of the -- you just -- you know just by experience you can hear and you can tell that there's a pop coming.
Q. And is it a certain pilot that does that always or is it --
A. Some pilots are more known for compression stalls than --
Q. Some pilots are more known?
A. For compressions stalls, yeah.
Q. Okay. And when you know that's coming, is that something that the pilot would write up?
A. On occasion.

Q. So you've seen cases where they've done that and there's nothing in the logbooks after the fact?
A. No. I always see a write-up for it.
Q. Okay. And with that happening, what do you guys do? How do you fix that? How do you sign off that it was serviced?
A. Well, we do our -- we follow the manuals.
MR. CRUZ: Okay. Okay. That's all I got. Thank you.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Just a couple more follow-ups from me and then we'll close out.
BY DR. BRAMBLE:
Q. Do you feel the quality of the manuals is adequate?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you have any engine specialist mechanics on staff that are sort of more highly trained on the engines than your average mechanic?
A. Yeah.
Q. Who's that?
A. Assistant DOM and the DOM.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. I think that is it for me. I have just a few standard closeout questions. Before I do that, I just want look around and see if anybody else has anything?
Everybody's good. Okay.
All right. Thanks so much for your patience, Michael. I appreciate your time today. Is there anything we haven't asked you about that you'd like to share with us?

MR. CRUZ: It's Aaron, wasn't it?

DR. BRAMBLE: Aaron?

MR. CRUZ: Yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: Oh --

MR. JERNIGAN: Well, I go by Mike, but --

MR. CRUZ: Oh, do you?

MR. JERNIGAN: Yeah.

MR. CRUZ: I -- you said Aaron. That's --

MR. JERNIGAN: Yeah. That's my legal name, but --

MR. CRUZ: I got it. Sorry.

MR. JERNIGAN: No. Not at this time.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. And any safety recommendations pertaining to this case or your workplace in general? Granted, there's limited information about this particular accident, but we always like to give people the opportunity if they have some sort of suggestion that they would like to share.

MR. JERNIGAN: No, not right now. I don't have any.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. And so that concludes the interview. It is 9:48 a.m., and we're off the record.

(Whereupon, at 9:48 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Aaron "Michael" Jernigan
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 21, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Kay Maurer
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

Interview of: DARRYL JOHNSON, A&P Mechanic
Transair

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday,
September 22, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

POCHOLO CRUZ, Maintenance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

STEPHEN MUSE, Aviation Safety Inspector - Maintenance
Federal Aviation Administration

DANIEL MARCOTTE, Air Safety Investigator
Boeing

RONALD LENHART, Chief Inspector
Transair

HANK CHIAO, Senior Field Representative
Pratt & Whitney

COREY WRIGHT, Attorney
Wilson Elser
(Representative on behalf of Mr. Johnson)

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:13 a.m.)

MR. CRUZ: So let's get started. It's September 22nd, 2021 around 10:13 a.m. So my name is Pocholo Cruz. I'm the Maintenance Investigator with the NTSB. I'm leading the Maintenance Working Group for this Accident Number DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810 and then assisted by another NTSB investigator, Dr. William Bramble.

The NTSB is an independent agent -- federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I would like to have Dr. Bramble and each of the Maintenance Group briefly introduce themselves.

Dr. Bramble?

DR. BRAMBLE: My name is Bill Bramble. I'm a Human Performance Investigator with the NTSB.

MR. MUSE: My name is Stephen Muse. I'm with the local CMOFAA office. I'm an aircraft maintenance safety commission.

MR. CHIAO: Yeah. Hank Chiao; Pratt & Whitney.

MR. LENHART: Ron Lenhart, Chief Inspector.

MR. MARCOTTE: I'm Dan Marcotte from Boeing Air Safety Investigations.

MR. CRUZ: Mr. Johnson, is there anybody you object to being

present for the interview?

MR. JOHNSON: No. I have no objections.

MR. CRUZ: Okay.

MR. JOHNSON: I have a little difficulty hearing the representative from Pratt & Whitney.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. We'll try to get that.

MR. CHIAO: Okay.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. So today, we'll be using a digital recorder for the interview. After the interview, we'll send the recording off for transcription and the party members will have the opportunity to review the transcription, correct of any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're here simply for you to share your insight in the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, however, we cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity in a transcription -- hold on here -- of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for the accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time and everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person who's asking questions at the time. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask a follow up question.

After each person has had his turn. Please answer all

questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand the question, just say so and if you realize you misstated something and want to correct something, please do so.

You're entitled to have one representation. Would you please introduce yourself?

MR. WRIGHT: My name, again, is Attorney Corey Wright with the Wilson Elser firm appearing on behalf of the witness today.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Oh, I'm sorry. I forgot to ask you. Are you okay? Who would you like to -- for you --

MR. JOHNSON: Yes. I'm okay with Corey representing me.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Great. Sorry. Okay. So do you have any questions?

MR. JOHNSON: No, not at this time.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. So I guess we'll get started. Okay. Let's see.

INTERVIEW OF DARRYL JOHNSON

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. So for the record, could you please state your name and how to spell it?

A. My name is Darryl Willis Johnson, D-A-R-R-Y-L W-I-L-L-I-S J-O-H-N-S-O-N.

Q. Okay, and your date of birth, Darryl?

A. My date of birth is September 15th, 1977.

Q. Okay, and what certificates or ratings or licenses do you hold?

A. At the company or --
Q. Yourself?
A. I have -- I'm an A&P mechanic. So I have Airframe, Powerplant and General.
Q. Okay, and do you have any certifications within the company?
A. I have Airworthiness Release. I have RII. I have Receiving and Forklift Driving.
Q. Okay, and could you briefly describe your professional background?
A. My -- I -- like, what I've done before or --
Q. Yeah. Yeah.
A. Okay. Well, I've been in the industry for nine years. Previously, I was working on cargo containers, galley carts and what have you, so aircraft removal equipment, and then when I -- I did that for about four years and then I came to Transair where I have been working on the Boeing 737-200.
Q. Okay, and what is your start date at Transair?
A. I believe it's November 24, 2016.
Q. 2016. Okay, and currently, what are your duties and responsibilities in your current position?
A. My current position as an A&P, I'm in A&P on nightshift. So my duties are to see the safe launch of the aircrafts, make sure that they are in a good condition for department and to facilitate their -- them going.
Q. And I'm assuming, are you a fulltime employee?

A. I am a full time employee.
Q. Okay, and what hours do you typically work?
A. Uh --
Q. Hours and days, I guess, if you (indiscernible).
A. Well, when I'm nightshift, I would work Sunday at 10:30 p.m. until the following morning at 7:00 a.m., and then I would work Sunday through Thursday night.
Q. Okay, and are they 10 hour shifts I take it?
A. Eight hour shifts.
Q. Eight hour shifts?
A. Five -- nightshift is five days, eight hour shifts.
Q. Okay. Okay.
A. But people do move back and forth between night and day.
Q. Okay, and how often do you do that?
A. I'm a nightshift, so --
Q. Strictly a nightshift?
A. It is where my posted position is supposed to be, yes.
Q. Okay, and is it the same task for you every night?
A. Essentially. We inspect the aircrafts, make sure that we -- there's no defects found, inspect logbooks, and then be there in case anything pops up. So basically the same routine every night.
Q. Okay. Do you work with a certain person every night?
A. Yes. I'm -- there's a rotating shift of daytime people that'll come to a nightshift for a month or two.
Q. Okay.

A. So I'll work for the same person for a month or two.
Q. Okay, and what type of shift turnover do you have between days and nights? Is there --
A. There's a pass down log and I physically see people to speak to them.
Q. Okay, and typically how many airplanes are at night that you take care of or launch?
A. Well, at this moment it would be none.
Q. At the time prior to the accident?
A. Three.
Q. Okay, and who would be your nighttime supervisor when you guys are at night?
A. The -- I would call Mike Johnson.
Q. Mike Johnson? Okay.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And Mike Johnson is who?
A. The Assistant Director of Maintenance.
Q. Okay. So how is performance evaluated for you as a mechanic on nightshift?
A. Performance --
Q. Yeah. How does management --
A. I'm sorry. I wouldn't know those metrics.
Q. Okay. So you -- okay. As a nightshift employee, what's your biggest challenge about the job at night?
A. The -- trying to get the aircraft's safety -- safely out on

time, which, you know, sometimes doesn't happen the best but safely getting them out on time.

Q. Why is that a challenge? Is there not enough people? Is there too much stuff going on? What -- why is that such a challenge?

A. It doesn't -- it's not always a maintenance thing. Like, sometimes cargo is late or --

Q. Okay.

A. -- there's just not enough ground people or it's factors that have nothing to do with us. It's, you know, just things aren't moving well.

Q. Got it. Okay. Does the FAA come see you guys at night at all?

A. Does the FAA?

Q. Yeah.

A. I do not recall.

Q. Okay. Okay. So you haven't seen the FAA kind of do any kind of inspections or random checks at night?

A. I've seen them very, very early in the morning but I've never seen them late at night.

Q. Okay. Have you received any training from the company as far as GENFAM or anything like that?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, and when was the last time you got any GENFAM training?

A. I believe I had a GENFAM training in 2017.

Q. So it's not an occurring/reoccurring? It seems like it's been awhile?
A. It -- yes, it's been a little while for me.
Q. Okay. Did they give you also, like, JTA training as part of that GENFAM?
A. I believe it was part of it.
Q. I'm sorry?
A. I believe so. I believe it was part of it.
Q. Okay. Is there any other part of training that you would request? Have you requested any type of training from Transair as far as other stuff that you would like more training on?
A. Yes.
Q. And what would that be?
A. I need to have more practice so that way I can have my -- my runup certification. So I've -- I've been trying to pursue that training.
Q. Okay, and where is the status of that training --
A. I --
Q. -- that you've asked for?
A. I've been told I need to practice. They -- it's been gone over with me and I just need to physically --
Q. Okay.
A. -- get on there with somebody in practice.
Q. I gotcha. Okay. As far as management is concerned, how many briefings do you typically get or do you get any briefings with

regards to what's happening in the operation?
A. You mean me speaking to management?
Q. No, no, no. Does management give you -- when you come on shift, does somebody give you a briefing about what's happening or anything like that for management?
A. No. When I come on shift, the -- that does not happen.
Q. Okay. So what do you typically do to find out what's happening?
A. I look at the shift turnover log and I look at the email that's been sent to the -- the company email.
Q. Okay, and that's the typical every day? That's --
A. Yes.
Q. So that's what you do when you come into work?
A. Yeah. If there -- yeah.
Q. Are there any issues as a mechanic that you brought up to management that -- and how do they react to that, you bringing up anything to them, as far as issues within the operation or safety issues or anything like that?
A. Normally fine. They, you know, noted as something that needs to be corrected.
Q. Okay. Have you done a specific -- can you cite an example that you --
A. I'll mention, like, you know -- I don't know the specific example, but I'll -- you know, if I don't see something quite right, it's not a huge thing but it may be -- maybe I'll just see

something not quite right, I'll pass it on.
Q. Okay. But are you -- as a mechanic, are you encouraged to write stuff up as you see stuff happening or issues with the airplane or --
A. I mean, yes, I have that ability if I -- if I feel it's warranted. I can -- I can certainly make a writeup.
Q. Yeah. Okay. How would you characterize the relationship between Maintenance and the pilots?
A. It's professional.
Q. There hasn't been any pilot that had issues with the way maintenance is being conducted on the airplanes as far as --
A. Normally that --
Q. -- saying that Maintenance doesn't do its job properly or that type of thing?
A. I wouldn't classify that normally, more as a personal issue as opposed to group versus a group.
Q. Okay. So as far as you're concerned, you're -- the way that the airplanes are maintained you think it's fairly good as far as Transair is concerned?
A. As far as I -- yeah, I believe that we do a fairly good job. We've tried to do the best we can in following the manuals.
Q. Okay. How do you deal with systemic issues on the airplane when they occur?
A. Systemic issues?
Q. Yes.

A. I mean do you have anything specific?
Q. Well, is there a -- let's say you have a chronic system on an airplane.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. How is that dealt with within the organization, the Maintenance organization?
A. It would be trouble -- well, first we have a writeup --
Q. Okay.
A. -- and if we have it, you know, a few times, we -- it wouldn't make it systematic, and then we try to troubleshoot it following the AMM.
Q. Okay. Is there a specific number of writeups before you put the airplane down in --
A. I am not sure about that.
Q. You don't -- okay. I understand you were on shift the night of the accident, is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. What were your duties during that night?
A. My duties were as stated before. I was watching a different aircraft. Because of airport rules, we can't have an aircraft open with no person at it. You don't want unauthorized. So I was securing and monitoring a different aircraft while 810 was being loaded and -- and crew were going on it and what have you.
Q. Okay, and who -- were you the only one onsite during that night or was it Ricky?

A. I was with Ricky.
Q. Okay.
A. Ricky May.
Q. Okay. So did you notice anything? I know that you weren't working 810. Did you happen to look around 810? No?
A. I did not. I -- I stayed on my aircraft. Ricky -- Ricky didn't seem like he had any issues or he didn't come over and said he had -- needed my assistance. So I -- I stayed with my aircraft.
MR. CRUZ: I see. Okay. I'll turn it over to Mr. Bramble.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.
BY MR. BRAMBLE:
Q. Darryl, did you notice anything unusual that night with 810?
A. I do not recall. I was not on that aircraft.
Q. Was it in your line of sight?
A. Yes. I would be able to see it from where I was.
Q. And in terms of comings and goings from the aircraft or anybody coming to the aircraft or anything like that, did anything seem unusual?
A. Not too much. Ricky walks around the airplane. Crew walks around the airplane. So nothing seemed too odd.
Q. Okay. Are you aware of any history of recurring issues with that airplane, 810?
A. None specifically that I recall.
Q. Did Ricky mention anything to you about hydraulic fluid

leaking around 810 that night?
A. No. We were -- we were quickly distracted by other incidents happening that night. So it wasn't -- it wasn't mentioned.
Q. All right. How do you feel about the quality of the maintenance manuals available to you at Rhoades? Are the instructions in the manuals clear and comprehensive?
A. Yes.
Q. Any shortcomings that you have concerns about?
A. No. The instruction manual seems fine.
Q. Any maintenance issues on the 737s in the last year or so that seem like the Maintenance department was having a particular difficult time diagnosing and repairing?
A. None to my recollection.
Q. If you had a safety related concern, how would you communicate that to management?
A. I would speak directly to management. I believe there's also a safety form we can fill in and -- and then drop off.
Q. Have you ever submitted a safety report like that?
A. I have.
Q. Can you tell us what that was about?
A. For safety. It was not properly stopped. I needed more band aids.
Q. Okay. Did you get any feedback on that in terms of being resolved?
A. I -- later I believe I received some as in -- as in weeks

later, I got some feedback.

Q. Did they take care of the problem?

A. I believe it was, yes.

Q. Were you satisfied with the response?

A. Yes, because it was resolved.

Q. Are you familiar with the SMS audits that occur?

A. Not very much, no.

Q. Have you had SMS auditors come ask you things?

A. I have not.

Q. Do you feel supported by management and able to make to make safety related decisions without fear of repercussions?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you feel pressures from company management to do things you feel are unsafe?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any safety related concerns about Rhoades?

A. I do not.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. That's it for me. Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have no questions.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. How do you check the SB and AD (indiscernible) that's on the component, Boeing aircraft?

A. I'm sorry. Could you increase your volume, please?

Q. Oh. How do you check the SB service bulletin in AD status on the parts or component going on aircraft?

A. How do I check the staters?

MR. CRUZ: So it is --

MR. CHIAO: Yeah. Service bulletin.

MR. CRUZ: Service bulletin and the AB --

MR. CHIAO: AD status.

MR. CRUZ: -- status of components that are going on the aircraft?

MR. JOHNSON: Well, we have the -- we have records and they track that stuff and they tell us when it needs to be dealt with.

(Typing sounds)

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. Okay, and there are a couple of current high EGT? (indiscernible), right? How do you manage the high EGT (indiscernible)?

A. How do I manage a high --

Q. EGT?

A. -- EGT? Well, we follow the procedure in the manual.

MR. CHIAO: Okay. I have no more questions.

MR. CRUZ: All right.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions at this time.

MR. MARCOTTE: Again, I'm Dan Marcotte from Boeing. A couple questions.

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. On the airplane before the event had, in April, had a writeup on back to back compressor stalls in cruise and I think in

November of 2020 you had some backfires on takeoff and they found inlet panel that (indiscernible) would go. They commented in -- or wasn't in the end -- or I'm (indiscernible) referring to the writeup, and they found that some -- the panel on stator vanes (indiscernible).

My question's in regard to reports of compressor stalls or backfires. If you were the mechanic, instead of (indiscernible) as a writeup, what would you do?

A. I'd have to go to the -- the Pratt & Whitney manual and -- and look at the proper procedures. I'm -- I don't recall them off the top of my head.

Q. Okay. Would you look in Chapter 5 of the (indiscernible) maintenance manual?

A. Limitations?

Q. Conditional inspections?

A. I'd go to the Pratt & Whitney manual to look at it.

Q. Okay.

A. Because that would tell m e proper diagnosis and troubleshooting.

Q. Okay, and the event airplane, did you -- as far as oil consumption, did you see anything abnormal? Did the oil consumption and heater engine, are -- do you think it was a -- more of an oil user than the rest of the fleet or --

A. I'm sorry. At this time, I don't recall how much I -- extra went into that aircraft.

Q. Okay.
A. It's a standard that we check then whenever they come back. So I -- it doesn't stand out.
Q. It doesn't stand out for you?
A. Yeah.
Q. All right, and working nights, so it sounds like that you get to do -- launch an airplane. It goes to an outstation, comes back and then you'll have a certain amount of time with the airplane again before it launches to another station?
A. Yeah.
Q. How much time do you have? Do you have to have -- with the airplane on the ground between flights?
A. It varies. It kind of depends on how quickly they have the cargo. If they have the cargo already ready, maybe 20 minutes. Maybe 30 minutes. If we're waiting for cargo, hour, hour and a half.

MR. MARCOTTE: All right. Thank you.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. I just have a couple of follow up questions.

BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

Q. Do you get the opportunity to fly with the pilots?
A. Yes.
Q. Just on your nightshift or during days or when --
A. Nightshift.
Q. Nightshift. Are there any issues the way that -- do they --

have you noticed the pilots flying with -- playing with the throttles as they fly?

A. I'm sorry. I'm not a pilot, so I don't -- I don't really --

Q. Okay.

A. I don't -- I don't judge what they do when -- when we're --

Q. Understood.

A. -- there.

Q. Understood. Understood. Okay. So when you fly with them, why are flying with them then?

A. I'm typically flying with them because I've been instructed to by maintenance -- by management because we want to make sure that airplanes come back. If there's any off stations issues, it cuts down on time basically if I'm already there.

Hopefully, I can just resolve the issue real quick, we can get the airplane back as opposed to off station that call. Then we've got to arrange transport and then it's, you know, hours and hours later before -- before we got a -- fixed a simple problem.

Q. Does that happen often that you fly --

A. That is not the default.

Q. That is not the default?

A. It is not.

Q. Okay. So in the case that you're being sent to fly with the airplane, why is the case -- why is that the case?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. I mean is it just because the airplane has a previous issue

that that they want you to be onboard just in case something happens?

A. That has -- that has happened, yes.

Q. Okay. But that's typically that's why you would be flying at that time though, right?

A. Well, ultimately the reason I fly with the aircraft is because management told me to. It might be that it had an issue that they want me to try to watch of maybe there's -- maybe there's a recurring issue, like, you were talking about systemic issue that if I'm on the flight I can see it.

But ultimately, it comes down to I don't super question it. I was told that I need to fly with airplanes so I fly with them.

Q. Okay. So how often did this management as you to fly with the aircraft?

A. Uh, not -- not super often.

Q. Okay. Not often. Okay. Do you recall if 810 had any issues as far as system issues or engine issues prior to the accident?

A. I'm sorry. I do not.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. That's all I've got.

MR. CRUZ: I don't have anything else. Steve?

MR. MUSE: No, sir.

MR. CRUZ: Hank?

MR. CHIAO: I'm good.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Nothing. Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Thank you, Darryl. I know this is hard to

do, but we just need to ask the questions that we're asking just to get more informed about what happened in the airplane, so we appreciate your time.

MR. JOHNSON: Well, thank you. I hope that was --

MR. CRUZ: Yeah.

MR. JOHNSON: -- beneficial.

MR. CRUZ: Well, one last thing. Do you have anything that you would like to share with us?

MR. JOHNSON: I -- no, I don't think I have any questions or -- or any statements at this time.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Fair enough.

MR. JOHNSON: No.

MR. CRUZ: All right. Thank you, and we're done at 10:42. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 10:42 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Darryl Johnson
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 22, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Lisa Smith
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174

Interview of: MICHAEL JOHNSON, Assistant Director
Rhoades Aviation

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday,
September 22, 2021

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APPEARANCES:

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National Transportation Safety Board

POCHOLO CRUZ, Maintenance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

STEPHEN MUSE, Aviation Safety Inspector - Maintenance
Federal Aviation Administration

DANIEL MARCOTTE, Air Safety Investigator
Boeing

RONALD LENHART, Chief Inspector
Transair

HANK CHIAO, Senior Field Representative
Pratt & Whitney

COREY WRIGHT, Attorney
Wilson Elser
(Representative on behalf of Mr. Johnson)

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I N T E R V I E W

(1:00 p.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. So is September 22nd, 2021 and it's 1:00 p.m. and my name is William Bramble and I'm a Human Performance Investigator with NTSB. I'm assisting the Aviation -- I'm sorry, the Maintenance Working Group led by NTSB Investigator Pocholo Cruz for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining a probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and we have no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I would now like to have Mr. Cruz and each of the Maintenance Group members briefly introduce themselves.

Mr. Cruz?

MR. CRUZ: I'm Pocholo Cruz. I'm the Maintenance Group Chairman for this accident, the NTSB.

MR. MUSE: Stephen Muse. I'm with the local FAA office on Maintenance.

MR. CHIAO: Yeah. Hank Chaio; Pratt & Whitney.

MR. LENHART: Ron Lenhart, Chief Inspector, Rhoades Aviation.

MR. MARCOTTE: I'm Dan Marcotte; Boeing Air Safety Investigations.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Is there anybody that you object to

being present for this interview?

MR. JOHNSON: No.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Today, we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we will send that recording out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to review that transcription, correct it for any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our role isn't to assign fault. We're here simply to -- for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, however, we can't offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity and a transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for the accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time and everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person asking questions. Everyone will have an opportunity to ask follow-up questions in turn.

Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection and if you don't know, it's fine to say I don't know. If you don't understand a question, just say so and if you realize you misstated something just let us know and we'll correct it.

You're entitled to have one representative of your choosing. Is there somebody here that you'd like to have as your

representative?

MR. JOHNSON: Sure.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Would you please introduce yourself?

MR. WRIGHT: My name's Attorney Corey Wright. I am with the law firm of Wilson Elser here appearing today as a representative for the witness.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Thank you. All right. Anybody have any questions before we begin?

(No response).

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

INTERVIEW OF MICHAEL JOHNSON

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right, Mr. Johnson, can you please tell us your full name and spell it for us?

A. Michael Johnson, M-I-C-H-A-E-L J-O-H-N-S-O-N.

Q. Okay, and how old are you?

A. Forty-one.

Q. All right, and what's your date of hire with Rhoades Aviation?

A. October 13, 2010.

Q. Okay, and can you give us a brief overview of your aviation related background that led to you working at Rhoades?

A. Sure. I've actually worked for Transair Part 135 before transferring over to Rhoades Aviation. In-between that I worked at Hawaiian Airlines for a short period.

Q. Okay. When did you start working for Transair?
A. October 13, 2010.
Q. Oh, I see. So that was your date of hire with Transair with the 135 side --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and then subsequently transferred over. What year did you transfer over to Rhoades?
A. The year, it was 2013.
Q. Okay, and what's your current job title?
A. Currently, I'm the Assistant Director of Maintenance.
Q. Okay, and who's your supervisor?
A. The Director of Maintenance, Mike Kimble.
Q. And in the role of Assistance Director of Maintenance, what are your job responsibilities?
A. Scheduling, training, parts, approving parts, making sure they come in, spot check on the line. I -- and it varies. If I need -- each other department needs some kind of help or input, I will help.
Q. Do you supervise anyone directly?
A. I have Greg Jernigan -- I mean, I'm sorry, Aaron Jernigan, which is a lead, and Greg Taisipic, also a lead.
Q. Okay, and what's your normal weekly schedule?
A. Monday through Friday, 9:00 to 5:30.
Q. Okay, and was that your schedule the week of the accident?
A. Yes.

Q. What training have you received from Rhoads Aviation for working on that certificate?
A. 737-200 General Familiarization, Engines, Runup, Taxi, RII qualifications, as well as to instruct and training.
Q. Okay. What do you find satisfying or difficult about working at Rhoades?
A. Satisfying? I like my hours. You know, it's you get the weekends off. Difficult? Being we're out here, sometimes you don't get the parts -- well, as fast where if you're on mainland US.
Q. Okay. Were you on duty the day before the accident? So the accident happened after midnight on the 2nd. Were you on duty the 1st?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember anything about that day? Anything unusual about that day?
A. No.
Q. Do you remember any work going on with the accident airplane on the 1st?
A. On 810 specific?
Q. Yeah.
A. No. There was -- aside from the daily schedule, our daily check, there's nothing.
Q. Okay. All right. Were you aware of anything unusual about the condition of the aircraft, the accident aircraft before the

accident?
A. As far as?
Q. Did it have any -- had it had any recent issues that you'd had to deal with as far as maintenance goes?
A. Before the incident or accident?
Q. Uh-huh. Beforehand, yeah.
A. There was a -- there was a -- it had to do with the AC system. I don't remember if it was left or right but they were saying it was blowing hot air.
Q. How long was that before the accident?
A. It was the same week. I'm not sure exactly what day, but it was the same week.
Q. Okay. Do you recall what was done on that?
A. Pack bell (ph.).
Q. And did that seem to resolve the problem?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did have any open maintenance issues or MELs that you're aware of at the time of the accident?
A. Open? No. That'll -- no, that I'm aware. No.
Q. And about the MELs, you don't remember? Is that what you said?
A. MEL? I don't -- I don't remember there being an open MEL --
Q. Okay.
A. -- at that time.
Q. And did it have a history of any recurring maintenance issues

that had been written up multiple times?
A. What's -- what's the number for, like, recurring?
Q. I'll leave that to you. Is there anything that stood out as an issue that kept coming back in a noticeable fashion?
A. Fuel quantity.
Q. Okay, and was that issue resolved by the time of the accident?
A. Yes. We didn't see any writeups for it after.
Q. Okay. Any other issues that were sort of ongoing or had been ongoing in the recent past?
A. No, not that I recall because the aircraft just came out of the heavy check.
Q. Okay. Were you aware of any issues with the airplane's engines specifically in the -- in recent weeks?
A. Recent weeks? No. Not engines.
Q. Okay, and had you heard anything about issues with high EGTs on the engines during takeoffs with rated (indiscernible)?
A. For 810?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. No.
Q. All right. All right. How was morale in the Maintenance department before the accident?
A. It was good.
Q. And was staffing adequate?
A. We were pretty staffed, yes.

Q. All right, and how about the quality of the facilities where you performed your work, was that adequate?
A. Yeah. We have the space to do the work.
Q. And how about the quality of the maintenance manuals? Were the instructions in the manuals clear and comprehensive?
A. Troubleshooting? There's some of the troubleshooting guides is not -- it's vague. It's -- it's not much to go off of and most times it doesn't lead you to the problem for the 200s.
Q. Is that -- why do you think that is? Is it because the manuals are old or some other problem with them?
A. I think just because the aircraft is old. It's -- manuals came out -- they're old, yes.
Q. You ever come across blank work cards for issues because there's maybe it was designed for a hyperlinked system, but there's no hyperlinks?
A. In the manual?
Q. In -- yeah.
A. There is hyperlinks, yes. I f you -- I f you click on a few of them, they don't take you to where it should take you.
Q. Okay. Who do you ask if you're not -- well, I guess do you -- how much do you do hands on maintenance yourself or are you primarily sort of managing at this point?
A. I tried to do once a week to get down with the guys so I'm working side by side with them, maybe there's something I can teach, I'll teach.

Q. Okay. Who do they turn to if they have -- if they have difficulty with a particular task and they don't know how to do something that's assigned?
A. Myself or the Director of Maintenance.
Q. And do you feel the Department has the resources it needs -- equipment and resources it needs to do the work?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What's the most challenging maintenance task you've had to do at Rhoades in the past?
A. It was a different aircraft. When we first got the aircraft on the certificate, one of the hardware for the landing gear didn't have paperwork and it's hard time components. So we had to replace it. It was a pretty big bolt.
Q. Pretty big bolt? Is that what you said?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. How confident are you about the quality of the maintenance work that you're able to accomplish at Rhoades?
A. Oh, I'm satisfied.
Q. And are there any particular maintenance issues on the 737-200s in the last year that the Department has had particular difficulty diagnosing and repairing?
A. In the last year? No.
Q. All right. Are you aware of any instances of rejected takeoffs due to crews observing EGT indications during D rated thrust takeoffs?

A. On any aircraft or?
Q. On any of the 73s, yeah.
A. Uh, one, maybe two in the last couple of years. I can't recall exactly when.
Q. Okay. Do you remember the cause of that high EGT?
A. Frost indication, bad gauge.
Q. Okay, and what was done as a result?
A. We changed the gauge out on one of them.
Q. Okay. How about the accident airplane? Did it have that issue?
A. High EGT?
Q. Yeah.
A. Not that I know of.
Q. All right. Do you recall any instances of a hydraulic system failing in flight, hydraulic B system?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Now one of the pilots that we interviewed relayed an incident where she found a broken circuit breaker panel behind the FOC and reported it to a mechanic and she claimed that the mechanic asked the captain to write it up when they got back from the trip instead of before they left, but then the captain declined to write it up and the damage wasn't repaired.
Do you know anything about that incident?
A. Second breaker panel?
Q. Yeah.

A. No. I mean it's a -- that's a pretty long panel behind that.
Q. Yeah.
A. I'd remember changing one of those out.
Q. Okay. How often do you interact with the FAA inspectors or the CMT for Rhoades?
A. They come -- they come pretty frequently to the office.
Q. And what's that relationship been like?
A. You want, like, good, bad or --
Q. Yeah. I mean are there any challenges or it's going well or --
A. I don't -- I would say contentious.
Q. Okay. Backing up a little bit. When you say they come pretty frequently, how often is frequently?
A. (No response).
Q. Before the accident. I should qualify that.
A. Once a week.
Q. Okay. In person?
A. One of the three would. Yes.
Q. Okay. What's your take on the contentious relationship? What do you think the cause of that is and how it could be resolved?
A. Can I compare to, like, prior CMTs that we had?
Q. Sure. Yeah.
A. I don't think they're fair from prior.
Q. You don't think the current one is fair?

A. No. No. I don't think they're fair and I --
Q. What -- how is it different with the current team?
A. Well, we have a procedure where the request documents and it goes through a chain of command where we need to know what they're giving out and we'll -- we'll give it to them. I think, at that time, the Director of Maintenance was in an interview.

One of the CMT members requested documents from the clerk and he followed procedure and said, "I need to let the Director of Maintenance know," and the CMT said, "Well, if you don't give it to me I'm going to give you an LOI," and I thought that was -- that was unprofessional.

He shouldn't have been said that to a clerk. You know, he was going to give it to him, he just had to follow his procedures that we have.
Q. What do you think caused this contentious relationship to be contentious in the first place?
A. I honestly can't say. I don't know.
Q. And has that changed at all since the accident?
A. No.
Q. It's the same? No better, no worse?
A. I think it got worse.
Q. Okay. Before the accident, who was responsible for managing safety at Rhoades overall?
A. Safety Department. They have a -- the Director of Safety, Orlando.

Q. Okay, and who's the accountable executive?
A. Accountable executive?
Q. For Safety Department or for the SMS?
A. That would, I'm going to say, the owner of the company, Teimour.
Q. Okay. If you had a safety related concern, how would you communicate that to management?
A. We have a form you can fill out and they're throughout the hangers. You can fill out a safety report and submit it to the Safety department.
Q. Have you ever filled one out?
A. Awhile back, yes.
Q. Okay. Can you tell us what that was for?
A. There was parts of -- from the K loader that as the K loader leaves, it leaves, like, those hard rubber from the tires and it was missed by the ground crew to pick it up.
Q. What happened as a result of your filing that report?
A. They -- I remember they started doing Fabloks as a result. There was a morning Fablok, afternoon Fablok. Before and after the aircraft leave there's a Fablok.
Q. Was that issue resolved to your satisfaction?
A. I think so.
Q. Do you participate in twice weekly safety meetings?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Are you involved in the company's CASS program?

A. If I need to fill in for Mike Kimble is not available, then I will.
Q. Okay. What's your role when you do fill in? What do you do in those meetings?
A. I'll answer the questions that's brought on either by internal or the CMT team.
Q. Okay. Are you familiar with SMS maintenance audits at the company?
A. Yes.
Q. What happens when they do one of those or do they ask you questions? Are you involved in any way?
A. We do corrective actions that needs to be addressed to fix the issue.
Q. But when they do an audit, does the SMS auditor come in and ask people questions, look at records, that sort of thing?
A. Yes, they do.
Q. Okay, and then are you somebody they ask questions of or you participate with them in asking other people questions?
A. If it's -- only when it deals with maintenance, yes, I do. I answer questions.
Q. Okay.
A. Majority of them, if it's log pages, they're all Inspections department.
Q. Okay. Do you feel supported by your management and able to make safety related decisions without fear of repercussions?

A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any -- do you feel pressures from management to do things that you feel are unsafe?
A. No.
Q. Do you have any safety related concerns about the company?
A. No.
Q. Did you before the accident?
A. No.
Q. All right. How would you describe the organizational safety culture at Rhoades?
A. They're -- we're -- we're okay. We -- we try to -- I mean we have to be safe in everything we do and we always preach safety. I think we're good.
Q. Can you describe the relationship between the maintenance staff and the pilots before the accident? Was it good or strained or neutral?
A. Before?
Q. Before the accident?
A. I'm going to say it was okay.
Q. Have you ever heard a flight crew saying they're afraid of being fired for writing up a maintenance issue?
A. No.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. That's it for me right now. Thanks, Michael. All right, Pocholo?
MR. CRUZ: Yeah. Just a couple of follow-ups for you.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. What certificates and ratings and licenses do you hold?

A. A&P, (indiscernible).

Q. Just A&P?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. No RII?

A. I do have RII, Engine Run, Taxi.

Q. Okay.

A. And Air (indiscernible) space.

Q. Okay, and you said you worked for Hawaiian Airlines previously. Was that prior to you starting at Transair for the 135 in 2010?

A. It was in-between.

Q. Oh. So in 2010, you started at Transairs 135, right?

A. Yes.

Q. How long did you stay and then you went to Hawaiian Air? When did you go to Hawaiian Air?

A. 2013.

Q. 2013, and then when did you go back to Rhoades?

A. I'm sorry. 2014, and I came back at the end of 2014.

Q. Okay. So you stayed at -- you left. You were at Hawaiian Air in 2010, right?

A. Transair, 2010.

Q. Oh, Transair, 2010, and you were there until when?

A. Beginning of 2014.

Q. Okay, and then so you -- so from 20 -- the beginning of 2014, you were at Hawaiian Air --

A. Until December 2014.

Q. -- and then you went back to Rhoades at the end of 2014?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Okay. Great. How were you chosen to be the Assistant DOM?

A. Well --

Q. Was there any qualification or requirement that you needed to be that might give you the opportunity to become the Assistant DOM?

A. Well, I started off as a lead and I worked my way up, supervisor and then Maintenance manager and --

Q. Okay. So you -- when you started at -- when you went back to Rhoades at the end of 2014, you just became a mechanic when you went back?

A. I was a lead.

Q. Oh, you were a lead?

A. Yes.

Q. They gave you the lead position?

A. Yes.

Q. When did you become the Assistant DOM then, do you remember?

A. 20 -- 2019, summer.

Q. Oh, okay. Summer of 2019. Okay. Okay. So assume you’re a fulltime employee, right?

A. Correct.
Q. Correct? Okay. Do you also -- do you hire the mechanics or does Mike?
A. I do interviews.
Q. Okay.
A. I do give my input on whether to hire or not to hire.
Q. Okay, and the typical people that you interview, is there a specific criteria that they have to have to be hired as a mechanic?
A. For one, they must hold a license, A&P license.
Q. They must -- I'm sorry?
A. Have an A&P license.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. That's always what we shoot for.
Q. Okay.
A. And, two, we look for experience, whether -- any type of 737 experience, that's a plus, and if they don't, then we see what overall experience they have.
Q. Do you think that you -- you're having a hard time hiring mechanics?
A. Right now? Yes.
Q. Okay. Do you guys do avionics in-house work group?
A. We do binary avionics, not -- nothing major.
Q. Okay, and is any component worked on in-house?
A. No, we do not.

Q. Are you in charge of any contract maintenance that's being hired?
A. Contract maintenance? I oversee contracts, yes. You're talking about bringing contracts into the work or --
Q. No.
A. -- outsourcing?
Q. Like, contract maintenance, you know, for if you need help, let's say, on an outstation and you need to hire somebody out there, do you bring -- did -- are you in charge of --
A. No. We normally send our guys out --
Q. Okay.
A. -- on the road.
Q. So you guys don't use any contract maintenance whatsoever?
A. We've had once. That was in Guam.
Q. Okay.
A. That was ferrying it back from a C check. The issue, we did a one day -- one job contract.
Q. Okay. You mentioned you do some engine training, is that -- did I hear that correctly?
A. I do engine runup and taxi training. Yes, I do.
Q. Okay. So what about JTA GENFAM familiarization or anything like that?
A. No, I don't.
Q. No?
A. No.

Q. Do you bring any outside vendors to teach any of your classes or do you or Mike the only two that typically teaches the classes?
A. For the engine or for the 200 GENFAM?
Q. For the engine? Let's start with the engine.
A. We do bring our engine shop. Our engine shop personnel, they come and they'll do on the job training with us.
Q. Okay, and what about the GENFAM?
A. Mike Kimble mostly does it. I fill in when needed.
Q. Is that an annual training or just a --
A. It's a onetime thing --
Q. Onetime thing?
A. -- for new hires, yes.
Q. Okay. Are all the classes held here in Hawaii or --
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever had -- have you or Mike ever sent mechanics out to get training somewhere else?
A. For GENFAM?
Q. Or anything?
A. No, not -- no, we don't.
Q. No? Okay. Is OJT required for every personnel?
A. Yes, it is.
Q. So the mechanics don't have any type of recurring training for certain --
A. They --
Q. They do?

A. They do.
Q. Okay. What type of training?
A. RII is a recurring.
Q. Okay.
A. The (indiscernible) is recurring. Engine runup and taxi's recurring.
Q. Okay. What training records are kept and who keeps them?
A. I -- training records? We keep training for everything that we do. We keep it on file, hardcopy and in our training software that tracks also our type components --
Q. Okay.
A. -- for maintenance.
Q. To your knowledge, do you know whether the FAA has ever audited your training program?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay. You said you sometimes fill in for CASS, correct?
A. Sit in, yes.
Q. Yeah. So what information is given by Maintenance to the CAS -- to populate the CASS report?
A. We -- for this month's CASS, everything's related to last month's events. So we'll have engine trend monitoring comes up in the reports, how many cycles per plane in hours for the month, and then if there's raw parts or engine changes, it's all in the CASS report.
Q. What about inflight shutdowns or anything like that?

A. All of that, yes. Incidents or SI -- SDRs, MIRs, they're in the CASS.
Q. Okay, and you -- is that your job to report that to CASS?
A. No. It's -- I don't report it to CASS. It comes from the pilot, if -- whoever the incident happened, they'll be generating the report. It comes to Maintenance department.
Q. So what does Maintenance -- what does your organization report to CASS?
A. Engine change.
Q. Okay.
A. We have chronic discrepancies. If there is, we --
Q. And is that your job to look at all the airplanes and see if there's any chronic discrepancies?
A. No. Inspections department.
Q. Inspection does that?
A. Yes.
Q. So you don't analyze any of that information as far as -- since you guys look at the logbooks every day -- I'm assuming. It --
A. Yes.
Q. Do you guys look at the logbooks every day?
A. Yes, we do.
Q. Okay. So but you guys don't analyze what's in the logbooks to determine whether something's chronic? It's the Inspection department that does it?

A. We don't handle those, correct.
Q. Okay. So I'm assuming you're familiar with AIP?
A. Yes.
Q. What is your responsibility when it comes to AIP on the maintenance program?
A. I -- well, when the task comes from the Inspections department, we go through the task and we see what we need as far as tooling. How long is it going to take? We plan it out, and then we assign when it's to be done.
Q. Okay. So it's not -- have you ever had a chance -- is there any changes in the maintenance program? Does that come from you? If you see there needs to be a change in the maintenance program, does that come from you as the Assistant DOM or the DOM or does another organization take care of the changes to the maintenance program?
A. It goes to Inspections.
Q. Inspections is the one that does it?
A. Yes. That's their -- that AIP belongs to them.
Q. Okay, and according to what we were reading, the GMM, is I guess the responsibility of the DOM?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there a reason why there's the GMM has not been revised since 2014?
A. I wouldn't --
Q. (Indiscernible) -- well, we got -- the information that we

got at the time that the accident happened was Revision II of the GMM. According to what we see in there is that -- and the last time it was revised was the 2014.

It's now 2021, but there's supplements in there up to 2016 but only certain sections of the GMM. There's issues with having Convair 640 still in there. Since the DOM is in charge of the GMM, is there -- what's the reason why it hasn't been changed since 2016 or 2014?

A. I can't answer for that.

Q. Okay.

A. I was -- I was not in management that --

Q. Right.

A. -- those years, so I don't know what -- what's the reasoning behind it.

Q. Okay. Does any of the mechanics or you looked at the GMM and said it's time to change certain things in the GMM? There's -- certainly, there's some certain errors in the GMM as far as having a Convair still in there?

A. Mechanics, yes, they've said. As far as abbreviations --

Q. Okay.

A. -- they mention about adding abbreviations that they would like in there that they --

Q. Yeah. Is there a process that they go through to make changes to the GMM?

A. They go to the Director of Maintenance.

Q. As an Assistant, doesn't that go to you or anything like that?
A. No. They brought it up to me, yes, and we go to --
Q. And when they bring up to the DOM, is there a process that the DOM goes through to make the changes?
A. I'm -- I don't know. I don't -- I can't answer for that one.
Q. Okay. Are you familiar with your MEL extension program?
A. Yes.
Q. And how many extensions are allowed?
A. We don't have any authorization for extension. We've had -- haven't had authorization for extension for quite a while.
Q. When you say -- so you're not allowed one extension?
A. No.
Q. No extensions?
A. Not without the CMT approval.
Q. Okay.
A. They revoked our extension right.
Q. All right. Well, this -- what I'm talking about is prior to the absent --
A. We have one extension --
Q. Okay.
A. -- before we request approval --
Q. Okay.
A. -- or second.
Q. Is there a reason why there's a -- in your GMM in 2016,

again, you were allowed three extension approvals. It's still in the GMM. Do you know what changed?

A. That -- that's between the CMT and the DOM. I'm not too sure what -- what changed or what made the changes.

Q. Okay. Are you in charge of filing SDRs?

A. Not in charge, but I do have access.

Q. So, okay, when you have access what does that mean?

A. I can go online and file the SDR --

Q. You --

A. -- make a report.

Q. So have you filed any SDRs?

A. No.

Q. So according to your GMM II, you also have a function of maintenance control. Do you or the -- do you have maintenance control? Is there --

A. It's me or Mike Kimble.

Q. Right. How often do you do this task?

A. Every day.

Q. Every day?

A. Yes.

Q. Weekends too?

A. Yes.

Q. Is it only you as the maintenance -- I mean you guys switch off? How does that work?

A. It depends on the mechanic at night. It's mostly maintenance

control is mostly at night when we're not there, when -- and it depends on who the mechanic. If he calls me, I'll answer. If he calls Mike Kimble, Mike Kimble will take the call.

Q. Oh, so it's not a certain -- like you have this weekend, Mike Kimble has next weekend?

A. No.

Q. It's not like that?

A. No.

Q. It's whoever the mechanic feels comfortable calling?

A. Well, because they rotate out so it's hard to keep track of who to call next because the mechanics --

Q. Oh.

A. -- rotate out.

Q. I gotcha.

A. So it's -- it's on them to decide who to call.

Q. Got it. So in your ADM -- in your GMM, it says Review Board Meeting Agenda shows that the DOM is presenting a repetitive item positive fix report. Are you familiar with that report?

A. Sorry. Can you repeat that?

Q. Yeah. Your ADM, Section 3.7.14, "Maintenance Control Duties and GMM, 14.0.7, CASS Review Board Meeting Agenda shows that the DOM presenting a repetitive item positive fix report." Are you familiar with that report?

A. No.

Q. Okay. I'm curious how this information is captured and what

the criterion for repetitive inspection is constitutes a positive fix, but you're not familiar with that report?

A. Repetitive inspection? Like, ADs?

Q. No. Repetitive inspections -- yeah, I guess so. Repetitive items. I'm sorry. Repetitive items.

A. Discrepancy items or --

Q. Yes.

A. I'm not familiar with that report.

Q. Okay. To your knowledge, when was the last under maintenance control process was audited or ever audited?

A. It was this year.

Q. Okay. What were the results of that audit?

A. I don't know. I didn't see the report.

Q. Oh, they didn't -- it hasn't been released yet?

A. I think -- if I recall, the last guy that did the audit, he'd already left the company. So I don't know.

Q. Well, okay. Let's see. You mentioned when you -- when Bill was asking, troubleshooting guide was vague, right? You -- I think you mentioned some --

A. Yes.

Q. -- of the troubleshoot guide is vague. Can you give us an example why? Which -- what was vague about some of the troubleshooting guide?

A. Sure. For a system, if -- if it's showing these symptoms and you go to the AMM, to the troubleshoot guide, it doesn't even have

a symptom that we're looking for actual on the aircraft that it's in the AMM. There's compass, for example, where there's a flag on the compass.

Well, troubleshooting in AMM, it doesn't really help you with what you're seeing on their instrument. So you kind of have to investigate further.

Q. So if you have an issue, like, that, do you go to Boeing or whoever owns the manual and ask for clarification?

A. A lot of times, we backtrack it. We start from the beginning and then we'll find something, like a broken wire, you know. We'll go back and double check what we did. We can't -- because I don't -- I don't think we've ever gone to Boeing for such things like this.

Q. Uh-huh, but if you're saying that some of the -- obviously, the troubleshooting is vague, right?

A. Right.

Q. And you use it the first time and you know it's vague, so when you use that troubleshooting procedure again?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So there is no wait for you guys to fix it to make sure it's better so that it's more efficient the next time you need to troubleshoot something?

A. Well, our AMM hasn't been revised since 2017 and Boeing already told us they will never revise it again because -- and we don't have a fault isolation manual, so we --

Q. Okay.
A. -- we're going to go off of the experience of if it's happened in the past.
Q. Is that a similar experience to you for the engine manuals?
A. Our engine manual's pretty -- it's pretty -- it has a lot of good troubleshooting.
MR. CRUZ: Okay. Well, that's it for me for now. I'll wait in the second round.
Mr. Muse?
MR. MUSE: Hi. Mike, once again, my name is Stephen with the FAA.
BY MR. MUSE:
Q. I had a couple questions for you, but my partner's down the line pretty much asked them. I just have one question, if you don't mind. Why did you leave Hawaiian Airlines back to GRE?
A. I had a bad experience with the HR department. I asked -- I had an issue with my badging and, you know, I waited four weeks before -- the Badging Office still didn't call, so I kind of went to the badging office and tried to figure out what's going on and they informed me that my packet was not turned.
So when I went back to HR department, they kind of told me, you know -- they kind of gave me the middle finger and told me, "That's not your job to go follow-up," and, you know, I'm saying, "I need to pay bills. Like, I'm at home waiting for a badge." So I got the bad vibe from that and I said, "If this is how they're

going to do this, then I don't want --

Q. So you --

A. -- "to be here."

Q. -- never really had the opportunity to get out there and turn a wrench for Hawaiian?

A. I did. On the --

Q. Oh?

A. Yes.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. We were escorted in the beginning, only in the hangar work.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. But for me to go to my actual bid location, which was light maintenance, I need my badge.

MR. MUSE: Okay. All right. Thank you. That's all I have. Okay.

MR. CHIAO: I have several questions.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. How do you manage a repetitive event of a high EGT or (indiscernible)?

A. I'm sorry. Say that again?

Q. Yeah. How do you manage a repetitive event of high EGT and (indiscernible)?

A. High EGT and?

Q. Stall. Surge.

MR. CRUZ: Stall or surge.

MR. CHIAO: A surge.

MR. JOHNSON: A lot of times, what we do, we -- if it's high EGT on one side, we try and, you know, switch the indicator to see -- isolate that it's not an indicator, and if it follows to the other side, we -- we know that's a bad one so we'll replace a bad indicator.

But if it doesn't follow, we have our AMM and we also have Pratt & Whitney's manual that tells us to go do a test with the bar field tester, and that'll tell you whether you have bad leads or if it doesn't, then we have a bad wire somewhere.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. But do you know how is EGT degradation being monitored?

A. Engine trend monitoring. We have a trend monitoring and the parties will -- they'll fill out their -- the trend report. We send it to the Trend Group and they'll notify us if there's been changes from the last trend meeting to the current one that's been submitted as far as EGT or any other parameters.

Q. And do you do that routine borescope for the engines?

A. No. We're not -- we don't do borescopes.

Q. Okay. But how do you know the engine is ready for removal (indiscernible) performance decoration?

A. As far as?

Q. I mean how do you know the engine is ready to remove?

A. A lot of time, it's an AV or the disk 6431. It's coming to -- any hard time components that's internal that we can do, we

have to remove the engine.
Q. Yeah. Besides that, (indiscernible) how for the engine performance perspective, how can you know the engine is ready to move into performance degradation?
A. If we start getting writeups about it's not making EPR or, you know, like EGT. We can't get the EGT fixed and we're going to take the engine out. We'll get the -- we'll call the engine shop and we'll tell them, hey, our EGT is not -- we can't fix it. We'll take it off.
Q. (Indiscernible) borescope inspection (indiscernible)?
A. We're not qualified for borescope.
MR. CHIAO: Okay. No further questions from me.
MR. MARCOTTE: (Indiscernible), Dan Marcotte from Boeing.
BY MR. MARCOTTE:
Q. So in April of this year, there was a pilot writeup of four back to back compressor stalls, number one engine and crews. So what would -- so an airplane comes in and the mechanic sees that writeup, what would you expect them to do?
A. For one, we do -- we look at the engine. We open the hulls. We look at the fan blades and then we always go off the manual for any special inspections.
Q. Okay. Where will you expect them to go in the manual?
A. There's surge is Chapter 5. There's some engine stuff in Chapter 5 and then Pratt & Whitney has their --
Q. Okay. Would you expect to see that in the signoff in the

logbook if there's a Chapter 5 inspection? Would you expect to see a Chapter 5 inspection was complied with in the signoff?

A. Sure.

Q. And there was a November previous report. The pilot report was "constant backfire from engine one during takeoff" and then there was some more information available to us interruption -- mechanical interruption report that says, "Shortly after takeoff, Honolulu, about 700 feet, number one engine suddenly developed a series of high, continuous backfires, backfires quickly brought under control with thrust lever.

Emergency cleared, flight returned. After landing, it was observed a complete section of engine one intake lamination was missing. Remnants of lamination were found on stator vanes and fan blades." So, again, for that writeup what would you expect a mechanic to do with this information and then what he observed between the log writeup and what I have in the MIR?

A. That inlet's got to be changed, for one --

Q. Okay.

A. -- and then we're going to have to do another inspection.

Q. Okay. Which inspection is that?

A. Pratt & Whitney inspection. We'll see what -- where we have to go look.

Q. Okay.

A. Fan blades for sure.

Q. Okay, and then Chapter 5?

A. 5, I would look in 5 too.
Q. Okay, and, again, you'd expect to see that in a signoff if there was an inspections called out in the manual?
A. In Chapter 5?
Q. Well, in Chapter 5 or in the Pratt manual, would you expect to, you know -- it says if saw this condition, they recommend you do inspections? Expect to see those inspections were compiled in the signoff?
A. Some of these references in -- within the reference, it tells you other references in there. So --
Q. Okay.
A. -- if that's already contained within that one reference, we're okay. That's --
Q. Okay. So if it's just in the Chapter 5, but it has other references, you're -- the signoff is good with just Chapter 5?
A. Yes, because we're covered --
Q. Okay.
A. -- in that.
Q. No, I understand.
A. Yes.
Q. I'm just trying to clarify. Thank you, and then was there anything on the event airplane just based on history? Was there anything special or atypical in oil consumption on the engines that you remember?
A. Oil consumption? No. I don't recall any issue with oil

consumption.
Q. Okay, and you had one -- in one of your questions, and I think it was Bill who asked you, kind of the quality of manuals and I think I heard you say -- and hyperlinks don't take you where they should take you?
A. Not all of them do. Most of them take you to the figures.
Q. Okay.
A. But when it references another AMM chapter and you hit it, they don't all go to that chapter.
Q. Do they --
A. So --
Q. -- go to the wrong chapter or --
A. It just doesn't do anything. So you would have to go and open that other --
Q. Okay. Okay. But at least it doesn't take you to the wrong spot?
A. No, it doesn't. No, no.
Q. Okay.
A. It just doesn't do anything.
Q. It still gives you reference you -- you know, it gives you the chapter number and page number you can go -- or task number --
A. Yes, it does.
Q. -- you can go look up?
Okay, and I think that is it. Thank you.
MR. MARCOTTE: All right. I don't have any additional

questions. Pocholo, you have any?

MR. CRUZ: Yeah.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. How often do you conduct briefings with your mechanics?

A. We do -- when I come in the morning, we usually have a little hey, what's -- what we got going on today as far as if there's writeups, and then I'll go check the -- our maintenance report, make sure, hey, we got this coming due. When are you guys going to do it?

A. We do a daily and we do have our turnovers that we need to -- if they're not here, they can read the turnover for communication. But I mostly send texts. It makes it easier.

Q. I'm sorry?

A. Text messages if there's --

Q. Oh.

A. -- important things for me to communicate to them.

Q. Okay, and how many people typically are in your text?

A. There is -- it's I have, between the two leads and then I have one between us three, if it needs a DOM is involved then.

Q. Oh, okay. So basically it just goes through the two leads, you and the DOM?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, and then do you expect the two leads to, I guess, disseminate the information to --

A. To the --

Q. -- to the mechanics?
A. Yes, the guys on the shift.
Q. I got it. Okay. Do you communicate directly with the FAA or is Mike the only one that does that?
A. I don't directly, no.
Q. No. Okay. So are you involved with any -- does Mike ask you for input regarding any LOIs that need to be answered or anything like that or does he take care of that himself?
A. I do both. I have to go research what they're asking for --
Q. Okay.
A. -- what they're looking for.
Q. Yeah.
A. Sometime clarification, can you -- I'm not quite understanding. Am I reading this wrong? Can you -- can you -- what do you make of this?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. I do get involved, but not directly with the FAA.
Q. Not directly?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You mentioned that the previous CMTs were a lot better. When was the change in the CMTs?
A. Officially, I don't remember the exact -- it was before COVID. Before last March last year.
Q. Okay. Before March of last year?
A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Does Mike bring you into the meetings when he talks to the FAA?
A. Yes. Not all the time, but I do sit in there.
Q. Okay. Based on the issue that you cited with regards to the CMT asking a clerk for information, what came about that issue as far as you -- the -- you said the CMT was going to give an LOI because the clerk wouldn't give information he was asking for. What came about on that issue?
A. I know the clerk wrote a statement. It was given to Mike Kimble and I don't know where it went from there. I haven't been -- I'm not 100 percent.
Q. Okay. So you don't know, but the clerk gave a statement to Mike, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Did the clerk ever give the information to the CMT?
A. Yeah. The required data? Yes. After.
Q. So yeah, because if she didn't give it that she would get an LOI?
A. Yes.
Q. So you don't know whether Mike went back to the CMO to complain about that issue?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Is the issue that you were having that you know of, is it with the PMI and the PAI or all three principles?
A. I'm going to say all three based on what I've heard in the

CASS meeting, just the way they -- I mean the letters I read.
Q. Right. So do you participate in a CASS meeting?
A. I don't -- I do fill in. I sit down if I have to sit down. I do, but I'm not there all the time.
Q. The -- when the ones that you have participated in has the principals been in there?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they have any input to any of the report that's being presented?
A. Oh, they did, yes.
Q. And are they -- what type of criticism or what kind of comments do they have on the report?
A. Well, they I 've heard things like, I don't know, you guys -- I don't think you guys know what you're doing, that kind of comments. Like, well, we're doing everything off the manual and it doesn't fix it, then we'll have to go deeper. We have to go look further. Maybe it's something else we're missing but it's --
Q. Do they give you suggestions on how to fix it or do they just say you don't know what you're doing?
A. They've never given suggestions.
Q. Okay. I guess from Transair standpoint, where do you guys go with the FAA at this point? Is there a way to fix the issue between FAA and Transair?
A. The current team? I -- that's really not my say. I don't --

I mean it's above my pay grade.
Q. I mean is there something that at least each of them are half -- are you meeting them halfway and FAA, you know, you're meeting them halfway and just to give a common consensus to try to fix the issue? Do you know?
A. Well, every letter we've gotten it's, like, we're already guilty. We have to prove our innocence. It's the way I read the letters. You know, it's we're already guilty. Like, well --
Q. Do they -- when they sent the letter to you, do you guys sit down as a team and kind of analyze what they're --
A. Oh, sure. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. And then you guys present a rebuttal --
A. Response.
Q. -- right?
A. Oh, yes.
Q. Answer to --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and lay it out for them?
A. Yes.
Q. And you present it to them and --
A. They come back with something else that's still related to this previous. It's -- it's, like, you're not giving us the whole issue that you have with this. You're only giving us bits and

then --
Q. Right. Right.
A. -- we tack on this after.
Q. So is there any way that you can say let's come sit down and do it once and for all and lay it all out?
A. No.
Q. Is that something -- that's something that you guys are or the FAA won't -- would do?
A. Oh, yeah. They've asked for a sit down and get clarification on things and --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- they've been rejected.
Q. Right. But I mean at the same time, if they keep asking piecemeal stuff, right --
A. Right.
Q. -- why don't we just all sit down and fix this all at once?
A. I don't know why they don't do it.
Q. But are you guys requesting it?
A. I'm not sure on that one.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Or is the FAA not requesting it, right? It's not --
A. I'm --
Q. What you're saying is they're not requesting something like that, a sit down face-to-face?

A. I don't think they have, to my knowledge.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Mr. Muse?

MR. MUSE: I just got one more thing.

BY MR. MUSE:

Q. In the sit downs and the meetings that you have had, interaction with the FAA, in the CASS meeting, closed door, Mike's office or what have you, would you say it's professional, neutral or unprofessional?

A. It's --

Q. In your opinion?

A. We've had different, like -- some were professional, some were neutral, some were just, like, where's this coming from. You know, so it's been a mix of all three of those.

Q. You think it's from both sides, you, unprofessional, and they're unprofessional, or your statement is you guys are always professional and sometimes they're not professional?

A. (No response).

Q. In your opinion?

A. I'm going to say it's a little of both.

Q. Little of both?

A. You know?

Q. Okay. Fair enough. Thank you.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. Were you aware of the engine return from the shop with limited EGT margin?

A. Yes. We get the -- we do get the engine -- the test run report. We do get it. We always ask for EGT margin.
Q. How limited -- was it limited or was it low EGT margin? So you know the engine will come with a limited EGT margin?
A. Yes. We have that report before we get the engine. If it's too minimal, we're -- for example, like, we had -- we'd 15 days or 15s where the margin was five degrees. We're not going to take it, so our engine shop has an option to upgrade it to a 17 when we get a bigger margin. So that's what normally we do.

MR. CHIAO: Nothing more.

MR. MARCOTTE: Nothing more. Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Bill?

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. I just wanted to clarify one thing.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. So Pocholo was asking you whether the clerk provided the information to the inspector that came to ask for it and then had threatened the clerk with the LOI and (indiscernible) asked if you had given -- if he had given the information to the inspector and you said, "After." I just wanted to verify.

Does that mean after the clerk checked with Kimble or --
A. No.
Q. When did he give it to him?
A. Right after he said, "LOI."
Q. I see. Right after he said that?
A. Yes. We found --

Q. Okay.
A. -- out after the CMT team left that he was threatened with the LOI.
Q. Okay.
A. And we were notify -- oh, this is what we gave him. We knew what they were coming -- what they were going to be in the office. We didn't know what they were going to look for.
Q. Yeah.
A. But they gave it to him right after he said, "I'll give you LOI," and then he notified us after the CMT team left.
Q. So yeah, but he gave it to him and then he notified you, right?
A. Yes.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. That's all I have. All right. Anybody else have anything else?
MR. CRUZ: Yeah.
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. Is there a -- do you know when that -- do you know approximately what date that happened?
A. Oh, that's -- this must've been June timeframe.
Q. This year?
A. Yes. June.
Q. So, like, a month before the accident?
A. I 'm -- yeah, summer, June. It was before the incident.
Q. Okay.

A. That's for sure.

Q. Okay. Also, I guess --

MR. LENHART: Oh, are we done?

(Indiscernible).

MR. CRUZ: Is there anything you want to share with us that we haven't asked you before? Any type of safety issue that you would recommend? We want to give you the opportunity.

MR. JOHNSON: No. I don't have anything.

MR. CRUZ: Okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

MR. CRUZ: Yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: Well, thanks very much. We'll go ahead and stop the recorders.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Michael Johnson
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 22, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Lisa Smith
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

Interview of: MICHAEL KIMBLE, Director of Maintenance
Rhoades Aviation

Honolulu, Hawaii

Tuesday,
September 21, 2021

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I N T E R V I E W

(1:03 p.m.)

MR. CRUZ: Again my name is Pocholo Cruz, and I'm the lead investigator with the NTSB. I'm leading the maintenance working group for Accident No. DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810, assisted by another NTSB investigator, Dr. Bill -- William Bramble.

The NTSB is an independent agency, federal agency, charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA, and has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I would like to have Dr. Bramble and each of the maintenance group members quickly introduce themselves. Dr. Bramble.

DR. BRAMBLE: I'm William Bramble. I'm a human performance investigator with NTSB.

MR. MUSE: Stephen Muse.

MR. CHIAO: Hank Chiao.

MR. KIMBLE: I'm sorry?

MR. CHIAO: Hank Chiao. Pratt and Whitney

MR. KIMBLE: Oh, Pratt and Whitney. Okay.

MR. LENHART: Ron Lenhart.

MR. KIMBLE: I'm pretty sure I know you.

MR. MARCOTTE: I'm Dan Marcotte. I'm from Boeing Air Safety Investigation.

MR. KIMBLE: Okay. Nice to meet you.

MR. CRUZ: All right. Do you have anybody here that you object to being in the interview?

MR. KIMBLE: No.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Okay. Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview we'll then send a recording for transcription and the party members will have the opportunity to review the transcription to correct it for any typographical errors.

MR. KIMBLE: Okay.

MR. CRUZ: Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine the probable cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our rule is not to assign fault. We're here to simply for you to share your insight, okay, with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, however, we cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity and transcription of this interview with eventually be part of the public docket for the accident investigation. Each individual group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time and everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person who's asking the questions. This will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow up questions after each person has had a turn. All right. Please answer any questions to your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so and if you realize you misspoke, just tell us and we'll try to correct it.

MR. KIMBLE: Okay.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. You're entitled to have a representative of your choosing. There's someone who would represent -- who would like you to represent.

MR. KIMBLE: Like me to represent?

MR. CRUZ: No, no, you okay, and for the record, state your name, please.

MR. WRIGHT: Sure, Attorney Cory Wright with the Wilson Elser Firm appearing today as a representative for this witness.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Thank you. Let's see, all right, do you have any questions before we begin?

MR. KIMBLE: No -- actually are you guys okay with me taking the mask off?

MR. CRUZ: It's your -- if you prefer that, but it's up to you guys.

MR. KIMBLE: Well --

DR. BRAMBLE: It's okay by you. We have a NTSB policy that says right now where we have to.

MR. KIMBLE: I see. Well, my voice does not carry, and a mask makes it worse, so --

MR. CRUZ: I hear you. Are you guys okay with him taking -- I just want to make sure.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

MR. CRUZ: I just want to make sure. Okay. For the record, it is -- what time is it?

DR. BRAMBLE: 1:03.

MR. CRUZ: 1:03. Yup. All right. So we'll begin.

INTERVIEW OF MICHAEL KIMBLE

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. For the record, please state your name with the spelling.

A. My name is Michael Kimble, M-i-c-h-a-e-l, K-i-m-b-l-e.

Q. Okay. And date of birth?

A. 1/5/66.

Q. Okay. And what certificates or ratings or licenses do you hold?

A. I hold an airframe and power plant.

Q. And can you please briefly describe your professional background?

A. I started in the Marine Corps in 1984 as an OV10 mechanic. I was in the Marine Corps for four years. After my service finished, I worked for a cargo airline in Michigan and I've been pretty much doing it ever since, so I'm right about 37 years I guess I've been doing this. 33 of that has been commercial aviation, and all my experience is 121.

Q. And how long have you been with Rhoades Aviation?

A. Next month will be seven years.

Q. Seven years. And your current position and title?

A. I'm the director of maintenance.

Q. And how long have you been director of maintenance?

A. Here? Seven years.

Q. Seven years. What duties and responsibilities do you have in your current position?
A. I mean, the standard director of maintenance responsibilities, and I was part of the -- this is part of a 119 personnel, and so I'm responsible for the maintenance personnel, staffing, tooling.
Q. Okay. Have you had any previous positions with the company besides the DOM?
A. No.
Q. How were you selected by Rhoades to be the DOM?
A. I was -- actually I was director of maintenance for another carrier on the mainland, and through a mutual contact I came to be.
Q. Okay. Prior to the -- prior to you becoming the DOM, is there -- do you know why the previous DOM was no longer here at Rhoades?
A. I do not. I know that they had brought somebody in to be like a director, some type of director, and -- I don't know.
Q. Okay. Just for the record, could you explain what the relations between Rhoades Aviation and Trans Air is?
A. So Rhoades Aviation is the 121. We -- my responsibility obviously is for the 737 fleet assigned to our certificate. Trans Air is the sister company which is a 135 operation.
Q. So --
A. But, you know, it's the same owner, but it's two separate

entities.
Q. But the airplanes, even though you say that Trans Air is the 135 you said?
A. Yes.
Q. Even though it says 135, the airplanes, the 737s have Trans Air.
A. Yes, but they're -- it's under the Rhoades certificate.
Q. Okay.
A. So like a DBA kind of thing.
Q. Okay. All right. How does the Rhoades Aviation in Indiana, how does that play?
A. So Teimour bought with the Rhoades Aviation certificate. Teimour meaning Tim Moriahi, CEO, and that was prior to my joining the company. I'm not sure what year. I want to say 2011, '12, somewhere in there.
Q. Okay.
A. And then I think 2015 they moved the certificate here.
Q. 2015 moved the certificate out here to Hawaii.
A. Yes. And I was involved in that.
Q. Okay. Is there any contact between Indiana portion and --
A. There's nothing there anymore.
Q. Nothing.
A. No, once we did the certificate transfer, everything was -- everything that was in Indiana at that time was closed down because we were not dealing with the Columbus team anymore.

Q. Gotcha. Okay. And I know that you guys have two certificates, the 121 and the 135, right?
A. Um-hum.
Q. For the record, you're a certificate of which one?
A. The 121.
Q. Just the 121.
A. Yes.
Q. So there is another DOM for the 135.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, I have no involvement in the 135 operation.
Q. Okay. And so how does that -- how does the 121 side keep separate from the 135 as far as -- so different procedures, different certificate? Obviously it's a different certificate, right?
A. Different everything.
Q. Different everything. But do you share the same mechanics for both?
A. For the 121, no. For the 135 we do have an agreement because the 135 does have a 737 200 passenger aircraft, and we have an agreement that we can assist when required.
Q. Okay.
A. But that --
Q. So there is a 135 737.
A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Are there a lot of organizational and structural changes in the last five years between, you know --
A. Not really.
Q. No? And then how many aircraft is in the 121 side?
A. As of right now there's four left.
Q. Four. Do you also have one that's being worked on right now?
A. Yes.
Q. But obviously that's not on the certificate yet or is it --
A. Oh, no, it is -- well, actually that's not true. Yes, we have a 400 that is not on certificate.
Q. Not on certificate.
A. It is currently -- I'm sorry, yeah, it's currently under a cargo conversion.
Q. Okay. And the four that you have here are all cargos, right? There's no --
A. I actually have three aircraft here. I have one aircraft in Taiwan and going under C-check.
Q. Right, but they're all cargo aircraft, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. All right. Can you I guess describe the type of maintenance facilities that you have here in Hawaii.
A. So here in Hawaii it's all just primarily line maintenance. We don't -- like I said, we don't do our heavy checks in house. We farm those out, so just all line maintenance.
Q. All line maintenance. Okay. And then how many hangars?

A. We have the -- where you were at, that's our main hangar for the 73's. It doesn't fit in the other hangar.
Q. Okay. And then how many mechanics do you oversee?
A. I think right now we're right around -- we've had some personnel changes. I'm going to say around 25 maybe. Between the certificate and non-certificated.
Q. And --
A. It might be less. I'm not sure.
Q. And as a DOM who did you report to at the time of the accident?
A. At the time of the accident I reported to the vice president of operations.
Q. And what is his name?
A. Tracy Reasoner.
Q. So in this organization, current organization, or at the time of the accident, who were your peers in the maintenance organization? Who were your peers?
A. As far as?
Q. As far as your peers as in mechanics, is it chief inspector, is it quality, director of quality? Who are your peers? Who are at level with you in --
A. Oh, the chief inspector.
Q. -- organization?
A. I'm sorry, I didn't understand where you were going with that.

Q. Okay. Do you also -- is there any other people besides the chief inspector that you're leveled with in the organizational structure?
A. Not in the maintenance department, no.
Q. Okay. So I'm assuming -- what are your hours typically?
A. Normally 9:00, 9:30 until 6:00, 6:30 for myself.
Q. Five days a week?
A. Five days a week.
Q. Five days a week.
A. Sometimes more.
Q. Okay.
A. You know, like any other small operator, you know.
Q. Yes.
A. It's an on-call and when you're needed.
Q. Yeah. Who would typically be your designee if you're not available?
A. My assistant director of maintenance.
Q. And his name is?
A. Mike Johnson.
Q. Is there a qualification or a requirement that you have to be your designee?
A. It is in our GMM, but, yeah, I mean, it's basically the same qualifications I hold.
Q. Currently right now what is the biggest challenge of your job?

A. As it pertains to what happened or --
Q. Being a DOM, yes. DOM as far as what happened during the accident.
UNIDENTIFIED PERSON: You mean prior to the accident?
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. Prior to the accident, I'm sorry.
A. You know, as it pertains to the incident, I don't think there was anything as far as that stuff goes. Organizationally, you know, we had a CHEP inspection going on so there was a lot of fallout from that, and interactions with our CMT.
Q. So do you -- as a DOM, do you perform any hands on maintenance work?
A. Very little.
Q. Like you do --
A. More for training purposes. We don't have a dedicated training department. At one point in my background I was a training manager. I am qualified to teach the 73s, so, yeah, I do quite a bit as far as that stuff goes.
Q. That's -- when you say that's hands on as far as maintenance.
A. More of a training event.
Q. And I guess what percentage of maintenance training do you typically do, if you do at all?
A. On a month basis? Yearly basis?
Q. Say yearly basis.
A. Oh, it's 10 percent.

Q. Okay. How stable currently is your work force?
A. Relatively stable. You know, after our certificate was, you know, we had our op specs amended --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- obviously that was a big hit to us.
Q. Sure.
A. But most of the guys that we have have been with us for a number of years.
Q. Yeah. So are you the one that hires the mechanics personally?
A. I am.
Q. Okay. And how are the mechanics selected typically?
A. I think like anybody else, you know, that's a hiring manager. You know, you try to find somebody that fits the, you know, that's going to fit your organization and be able to contribute something.
Q. Is there any pre-employment background screening that you do before?
A. Of course.
Q. Are any of the avionics work done in house or --
A. No.
Q. All farmed out.
A. Well, I mean, as far as like instrument repairs, that kind of stuff?
Q. Yes.

A. Yeah, that's all farmed out.
Q. But you do have -- do you have R&E?
A. I have avionics, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. And some of my mechanics are, you know, qualified --
Q. Right.
A. -- for avionics.
Q. And most of the components are farmed out for overhaul --
A. All the components are farmed out.
Q. Okay. Do you use contract maintenance and vendors typically?
A. Only for essential maintenance.
Q. Who selects your contract maintenance provider?
A. Well, it's, you know, it's like anything else. It's a collaborative effort, you know. Myself, the prior chief inspector, you know. We looked at Air Asia after we got rid of Air Rod and Malaysia.
Q. Prior to the accident, did you have any concerns with any of your contract maintenance providers?
A. No. I only have one.
Q. Okay. And since you -- you just said that you do the training yourself, right?
A. I do the training for our people, yes. Well, that's not entirely true. I do the bulk of it, but my assistant director of maintenance, you know, he'll do some of the basic indoc and stuff. Primarily for me it's more for the FAM courses and --

Q. Okay. So is there certain trainings that -- can you cite an example where you could recommend additional training for mechanics that you -- to identify some issues or anything like that?
A. Like I said, I'm, you know, I have training background so I mean there's always training that can be done, and we do to some extent. Once a week we have a get together with the guys, you know. Prior to this, you know, any issues we had as far as, you know, we had a APU problem, you know, we would kind of talk about that as far as what trouble shooting can be done, and, you know, things along those lines.
Q. Do you have any training for engines, the JT8s or anything like that? Do you do that or do you farm that out or how's that work?
A. I mean, the JT8 training we do is part of the FAM course, but is, you know, I mean, once again we don't take them apart other than, you know, the QECs. Any work that has to be done all goes -- it's all done by our engine vendor.
Q. So do you -- have you asked Pratt and Whitney to come in to do some training for your folks?
A. I have not.
Q. Okay.
A. I'm not even sure if Pratt and Whitney does JT8 training anymore. I know Boeing doesn't teach the --
Q. Well, yeah. Okay. I would submit that all the classes that

you teach are held in house.
A. Yes.
Q. Is OJT required for every personnel?
A. Yes. We encourage OJT for everyone, especially if they're trying to get a qualification.
Q. And do you see some of your mechanic helpers trying to get --
A. I encourage our -- one of my mechanics just, you know, started as a stock person.
Q. Okay.
A. One became an assistant and just got his A&P. You know, I highly encourage my guys to get their licenses.
Q. Okay. Do you know whether the FAA has audited the Rhoades training program?
A. I couldn’t tell you.
Q. You couldn’t. Just out of curiosity.
A. I'm sure they have, but when it was done I couldn’t tell you.
Q. Well, don't they -- well -- so there -- I'm sure there have been some times where mechanics have issues. Who do they report that to?
A. Normally, you know, it depends who the mechanic is. You know, the chain of command is lead mechanic, assistant director of maintenance and then myself.
Q. And then how is that -- how did those issues get resolved and how does that get back to the mechanic? Is that like a briefing item after that or if there's issues that need to get resolved?

A. Can be. It depends on what the situation is.
Q. But typically how does it get back to the mechanic if there's an issue?
A. Directly. I mean, you know, it's not like we've got, you know, 600 employees --
Q. Sure.
A. -- and, you know, over two stations. I've got, you know, 25 mechanics based on one base, so, you know, everything is either done as a group or individually, you know, to address any concerns or, you know, issues they might be having.
Q. Can you identify any recent safety related issues within the maintenance organization?
A. Within the maintenance organization?
Q. Yeah.
A. Nothing comes to mind recently.
Q. Okay. Is there an incident reporting system that you have in maintenance?
A. There is.
Q. Can you explain what it is?
A. Well, it's part of our safety program, so we have a safety reporting. You know, we can -- they can do it electronically or they can do a paper form and it goes to the safety department.
Q. Okay. And then what happens after -- what does the safety department -- do you know what they do with it?
A. It would -- well, if it was part of my department it would

come to me for my input. If it's part of our safety committee, then that's how it's discussed.

Q. Gotcha. Okay. And how is your relationship with the owner or the VP as far as any issues?

A. No.

Q. Good relationship?

A. Obviously, you know, we've worked together for a number of years.

Q. Right.

A. You know, even in a different -- when he was in a different role, so, you know, it's not like he's a new entity to me.

Q. Different role as in?

A. He was the VP of cargo operations and then they moved him to VP -- just VP of operations, so he's with the company a number of years.

Q. Okay. VP. Can you describe your working relationship with flight crews as far as -- or the director or officer between the two?

A. Like I say, yeah, I don't have much direct involvement with the pilots per se.

Q. You don't.

A. No. You know, that's -- normally I'm out there, you know, every day with those guys, the mechanics. I think I have a good relationship with the chief pilot and then I think a normal relationship with the, you know, between operations and

maintenance there's always a little bit of friction, or can be, I should say.

Q. Yeah. Is there any point where a flight crew would come to you about issues that they see or has there been?

A. No, nothing comes to mind.

Q. Any repetitive issues that for some reason a flight crew sees?

A. I will not normally take that up with the individuals. I'll take that up with the chief pilot as far as that stuff goes, you know. You know, different than I wouldn't expect him to go to my folks if they've got an issue. They would -- he could come to me to address, so that's kind of the way we work those issues.

Q. Okay. I have a question with regards to the maintenance program. The AIP, according to what was given to us, was revised in 2014.

A. Yes.

Q. It hasn't been any changes to the maintenance program or anything that would warrant a revision closer to 2021?

A. Well, I'll say this, you know, the MRBR came out in 2011. The MPD was, what, 2007 I believe, so there really haven't been a whole bunch of changes made to those programs, you know, given the age of the aircraft, so as far as that goes, I really can't speak to, you know, how often it should be revised.

Q. And I guess in the same sense, is there a reason why the GMM hasn't been revised since 2016? I mean, you still have some

Convair, I think, in there, 640 in the GMM?
A. So, yes, we've been kind of going back and forth with the GMM, and, of course, as you know, the AIP also became an issue during the CHEP inspection.
Q. Yes.
A. Part of it's personnel as far as, you know, technical writing.
Q. Personnel within Trans Air?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. You know, we didn't have a very strong technical writing staff.
Q. Okay.
A. Something that we just recently remedied by getting an outside company to assist us with it. You know, we don't have the -- once again I don't have a huge staff to, you know, be able to sit there and take all these changes in as rapidly as we'd like to have them in, but --
Q. Okay. And obviously like you said there's some issues with the GMM. There's sections missing? 10.9, the RVSM stuff.
A. Because we don't operate RVSM any longer.
Q. So how about 10.6, earlier prevention control program.
A. I don't believe that's not missing.
Q. I believe -- well, okay, because I had Ron look at it and it's not there.

A. I'm not aware of that.
Q. Okay. Let's go with the -- what's the current MEL program that you have as far as extensions, extension program? How many -- can you explain like the program and how often you're allowed to do extensions?
A. Current -- well, we just did a bulletin as far as the extensions go, and I'm sure you guys are all aware with the current CMT made the determination that we were accessibly using our deferral process. Whether I agree or disagree doesn't make a difference. At the end of the day I don't decide what they do and what they don't do. I don't feel that we've abused it. Any time that we had extensions, they were approved by the previous CMT.
Q. Are you allowed to do multiple extensions?
A. I was under the impression that we could, but with the new guidance it was pointed out to me is that's no longer the case and we did change our program accordingly.
Q. Yes. I guess is there a reason why Trans Air decided to change the MEL program to more than one extension allowed?
A. As I recall, there was a change that came out from the previous CMT, but I don't recall the -- what drove that.
Q. Okay. Let's see, PMI approved the change from 2014 to 2016 revision. What discussions were held for that change? Because the current D95 off specs signed by the PMI and I believe it was yourself on 2018 showed approval for a single extension.
A. Right.

Q. Yes.
A. For us to approve a single extension.
Q. Right.
A. Oh, okay, I didn't understand you.
Q. Right.
A. I thought you were talking about FAA. Yes, we can approve once.
Q. Right.
A. Yes, and that's not never been an issue as far as -- until these guys took over.
Q. Right. Yeah. The documents that we saw, there was approval for two extensions in the GMM, not just the one single extension. There were actually physically two extensions.
A. Without --
Q. Without looking at it?
A. Yeah, I don't remember that being the case.
Q. Yes. Let's see. Who files the SDR for you guys and the MISs for the FAA?
A. Depends where it's being done at. If it's being done at the MRO, the MRO will do the SDRs. The MROs and stuff is done by our team. It's done in house by our team inspector.
Q. Okay. MRO, I think that's repair organization?
A. Yes, our central manage provider.
Q. Which is Taiwan?
A. Yes.

Q. Okay. So in Section 3.03 it says the director of maintenance or his designation will perform the maintenance control function. How often do you do the set?
A. How often do I? I'm sorry?
Q. Maintenance control.
A. Yes.
Q. It says that the DOM or the designee will be doing -- perform a function of maintenance control. How often do you do that kind of stuff?
A. Well, maintenance control for us, it basically applies, and I think it does say in our GMM any time the airplane is (indiscernible), it can be during the day, it can be at night. If they get stuck out there and they have an issue, then they can contact us, either myself or like I said -- it falls down to primarily myself or the assistant director of maintenance as far as --
Q. So there is no -- essentially you're playing double duty as the main control --
A. Yes.
Q. -- as well as the DOM and --
A. I do not have a dedicated manage controlling department, yes.
Q. So you guys switch off on the weekend duty for that or --
A. Pretty much.
Q. And obviously it's done remotely and not in the office?
A. Right.

Q. So based off your ADM and your GMM, and your CASS review board meeting, it shows that you as representing repetitive item positive fix report, how is this information captured and what if the criteria for repetitive item and what constituted -- constitutes a positive fix? How do you gather that report?
A. That will come from our records people. They'll capture the data, you know, when they're recording the -- they're going through the log pages as they come in, and that'll get passed onto us as part of our CASS.
Q. Do you analyze the data because the record people just input data?
A. Well, yeah, that's part of our CASS is for us to take a look at that and make a determination as far as what we do going forward.
Q. Is the CASS the chief inspector or your part?
A. It's -- well, I mean, it's all part of the same, you know. The CASS kind of covers a little bit of everybody. It is the chief inspector's program, but, I mean, obviously it can play a big role in maintenance.
Q. Okay. So there is somebody -- what I'm hearing from you, and correct me if I'm wrong, is that the maintenance department is looking at all the issues as far as repetitive issues on the airplane.
A. We look at issues and repetitive issues, yeah, anything that --

Q. To your knowledge, do you know the -- well, whether the maintenance control process has ever been audited by the safety department?
A. I'm sure it has, but I couldn’t tell you when.
Q. Okay. So you do a lot of GEN FAM training. Do you do engine training, too?
A. Like I said, just part of it, just part of the GEN FAM.
Q. Okay.
A. And by a lot, I do maybe two or three a year.
Q. Two or three a year. Like each quarter or something?
A. Just as I get people that need it.
Q. Okay. So are inflight shutdowns and air turn back strike in the maintenance part, in the maintenance department? If so, how and is this information related to CASS or incorporated into CASS?
A. We actually have a section in there for inflight shutdowns and returns. You know, the SDRs, MIRs. That's all tracked as part of our CASS.
Q. So during our investigation we have been made aware of Trans Air personnel reporting to the FAA about engine issues that were repetitive in nature and maintenance has not fixed on the 737 airplanes. Do you care to comment?
A. I'd like to know a little more as far as -- I don't understand exactly what you're driving at.
Q. Well, we were told that there were some -- not necessarily maintenance personnel, but pilots as well, issues with engine

discrepancies that hadn't been rectified numerous times. They didn't give very many specifics, but I feel like we need to ask the question to you, have you heard of any of these issues from either pilots or mechanics?

A. Yeah, obviously, you know, and I'm sure we're talking about compression stalls here, so --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- of course. You know, and there's so many factors that can drive that stuff, so it was one of our CASS findings a few months back, you know, because we had multiple write ups and then -- so basically to mitigate that, we -- I put together a memo, and we sent it out to the flight crews, you know, jockeying the throttles, operating them quickly can cause a stall, you know. Even leaving the box and you throttled up too quick there's a good chance you're going to make it stall, so, I mean, obviously there are cases where you have components that fail. You know, the JT8 is not a really, you know, intricate engine. It's pretty straightforward. There's only a few things that cause a compressor stall. Component wise, very few. A couple of valves and the controller. If the input's going into it, it can make a substantial change.

Q. So obviously you've heard pilots playing with the throttle.

A. Of course I have, and I -- that was one of the things that we put out, you know, trying to do acceleration checks. You know, there's a way that you do it and there's a way you don't do it.

If you're not trained to do it, don't do it.
Q. Is that something that was brought up to the -- your --
A. That was something that -- yes, it did come back to me, and once again, you know, when you start looking for factors and try to determine what's causing this stuff. You know, you have to look at all of it, so, you know, like I said, I put together a memo that says there's a number of issues that can cause this, you know. Push them up too quick, pull them back too fast, you know.
Q. So I'd like to talk to you about your relationship with the FAA. How often does the FAA visit the facility?
A. At least once a month if not more, though. I mean, we have more communication than we do actual face-to-face visits.
Q. And in your opinion, what's your relationship with the FAA like?
A. Well, you ask, I'm going to tell you. We have a pretty contentious relationship. I know you guys have seen all the documents that have come in and out of here. You know, right now part of the reason I almost didn't make it, you know, we've got another op spec amendment on my desk that I've got to deal well, and they knew full well this week that he was going to be tied up with the NTSB. I was going to be here, you know, the rest of my staff will be here tomorrow, and we got it on Friday and we've got the seven calendar days. We have to file articles of reconsideration, and they haven't given us back the last set of op specs, so, why?

Q. Yeah. I guess is there a reason why? Is there -- did they have a reason why it's so contentious between you guys over the past year or year-and-a-half, or two years or --
A. I don't know. I've never seen anything like it.
Q. How long has your current principals been on the certificate?
A. I'm going to say -- I think they came out in January of last year.
Q. And they just started on your certificate January of last year?
A. Yeah, and, you know, and they changed all three at the same time --
Q. Sure.
A. -- which to me is unusual.
Q. Yeah.
A. So just at the start of the pandemic they changed principals.
Q. Yeah, pretty close to that.
Q. Okay.
A. I couldn’t give you the exact dates, but it seems like it was in January, February of 2020, somewhere in there. And then, of course, in November, you know, we had a CHEP inspection, and they made it very clear to us that it was, you know, just our five years. That makes sense. The last one we had was in 2015 when we transferred the certificate.
Q. Okay.
A. So, but, you know, it's a little strange to me that I have a

new CMT, and we're going through a CHEP inspection, and, you know, I've done these plenty of times over the years, but I've never done it when everybody is remote. It's -- that was really a challenge, and I can tell you this, you know, I pulled airplanes out of service for reasons that these guys questioned without really having the facts. I've had my op specs, you know, be threatened amended at least five times. So, you know --

Q. So you're saying they were doing the CHEP inspection remotely?

A. Yup. I never once saw a CHEP inspector here on the island.

Q. Really?

A. Yup.

Q. Okay.

A. And these guys set it up that everything had to go through them to come to us. And everything came to us in the form of a hazard letter, a letter of investigation. I think I can maybe give you two or three emails where we received direct correspondence from the CHEP team which I thought was unusual.

Q. Okay. And obviously you're in charge of all the LOIs typically on the maintenance side and everything else, right?

A. Yes, yes. Well, once again it's, you know, even if it's been a maintenance issue, they've sent everything to the accountable executive in most cases. They don't come to me directly, they're just our CEO.

Q. Is that typical?

A. Not in my experience.
Q. Yeah. Okay.
A. Normally if it's a maintenance issue it comes directly to the maintenance department for us to address --
Q. Okay.
A. -- if there's an issue.
Q. And that's typical that you know from previous, that's how it works.
A. Yes. You know, like I said, prior to here I was the director of maintenance for the 121. Prior to that I was director of quality for a passenger 737 operation.
Q. Yeah.
A. So, yeah, I'm pretty familiar with dealing with the FAA and I can tell you I've never, ever in all my years received as much correspondence. Not necessarily all, you know, it's mind boggling, and it's really difficult to keep up with. I have -- can I ask questions here? I am going to assume that you are not the guy that was with Pratt and Whitney when you guys visited our facility, is that -- so the Pratt and Whitney guy made a comment about one of the blades that we had -- a couple of blades that we had cropped on one of the engines, and he made a statement that said it was -- that he thought it was out of limits, so --
Q. Sorry, Pratt and Whitney guy who?
A. From the NTSB when you guys were here last time.
Q. Oh, okay. Okay.

A. So I didn't know who it was. I was just told --
Q. No, he's not part of this team.
A. So I was --
Q. He's with the Powerplants.
A. I see. I was just told and he's -- apparently he questioned these blades and --
Q. No.
A. -- next thing you know I get a letter of investigation although the -- we had kind of done a little bit of a musical engine change just for me to keep -- I don't like intermixes as far as aircraft engines go, so I had -- kind of had moved some stuff around so I could keep my 15s and 17s, you know, so I didn't have two aircrafts with intermixes, so that engine had been installed on another aircraft that went to an aging aircraft the September prior, and it was questioned, and the previous chief inspector said -- went and evaluated it and said, no, these are within limits, and the PMI was good with it. And then when all this stuff came up as far as this thing here, you know, they made a big issue about it. Myself, the current chief inspector, our inspection manager who worked for Pratt and Whitney before, and my assistant director of maintenance went out and re-evaluated it, and we said these are good, so next thing you know we get another -- we get a letter of investigation because they don't agree with that.
Q. Okay.

A. So that's kind of where we're at now. It's -- that's the only one we had hanging over us, so it's, you know, makes it hard to do things. You spend all your time having to respond to the same things over and over again.

Q. Yeah, definitely LOI, there's definitely a lot of stuff going on there that needs some type of attention.

A. Well, you know, it's been my experience, you know, if a question's raised and you evaluate the thing and you make an entry saying that, you know, we've determined this to be within limits and acceptable, that should be the end of it. I'm going to tell you this, this is not a compliant philosophy team. This is an enforcement philosophy team. Like I said, I don't think that --

Q. I get it.

A. I don't see what purpose it serves to just keep inundating us with documents. And I don't see what good it was to pull our maintenance time limitations as far as our AIP which we talked about earlier.

Q. Right.

A. We spent a lot of time trying to correct it. Once again I said, you know, we're not tech pub people, we're maintenance people, you know. We know the content, but maybe I can't present it in a, you know, the right font and all the change bars where they need to be, but, you know, that doesn't necessarily mean that the information that's in there is not correct, so --

Q. Okay.

MR. CRUZ: We'll defer now to Dr. Bramble.

MR. KIMBLE: Okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: Thanks, Pocholo. Mike, do you need a break?

MR. KIMBLE: No, I'm good. Thank you.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. All right. Just a couple of follow up things from what Pocholo was asking about. It sounded like maybe the person you report to has changed since the accident?

A. No.

Q. You still report to the VP --

A. Same person. No, I just said he held a previous position before he had the one here, so I've known him for a number of years.

Q. Okay. And then I had a little trouble following the training stuff. At one point you said that you do the bulk of the training, but then some other kind of training you do 10 percent? Can you kind of help me there?

A. Well, I mean, 10 percent, you know, amongst everything is all.

Q. Oh.

A. But I do most of it, or I do maybe a lot of it's right word. And it could be anything as far as, you know, we talk about recurrent training, you know, air witness release, parts receiving. Well, actually prior to Ron joining us, you know, I did a thing about (indiscernible). You know, I don't hold one,

but it doesn't mean I don't understand what the --
Q. Sure.
A. -- requirements are for. That was in response to another issue we had with one of the guys missing an (indiscernible) signoff.
Q. Yeah.
A. So, you know, that would be an opportunity where we'd make that a training event and apply it to everyone instead of just an individual, so --
Q. Was it maybe the GEN FAM course, you do most of that?
A. Yes. But like I said, I don't do those, I don't do those on a regular basis.
Q. Um-hum. What's that like? Is it a multiday thing? How long's take?
A. It's a 40 hour class, so it's a week long.
Q. Okay. How much of that's devoted to the engines?
A. I would say probably 15 percent.
Q. Okay.
A. Maybe 20 as far as -- well, maybe 20 as far as they interact with the airframe.
Q. And what does that consist of? Like what do you do during a GEN FAM class? How's it break down? I mean, do you go out -- is it a lot of hands on or --
A. It's a little bit of both.
Q. -- just classroom?

A. Yup, no. We do classroom, you know. I have a power point just like anybody else that teaches the FAM course, and then, yeah, then we go down and do show and tell. I find it easier. It makes more sense to the guys when you can show them on a diagram how it works and then actually show them where the component is on the airframe.

Q. Um-hum. Pocholo had asked if you'd identified any recent issues within the maintenance organization and you had said nothing came to mind recently. I just wanted to make sure first of all -- I can't remember if the question was safety issues, so let me ask sort of a clarification which is had you identified any safety issues within the maintenance organization in the, let's say, few weeks preceding the accident?

A. Nothing comes to mind.

Q. Okay. And then as far as the repetitive issues for the CASS program, is there like a formal criteria as far as like how many times something has to be written up --

A. I think it's --

Q. -- or is more subjective?

A. I think it's three, but it is in our manual as far as, you know, repetitives.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. Just to interject real quick, I couldn’t find anything with regards to your repetitive in your manuals whatsoever. Unless you can show me different or Ron can show me, I have not been able to

find anything in your GMM.
A. And, of course, you guys have revision two, you don't have revision three.
Q. What revision do I have? I have no idea.
A. Well, you have the one that was in force at the time.
Q. Right, and that's what we needed to see.
A. So we had actually had a revision three done prior to that which did remove some of the (indiscernible) stuff and that had been rejected so, you know, we took it back and we're still kind of trying to work through it when all this stuff happened.
Q. Got it. So that's why there's stuff missing and stuff is not there, and there's too much stuff in there?
A. Yes.
MR. CRUZ: I'm sorry, Bill, I just --
BY DR. BRAMBLE:
Q. So the manual that was in effect at the time of the accident, did it have the criteria for repetitives?
A. I thought it did, but I could be wrong.
Q. Okay.
A. I would have to verify that.
Q. All right. All right. I may have some pauses here because I have to sort of eliminate questions --
A. Sure.
Q. -- that have already been addressed here. Wait a sec. All right, were you on duty the day before the accident, July 1?

A. I don't recall if I was on that day. I think I was off the day of because --
Q. It's tricky because the accident happened --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- after midnight on the 2nd, so, I mean, like sort of --
A. Yes, I worked because I got the call that night, so --
Q. Okay.
A. -- I worked that day.
Q. Okay. Anything unusual going on with maintenance of the aircraft that day?
A. None that I recall.
Q. Okay. Were you acquainted with the two crew members, Henry Okai and Greg Ryan?
A. I didn't know them.
Q. Okay.
A. I knew of them, but I didn't know them.
Q. Had you heard any complaints about their interactions with maintenance personnel?
A. The only thing that I'll say about that is that, you know, the guys kind of said it (indiscernible) little weak system wise and we had some issues as far as, you know, deciphering some of his write-ups.
Q. Anything in particular come to mind?
A. Not off the top of my head.
Q. Aware of anything unusual about the condition of the aircraft

before the accident?
A. No.
Q. Any open maintenance items that you're aware of when it departed?
A. No. No maintenance items that I'm aware of.
Q. Any recent history on that accident -- on that airplane of recurring maintenance issues before the accident?
A. The only thing I recall on that one, we were chasing an intermittent fuel quantity issue which only would do it it seemed to be on approach. It wouldn't do it on the ground, so it's kind of hard to track that one down.
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. Just to interject.
MR. CRUZ: I'm sorry, Bill.
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. (Indiscernible) right here on this particular airplane, specifically on Chapter 28 the fuel in the engine obviously.
A. Um-hum.
Q. The airplane had a history of quantity indication like you said on number two for close to almost a year. The airplane went through the heavy maintenance at the end of March.
A. It did.
Q. Came out in late April.
A. So they had found what they thought was the problem, and we thought we corrected it, and it was -- seemed to be okay for a few

weeks and then it was always an intermittent issue, so it was just really hard to track down. And like I said, on the ground it always worked.

Q. Right.

A. So we just couldn't seem to make it fail.

Q. So at that point because there are definitely quite a bit of write ups just in May coming off it. At some point it's been written up (indiscernible) based off of the log book pages. At that point is there a point where you as the director of maintenance says we need to put this airplane down and fix it?

A. It was getting to that point, you know, in all honesty, but, you know, like I said, it's one of those things where, you know, everything that we had tried to, you know, correct it, we didn't find anything wrong. You ring out wires, you ring out, you know --

Q. Is there a point where you may contact Boeing and ask for some help?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Are you asking if he did or do you think he thinks he should have?

MR. CRUZ: Yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Which?

MR. CRUZ: He should have.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.

MR. KIMBLE: Oh, you think I should have.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. I mean to say, I'm asking if you should have asked for help for this particular issue.
A. I don't have an answer for that.
Q. Okay.
A. It's one, like I said, it's one of those things where, you know, what do you tell them? It's just an intermittent issue and on the ground it works all day long, and it works in flight.
Q. Understood.
A. And it works every other day, so, I mean, it's kind of a, you know, how do you describe that?
MR. CRUZ: Sorry, Bill.
DR. BRAMBLE: No, that's okay.
BY DR. BRAMBLE:
Q. Are you aware of any issues with the airplane's engines prior to the accident in terms of backfires or stalls?
A. No. And we actually had had an engine trend monitoring I think two days prior that showed everything normal.
Q. When the airplane came back from its maintenance at the MRO, did you have -- did they provide you any indication with how much margin you had on the two engines as far as temperature?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. The only time you get an engine margin is when it comes out of the test cell.
Q. Okay. All right. Have you hear anything about issues with

high EGTs on the accident airplane's engines during takeoff with (indiscernible) before the accident?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. And how about rejected takeoffs for that reason?

A. On that particular airframe, not that I'm aware of.

Q. So a number of pilots that we talked to said that they've observed during derated takeoffs, derated thrust takeoffs that the EGTs would come right up to the bottom of the yellow range or maybe a little bit into it during takeoff. Is that concerning or is that sort of within acceptable parameters?

A. Whitney says that that's acceptable parameters.

Q. It's in -- I'm sorry, I missed the first part of that.

A. Oh, I said Pratt and Whitney says that that's acceptable parameters.

Q. Okay.

A. That you can be in that range for I believe it's five minutes. Actually you can be at the top of the button, the top of the red for five minutes.

Q. Okay. Is that per occurrence or is that cumulative over time?

A. It doesn't differentiate to my knowledge as far as what's in the Pratt's manual. I don't have it in front of me.

Q. Okay. All right. We also had information from the first officer about a hydraulic fluid leak out of the right hand landing gear wheel well and it looked like, according to him, or according

to the captain and the mechanic on duty that night that it was a -- maybe dried fluid, maybe not an active leak. The reservoir looked okay. Have you heard of any problems in the past with hydraulics leaks out of the main landing gear wheel well for that airplane?

A. No. I was not aware of the leak until after.

Q. Okay.

A. On that particular aircraft.

Q. Was that -- how did you feel about the way they handled that? Was that appropriate?

A. So my -- what I normally tell them, and I tell the pilots the same thing, you know, you want something addressed, you put it on the log book. That's what should have been done. I think if it was an issue, it should have been documented.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. Have you seen the picture that --

A. Yeah, I saw it after the fact. It's kind of hard to say. As you may or may not know, but you actually service the hydraulics on that side of the aircraft, so if the guy, you know, put a can up there and made a mess, I don't know, but what I was told is that they did actually power the system up and confirmed there was nothing, no active leaks is what I was told, but it still should have been documented.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. So even if they ruled it out as an active issue, you

felt it should have --
A. If it was a problem, and it was a concern where he took a picture, he should have documented it.
BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
Q. Do you expect that if the pilot wouldn't do it, that your maintenance personnel would?
A. I encouraged -- you know, if the pilot finds it, he needs to document it, and that's pretty much what I tell, you know, the guys. If the pilot has an issue, he needs to make an entry for it.
MR. CRUZ: Anything else?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry.
MR. CRUZ: We really should try to --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry, I'm sorry.
MR. CRUZ: It's hard for the transcriptionist.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm sorry.
MR. CRUZ: All right.
BY DR. BRAMBLE:
Q. All right. So how was morale in the maintenance department before that, before the accident?
A. I mean relatively good.
Q. And was staffing adequate in your view?
A. Staffing was as adequate as I can make it.
Q. Did you feel like you were down people or --
A. Well, we're always trying to hire. I've got ads I've been

running for over four years.
Q. If you could find enough qualified people, how many people would you be able to hire do you think or how many people would you be authorized to hire?
A. I'd be authorized to hire what I felt was sufficient. I've never had any restrictions placed on me for, you know, hiring people if that's what you're asking.
Q. I'm kind of trying to get a sense of how many people you'd like to have basically.
A. Like any manager, I'd love to have more people. Yeah, I mean, the more the merrier as far as I'm concerned, but it's what you can get.
Q. Okay. So you don't feel like you're at like half-staff or something like that.
A. Not half-staffed. I mean, like I said, you know, I took a hit here when all this stuff happened, but --
Q. All right. And how do you feel about the facilities that you're provided for your department? Are they adequate?
A. Adequate.
Q. And the pay, do you feel the pay that you can offer is adequate?
A. We are, yeah, we are very competitive pay wise.
Q. And do you feel like the company provides you the equipment and resources you need?
A. Yes. I had no restrictions placed on me what I can and can't

have. Within reason, that is.
Q. Okay. And you guys discussed the manuals some. I know there's been some ongoing issues, but how do you feel about the adequacy of the maintenance manuals that actually provide the maintenance instructions and so forth?
A. The ones -- I'm sorry, I don't follow your question.
Q. So it's like the airplane maintenance manual. Do you find it has adequate instructions in it and work cards and -- well, maybe not work cards. Do you have -- do you feel like it has adequate --
A. Well, I mean, everything that we get is from Boeing and, yeah, I mean, I think what we have is sufficient.
Q. Okay. So it's not a -- I'm just wondering if it's like, for example, like let's say it was an older manual and you feel like it could be written better, to more contemporary standards or something. I don't know if that's the case. I just --
A. I don't know. I've used those manuals for so long that I'm pretty comfortable with them, so, you know --
Q. Yeah.
A. No, I don't think there's anything wrong with what we have.
Q. Okay. All right. So there's a lot of back and forth between you guys and the FAA about the inspection program and I think there was some weight and balance stuff. The weight and balance stuff doesn't fall under you, right?
A. Just the weighing of the aircraft.

Q. Just the weighing, okay.
A. Yes.
Q. So the primary work on manuals that you guys were doing as a result of all this back and forth with the FAA, which manuals were affected by that?
A. The GMM and the AIP, General Air Inspection Program Manual.
Q. Okay. And what was the status of the revision process to those manuals at the time the accident occurred?
A. We -- they were both being in process of being revised.
Q. Okay. All right. So you were within one of those windows that they had granted you to fix it or something?
A. It was one of the returns, yes.
Q. Okay. All right. So granted, you know, you're overseeing this work, but just in terms of your overall feeling of confidence about the level of quality of the maintenance work done at Rhoades, what's your feeling? Do you feel confident that it's high quality?
A. We do a good job. Like I said, most of my guys have been with -- have been here a long time, you know. You don't hire guys on the street that work these aircraft because of their age, so they've got to learn, so, yeah.
Q. And you mentioned the fuel quantity indication being a tricky one to run down. Are there any other issues that -- with the 73s in the last year or so before the accident that were particularly vexing in terms of trying to figure out what the problem was?

A. It's like any aircraft, you know. This aircraft doesn't tell you anything, you know. You don't push a button on this one and, you know, you can go into the maintenance data computer and it spits out, you know, every fault that it had for the last 31s. This aircraft, it only does what you tell it and it doesn't tell you anything when it doesn't want to work right, so there's good and there's bad to that.

Q. All right. So one of the things that we've heard from a number of people was about the coding of maintenance write-ups, log book write-ups with F or I, F for flight crew maintenance item, and I for informational items. Were you aware of that before the accident?

A. There was some going back and forth on that. There seemed to be some confusion as far as that stuff goes, you know. It really doesn't make a difference in all honesty, you know. If it's an item that requires us to investigate whether it's an information or a flight crew item, it doesn't make a difference. It still has to be resolved.

Q. Okay. So in terms of the handling of those items, was it a different process?

A. It doesn't make a difference. Like I said, it's not what they're -- which code was used, it was what was written and what had to be done to comply with it.

Q. Okay. All right. So I have a handful of things that are basically issues pilots brought up at interviews. I just want to

give you a chance to comment on each of these things, so are you aware of any instances of mechanics asking crews to delay write-ups until they get back from a trip rather than before they leave?
A. No, and I don't encourage that.
Q. Okay. A number of pilots mention issues with pressurization some of which may have been MEL'd and taken a while to resolve. Has that been an issue, particular challenge or --
A. Yes. And I started working these aircraft back in early '90s and I've never dealt with pressurization issues like I have here, and I think a lot of it is, (a), the way the airplane is managed, and (b) the fact that the system doesn’t ever have a chance to stabilize. You know, normally you would go up to 25,000 feet and stay there for an hour so everything has a chance to, you know, kind of find its center, so-to-speak, but, you know, on a 13 minute flight, it's kind of -- you're up and you're down, so, yeah, I go through a lot of pressurization components because of that.
Q. All right. Another pilot mentioned an incident where he said that he reported a hydraulic leak, the mechanic looked at the drip frequency, decided it wasn't dripping fast enough to ground the airplane, and then they flew to Hilo and the hydraulic B system failed and then they had to somehow get the airplane back. Do you recall this incident?
A. Well, the AMM does provide for leak limitations, and that's what he would have used to determine serviceability, but what

would cause the system to fail, I don't know as far as that stuff goes.

Q. And I think you shook your head earlier indicating that you're not really aware of the specifics of this incident.

A. I don't recall this one, no.

Q. Okay. All right. So we had another pilot that said they came to the airplane and the FO's seat had damaged the circuit breakers behind the FO's seat and she reported it to a mechanic, and the mechanic asked the captain to write it up when they got back from the trip according to this pilot, but that -- she said that the captain declined to write it up and the damage wasn't repaired in a timely fashion. Do you know anything about this?

A. I have no knowledge of that.

Q. Okay. All right. How often do you typically interact with the FAA certificate management team? I think you said -- actually that was the previous interview. Let me just leave it at that. Basic question.

A. Like I was saying before, it's more by correspondence than anything else.

Q. Okay. So in the last year it's primarily been remote correspondence like email or --

A. Email, phone calls. I mean, they do come on premises, but it's not, you know, on a regular basis or anything.

Q. All right. Before the accident, who was responsible for managing safety overall at Rhoades Aviation?

A. Are you talking about the director of safety?
Q. Yeah, that's what I was looking for.
A. Okay. That would be Orlando Debrum.
Q. And who is the accountable executive for safety management?
A. That would be Teimour Riahi.
Q. And if you had a safety related concern, how would you communicate that to management above you?
A. I think the process we have is good. We'd go to the safety department, to the director of safety.
Q. Okay. Have you ever done that and brought up a concern to him?
A. I'm sure I have, but I don't recall exactly what it was. Nothing recent.
Q. All right. Do you participate in the twice a week safety meetings?
A. I do.
Q. And what's your role in those meetings?
A. I -- once again it kind of depends on what the topic is what my role may be. If it's a maintenance concern, obviously I'm going to take a big part of it. If it's operations, probably not so much unless it pertains directly to the aircraft or something.
Q. Okay. Who else typically attends those meetings?
A. Myself, the chief inspector for the maintenance side, director of safety, chief inspector -- or chief executive, I'm sorry, vice president of operations, DO, anybody else they decide

they want to drag in there. It could be, you know, somebody from cargo or whatever else.

Q. Okay. Do you feel those meetings are effective for identifying risks and developing mitigation strategies for addressing that?

A. I do. I think we're getting better at it as far as an organization.

Q. All right. And are you involved in the company's CASS program? Do you run the CASS program or is that the chief inspector?

A. Chief inspector.

Q. Okay. Do you have any kind of direct involvement in that or just discuss it during the safety meetings? Or how's that work?

A. Well, so I'm actually -- well, I mean, you know, I'm part of the CASS board.

Q. Okay. All right. And so not being a mechanic, I'm not familiar with the CASS stuff, but what does -- how does the CASS program function? Like what is its activities?

A. So not to go too far into this stuff, but, I mean, with -- the main goal of the CASS program is, you know, is basically to make us a more effective organization as far as, you know, our reliability, you know, the issues that we're having, what our write-ups are, you know, what we can do to improve our processes and procedures.

Q. So it sounds like CASS kind of goes beyond safety a little

bit into efficiency and quality?
A. It's a little bit of everything, yeah.
Q. Okay. All right. And then on the recurring write-ups, if you had sort of recurring issues in a particular type of write-up, then that's a place where that would be flagged, is that accurate?
A. That would be addressed.
Q. Okay. In the last year or so were there -- can you recall anything that may have come up as recurring issues in CASS?
A. I think some of the stuff's already been articulated, you know. Pressurization was one that was brought up, compressor stalls was another one that was brought up. You know, so basically -- you know, based on that then we decide what we're going to do going forward.
Q. Okay. So we pretty much have our arms around it then in terms of the investigation, in terms of the issues that came up.
A. Um-hum. Yes, and some of this stuff, you know, will be tabled for the next time around and we'll take a look at it to see if what we did was effective or not. If that didn't work, then maybe we change our mitigation strategy.
Q. Okay. But there are other recurring issues we haven't -- we don't know about or haven't raised already that were sort of big topics of conversation?
A. Nothing comes to mind.
Q. Okay.
A. Of recently.

Q. All right. And do you feel the CASS program has been effective in identifying and addressing relevant trends and recurring maintenance issues?
A. I would say yes.
Q. And what makes you say that? What gives you confidence?
A. Well, you know, for example, like I said, we, you know, we had the issue with the compressor stalls, you know, so we looked at it, and we were trying to determine what would actually, you know, could cause it, the factors there we were having, was it a component issue, was it operator issue, so one of the things like I said we did is we put out a memo to the pilot group and said, you know, these things can cause a compressor stall, and the next month when we did our CASS meeting, we didn't have anywhere near the numbers. So that to me would be an effective --
Q. I see.
A. -- outcome.
Q. So you guys identify a problem, you try to figure out the potential causes, you communicated that back to the workforce and it seemed to reduce the problem. Okay. All right. And one of the things we've heard about is the SMS audits and we understand that there are SMS maintenance audits.
A. There are.
Q. Do you have -- do you interact with those in any fashion or --
A. As far as, you know, the safety management audits you're

talking about?
Q. Um-hum.
A. Not so much. As far as, you know, I don't -- I mean, I'm not involved in the actual audit of it, you know. I mean, I am presented with their findings, make a determination of whether what they have is an actual or whatever the case may be.
Q. Okay. So what would be an example? Like what would be -- can you describe one? Can you tell us what an SMS maintenance audit looks like? What do they do?
A. They primarily use the DCTs for their audits. Once again, we're a small company so we, you know, don't always have the wherewithal to develop your own personalized audits, so it's easier to take something that's already boxed up, so-to-speak.
Q. Okay. Do you feel that those audits are effective for identifying risks including safety?
A. I think if the audit is done properly, yes.
Q. What kind of safety related communications do you get from the company or from the safety department specifically or from the CEO since he's the accountable executive? Do you get routine communications --
A. Yeah, we --
Q. -- from --
A. -- do -- they do a quarterly newsletter and then, of course, any safety concerns that, you know, are generated if they're maintenance then they come to me for my input or what not. So it

could be any number of ways.
Q. Okay. All right. And from a cultural standpoint, one of the things that we heard from the oversight team is that in their experience it can take time for an organizational culture to develop or to shift and so I have a few questions I'd really like your insights about, sort of the culture at Rhoades, the organizational safety culture at Rhoades, and how things may be changing over time, and -- so I guess I'll start with do you feel supported by management and able to make safety related decisions without fear of repercussions?
A. I do.
Q. Do you feel pressures from management to do things that you feel are unsafe?
A. I do not.
Q. And prior to the accident did you have any safety related concerns about the company?
A. No.
Q. How would you describe the organizational safety culture at Rhoades before the accident in terms of, you know, how did the company -- what was the company's approach to balancing safety and productivity and what was the atmosphere like in terms of being able to be open and raise safety issues and address them in a non-punitive way?
A. I think our culture is good. I mean, everyone is encouraged to bring up anything that they think, you know, may be an issue or

could become an issue, and we come up with ways to mitigate it.
Q. All right. So are we to understand that during a CASS meeting there was a discussion of a safety report? Maybe it was a joint CASS safety meeting.
A. So normally we do our CASS first and then we do our safety meeting follows after it.
Q. Okay. During one of those meetings there was an agenda item about a safety report from a pilot saying a captain declined to write-up a maintenance issue because they were afraid of being fired, and then the CEO sent out a letter to the company employees saying that that was not the -- our understanding is the letter said that, you know, that was not the case, encouraged company employees to report things without fear of retribution and so forth. Are you aware of that incident?
A. I am.
Q. Okay. Have you ever heard of any other instances of someone saying that they were afraid to report something for fear of being fired?
A. I think, you know, if you guys had looked at our log pages, I don't think -- I think there's plenty of write-ups that have been generated and like I said, my philosophy is, you know, everything needs to be documented, so -- I know what you're talking about, but I'm not aware of anyone else making that -- arriving at that assumption I guess would be the term.
Q. Okay. You're not aware of anyone else other than that

particular report arriving at that assumption.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. All right.
DR. BRAMBLE: That's all I have, so I'll pass it onto Steve.
BY MR. MUSE:
Q. Like Mr. Cruz here, I had two questions for you. He pretty much asked you both the questions I was going to ask.
A. Okay.
Q. But you brought up something and I want to know if this was pre-accident or post-accident --
A. Okay.
Q. -- about the FAA's compliance philosophy versus let's violate them philosophy. Did that start after the accident or has it always been like that?
A. No, it's been like -- it was like that prior to.
Q. Prior to.
A. I mean, we already had the D89 op spec amendment at that point, and we had one against the, was it the -- I think it was for the aircraft listing. I forget the op spec for it.
Q. (Indiscernible).
A. The one for 326.
Q. The D85, 326 -- yeah, 326 and 810?
A. No, that was -- no, it wasn't -- because 326 they were going to take off for the cargo loading stuff.
Q. So in your opinion was the D85 --

A. No, and --
Q. -- ready for (indiscernible).
A. Yeah, that was because, like I said, because they said we didn't have the data for the cargo loading which we did, you know, and we provided that when we conformed. You know, one of the problems that we ran into the CHEP was, you know, given the age of our aircraft, a lot of these -- a lot of the documents are relatively old and they're paper copies. They're not electronic, you know, so I don't have this stuff readily available, and some of this stuff, you know, for example the airplane we're talking about with the cargo loading system was just all back in the '90s, like '93 or something, so, you know, I've got to go back through 30 years of records and look for this stuff. Another big one we had was, you know, they were going to -- I forget what the op spec was for -- the big thing came up with the landing gear of the CPCB, and the restoration cards, you know, which is part of the maintenance program. PMI felt that we needed to have an 8130 for the restoration of the landing gear because he said it constituted an overhaul and I said it does not. Restoration is just that. It could be an overhaul but it doesn't necessarily make it so, and went back and forth, but we had to go back and show them the last time the gear was overhauled and provide the dirty fingerprints for them to review. In the meantime, like I said, I parked an airplane for a week until we straightened all that stuff out.
Q. So in your opinion the accident has not changed the

relationship.
A. I think that the accident was used to, like I said, you know, we already had the ops thing, you know, all this stuff going on after the accident, and they went forward with the amendment, and, like I said, you know, they also went after our D72 and now they're going after our D97.
Q. Was the prior CMT prior to these three folks coming on board or was the relationship better or about the same?
A. Much better.
Q. Much better.
A. They would work with us, you know. There's a difference between, you know -- anybody that comes into any organization is going to find something. I mean, we expect that, you know, with any kind of a CHEP inspection. You're going to find something wrong. We expect it, but --
Q. That's the only question I had. Thanks.
A. Right, but I'm just saying, you know, but it seems to be a gotcha type deal, you know. If I provide information then, well, you know, that's not what I wanted. I want this, and, you know, what we look at now is goal posts keep getting moved. They want this corrected, we correct it, and now they want this corrected. It's just kind of where we're at now, so --
BY MR. CHIAO:
Q. Were you aware that the engines were (indiscernible) JT89 margin?

A. JT9s -- I'm sorry, JT89 tend to have a small margin compared to a 17 anyhow, and so I'm not surprised with the 20 or 30 degree margin, that's pretty standard for those engines.

Q. And when was this (indiscernible) operation?

A. I'm sorry, I didn't understand the question.

Q. (Indiscernible) a plan to maintain the engine to insure (indiscernible) operation.

MR. CRUZ: Is there --

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. -- EGT (indiscernible).

MR. CRUZ: -- a plan that you have maintaining those EGT margins after it went in operation?

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. (Indiscernible).

A. Well, it's --

MR. CRUZ: After it stalled.

MR. KIMBLE: It's pretty hard to maintain the EGT margin. I mean, that's what they're for, you know, but that's -- basically that's going to give you the life of that engine is your margin, right? So, you know, that's how you know how much life you're going to get out, you know, the bigger the engine, the bigger the margin, the more you're going to get out of it. So I'm sorry, I don't really follow your question as far as that, you know. I mean, it's like everything else, we maintain them, but if an engine doesn't pass muster, doesn't pass muster, we replace it.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. So the question is what interval were you doing the PSI on the compressor and HPD sections?

A. We do not do borescopes in house. If I have to have an engine borescoped, I bring somebody in for that, and Pratt and Whitney gives you a pretty good size interval for your borescopes. We tend to use the four year disk for the 6431, so that means, you know, basically we're taking these engines off every four years and we send them to the shop to have the (indiscernible) reapplied and everything else, and they through a test cell at that time.

Q. And how do you check the SBs and (indiscernible) through CASS going on the aircraft?

MR. CRUZ: How do you check all the SBs and (indiscernible) data on the parts before they get on the airplane?

MR. KIMBLE: Are we talking about --

MR. CRUZ: Service bulletins and --

MR. KIMBLE: For Pratt and Whitney?

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. Yes.

MR. CRUZ: Yeah, engine --

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. -- front engine.

A. Yeah, so we have the subscription with Pratt for the JT8s. What I mean is there's not much that we do where we would incorporate a service bulletin for the most part. That's going to

be done by our vendor that does our engines, and, of course, when we get the engines back we get the service bulletin listings and everything else, and all the AD compliances which would be in the mini pack.

MR. CHIAO: I have no more questions.

MR. CRUZ: Ron.

BY MR. LENHART:

Q. I don't really have a whole lot of questions. One of the things I do have a little bit of concern about is like the ECMs and stuff and I know you do get a little bit of reports back from the company that does that for you, but I don't know how we can really apply anything together from the cycles that we put on the airplanes that work with that altitude or not, but maybe that's something that we could look into moving forward, you know, and how to monitor the instrument a little bit better, but if you're only up there one time a day and you get 20 in a month, it doesn't do you --

A. So --

Q. -- plot with to see --

A. So let me respond to that. So we tried that when I first started working here because we did that before, you know, and we didn't use the same company, but we did not -- you know, we don't do our engine monitoring in house. We actually farm that to a company owned by Pratt and Whitney, you know. It's on the cruise data, and criteria is you have to be stabilized for you to be able

to get accurate data, so when I first started -- when I first joined Rhoades Aviation, it was all over the place because they were trying to do this stuff going to Maui or Lahui and, you know, just everywhere because the data never stabilized, you know. Obviously the best time to get data off any engine is during takeoff, and if you've got a QAR that's just brilliant, but, you know, we just don't have that type of technology or any way to really obtain it, but -- so, I mean, so the only solution was was to take the longer flights, so I said anything more than 40 minutes at that point we'll extract to that, so --

Q. Okay. And then to kind of follow up with your question earlier about the two sections that were missing in the GMM for the (indiscernible) that was provided to you that was on our drop down box and stuff, Chapter 10.5 through -- and 10.6 were both missing out of the manual (indiscernible). It said the other ones would be made to the revisions. You have seen it in there for the --

A. So maybe the one --

Q. (Indiscernible).

A. -- that was in the drop box was jacked up. Okay.

Q. So that's kind of what happened.

A. Yeah, so we did find -- we had a little bit of a problem with our tech pubs. That was one of the big findings out of our CHEP. We didn't realize things were where they were, but, you know, we got new people in here, and we go some folks that know what

they're doing now, so --

MR. LENHART: That's all I have.

MR. MARCOTTE: And, it's been a while. Dan MARCOTTE, I've got a few things to add.

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. Do you guys do tank entries?

A. Very rarely, but, yes, we do.

Q. I was asking really, you know, fuel quantity.

A. Yeah.

Q. If you're not doing fuel quantity --

A. Yes, we did go in the tank.

Q. You go into the tanks.

A. Yeah.

Q. Strip the wires, look for probes.

A. Yeah.

Q. All that.

A. And, like I said, the airplane had just gone through a heavy check, you know, a couple months prior.

Q. Yeah.

A. And they had found one of the probes was bad, and they found some corrosion on one of the connectors so we replaced all that, and --

Q. Did you consider replacing the harnesses?

A. It's kind of hard to get harnesses for these guys --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- you know, because of the age of the aircraft and there's not --
Q. Okay.
A. But we did, you know, shoot all the wires and, like I said, we just weren't able to find anything conclusive.
Q. Okay.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.
MR. MARCOTTE: I'm still -- I got a few more.
DR. BRAMBLE: Oh, you do. Okay.
MR. MARCOTTE: Yeah, I got a few more.
DR. BRAMBLE: Jumping the gun there, sorry.
BY MR. MARCOTTE:
Q. So you brought up the compressor stalls. There were a couple write-ups (indiscernible).
A. Um-hum.
Q. There's one for the (indiscernible) cruise, there was a write-up and --
A. The one in cruise as my understanding was, what I got back from the maintenance guys was that the first officer was jockeying the throttle --
Q. Okay.
A. -- so that would stand to reason.
Q. Okay. I just wondered, standard practice when there's a log book write-up with back and forth compressor stalls and cruise at 1,300 -- 13,000 feet during cruise, what would you expect for the

maintenance crew to do?
A. Well --
Q. What would you expect in the log book?
A. I expect to say that they had multiple stalls and, you know, for us we'd have to do an engine run to confirm what we have. You know, it's the same thing, you know. If we're operating the engine properly, the chances of, you know, us trying to, you know, I mean, we're not going to try to, you know, induce a stall, you know. This engine does pretty well with them, but you still don't -- it's not the right thing to do as far as that stuff goes, but, you know, if we can't replicate it, we can't replicate it. In most cases, you know, we'll check to make sure we don't have any obstructions in the PT2, or none of the lines are loose, that kind of stuff. You know, I mean, obviously we'll investigate it to make sure there's nothing externally wrong.
Q. Would you expect them to look in Chapter 5 for conditional inspections?
A. There is a thing in there for a surge, yes.
Q. So would you expect that (indiscernible)?
A. We could, yes, but they also may use the Pratt manual because it does also give inspections for the same thing.
Q. The conditional inspection refers to the Chapter 72 drop the Pratt, I believe.
A. Yes.
Q. So --

A. As I recall, yes.
Q. And I think I recall directly it says prior to further flight, depending on the condition of the surge occurred in perform one of three inspections for the Pratt drop.
A. Without having it in front of me, I'd have to look.
Q. No, I understand. But if that was the case, if you understood it said prior to further flight, would you expect that --
A. Yes.
Q. -- to be in the sign off?
A. I would.
Q. Okay. And I understand you've always walked, you know, as a mechanic you use your personal experience and the manuals, too. Do your guys follow the troubleshooting information in the maintenance manual for stalls? Do you expect them to or just kind of their own experience or --
A. They'll look at it. As you know, the troubleshooting in the 200 manual is not exactly stellar --
Q. No, I --
A. -- because there's no FIM (ph.) for these aircrafts so, you know, it does -- and they do use it because it does at least give you point you in the right direction as far as that stuff goes, but, yeah, I think it's, you know, like anything else, it's going to be a combination of, you know, experience. We know what normally causes it.

Q. No, I understand.
A. You know, these airplanes are operated a little bit differently than anything even that I've experienced in, you know, all the years I've been working the 73s. It's just a short hops, you know, you're up, you're down. The airplane is never cold soaked so your fuel is always hot so your engine is always warmer than one would normally expect. It is what it is.
Q. Okay. And the other one was you had the backfire during -- constant backfire during takeoff. That's when it was -- I saw in an interruption report that they had acoustic liner, excuse me, a composite liner, a lamination. You laminated it.
A. Which airplane?
Q. That was 810. It says after takeoff --
A. What day was this?
Q. 29 April of this year.
A. It said the acoustic liner separated?
Q. Excuse me, (indiscernible). 25 November.
MR. CRUZ: 2020.
BY MR. MARCOTTE:
Q. 2020. Let me find the exact -- constant backfire from number one engine during takeoff, and this was on the final corrective action was engine runs and (indiscernible). But some place in your -- this interruption report they said it had an acoustic -- not an acoustic panel, but a laminated panel that detached from the inlet.

A. It's -- what -- it's the mesh.
Q. Right. I keep calling it acoustic liner and I've heard this airplane has that, but --
A. Yeah, it's like I said, it does have acoustics --
Q. It's the same.
A. -- but what separates is that mesh that goes around it, and, of course --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- any time that happens you're going to have compressor stalls.
Q. The last page I looked at, it says shortly after takeoff from Honolulu about 700 feet number one engine suddenly developed a series of high continuous backfires. The backfires were quickly brought under control with russ level, emergency declared, flight returned to Honolulu. After landing it was observed a complete section of engine one indent lamination was missing. Remnants of lamination were found on stater vanes and fan blades. The lamination of intake (indiscernible). So with that type of a -- and that was in the summary. That wasn't in the pilot report. The pilot report simply said backfires on takeoff. But anyway, what would your expectations be with -- for a mechanic if he, you know, he said the backfires, finds that laminate in the intake separated.
A. Like I said, it's a mesh.
Q. Yeah.

A. Which makes -- so --
Q. And they found it in stater vanes and fan blades. Would you expect -- again, well, Chapter 5 inspection probably --
A. Absolutely.
Q. -- backfire.
A. That'll do -- well, that, but also they'd have to make sure that we got everything. As you know, when those things do that stuff, it doesn't, you know -- it's going to cause a compressor stall and it does happen. I mean, I've had it happen on the 73s, 76s, 75s. Same thing.
Q. Yeah.
A. And except with those airplanes it's a lot more expensive because you --
Q. Right.
A. -- use panel the fifth stage blades, but, yeah, so it's -- and it's -- honestly it's getting -- I mean, it does happen. And we do have repairs, and we were actually able to find these things. I mean, those kinds are getting hard to come by.
Q. Okay. Okay. That's it. Thank you. I was just looking at the log book. Now I understand it's an old airplane, and older engine, and it seems to get serviced pretty frequently with oil. Do you have an oil consumption tracking somewhere?
A. We keep track of it so when we do -- we do record it on our log book. As you know, you can burn a quart an hour. And I'm going to -- no offense, but I'm going to say it's like any other

Pratt and Whitney, if it's not leaking, if something's not coming out of a drain or a vent --

Q. It's dry.

A. -- it's dry, yeah.

Q. More like a Harley. So do you know what the consumption rate on this airplane was prior to the accident?

A. Without looking, I'd have to go back and -- we'd have to go back and do the data for it. I couldn’t tell you.

Q. Is there some -- you know, your GMM says you talk about oil consumption daily, the stand up, you have a daily maintenance meeting. Do you have a place holder for some meeting or someplace to talk about oil consumption?

A. Well, we just talk about everything in general as far as that stuff goes. If we notice, like I said, anything abnormal --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- I mean, oil, hydraulic, you know, if we've got a leak someplace, we're going to start doing investigations.

Q. The last on this in a couple of the meetings and I realize this is -- the chief inspector who does the -- who prepares the meeting and what not, but you do sit in on them. In looking at your GMM in a lot of CASS based on trend data, you know, the (indiscernible), when you look at the meeting minutes we got, and, you know, I'm not at the meeting, I'm just looking at what were the meeting minutes, I didn't really see things that are called trend data, it's just this month here's what we saw from write-

ups. I didn't see anything on trends over time. When I looked in your GMM, it appears that you're supposed to be having -- tracking the number of prior reps by ATA, and there's alerting levels in the GMM. It's -- though I didn't see that any in the meeting minutes.

A. I don't know what was put in the meeting minutes. Off the top of my head I couldn't tell you.

Q. Okay. Also in the meeting minutes, you know, I didn't see any really reportings of discussions or decisions. Was this kind of more like an agenda or a data package. And you used a couple of examples where you looked at the data in a meeting and some actions were taken as a result of the meetings. You said pressurization, you talked about that, some compressor stalls. Where could we see -- do you know where we could find evidence of what was discussed in a meeting, what some of the actions, who was responsible for actions, the follow up on actions?

A. So, yeah, we do have a part of our CASS where, you know, anything that we decide to table for the next round, I mean, it is documented in there, so I'm not -- once again I don't have it in front of me so I don't know what you're looking at exactly, but we do have a section in there for that.

Q. You know, I'm just trying to find --

A. I understand.

Q. -- you know how it is. And last in the safety meeting you brought up the captain, one pilot said another pilot was afraid to

write-up things, he had been threatened with his job if I understood. Do you remember that discussion? In the meeting minutes it does say that it was a line item closed. Do you know how that would close or do you remember? I don't --

A. Like I said, I think what came out -- I'm sorry, is it Dr. Bramble?

DR. BRAMBLE: Um-hum.

MR. KIMBLE: Like I said, the CEO put out a big memo that said this is not the case.

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. Yeah.

A. You know, everybody's free to do -- to make any entries as far as that stuff goes. I think that was a corrective action. We just reiterated what should have already been well known.

Q. So that -- I'm just kind of wondering what was discussed during the meeting, you know, that led to that action. Do you remember?

A. I don't.

Q. Okay.

A. It was kind of a pilot thing and I thought it was kind of sad. I didn't think that was an accurate statement.

Q. Okay. That's it. That's all.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. There's been a break requested before we do just a short round of follow-ups, so I think we're just going to take a quick break in case somebody needs a bathroom

run.

MR. KIMBLE: Okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: And there's water behind you, too, if you want some.

MR. KIMBLE: I need some more shortly.

(Off the record)

(On the record at 2:52 p.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. We're back on the record and it is 2:52 p.m. Mr. Cruz, do you have any follow up questions?

MR. CRUZ: Yeah, I did have follow up questions.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. Just to be clear, you basically said you don't have any bars for qualifying mechanics, correct? Any borescope that's being done is being farmed out?

A. Normally I'll bring in the guys that do our engines, their people.

Q. I'm sorry?

A. I said any time we have to do anything internal to the engine, I bring in my guys from Miami that do our engines.

Q. Are those the guys that overhaul the engines off site? You bring them out and have them work on them. So what -- part of the troubleshooting requires a borescope.

A. I bring them out.

Q. You actually call people from Miami and bring them here.

A. If I need to.

Q. You don't have anybody local here that does borescope for you?
A. Most of the guys, like I said, it's like I said before, you know, most guys working the JT8s are all, you know, older guys and a lot of them are retired, so, you know, the guys that are there, I know they know what they're looking at. I know they know what they're doing, so I prefer to, you know, bring them in.
Q. Okay.
A. Because I honestly don't -- I personally don't -- you know, I'm not from here. I don't know anybody that actually does that here. I'm sure Aloha's got some guys, but they don't do work for us obviously, so I bring folks in.
Q. And have you ever had a chance if -- have you ever in your time here brought in somebody from Boeing or Pratt to do some troubleshooting for you?
A. I actually brought in the guy that owns the engine shop to do JT8 training. Specifically, you know, to do some stuff on it actually and provide OJT for gear boxes.
Q. That was the engine shop in Miami.
A. Um-hum.
Q. Okay. So you brought him out here?
A. Brought him out here.
Q. How long ago was that?
A. Oh, probably a year-and-a-half ago I guess I had him out here.

Q. Okay. Just to train all your mechanics or just --
A. No, when we -- you know, this kind of stuff here, I try to make sure everybody gets it.
Q. Okay.
A. So everybody gets a little piece of it because --
Q. Okay.
A. -- you know, it just depends who's there.
Q. Besides the personality issues with the FAA with your new CMTs is that what really caused the transition from your previous PMI to new PMI that have that issue with regards to playing well with you versus giving you guys a harder time or making sure that you guys are --
A. So, you know, it's one thing if you have a question --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- as far as, you know, how are you guys doing this. This is how we do things.
Q. Yes.
A. Okay. We found this one here. We don't necessarily think this is right --
Q. Yes.
A. -- okay? Then what can we do to correct it.
Q. Yeah.
A. Well, but when you -- which is what I kind of had with the other team, you know. Like I said, we have issues like anybody else. We make mistakes --

Q. Sure.
A. -- you know. We've had to disclose, you know, self-disclosures and everything else, but it's what you do with the data once you're given it, you know. Are you going to try to use that as a took or a leverage as far as, you know, going forward what we're going to do. Like I said, I used this thing with the landing gear, you know. He called me on a Friday and said, you know, basically if I flew the airplane I was going to be violated because we -- you know, they didn't like my answer on the landing gear stuff, so I pulled the airplane out of service, you know. Being threatened with the violation, of course I'm not going to violate.
Q. Yeah.
A. I mean, who would? It's just -- so -- but, you know, we spent I'm going to say 10 days, you know, going through this stuff, pulling out records and showing them the dirty fingerprints --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- the overhaul records, and, you know, by the time it was all said and done, he's like, well, you know, there was four days according to when the gear was done for the CPC, I'm going to have to violate you for those four days, and I said you can't. I said it wasn't installed, and I actually had to send him a thing from Boeing where Boeing said the new CPC on the landing gear, the clock does not start until you install it on the air frame.

Q. And what did he say when you did show it to him?
A. Well, then, of course, he backed off, but if I hadn't been able to produce that document which I got from, you know, when I was a 767, you know, maintenance guy, because we had the same question posed to us, you know, I would have had another -- I'd been looking at another LOI. I can say as far as like, you know, we talked about the fan blade thing, I invested over 100 man hours, re-evaluating and, you know, going back and forth, and we went as far as trying to contact Pratt and Whitney. Of course, we had the NTSB, we had to get approval to go back to those guys and Pratt kind of said, well, we think you're good, but, you know, it's just like anything else, they're not going to give us a definitive answer. They said basically it's up to the operator, but we spent a lot of time and I said I've got two LOIs on the same issue.
Q. Right.
A. I just got an LOI last week going back to something that happened the prior year about an MEL for an aircraft. And it was an FAA approved MEL item. We had deferred the number two COM as we interpreted the MEL. It was approved when I got here. I never changed it. In all honesty, I had applied the same relief the same way at two other airlines which I shared with the POI who said, well, they went out of business, it doesn't matter, okay. So at the end of the day, we -- because, you know, he wanted me to go to draft something for FAA legal to state how I felt that I applied

to a specific regulation which I don't know off the top of my head, but I'm not doing that, you know.

Q. Is that the reason why you're mostly all correspondence instead of talking face-to-face and actually sitting down?

A. They have -- I mean, we do have face-to-faces and don't get me wrong, I mean, but something that, like I said, it's -- everything normally comes in a form of a documentation, and I can almost take a bet I'm going to get it on a Friday and have to have it -- you know, and seven days, seven calendar days to respond.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know, it's --

Q. And is it typically you or the director of ops that has to respond to that?

A. Like I said, most of the stuff is sent directly to the accountable executive.

Q. Oh, that's right. You said the accountable manager is the one that has to respond.

A. Yes.

Q. It's sent to -- it's addressed to him.

A. It's addressed to him. Whether it's a maintenance or an operations issue, it is addressed to the accountable executive.

Q. Gotcha. Yeah, because obviously it's quite interesting to hear the dynamics that's in (indiscernible) obviously.

A. Well, like I said, I think you guys have access to all of the letters and everything else from what I understand.

Q. Yeah, we're supposed -- in the midst of trying to get your correspondence letters to the FAA because that's something that we don't have --
A. Well, it's a substantial amount. For example, the D97 we just -- we submitted the -- after we brought the company in, we spent two weeks -- and these guys, this is what they do. They do 121 manuals.
Q. Yeah.
A. Which is what we needed.
Q. Yeah.
A. The first company I hired was a train wreck. They made it worse.
Q. Is that what you have now?
A. Well, so I started off with a company called Aviation Manuals and they did the first go around for me, and they said, oh, we can do this for you in 24 hours, but we had to pay up front, so I should have known better, but, anyhow, yeah, it was bad. It was real bad.
Q. Um-hum.
A. And then the -- we tried to correct it ourselves and, you know, we submitted it, and it was returned, and then we finally were able to find a company that we use now, and these guys do specialize in 121 manuals with frame maker and all the bells and whistles that normally you'd have.
Q. Right.

A. But, anyhow, we got -- we submitted that stuff on August 11, I think like 2:00 in the morning, and here we are almost October. We just got the --

Q. You're talking about the GMM --

A. I'm talking about the AIP right now, actually, I'm sorry.

Q. Just the AIP.

A. Yeah. We just got the -- we just got the rejection letter on Wednesday and then on Friday of last -- last Wednesday and on Friday of last week, and we got the op spec amendment two days later, and, like I said, we still don't have our other op specs b back.

Q. Yeah.

A. And they're going after another one, so --

Q. In your opinion, your opinion only, are they being very unreasonable with regards to trying to work with you guys?

A. The only thing I can say for this, well, in my opinion, yes. They're being totally unreasonable. You know, when you reject a manual for font and, you know, a table -- the affected pages aren't 100 percent correct, I mean, I understand that's what it's supposed to be, but --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- is that necessarily grounds for, you know, not allowing you to operate? You know, you asked for my opinion, I'm going to give it.

Q. Sure.

A. You know, one of the first things that came out when they, you know, amended our op specs and stuff was flying was the first thing that we see on TV was that Rhoades Aviation was -- have been under investigation since November of 2020. That's not true. We were under a CHEP inspection, but that's not an investigation as far as I understand it, and they said maintenance and safety issues. What, you know -- I don't see what basis they used for that, so -- I'm sorry, I got off base a little bit.

Q. No, that's -- like I said, it's --

A. But it's frustrating and, you know, I think it really makes it look like that we do have systemic issues which aren't necessarily there.

Q. Yeah, it's -- obviously we want to make sure we get your side of the story, too, and obviously we'll be talking to the FAA as well for their side of the story.

A. Yes, I understand that.

Q. But I also wanted to know from your standpoint and how you feel about how Rhoades Aviation is being treated by the FAA obviously.

A. Yeah, I think any operator wants to be treated fairly.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know, I mean, I don't -- we're not asking for anything special or, you know, to be given special consideration. Maybe perhaps in this case here, like I said, they knew we had all this stuff going on because they were preparing with their people as

well.
Q. Yeah.
A. Yet you want to place a restriction on us and, you know, threaten to -- so you're forcing me to do something in a manner where I have little hope of having any kind of a positive outcome --
Q. Right.
A. -- or acceptance from them.
Q. Right.
A. So, you know, I don't see the value in all honestly.
Q. Yeah, and that's what I want to try to get from you and understand from your standpoint, from a company standpoint for Rhoades. Obviously it's an issue, a contentious issue between Rhoades and the FAA, and all this stuff obviously was all before the accident even happened. There was stuff already in the works, I guess, and --
A. Well, no, and I think that the accident was a catalyst, you know, and once again, I mean, I -- in my opinion, I don't think there's anything wrong with that aircraft. I mean, obviously one engine quit working. I don't know why that is the case --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- but, I mean, but how many engine failures have people had over the years?
Q. Right.
A. We were talking, I work 72s and 73s and I've had multiple

failures over the years and it's never resulted like this.
Q. Well, until we obviously bring the engines up --
A. Exactly.
Q. -- and take a look at them --
A. Exactly, so --
Q. We also want to address the issue that Dr. Bramble and Sean Etcher from our offices basically saying that, well, if these airplanes had engines issues for the longest time, right, and --
A. I'm sorry, I don't agree with that.
Q. Again, the data is what's going to show us --
A. I understand.
Q. -- whether yes or no, right?
A. I understand.
Q. So -- but we want to make sure that, you know, we give you guys the opportunity to give us your take on it, right, and to try to understand your culture and the way that you interact with the FAA and the way the FAA interacts with you.
A. Sure, I understand that.
Q. I need to ask this question, and I know we've parked on this a lot, when the ops people says, well, it's in writing, right, from the Safety Review Board with regards to mechanics not -- or not mechanics, the pilots told not to write stuff up. Have you ever asked your mechanics not to write stuff up?
A. I'm sure my mechanics and the pilots will tell you that everything needs to be documented. I preach it to everybody.

That's the philosophy.

Q. I think that's all I have for you.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Steve.

BY MR. MUSE:

Q. And I have one last thing. In your personal, honest professional opinion with your background on this aircraft, we talked a lot about what causes this compression stall, in your professional opinion do you feel like after an airplane has stalled so many times on whatever hits you, do you not feel like you need to look inside that engine to see if the stall has not caused significant damage to the presser blades or anything of that nature with the salt water atmosphere and everything you have here, the corrosion and what not? This is your opinion because we don't have tech data in front of us, so --

A. Right, well, like I said, I don't know what kind of data you'd actually be looking for. In my opinion, like I said, I started working these JT8s back in the '90s, and I've worked them, you know, and in salt water environments and everything else, and, you know, like I said, any number of things can induce a stall.

Q. I understand. What --

A. On these engines, though, it really -- you know, you don't have variable stagers. You don't have variable guides, you know. They just don't -- they don't have the same issues that like a CFM would have or, you know a JT9 for that matter, any of the high bypass engines.

Q. You don't think compressor stall would --
A. So, like I said, I worked -- back in the day I worked 727. I think -- I'm sorry, sir, I think you said you worked 72s as well? Number two engines on those things were notorious for compressor stalls. I mean, you just turned -- you know, you're just taxiing the airplane, and they make a turn, and the thing will start stalling because you interrupted the airflow going into the engine, and it's not a catastrophic event like it is on a high bypass engine. Like I said, you know, if you have a compressor stall on a CF6 or a JT9, it's -- or a CFM for that matter, it's done.
Q. Thank you.
BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
Q. Okay. Thank you. If troubleshooting on the (indiscernible) required a (indiscernible), so was the reason it had been done?
A. It would have been done, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. But, like I said, most of the time I don't think that a compressor stall is going to warrant -- unless you have another issue that's driving you into that. You know, if the engine is not making EPR, if it's not -- and we had one of those not too long ago, you know, wasn't stalling -- well, actually it was stalling, but, you know, when we evaluated it and confirmed it was, yeah, this thing is -- we brought a guy out and we borescoped it and, of course, that engine at the time, it was due -- almost

due for an overhaul. We had 70 (indiscernible) cycles on that engine. It was just tired, and so we replaced it.

Q. Do you have any PSI report (indiscernible) policies?

A. For bird strikes?

Q. For borescope.

A. Oh, borescope, no. No, we would have just said we borescoped it and we didn't find anything.

Q. You don't have any (indiscernible).

A. No. No, we would have made -- it just depends on the situation. Here we didn't even make an entry because we decided to take the aircraft -- take the engine off wing, so we just sent it to the shop.

Q. Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible).

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Yeah, it looks like we're all good.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Mike, is there anything we haven't asked you about you'd like to share?

A. No, I think I've been relatively forthcoming as far as what I think.

Q. Okay.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. And we always offer everyone the opportunity to volunteer safety recommendations either pertaining to an accident or the, you know, the workplace in general. Do you have anything you'd

like to offer at this time?

A. No. I mean, nothing really -- I think I'm curious what you guys are going to find. I think that's probably --

MR. CRUZ: Well, like I said, we don't have the answers yet.

MR. KIMBLE: Yeah, like I said, I'm pretty curious.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. With that, we are off the record at 3:11.

(Whereupon, at 3:11 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Michael Kimble
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 21, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Lois D. Rush
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174

Interview of: RICKY MAY, Aircraft Maintenance Technician
Rhoades Aviation

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday,
September 22, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

POCHOLO CRUZ, Maintenance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

STEPHEN MUSE, Aviation Safety Inspector - Maintenance
Federal Aviation Administration

DANIEL MARCOTTE, Air Safety Investigator
Boeing

RONALD LENHART, Chief Inspector
Transair

HANK CHIAO, Senior Field Representative
Pratt & Whitney

COREY WRIGHT, Attorney
Wilson Elser
(Representative on behalf of Mr. May)

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I N T E R V I E W

(8:02 a.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Today is September 22nd, 2021 at 8:02 a.m. My name is William Bramble and I'm a Human Performance Investigator with the NTSB. I'm assisting the Maintenance Working Group led by NTSB Investigator Pocholo Cruz for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining a probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the DOT or the FAA and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I would now like to have Mr. Cruz and each of the Maintenance Group members briefly introduce themselves.

Mr. Cruz?

MR. CRUZ: Pocholo Cruz. I'm the Maintenance investigator for this accident.

MR. MUSE: I'm Stephen Muse with the FAA. I work at the Honolulu CMO. I'm a geographic maintenance inspector.

MR. CRUZ: Okay.

MR. CHIAO: Yeah. Hank Chiao; Pratt & Whitney.

MR. LENHART: Ron Lenhart, Chief Inspector, TransAir.

MR. MARCOTTE: And I'm Dan Marcotte from Boeing Air Safety Investigations.

MR. CRUZ: Okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Thank you, gentleman and during the interview, when it's your turn to ask questions, please also state your name just to help the transcriptionist.

Mr. May, is there anybody that you object to being present for this interview?

MR. MAY: No.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. Today, we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we'll send the recording out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to review that transcription and correct it for any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're here simply for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, however, we can't offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity from other organizations, that sort of thing and a transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for this accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time and everyone's been instructed not to interrupt the person who's asking questions. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person's had a turn.

Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection.

If you don't know, that's fine. You can say you don't know. If you don't understand a question, just say so and if you realize you misstated something just let us know and we'll correct it.

You're entitled to have one representative during the NTSB interview. Is there somebody here that you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. MAY: (Indiscernible).

DR. BRAMBLE: Please introduce yourself, sir.

MR. WRIGHT: My name is Attorney Corey Wright with the Wilson Elser firm appearing today on behalf of the witness.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Thank you. All right. Anybody have any questions before we begin?

(No response).

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

INTERVIEW OF RICKY MAY

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Mr. May, can you please state your full name, please?

A. Name is Ricky Dwain May, and I work at Transair as an Aircraft Maintenance Technician.

Q. And can you spell your name for me?

A. R-I-C-K-Y, middle name, D-W-A-I-N, last name M-A-Y.

Q. Okay. How old are you?

A. Fifty-eight.

Q. And what's your date of hire with Rhoades?

A. March -- I don't have the exact date as far as the day, but

March 2015.
Q. 2015. Okay, and could you give us just a brief overview of your aviation related background that led to you working at Rhoades?
A. Okay. I worked three years at Comair Aviation as an aircraft mechanic. I worked 14 years at Comair -- or Continental Airlines as an aircraft mechanic, RII inspector, assistant supervisor. Left Continental Airlines 2004, June 2004, and then worked a number of contract agencies and then from 2004 until 2015, and then went to Rhoades Aviation.
Q. Okay, and your current job title is Aircraft Maintenance Technician?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Who's your supervisor?
A. That would be Mike Kimble.
Q. Okay, and what are your roles and responsibilities briefly as an AMT?
A. Aircraft maintenance technician and RII inspector.
Q. All right. Do you supervise anyone?
A. On occasion, whenever the normal lead is busy, then usually because we have maintenance helpers and sometimes I'll supervise them.
Q. Okay. All right, and what's your normal weekly schedule?
A. Normally weekly schedule is Tuesday, Wednesday and then Friday, Saturday.

Q. Okay. Hours?
A. Ten hour shifts.
Q. Okay. When do you typically come in and leave?
A. I usually come in at 8:00 and then leave at 6:30.
Q. 8:00 p.m. and 6:30 a.m.?
A. 8:00 -- 8:00 a.m.
Q. Oh, okay, and leave at 6:30 p.m.?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, and how about the week of the accident? What was your schedule that week?
A. That week I was working nightshift, which would've been -- I think it was 11:00 to 7:30 in the morning.
Q. Okay. 11:00 p.m. to 7:30 a.m.?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. What training did you receive form Rhoades aviation with respect to your job duties?
A. We had paperwork training and also the RII training and hazmat training, hazardous material handling, and then actually hazardous material identification.
Q. Okay, and did you get some type of INDOC training and then you have --
A. INDOC, yes.
Q. Do you have any (indiscernible) current?
A. No, it's just initial indoctrination and then we have recurrent on the RII and then the hazmat and the normal

cooperating procedures as far as wastewater and so forth.
Q. Okay, and how about airplane specific training with respect to the 737? What training did the company provide you on that?
A. That one, the company did not provide any specific training on the 737. I had 737 training through Continental Airlines and through Vincennes University.
Q. How many years did you work on the 73 before Rhoades?
A. From 1990 until -- until now from different companies. A lot of the contract agencies also worked on 737s.
Q. Okay.
A. But the newer generation ones, of course.
Q. Uh-huh. Okay. What's satisfying or difficult about working at Rhoades? How do you like it?
A. It's pretty good. It's not bad. It's a little less chaotic than working for the airlines because the airlines, you know, they have a lot more airplanes to actually move and to, you know -- to do checks on.
Q. Okay, and were you on duty the night of the accident?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Okay. What time did you start shift that night?
A. 11:00.
Q. Okay. What do you recall about that night?
A. Okay. All right. So I do -- I do have the times written down someplace. Anyways, when we came in we did just basically, like, drove around each airplane to verify there wasn't any

problems that were obvious and then we went over to find out what the schedule was airplanes departing and then afterwards, Darryl went over to one of the other airplanes and I went over to 810, and as far as 810 goes, the pilot showed up.

They were doing a walkaround and basically they did a total walkaround of the airplane, turned on their hydraulic pumps like normal and all their pumps to verify no leakage or anything else. Prior to the accident, the pilots had a little concern with a very small puddle. It wasn't really a puddle.

It was just a little tiny, like, wet spot and afterwards, they called me over. They said, "What do you think of this," and I was, like, "Well, let's, you know, turn on the interconnect and make sure that the whole system is powered as far as the hydraulic system, and we looked at it.

We verified it was no active leak and the pilots were happy with it and that was pretty much the end of it until probably after the pilots took off, then the ramp control came over and said, "Your airplane has been involved in an accident," and at that time, I contacted Mike Kimble and Wallace Horibata.

Q. Okay. All right. So can you tell us in more details for how the crew -- well, let me preface this with we have no idea whether the -- this (indiscernible) leak has anything to do with the accident.

A. Okay.

Q. But because we don't have the airplane, we're trying to

basically just check all -- we're trying to make sure that we look carefully at anything that looks unusual, and so we want to just find out as much as can about this among other things.

So can you tell us, in a little more detail, like, which crew member approached you and how'd that conversation go?

A. Okay. That would've been Henry Okai.

Q. And what did he say when he brought it up to you?

A. I was, like, "Well, let's go take a look at it," and so we went over and actually looked at it and basically it was he did a walkaround. He came over. He goes, "I'm not really worried about it." He goes, "But we do have a small leak" --

Q. Okay.

A. -- "or what looks like a small leak.

Q. Okay, and so you mentioned turning on the interconnect and looking for an active leak. You guys do anything else?

A. No, that was it.

Q. Okay. So Mr. Okai mentioned checking the reservoir -- some reservoir?

A. Yes, we did check. We actually -- he did a thorough walkaround, said the reservoir was good.

Q. Where is that located?

A. The wheel well. In the center -- center beam of the wheel well and the ceiling, near the ceiling.

Q. Okay. Did you actually see what reservoir or just Henry checked it?

A. Yeah.
Q. You did?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. I checked that.
Q. You did check it?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, and where did you see the fluid level?
A. Right at the full mark.
Q. Okay, and did Henry ever mention anything about writing up the -- as a discrepancy? Sorry.
A. No.
Q. You've got to have your audio --
A. No.
Q. -- oddly. Okay. Okay. Is there anything else in the wheel well that has its hydraulic reactivated or has hydraulic lines that goes anywhere besides the landing gear?
A. The pumps, the hydraulic reservoir, the different valves, interconnect valves, numerous valves, flight control, packets as far as you're A&B system flight control systems. Oh, I have hydraulic plumbing in that area.
Q. Okay, and did you -- were you able to tell where it had come from depending on -- based on kind of where it was falling?
A. It looks sort of, like, it was residual where somebody had either done maintenance previously and because when we looked --

or when I looked up in that area, because there's an -- it's sort of a -- the way it's shaped, shaped like this and goes right to the wheel well, and then as you look, you have a -- you know, the landing gear actuator and it looks like they had either tightened the line up in that area and they just didn't clean the mess.

Q. Okay. All right, and you didn't -- did you see any wet --

A. No. There was --

Q. -- hydraulic --

A. -- no active leak at all.

Q. Okay. All right. Is that the kind of thing that you would normally write up or not because it's not an active leak? I should add -- I should rephrase that. What -- how would you decide whether to write something like that up?

A. If it's something that the pilot was actually concerned about, normally they would write that up but it was more like a question, you know. What do you think of this because we've got the pumps on and there's nothing actively happening and that's -- and we said, well, probably there was maintenance done to it, and we looked.

We actually looked in the logbook prior to that and we didn't see any maintenance had been done, but it wasn't actively leaking so we just looked at it and kind of thought, well, if pumps are on and the interconnect is energized and there's no leak, then, you know, they decided not to write it up.

Normally, if it's anything of concern, like, you know, if you

have, like, you look at it and if it's dripping, you know, then they would actually write it up and, you know, we'd either tighten it or address whatever type of problem there actually was with it.

Q. Okay. All right. So it basically didn't look like it was an active issue and that's why?

A. No, it didn't -- did not seem to be active.

Q. Okay. All right. How well did you know Captain Okai?

A. I flew -- or I actually have flown with him or actually sat in the jump seat and observed, you know, flight characteristics or how he flies.

Q. Okay, and how'd that go?

A. At different times, he was -- seemed to be a pretty proficient pilot. Sometimes there's a little linguistic difficulty as far as because he's of African origin and sometimes it's hard to understand pronunciation or some of the words because, you know, occasionally the accent kind of, you know, whenever, you know -- whenever they're doing their call outs in the cockpit and everything, sometimes linguistically you may have a little bit of difficulty understanding what he says.

Q. Uh-huh. Okay. Did he seem proficient at the flying aspect of things?

A. He seemed to be -- he's actually very thorough but, like I said, sometimes, you know, the linguistic part of it is just a little -- a little bit of a difficulty. As far as his flying proficiency, I mean I've flown with him numerous times.

Occasionally, you know, different pilots will, you know, occasionally miss things. But on an -- on an average, he's actually pretty proficient.

Q. Okay, and what's he like interpersonally as just as a -- in terms of his personality?

A. Sort of almost like a -- he actually has somewhat of a pleasant personality. Like I said, except for the occasional, you know, whenever he's talking it's sort of almost like British, like, you know, a thick -- but he's from -- he's from Africa but it's a thick British accent, so sometimes it's difficult to -- to pick up on, you know, some things that he's talking about because, like I said, linguistically, occasionally, you know, you'll -- it sometimes when he's saying something, it's, like, excuse me? What did you say?

Q. And how did he get along with the mechanics in the Maintenance department?

A. He occasionally, you know -- each -- he gets along pretty well with them as far as occasionally he may have rubbed a couple of them the wrong way. I actually, personally, somewhat got along with him. You know, occasionally he would do -- because, you know, each pilot has their own little nitpicks, you know. His big thing was, you know, he just -- he would find something and, hey, you know, please check this or please check that and then, you know, you'd go out and check it and then, you know, come back and it seems it's pretty good or it's okay and he was okay with that.

Q. Okay. So you got along with him pretty well?
A. Pretty much. There was a -- there was a couple people that, you know, he either picked at a little more than others but, you know, he actually was somewhat fairly easy to get along with.
Q. Okay. All right. How well did you know First Officer Greg Ryan?
A. I hadn't -- I hadn't flown with Greg as often as I had Henry or some of the other pilots. I think I might have actually flown along with Greg around maybe twice.
Q. Any observations about his ability?
A. A lot of times what you're -- you're watching, because, you know, pilots are always either stay in command or transfer command whenever they're actually flying the airplane, so a lot of times whenever they say, "You have control" or "You have control," you know, a lot of times the pilot's actually flying the airplane more often than the copilot.

But the copilot occasionally will take command of the airplane. So whenever you're observing them or when you're flying in the cockpit and you're watching what they're doing in association with if you're trying to isolate a problem with the problem or otherwise, then you're observing, you know, how each one of them flies.

And, of course, certain pilots are a little bit more proficient than others and are a little faster and have better cockpit orientation than others do, and as far as -- I think as

far as his flying ability, he had fair -- fair to good flying skills.

I mean I -- I've personally recorded some of the pilots just because of maintenance problems in the past and flown along with him and seen whether or not it was an actual maintenance problem or an operational problem on the pilot's end.

Q. So he seemed pretty proficient?

A. He seemed pretty proficient. I mean every pilot makes an occasional error.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. Like, you know, if you're looking at your forward glare shield or your forward area --

Q. Uh-huh.

A. -- and you get your amber light as far as your flap indication, you know, you document that or, you know -- because you come in and you do your landing with, like, 30/30 green light, which is correspondence between the flap position line on the ford and on the overhead. So he was pretty good in that.

Q. Okay, and what kind of a person was he just personally?

A. Pretty good. I mean he had, like I said -- he was pretty easy to fly with and easy to get along with actually.

Q. Okay. Did you know -- well, how'd he get along with the mechanics in the Maintenance department or did he have much interaction with them?

A. Pretty good. Occasionally he might've -- he occasionally

would get not in arguments, but with some of the other maintenance people, occasionally he'd get in some arguments.

Q. Okay. What do those arguments center around?

A. It's usually he would write up things, like, oil servicing and -- but they had, you know, signed it off previously and that was, like, a pet peeve. So he would write something up and then usually day shift would, you know -- day shift usually took care of that airplane and signed it off.

So they're basically responsible for the actual oil servicing. When you come in at night, normally the only thing you're taking charge of is the actual airplanes, the way they sit.

Q. Why did he -- why'd he want the oil service?

A. That's just it was a pet peeve. Normally, like, he'll all -- he used to always write that up as it's, you know -- certain pilots will write things up, pressurization, whether or not the airplane actually has pressurization problems because some people have more sensitive ears than others.

So if you have a bump, because occasionally the pressurization system will bump, and they'll write -- you know, certain ones will write things up, you know. They have their own -- they have basically their -- their own style. You know, some people are more concerned with lightbulbs, other people are pressurization, and Henry's thing was basically, you know, oil servicing --

Q. Or Greg you mean?

A. -- making sure the engine oil was serviced. Huh?
Q. Greg's thing was oil service?
A. No. Henry.
Q. Oh, Henry's the one that was asking for oil, the captain?
A. Not that night, no.
Q. But, I mean, in general?
A. In general.
Q. Oh, I thought --
A. He's like --
Q. -- you were talking about the first officer.
A. No, uh-uh.
Q. All right. Okay. So that -- the oil servicing was Captain Okai's pet peeve?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. All right. Was he looking at, like, an oil level indicator and saying it's too low or what? What was his reasoning for it for wanting to get it serviced?
A. Well, usually see, he would -- he just -- he has a tendency of writing that up. Even if it's, like, if it's at two and a half, which two and a half gallons is actually sufficient. But occasionally, you know, if it got down below three, he just -- he always had a tendency of wanting to write it up at the end of the day.
Q. Okay, and the FO, how'd he get along with the mechanics?
A. He's actually pretty -- he was somewhat quiet. He really

didn't -- he didn't, like, interact with a lot of different people.

Q. Okay. Did you know the captain was an A&P? Did he ever mention that he had an A&P certificate?

A. Henry?

Q. Yeah. Can --

A. No.

Q. Okay. I don't know how it had been since he'd actually worked airplanes. I can't recall, but I was just curious whether he -- there was every any sort of, you know, I know what I'm talking about because I'm an A&P and listen to me kind of thing or if he let you make your own decisions about maintenance related things?

A. No. Uh-uh.

Q. No kind of

A. No.

Q. -- conflict like that?

A. Uh-uh.

Q. Okay. All right. How did the two crew look when you saw them that night in terms of alertness and mood?

A. They were pretty good. They seemed to be fairly alert. Everything was actually going pretty much as normal.

Q. Okay. Did they seem to get along with each other?

A. Pretty much. I mean they didn't seem to be like -- they didn't seem to be adversarial towards each other. We did have a

-- we did have a female pilot did that -- that did not like to fly with Henry, but that was about it.

Q. You know anything about the reason for that?

A. She -- I think she just didn't care much for him. She had refused to fly with him the night before.

Q. Okay. On the accident airplane, aside from that what looked like an old leak under the landing gear, are you aware of anything unusual about the condition of the aircraft in recent days?

A. No, because, like I said, I'd worked nightshift at two months -- for two months and for those two months, basically the only thing we had to look at for the condition of 810 was whether or not it got signed off by day shift because they signed the airworthiness release and the person that signs the airworthiness release is stating that hydraulics had been checked, oils had been checked. The airplane's had a proper walkaround.

Everything else has been checked and the airplane is serviceable for release for flight.

Q. And so your responsibility at night then was?

A. Launch the airplane. Just make sure that they didn't have any active leaks, there was no problems, there was no avionics issues. Any avionics problems that were -- that happened, basically we would look at or any -- any problems. The airplane was supposed to be in serviceable condition whenever we came on shift and we accepted the airplanes.

Q. Okay. If it did have an issue, like let's say it had an

active leak or something like that, what would be the procedure for dealing with it given that you didn't have the whole maintenance crew on duty at night?

A. Basically isolate the problem, as far as isolate the leak, and verify what part was leaking and would've gone over to the Parts department and acquired a -- a part to -- to actually put on there or if we didn't have the part, to go over to an out of service airplane and remove a serviceable part from it.

Q. Did your Parts department have staff at night?

A. No. We normally have to get a key and then enter the Parts department and look for the part ourself. We have an inventory upstairs, so we can actually cross-reference whether or not we have that part in stock after identifying it.

Q. Okay. Did the airplane have any open maintenance items that you're aware of?

A. No, except for MELs and I'm not -- I don't remember exactly which MELs they had at that time.

Q. Did the airplane have a history of any recurring maintenance issues in the proceeding months that you can recall?

A. No. That aircraft, from what I remember, wasn't one of the ones that was having problems.

Q. Okay. Are you aware of any issues with its engines?

A. No. As far as the engine, I think the engines, I don't remember anything actually prior to that. They may have had some -- I believe they had some writeups as far as towards the day

shift as far as the end of the flying -- the flying day, and they may have turned those over to day shift.

Q. All right. Have you heard anything with the fleet of 737s in general at Rhoades about high EGTs on engines during takeoffs with D rated thrusts, like, writeups by crews or rejected takeoffs or anything like that?

A. There's been a couple incidents, but normally, those -- those have been written up at the end of the flight day and then the day shift maintenance crew has taken care of that normally.

Q. And at the time of the accident, you said you'd been on nightshift for, like, two months or something?

A. Pretty close -- I was actually nearing almost three months --

Q. Okay.

A. -- being on nightshift.

Q. All right. So you wouldn't have been as tuned in to what was going on on the day shift and work --

A. No.

Q. -- that day? Okay. Do you remember hearing anything about the cause of the high EGT issues?

A. That one, I remember them saying they had some writeups and they had written -- written up the problem, but I don't recall exactly. I think they -- they may have changed an EGT indicator prior to that, but that's the only thing I remember actually being changed.

I don't remember anything else as far as changing components

on that aircraft as far as what they troubleshot or what they found because, you know, that's like you read -- you read the turnover and then when you get the turnover, you go from that and sometimes --

(Pause)

Q. Sometimes?

A. Sometimes, you know, they just don't list anything or the only thing you see is, like, EGT indicator changed for high temp --

Q. Okay.

A. -- problem and that's it.

Q. Did you guys do any kind of, like, weekly briefing or shift handover face-to-face kind of turnover?

A. No.

Q. Well, so when you came in, the day shift was already gone?

A. You have a -- yeah, just basically have a book and then you read it. You flip to the page, and it's shift turnover, and whatever they did on day shift, they write into that shift turnover and then you basically look at your shift turnover and you initial it that you actually looked at it.

Normally, some guys are better at shift turnovers than others. Sometimes you get a good amount of information, sometimes you get a really amount of information. Just whoever writes it.

Q. Okay. In your work with the 73s past operators, did they have the GTA engines?

A. No. They had the CFM56 engines and they were mostly newer generation airplanes. Oldest was, like, 300, 500s, most were 7s, 8s, and 9s.
Q. Okay. All right. Let's just talk in general about the workplace. What was morale like in the Maintenance department before the accident?
A. At different times, it's -- goes from really good to sometimes, you know, just average or mediocre. Sometimes it's really good, you know. Just I think it depends on, of course, you know, how the company is doing or what's going on at the time as far as the morale goes.
Q. Or what's going in what?
A. What's going on in general. How --
Q. In general.
A. -- healthy the company is. I mean, you know, how much freight are we carrying, you know, as a lot of it has to do with, you know, the seasonal, you know, because at Christmastime, of course, it's busier and normally higher demand. People are usually somewhat during Christmastime and so forth --
Q. Uh-huh.
A. -- some of those times.
Q. Okay. How about staffing in the Maintenance department? Do you feel like it was adequate for the amount of work?
A. Sometimes adequate, sometimes not. Just depends on the influx of people. You know, some people they leave. We have,

like, two or three mechanics leave for other companies and it's kind of cyclical. It actually, you know, sometimes, you know, the -- the staffing is good and sometimes it drops suddenly by three or four people.

If it drops by three people, of course the, you know -- the actual -- your staffing is going to suffer a little bit.

Q. Okay. How was it at the time of the accident?

A. Actually, the staffing was halfway decent, I think, at that time. I don't think that was, like, a drop and we, you know, lost two or three people. At different times, you know, the -- you know, people will -- will leave because of higher pay rates and better benefits at other facilities.

Q. Okay, and how's the pay compare at Transair to other places you worked?

A. It's sort of in the middle of the road as far as competitive. It's -- it's pretty competitive. Of course, it's not at the high end compared to, like, a UPS, FedEx. The higher -- the bigger cargo companies, of course, pay better. But it's right in the middle.

Q. Do they have certain advantages as far as working there compared to UPS and FedEx that, you know, make it attractive?

A. Basically because of being a smaller company, you're not seniority driven. You know, you -- a lot of the major companies, you'll never see day shift, you know, with less -- you know, with less than 10 years. You know, you need 10 years or greater to

even get close to swing shift.

So, yeah, and because they also rotate the shifts, it seems to be a little fairer even for junior people because it allows junior people to actually go on a day shift instead of being stuck on nights forever. You know, it -- it offers a little bit more flexibility. Of course, the pay is a little lower.

Q. Okay, and how would you judge the quality of the facilities that they provide for you to do your work?

A. Kind of that's sort of, like, in the middle of the -- middle of the road. I've worked at probably one of the best state of the art hangars in -- in the Midwest. So comparing it to that, eh. But in general, it's, you know, what you have to work with. Sort of in the middle of the road.

(Crosstalk)

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Pardon me one sec. I'm just trying to see if I can -- if these guys will quiet down here for the -- I don't want to have the transcriptionist have --

(Loud sound)

DR. BRAMBLE: -- (indiscernible) -- one second.

(Crosstalk)

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, sorry.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: My bad (indiscernible).

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible).

DR. BRAMBLE: Oh, that's okay.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. Okay. How about the maintenance manuals. Where you actually find the instructions --

(Crosstalk)

DR. BRAMBLE: -- for troubleshooting and repairs, are the instructions in those manuals clear and comprehensive and adequate to address issues that you encounter?

MR. MAY: That's -- their manuals are a basic aircraft maintenance manual as far as 737s go. The hyper -- there is no hyperlinks that are active on our maintenance manuals. It's the old system that they incorporated after they -- they used to have microfiche.

All the maintenance manuals were loaded on microfiche years ago and it's sort of a manual that they have after they computerize the microfiche into a format as far as maintenance manuals. They don't have hyperlinks enabled, which is the -- the newer Boeing toolbox.

The newer Boeing toolboxes utilized by a lot of the contract companies in conjunction with Boeing and so they're a little more -- they're adequate, but they're not brand new because, you know, you've got to pay for the hyperlinks to be enabled onto the maintenance program. So they have the older variation of the maintenance manual program and the IPC.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Did that have an impact on some of the mechanics in terms of their ability to deal with troubleshooting certain issues or --

A. No, in the -- I think that it just makes your job just a little longer because, you know, it's with the hyperlinks enabled, you go to your maintenance manual function and, of course, you know, it cross-references right to the IPC and it gives you kits that are associated with doing the maintenance.

We have to build our own kits. You know, as far as the Maintenance department, any of the guys that are working on that, if they have to do a function such as a filter change, they have to pull out the filter, the, you know -- the packings, everything else are all done by, you know, the person actually looking at the material because with the hyperlinks enabled, you would go to that maintenance manual reference and you just click it and click the other and it would automatically come up with the information.

Q. Okay. So it might just take them a little more time?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Did you feel that you had the equipment and other resources you needed to effectively do your work?

A. That's -- whenever you compare things like that, they have adequate supplies. You know, if you've worked at a state of the art facility, of course, you have 200 screw guns. We have four because we don't have that number of people. So we have a number of tooling associated with the number of people.

It's not like we have an abundance, but we have just what we need to do the job and occasionally you might have to look for it. But besides that, yes.

Q. Was there anybody on staff qualified to do bore scope inspections?
A. That one would've been -- I believe that Bill Reyes is the person that's actually qualified to do the bore scopes and he just -- he works on certain days. So it's just whether or not the company decides to get ahold of him.
Q. How do you spell his last name?
A. R-E-Y-E-S.
Q. Okay. When's the last time before the accident you saw him come in and do that?
A. Probably -- well, I saw him, like, last week. But before the accident, I would say a month, month, month and a half before the accident maybe. I just -- I don't really remember --
Q. Uh-huh.
A. -- as far as that one goes.
Q. Okay. What's the most challenging maintenance task you've had to do at Rhoades?
A. Probably flight control changes and gear changes as far as changing landing gear components, as far as the heaviest and the most difficult physically.
Q. Okay, and how confident are you about the quality of the maintenance work overall at Rhoades?
A. On most days, pretty -- it's pretty confident on most -- most of the people. Of course, you have to work with somebody for a number of months to actually find out whether, you know, what

their mechanical skills are, what their aptitude is and how well they, you know -- how conscientious they are as far as their work -- their work quality.

Q. Had there been any maintenance issues in the year before the accident that the Maintenance department had a particularly difficult time with diagnosing and repairing?

A. Those were just we had issues a couple times, but I don't think they had a real difficult time except for the fact of getting Maintenance out to the different stations and, of course, that's more of a logistics thing as far as getting the people out to the airplanes when they break on outer islands whether or not, you know, we use our own staffing as far as flying an airplane out to them or using Hawaiian and flying the people out there.

It's more of a logistics difficulty and the ability to transport the people to the place wherever the airplane broke down at.

Q. Okay. But there was never an issue where for months you're trying to track down why are certain occurring and having trouble figuring out what it is or something like that?

A. I think they -- they may have had one problem associated with a nav aid and it took almost -- it took about three months to isolate it, you know, off and on, off and on, like, you know, same writeup, you know, two or three times and then they isolate it and they fix the problem.

Q. Okay. Do you have any involvement with the CASS program?

A. No.
Q. Okay. All right. Have you seen writeups in airplane logbooks coded F and -- or I? Have you seen I writeups?
A. I is info, Flight is basically from the, you know, pilot's group and then, you know, you have the Maintenance writeups.
Q. And what's the I mean?
A. The I is info. That's informational writeups. That's normally where the, you know -- if an engine's running hot, they'll write up engine runs hot. But it's not -- it runs beyond, you know, its limits. It's just an info writeup stating that the engine's running hotter than normal and they'll make an info writeup on that.
Q. Okay, and then what are you supposed to do if that -- if you see an I writeup like that?
A. You do -- you do the research as far as, you know, you hand it as almost like an active. It -- normally it'll be signed off noted by Maintenance or, you know, a planned off per the engine manual as far as the operating parameters and within limits.
Q. Okay. Are you or were you required to address an I just the same as you were required to address an F or did it require --
A. It's an --
Q. -- (indiscernible)?
A. It's an info only and it's supposed to be informational.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. But it depends on how they write something up. If it's an

engine -- if it's a problem with an engine, an EGT problem, then you -- then you look at it as an active. But, you know, it still will be signed off as, you know, noted by Maintenance. Or if you -- you know, if you do the research on it, sign it off per the engine manual.

Q. Uh-huh. All right. Are you aware of any instances of flight crews being asked to delay writeups until they get back from a trip rather than before they leave?

A. Not normally. Normally, we'll get a phone call and a pilot will call us in an active flight, if he's flying back in, and then he'll describe, you know, a problem and what to do to troubleshoot it, you know, or help trouble shoot it because a lot of times the pilots will actually call and say, hey, I'm having this problem with the airplane. What do you think it is? What should I do?

And normally, you know, that's -- that's prior to them getting back there.

Q. So how do you decide whether they should bring it back and have it troubleshot in Honolulu or whether they should ground the airplane and fix it there?

A. That's -- that's all whether or not they -- you know, if they feel, as far as the flight crew, if they're having severe problems. Normally, it's, like, you know, they get a weak signal on a nav aid, an ILS, you know, so forth, doesn't pick up, you know, the ILS signal.

You know, it has to be, like, really close to the airport and

they'll have a problem with the ILS, you know, a lot of times that's -- that's actually some of the nav aids, because in the past we've had nav aid problems at the outlying airports with the actual navigation systems at that airport or, you know, normally the issue would note them to airmen.

But sometimes not, you know, and the pilots will be having problems with a nav aid problem and they'll say, hey, we're having problems out of this one because it seems to be weak and what do you think it is?

It's, like, you know, and we'll, you know, recommend they, you know, either fly it back or normally it's -- normally they'll fly with it if it's just a weak signal and they're having problems with the nav aid. But, you know, they -- on different occasions, they will bring the airplane back.

But normally, you know, if it's a navigation problem, no. If it's -- if they're losing any type of fluids, yes.

Q. If they're losing any type of fluids, yes?

A. Yeah. They would bring the airplane back.

Q. They would bring it back?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. But they wouldn't ground it for that?

A. Well, they would write it up and it would be grounded until you sign off.

Q. At the outstation or after they bring it back?

A. After they bring it back or at an outstation. If they lost

oil, you know, they'd be grounded wherever they land at.
Q. Uh-huh. Okay. All right. I have about a dozen more questions about safety management and culture, but I've been talking for about an hour. So I thought I'd give you an opportunity to have a break. You want a break?
A. Okay. Yeah. Actually kind of a backache.
Q. Okay. All right. Let's take 10.
A. All right.
(Off the record)
(On the record at 9:03 a.m.)
DR. BRAMBLE: On at 9:03. Okay.
BY DR. BRAMBLE:
Q. How often before the accident did you typically interact with FAA inspectors or the CMT for Rhoades?
A. Just once in a while. Occasionally, they would come in and introduce themselves. They would basically come in at, like, one of our morning meetings -- or it's not a morning meeting. It's an afternoon meeting, and they would introduce themselves and they were going to be looking around the facility and that was basically it.
Q. Okay. What's the relationship been like with the FAA at Rhoades prior to the accident in recent months?
A. You know, we don't really -- as maintenance or mechanics, we really don't have too much interaction between them. They'll come out, you know, walk around on the floor or they'll fly with the

pilots. They'll do more flying with the pilots than they do anything.

They have more interaction with probably Mike Kimble and some of the other officer personnel.

Q. Okay, and who as responsible for managing safety at Rhoades before the accident?

A. That would've been -- well, Dave Seest for the pilots. He's supposed to be the safety person, and then I think Orlando Debrum was for maintenance or the shorts area. Mike Kimble's the one that actually did the SMS -- I think he was at the SMS meetings or the Safety Management System.

Anyway, he was basically, since he was DOM, I think he was also acting person as far as safety for the Aviation area or for the Maintenance area.

Q. Okay, and who ran those safety meetings?

A. You know what? Most of the time, the actual safety -- I think Ron was actually in with some of those. But most of Maintenance, as far as the mechanics, we normally just came in on the Wednesday meeting and that was basically just a meeting of any type of operational difficulties we were having.

Q. Okay. All right. If you had a safety related concern, who -- how would you communicate that to management?

A. Normally you'd go to your director of maintenance because that's the person that's actually supposed to have direct interaction with, you know, the safety -- safety systems or Dave

Seest and the Pilots group. But like I said, he basically handles the pilots if they have a safety problem.

Q. Okay, and was there any kind of reporting system available to you, like a safety reporting system?

A. You could file a safety report if you thought that, you know, anything at work was safety related, you know, equipment not properly maintained. You could file a, you know, repair order or a safety -- safety complaint against that piece of equipment or if there was safety concern.

Q. Okay, and did you ever have cause to do that?

A. Normally I've ever -- I've filled out repair orders on different vehicles or repair requests, you know, red tag it until some of that actually gets fixed and different -- of course, different pieces of equipment have different problems at work.

Q. But no safety report?

A. No specific safety report. Just a repair. Usually just a repair request --

Q. I see

A. -- at different times.

Q. Okay. Have you interacted with any of the SMS auditors, like, when they do a maintenance audit, do they come around and ask you stuff or is that --

A. I think on different occasions we had, like, different people doing our -- our audit. We had one of our mechanics actually doing the audit as far as -- as far as that goes. Not

specifically, not coming and saying this is a problem or is this a problem.

Q. So they didn't typically interact with you directly that much during the audits?

A. They would come up and they just say, oh, what do you think of this or what do you think of that. That's about it.

Q. Okay. Do you get any kind of safety related communications from the company, like newsletters or anything like that?

A. We get, like, the regular newsletters. Not actually, like, a safety -- a safety report saying, you know, we had, you know, so and so was injured here. Be careful of pinch boy and so forth, so forth. Nothing like that, but just basic, you know -- basic stuff.

Q. Okay. All right. In terms of the culture at the company, do you feel supported by management and able to make safety related decisions without fear of repercussion?

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you feel pressures from company management to do things that you feel are unsafe?

A. No, not normally.

Q. Are there abnormal times when they -- when you do feel pressure to do things that are unsafe?

A. No. Of course you -- you occasionally get the, oh, you guys check that. Make sure you check that. It's, like, okay, we checked it. Not as -- we don't really have, like, a -- I don't

think we've had, like, you've got to sign that off or you've got to do this, you gotta, you gotta.

We don't -- we haven't had any problems on that. You know, the -- the equipment's actually old enough to where we actually have to sit back and truly troubleshoot most of it. So --

Q. Okay. Before the accident, did you have any safety related concerns about the company?

A. They've been trying to address those. Those have to do more with manual -- out of manual writing, but that's actually, like, the Tech Pub's department, such as if you have a maintenance piece of letterhead, right, or a piece of maintenance -- a task card.

If you have a task card and it refers you to a reference material, but the reference material no longer exists because somebody else wrote the job card, then you have to look at those job cards and correct those problems, which is more of a -- more of an ongoing problem.

They just got done hiring, like, a team to do that and there is some job cards that have no information or the information that is presented on the job card is no longer valid in the maintenance manual that they use, because whoever wrote that job card wrote it out of a Boeing toolbox that it's -- had its hyperlinks enabled.

Well, we use a maintenance manual that has no hyperlinks.

Q. I see. All right. How would you describe the organizational safety culture at Rhoades Aviation?

A. It's a small company. So basically you have a group of

people that you work with on a weekly basis that you, you know -- you know, that you have to coordinate their thoughts as far as safety goes and sometimes, you know, it's Dave with the -- with the Pilots group and Mike Kimble with the Maintenance group, and so as far as safety culture, I think it's a safe -- it's a safe environment, but it's -- it's family orientated.

It's a very small company, doesn't have -- you know, in the companies before, when you're talking, you know, 5,000 employees or more, of course OSHA -- OSHA has more of a presence than anybody and there, it's more of a, you know, the people that actually work there that run it, run it as a -- more of a family business, I think, or family ran.

Q. Okay, and do you feel comfortable raising any safety related issues that you might have?

A. No, not normally.

Q. But I mean if you had one, would you feel comfortable raising it to management?

A. Well, yes. If it's a continuing problem and it's an actual real concern, like, it's a problem that constantly reoccurs, yes.

Q. All right, and how was the relationship in general between the Maintenance staff and the pilots at Rhoades before the accident? Was it good or strained?

A. You had, like -- it's pretty good in the fact that on most occasions, you know, we occasionally Maintenance has to fly out and fix the airplane and fix the airplane in conjunction with most

of the pilots.

So a lot of times when you're working with the pilots, you have to actually fly to the location, repair the airplane and fly back with the pilots and, you know -- so I think that on a whole, it was pretty good.

Different pilots just, you know -- some of them don't particularly care for, you know, if -- if a mechanic is willing to fly with the airplane and willing to go out and, you know, to troubleshoot the airplane and then bring the airplane back while flying on it is what the pilot wants to see, of course, with any of the Maintenance staff because you, you know -- if you're flying out with them or flying to rescue them, you know, basically that's what they're looking for, somebody that's willing to, you know, either trust their piloting skills or your own skills.

Q. Okay, and do you know a mechanic, Michael Jernigan?

A. He's our -- our lead on day shift.

Q. All right. Well, does he fly out to the outstations if there's a need?

A. He normally -- he has a fear of flying with our pilots.

Q. He has a fear of flying with your pilots or a fear of flying period?

A. He has a fear of flying, but specifically probably a fear of flying with a couple of our pilots.

Q. Why the specific pilots?

A. Basically I think because he didn't trust their skill level

or they had issues with either not so much linguistics probably, but they may have been slightly handicapped in some form or fashion and he may have thought that is -- he just he has a fear of flying, but he has a fear of flying with certain pilots more than others.

Q. Okay. Are there any accident crew members, people he seemed to avoid flying on?

A. I don't really recall which ones he personally doesn't like to. I don't really get that closely involved with who he, you know -- he doesn't like to fly with.

Q. Uh-huh. Have you ever heard of a flight crew saying they were afraid of being fired for writing up a maintenance issue?

A. No, but there is pilots that have sensitive -- you know, they're very -- some pilots are more sensitive to others, to problems because we've had pilots that had press -- you know, they'll write up a pressurization problem for -- let's say you have an airplane that has just a bump, you know, of -- you know, 500 feet per minute bump on your cabin indicator and cabin pressure and indicator and some pilots, they'll pick up on that or it'll hurt their ears.

Well, other pilots, their ears aren't very sensitive. So for them, a 500 foot bump is, like, that's normal. It's just the way the system works because it's old. You know, it basically needs that time for that sensor to -- to pick up on that pressure difference.

So some people are more sensitive to it than others, you know, and some of them -- well, let's write -- you know, they'll write up three different airplanes and then we'll find that the system works correct, you know, two of them and the one just needs a basic component change.

But sometimes they'll, you know, depending on the pilot, they're just sensitive toward, you know, pressure changes.

Q. So some pilots write up things with a fairly low threshold. Are there any that seem to be afraid of writing things up?

A. Not really, because, yeah, they seem to -- they'll write up items quite often and, you know, I don't think there's an actual fear of it. I mean they don't get the fear or reprimand. I don't think so.

Q. Okay. All right. Well, thanks so much, Ricky, for answering my questions. I'm going to give these guys a chance to follow up. Appreciate it.

A. Okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: Pocholo?

MR. CRUZ: Yeah. Thanks, Ricky, for coming today.

MR. MAY: Okay.

MR. CRUZ: Again, I'm Pocholo Cruz. I'm the Maintenance investigator for this accident. Bill, has basically taken a lot of my thunder, so I'm just going -- I've got some specific questions I would like to ask you.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. So you brought up a point that you've flown with some of these pilots. Is that typical for Maintenance to fly with the pilots?

A. Maintenance will fly with the pilots when we have, like, reoccurring problems or to isolate certain problems because sometimes they'll write stuff up that might be deemed a nuisance item.

Like I said, you know, whenever you have -- when you're coming in for your approach, of course you're going to select your flaps to its landing configuration and you're going to verify that you're in transit light extinguishes and you get your green extend light on your forward pedestal area, and then on your overhead, as far as your flap indication.

And a lot of times we'll get writeups where that light will flicker on the overhead and it'll give you just a, you know, constant flickering, right, and we try to troubleshoot which system is associated with that forward light or, you know, coincides with that so that we can troubleshoot the system better on the ground because a lot of times you won't get that indication because the air moving against the actual leading edge devices --

Q. Uh-huh.

A. -- because, you know, it does this --

Q. Okay.

A. -- and it makes that thing flicker. So you just try to isolate it. That's why the pilot -- or that's why the mechanics

will fly with the pilots.
Q. All right. So you typically fly with them on day shifts or at nights or either one or --
A. Either one --
Q. -- have you done both?
A. -- sometimes.
Q. Okay. Either one sometimes?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, and specific to the accident airplane, have you flown on that airplane troubleshooting certain things?
A. I've flown with Henry Okai troubleshooting the leading edge systems --
Q. On 810?
A. -- as far as -- yes.
Q. Okay, and what was the -- how did you -- how was that fixed?
A. They adjusted the proc sensor.
Q. Okay. Was that a chronic problem on the airplane?
A. It happened a couple times and they -- they squawked it as far as when they were flying, but once it got on the ground, you ran your flap -- your flaps and your slats normally and the indications would be good.
Q. Okay.
A. But then once you got in the -- in the air, you know, they'd flicker.
Q. Okay, and you said you don't recall any chronic airplanes on

the accident airplane -- or chronic systems on the accident airplane?

A. No, not really. I mean that airplane was really old, so no. But it didn't have any chronic problems. Actually, that airplane probably had less difficulties because the instrumentation was, you know, one of the older instrumentation systems as far as avionics system.

So a lot of times they didn't have like a -- a lot of, you know -- didn't have a lot of problems, didn't have a lot of writeups. Prior to, like I said, I was working nightshifts so I didn't really get to troubleshoot any of it as far as, like, the three months leading up to that because --

Q. Uh-huh.

A. -- basically we just came in and accepted the airplanes the way they were because the guys on day shift had gotten, you know, basically they worked the -- the writeups at the end --

Q. Uh-huh.

A. -- of the day. So we always got whatever, you know, they had signed off and verified.

Q. Right. Yeah. That was the question is that do you know any maintenance checks that were done prior to the -- prior to departure on that day of the accident?

A. They had done a basic daily check on that airplane.

Q. Okay, and nothing else that you recall as far as issues?

A. They had troubleshot, I think, the month prior to that

compress stalls on day shift.

Q. Okay.

A. But that's the only thing I recall. That's the only problem that airplane had was it -- prior to that, they had had stalling issues.

Q. Do you know how long the airplane was on the ground prior to departure on that type?

A. It would've -- we were there probably an hour and 20 minutes prior to that, prior to at actually departing. So I got the exact times written someplace, but I didn't really sit back and look at them and, you know, because I wrote down, you know, what times all this stuff happened, you know, because the night of the actual accident, I was sitting back just, you know -- as it happened, I just got my phone out and quickly jotted --

Q. Okay.

A. -- you know, because I contacted, you know -- Ramp Control contacted me. I contacted not only Mike Kimble, but Wallace Horibata and I also tried to call Greg Ryan to let him know that the Coast Guard was on their way to pick him up in the water, him and Henry. So --

Q. Okay.

A. -- anyway. But as far as, like, exact times, I mean it's -- we would've got there 11. It probably launched by 12:30 --

Q. Okay.

A. -- 12:45, something like that.

Q. Okay.
A. Maybe.
Q. Is that -- is it typical for you to be the only guy on shift?
A. No. I'm usually there -- it used to be we had, like, one -- one mechanic and then one helper.
Q. Okay.
A. But that night, we had Darryl Johnson working on the other airplanes and then I was working opposite.
Q. So there were two of you guys on shift?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Okay, and typically who would you call -- I mean do you have a maintenance control?
A. We don't have an actual maintenance control department. Similar to a large carrier?
Q. Yeah.
A. No, because our maintenance control, we -- we basically. We issue our own control numbers, you know, with the -- because it coincides with the aircraft number, date and the number of whatever that MEL is.

With the -- with the major airlines, normally you have a maintenance control that issues a control number for each MEL that is issued. But they don't do it that way. So --
Q. So during nightshift --
A. -- because it's very small.
Q. -- when you need support from management, who do you contact?

A. Normally Mike Kimble.
Q. Okay. So you said that you knew about previous backfires on the airplane. Have you had to troubleshoot anything like that while on the ground during days or nightshift?
A. As far as?
Q. Backfire or compressor stalls on the plane or --
A. Yes. We had one problem with it but we just grounded the airplane until day shift got in --
Q. Oh, okay.
A. -- because we changed --
Q. You were night --
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. We changed one part because we don't -- we didn't have time. So we changed one part. The airplane was still backfiring. Airplane's grounded. Just leave it for day shift.
Q. And what do you guys typically do? How do you determine how to troubleshoot it?
A. We'll use -- basically, we'll go to the maintenance manual for the engines and also for the airframe and, you know, looking in correspondence to whatever it recommends.
Q. Okay.
A. I think that the one time that we had the compressor stall, we changed the PRBC. It didn't help, so we just left the airplane grounded.

Q. Okay, and you mentioned somebody by the name of Bill Reyes. Is he a Transair employee?
A. He's -- he used to be our inspector. He's Level III inspector, and I think he's the only one. Level II or Level III. I don't really recall, but I know he's the only one qualified to do -- that's checked off to do the inspections at that point.
Q. Bore scope inspection?
A. Correct. Or that's what I understand.
Q. So he is a Transair employee or a Rhoades employee?
A. Well, he is but he -- he's, like, he doesn't work, like, full, full-time. He's more like a he comes in and he does his special inspections that require the specific entity.
Q. Okay. So is he a contract to Rhoades or is he -- does he have an employee number, I guess?
A. You'd have to ask Ron. Does Bill have a current --
MR. CRUZ: We'll talk --
US: He's a --
MR. CRUZ: We'll have to talk to Ron afterward, yeah, because it's for the purposes of the interview, we'll --
MR. MAY: Okay.
MR. CRUZ: -- (indiscernible).
MR. MAY: I believe he is. You know, he has been in the past. So he does have an employee number, but he's not, like, a full-time --
MR. CRUZ: Okay.

MR. MAY: You know, he comes in whenever he wants to come in.
MR. CRUZ: Yeah.
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. Have you ever had to ask for help on the nightshift while you were working?
A. As far as?
Q. As far as maintaining the airplanes -- or how many airplanes are typically on the nightshift? I'm sorry.
A. Normally you've got, like, two or three airplanes. Normally they try to maintain -- they like to maintain three or four, but normally, realistically, we have -- at that time, we had three or two --
Q. Okay.
A. -- flying.
Q. Okay.
A. And it depended on if one was out of service or all three were out.
Q. Okay, and the night of the accident there were two of you guys on shift taking --
A. Yes.
Q. -- care of about two or three airplanes?
A. Yes.
Q. Gotcha. Okay. Has anybody ever forced your hand in changing any type of signoffs that you've had to do on an airplane?
A. I would say no. As, you know -- as far as, like, if you

change a part and you don't feel it's correct, normally it's, you know, changed part did not fix, you know, writeup continue -- or, you know, you know, for troubleshooting purpose, changed this part so on --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- and so forth. Did not fix problem --

Q. Right.

A. -- for troubleshooting. But, no, uh-uh.

Q. No. Okay, and do you know if Rhoades Aviation has a chronic program as far as determining what system is chronic, what's not and how often?

A. They do not have an actual chronic placard crew, if that's what you're talking about as far as, like, the major airlines that have a chronic writeup crew.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. I think they treat it more of an individual airplane, you know, this airplane has these difficulties. We know about these difficulties and so forth, but they don't have an actual dedicated crew that's specifically like a chronic crew or a chronic placard crew as far as a reoccurring problem

Q. Okay.

A. You know, a lot of the major airlines, they have, like, the chronic placard crew where you have writeups that continue for more than 30 days and you have to actually get a special crew on it because of difficulties as far as troubleshooting those items.

It’s just handled on an airplane to airplane situation.
Q. Since you’ve worked there, do you know whether they’ve had an opportunity -- have you seen an opportunity where the airplane was so chronic that they had to ground the airplane?
A. As far as, like, numerous writeups?
Q. Yeah.
A. I’ve seen them ground a couple.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. And for what reason, do you recall?
A. Compressor stalls.
Q. Okay. Can you explain a little bit more about that?
A. Just ones that we had, they had to change a lot of parts. Three, four months prior to that, they had one airplane that had constant compressor stalls that night at, like, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom, boom and, you know, it was no good. They grounded the airplane. They had to change two or three parts.
Q. Was it --
A. Fixed it a couple days later.
Q. Yeah. Is that 810 or just any of the other airplanes?
A. I don’t remember if that was specifically 810 or not because I didn’t actually troubleshoot that one, per se I didn’t change the parts.
Q. Yeah.
A. That was something that, you know, on nightshift, basically

if we change one part, because that's all we have time to change, if it doesn't fix it, airplane's grounded.

Q. Okay.

A. And then we leave it for day shift because they've got more personnel and more manpower to throw at it.

Q. You mentioned that you flew a lot with the crew. Do you see sometimes the crew playing with the throttles inflight?

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. Not playing with the throttles inflight, but a lot of times, you know, some pilots, it depends on how you transition the throttles that'll induce problems onto airplanes or has a tendency to, you know, jockeying throttles. I guess you could say that.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. But --

Q. As ones that you witnessed, did they cause any compressor stalls inflight or any backfiring inflight while they're doing that?

A. I've seen them advance the throttles. I -- you would saying jockeying. Yes, I have seen them do it a couple times.

Q. Yeah, but the -- during, while they were doing it, did it cause any backfire or --

A. Yes.

Q. It did?

A. Yeah.

Q. Was that -- were those ever written up by the pilots?
A. That one, I don't believe they were because they -- they were try -- they were basically troubleshooting at that time. But I don't think -- they didn't write those up.
Q. They were troubleshooting why it was backfiring?
A. They were -- they were looking at it. What they were doing, they -- they would advance the throttles and, you know, if some -- some of the pilots occasionally were getting backfires on the engines and a lot of times it was because how they're advancing it or you'd see them, you know, push the throttle up, pull it back, push it up, pull it back and you'd get a compressor stall and, you know, instead of advancing the throttles up to take off power, it's some of them -- some of them would actually do that occasionally.
Q. Do you know whether it were more chronic with certain crews that are doing that or certain pilots that are doing that?
A. I had seen pilots in the past do that, but specifically saying those pilots did that more often? No, not really.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Getting back to the maintenance of compressor stalls, has the company or Rhoades ever contacted a Boeing or Pratt with regards to how to maintain or troubleshoot a chronic compressor stall on an airplane?
A. They contacted, like, the engine shop because we -- we work

with an engine shop as far as Pratt & Whitney, and I believe that they did contact an engine shop. I'm not sure exactly which state it's in. I think it's Florida.

Q. Okay. Not here in Hawaii?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. But they were, like, one of the main overhaul facilities and they had to order parts because of, of course, some of the parts aren't readily available.

Q. Do they send parts or they send maintenance personnel or both?

A. They send actual maintenance personnel. We've had maintenance personal come in from Pratt & Whitney and actually --

Q. Okay. Have you heard of pilots ever complaining about Maintenance not doing the -- doing their job properly?

A. I would say that some of the pilots just, there's certain mechanics that some of the pilots don't really work well with. Some, not all.

Q. And the issue being personality or they think that they -- they're not a good mechanic or what's the issue, if you know?

A. I think it's basic personality differences, you know. Quite truthfully, I think that's what it is. A lot of times, you know, you know, some of the -- some the pilots, you know, it's -- some of them will say something not exactly toward all of Maintenance but towards specific Maintenance personnel.

They'll say, "Oh, why don't he just do his job?" But most of the time the person's actually doing their job.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. That's it for me right now.

Mr. Muse?

MR. MUSE: Hi, Ricky. Steven with the FAA. I've just got a few things for you.

BY MR. MUSE:

Q. Circling back to the hydraulic leak, was that on the left or right side?

A. Left side.

Q. Left side?

A. Left side.

Q. And you stated you thought it was coming from the landing gear actuator --

A. Correct.

Q. -- if it was leaking from anywhere?

A. Yes.

Q. Now with the landing gear down and locked on the 737, is there any pressure on that landing gear actuator?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So the gear was never cycled to check to see if that actuator was leaking, correct?

A. No.

Q. Okay, and then the last thing I've got for you, you feel that you're properly trained to do the tasks that JRAA asked you to do?

Because you said you've been on 737s for a long time, but you've been on 300s, 400s, 500 --

A. Yes.

Q. -- with turbo fans, not the specific engines that they had. Do you feel like you're properly trained to do tasks on that?

A. Yes, because actually at Continental I was at Continental in the 90s.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. In the 90s, we had 737-100s and 200s.

Q. Okay.

A. You know, it was exposure years and years ago to those specific engines.

Q. But they didn't give you any kind of refresher training or anything once you got to --

A. I did -- I did in Vincennes University. Vincennes University, they had a refresher training.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. But that was working -- of course, that was working contract maintenance.

MR. MUSE: Okay. Okay. Thank you. That's all I have.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. Do why there is a (indiscernible) interval for the (indiscernible) section or (indiscernible)?

A. Normally that's put on some of our maintenance program as far as the A checks. I think Bill comes in and actually does that, or

he's supposed to.
Q. So if there is a correction of an inter-polarization of the BSI, so who will be the second review for the BSI?
A. For the actual inspection of the --
Q. Bore scope inspection?
A. Bore -- Bill would be the person that does the bore scopes/
MR. CHIAO: So no second? Yes. I have no more questions.
MR. CRUZ: (Indiscernible).
MR. CHIAO: Okay.
MR. CRUZ: Ron?
MR. LENHART: At this time, I do not have any. Thunder's been stolen.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Dan?
MR. MARCOTTE: Okay. Thanks. Again, I'm Dan Marcotte. I'm with Boeing. Just going back with some follow-up questions on some others -- a few previous questions.
BY MR. MARCOTTE:
Q. So it sounds like you generally had two or three airplanes operating at night?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you pretty turned them -- you launched them. When they come back, you look at the log, clean up whatever needs to be done and -- and relaunch it. So how many flights would you turn in a night?
A. Probably nine flight -- well, more than nine flights because

you have a flight out to the island and then back times three and then 12, about 12 flights. Twelve or more.

Q. Okay. Okay. So you'll launch 12 out of Honolulu at night?

A. Well, no. Launch probably six out of Honolulu --

Q. Okay.

A. -- and then, you know, then you've got return flights.

Q. Return flights. Okay. All right. What's your average time between when the airplane comes back and when it launches again on a night turn? How much time do you have (indiscernible)?

A. It depends on which station it flies to.

Q. Okay.

A. If it flies to OGG, you've got about an hour and a half, but if it flies to ETO, those places, a little more time. Probably, you know, three or four hours.

Q. Okay. Okay.

A. About three hours.

Q. Okay. I'm really interested in the ground time in Honolulu that you have the airplanes. So you -- it returns and then you have your --

A. On the average --

Q. -- amount of time before --

A. -- an hour or to --

Q. -- you launch it again.

A. -- hour, hour and a half --

Q. Okay.

A. -- maybe two hours. It just depends on -- but sometimes they're in more of a rush to get the freight on than it is.
Q. Okay. Thank you. Does some of your inflight experience with the stalls --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- that you observed, were those takeoff or cruise or all -- what -- if you'd give me a little more information on what you saw, kind of the conditions?
A. Normally it depends on the actual when they had those compressor stalls, because some of them were just leaving the gate.
Q. Okay.
A. Some of them literally just pulled out of the -- the block area and started compressor stalling. We had a couple airplanes that just basically as soon as they started and went past idle, they started compressor stalling.
Q. Okay. Did you see any inflight compressor stalls? When you were flying with your own inflight experience, did you --
A. No.
Q. -- see any inflight?
A. No.
Q. Okay, and --
A. Normally --
Q. -- none of the them would take --
A. -- normally the pilot --

Q. -- off (indiscernible)?
A. -- would not take off. If they advance their throttles and the engine started compressor stalling back at the blocks --
Q. Right.
A. -- you know, before they take off? No.
Q. Okay. So your experience were seeing compressor stalls yourself was ground out zone?
A. Mostly, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Like I've said, I've never seen one actually happen in the air flying with any of the pilots or didn't experience any.
Q. Okay. All right. Good. Going back on the question on you had the previous, you said the airplane had a history months before of stalls, the event airplane compressor stalls in groups. What would you normally expect a maintenance tech to do if the airplane came and you saw the logbook writeup that said they had a number of compressor stalls in crews?
A. Pretty much change the PRBC -- well, of course, consult your maintenance manual to find out exactly what it states to do.
Q. Okay.
A. But probably look at the PRBC, change of PRBC first, pressure regulating bleed control valve, and then do a basic ground run and see it if, you know, taking up the power and see if the compressor stalls.
Q. Okay. Where would you start in the maintenance manual? What

section would you go?
A. Troubleshooting as far as the, you know -- the engines, as far as the Boeing section and also the Pratt & Whitney manual.
Q. Okay. Would you look at Chapter 5 or inspections, conditional inspections?
A. Conditional inspections? Normally I would just go to compressor stalls as far as troubleshooting the engine.
Q. Okay.
A. But --
Q. Okay. Before the accident, so not today but before the accident, you were talking about job cards and sometimes the references weren't correct.
A. Yeah.
Q. It would reference another document that wasn't there --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- for one reason or another. So if you had that job card and you're doing a work step that made reference to go over (indiscernible) something to do --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- the work and it wasn't there, what would you do?
A. I would just look for the specific maintenance manual reference for that specific task. A lot of times it'll get, you know, the -- they have it written for a hyperlink, but there's no hyperlink there. It doesn't exist anymore. The subtest doesn't -- because it's written out of a different maintenance manual.

Q. So the subtext wasn't there, so I'm trying to understand. What would you do then if the subtask wasn't there."
A. Well it depends on which ATA code --
Q. Okay.
A. -- it's listed as, because it has, like, a filter change.
Q. Okay.
A. Or anything else, you know, you would go to that -- that ATA code and then just look up, you know, if you were changing filters --
Q. Okay.
A. -- which filters you needed to change, so forth, and your O rings for that.
Q. Okay. Did you have a process that notified the company that you'd process with -- at the process issue with the job card?
A. We're actually looking at that. They've got a guy that's sitting in there at a desk that's specifically at our job cards, because we've had a problem with out of the job cards, some of the -- some of the hyperlinks aren't enabled or there is no hyperlinks anymore and who wrote the job cards didn't -- didn't do them properly.
Q. Okay, and you talked a little before on the Captain Okai. You know, you said he had some -- he's kind of had some stuff. He said he kind of nitpicked on some stuff and then he'd call in and ask for an opinion, you know, whether he should be concerned or whatever about something.

When he did that, do you know that those -- would he typically also put it in the logbook or would he talk with you and a night person, another guy making decision if he's going to put it in the logbook?

A. Normally he would actually put it in the logbook, about probably, I'd say, 70 percent of the time. Occasionally he would call and say, oh, I have a problem with this, you know, and but most of the time it just went directly into the logbook.

Q. Good, and does the event airplane, did you have an opinion or, you know, was the engines, did they use a lot of oil? Was there oil consumption one you'd think was normal or difficult or --

A. The JT8 I think uses much more oil than, like, the CFM series engines just naturally. So I don't think -- it wouldn't be something that you would have, like, on a hot watch, high load consumption watch. So I don't -- I don't think that they would actually -- they didn't have, like, a super high oil consumption.

You know, we would occasionally look at the engines, you know, if we were servicing them a lot at night.

Q. Yeah.

A. It's, like, oh, that -- that engine uses a lot of oil. But there wasn't any, like, abnormally high oil consumption or nothing that you would sit back and say, oh, it's using, you know, more than, you know -- more than the normal amount of oil. You know, at the end of the day, service, like, with two quarts of oil

usually in user max, that's good.

We didn't have any of that, like, had a real abnormally high oil consumption. They're normally, like, pretty -- pretty good.

MR. MARCOTTE: All right, and that's it for me. Thank you very much.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. What do you think of your management team, the DOM and Assistant DOM, in terms of how capable they seem to be?

A. They seem to be pretty good on most -- most days. Of course, everybody has their good days and bad days, but they seem to be -- they seem to be pretty good on most days.

Q. Anything that they're kind of struggling with you think in terms of trying to address?

A. They may have been trying to -- they may have had some difficulties with the manuals as far as the way the manuals were originally written. I think they've been trying to rewrite some of the manuals.

The ones that are DOM actually rewrites or the MELs and I think some of just the -- the general, you know -- the basic operational end of maintenance and not -- not the RAI cards. I think the RAI cards were generated by somebody else and --

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Pocholo, do you have any other questions?

MR. CRUZ: Just a couple follow ups.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. You mentioned that Mr. Okai, the captain, was nitpicky on oil consumption issues?

A. Yes.

Q. Did he have -- was he nitpicking on the accident airplane as far as oil consumption issues?

A. No, just in general. He was just one of those people that constantly nitpicked on engine oils and --

Q. Regardless of what airplane he was flying?

A. Regardless of what airplane. If it was -- if it was below, probably, I would say, two gallons, he would make a write up. He liked his oils at, like, two and a half or better, you know, like sitting. Two and a half to three. He didn't like it anything -- anything below that.

Q. Okay. Based on your experience with the JT8s, I know you had that a long time in your previous employers. Do you think there's a need to do more training, not just you but all the mechanics regarding JT8s and how it should be maintained?

A. Well, I think anything -- any type of refresher course because people occasionally, you know, you get, you know, any extra information's always good, you know, because in -- in the past, we always issued an HOC watch if our engines were on high oil consumption. You know, for the major airlines, that's -- that's, like, basic protocol. They would actually issue an HOC watch. On that corresponding engine, whether or not it, you know

-- if they actually did experience high engine oil consumption, it would normally be on a watch program and, you know, with it's a limited size company, so of course they don't have an actual HOC watch.

Q. Yeah. Do you know if the company has ever given a JT8 refresher for the mechanics at Rhoades?

A. We have not actually done a specific formal class --

Q. Okay.

A. -- as a refresher course. They have had the FAM classes associated with those particular airplanes. Mike Kimble --

Q. GEN FAM you said?

A. -- usually does that one.

Q. GEN FAM, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. General familiarization classes?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. But not an actual -- the actual Pratt & Whitney class, actually come in and, you know, teach the actual, you know, engine itself? No.

Q. All right. So based off of your opinion, how would you characterize the engine maintenance program of Rhoades?

A. It's basic line maintenance function. I don't, you know -- we don't have a true engine shop or a -- a dedicated engine shop.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean different facilities, I worked facilities that had an actual dedicated engine shop. If they had engine problems, they had an engine shop that actually would come and address that problem.

Q. Yeah.

A. Sometimes direct representation from either General Electric or Pratt & Whitney, either one. We do not have that, but we do have people that have -- that own an engine shop and do the maintenance for our engines that they correspond with.

Q. Okay. I just want to touch and get clarification on something that I heard you answer Dan on, and in that regard to flying on an airplane and seeing pilots play with the throttles, and you mentioned that it -- at the time when you did mention and you saw those, did they witness a backfire at the time inflight or no?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. No. No.

Q. But they were just playing with the throttles? You noticed --

A. Yes.

Q. -- the pilots playing with the throttle --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- a lot?

A. Yes.

Q. But it didn't cause any type --
A. No.
Q. -- of issue with engine compressor stall or anything like that?
A. No. They would sit back, they would jockey the throttles and -- and just watch their -- they were looking how close the engines were because, you know, you're allowed to have a certain throttle split --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- and they would look at their engine parameters, you know. They would sit back and, you know, goose the throttle or, you know, advance it different -- different times to watch their field flows and so forth, make sure the field flows were actually --
Q. Is that typical?
A. It -- it really depends on the -- the pilot styles. A lot of them, they'll -- they'll actually set their cruise and then they'll compare their parameters and not sit there and, you know, play with the throttles.
Q. Okay.
A. It's kind of like I think it depends on the pilot's flying style. Some will, some won't. You know, as far as, like, sitting back, you know, like, moving it back and forth like that, it's whether or not they're actually trying to eliminate some of the hysteresis and the actual cables.
Q. Gotcha.

A. But I don't think that, you know, they're -- it's just different styles of, you know, whether or not they're looking at their indications and seeing if there's a different -- you know, a problem with their indications.
Q. Okay.
A. But, you know, some have.
Q. So typically, like you said, the only time you've seen any backfiring is when it's on the ground and they're ready to go, right?
A. Yeah. When they're pulling out of the blocks.
Q. Right.
A. That's when they normally will ride it up or if they get down to the end of the runway, they advance their throttles and their throttle, you know, and they go up to actually take off power and then they have an actual --
Q. Is there something --
A. -- compressor stall.
Q. -- is that a style of the way that they run the airplane? I mean has Ops even give them -- was there -- have you seen any memos from Ops on how to make sure that you're not causing backfire when you're running the engines or when you're about to go?
A. As far as the operation of what the pilots are doing?
Q. Yeah. Well, what -- does anybody from their director of Ops say something about, you know --

A. As (indiscernible) --
Q. -- causing --
A. No.
Q. -- causing --
A. They've talked about it with one another, you know. You know, if you're, you know -- don't -- don't advance the throttles too fast coming out of the blocks.
Q. Right.
A. You know, especially if you have, like, a crosswind or something that, you know, is pulling air from the, you know --
Q. So a newer --
A. -- preventing, like --
Q. -- policy in a --
A. -- a (indiscernible) --
Q. -- memo set the policy (indiscernible)?
A. There was no -- there was no policy or memo sent out to the -- from what I know. I mean, you know, as far as, like, write, you know -- they didn't have any, like, notice to (indiscernible), you know --
Q. Right.
A. -- the -- the notice that most of the time they read. Then -- or, you know, like, intercompany?
Q. Yes.
A. No. As far as I know of, no.
Q. Do you know whether any of the mechanics have told the DOM to

say something to the pilot group with regard to that?
A. I think in the past they have. Whether or not they did or not, I'm not sure.
Q. Okay.
A. You know, but, you know, a lot of times, you know, they -- they probably would or they would mention something to --
Q. But recently, no? Nothing?
A. As far as I know of, no.
Q. Prior to the accident?
A. Prior to the accident, they have made -- they may have actually said something to the -- to the pilots as far as, you know, possibly they, you know, don't, you know --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- like you said, jockey the -- the throttles.
Q. Yeah. Okay.
A. Or --
MR. CRUZ: Okay. Thank you very much.
MR. MUSE: Nothing. Nothing else.
MR. CHIAO: I have one question.
BY MR. CHIAO:
Q. So how manage a high EGT (indiscernible)?
A. The high EGT?
Q. Yeah?
A. Normally they'll -- they'll run the engines and verify that they actually have an EGT writeup as far as a high EGT. Normally,

they'll change the EGT indicator. Of course, you look at the maintenance manual prior to all that. But a change of EGT engine -- indicator, look at the harness, get the bar field EGT test box out, hook up, make sure that your EGT is reading correctly off the engine and then go from there.

If that doesn't fix the problem, then start looking at the wiring and see whether or not you have a wiring issue.

Q. And how is EGT degradation being (indiscernible)?

A. Pardon?

Q. How is EGT degradation track?

DR. BRAMBLE: How do you track the EGT --

MR. CHIAO: Yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: -- degradation?

MR. CHIAO: (Indiscernible).

MR. MAY: Oh.

MR. CHIAO: Degradation.

MR. MAY: Through a -- they don't have an ACARS system. We don't have a true ACARS system. So none of our airplanes are equipped with ACARS. So they basically have to fill out their own trin monitoring.

They have a trend monitoring sheet at the very bottom of the logbook and basically the pilot's responsibility is to actually enter the trend monitoring information at the very bottom of the logbook.

MR. CHIAO: Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Ron?

MR. LENHART: I have nothing more.

MR. CRUZ: Dan?

MR. MARCOTTE: I'm going to follow -- this is Dan Marcotte of Boeing. I'll follow-up with just once on Pocholo's follow-up, you know.

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. And it sounded like you said you in inflight you'd see crews occasionally adjusting throttles, observing indications kind of seeing if they could match certain parameters --

A. Yes.

Q. -- if I heard you correctly?

A. Yeah.

Q. Would you call, you know -- how much were they moving the throttles, like, the knobs? You know, would they move it, like, (indiscernible) --

A. Uh --

Q. -- three or four knobs and --

A. No. Normally, it was, like, whenever we had any type of problems, a lot of times it would less than a full knob split --

Q. Uh-huh.

A. -- like, basically, like, a half a knob --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- three-quarters of an knob split.

Q. So would that --

A. We --
Q. -- be about how much the flight crews are moving the throttles?
A. Uh --
Q. And just -- and this is purely on your -- I know you've observed a few flights.
A. Yeah. That depends on --
Q. (Indiscernible) --
A. -- if they were trying to match their throttles inflight or they were having a problem with a throttle split, they were having a problem with a throttle split. Of course, they're going to, you know, a lot of people say jockeying the throttles, but they'll move the throttles up and then they'll bump one throttle until your parameters match and then you'll compare your throttle split and see if that's actually within limits.

And if it's not within limits per the maintenance manual, then, of course, you address that problem.

Q. Right.
A. But a lot of times, you know, pilots occasionally, instead of just advancing and doing that, they'll move it back and forth to, you know, to either get rid of hysteresis out of the cable or they'll, you know -- some of them will.
Q. Right. I'm just trying to get an handle on how much they move it back and forth. You know, like, is it stop to stop?
A. No.

Q. Do they move it, like, two or three --
A. No.
Q. -- (indiscernible) --
A. Some --
Q. -- (indiscernible) --
A. Like I said --
Q. -- (indiscernible) --
A. -- it definitely depends on the pilots because some of them are really smooth and deliberate --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- while other ones, you know, they'll -- they'll get it up and they'll sit back and do this stuff and it's, like --
Q. Okay. So when they're --
A. You know --
Q. -- when they're doing this stuff, I'm just trying to figure out, how much are they -- do you think they're doing the throttle?
A. At least three or four knobs.
Q. Okay.
A. Maybe -- maybe five knobs between, you know --
Q. All right. Yeah. I was just doing it in my head.
A. Yeah. because, you know --
Q. You know, I --
A. -- some --
Q. -- now that I'm watching your hand, I understand this -- (indiscernible) understanding --

A. Yeah.
Q. Yeah, just how much they're --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- throttling from.
A. Yeah. It's quite a bit.
Q. Okay.
A. Like I said, some pilots are really smooth. So when they advance their throttles, you'll see them actually advance their throttles and then they'll look at their cruise, you know -- their cruise indications as far as their parameters go and then you'll see them moving up a little bit and if they move it up a little bit, they're trying to match their, you know -- they're trying to match their EPRs or they're supposed to be trying to match their EPRs, because it's, you know -- but a lot of times, the pilots would look more towards field flow than they do toward their EPRs --
Q. Okay.
A. -- indication. So they're trying to match their fuel flows and you'll see them do that, but you'll also see the fuel indication, of course, go back and forth, back and forth, back and forth, back and forth, and but that's what they're trying -- they're basically trying to match their engine from air a lot of times to troubleshoot, like, a throttle split, if they have a throttle split --
Q. Right.

A. -- and whether or not it's -- well, like I said, some pilots are a little bit smoother than other ones are.

MR. MARCOTTE: Okay. Thank you.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Anybody else have any follow-up questions?

(No response).

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Then we're all done then. Thank you so much and we're off the record at 10:02.

MR. CRUZ: Thank you, Ricky.

(Whereupon, at 10:02 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Ricky May
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 22, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Lisa Smith
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

Interview of: SCOTT MAYURAL, Former Chief Inspector
Rhoades Aviation

Honolulu, Hawaii

Thursday,
September 23, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

POCHOLO CRUZ, Maintenance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

STEPHEN MUSE, Aviation Safety Inspector - Maintenance
Federal Aviation Administration

DANIEL MARCOTTE, Air Safety Investigator
Boeing

RONALD LENHART, Chief Inspector
Transair

HANK CHIAO, Senior Field Representative
Pratt & Whitney

COREY WRIGHT, Attorney
Wilson Elser
(Representative on behalf of Mr. Mayural)

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:03 a.m.)

MR. CRUZ: So, again, my name is Pocholo Cruz. I'm a maintenance investigator with the NTSB. I'm leading the maintenance working group. Oh, it's 9/23/2021 at around 10:03. So I'm leading the maintenance working group for the accident number DCA21FA174, involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810, assisted by another NTSB investigator, Dr. William Bramble.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and it has no regulatory enforcement powers.

I would like now to have Dr. Bramble and each of the maintenance group members briefly introduce themselves.

Dr. Bramble.

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah, I'm William Bramble. I'm a human performance investigator with NTSB.

MR. MUSE: I'm Stephen Muse, a local FAA maintenance inspector here at the Honolulu CMO.

MR. CHIAO: Yeah, Hank Chiao from Pratt & Whitney. Pratt & Whitney.

MR. LENHART: Ron Lenhart, chief inspector, Rhoades Aviation.

MR. MARCOTTE: Dan Marcotte, Boeing air safety investigation.

MR. CRUZ: Is there anybody you object to being present in

this interview?

MR. MAYURAL: No.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we will send the recording out for transcription and the party members will have the opportunity to review that transcription to correct it for any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of this investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're simply -- we're here simply for you to share your insight and with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, however, we cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity, and a transcription of the interview will eventually be part of the public docket for the accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time and everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person who's asking a question at that time. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person has had a turn. Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so. And if you realize you misstated something or want to correct something, please do so.

You're entitled to have one representative of your choosing.

Is there someone you would like to have as your representative?

MR. MAYURAL: (No audible response).

MR. CRUZ: Would you please introduce yourself?

MR. WRIGHT: Thank you. This is attorney Corey Wright with the Wilson Elser firm, appearing today as representative for this witness.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Does anyone have any questions?

Do you have any questions?

MR. MAYURAL: No, I don't.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Okay. We shall begin. Thank you for taking the time out to speak with us today.

MR. MAYURAL: Oh, thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Appreciate it.

INTERVIEW OF SCOTT MAYURAL

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. For the record, can you please state your name and spell your name?

A. Scott Mayural, S-c-o-t-t, M-a-y-u-r-a-l.

Q. And your date of birth, Scott?

A. 6/17/63.

Q. Okay. And what certificates do you hold?

A. Airframe and powerplant, inspection authorization, and GROL FCC.

Q. Okay. And can you please briefly describe your professional background?

A. I did 21 years in the army, helicopter repairman, mechanic. Got my A&P in 2000 while I was in the army. Worked at Island Air, Aloha Airlines, AirMed Hawaii, Hawaii Life Flight, Mokulele, the FAA, and Rhoades.

Q. Okay. And when did you start with Rhoades?

A. In the chief inspector position?

Q. No, just when did you start with --

A. Oh, as a mechanic. February, I believe, April -- February of '19. I think it's '19.

Q. 2019?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. February 2019?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And you started, you said, as a --

A. Part-time mechanic.

Q. Part-time mechanic?

A. Yeah.

Q. When did you go into the -- oh, was that --

A. I resigned. I left for a few months, and then they called me back and asked me to try out for the CI position. I was finally -- I believe my final interview with the CMT was in June or July of '19.

Q. July of 2019?

A. Yes.

Q. So at that point you were the CI?

A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And the current position that you hold at Rhoades right now?
A. I'm kind of in between positions right now, so -- with the inspection section, and helping out with planning and records.
Q. Planning and records?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And how long have you been in that position?
A. Since my resignation. So I resigned the -- my date of resignation was the 21st of May.
Q. 21st of --
A. This year. Yes.
Q. -- May. So from May of 2021 to currently, that's where you've been working, in the records?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And your duties and responsibilities in your current position?
A. Duties and responsibilities: oversee and help with planning and records, and I'm going through NDT training at the same time.
Q. Okay. Do you -- do people report to you in your current position?
A. Not right now.
Q. Okay. So I want to discuss the time that you were previously the chief inspector. So it would appear you were the chief inspector for how many months? Or is it a year?

A. Year.
Q. A year?
A. Almost 2 years, right? July '19 to May '21.
Q. Okay. Is there a reason why you left the chief inspector position?
A. My medical condition was being exacerbated by the stress that I was feeling in the position to where -- the point where my doctor recommended I resign to get away from the stress.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Were you also in charge of the Part 135?
A. No, sir.
Q. Just strictly --
A. 121.
Q. Strictly 121. Okay. As the previous chief inspector, who did you report to?
A. Tracy -- I don't know, the GM, the vice president. Or Teimour, the owner.
Q. Who were your peers at the organization at the time?
A. I'm sorry, sir? Who was my peers?
Q. Who were your peers? Yeah.
A. Mike Kimble, the director of maintenance; David Seest, the director of operations; Orlando, the director of safety.
Q. Okay. How was your relationship between the three gentlemen?
A. Good. Cordial, courteous, respectful.

Q. And as a chief inspector, what were your duties?
A. To make sure everything was being done correctly and legally.
Q. Okay. And what does that entail when you say that?
A. Regulations, policies, making sure the airline was in compliance.
Q. Okay. And did you work -- is that a full-time job? I mean were you --
A. Yes, it was.
Q. -- a full-time employee? How many days a week did you work?
A. Five, minimum.
Q. Minimum? How many hours a day?
A. Ten to 16.
Q. Do you have a designee when you're not there as a CI?
A. For what?
Q. For --
A. Like if it came to records, it would be my record manager. If it came to planning, it would be my planning -- my planning clerk would be my designee.
Q. Okay. So that's who you would --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that's who would -- if you're not there, those are the people that would be taking those responsibilities?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. So how many people at the time were working for you?
A. Three.

Q. And can you describe each of the three positions?
A. One of them is the planning/records manager, Ben. He's actually the planning clerk as well. Richie's the records clerk. He reports to Ben. And I have Bill, who is my inspector/NDT inspector.
Q. Okay. Was there a specific qualification for each employee that worked in that position?
A. Yes. I'm sure they had to meet -- they were all there before I got there, but I'm sure they met the qualifications in the AVM manual for the duties and responsibilities. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Is it necessary -- was it necessary for them to have an A&P to be in that position?
A. Bill, yes. The inspector, yes. The clerks, no.
Q. No. Okay. And were they all full-time employees or part-time employees or --
A. All full-time.
Q. Okay.
A. I'm sorry. I don't know if -- Bill got -- was trying to retire later, so he went -- stepped down to part-time.
Q. Okay. So what about the other two? Were they -- how many hours --
A. Forty hours.
Q. Forty hours a week? Five days a week?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Describe the nature of your communication with the people

directly below you, meaning, you know, how frequently you talked to them --

A. Every day, 40, 50, 60 times a day. They were like 20 feet from me.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Was there any type of training that you had to give your employees to do their jobs?

A. Like I said, they were already in the position when I got into the CI position, so they were kind of rounded -- well rounded already. But whenever there was some discrepancy or mistake, then, yeah, some correction and a little bit of training or retraining.

Q. What was the biggest challenge about your job as a CI?

A. Not having the personnel that I felt that I should've had, the amount of people to handle the responsibilities and the duties effectively.

Q. In your opinion, how many more people would you have needed?

A. It wasn't really the amount of people, but the -- maybe two, two others, a CASS manager -- I mean you need CASS, somebody who knows CASS.

Q. Okay.

A. And another inspector, at least.

Q. Do you know who the previous CI was before you?

A. Yes, sir. Rick Brinsky (ph.).

Q. Okay. And why did he leave the CI position?
A. From what I was told, that happened before me, Rick got his foot chopped off because of diabetes or something, his medical condition, so he had to move back with his family in California.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. How often did you see the FAA principals?
A. It varies. Sometimes four times a month, sometimes once a month. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Who was the FAA PMI at the time?
A. Ray Lesane. Oh, the old CMT or --
Q. No. Well --
A. Both -- I worked with both teams.
Q. Oh, you did? Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. Who was the one, I guess, the previous PMI? What was his name?
A. Stan Chuck.
Q. Okay. And then you worked with the new PMI?
A. Ray, yes.
Q. Ray Lesane? Okay. And then who was the PAI, the previous?
A. Scott -- I forgot -- Masters. Scott Masters.
Q. Okay. And who is the current?
A. Ace. Do I know Ace's last name? Acevedo.
Q. Okay. All right. Were you their primary contact when the

FAA visits?
A. Not really. They came either to me or to Mike Kimble.
Q. And what was your relationship with the previous PMI and PAI?
A. Cordial, respectful, open. Good, good relationship.
Q. And were they available to you when you needed it?
A. Yes. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. What about the current PMI and the PAI?
A. It started off, in my opinion, courteous, respectful, and it kind of morphed into like I'm going to get you. That's what it felt like. But that's my opinion, my personal opinion.
Q. Yeah.
A. But it still -- even though it was like -- it had that feeling, you know, it was still professional.
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah.
Q. Why do you think that changed? Is there something --
A. I don't know. I really don't know why.
Q. And do you know about what time frame that the transition between the old PMI to the new PMI was? Can you give us --
A. Okay. So Ray and Ace came in at the beginning of the CHEP. The CHEP started in August, August/September of last year. So right around there, July, August, they went from one team to another.
Q. July/August of --
A. '20.

Q. -- 2020?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Was there a particular issue that the PMIs, the new PMIs were harping on as far as --
A. Manuals.
Q. Manuals?
A. Paperwork.
Q. And the previous PMIs didn't have those issues?
A. They did.
Q. Okay.
A. I believe so. Yes.
Q. So both before and after, PMIs, they had issues with those --
A. Yes.
Q. -- with the manuals? Do you recall what type of surveillance they would do besides just manual checking? Did they have specific tasks that they needed to accomplish and ask you guys?
A. Audits, DCTs, on-the-spot inspections; just basic stuff.
Q. And what were the result of the -- did they typically give you feedback?
A. Yeah. Sure. They'd come in and -- not every time, but majority of the time, several days later, we'd get a letter of -- hazard letter or compliance action letter, yeah, which would state what they --
Q. Right. And how do you as a CI take care of that issue?
A. Meeting of the minds with the DOM or the DO or all three of

us, and we start coming up with some sort of plan of action to address what was addressed on the letters.

Q. Right. And were they satisfied with how you guys --

A. I don't know what they're thinking, if they're satisfied, but it didn't seem like it.

Q. They didn't seem like it? Did you get follow-up letters that said fix this or fix that or that's not acceptable?

A. Yes. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. Not me personally, but the company, yes.

Q. Right.

A. Yeah.

Q. So that's basically -- it sounds like it's an ongoing issue as far as the same subject all the time?

A. Oh, no, not the same subject, but the same systems that needed to be corrected in their findings: manuals, paperwork, or whatever the topic was.

Q. So there wasn't really a resolution at some point on certain things -- was there some resolution on certain things or --

A. Oh, yeah. There was resolution on a lot -- majority of them. It's the majority right now, in my opinion, from what I know now, not being in that position of knowing, is the manuals --

Q. The manuals?

A. -- from what I know, the AIP and the GMM. That's all I know.

Q. Okay. At the time, do you know what the current revision to

the GMM was when you were the CI?
A. I forgot the number. No. I don't want to speculate.
Q. Okay. That's fine. We've noticed on the GMM that there was still some CE640s in there. Was the -- was it ever flown in Part 121 ops?
A. If it was, it was before me. When I got there, that plane didn't exist.
Q. Right. Okay. And you didn't hear anything about any of -- either the previous PMI or the current PMI to remove or take that out of the GMM?
A. I know -- yeah, both of them did.
Q. Both of them did?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So if they --
A. They made recommendations.
Q. Okay. And how come that has not been done? Because the current revisions that we were getting still have these on there. And if they made recommendations previously to have them revised and taken out, why was that not done? Do you know?
A. I guess whoever the manual owner is, you have to get that answer from that person.
Q. Okay. Fair enough. And do you know why there are two section 14s, which is the CASS section, in the GMM?
A. No. I only know of one Chapter 14. I didn't know there were two.

Q. Okay. So are you familiar with the MEL extension program?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Please explain how the program works, because it involves starting with the GM -- there's revision 2, which is in 2014. There's a revision 16-3 in 2016. So the 2014 one was -- how did they -- how was the extension, MEL extension run?
A. Just in general, the whole program?
Q. Yeah. Yeah.
A. Without having the manual in front of me, I can just go by memory.
Q. Sure.
A. Yeah. Yeah, so if you find a problem with the plane, can't remedy it right now, you go -- if you find it on the MEL manual, if it's allowed by Boeing and Rhoades or Pratt or whoever, if you find that there's relief in there, you use that, the number, the category, which you got the time limits. And then you got your M and your O procedures that you need to comply with.
Q. Okay.
A. And whatever -- you got 3 days or 1 flight day or 10 days, you have to have the MEL relief by then or ask for an extension through the CMT.
Q. Okay. And how many extensions are allowed? Do you know?
A. When I first went in Rhoades, we could do two on our own. The third one would have to be through the CMT, their approval. Now -- well, not now, but towards the end, this year, we could do

one MEL on our own and the next two would have to be approved through the CMT.

Q. Is there a reason why it went from -- the 2014 one, from what we can tell, you were allowed one extension. The 2016 revision allowed two extensions and even a third. Do you know why it went from a one to three extensions?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Why it came about, that?

A. No.

Q. Do you know whether the PMI approved the extension from 2014 to 2016?

A. No, I don't --

Q. Because it's in the manual, right?

A. Yeah. I don't know, sir. I don't know what the answer to the question is.

Q. Okay. At the time that you were a CI, could you please describe how the engine condition monitoring program worked?

A. We do a trend whenever we could do a flight long enough, the pilots would write down what the trend was. As we collect the trend, we forward it to the trend monitoring company and they give us the feedback and readouts and recommendations to -- what needed to be -- what they recommended might be a red flag and some recommendations as to the solution to what they thought was wrong was the engine.

Q. And have there been cases where you did have to make some

work on the engines based off of ECMs?
A. From my recollection, my memory, I can think of one or two instances where recommendations came through.
Q. Can you give us an example of one of those two? Do you remember?
A. Like replacing the -- checking the ITT indicator or the -- the indicator or the wiring to the indication system, the probes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, stuff like that.
Q. And that pretty much worked?
A. It must have, because -- yeah.
Q. Okay. According to the GMM, you guys were in charge of the -- or the CI was in charge of the FDR maintenance program?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Could you please explain how the program works?
A. We take the readout from the FDRs and send them to the FDR company, the company that reads the data.
Q. Okay. And then what happens?
A. And they return their findings.
Q. Okay.
A. I've only seen it through my time I was there, from what I can remember, once, from what I remember.
Q. Once?
A. Once. I was privy to -- well, twice, the FDR. But it -- the recommendations.

Q. Okay. And so if there were any issues with the findings from the FDR when it was downloaded, what happens next?
A. When it's being downloaded?
Q. When it's downloaded, they analyze the data, they return some issues --
A. Okay.
Q. -- or they return the readout and they find issues with the readout.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happens?
A. We bring it up to the attention of the DOM and the assistant DOM.
Q. Okay. Is it your job as the CI, do you open a nonroutine write-up to get it fixed or is it the DOM's job to do that?
A. I don't know whose job it is, sir, honestly -- to be honest with you, but it was opened usually by the maintenance guys.
Q. So the data, you give the -- you receive the data from the people that analyze it.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And then you give it to the DOM to take care of if there was any issues?
A. Yeah, we talk about it.
Q. You talk about it or --
A. Yes, sir. We look at it and talk about it.
Q. Okay. And then but you -- but who takes action against it?

If there's action --
A. After that?
Q. Yes.
A. The maintenance side of the house.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So according to the program, a periodic audit of the program is to be accomplished periodically. Was a periodic CASS audit accomplished on the FDR maintenance program --
A. No, sir.
Q. -- when you were there?
A. No, sir. Failed -- I failed to that. No, sir.
Q. Who on your team do you count on to gather and analyze data for the Rhoades Aviation CASS program?
A. When I was in the seat, I had no one. My clerks and myself.
Q. So it was --
A. Pretty much.
Q. Okay. And you said there really wasn't a specific qualification for --
A. Yes, sir.
Q. -- for the team to analyze it? They didn't have any history or experience in analyzing data?
A. No, sir. The clerks? Is that who you're talking about?
Q. Yes.
A. I don't think so. I don't know what kind of training they

had before me, but --
Q. Okay. So they were just data entry and gather data and that's it, and put it in a report?
A. Pretty much.
Q. Okay. Were you the one presenting the daily -- the monthly CASS report or was it the clerks that were doing that?
A. My clerk would do it.
Q. The clerks would do it?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So we have copies of the CASS report and it's a bit -- and I grant that these are just the recent ones and you were no longer a CI at the time, but it would appear that a lot of the data collected is very sporadic and inconsistent as far as what is recommended for a CASS program. Is there -- as the CASS manager or CASS manager as a CI in charge of the CASS, is there something that you went by to see if you can tighten the stuff up or --
A. As much as possible. I just do research on my own, I mean along with the other hats that I was wearing. I really needed a CASS expert. I've asked -- yeah, I needed a CASS expert.
Q. I mean did you ask the FAA for help or -- obviously you --
A. I didn't ask the FAA for help.
Q. So they typically are there when the CASS reports are presented, right?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did they have any feedback to you as the owner of the CASS as

far as --
A. Yeah, I'm sure --
Q. -- improvements, that type of thing, suggestions of how -- did you ever hear that from anyone?
A. Yes, I did hear it.
Q. And what is --
A. Not enough time. Not enough time. One person -- in my opinion, all this going on, the daily operations, the recommendations and the letters -- and the letters just keep coming, and it's all hands on deck for the letters. So kind of spread yourself thin on how much you can actually get done in 24 hours.
Q. Does the FAA give you enough time to try to fix all this, or --
A. If we had just one letter, I think we could've just satisfied that. But when they keep coming and coming and coming and coming --
Q. So did you ever ask management for help as far as getting more people --
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. -- or getting people that -- and what is their response?
A. We have ads out looking for people; we're just not getting the resumes, the applications. Or what we're getting is not -- the people not qualified.
Q. So you were basically told that you can hire whoever you

want?
A. No, not whoever I want. I asked for a CASS manager, yeah, and actually a planning manager to be over my two guys.
Q. Right.
A. But somebody with an A&P, with some background.
Q. Right. Okay. Okay.
A. Yeah. I got the okay to look for that, but I could never -- I couldn't find --
Q. They never hired anyone?
A. Nobody applied.
Q. Okay. Did anybody in your team look at any chronic or repeat system discrepancies on airplanes?
A. Yes. What do you mean, go investigate?
Q. Yeah. Yes.
A. Yes, the mechanics.
Q. The mechanics. But do they report to you?
A. No, no, no. I'm sorry, sir. Maybe I didn't understand your question.
Q. Do any of your people --
A. Oh, my people?
Q. Yes, because they're the ones that put together the chronic report for the CASS presentation.
A. Okay.
Q. Did they analyze each one of those chronic issues on airplanes?

A. No. They don't hold --
Q. They don't do that?
A. -- the experience to, so --
Q. So who gives them the information to put in a report that says these are chronic systems on airplanes, on certain airplanes?
A. Anything -- they don't need to meet with anybody. Anything -- we consider three or more write-ups of the same thing a chronic. So they wouldn't need to ask me, for example, say, should I put this on the chronic list?
Q. So they pull that from the logbooks?
A. The log sheets every morning, yes -- every day.
Q. Okay. So is there a chronic procedure in the GMM?
A. I don't want to speculate and say -- yes, sir.
Q. So how do you know it's three or more?
A. From the discussions that I've been having with the DOM.
Q. So it's just discussions?
A. I'm sure I read it somewhere. I wouldn't have just pulled it out of the air. But right now I can't recall.
Q. So as the CASS manager, how did you set the alert conditions on component systems, or did you?
A. I didn't.
Q. I'm sorry?
A. I did not.
Q. Okay. As a CASS manager, how did you deal with -- how many CASS audits did you do?

A. One.
Q. And what was that audit on?
A. CASS.
Q. CASS?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And what was the result of that audit?
A. Finding a whole bunch of discrepancies.
Q. And how was -- was it ever rectified?
A. I don't know how to answer that.
Q. What -- I guess what specific in the CASS did you do, did you audit? You said you did one CASS audit.
A. Yeah, the CASS audit wasn't local. It was not a good audit, good audit that I did on myself.
Q. Okay. And was there anything else that you did -- you said it was no good. What --
A. In my opinion, because I didn't have people to handle CASS.
Q. Okay. And what did -- did you bring that up to upper management, the accountable manager, to do something about it?
A. I am the accountable -- I was the accountable manager.
Q. Okay. For CASS, right?
A. Yes.
Q. You said there were issues. What did you try to do to try to fix those issues?
A. Tried to hire a CASS monitor.
Q. Okay.

A. And employ people to come under me who knows how to handle CASS.
Q. And did you explain that to your VP and everything like that, we've got issues here?
A. Not to the VP. I brought it up in the executive meetings and to the DOM.
Q. And to the DOM?
A. Because he runs -- he got the control on the advertisements that we use on JSfirm if I wanted to advertise for it.
Q. Were you getting pressure from the FAA to fix the CASS?
A. Oh, yeah. Yes, sir.
Q. Yeah?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. This is prior -- does the prior PMI and PAI --
A. No. No, this one.
Q. This one?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So the prior PMI and PAI never pressured you guys to fix the CASS system?
A. Not to my recollection, sir. Not that I know -- can remember back that far.
Q. But typically the two current PMIs or the PAI was -- are hands on to fix it?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall doing a CASS audit on the maintenance training

program?
A. I did a -- no, I don't remember. I know I did DCTs on it.
Q. Okay. Okay, so I need to ask this. According to the AIP you're in charge -- the chief inspector was in charge of the AIP, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So it would appear that Revision 2 is the latest revision of the AIP.
A. Okay.
Q. It's dated 2014. At the time of the accident is what I'm saying, okay? In the Section 1.0.4, which is the applicability, why is the accident airplane or -- has not been incorporated in the listing of the program?
A. I don't know, sir.
Q. Okay. So since the AIP hasn't been revised since 2014, do you know what procedure it is to revise the AIP?
A. No, sir. Not offhand. Not off the top of my head.
Q. Do you know if the FAA was involved in that originally?
A. Oh, yeah. Yes, sir.
MR. CRUZ: All right. Thank you. That's it for me for now. Bill?
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Do we need a break?
MR. CRUZ: Do you need a break?
MR. MAYURAL: No, I'm good.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. I think I -- I don't think I captured your date of hire with Rhoades. What was that? Or at least your month and year, if you can recall?

A. February '19.

Q. Feb of 2019?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. All right. I've got a list of questions but a lot of them have been asked, so I just want to have a minute to pause while I skip over stuff.

All right. Actually, let's back up and just talk about -- just so I understand a little better because I'm not up to speed on the maintenance stuff, but kind of what was a typical day like for you as a chief inspector in a typical week? Like what did your job entail basically day to day?

A. I come to work, go through the log pages, handle any fires from the day -- afternoon or the night before. When the DOM and the assistant DOM would come in, we'd pow-wow on what we got going on. Once the CHEP started, it became, well, became pretty busy, pretty -- everything was an emergency. For good reason. Letters from the FAA, we wanted to satisfy the letters.

Q. And I think you mentioned when that was, but -- that was August of 2020?

A. I believe the CHEP, the CHEP inspections started in August or September of 2020.

Q. And then by April of 2021, that's when you stepped back from the CI role?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And was that your initiative of you decided to do that or somebody told you -- did somebody tell you to do it?
A. My doctor been recommending it for a long time, and I -- him and I made the decision to finally -- yeah.
Q. Is it fair to say that by April of 2021, that your job responsibilities became overwhelming?
A. Oh, yeah. Yes, sir.
Q. At what point did you start to feel that was the case?
A. Maybe November. Right around the holiday season things started getting pretty wild.
Q. Okay. And was management aware that you were overwhelmed at that time?
A. I know my peers was. I don't -- I couldn't -- I don't know if -- I would assume so, that the owner would know, but it's just assuming. I never told him.
Q. How about the VP of ops, did you tell him?
A. No.
Q. When did they finally find out that this was more than you could handle?
A. Oh, the -- oh, I'm sorry. I thought you meant my medical condition.
Q. No, no. I mean about the job being more than you could

handle.
A. I guess I was starting to give them hints in the beginning of '21. Like this is getting -- I can't respond, I can't -- I don't have time, I don't have the personnel to do what I need to do.
Q. Okay. And in response, they said they would try to help you hire --
A. We'd hire -- yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Who was in charge of that hiring process?
A. I guess, cumulatively, all of us as the management.
Q. Okay. But you said the DOM placed the ad?
A. He has the account to place the ads. So I'd write up what I would want in the ad. Him and I would decide what we'd put in the ad.
Q. And then after you stepped back, they found somebody else to replace you?
A. Oh, yeah, Ron. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And where did they find him?
A. I don't know.
Q. All right. Was the FAA's CMT aware of your dilemma with being -- feeling understaffed and unable to handle all the --
A. I made it known to them, yes.
Q. Can you tell me who and when that happened?
A. I don't know when, but whenever the PMI and PAI -- they came down for a couple things, audits, surveillance, DCTs, and we had one, I guess, meeting. We were talking about CASS and I told them

I'm just overwhelmed, I don't even have time. So it was the PMI, PAI, I would say this year, like -- I'm guessing February, January, the earliest. Yes.

Q. Okay. All right. So before the CHEP, what was kind of your daily focus typically?

A. Log pages, task cards, going -- trying to get another NDT guy, get an NDT program -- a better program going, trying to improve on what we had.

Q. Did you guys have a borescope qualified person?

A. I don't know if Bill is or was qualified. Other than that, he would be our only guy. I don't know of anybody who was qualified as a borescope, except Fred, the owner of APEX, the engine station.

Q. Where's he located?

A. I don't know. I think Fred's shop is in Florida somewhere.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, he did all the engine work.

Q. And then after the CHEP inspection began, what percentage of your time was consumed with dealing with the FAA letters?

A. 100 percent. Or 99.9999 percent.

Q. Okay. So from what time until what time was that true? Like August of 2020 to April of 2021?

A. Yes, sir. And I'm just using the CHEP as a basis for a timeline, not that they was the ones giving the letters or anything like that.

Q. Okay. So it wasn't all emanating from the CHEP, but it began around then as far as the letters and --
A. The timeline. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Did you feel like the amount of -- did it interfere with your ability to do your job as far as your regular responsibilities?
A. Yes. Definitely.
Q. Okay. All right. I realize it's been a while, but I wanted to ask you a few things about the accident airplane, if you can remember. Are you aware of anything unusual about the condition of that airplane, 810?
A. No.
Q. Before the accident?
A. No.
Q. And do you remember if it had a history of any recurring maintenance issues?
A. I remember chronic write-up for the EGT and I think the aircraft -- the fuel system, the indication.
Q. Do you remember anything more specific about the EGT write-ups? Like what was that about and how was that handled?
A. I'd have to get the paperwork. Other than that, I'd be speculating.
Q. Okay. Were you aware of any issues with the -- any other issues with the engines on that airplane?
A. Not that I can recall, no.

Q. How about hydraulic fluid leaks? Do you remember any issues with that?
A. Not specifically to 810, but I remember some hydraulic leak write-ups coming through my desk. None that I would deem chronic, though.
Q. Okay. None that you --
A. Not that I can remember.
Q. -- would deem chronic?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Yeah. All right. How would you describe morale in the maintenance department before the accident occurred?
A. I don't really interact with the mechanics as much when I was a CI, but everybody seemed like the normal day-to-day thing to me.
Q. You didn't interact with them much as a CI or you didn't interact with them after you weren't the CI, or always?
A. In the CI, I'm in my box. I've got all my computer paperwork and -- so I'm not on the floor with the guys.
Q. I see.
A. That's what I meant. Yeah. So they come and see me once in a while if they have a question or if they need advice or whatever. But other than that, yeah, didn't interact with them every day.
Q. Okay. Did staffing seem adequate in the maintenance department before the accident aside from the inspection function?
A. I think it was adequate. Of course, the more the better,

but -- as far as mechanics goes, but -- yeah.
Q. Okay. And how about the quality of the maintenance manuals for the 737s? Do you feel that was adequate?
A. I felt there was a lot to be desired, but that was the manuals from Boeing, that Boeing had for the 200s.
Q. Okay. What was -- what were the shortcomings?
A. Information's all over the place. I'm used to Bombardier, different kind of manuals. To me the old Boeing manuals are just difficult -- different, should I say.
Q. Okay.
A. They're old, really old.
Q. How confident are you about the quality of maintenance work at Rhoades?
A. How confident? Like on a scale of 1 to 10 or --
Q. However you'd like to characterize it. But I should qualify that and say, before the accident, how confident were you in the quality of the maintenance work that was being done?
A. They got their main troubleshooters that would -- the rock stars or whatever you call them. So with those guys, yeah, yeah. I mean, of course, you're not going to let an apprentice go troubleshoot. But the main troubleshooters, yeah, they did -- they were pretty accurate most of the time and they know the plane pretty well. I think because of the age and the condition of the plane, it kind of made -- troubleshooting can be a challenge.
Q. Do you remember any issues on the 737s in the year or so

before the accident that the maintenance department seemed to have a particularly difficult time diagnosing or repairing?

A. Some chronics, and I'm not talking -- some chronics that pops up in my head right now, and I'm not saying to 810, specific to 810, would be EGT, fuel indication. I know there was some chronics on compressor stalls different engines, different planes. And then ADS-B stuff.

Q. ADS-B?

A. Yeah, when we were doing the ADS-B mods. Yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. How did the phase-in of SMS affect your role as CI? Or was that all completed before you became a CI? Safety management system.

A. Yeah. I'm sure it was in place before I became CI. It needed to be. It was a learning process for me, yes. It still is, I guess, for all of us.

Q. How did you interact with the SMS at the organization?

A. On our weekly, bi- -- well, not bi- -- we had two meetings that are weekly meetings.

Q. And what happened there?

A. So the director of safety would bring up all the, I guess all the topics for discussion, the discrepancies or concerns that the employees would have. And then we'd go through it and they get assigned as to who they belong to, whether they're for ramp, for loaders, for GSE, for aircraft maintenance, for the pilots. And we'd all pow-wow and have a big discussion on it.

Q. Did you feel like those meetings were pretty effective for identifying, you know, safety-related risks?
A. Oh, yeah. Yeah.
Q. And mitigating them?
A. Pretty good for identifying and mitigating risk.
Q. And I understand you were saying that you were kind of under resourced for the CASS stuff, but how did you see that plugging into the SMS, or did it?
A. Being understaffed, how would that affect SMS?
Q. How did the CASS program interface with the SMS during your time there?
A. I don't really understand the question, sir. Sorry.
Q. Let me see if I can rephrase it. Was the CASS program sort of like a part of the SMS? Was it like something that supported the SMS?
A. Yeah, it should have. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. Is it that basically it wasn't really able to because you were under resourced and so it didn't really have that much input?
A. Pretty much. Pretty much, yeah.
Q. Okay. Okay. Did you interact with the director of safety that much?
A. When we had issues, yes, sir.
Q. Did he seem that involved in trying to get information from the CASS program or was that not really in his wheelhouse, you

think?
A. Not really. No, sir.
Q. He didn't really seek you out to get CASS information?
A. Not from my memory, no.
Q. All right. If you had a safety-related concern when you were the CI, how would you communicate that to management?
A. If it's safety related, I'd take it to the Orlando, the DS.
Q. Okay.
A. Or I'd bring it up in the meetings. Or I'd do both, bring it up to Orlando and in the Tuesday and Friday meetings, manager meetings.
Q. And did you bring up the under-resourced nature of the CASS in all those contexts?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you feel supported by management and able to make safety-related decisions without fear of repercussion when you were the CI?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you feel pressures from management --
A. Oh, did I feel pressure? No.
Q. No, the first one was did you feel supported to make safety-related decisions without fear of repercussion?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And then the next question is, did you feel pressure from company management to do things that you felt were unsafe

when you were a CI?
A. No.
Q. And did you have any safety-related concerns about the company before the accident?
A. Basic -- yeah. I mean -- no, no, not safety related. Administrative related. No, no on safety.
Q. Okay. Primarily related to administration --
A. Administrative -- yeah, the manuals, the CASS programs.
Q. Okay. The manuals needing revision, did you -- were you responsible for making those changes to the AIS? Or the AIP?
A. AIP. Yes, sir.
Q. But not the GMM?
A. No, sir.
Q. Okay. And so how did that go with the AIP manual? Did you try to make changes to that over the last year?
A. No, sir. No, I did not, the reason being, one, I'm not well versed with the airframe and the Boeing AIP program. The previous CI, Rick, was to assist me, help me, to get that done because he understood it. And once -- honestly, once the CHEP came, we just got inundated with priorities and -- that's my feeling of it.
Q. Is it the case that you felt like you no longer had control over your time to prioritize things at that point?
A. You could say that. Every day was -- there was a different -- not every day, but majority of time, majority of weeks, there'd be another letter to -- for a fire to put out, and

we still got the other fires going and you still got the daily ops going on.

Q. Okay. What was needed on revisions for the AIP in general?

A. In my opinion?

Q. Uh-huh.

A. Somebody who understood it and just had the time to do it.

Q. Okay.

A. And the resources, of course, the people.

Q. What kinds of changes were needed? I haven't read the AIP.

A. From what I know, some task cards were missing out of it, the setup for the MSG, some of the C checks were not -- from what I was told, needed improvement.

Q. Okay. Did you oversee the people who did inspections of maintenance work that had IA's or RII authorization?

A. I didn't. Like oversee, like stay over them as they did it?

Q. Did you oversee -- like kind of were you responsible for overseeing the inspection part of their work or how did that work? For people that had inspection --

A. The RII?

Q. Yeah, or inspection authorization.

A. Yeah, I wouldn't be there with them doing the work on the plane. But one of my responsibilities for RII, if you're talking about RIIs, getting that person trained up, tested, qualified, issuing an RII authorization, and then monitoring the log sheets as they came through and auditing them, making sure that all the

work that required a RII had been RII inspected.
Q. Okay. All right. Do you recall Michael Jernigan having a letter of investigation from the FAA about missing a sign-off?
A. I know he missed a RII. I don't know about a letter with the FAA.
Q. I may have misspoke in terms of the administrative process.
A. I think he had some kind of repercussions because of it. Yes, I know of it. But I think it was -- I believe it was through the company. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay. So that didn't occur while you were the CI?
A. I don't think so. It was towards -- just when I was stepping out.
Q. Okay.
A. No, I'm sorry, sir. I'll correct that. It is during when I was stepping out, because we were trying to get him to be the interim CI, that's right, and that's where we found that discrepancy with the missing RII.
Q. Okay. Do you recall how that was detected and what the sign-off was for?
A. It was either for some rigging -- without the paperwork in front of me, I wouldn't be able to tell you accurately.
Q. Yeah.
A. But I'm going to -- I think it was some kind of rigging, he didn't get it RI'd.
Q. Okay. And was it sort of like a company process that

detected it wasn't signed off or --
A. Yes. Through the audit, the morning audit.
Q. Which audit?
A. Every day we grab the sheets from yesterday, audit it, make sure all the dates, all the times, everything is all filled out correctly.
Q. So there's a daily audit?
A. Yes.
Q. Conducted by -- who would have done that?
A. Either my clerks or myself.
Q. Did you find that or did someone else find it?
A. Someone else found it.
Q. Okay. Was there any kind of a systemic fix -- or was that sort of worked through the safety management system process at all or --
A. The fix or the immediate relief we had for that was took away his RII privileges or authorization for 30 days.
Q. Okay.
A. And then retraining on the RII manual or section, the RII section of the GMM manual.
Q. All right. So, in general, how would you describe the organizational safety culture at Rhoades? What in general was the company's sort of approach to dealing with safety and balancing it with productivity and so forth?
A. I believe that now with, well, with the safety department,

it's really bringing to light some of the things that maybe wasn't in the light before, not only aircraft maintenance but with loading. We had a lot of loaders and rampers get hurt from bad practices, I would classify that as. But the safety culture for the company, I'd say that Teimour is really pushing for that. Like he's really, really, really pushing for that.

Q. Do you feel like he's trying to do the right thing?

A. Oh, yeah. He gets very upset when we got problems, when we get an accident or somebody gets hurt. And he's always, no problem to spend money to fix, say, the painting of the lines so the pilots can taxi in, so they can see the taxi line, the lead-in line. Small stuff like that, he has no problem. He is very proactive with trying to promote safety.

Q. Okay. Do you feel like in general people feel comfortable bringing safety concerns up or reporting them without any concern about being penalized?

A. I feel people have no problem bringing up concerns, but like the other companies, too, I've worked other places, people talk about it but only a handful of people do something about it, and whatever their reasons are is their own personal reason. I know I don't have a problem with bringing up something if I felt it was unsafe.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. I think that's all I have for right now. Thanks, Scott.

MR. MAYURAL: Yes, sir. Thank you.

MR. MUSE: Hey, Scott. Stephen, once again with the FAA, just for the record.

BY MR. MUSE:

Q. I've got one thing for you. I heard you mention sometimes the FAA is kind of overwhelming with their letters and their demands on your organization and that's part of your frustration. I also heard that from previous folks that we interviewed. My question for you, have you or did you or anybody in your organization report that to anybody else other than the Honolulu CMO?

A. I don't know. I know we discussed it at meetings and it was brought up to Tiffany and -- to the CMT and to the manager.

Q. I'm talking about anybody outside of that office, and do you know the proper channels to go around that office if you feel like you are being berated or disrespected or what have you? Has anybody that you know of went outside of that office --

A. Not that I know of, no.

Q. Not that you know of?

A. No.

Q. Do you know the process to do that?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. Because I don't feel that way.

MR. MUSE: Okay. Thank you.

MR. MAYURAL: Yes.

MR. MUSE: That's all I have.
MR. CHIAO: Hi.
MR. MAYURAL: Hi.
MR. CHIAO: I'm Hank from Pratt.
BY MR. CHIAO:
Q. So I got one question on are you satisfied with troubleshooting on the JT8 surge and the high EGT issues?
DR. BRAMBLE: Are you satisfied on the troubleshooting --
MR. CHIAO: Troubleshooting --
DR. BRAMBLE: -- with the surge and EGT issues?
MR. MAYURAL: I leave that to them. I'm satisfied from what I saw. I'm not the, I'm not the JT8 expert, so I let that to the people who know the JT8s.
BY MR. CHIAO:
Q. Okay. And do you know how is the EGT margin monitored?
A. How are they monitored?
Q. Yes.
A. The EGT --
Q. Yes.
A. To the trend?
Q. Yeah, the -- yeah, set the engine and the EGT margin.
A. I'm sorry. I cannot --
MR. CRUZ: How is the EGT margin --
MR. CHIAO: Monitored.
MR. CRUZ: -- monitored, is what he's asking.

DR. BRAMBLE: For the JT8. So when you have like -- when you have the engine monitoring and you get reports back --

MR. MAYURAL: Yes, sir.

DR. BRAMBLE: -- there's like margin on the EGT that's available. Is there -- how do you keep track of that, is I think what Hank is asking.

MR. CHIAO: Yes.

MR. MAYURAL: Oh, I don't know.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. How do you handling the high EGT?

A. How would we know --

Q. Manage it, managing for high EGT?

A. I have to point you to the director of maintenance, assistant DOM, sir.

Q. No problem. And do you know what is the borescope inspection interval for the oxygen and the compressor?

A. When was it done? Is that what you're --

Q. No, what is the interval?

A. I don't know what the -- I don't know without the document.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you have borescope inspection equipment?

A. Me? Us? Not that I know of, no. I've seen one, but I don't think it's the one for the engine.

Q. And how do you track the SB or AD --

A. Oh, we have a AD --
Q. -- part according to the (indiscernible) on aircraft?
A. The part?
MR. CRUZ: How do you track it?
BY MR. CHIAO:
Q. How do you track the SB and the AD status on the part?
A. Oh, we have a AD tracking system and we have -- now it's Q, QAD. We have another tracking, maintenance tracker.
MR. CHIAO: Okay.
MR. MARCOTTE: It's been a while. I'm Dan Marcotte --
MR. MAYURAL: Hi.
MR. MARCOTTE: -- from Boeing, just to remind you. I got a few questions.
MR. MAYURAL: Okay.
BY MR. MARCOTTE:
Q. One was, you just made a comment that was pretty interesting to me, but I'd like some clarification, where you said people feel free to bring up safety issues, only a few do something about it.
A. Um-hum.
Q. Can you expand on that? What, you know, what's the difference between, you know, people -- it sounds like everybody feels free to bring up safety but very few people do something about it. I was kind of interested by that, if you could expound on it a little bit?
A. People grumble all the time, every day.

Q. Yeah.
A. I mean everybody does it, I mean every day (indiscernible). One example I would say applicable to the shop, somebody running their air hose across the walkway without the proper mat for safety. Everybody's grumbling because they don't like the guy who -- but nobody goes and say something.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. So you got --
Q. So it's like the -- you kind of feel that, you know, a lot of people will see something or talk about something but not everybody makes a safety report so that the company can do something about it?
A. That's what I feel.
Q. Okay.
A. My own opinion.
Q. I'm just trying to clarify what you meant.
A. Yes, sir. That's my own opinion.
Q. The difference between people seeing something and reporting or people report things and then there's not really leadership who always takes action.
A. Oh, leadership will take action once it's reported.
Q. Thanks. That's what I was getting at and clarify.
A. Yeah, for sure.
Q. And then because you said -- we heard about FAA letters in your interview and there's a quite a quantity of letters, it's

pretty overwhelming. So when you get a letter from the FAA, before you reply, is there any somewhat -- I'll call it more of an informal communication with the FAA, the principals, that say we got your letter, you know, here's the way I'd like -- you know, here's what I'm thinking about doing or here's the draft of what I think I'll send to you, what do you think? You know, is there a little informal back and forth? Or is it -- or is things broken -- things gotten to a point where it's just like letters back and forth with no informal communication or anything to try to --

A. Out of all the letters that Rhoades or Transair received, only -- I can only speak of one that was directed to me or to my position. And, yeah, we had a discussion about it, no problems.

A lot of the letters, from what I saw, with maintenance went to the DOM. And it started off -- because we'd have conversation, hey, Scott, come in my office; we just got this letter today, blah, blah, blah; what do you think? Okay, let's do this. Let's go talk to Ace and Brigg (ph.), see what they say. It started out that way, being cordial, I guess, in my opinion. Then it, I don't know, it just -- I don't know what the reasoning, it just went -- in my opinion, it went -- my professional -- my personal and my professional opinion, it just went downhill, the relationship, to the point where it was just here's a letter. Well, what do you guys want us -- what exactly -- read the regs, figure it out.

Q. If you submitted a letter, a response letter, and whatever

your proposal was, they didn't find it acceptable and they'd send you probably another letter back, did -- if they didn't accept something you proposed, when they replied to you, either in a letter or conversation, was it usually pretty clear about why they didn't find it acceptable?

A. Like I said, for me, the interaction was only one letter.

Q. Yeah.

A. But from what I've heard and from what I witnessed, I don't think -- I think it could've been made more clearer. That way we could get a solution to whatever the problem was quicker or more accurately.

Q. All right. Then I'd like to go over the CASS process a little bit. And what I looked at was, in your -- in the GMM there's a bulletin, 16-1, dated March of 2016, that's the CASS process in the GMM, or the section I found on CASS. So in it, it talks about a reliability report, and it takes -- I think it takes, as a logbook entries are input into the system, data goes into like Cell Street, which then gives you information, for example, on the number of PIREPs by ATA, and there's alert levels assigned. And then when something goes over an alert level, there's a risk analysis. So I read that. But then when I looked at the meeting minutes supplied to us, I didn't see anything with PIREPs or any reference to alert levels or anything of that nature.

So I was wondering, is there an expectation for that

information to be in the CASS meeting itself, or is it background and only if something trips an alert does it go to CASS? I saw nothing -- no trend data on PIREPs in the CASS meetings, minutes that we've received.

A. Oh, really?

Q. Yeah. And again, I'm reading minutes, I think, that goes from the the last year, so it might've, you know, (indiscernible).

A. I think it's changed now. But -- yeah, I --

Q. Okay. So when you were the CI, though, there was the -- reliability report was generated and reviewed for alert levels so that a risk analysis could take place to determine if there was a risk?

A. We -- yeah, we'd meet and talk about it. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Also, in the meeting -- well, again, we only have the meeting minutes from the last year, but the meeting minutes I had to look at, as I said, there wasn't PIREPs, you know, information in there. The other thing was it looked more like an agenda and maybe some presentation material, but I didn't see anything that would document discussions --

A. Yes.

Q. -- or decisions or action items were assigned to people or follow-up from previous months' action items.

A. Yes. We failed in that, in my opinion. We failed in that, in that topic.

Q. And my last question on CASS has to do with the audit of the

CASS process itself. Okay? And again, I'm getting this from this -- from the bulletin with your CASS, and from the GMM. For a CASS audit, so in the -- I saw there was three CASS audit checklists in the appendix. And this is just for the audit of the CASS process itself, not the regular audits, other audits, and there was three. There's the CASS 007 and a CASS 008, which are annual and semiannual CASS audits. But I also when I went through the appendix, I saw there was a 003, which was also just called CASS audit. And when I was looking, I really -- in the process, and again, I could've missed it, but I didn't really see the description of when the 007 or 008 was used. Although, it did say there as an annual and semiannual, I think, audit, but it didn't give the checklist. But there was an example of when the 003 was used. And it looked like the director of -- if I'm right, it looked like the director of safety did his own audit of the CASS process using the 003 form. And is my understanding correct? So --

A. When I took over, that whole chapter is like --

Q. Yeah.

A. So I worked with Orlando, the director of safety, and that is the main topic in the revision now. Him and I -- bottom line, we just did our best. We winged it and did what we could.

Q. Okay. And again, I'm not trying to --

A. I didn't understand.

Q. I'm just trying to understand what --

A. Yeah.
Q. I'm seeing in here, by looking at the appendix and then going back and try to see what forms that you used. And I'm asking because when we asked for the CASS audit process, what was provided to us for the last audit, I think we only had the 008. I didn't see a 003 or 007. So that's what got me interested, what is -- but do you think I understood it correctly, where a visit would be your -- the CI's organization is the 007, 003 -- or 007 and 008 --
A. 008. CASS does the three --
Q. -- and the director of safety does his own audit using the 003.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that correct? Do you think I got it right?
A. I think so.
Q. Okay. All right. Thank you.
A. The reason I say I think so is because that chapter's kind of hard to understand. It's being cleaned up now.
MR. MARCOTTE: Yeah. Okay. Thank you. And I think that's it for me. Thank you very much.
MR. MAYURAL: Okay. Thank you.
MR. CRUZ: So I have a couple follow-up questions for you.
MR. MAYURAL: Sure.
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. You were the CI until April of 2021.

A. Yes.
Q. Ron did not come in until June of 2021. Who was the CI in between there? Do you know?
A. No, I do not know.
Q. Okay. So you don't know who took over for you and Ron --
A. No. That's why they were trying to get Jernigan to be the interim and how we caught that RRI that he missed.
Q. Oh, okay. So if he didn't get the CI for that, you don't know who they put in that position in the interim?
A. No, sir.
Q. Okay. And then what job did you take after you stepped down?
A. Like I said, I'm working with planning and --
Q. Okay.
A. So the two clerks that was helping me, I'm directly over them now. And I'm also working on the inspection section, trying to create an NDT program.
Q. Okay. That's your job, in the inspection --
A. For right now. It's kind of -- I have nothing written. They're trying to create one for me.
Q. And I just want to make sure I understand correctly when you said that the aircraft inspection program --
A. AIP.
Q. -- you said you didn't understand how it worked?
A. I do. I mean I understand how it works. It's --
Q. Okay.

A. I wasn't an expert.
Q. Okay. And --
A. Rick was the expert, the old CI.
Q. The old CI?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you said you were asking -- Rick was supposed to assist you to do what?
A. Working any -- what's the word I'm thinking of -- any amendments, any changes to the AIP, and bringing it -- just fixing it, fixing the AIP manual.
Q. Oh, fixing the AIP manual?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. But as far as the -- you understood the aircraft inspection --
A. Yes. Oh, yeah.
Q. -- program and how it works?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And, you know, how task cards are put out and when those task cards are put out and that type of thing?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. I just wanted to make sure I understood that that what's you meant by -- because when you said, just to understand the maintenance program, I would expect --
A. Yes, of course.
Q. -- you to understood the -- okay.

MR. CRUZ: I think that's all I have.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. Just a clarification on the timeline with Rick. So what happened to Rick? He's the gentleman that lost his foot; is that right?

A. Yes, sir. I think a portion of his foot.

Q. Okay. When did Rick leave the company?

A. When I came, he -- he's still there, but he's a -- he works remotely from California.

Q. Okay. So you came in to replace him --

A. Yes, sir.

Q. -- and the idea was that he would help with revisions to the AIP?

A. Yeah. He is -- he helped with a lot of things. He's the director of tech services right now.

Q. Okay. And so why -- what happened to him? Why didn't he help with revisions to the AIP? Was it because of the medical emergency or --

A. He is doing -- he was handling audits on the mainland, that I know of. I don't know if this is what got in the way of it, but he's doing a buy of a 400, some engines, he was all over the US running around. He had his regular responsibilities, I assume, and like everybody else, we were all, all hands on deck with getting the letters addressed.

Q. Okay. So when he -- when you took the CI position, did he go

directly to the director of tech services position? Don't know?
A. I don't know. That's above my pay grade.
Q. What happened in terms of your interaction with him after you became the CI? Like what's your visibility to where he was and how much he (indiscernible)?
A. Oh, every day. Daily.
Q. Oh, okay. So he was around?
A. On the phone, though. Either by computer or by phone, yeah.
Q. Okay. But it's just that he was also busy with responding to letters and doing things with the 7-400; is that right?
A. I don't think he was doing letters, but he was doing AD. We were doing a lot of work together. We were doing the plane and heavy check. He's getting the work packages, making sure the SDRs are created for all the work they're doing there.
Q. Was this the work on the new plane, the 737-400, or --
A. No. Just our planes over in Taiwan going in for their C checks.
Q. Oh, okay. So he was pretty involved with overseeing that work?
A. He's involved with a lot. Yes, sir. He's got his hands all over the place.
Q. Okay. So one other question on the letters. So you only had one FAA letter addressed to you?
A. That I can remember, yes, sir, one to me.
Q. But then you said you were kind of preoccupied with the

letters from August of 2020 to April --
A. Yeah. We all worked together on all the letters, because one person cannot -- no way any one person could make the timeline. You got 5 days, you got 10 days. There's no way you could address the letter.
Q. Okay.
A. And addressing letters, the reasons why some of them takes time is because you have to go into the physical records, and talking about 400 boxes of records, and you got to find -- one, you got to find where the box is, you got to find that box, you got to find that document. It takes time. It takes people crawling over pallets and days of just moving boxes by hand.
Q. Okay. And one last thing on Rick. I mean was the -- was his medical situation, I mean was that a -- did that sort of take him out of circulation for a while? Did that hinder your ability to deal with some of these issues or was that not really a factor?
A. It's not -- I don't -- I wouldn't say it was a factor with me.
Q. Okay. In terms of dealing with the AIP revisions, was it just that he was too busy or was he kind of out commission with medical stuff?
A. No, he wasn't out of commission.
Q. Okay. All right. He was just --
A. All that foot stuff happened right when I was coming in. Yeah. So once he moved back to the mainland, he was -- he's just

busy.
Q. Okay. I see. All right.
A. He had surgery once and he was out for like 1 week, and that was it, that I can remember.
Q. All right.
A. Yeah.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. That's all that I got right now, I think.
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. So just to follow up on that real quick. Once he was busy enough, did you not ask for more help or another person to help in trying to fix the AIP?
A. Constantly asking, yes.
Q. And they couldn't give you another person that knew the maintenance program enough to help you or help you fix the AIP?
A. Apparently not. Thus, my stress. Because I know something is wrong and they're not fixing it. And I --
Q. So you asked for help from --
A. -- I'd bring myself down.
Q. You asked for help from management to have somebody else help you besides Rick --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and nobody was able to --
A. There was nobody to produce with the knowledge.
Q. Yeah.

A. Yeah. I mean there's people, but nobody with the knowledge, in my opinion. That's my opinion.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. I don't see hands up --

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. So just a little -- to make sure I'm kind of clear on what he just discussed. So when you went, I guess, to ask for help or another person to help with the AIP, was that another case where you were authorized to go find someone and you couldn't find --

A. Yeah. We were already authorized to find somebody, but we just couldn't find them.

Q. Okay. So that was another case where you got authorization and you went to the director of maintenance and you guys put out the ads and there wasn't qualified --

A. Nobody --

Q. -- candidates who responded?

A. Nobody biting, yeah.

Q. Okay. So the leadership was still trying to --

A. Oh, yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Thanks.

A. The leadership never told me no.

MR. MARCOTTE: Okay. Thank you. I just wanted to clarify that. I appreciate it.

MR. CRUZ: So we want to thank you for your time. Is there something that you would like to tell us that we haven't asked you before or any type of safety recommendations that you would like

to tell us?

MR. MAYURAL: No, not that I can think of.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. I guess we are done at 11:37. Okay. Thank you very much, Scott, for your --

(Whereupon, at 11:37 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Scott Mayural
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 23, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Kay Maurer
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

Interview of: GREG TAISIPIC, Lead Mechanic
Rhoades Aviation

Honolulu, Hawaii

Tuesday,
September 21, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

POCHOLO CRUZ, Maintenance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

STEPHEN MUSE, Aviation Safety Inspector - Maintenance
Federal Aviation Administration

DANIEL MARCOTTE, Air Safety Investigator
Boeing

RONALD LENHART, Chief Inspector
Transair

HANK CHIAO, Senior Field Representative
Pratt & Whitney

ANTHONY DiCIOCCIO, Senior Manager, Customer Technical Services
Pratt & Whitney
(Via telephone)

COREY WRIGHT, Attorney
Wilson Elser
(Representative on behalf of Mr. Taisipic)

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:07 a.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: Today is September 21st, 2021; it is 10:07 a.m. and my name is William Bramble and I'm a Human Performance Investigator with the NTSB. I'm assisting the maintenance working group led by NTSB Investigator Pocholo Cruz. That is Working Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I'd now like to have Mr. Cruz and each of the maintenance group members briefly introduce themselves. Mr. Cruz.

MR. CRUZ: So I'm Pocholo Cruz, I am the maintenance group chairman for this particular accident.

MR. MUSE: I'm Stephen Muse, I'm with the FAA here at the Honolulu CMO, I'm a geographic maintenance inspector.

MR. CHIAO: I am Hank Chiao, Pratt & Whitney representative.

MR. LENHART: Ron Lenhart, chief inspector.

MR. MARCOTTE: I'm Dan Marcotte, I'm with Boeing, I'm in air safety investigations.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Is there anybody in this room that you object to being present for the interview?

MR. TAISIPIC: No.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. And for Pratt & Whitney do you guys -- are you still going to have somebody on the phone from the group or --

MR. CHIAO: Yes.

DR. BRAMBLE: Oh, you do currently?

MR. CHIAO: Yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: So the person on that, can you have the person on the phone identify themselves or can you tell us who you are?

MR. CHIAO: That's Tony.

MR. CRUZ: That's Tony DiCioccio, he's the Pratt & Whitney Maintenance Group representative for whomever.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. And he could not make it today, is it okay with you that he's present by phone?

MR. TAISIPIC: Yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview we will send that recording out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to review the transcription and correct it for typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault or blame; we are here simply for you to share your insights with the goal of preventing accidents.

Having said that; however, we can't offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity; transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for this accident

investigation.

To the group members, we'll have a chance to ask questions, we'll ask questions when the time and everyone's been instructed not to interrupt the person who's asking questions at that time. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person has a turn.

Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question say so and if you don't know you can say you don't know and if you realize you misstated something or want to correct something, please go ahead and do so.

You are entitled to have one representative of your choosing during an NTSB interview. Is there someone present that you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. TAISIPIC: Yes.

DR. BRAMBLE: Who is that?

MR. TAISIPIC: (Indiscernible).

DR. BRAMBLE: Can you please introduce yourself?

MR. WRIGHT: Sure, I'm Corey Wright; I'm an attorney with the firm of Wilson Elser here on behalf of the witness today.

DR. BRAMBLE: Thank you. Okay. Does anyone have any questions before we begin?

(No audible response).

INTERVIEW OF GREG TAISIPIC

DY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Do you go by Greg?

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Okay, Greg, can you -- we'll start with the tough questions, can you just give us your full name and how you spell it?
A. Greg Taisipic, G-R-E-G, Taisipic is T as in Tom-A-I-S as in Sam-I-P as in Paul-I-C as in cat.
Q. Okay. And how old are you?
A. 53.
Q. Okay. What's your date of hire with Rhoads?
A. August 29th, 2018.
Q. 2018, okay. Did you work for Transair before that or --
A. No.
Q. Okay. All right. And can you give us a brief overview of your aviation related background that led to you working for Rhoades?
A. I started my career in Guam at Big Eye Helicopters. It went bust soon after I went to Continental Micronesia Airlines. Worked there for about 17 years, left there went to Asian Pacific Airlines, about five years there and then to Pacific Airport Services and worked briefly with Cape Air, United Express in Guam, which both had to let me go because of contracts being cut so they had to let most of the employees go or all the employees go actually.
So I found a stint out here with Transair, came out here to work for them, been here since.

Q. Okay. And what's your current job title or what was your job title at the time of the accident?
A. Lead mechanic.
Q. And who's your supervisor?
A. Mike Johnson and Mike Kimble.
Q. What are their positions?
A. Director of maintenance, Mike Kimble, and assistant director of maintenance, Mike Johnson.
Q. Okay. And as a lead mechanics what are your roles and responsibilities in general?
A. Assist the mechanics through whatever problems they're having with the airplanes and pretty much hands-on work, lead man.
Q. Do you supervise the mechanics?
A. Yes.
Q. How many?
A. Let's see, five people total.
Q. Okay.
A. Right now six.
Q. But five at the time of the accident?
A. Five at the time of the accident.
Q. Okay. So you had five people and then another lead mechanic supervised a different group of mechanics?
A. Yeah, he supervised a different group.
Q. Okay. What's your normal weekly schedule?
A. Starting Sunday, Monday, Wednesday, Thursday.

Q. And what hours?
A. Eight to six.
Q. Okay. Was that the case the week of the accident?
A. Yeah.
Q. All right. What training have you received from Rhoades Aviation since you started working for the airline?
A. Ground equipment like forklifts and stuff and belt loaders, kind of what do you call that, the gen fam differences on the 737.
Q. Who provided the gen fam stuff on the 737?
A. Mike Johnson.
Q. All right.
A. Otherwise I did have prior knowledge on the 737, just differences.
Q. Where did you work on those, which airlines?
A. Continental Airlines, Continental Mic, Continental Airlines.
Q. Okay. What airplane specific training have you been provided on the company's -- I guess we kind of already covered that but how about have you had any specialized training on the Pratt & Whitney engines on these airplanes that Rhoades operates?
A. Not with Rhoades. I used to work Continental Micronesia, like I said I had A&P training with Continental Micronesia on the 727s with the JT8s.
Q. Okay. What's satisfying or difficult about working for Rhoades?
A. Pretty much nothing, it's an easy schedule. I don't have to,

I don't have to work too many airplanes like I used to with big airlines.
Q. Who supervises the mechanics when they're working at night?
A. They do have one mechanic at night, as far as the supervision, I guess he would supervise himself if, yeah, if he ran into any trouble he'd make calls to whoever is maintenance control.
Q. Okay. Who would that, who would that typically be, like who would be on call as maintenance control?
A. Mike Johnson or Kimble.
Q. Okay. All right. How well did you know Captain Henry Okai?
A. I knew him. I don't know him very well outside of the company, just professional working relationship.
Q. Okay. How did he get along with mechanics?
A. He got along with mechanics, yeah.
Q. Any, any problems there?
A. No.
Q. And how about first officer Greg Ryan, were you acquainted with him?
A. I was acquainted with him but I don't know him personally, just professionally.
Q. And how did he get along with the mechanics?
A. He was -- he got along with them alright.
Q. Okay. Were you aware -- before the accident were you aware of anything unusual about the condition of the, of the accident

airplane?
A. No, none.
Q. Any open maintenance items you were aware of?
A. Prior to the accident had a couple squawks with the left hand pack blows hot.
Q. All right. Did that have to do with the --
A. Air conditioning.
Q. -- air conditioning? All right. Any recent history before the accident of recurring maintenance issues with the accident airplane you can recall?
A. Reoccuring?
Q. Yeah, was there multiple write-ups?
A. Engine problems, engine, airframe problems, what?
Q. Anything that sticks out as sort of a continuing problem you were attempting to diagnose and address.
A. No.
Q. All right. Were you aware of any issues with the accident airplane's engines before the accident that were being written up or cause, cause for concern?
A. In the months prior, no.
Q. All right. Any reports of backfires with those engines --
A. Yes.
Q. -- in recent months? And what was the nature of that issue?
A. I couldn't find any faults, any damage.
Q. What type of diagnostic action was involved with that, can

you tell us more about how that was reported and what happened?
A. It was written up as four consecutive compressor stalls about two months prior, somewhere around two months prior and I went to the AMM, looked up what I could for compressor stalls, did the inspections per the AMM for Pratt & Whitney and Boeing, didn't find any, any noticeable damage so I ran the engines and nothing since.
Q. Was the -- when you ran the engines did everything appear normal?
A. Yeah. No stalls, no -- idle was fine, EGT was fine, everything was -- all parameters were normal.
Q. Okay. When you run the engines like that, how do you do that, like what's the procedure to check it?
A. Well, they said they had a compressor stall so can't get a compressor stall at just at idle so I had to bump up the throttles a little bit to see where we pop. I wouldn't get no pop.
Q. Do you have to increase it to a certain amount of EPR or do you just try to --
A. No, not EPR, I just went by the percentage.
Q. Okay.
A. Because on the N2, on the N2 indicator bring it up about maybe 90, 95 percent and pop.
Q. Okay.
A. Usually pops around there.
Q. In this, in this case there was no pop?

A. None.
Q. Okay. All right. So we had heard from some pilots about observing sort of high EGT indications on the engines for the accident airplane and maybe some of the other airplanes as well during takeoff with the rate of thrust like maybe the EGT getting up kind of near the yellow range and then maybe even a little bit into the yellow range.

And I was wondering if you heard any reports about that from pilots?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Okay. If you did would you -- would that concern you about the health of the engines?
A. It would. I don't take verbals lightly.
Q. Okay. Is that the kind of thing that would typically be written up or should be written up? I'm not aware of what the criteria is for what should -- has to be written up and what doesn't with respect to temperature?
A. It should, yes.
Q. Okay. What would be -- like kind of what's the limit for something that's significant enough to write-up with the engine temperature like if it gets into the yellow or if it stays there?
A. I couldn't comment on that, it's whatever the pilot feels uncomfortable with any of that.
Q. Okay. So it's kind of up to the pilot to decide. All right. One other thing that had come up was the issue of some hydraulic

fluid leaking on the right main gear that was noticed during the preflight before the accident flight and I was just wondering if you were aware of any issues with hydraulic fluid leaking from the right main gear area --

A. No, I wasn't.

Q. -- on that airplane? No. I think I talked over you but for the transcript you said, no?

A. No.

Q. No, okay. All right. All right. In terms of the maintenance department in general how was morale before the accident?

A. Morale?

Q. Uh-huh.

A. Well nothing, nothing eventful. Everybody just comes to work happy.

Q. Okay. And was staffing adequate in the maintenance department before the accident?

A. Yes.

Q. How about pay, did you feel that was adequate?

A. Yeah, yes.

Q. And how about the quality of the facilities where you perform your work, did you find that acceptable?

A. It's acceptable, yes.

Q. Did you feel you had the equipment and resources you needed to effectively do your job?

A. Yes.
Q. And had there been any maintenance issues with the 737s in the last year or so before the accident that the maintenance department had had particular difficulty diagnosing or repairing?
A. No.
Q. And overall how confident are you about the quality of the maintenance work performed by Rhoades Aviation?
A. I'm confident.
Q. Okay. All right. One of the things that some of the pilots talked with us about was the different types of log book write-ups where crews would sometimes put an F next to a write-up for a flight crew maintenance item or an I for an informational item. Have you seen those informational write-ups?
A. Yes.
Q. And what does it, what does it mean if an item is informational?
A. From what I understand when a pilot writes up information it's just an informational -- it's just to let us know what's going on.
Q. Okay. How do you address the two different kinds of write-ups?
A. I address it as a write-up.
Q. So if it's an I does it -- do you have the same obligation to do something about it as you do with an F?
A. If it's in the logbook I just -- I treat it as a write-up.

Q. Okay. All right. Are you aware of any instances of crews being asked to delay write-ups until they get back from a trip rather than before they leave?
A. No.
Q. And are you aware of any rejected takeoffs due to crews observing high EGT indications during takeoff roll?
A. I heard about one but I wasn't there for it. I don't know all the info.
Q. Okay. Were you involved in resolving that issue, diagnosing and resolving that one?
A. That one, yeah.
Q. You were involved?
A. Yeah, because it grounded the airplane.
Q. Okay. Is that the one we talked about earlier where you went through the manual and looked to see if there was --
A. No, a different aircraft.
Q. Oh, okay, okay. So tell me about, tell me about this one in terms of this issue with the rejected takeoffs and the EGT, how did you find out about it and then what happened?
A. When I came in in the morning I got a turnover from the night shift crew that aircraft we had rejected takeoff and upon looking, looking at the engine, looking in the exhaust area all the -- some fan blades were broken off so that was pretty much an engine change.
Q. Okay.

A. As far as what went on during the takeoff, I don't know.
Q. About how long ago was that?
A. I can't recall.
Q. Was it more than a year ago, do you think?
A. About within -- yeah, about a year or so.
Q. About a year?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. I can't recall the exact date.
Q. Do you recall which airplane?
A. 326.
Q. Okay. Are you aware of any reoccurring issues with cabin pressurization that have been difficult to diagnose?
A. Yes.
Q. Any particular airplane that seems to have that problem more than others?
A. No, not a particular one, no. Not one more than others, no.
Q. So it's kind of, kind of a general issue across the various airplanes?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. All right. Are you aware of any inflight hydraulic failures that may have occurred in the last year or two with -- we had a report from one pilot about a hydraulic B system failure inflight that had to be -- I think they, they had to ferry it back and then have it addressed back in Honolulu, did you know anything

about that?
A. No, I don't believe we ferried anything back.
Q. Okay. I may have the detail wrong but do you recall anything about a hydraulic B failure in flight?
A. Yeah, in Kona.
Q. Okay.
A. They landed, they lost all hydraulic fluids and the airplane was stuck on the, stuck on the taxiway.
Q. Okay. How long ago was that?
A. Oh God that's eight months ago, nine possibly.
Q. Okay. All right. Do you know if a hydraulic leak was reported to maintenance by the crew of that airplane before they departed?
A. Which airplane?
Q. The one that had -- that was stuck on the taxiway?
A. No, there was none.
Q. Okay. So another pilot told us about an incident where she came onboard the airplane and the circuit breaker panel behind the FOC was damaged and she said she reported it to a mechanic and the mechanic asked the captain to write it up when they got back but the captain declined to write it up and then the damage wasn't repaired. Do you know anything about this situation?
A. No, haven't heard about it.
Q. Okay. All right. How often before the accident did you typically interact with FAA inspectors or members of the

Certificate Management Team?
A. After the accident?
Q. Before.
A. Oh, before. I don't normally interact with them. They're usually in the offices.
Q. Okay. All right. And before the accident who was responsible for managing safety at Rhoades Aviation?
A. Managing safety?
Q. Yeah, for the company as a whole.
A. Orlando.
Q. Okay. And was there -- is there a particular executive who serves as sort of a name, accountable executive for safety management?
A. All I know is Orlando Debrum is the safety director.
Q. Okay. If you had a safety related concern how would you communicate that to management?
A. We do have paperwork we could fill out and turn in, otherwise you can go online to Transair.com and fill that out and turn it in through to the website.
Q. Okay. Have you ever filed a report like that?
A. No.
Q. All right. Do you participate in the twice weekly safety meetings or is that only the top managers?
A. That's just management.
Q. All right. And do you have any direct role in the company's

CASS meetings?
A. No.
Q. Okay. All right. Do you interact with S.M.S. auditors on maintenance audits?
A. No.
Q. All right. What kind of safety related communications do you get from the company in terms of safety promotion, newsletters, things of that sort?
A. Can you repeat that?
Q. Do you get sort of regular communications from the company sort of promoting safety in various ways?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What kind do you get?
A. We usually have a maintenance meeting on Wednesdays where all the mechanics and leads sit.
Q. Okay. And how about newsletters, bulletin boards, that kind of thing?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. In your job as a lead mechanic do you feel supported by management and able to make safety related decisions as a -- as a mechanic, I'm sorry, without fear of repercussions?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you feel any pressure from company managers to do things you feel are unsafe?
A. No.

Q. Before the accident did you have any safety related concerns about the company?
A. No.
Q. And how would you describe the organizational safety culture at Rhoades Aviation?
A. How would I describe what? Say that, repeat that.
Q. Yeah. So there's a term called organizational safety culture which is -- basically it's sort of the way that the company approaches dealing with safety issues and balancing safety and productivity and what is the sense that you get of the culture at Rhoades in terms of how it prioritizes safety versus productivity and how open people are about discussing safety issues and whether or not when people bring safety information to management that information is accepted and accepted upon as opposed to buried, that sort of thing.

Do you feel like the company's proactive in terms of safety?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Okay. I said a lot of things there but I didn't --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- I didn't want to put words in your mouth. But in terms of this company's approach to safety, do you have any sort of reflections on that?
A. No.
Q. No thoughts?
A. No thoughts.

Q. Okay. All right. In general can you describe the relationship between the maintenance staff and the pilots before the accident, was it a good relationship or was it strained?
A. Our relationship, the pilot group and maintenance group?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Between the pilot group and maintenance group?
Q. Yeah.
A. I don't see it strained, pretty professional.
Q. Okay. Have you ever heard of a flight crew saying that they were afraid of being fired for writing up a maintenance issue?
A. No.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. Thanks for your patience, that's it for me. I'm going to pass it on down. So Pocholo Cruz --
MR. CRUZ: Yeah.
DR. BRAMBLE: -- you're up next.
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. Thanks for coming today, by the way, appreciate it. Just a couple of things. You said you work swings or days?
A. Days.
Q. You work days, okay. And correct me if I'm wrong, who is your supervisor on days?
A. Mike Johnson and Mike Kimble.
Q. Okay. Were you on the night for the airplane accident, were you working the day --

A. The day before.
Q. The day before?
A. Yeah.
Q. Because the airplane left in the morning, right?
A. Yeah, it did. That was what the --
Q. The 2nd.
A. The 2nd.
Q. Friday, I think, is the 2nd.
DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah, it departed just after midnight on the 2nd.
MR. TAISIPIC: Yeah. I worked the day before.
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. So you worked on that Thursday?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Was there -- do you recall if there was any work done during nights like that afternoon, because you worked days, right?
A. Right.
Q. Do you know if was there any work done during that afternoon?
A. That afternoon, yes, we worked on the air conditioning pack, left hand pack.
Q. That was, that was the work that was being done after you left?
A. Yeah. Well it was done, we signed it off.
Q. So it was done after you left?
A. It was done prior to me leaving to go home.

Q. Okay. Yeah, okay. And there were no other issues like you said, that you know of on the airplane, with regard to that?
A. No. They wrote up the left hand pack blows hot, we found the problem, corrected it.
Q. Don't recall anything about fuel quantity issues or engine related issues that you recall?
A. Fuel quantity issues, yes, but were having on not just one airplane.
Q. Okay.
A. I can't recall the other.
Q. Do you know if Rhoades Aviation has like a chronic system in place like if there's a discrepancy on a specific system --
A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- like, you know, as far as being repetitive, number of days it keeps getting hit, or do you know if there's such a procedure in place in the GMM with regards to repetitive issues that are to be tracked or dealt with?
A. I don't -- I haven't read, no.
Q. No. So let's get back to I think -- I don't know whether Bill already asked you but you haven't had outside training with regards to Pratt engines, have you, besides your previous employers, right?
A. No.
Q. Rhoades has not given you any or offered you any type of training with Pratt & Whitney or anything like that?

A. No.
Q. Okay. How often do you -- I know Bill asked this, how often do you see the FAA there at Rhoades?
A. At least once a week.
Q. Once a week. Have you had any interaction with some of the FAA guys as far as your issues or do they ask you questions like you're working and they come up, do they?
A. No.
Q. No. How would you characterize your relationship, the company's relationship and your relationship with the FAA?
A. Professional in nature but I don't, I don't personally interact with them that much.
Q. Okay. So, okay. As far as the manuals are concerned, do you think it's lacking, do you think it's all there; do you think there's something missing?
A. No. It pretty much, pretty much explains all that I do.
Q. Yeah. Is there -- if there's something that needs to be -- that you guys need does management take care of that as far as manuals or anything else?
A. Yeah.
Q. Parts or anything like that that you guys need?
A. I take -- I get my parts as I need it and as far as the manuals, yeah, they're, they're adequate.
Q. So they support you --
A. Yeah.

Q. -- as far as trying to get stuff? Have you ever been pressured to not write anything up --
A. No.
Q. -- by management? No. As far as this particular airplane do you recall any issues with having backfires or pressure stalls on this airplane?
A. On 810 in particular?
Q. Yeah.
A. Just that, just that one on 810.
Q. And when was the one?
A. That was two, three months before the incident --
Q. Okay.
A. -- and that was it.
Q. So I need to show you this just to make sure. So these are basically logbooks. This logbook right here is dated November 25th, 2020, on 810.
A. November 5th?
Q. November 25th.
A. Okay.
Q. And this was specific to a constant backfire from Number one.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is this your sign off right here?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Can you expound a little bit on the sign off because you change a nose cal assembly?

A. I believe for that particular one on the nose call it has that acoustic liner.
Q. Okay.
A. It ripped up into the intake and it got stuck --
Q. Okay.
A. -- preventing the air flow, adequate air flow.
Q. And so based off of that, based off of the backfire that's what you assumed caused that?
A. Yeah, because after we, after we replaced it --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- we ran the engines, brought it up to, brought it up to speed where we popped and it didn't.
Q. Okay. Is there -- is this the first time that you've seen anything like this happen?
A. No.
Q. Oh, you have okay.
A. That's not the first time.
Q. So you've seen that happen in other engines when you have a liner that --
A. Yeah. I've seen it; I've seen it before, yes.
Q. Okay. So that's one thing. And then I need to show you, this is the one that you said had four backfires and let me show you this date, May 6th, 2021.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So that's the one that you're talking about that happened one

month or two months prior?
A. Yeah.
Q. And is this your sign off right here?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Can you explain this particular issue right here?
A. Airplane arrived --
Q. Uh-huh.
A. -- prior to the crew departing the -- he wrote it up and when he was walking out he gave me a verbal turnover and I said, “Yeah, we had four compressor stalls.” But even the pilot was telling, the captain was telling me that they were moving the -- the throttles were being moved a little bit too quickly.
Q. Is that typical for them to do that or is that something that they would typically do?
A. That’s something they typically do but --
Q. Why would they do that?
A. I’m not sure.
Q. Okay.
A. I advised him, “Yeah, if you move it around, if you move the throttles too quickly you could cause a compressor stall.”
Q. And is that in climb, cruise, while on the ground or what, did he mention any of that, cruise, at what point in flight?
A. I can’t recall.
Q. Okay. So that’s what you were told is they typically just move the throttles back and forth?

A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And do you recall these are the only two things that we were able to see in the logbooks. Is there anything else that's not -- potentially could --
A. No.
Q. No, no other issues.
A. I had no other engine issues with 810.
MR. CRUZ: Okay. All right. I'll stop for now. Stephen.
BY MR. MUSE:
Q. Once again, my name's Stephen with the FAA, can you hear me okay?
A. I can hear.
Q. I'm going to ask you three questions, okay? And I'm sorry if some of this repeats what some of these other folks have asked. At the beginning of each shift do you have a clear understanding on what needs to be accomplished during your shift?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Do you feel JRAA provides you access to current tech data, tools and parts to complete each task?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever been told by management to falsify aircraft documents or pencil whip a discrepancy?
A. No.
MR. MUSE: That's all I have, thank you.
DR. BRAMBLE: Hank.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. Yeah, Hank Chiao. I have a question; you have gotten a couple of occurrences of high EGT mentioned. What is the plan to maintain the engine to ensure that they do not exit during operation?

A. I can barely hear you.

DR. BRAMBLE: So he's asking about EGTs.

MR. TAISIPIC: Uh-huh.

DR. BRAMBLE: What is the plan currently with Rhoads Aviation with regards to maintaining its EGT levels, right?

MR. CHIAO: I guess.

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah.

MR. TAISIPIC: What is the plan?

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. Is there a plan?

MR. TAISIPIC: I don't know, I don't know.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. Are you aware of these high EGT issues?

A. Some of them, yes.

Q. Okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: So I guess he just wants you to expound on high EGT issues what do you, what do you typically do with high EGT issues?

MR. TAISIPIC: I try to ascertain are they indication issues, are they actual malfunction issues, inspect per the maintenance manual any, any faults that are in within the system that we could

take a look at and try to correct.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. What is borescope inspector skills?

A. I am not skilled in any NDT.

Q. (Indiscernible) some kind of BIS inspector?

A. Say again.

DR. BRAMBLE: Do you have an inspector that's borescope qualified?

MR. TAISIPIC: Not to my knowledge.

DR. BRAMBLE: So if a borescope needs to be done how is that accomplished?

MR. TAISIPIC: How would that be accomplished?

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah.

MR. TAISIPIC: Outside vendor.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. So is there any internal procedure that converts the SB or technic data or the AD (indiscernible) to the task instruction?

DR. BRAMBLE: Say that again, Hank.

BY MR. CHIAO:

Q. So is there any internal procedure that converts the SB or technic data or the AD into the task instruction easy for (indiscernible)?

A. Yes, there is. It's been for service (indiscernible) and AD, yes, we have, we have those incorporated into also task carts

also.

MR. CHIAO: Okay. That's all (indiscernible).

DR. BRAMBLE: Ron.

MR. LENHART: No questions at this time.

DR. BRAMBLE: Dan.

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. Again, I'm Dan Marcotte. Just some engine related questions. The write-up that cruise where they had four compressor stalls at cruise.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Let's see, that was, like I said, that was in May, just a couple months, two, three months before the event. And I think you said you formed the -- you looked at the AMM and did the inspections per the AMM, could you expound on that a little bit, what, you know, what inspections were you -- what part of the AMM were you working the inspections?

A. I can't, I can't remember all the details.

Q. Sure. Just generally what part?

A. Generally take a look at the inlet for any damaged blades, bent blades, broken blades, nicks, chips and then --

Q. Is there a second (ph.) numbered section from the AMM that directs you to the --

A. 72 something. I forget what it was. I believe it was you --

DR. BRAMBLE: Do you want me to --

MR. TAISIPIC: No, look that up.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.
MR. CRUZ: Yes, sir.
MR. TAISIPIC: I believe it was you that asked me about it --
MR. CRUZ: Yes, sir.
MR. TAISIPIC: -- the first time and we went through the AMM --
MR. CRUZ: Yes, sir.
MR. TAISIPIC: -- and the Pratt & Whitney manuals.
MR. CRUZ: Yes, sir.
MR. TAISIPIC: Yeah.
BY MR. MARCOTTE:
Q. Okay, thanks. Was there any, was there any troubleshooting instructions in the manual?
A. Mostly just inspections like the troubleshooting I did was just to ensure that there was no further compressor stalls since I didn't find any damage or any, any faults in the system. I checked the sense lines on the engine, checked the PRBCs for any loose fittings that could have prevented the 13 station from opening. I couldn't find any so I decided to start the engine --
Q. Okay.
A. -- and run (indiscernible).
MR. CHIAO: Did you get to the borescope?
MR. TAISIPIC: No, didn't. Since I didn't find any damage externally.
BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. And you said when you do it that an engine runs (indiscernible) for a stall write-up it sounds like for if you're doing a surge or a stall or a backfire right after the two engine runs you said and please correct me if I'm wrong. Just you said you would run engines and if there was an issue to expect a pop at about 99.5 and --

A. Around between 90 and 95.

Q. Okay. So is that just based on your own experience or is there some guidance from Pratt or Boeing for that in the engine room or is that on your own experience?

A. That's just my own experience.

Q. Okay. So, okay. And now on the other issue that Pocholo had on the constant backfire during takeoff event back in November and that was the one where the panel had come loose from the --

A. Acoustic liner.

Q. -- the acoustic liner had come loose.

A. That was, it was a significant part of it that came off.

Q. Okay.

A. Prevented the airflow.

Q. Okay. And then so was that, I mean, the same inspections, Chapter 72 or whatever, for that one, what inspections did you do?

A. Same thing pretty much, yeah.

Q. Same thing, okay.

A. I did one really out, that was just the cause.

Q. Okay.

A. If it was anything else let's find it now.
Q. Okay, all right. So was there -- so what troubleshooting did you follow, was there something in the manual covering that or was that just basic troubleshooting on your own experience?
A. No, per the manual just, like I said, I can't remember the whole detail for the manual, just inspection of external, externals of the engine and sense lines making sure nothing's loose.
Q. Okay. Okay.
A. I didn't lose any air.
Q. Right.
A. Air or sense lines or anything.
Q. Yeah. And it was the same, then you did an engine run and it was normal and no -- none of the popping?
A. Right.
Q. At the higher (indiscernible)?
A. Right.
Q. Okay. Good, thank you. And lastly on oil consumption, I know you guys don't have a lot of airplanes and you probably can remember airplanes pretty well, does anything stand out on the event airplane in oil use, does it --
A. High oil usage, no.
Q. Okay. Okay.
A. Nothing stands out, no.
MR. MARCOTTE: And I think that's about it for me, thank you.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. I don't have any additional questions. Go around for another round, Pocholo, what do you have?

MR. CRUZ: Yeah, I have just a couple follow-ups.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. So you're saying that nobody is borescope qualified, is that correct?

A. I believe there are now but at the time.

Q. Now as in after the accident or before the accident?

A. We did have NDT training on it; even I was scheduled for NDT training.

Q. Okay.

A. But, I'm sorry, no, the NDT training happened.

Q. That's NDT, this is -- I'm talking about borescope.

A. Right. I don't offhand off the top of my head know of anybody with borescope experience.

Q. Okay. So what -- so do you guys have equipment to do the borescope?

A. Yes, we do.

Q. You have the equipment?

A. I believe we do have one, one guy on call.

Q. On call, so he's not a Transair employee --

A. Yes.

Q. -- he's an outside vendor?

A. He is a Transair employee.

Q. He's a Transair employee?

A. Yes.
Q. So you have one, was this before the accident or after the accident?
A. No, he's, he's been working with us full-time up until, I can't remember, I can't remember when he retired.
Q. He retired? I'm sorry, I didn't hear you.
A. Yeah, he retired.
Q. He retired.
A. Yeah.
Q. So you had somebody that was qualified and retired that was borescope --
A. Before, yeah.
Q. -- before the accident?
A. Yeah. I don't know his full qualifications.
Q. Okay. But I'm just trying to get a clarification --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- on borescope qualification. So the question is, what happens if you do need borescope done based off of your troubleshooting?
A. We could recall him or have an outside vendor come in.
Q. Okay, all right. So have you had to do that? Have you had cases where you had to have a borescope done on an engine and had to call or outsource any of that?
A. I don't recall.
Q. You don't know?

A. I don't recall any.
Q. Because obviously that takes some time now, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Yeah, I mean, basically it holds the whole operation of whether you're going to do an engine change or not?
A. Right. I can't recall of any, yeah.
Q. Okay. And you said you characterize the relationship between pilots and maintenance as professional?
A. Yeah.
Q. Right? Is there any -- because we, we have heard from interviews that pilots keep complaining about maintenance and not being done properly on the airplanes. What are your thoughts?
A. I haven't had any animosity towards any of them. I haven't had any run-ins with any of them, my dealing with them are pretty much professional.
Q. Okay. Do they, do they sometimes give you a discrepancy, a verbal discrepancy and then what happens?
A. Sometimes they do give us a verbal and I tell them to put it in the book.
Q. Okay. And do they typically do that or do they just blow it off and say --
A. They typically do that, yeah.
Q. Okay. Do you think that the manuals are adequate for troubleshooting any engine issues with the Boeing or Pratt & Whitney manuals?

A. Yes.
Q. Yeah. Do you think you could use more training in the engines or not just you but specifically mechanics in general?
A. Training is good, yeah.
Q. Okay. Have you even asked for -- not just engines, I guess, any type, have you asked for training from management with regards to certain aspects of the airplane?
A. No.
Q. So as far as management is concerned, do you think they are giving you enough support to do your job?
A. Yes.
Q. Have they pressured you in doing your job faster?
A. No.
Q. What's the most challenging part of your job right now?
A. The most challenging. I don't know. I've had a lot of help along the way so --
Q. Okay.
A. A lot of support and a lot of help so I can't think of anything really challenging.
Q. Is there something that concerns you about Transair?
A. No.
Q. No. If you could change one thing right now in your job in the way of procedures, anything else, what would it be?
A. If I could change anything?
Q. Yeah. Around your scope, you know.

A. Training.
Q. Training, okay.
A. Training. Training is a good thing, more knowledge on hand the better.
Q. How do you know if a system, a specific system on an airplane is chronic? What do you do to determine whether something is chronic or not? Since you just said that there is no chronic procedures that you know of, right?
A. Typically where I used to work we'll sit the airplane down.
Q. Where, I'm sorry, where you used to work?
A. Yeah, previous employed with Continental Airlines.
Q. Oh, okay, so you're talking about --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- your previous experience?
A. My previous experience.
Q. Okay, what would you typically do previously?
A. We'd sit the airplane down and do some extensive troubleshooting and tech support.
Q. Okay. And what happens here at Transair?
A. We do sit airplanes down for extensive times and try to, try to correct what we can.
Q. Good.
A. We'll find whatever we could find.
Q. Right. So how is that different from what you previous did to now, it seems like to me that you just said basically the same

thing, is that the case or not the case or --
A. That's how I treat it.
Q. Okay, okay.
A. It seemed to work so --
MR. CRUZ: Yep, all right. That's it for me, Steve.
BY MR. MUSE:
Q. Greg, I just have one more thing because you kind of brought it up whenever we spoke two months ago.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Do you mind if I read the notes that --
A. No.
Q. Okay. You said the captain stated the first officer was rapidly advancing throttles from idle to MCT, which stands for maximum continuous thrust. Do you agree with that?
A. Yes.
Q. And you showed me Maintenance Manual 71-00-00/601.
A. Uh-huh, yes.
Q. Okay. And Pratt & Whitney Manual 72-00-00. And you stated you ran both engines 70 to 90 percent. I assume that's in two, for eight minutes with no abnormal indications.
A. Correct.
MR. MUSE: Okay. I just wanted to get that. That's all I have, thank you.
BY MR. CHIAO:
Q. How do you keep the BSI records?

A. BSI records?
Q. Yeah, the borescope records.
A. Oh, I don't know.
Q. You don't have any slight knowledge of the procedure for BSI, I mean, the borescope inspection?
A. We do -- if you do the borescope, yeah, you put it in the logbook and that would be our record.
DR. BRAMBLE: Anymore questions? Ron.
MR. LENHART: I have nothing further.
DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Dan.
MR. MARCOTTE: Yeah, I have a few more.
BY MR. MARCOTTE:
Q. So you said, if I understood correctly on the event, the cruise event with four backfires --
A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- you said the captain reported the first officer in the cruise was rapidly moving from the cruise power setting to MCT and back and forth. Did he say why the first officer was doing that cruise?
A. Did not.
Q. Do you feel the quality of your (indiscernible) are good, you know, do you have any issues with that from stock parts or parts you put them on the airplane they seem to come off pretty quickly?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. When you do have -- you know, you were saying, you

know, sometimes they put airplanes down if there's chronic issues or you mentioned that, you know, you guys, if there's an (indiscernible) or, you know, it sounds like that you keep working problems obviously but sometimes you put them down. And you mentioned that your old airline, you know, when you put an airplane down there'd be like a tech ops group, like held out to mechanics to troubleshoot procedure?

A. Yeah.

Q. At Rhoades Aviation is there a similar group? Is there somebody who comes and helps maintenance if there's unknown issues and the airplane is down for troubleshooting?

A. Pretty much we're not organized like the big airlines so --

Q. No, I understand. So it's on the mechanics?

A. No, it's not just on the mechanics. Usually I get support from Mike Kimble or Mike Johnson.

Q. Okay, okay. All right. And finally, if you have surges or stalls issues, engine issues, is there any Chapter 5 inspections for those?

A. I believe there is.

Q. Okay.

A. I can't recall the reference.

MR. MARCOTTE: Okay, okay. I think that's it then.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Anybody else have any additional follow-up questions?

(No audible response).

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. I just had one thing just to make it's clear in the transcript. You mentioned that there was an individual who had retired from Rhoades Air but was still on call for performing borescopes?

A. NDTs, yeah.

Q. N what?

A. NDTs.

Q. NDTs, okay. And so when did he retire, was that before the accident or after the accident?

A. I can't recall.

Q. Okay. So prior to the accident can you recall if you -- what was the procedure if you needed a borescope, you don't remember at the time?

A. I don't remember. It was -- it didn't even happen on my shift.

Q. Okay. Okay. Is there anything we haven't asked you about that you'd like to share with us?

A. No.

Q. Okay. And do you have any safety recommendations pertaining to this case or about your workplace in general that you would especially like to convey to us?

A. No, no.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, thank you. With that, we're off the record at 11:11 a.m.

MR. CRUZ: Thank you very much.

MR. TAISIPIC: You're welcome.

(Whereupon, at 11:11 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Greg Taisipic
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 21, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Wade Donovan
Transcriber

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

Interview of: ANGEL ACEVEDO, Principal Avionics Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

Via telephone

Friday,
September 24, 2021

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I N T E R V I E W

(8:10 a.m.)

MR. CRUZ: There's a preamble that I'm going to read, that we typically do. So today is 9/24/2021, at about 8:10. My name is Pocholo Cruz and I'm the maintenance investigator with the NTSB. I'm leading the maintenance working group for accident investigation number DCA21FA174, involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I would now like to have each of the maintenance group, which is very limited today, to briefly introduce themselves. Let's go with --

MR. MARCOTTE: I'm Dan Marcotte. I'm from Boeing air safety investigations.

MR. MUSE: Stephen Muse with Honolulu CMO.

MR. CRUZ: We also have?

MS. WARD: I'm Lorenda Ward. I'm the investigator in charge of this accident. Good morning.

MR. ACEVEDO: Morning.

MR. LUSH: Good morning, Patrick Lush (ph.). I'm party coordinator in FAA IIC for the accident.

MR. CRUZ: Mr. Acevedo, is there anybody you object to being present for your interview?

MR. ACEVEDO: No. I have no objection.

MR. CRUZ: Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we will send the recording out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to review the transcription to correct it for the typographical errors. Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and to prevent reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're here simply for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents.

Having said that, however, we cannot offer any guarantee or confidentiality or immunity. And a transcription of the interview will eventually be part of the public docket for the accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time. And everybody has been instructed not to interrupt the person who is asking questions at the time.

There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person has had a turn. Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so. And if you realize you misstated something or want to correct something, please do so.

You're entitled to have a representative of your choosing.

Is there someone you would like here to represent you?

MR. ACEVEDO: Mr. Matt.

MR. PICCIOTTI: Matt Picciotti with the FAA, Office of Chief Counsel.

MR. CRUZ: Does anyone have any questions? No questions? Okay. One more thing I forgot to mention. We do have Pratt & Whitney on the phone with us, too.

MS. LEW: Lorinda Lew (ph.) (indiscernible).

MR. CRUZ: We have Tony, the GGO and Hank Chiao, who are both Pratt & Whitney representatives.

INTERVIEW OF ANGEL ACEVEDO

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. Let's start. Please state your name and spell your name, please, for the record.

A. Angel Robert Acevedo, A-n-g-e-l R-o-b-e-r-t A-c-e-v-e-d-o.

Q. Your date if birth, Mr. Acevedo?

A. November 6th, 1964.

Q. What certificate ratings and licenses do you hold?

A. Airframes and power plant certificate.

Q. Then could you please briefly describe for us your professional background?

A. Currently the principal avionics inspector for Rhoades Aviation. I was a line maintenance supervisor for Hawaiian Airlines. And I was retired Navy after 30 years for flight engineer and maintenance lead.

Q. When did you start with the FAA?
A. September of 2016.
Q. You said your current position is what?
A. Principal avionics inspector.
Q. How long have you been in that position?
A. August of 2020.
Q. As a principal avionics inspector for Rhoades Aviation, what are your duties and responsibilities?
A. Conduct surveillance of Rhoads Aviation using guidance out of the 8900. Sharing airworthiness responsibilities with principal maintenance inspector.
Q. Besides Rhoades Aviation, is there any other certificates you were assigned to?
A. Currently, no.
Q. I'd like to be able to understand how you develop your work program. So these are the questions that I need to ask. Could you please explain how you develop your work program every fiscal year?
A. We use the safety assurance system, SAS. The comprehensive plan was already built when I got on board which we use that for the fiscal year. And we did quarterly surveillance. That's the plan we stuck to unless we added an assessment.
Q. Prior to taking the -- prior to being the PAI on August, did the previous principals give you any feedback with regards to Rhoades Aviation as far as what's concerning, what's not

concerning?
A. No.
Q. No. Okay. And have you made adjustments, I guess, to that work program?
A. Yes.
Q. What type of adjustments did you make?
A. The SAS is now sorted with a particular -- with numbers, with criticality. That helps. It does some of our work for us. But we have added assessments following the CHEP. If you're familiar with CHEP, the national program for evaluations for the design element. We added seven or eight assessments from that.
Q. When was the CHEP inspection done?
A. It began in November of 2020.
Q. So what you -- just so I understand, you take whatever they -- inspection was done and then readjust the work program based off of that inspection? Is that how that works?
A. Yes. As we accepted the findings of the CHEP, we added some assessments to cover the discrepancies that they found.
Q. The -- okay. Can you cite a couple examples from the CHEP inspection that you added to the existing work program that you -- that was developed?
A. We added -- from the CHEP, we added the maintenance inspection schedule, maintenance inspection requirements. We added findings from the cargo focus portion of that.
Q. Did they specifically focus on -- what particularly in the

maintenance program did the CHEP focus that you had to adjust?
A. Task interval time frame. The manual in particular.
Q. My understanding is the CHEP inspection is done every five years. Is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. Did you happen -- or any of the principals happen to look at the previous CHEP inspection and see what the findings were?
A. Yes, we did.
Q. That's good. Can you please tell us what was in the previous five years ago?
A. A lot of similar findings from the previous five years, from the most current inspection.
Q. Similar findings?
A. Very similar.
Q. So I guess, based off of the second CHEP inspection, things were not moving forward as far as getting those rectified. Is that a fair statement?
A. I'd say that's a fair statement. For my time, yes. But (indiscernible).
Q. Since I don't understand the FAA system, per se -- so what is the relationship between SAS, FSIMS, SPAS, and the PTRS system?
A. PTRS was replaced primarily for documentation by the SAS system. Could you restate the other two pieces you're looking for?
Q. Yeah. FSIMS.

A. FSIMS is the book of guidance we follow for evaluations and monitor.
Q. Then SAS is obviously -- is that what --
A. It's our data entry, data collection entry.
Q. As an inspector, is there a core program that you need to accomplish every year as far as your work program is concerned?
A. Could you say that again?
Q. Yeah. As an inspector, is there an amount of time or hours that you need to accomplish for your work program?
A. In hours? I don't understand.
Q. Yeah. Like 1300 hours of surveillance or anything like that?
A. No, it's not --
Q. No?
A. I've never heard of any hour.
Q. Typically, as a PAI for an operator, how long are you assigned to an operator?
A. Up until this point, I had only been a temporary PAI.
Q. So you had not been a PAI previously?
A. I was given short-term assignments as a PAI, 90-day or six-month assignment.
Q. So you're unaware -- on a stint -- if you're the permanent PAI, how long you would be in that position for --
A. No.
Q. There's a couple of questions that I have for you regarding its -- the -- what's the current GMM revision for the airline?

What revision is the most current?
A. Most current is GMM revision 2.
Q. Do you recall when was the last -- when was revision 2, when was the last date of revision 2?
A. Revision 2 received a revision in 2014.
Q. Okay. When was the last time the FAA did an audit of the TransAir GMM?
A. It's currently being done now.
Q. Well, prior to the accident. I'm sorry.
A. I don’t know. I mean, it's always been under review since I've been on it. That was our first.
Q. So the previous PAI and principals, they didn't give you guys any feedback as far as the GMM prior to you guys being assigned to it?
A. No.
Q. So with you saying that's always been in perpetual revision -- so I guess that's a way of the FAA pushing TransAir to make sure that this revision is current?
A. I don't understand that question. I'm just kind of focusing on when I came onboard from the time I read it until now. And we informed them of the discrepancies.
Q. Were there any letters of -- letters to TransAir with regards to making sure the GMM is up to date or revised properly?
A. Yes.
Q. Prior to you getting -- being the PAI?

A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Do you know what the TransAir current MEL extension procedure is?
A. Current MEL extension procedure?
Q. Yeah.
A. Requesting an extension to any MEL item?
Q. Um-hum.
A. I do.
Q. What is it currently?
A. The first extension has been suspended by the PMI. First extension as listed on the ops spec for the initial and then one extension. Again, the extension was removed for the (indiscernible).
Q. Do you know what the GMM says as far as their MEL extensions are currently under revision 14?
A. Under revision 14?
Q. I'm sorry. Revision 2 in 2014 or --
A. It was included a bulletin that allowed Rhoades to apply three extensions. Which didn't match the ops spec of course.
Q. Do you know -- I know that you were not the PMI. Do you know how that came about as far as the three extensions?
A. I do not.
Q. I'd like to talk about the CASS program with you. How often does Rhoades Aviation do a CASS presentation?
A. Monthly presentation.

Q. Do you or any principals from the FAA attend those presentations on a monthly basis?
A. All three of yes. Yes.
Q. Has the FAA ever done a CASS audit of their CASS program?
A. Yes. That was one of the first audits I did was CASS.
Q. About when was that done?
A. That was September of 2020.
Q. What findings did you have?
A. I determined -- I was not presented with any CASS audits. I asked them to procedure the -- any audits that I can review. And they didn't have any. I asked for a years' worth or two and they didn't have any.
Q. Per their GMM, who typically did their CASS audits?
A. For Rhoades?
Q. Yes.
A. The chief inspector had the responsibility but they didn't have anybody under him. They didn't have a maintenance, an auditor, as well, in the safety office at the time.
Q. Who did the chief inspector have?
A. Nobody. Just him.
Q. Just him?
A. You had RII-qualified folks. But at the time of the audit in September, nobody worked for him. He was just the only part of inspection branch.
Q. So is the chief inspector the one that's putting together the

CASS presentation or who gathers all the data for the CASS presentations?

A. He was responsible to do that. I don't know if it was him. I don't think it was him.

Q. You've sat in a couple CASS meetings already. What issues or concerns did you have when you were listening to the CASS meetings?

A. As pointed out from the September audit was lack of audits. The lack of a schedule.

Q. Can you expound? What do you mean by lack of schedule?

A. In the manuals, they did list an annual inspection, a semi-annual inspection, a quarterly inspection.

Q. Was that off the CASS system?

A. That was part of the CASS to perform them at a certain time. But it wasn't addressed during our -- the CASS monthly meeting. They had no schedule in the manual. They had no schedule period. And it was recommended then to include that to get those going. Was there a second part to that question?

Q. No, I mean, is -- what about the data that's been presented? Is it adequate, is it lacking, what's --

A. It was lacking. They included reliability information. But they don't have a reliability program. And that essentially was the minutes of the CASS that was presented to us, which didn't really kind of explain anything. Didn't --

Q. What about any chronic issues that the fleet was having, or

systems, or anything like that?
A. The chronic issues were actually a part of why they pulled the MEL extension for pressurization.
Q. For pressurization?
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you explain a little bit further with that, please?
A. They wouldn't show any work was -- or troubleshooting was completed on the pressurization system prior to requesting another extension.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. That's when we stepped in and pulled the extension.
Q. Is this on 810 or just in the fleet in general?
A. I couldn't give you a tail number on that but it was -- they had quite a few pressurization problems.
Q. Have you seen Rhoades Aviation ever file an SDRs or MISRs to you guys?
A. MISRs was fairly regular, I would say. I think at the time we were receiving one a month. And it followed what we knew from the occurrences. SDRs were lacking. I think at the time they might have had two on file. We questioned that, as well.
Q. Nothing systemic that you could see on either of those reports?
A. We did comment on the December time frame. We saw a sharp increase of MIS reports. Mainly it went from one -- maybe one item a month. I think December had eight or nine. It was called

their high fly time for the holidays.
Q. Do you know how Rhoades sets alert conditions for each of their components or systems to see if it -- if they have a spike on the system or anything like that?
A. I did not see one in any of their data.
Q. Do you think that Rhoades has any risk analysis on certain components or any system that they have?
A. Rhoades do that?
Q. Yes.
A. I would -- I've never seen one so I don't know.
Q. Have you seen any type of issues that they raised and they tracked and give status on who -- and assign who works the issue and gives status on a monthly basis on where it is, where is the fix, that type of thing?
A. No, I have not seen that.
Q. Is that something that's typically in a CASS?
A. Under any safety management, you would think they would assign somebody to follow it down until completion. Their CASS minutes never identified any of that.
Q. I was told that there is an SIEM meeting. Is that a safety meeting typical after the CASS? Is that correct?
A. That is correct.
Q. And the FAA also participate in that meeting?
A. Yes, we sat -- it came right after the CASS meeting so we were still there.

Q. Were you involved in the -- I guess it would be -- were you in the May 2021 -- which would be June, obviously, because they're a month behind. The May 2021 SIEM report stated that there was an issue with -- it was stated as a flight crew being told not to write anything up because they would get fired. Do you recall that particular report?

A. I do.

Q. What is -- did you know about that particular issue prior to that meeting?

A. No, I did not.

Q. What was the response of the FAA or the principals in that report once you guys saw that report?

A. That was -- I don't remember if I added any input to that at the time. But I do remember -- it was somewhat of a back and forth between the director of maintenance and the chief pilot. They were kind of going at it for a while. That was kind of a strange -- strangest thing we ever saw. It was a matter of opinion, I guess. But it was -- we watched it go on.

Q. There was no -- did any of the principals talk to either one of them, find out anymore about what the issue was, and why it was reported that way, and why was it recorded that way?

A. No. The final -- I think the only thing that was said by the principals was we concur that both PIC and first officer should be writing discrepancies. That was the assurance from the CEO that that had been resolved. That they had published information for

both -- for anybody to write a discrepancy.
Q. Have you heard anything from the maintenance side as far as a similar-type action as far as not writing anything up when they see something?
A. Personally, no. I didn't hear it personally. Although the chief inspection at the time would kind of suggest stuff like that.
Q. He would suggest that maintenance wouldn't write it up?
A. He didn't -- he never said that in those words specifically. But things he would say just kind of added to our -- more of an inquiry. But he never said that they were not documenting anything. He never said that. But he included some items that just didn't make any sense.
Q. So in general, how would you describe their CASS program in general?
A. Non-existent, dormant, not producing any performance effectiveness, not producing anything. If you're not doing an audit, you're not getting anything out of it.
Q. Did the principals recommend them to help the company change that or --
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. -- suggest --
A. This was early October. September, we did the audit. Early October we sat down with them. Explained the tools that they should be using. Presented their own audit forms out of their

manual. And the chief inspector said, where did you get those. From your GMM. Really? That was just another alarming thing that happened. But we presented that in the form on importance of the CASS.

Q. Do you think they have an issue of personnel or not having enough personnel to do the job?

A. Without any assigned maintenance inspectors primarily for the job or an auditor, I would say yeah. It was brought up as a resource.

Q. Currently, what is the FAA's relationship with Rhoades Aviation, management -- maintenance management?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible) his or like the group's relationship?

MR. CRUZ: Well, the principals.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: That makes sense.

MR. ACEVEDO: Well, I can talk to both the DOM and the chief inspector on the phone. And that doesn't seem to be an issue. I think Rhoades as an organization though -- I don't think they care for the FAA too much.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. So you're saying that you don't have any problems talking to the DOM or the chief inspector?

A. I don't. No.

Q. Is it a friendly conversation or a productive, business-like conversation when you have that?

A. (Indiscernible) it usually is, yes.
Q. How often do you visit Rhoades Aviation?
A. We were going over there weekly. It was a regular thing.
Q. At least once a week?
A. And that's not counting the phone calls. It was regular.
Q. Typically, who was your primary contact when you go visit Rhoades?
A. It was the DOM.
Q. Just the DOM.
A. It was primarily the DOM because the chief inspector was out quite a bit. He had a medical problem.
Q. Oh, medical issue. Okay. I know we were told that the chief inspector had, like you said, medical leave. Was there somebody that they put in his place or who was filling his space while --
A. Nobody.
Q. Before the current chief inspector that's in there now?
A. They didn't actually assign anybody until he took his leave of absence. So when he was gone sporadically throughout the time, nobody.
Q. Nobody. Did you guys give them -- did the FAA give them, as principals, did you give them -- I mean, what did you do? Did you say, you need to put somebody here within X months or anything like that or --
A. Yes. When the issue formally came out in a letter, we addressed it and said that his successor would have to be

identified.
Q. How long did you give them to do -- to make sure that they had somebody in his place?
A. Ten days.
Q. Oh, ten days.
A. Because we kind of knew it was coming. It wasn't a secret to us because chief inspector told us his problem.
Q. So typically, when you go visit Rhoades Aviation, what do you guys typically -- is there a certain surveillance that you do when you go visit Rhoades on a weekly basis, or is it different every time? And how do you go about doing your surveillance?
A. In particular to --
Q. Anything. I mean, obviously, you're doing part of your work program when you're doing surveillance. Right?
A. It depended on what we were looking at that day really.
Q. Yeah, sure.
A. We always checked in with the director of maintenance or the chief inspector.
Q. Yep.
A. And we would start covering the items that were on the -- our quarterly data collection.
Q. Can you give me like a sense of what some of that -- as an example?
A. We would talk with the director of maintenance on any follow-up items we were -- that had either come up. We would look at log

pages at random essentially, talk about CASS all the time. I think that was a common theme. The CHEP results, cargo focus results. Sometimes we were on the ramp, as well, just watching the operation.

Q. Is there typically an out brief after each visit that you guys -- with the DOM or the chief inspector?

A. Yeah, pretty simple debrief. What we were looking at, what we were finding, and what they needed to take a look at, as well.

Q. Do you typically jot that down or put it in a letter as far as what -- what you need to check back on or how does that -- how do you keep track, I guess, if there's issues?

A. I would take some notes. We would have them make some copies of documents, as well, log pages. Maybe write a note on the log page itself. If it was DCT specific, I used to print out the DCT with my notes on the DCT.

Q. How would you -- are you pretty satisfied the way the airplanes were maintained at Rhoades Aviation or how would you characterize their maintenance department?

A. I would characterize it as nobody really in charge. They did not -- they don't have a maintenance control. So their -- used to fly at night primarily. Most of their schedule was in the midnight hours. So they did most of the work in the daytime. With -- I couldn't really see the flow of maintenance without a maintenance control because the director of maintenance was the maintenance control during normal working hours. That just didn't

make too much sense that way.
Q. There is no maintenance control at night is what you're saying?
A. There's no maintenance control at night. The way it was designed was the lead mechanic, per shift, would be the so-called maintenance controller. That kind of left them in a bind on a weekend especially with new guys because they really didn't understand that.
Q. Is that -- is there a regulation that you need to have maintenance control?
A. Well, it was listed in their GMM (indiscernible).
Q. So you're going by what was approved in their --
A. Right.
Q. What the FAA approved as the way that they were going to run their business.
A. Right.
Q. But there is no regulation that you need to have maintenance control?
A. I really don't rememorize the reg but there is a maintenance control audit.
Q. Do you know whether they did a maintenance control audit or have you seen one?
A. I have not seen one.
Q. Have you had any issues with the mechanics that -- I'm sure you talked to -- do you talk to mechanics typically when you go on

the ramp and do a ramp inspection?
A. I do.
Q. Have you had any issues with any of the mechanics or their training records or anything like that?
A. The mechanics themselves, no. I had no problem whatsoever. If I ever talked to them or asked them a question, they answered the question no problem. If I asked to see some of their -- they used to carry little cards out for airworthiness release and whatnot. They'd dig it out for you and show it to you no problem.
Q. Have you had a chance to look at their training records to see if there was any issues or anything like that?
A. I did look at their training records. It was -- I was looking for one specific item at the time of the data collect. And the chief inspector handed me the box of training records and said, here you go. And I said, where is the summary sheet, don't you have one of those. It says right here in your manual you should have the summary sheet ready to go. I don't have one of those. Okay. So if you're going to let me look at this whole box, I'll go ahead and look at everything that's in there. And it was not looking good. They had a lot of stuff because I can dig it out myself and write the note, yes, their airworthiness release --
Q. Sure, sure.
A. Yes, their RII; yes, their this; yes, their that. But it had not received any sort of attention for a while.

Q. Do you know whether they have recurrent training for their mechanics?
A. They do.
Q. Typically, what subjects do they usually have recurrent training on?
A. I sat in on their weekly. They have a Wednesday meeting and it covers quite a bit of things. It kind of goes with the types of discrepancies the aircrafts were having. So I thought the Wednesday afternoon meeting was good. It was a good refresher. It was a good insight to things. Some of their recurrent training that was not documented, that was brought to their attention.
Q. Not documented. Like what? Like a GENFAM class or --
A. We're talking about RII and airworthiness release. There were lapses of recurrent training.
Q. Are those typically a yearly recurrent training --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- is what I'm hearing from you?
A. Yes. They weren't documented. The day I brought them up to the DOM, they held a specific recurrent training class that day.
Q. For everybody?
A. Yes.
Q. Who typically would give the training? Just the DOM or the chief inspector or who?
A. The DOM just did everything. He was -- he did everything. He gave training, he gave (indiscernible), he gave engine turns,

he did engine turns. He did everything.
Q. Do you know whether they do any Pratt & Whitney training for the JT8s?
A. Not that I'm aware of.
Q. Do you think that the -- that Rhoades Aviation had an issue with their -- how they maintained their engines?
A. I would say yes because we asked if they had a regular borescope problem or regular use of borescope. And the director of maintenance said that they don't borescope their engines. So we thought that was kind of an issue. The way the -- it was addressed in their manual was that they didn't have -- there were -- only things identified on the task interval cards is when they would borescope engines. As far as troubleshooting, we never heard of them doing any borescopes.
Q. Could he also -- could he have also meant, basically, that they don't do borescope but they farm it out, or --
A. No. He said the only real borescope guy they have was their NDT guy who was on the verge of retiring. And that was about as close as they got.
Q. How long ago was this conversation with -- regarding borescope? Do you know?
A. I didn't have the actual first borescope question. But on the second was -- he added more to that talk, talking about his NDT guy going to retire and that he wouldn't have a borescope guy at all. I know he -- it was addressed prior to with the PMI that

they didn't borescope engines.
Q. Got it. Did you happen to check the person that they said was borescope qualified to see if he had that qualification, by any chance?
A. He was level 3. He had quite a bit of certs.
Q. Did they have the equipment to do borescopes there, do you know?
A. I didn't do the last tools on DCT so I couldn't -- I don't know.
Q. Have you ever done an audit of their heavy maintenance facility in Taiwan?
A. No.
Q. Has anybody from the FAA done an audit of the facility in Taiwan?
A. I remember the PAI, previous PAI went out there. I really didn't really think about except he had a lot of travel issues. So that was really why we knew he went to Taiwan. To get from here to Guam in-route, all that stuff was the issue.
Q. Oh, travel issues --
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. -- to go do the -- okay, the audit.
A. But I knew he went to Taiwan.
Q. You don't know what the findings were from his trip?
A. I do not.
MR. CRUZ: I will -- are you okay or do you need to take a

break?

MR. ACEVEDO: I'm good for a little bit if everybody else is.

MR. CRUZ: Dan?

MR. MARCOTTE: I have no questions right now.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions.

MR. CRUZ: Lorenda?

MS. WARD: Oh, you're asking a question on the break or questions --

MR. CRUZ: No. Questions for him. He said he was okay.

BY MS. WARD:

Q. Yeah. So I just have a few questions. It has to do more towards your experience working with the FAA. So did you feel like there was any pressure from (indiscernible) or from anyone within the FAA as far as when you were doing your inspections or interactions with Rhoades? Did you feel like you had pressure on you when you came into the job or did you feel like you had the time you needed to do what you needed to do or --

A. When I came onto Rhoades, no pressure whatsoever. Plenty of time to do the work I was assigned.

Q. Did you feel like as far as like the SMS and then Rhoades transition to SMS -- you didn't feel like there was pressure from the FAA to make sure that they were in compliance with having a good SMS program or --

A. Well, as you mentioned, the transition, I wasn't on the certificate. I think they did theirs in 2017. I know they didn't

use it very well. I know their manual was unacceptable. I mean, in fact, it was very hard to understand.

Q. Do you feel like you would have management support if you went to them if you had a concern about Rhoades?

A. Are you talking about FAA management?

Q. Um-hum.

A. Oh, yeah. I think they are -- they were very supportive with us. They helped us out quite a bit.

Q. Was Rhoades your first carrier? Did you say you worked for Hawaiian? You (indiscernible) Hawaiian for --

A. This is my first permanent assignment. The other previous assignments -- I did a stint with Aloha Air Cargo. That was a 90-day -- or was it six months -- 180 days with Aloha Air Cargo. That was the only real assigned temporary duty. I did work with other carriers. Yes.

Q. If you had to measure Aloha Air to Rhoades, how would you rank them?

A. From what I could see with Aloha's manuals, far better than Rhoades' manuals. With their resources -- they had far more resources to conduct operations. But they had more of a workload, as well. They covered many airlines that came in under contract.

Q. If you could put an estimate, what do you think would be the (indiscernible) number of people that the chief inspector would need underneath him, he or she?

A. For Rhoades organization right now, probably three dedicated

maintenance inspectors.

MS. WARD: You mentioned that you were able to call and talk to the director of maintenance and the chief pilot. I think it was the chief pilot or was it the chief inspector?

MR. CRUZ: Chief inspector.

BY MS. WARD:

Q. Chief inspector. And were able to interact with them. But you did feel that maybe the rest of the organization didn't have a favorable view of the FAA?

A. Well, again, I can call the chief of inspector or the director of maintenance today and have a very professional conversation with them. After submitting so many compliance action letters and hazard letters, they kind of start getting -- I'm not saying anybody in particular -- the feedback we hear is that different comments. The POI is out to get him for this and that. The PAI, PMI are, you know, just kind of not really looking at it the way we look at it or something. Yeah, I think it's a little contentious.

Q. You say you do go over and you visit them at least weekly. Do you feel like you're treated in a professional manner or do you feel like there's a hostile environment when you go over?

A. Amongst the mechanics, it's normal. It's very cordial. Again, we talk very professional. They won't give us anything we're asking for unless the DOM gives them the head nod. That's really about it.

Q. Do you feel like the -- Rhoades is being responsive to the communications that you have been sending over to them?
A. Responsive in a communication way or responsive in actually correcting stuff?
Q. In accomplishing what has been asked.
A. No.
Q. Do you think that's due to the lack of resources they have or lack of will? I mean, what do you think is your best guess?
A. Well, if I -- the manual in general. I just think they didn't have the expertise to revise their manual. The manual was created, I would say, bare bones minimum. If there was any program, it was very bare bones minimum. It was a lot of cut and paste from other documents, the rules exactly, the CFRs. I mean, and that was their -- that was it. I mean, they had some chapters that were okay.

But for the most part, it was a cut and paste type manual. I don't think they have the expertise to kind of formulate their own policy, process, and procedure. They actually invited an outside organization, two as a matter of fact, to try to help them with that.
Q. Do you feel like there has been a shift in how Rhoades may be responding from when you first came in and 2020?
A. Yes.
Q. So from 2020, has there been a shift in how they've been responsive or in how they're accomplishing things? Do you think

that they're slowly getting better, or do you think dragging more? What is your perception?

A. Well, the change from the chief inspector who resigned to the new chief inspector -- he happened to be (indiscernible) I knew him (indiscernible). That hasn't been established yet since he's been there such a short period of time. He did hire a CASS manager to take over CASS. But that still hasn't been established since he's fairly new. I see that as something good for the future, I guess.

From the time we started submitting letters to them addressing the compliance issues, it took until, what, August, July, or August of this year for them to really address the manuals. They would send us a type of revision, a revision that was still very, very poorly accomplished. And we actually had to kick it back probably multiple times per manual.

Q. Do you feel that, from the FAA side, do you have enough time to be able to conduct your oversight duties for Rhoades Aviation?

A. You kind of cut out right about the halfway -- what did you say?

Q. Do you feel like that you have enough time to be able to do what's required of you? To be able to give your oversight to Rhoades.

A. Oh, yes, I have plenty of time to talk to them about the issues.

Q. You mentioned that once -- has anyone from Rhoades brought

something to your attention that they think could be improved or they may need some assistance from the FAA? Like, have they asked for help?

A. Yes. The initial October meeting was somewhat of an agreement that we would sit down with them upon request. And they requested the meeting which kind of established the revising of the GMM at the time, as well as the CASS program. After October, it was somewhat -- just became somewhat non-existent actually. The minutes of that meeting, so-called: we're going to do this, we're going to do that promises never actually developed. Nothing developed from the DOM. Provided no feedback, no root causes, no follow-up, no SRAs. Nothing.

MS. WARD: That's all I have, Pocholo (indiscernible).

MR. CRUZ: I'm sorry. Tony, I forgot to ask, do you have any questions for the PAI?

MR. DICIOCCIO: Yeah, just --

MR. CRUZ: Hold on, Tony. I got to put you on speaker.

BY MR. DICIOCCIO:

Q. So the connection hasn't been all that great. But a couple of things just to clarify. So I apologize if it's a little redundant. Does the airline have borescope equipment or did you witness if they had borescope equipment?

A. I did not validate if they had borescope equipment. I didn't do the last tool audit.

Q. So in regards to troubleshooting tasks, if they were required

to do the borescope, do you feel that they would be doing it?
A. What appeared on log pages was they went for the low-hanging fruit item such as the EPR indication. We did see EPR transmitter swaps a few times on a few log pages. But we just never seen any borescope results on a log page.
Q. And just -- my last question is the manuals. Did you get an idea of what the source of the manuals were? Were they working to the current revision of manuals or were they working the paper manuals or were they logging into (indiscernible) Boeing site to get the latest and greatest technical data?
A. They downloaded the Boeing AMMs onto the computer for all to access. As far as current, I mean, I don't know if you said current but they believe they haven't had any revisions to the Boeing manuals for about 10 years. That was a comment from the director of maintenance although there may have been up to five or six revisions to the Boeing AMM. As far as any of the manuals, Pratt & Whitney manuals, I don't know they accessed the Pratt & Whitney manuals.
Q. So you don’t know whether they were using Fleet Care or something -- or they had paper manuals or something like that?
A. If they had it, was downloaded onto a computer for all the mechanics to use. He never -- they never mentioned Fleet Care. I mean, I use Fleet Care. But they never mentioned it.
MR. DICIOCCIO: Thank you very much. That's all I have.
MR. CRUZ: I have a couple of follow-up questions if you

don't mind. Oh, I'm sorry. Patrick, do you have anything?

MR. LUSH: Yeah, I do have a handful of questions.

BY MR. LUSH:

Q. Ace, do you -- have you ever documented an in-route inspection on TransAir, riding along on the jump seat?

A. I did not.

Q. Do you know if any of the other principals routinely in-route, and if they do, how often they would ride on TransAir?

A. I know I did not. And I know the PMI did not. I believe the POI may have conducted one or more. But due to COVID at the time we stayed away from that.

Q. Would you feel safe flying on a Rhoades aircraft?

A. No.

Q. In your opinion, is Rhoades adequately qualified to hold a Part 121 operating certificate?

A. From what I know today, I would say, no.

Q. Were you aware of Rhoades' increase in risk within the FAA's interim certificate holder priority index, the ICPI risk analysis program, that brought Rhoades to the number one risk category prior to the accident across similarly situated carriers?

A. Yes. I -- we were aware of the number. Yes. As we started entering data from SAS.

Q. Do you know if at that time, there was any discussion amongst the CMT or the leadership within the CMT about suspending the Rhoades certificate as a result of that increase in risk?

A. The conversation of suspending Rhoades by the risk did kind of amount to how many letters have been presented to Rhoades and what was in SAS. The CHEP and cargo focus team included comments which also kind of added to that. A comment such as it's not a matter of when they have an accident -- or if. If it's a matter of when. And the debrief for the cargo focus team was in January and the CHEP was in February, I think.

Q. Do you know -- let me back -- let me rephrase that. Would you feel comfortable telling your leadership chain that you felt (indiscernible) carrier needed to be grounded?

A. Would I feel comfortable about telling them that? Yes.

Q. Do you know if anyone on the CMT did state that they felt the carrier needed to be grounded?

A. In so many words, I would say, yes. It was a matter of what type of operational CFR, where they failed in. And we were kind of equating the manuals themselves as being a big indicator that they're not following any sort of organized plan or any sort of instructions on how to maintain their aircraft.

Q. Did Rhoades voluntarily suspend their own operations in the immediate aftermath of the accident?

A. They did.

Q. Did they engage the CMT in discussions prior to resuming service?

A. A letter was sent to the CMT describing items that they would conduct for their SMS and provide follow-up. I think a third of

those items were presented. The other two-thirds were not. We never seen any sort of documentation of those items.
Q. Prior to them -- so prior to them resuming service after the accident, were you aware that they were going to, or did you just receive the letter and then that was your notification that they decided to start again?
A. I don't know how we got word but they were going to resume flying on a Friday. I don't know how we heard that. But they started flying on Friday. It wasn't like an official letter that was presented.
Q. And one last follow-up question. Back to when you had discussed reviewing their manuals submissions and back and forth multiple times, could you elaborate on some of the reasons why the CMT kicked back their manual revisions?
A. If we presented a letter with 10 items on it but informed that the lack of comprehensive review by Rhoades had not occurred, we are telling them to do a complete review. And they would only fix the eight or nine items that we presented without doing a complete review. It still had errors in regulations, typos, no real clear policy procedures throughout the manual. It would have been a multiple-page input to provide that which is still occurring today.
Q. So to clarify a little bit on that. If I'm understanding correctly how you're saying that, you would get the manual, you would start reviewing, you would find eight to ten issues with it,

put those in a letter, send the whole thing back. You basically stop your review at that point. Send it back partially reviewed and say, hey, we've already found eight or ten things in the first two or three chapters; you need to fix those and you might want to check the rest of it before sending it back.

A. Yes.

Q. You'd get it back again and then you'd pick up where you left off and you'd find another handful of things. In other words, it was never a comprehensive review by Rhoades before you received it. Is that how I'm understanding that process?

A. Correct.

Q. Then just to poke a little bit more detail on that. The findings, were they primarily process/procedure related or were they formatting type issues?

A. Both. Process and procedure. The manual itself is not formatted very well from the get-go. But process and procedure. Like I said, they probably cut and pasted the rule and made that their process and procedure.

MR. LUSH: I have no further questions. Thank you, Ace.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. Just to kind of dovetail on what he's saying. So from my understanding, what I'm hearing from you, with those letters, there's eight items and then you ask, at the end, to do more -- a more comprehensive review. If they fulfilled those first eight items, that's not good enough as far as the comprehensive review

that the FAA has done. Right? So what I'm asking, I guess, is those eight items that they've already checked off should have been: we're done with those. Now, the comprehensive review -- if you accept those eight items that they've basically answered, right -- if they're acceptable to you, does that letter still say that it hasn't been completely done because the comprehensive review hasn't been done? You know what I'm saying?

Basically, those items that you've asked them, the specific eight items are already -- and you've accepted that it was good. But the latter part is the comprehensive part hasn't been done. So does that letter still stay open even though all eight items have been done?

A. Once the manual was returned with the letter and the note that it was submitted without a comprehensive review, that was the first -- that was the opening paragraph, essentially, of the letter. Many times, of the so-called eight or ten items, most of them weren't actually corrected. And -- but you could see that that was their only intent was to fix the items the FAA provided them.

Q. Sure, sure.

A. We really -- I don’t want to use the word offended -- but we knew that a comprehensive review didn't happen because one of the publishers of the manual, when it was returned, it was no longer GMM revision 3. It was actually GMM revision 4. And it included items that did not include the temporary revisions. Two of the

ending chapters, chapter 12, 13, 14, they took out chapter 14. And it was obviously not reviewed. And they blamed the publisher of that.

So -- but they still submitted it to us. Said this is not good, this manual. And they basically pointed the finger at the publisher. I don't know what they did. But yeah, they screwed us over. Yeah. That's the problem. But yeah, it was bad.

Q. Does that basically show that they need help as far as, obviously, putting the -- a revised manual together, and as far as -- are they short-handed? Do they need the right people? That type of thing as far as trying to help them -- is there an avenue where they come to you and say, hey, this is what we're thinking as far as these manuals are concerned. We're planning on changing these things. Is this acceptable to you? Has that conversation kind of happened off -- before putting in the final. Right?

A. No, no.

Q. Have they asked for anything like that?

A. They asked one time. It was to pull some (indiscernible) critical items and to take them out of the aircraft inspection program manual and put them into an appendix. That's the only type of manual conversation that we had.

Q. Has the FAA ever suggested: hey, maybe before you send this in, let's discuss to see if we agree this is how it should be presented?

A. Yes. That happened after the CHEP. It was easily explained.

You should probably start looking at design-element-type questions for your manual with regard to the programs. And take a top to bottom look of each program.

Q. Sure.

A. I think we counted -- we said you have 56 programs embedded into this manual. But you're not actually reviewing all these programs, you're not editing these programs, you're not doing a comprehensive review. So our suggestion would be to take each program and formulate something along the lines from the rule to the AC to the guidance if you want to use it. The DCT is always there. And evaluate your own program. And that just wasn't part of their repair.

Q. I guess, let me see if I can restate this. Has there been an opportunity where you've talked to them, Rhoades Aviation, and said, hey, before you turn this into us, let's sit down, explain to us what you're doing so that we understand -- when we turn this into you, that you would approve it? Basically, give your blessing before we throw this back to you guys to look at. If there's any issues, you would catch it on the front end, and then they would have the opportunity -- at least feel good that they fixed something.

A. Not for a manual. But they did offer that up on a letter. At least one of the letters that I remember. But a manual itself, no. I thought that was the discussion we had back in October of 2020, kind of explaining the initial findings of the GMM. And how

to put it together. But how to realize what's wrong with their manual using root cause analysis, using SRM, and so on. But again, by December time frame, they didn't employ any of those items. And those are in their manual. Those aren't suggested. Those are part of their manual system and their organization.

Like I said, a letter -- they did ask -- they said, could you come over and explain the letter to us. And we said, well, we're kind of booked actually for the week. But we did talk to them on the phone about the letter. You know, if you want to call that reaching out, yeah, that was at least a reach out. So a manual, no, that never.

Q. And you said it is mostly not just -- it's procedural and typographical and formatting issues that you guys basically outlined to them. Is that correct?

A. Well, those are the obvious.

Q. Right.

A. Including regulations that were -- didn't exist. I mean, incorrect regs. I mean, just an item that had to come out of the manual that we suggested was removing all their Convair 640 stuff. I mean, that plane has been out of service for you guys for over four years. And it's still in this manual.

Q. Agreed.

A. I mean, that was a suggestion kind of comment. But there were a lot of things like that that said this process and procedure, I can't follow it. It's not written in a way to

provide any instruction or method.

Q. The FAA approve their manuals way back in 2014. Granted, you weren't there. Right. And obviously, there were already issues from 2014 to now. And then, obviously in between. There have been principals way before you, obviously, that also was dealing with the issue. Right. It just takes -- it's -- we question why it took so long from 2014 until now, 2021, that we're talking about issues with these manuals that basically started when they got their certificate.

Let's talk about the LOIs. There's, I guess, five that was provided to us to look at. Obviously, some of it is -- there's a lot in there from the previous year that you guys were still having to deal with, the issues. It would appear, based off of the way we -- I read it, is that they're trying to give you guys what you guys would want and need on those -- as far as the manuals or whatever subject that's in there. Like I said, there's only certain ones that you say, yes, that's good to fix but there's still a lot of open issues with those LOIs.

Because they are short-staffed, is what they're claiming to be, do you think the amount of LOIs that's being piled on them, and they're not able to answer all of them at the same time, is that a cause? Because there's so much that you guys are dumping all at one time. And how do you -- how does the FAA resolve that there's a lot on their plate, they're trying to get their head above water. Now they've had this accident. Is there any leeway

that the FAA would give them are you say, enough is enough, you guys got to fix this?

A. There's a lot in that statement there.

Q. They're not a big company. You said so yourself.

A. I consider them a small --

Q. Yes, yeah.

A. -- company.

Q. Very minimal resources. Would you agree?

A. They have minimal resources. They're not short on making profit. I know that. But --

Q. No idea about that.

A. Either way. They -- I would say that their resources as they were addressed early on, you know, they probably need to hire some more people. The response we got was more of a mechanic response. Not the maintenance inspector or auditor comment; was the response give to us by the director of maintenance.

As far as the LOIs, just to put that in perspective, each quarter, as we develop -- looked into more of the items that we were doing the data collect on, the results of those specific quarters produced findings. And most -- some of them required the LOI to be addressed in a quarterly fashion. I don't remember the dates of all the letters.

Q. Sure.

A. Or any specific item. But --

Q. I mean, there are some in there that obviously -- going back

to the last year. Since I don't know how Rhoades responded to you guys -- I only see only one side of it. Because we have not seen the Rhoades part of it.

A. Yeah. I mean, again, if you were more specific, I might be able to get an item. But if it's just in pertaining to -- do they have the resources to address --

Q. In general. Yeah.

A. -- in general to address five LOIs, as you say --

Q. There's quite a bit in there. I mean, there's quite a bit of LOIs that's open. Open or closed, I have no idea. Like I said, I haven't seen what Rhoades responded to the FAA on.

A. I mean, a lot of it follows the guidance we use with SAS really. If it's leading in the way of documentation into volume 14 of SAS where it starts talking about essentially what to do next, essentially -- that's how we patterned our LOIs. Other than that, I really can't say if they have the resources specific to one LOI or more. But --

Q. Have you had any chance to look at their engine monitoring program by any chance?

A. Specifically to look at the input -- I think they use the trend group. I don't -- I didn't look at it specifically, but I was asked a question about that like a week before the accident.

Q. What was the question about?

A. The director of operations asked me, shouldn't our engine monitoring program -- shouldn't it have caught these engine

problems we've had. And I said, well, if there's a trend established, you would see a spike and some sort of fuel flow or EGT. And that I guess answered his question. He was satisfied with that.

Q. So you haven't seen an actual EHM report back from the trend group or anything like that?

A. Not from the trend group. No. I've seen a lot of their inputs that go into the trend group. Yes. But I haven't seen the actual report.

Q. Let's see. So do you think -- this is -- this is your opinion, obviously. Do you think the FAA has done everything possible to help Rhoades Aviation become a better airline?

A. Oh, yes. For the amount of investment we put in in the last year, it's a lot. I wish we would have gotten more return on the investment as my POI would always say. It's -- from the stuff we presented to them to address, we haven't gotten the same amount back. That's for sure.

MR. CRUZ: Dan?

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. So we heard -- I'm from Boeing. I'm not an FAA guy so I've heard a few things in the last days. And I'm trying to understand principals (indiscernible) roles. I feel a little better knowing what you guys do now. So I heard that before issuing a letter, often you would look at the carrier's attitude. Do they have an attitude of compliance and they're trying to get better towards

compliance. Also, there would be some type of risk-based assessment by a principal before he sends them a letter.

Then I think I heard you just mention that part of your -- how you decide if there's a letter, you follow kind of a process given to you. Then there's guidelines for when to send the letter. So I'm trying to figure out how do those two principles play along. You know, the attitude of compliance, we're trying to get better, and the risk-based assessment versus what the tool tells you. Does my question make sense to you?

A. If you can kind of tighten it up there.

Q. Okay. So first we'll say, do you think that Rhoades had an attitude where they were trying -- they understood they had compliance issues and they were trying to get better? You know, it might not be as fast as people would like. But do you think they're trying to move forward?

A. Compliance -- that's probably the key word in this whole thing. From the items that we documented -- showed a pattern of non-compliance. As for their attitude, I don't necessarily use the word attitude. I look at more of kind of a safety posture, safety culture kind of thing. With that in mind, I would say, no. They were non-compliant.

Q. You didn't see really where they were -- they recognized they were non-compliant and were making some level of effort to improve in terms of compliance?

A. From what I've seen from their responses where they would

respond to a letter but produce no follow-up to it. No -- there was no action after the response.

Q. And again, I'm not an FAA guy. I'm just -- you know, I've heard things -- bits and pieces in the last few days. How about some type of -- do you have some type of risk-based assessment or risk-based thoughts before you issue a letter? And when I heard that, I'm thinking, there might be things in their manual that aren't good or just totally incorrect from a standpoint of safety.

But it wouldn't be something you'd want to address. You wouldn't press to address it immediately like in the next five days. (Indiscernible) conveyors are still in the manuals. They probably shouldn't be there. But I'm not sure that's really a safety issue.

So is there some type of risk analysis, safety, no-safety, or -- that goes into your decision to issue a letter? Or in a follow-up -- you know, if you do -- does that go in your decision if you're going to issue a letter. The other thing is if you do issue a letter, does that go into your thoughts on giving them a time frame to provide a reply.

A. Yes, and yes. As the assessment is done, it's provided a grade that our volume 14, the guidance gives us more direction on what to follow after that.

Q. So that's -- because like I said, I heard you mention chapter 14 earlier. And you just did what I was looking for (indiscernible).

A. Yeah. It gives us kind of the path, the way to approach this in what we've documented and what we now assessed it to be.

MR. MARCOTTE: Now I understand. Thank you very much.

MR. ACEVEDO: Okay, no problem.

MR. CRUZ: Tony, do you have any further questions?

MR. DICIOCCIO: No, I do not. Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Lorenda?

MS. WARD: You've been asked a lot. Is there anything that you would like to add from what you have been asked that you think that might be helpful to our investigation?

MR. ACEVEDO: I don't know. I don't think so. I mean, I'm as curious as you guys.

MR. CRUZ: Patrick?

MR. LUSH: No further questions. Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: I guess, is there anything else that you would like to tell us that we haven't asked you? Any safety recommendations you may possibly have for us.

MR. ACEVEDO: I can only -- not for you guys. But they got to get their CASS program going. I mean, that's a start. That's -- from a maintenance side -- without doing it for two years at least, that's not good.

MR. CRUZ: Thank you very much. Anybody else just before I close it out? Nope. I think we're done at 9:42. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 9:42 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Angel Acevedo
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Via telephone
DATE:	September 24, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Katie Leach
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

Interview of: STANLEY CHUCK, Principal Maintenance Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

Via telephone

Wednesday,
October 13, 2021

APPEARANCES:

POCHOLO CRUZ, Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

STEPHEN MUSE, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

MATT PICCIOTTI, Chief Counsel
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RON LENHART, Chief Inspector
Rhoades Aviation

TONY DICIOCCIO, Customer Technical Services Manager
Pratt & Whitney

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I N T E R V I E W

(2:00 p.m.)

MR. CRUZ: Let's get started. Again, my name is Pocholo Cruz. I'm the maintenance investigator with the NTSB. I'm leading the maintenance group for this accident investigation number DCA21FA174, involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810. Again, I'm assisted by another NTSB investigator, Dr. William Bramble.

By the way, it is October 13th, 2021, about 2:00. The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I'd like to have Dr. Bramble and each of the group members, I guess, introduce themselves. Dr. Bramble? Okay, let's go with Dan. And I guess let's go with Mr. Muse.

MR. MUSE: Steven Muse with the Honolulu CMO, aviation safety inspector maintenance.

MR. CRUZ: Mr. Lenhart?

MR. LENHART: Ron Lenhart, chief inspector, Rhoades Aviation.

MR. CRUZ: And Tony? Sorry.

MR. DICIOCCIO: This is Tony DiCioccio. I'm a customer technical services manager with Pratt & Whitney.

MR. CRUZ: Okay, great. Mr. Chuck, is there anybody that you object to being on the call for this interview?

MR. CHUCK: No.

MR. CRUZ: Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we will send the recording out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to review the transcription, to correct it for any typographical errors. Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and to prevent reoccurrence. Our goal is not to assign fault. We're here simply for you to share your insight in the goal of preventing accidents.

Having said that, however, we cannot offer any guarantee or confidentiality or immunity. And a transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for the accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask one question one at a time. And everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person who is asking the question.

There is an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions for each -- after each person has had a turn. Please answer all the questions to the best of your recollection. If you cannot understand a question, just say so. And if you realize you misstated something or want to correct something, please do.

You're entitled to have one representative of your choosing. Is there someone you would like to have as your representative?

MR. CHUCK: Matt.

MR. CRUZ: Mr. Picciotti, could you please introduce yourself for the transcriptionist.

MR. PICCIOTTI: Yes. Matthew Picciotti, Federal Aviation Administration, Office of the Chief Counsel.

MR. CRUZ: Thank you. Does anyone have any questions? Let's begin.

INTERVIEW OF STANLEY CHUCK

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. Thank you, Mr. Chuck, for taking the time to speak with us today. Would you please state and spell your name for us?

A. Stanley C. Chuck. S-t-a-n-l-e-y C-h-u-c-k.

Q. Your date of birth?

A. 12/16/1952.

Q. Do you have any certificates or ratings or licenses that you hold?

A. I have an A&P certificate.

Q. What was your start date with the FAA?

A. I'm the principal maintenance inspector.

Q. What was your start date?

A. Oh, my start date. I'm sorry.

Q. Yeah.

A. Excuse me. My start date was 9/1992.

Q. What is your current position? You just said it but go ahead.

A. Principal maintenance inspector.

Q. How long have you been in that position?
A. Total of years for being a principal maintenance inspector?
Q. Yes.
A. (Indiscernible) general aviation.
Q. Basically, when you were with the FAA. How long have you been the principal maintenance inspector?
A. I'd say 20 something years.
Q. During your -- can you give us what your professional background is prior to going to the FAA?
A. Was an aircraft mechanic.
Q. For -- company?
A. Aloha Island Air.
Q. How long were you with Aloha Island Air?
A. Nine years.
Q. When you started with the FAA, what was your position? Still a principal maintenance inspector?
A. I was an ASI. Aviation inspector. When I passed my probation (indiscernible) principal maintenance inspector.
Q. As a principal maintenance inspector with the FAA, what was -- who did you oversee while you were there prior to Rhoades Aviation?
A. Prior to Rhoades Aviation, I was on the air carrier side. Or are you asking me on the general aviation side? Because general aviation side, there's a lot of certificates that I was on.
Q. Oh, okay. So when you were with the FAA, when you started

with the FAA, you went through your probation, you became a PMI, who did you oversee after you became the PMI? And if you could give me dates, that would be great.

A. I became principal 2000. And I had several certificates. The biggest was (indiscernible) certificate. And there were several other smaller certificates. It was mostly helicopters. And then, in 2007, I left general aviation and I went to air carrier. I worked as an assistant principal maintenance. That was under (indiscernible) airlines.

Then I had a couple temporaries in 2008. Then I got a permanent, I think, in 2009. And I was with Freedom Air. Then I left Freedom Air back in 2014 because they were terminated. (Indiscernible). I went to Rhoades Aviation 2015. I left there about 2018. Now I'm at Hawaiian Airlines (indiscernible) 2018.

Q. Sorry, I'm writing some notes. So you said you were Rhoades Aviation. You got the certificate in 2015, you said? And then left in 2018. Is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Currently, you are currently the principal maintenance inspector for what airline?

A. The one I'm -- right now?

Q. Correct.

A. Hawaiian Airlines.

Q. Hawaiian Airlines. Okay. Mr. Chuck, I have a question with regards to -- at the time when you -- prior to getting the Rhoades

certificate, can you explain to me how you developed your work program for Rhoades Aviation?

A. They already had a work program. And the work program that we (indiscernible) was a SAS. And there are DCTs that we have that we work with and oversee things.

Q. So that was already developed for you when you got the certificate or did you have to develop that yourself?

A. No. SAS was already developed. That was -- and I don't -- that the agency has developed (indiscernible) on site.

Q. And there is a chance for you to, obviously, either revise it or add to it or take some off based off of what you saw as a principal. Is that correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Prior to you taking on the certificate, did you have a chance to talk to the principals prior to you taking the certificate?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Did they provide you any information with regard to Rhoades Aviation? And if so, what was that information?

A. The only thing that they provided is that they overseed it and they found small problems which were like -- I'd say developing (indiscernible) manuals which we undertake and work with it.

Q. Besides -- is there anymore specific, as far as manuals is concerned -- what issues did they have as far as that was concerned?

A. From the prior inspectors, they had no issues.
Q. So the prior inspectors that you talked to said that they had -- that they did not have issues with the manuals. Right? I'm just trying to understand.
A. No (indiscernible) with the manuals. They had no issues with Rhoades Aviation (indiscernible). There were some manual issues which we were working with.
Q. Let's talk about the surveillance of Rhoades Aviation while you were the PMI. What was your relationship with the Rhoades management when you came in?
A. We discussed things. Working with them was like working with any other certificate. There were things that we noted (indiscernible). We presented it to them and they corrected it and worked with us and collaborated well. That's (indiscernible) about it. I mean, there was good communication between us.
Q. And who was the PAI at the time with you at Rhoades?
A. Scott Masters.
Q. Scott Masters? Okay. Who was your primary contact when you did talk to Rhoades Aviation? Who did you typically see?
A. The DOM. The director of maintenance.
Q. Who was the DOM?
A. Mike Kimble.
Q. Did they have a chief inspector at the time?
A. Yes, they did.
Q. Who was the chief inspector?

A. Richard (indiscernible). Then he left. And then it was Scott Mayural after that.
Q. So when that first CI left, you still had the certificate?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. How long was he the CI before the new person came in?
A. Richard was there from what I know -- the time that they transferred the certificate over to Honolulu.
Q. No, no. But when you were the principal maintenance inspector, you said that Richard was there. And then he left. Then another CI came in. Right?
A. Correct.
Q. How long was Richard in that CI position while you were there?
A. Stated that when I got on board, when I took over from the transfer of the certificate, Richard was already there.
Q. Right.
A. He was the owner of the certificate.
Q. Right. So when did he leave?
A. He left I say just about before I left. 2018.
Q. Is there a reason why -- did they tell you why he left?
A. He had health issues that he needed to go back home with (indiscernible).
Q. Can you give me an example of what surveillance you accomplished while you were the principal maintenance inspector with Rhoades Aviation? Just generally.

A. Generally?
Q. Yeah.
A. (Indiscernible) whatever the work that they had, inspections with aircraft. I would watch that. If they had inspections with engine, I would watch that. If there were a cargo operation group, I would watch how they load the containers and how they maintain the containers. That was surveillance of what I have plus records and maintenance.
Q. During your time, what types of issues did you find out during your -- that you found during surveillance? Typical.
A. Typical, they were lacking of manpower because they're not a big carrier. The publication department was one person. So publication was very slow, what was coming. They always tried to work and comply. So I would say the biggest issue that I noted was manpower. Not having the efficient amount of people in areas that they needed. They have mechanics. And those were good. They did their work. The followed the --
Q. So they did -- you didn't have any issues with how the airplanes were maintained by the mechanics and how paperwork was signed off and that type of thing?
A. I reviewed paperwork. There were small filings but nothing big. Put it that way. Nothing big. They worked, they had shifts. I didn't find anything of them not following manuals or anything else like that. They complied with all that.
Q. What about any issues with the maintenance program that you

saw while you were PMI?
A. Maintenance program. What are you discussing about?
Q. Basically, the AIP.
A. The AIP, they had -- they worked it. They did that well.
Q. Yep. Were there --
A. (Indiscernible) big issues --
Q. So at the time when you were a PMI, did Rhoades have -- did you see any issues with -- regarding to how the engines were maintained on the airplanes?
A. No. I didn't see any issues there. I didn't know that they were converting.
Q. Did you notice any chronic systems or issues that they had in the fleet?
A. No, not to my knowledge. No really chronic issues.
Q. Were the mechanics at the time that you were there -- were they pretty open about sharing information with you, the FAA?
A. We talked but I wouldn't say that (indiscernible) their self or how they feel about working or looking at other places. They didn't talk to me about any (indiscernible) or anything else like that.
Q. Did they have any issues with regards to management and how they were treated or complain about the hangars, the tools that they had, that type of thing?
A. No, they never did complain about that.
Q. How would you characterize the relationship between the

maintenance and the ops organization at Rhoades when you were the PMI?

A. From what I seen, they worked together. I didn't see anything wrong. They did have meetings that I knew of. (Indiscernible) anything else.

Q. By the way, who was the principal operations inspector when you were there?

A. John Murakami.

Q. Did he convey any issues from the ops part of it with regards to maintenance or anything like that, pilots complaining about maintenance or anything like that on how they were maintaining the airplanes?

A. No. He did not convey anything to me about that.

Q. So there were no -- just to be clear, there were no mechanics -- or I should say pilots that were -- that complained about how the airplanes were maintained while you were there?

A. Correct.

Q. While you were there, can you describe how Rhoades would deal with chronic issues if you saw any on the airplane?

A. As I stated earlier, I didn't know of any chronic issues. So if they did have some (indiscernible) what they have in their procedures on the chronic issues. But when I was there, as I said, I have not seen a chronic issue. When you say chronic, you're talking about multiple times. Right?

Q. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Do you know what the chronic program was

at Rhoades Aviation at the time that you were there, how it worked, basically?
A. They had a CASS program. They had a CASS program from what I know. What was in the CASS would come out. And they would tell me if they had more than one issue, they would do something.
Q. Who was -- I guess who gathered all that data?
A. That would be the inspection.
Q. The inspection department. How big was the inspection department?
A. (Indiscernible) I'd say two persons.
Q. Two persons. Were -- was the inspection -- did those two persons have an A&P?
A. Yes.
Q. Both of them did?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall who the two people were in the department, by any chance?
A. Richard -- and I don't know his other person (indiscernible).
Q. Richard is the CI. Right?
A. Yeah.
Q. So he only had one person -- one other person?
A. He had more than one (indiscernible). So yes, it would be Richard and (indiscernible).
Q. So it would up to Richard and that other person to get the data from the logbooks and everything else? Was there -- is that

how it typically would work for them to put together some type of document that shows that something is systemically an issue?
A. Yes. They had people but they're not A&Ps. Put it that way. (Indiscernible) records, I gave it to Richard.
Q. What type of checks are typically done in Honolulu?
A. Checks? Like --
Q. Maintenance checks.
A. They have different tasks that they do. Visual inspections, routine inspections. Nothing major. All just minor type of inspections that comes out from their hangar.
Q. So they don't do any major checks. Do you know where the major checks are accomplished?
A. The major inspections were done in Taiwan.
Q. In Taiwan. Did you happen to visit that facility in Taiwan?
A. No, I did not.
Q. While you were there, do you recall Rhoades doing any engine work where they need a borescope?
A. To my recollection, I don't remember any borescope. I know they did change engines. But I have -- I don't remember if (indiscernible) borescope.
Q. Do you know whether Rhoades had a borescope-qualified mechanic?
A. I'm not really sure if they did have. I don't know what you mean by qualified. I don't know if they had to be qualified put it that way. When I was there, I --

Q. Well, do you know whether they had any borescope equipment of their own?
A. I think they did.
Q. When you were there, did you witness any of the reoccurring -- any training program that they currently have as far as recurrent training or anything like that as far as DMM, any type of training that you witnessed while you were there?
A. The only training I witnessed was the hazmat training.
Q. Is that reoccurring training for them?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall who gave the hazmat training?
A. It was a contractor.
Q. As far as mechanics are concerned, you said they -- it was a small outfit. Did they have a problem hiring people or retaining people that they had?
A. I would say hiring and retaining.
Q. So they had problems getting the necessarily amount of mechanics. Right? Is what I'm hearing from you?
A. Correct.
Q. Were there a lot of mechanics leaving at the same time, as well, as they bringing in?
A. No. There were a few but not a lot.
Q. Is there a reason why that those mechanics would leave?
A. They moved onto bigger airlines.
Q. So let's talk about the CASS. Did you attend -- how often is

the CASS meetings presented?
A. Well, it's been a while so I can't really say anything was quarterly. And I don't want to say how long because right now, I really don't recall.
Q. At the time, do you recall who was putting together the information in CASS?
A. (Indiscernible) inspection department.
Q. It's either the CI or his other person. Or do you know which one of those two were?
A. I'm not really sure which one put it together. I know it was the inspection department.
Q. Who was giving the presentation typically?
A. The inspection department. Well, I'll take that back. At first, it was the director of maintenance. But then converted to the inspection department.
Q. When you say inspection department, there's only two people. Is Richard or -- is Richard the one giving it or the other person?
A. I think it was mainly Richard that was giving them.
Q. During those CASS meetings, is it all three of your principals would attend or just one of you, or two of the three of you, or how does that work?
A. Sometimes it was the two of us (indiscernible) maintenance. Once in a while (indiscernible) would come.
Q. What are the things that they'd typically talk about in the CASS meeting?

A. Write-ups, any issues, inspection programs that are coming up. There might be other things that I don't recall right now. Those are the main issues, I think.

Q. Did they talk about in-flight shutdowns or anything like that, STRs, or --

A. If there was, yes, they would.

Q. Did the CI, to your knowledge set any alert conditions for the components or systems within the airline to be flagged when something happens as far as so that CASS can catch it?

A. Yes, they did.

Q. Do you recall how they set those alerts? I'm sorry. Go ahead.

A. I said if they were coming, they would send out an alert. We would go ahead and order it and put it out to the mechanics or to their program, in their program. Just want to say, what you're saying -- there were not that many so I've not really seen many of those.

Q. Have you seen -- as part of CASS, typically they would do a risk analysis on certain components or systems. Did you see them -- did the CI ever do that, that you recall?

A. No, I don't recall.

Q. Do you recall -- let's talk about the GMM. What was the latest revision of the GMM while you were there, when you were there? Don't recall?

A. Couldn't recall (indiscernible) revision.

Q. You mentioned earlier that the issue that you brought up to them was the manuals. This particular GMM was dated -- I believe, revision two was dated 2015. It is now 2021. The revision that's still there is 2015. Can you explain to me why the FAA, at the time, didn't push to update their GMM a lot more sooner?

A. At that time, I was doing the compliance, working with the operator. Knowing that their issue was, again, manpower. Not having the tools so we were doing what we were (indiscernible) working in compliance with them to help them through. As I said, there were times that they were working on it. And they showed things here and there. But they were not complete.

When I left, it was told that they were close to it. That was -- I thought that it would have been already (indiscernible). But as I said, we tried to work with them because they are being compliant with us. They are advising (indiscernible) but it was not the quickest.

Q. Would they typically put revisions in -- did they ever turn in a revision to you to make changes to update their GMM and -- that you recall?

A. I think the last time I seen any type of trying to get them changed in there was, again, maybe 2016. And I sent it back because it was more policy than what it was -- procedure.

Q. So the last -- just -- the last part of that in the GMM that I -- that we saw was there was a supplement in the GMM for the MEL extension. According to what we have, the first and second

extensions were okay per the -- for them to do -- with just notifying the PMI to do it. And also, they were allowed to do a third or more extensions. But they needed to go through the PMI to have it done. That was in 2016.

The op specs which were signed off allows for only one extension and that was signed off on 2018. Is there a reason why their GMM was not revised with regards to the op specs being very restrictive as far as their extension is concerned in 2018? And their MEL extension at 2016 was quite more, I guess, open with regards to extensions.

A. I (indiscernible) explain it to you. I know about -- talked about that (indiscernible) GMM. But as for the op specs, I don't know if that was changed -- that op specs was changed in 2018 or was signed in 2018?

Q. It was signed actually by you in 2018.

A. 2018.

Q. Yeah.

A. So there was supposed to be a change in the MEL (indiscernible).

Q. Right, right. The GMM. But currently, their GMM still says, they're quite liberating.

A. As I stated earlier, all that was supposed to be revised.

Q. Right. So the AIP also -- we're looking at the AIP. I'm assuming you know the aircraft inspection program?

A. Yes.

Q. The aircraft inspection program does not list the accident airplane. The AIP -- pull it up here real quick. The AIP was last revised in 2014.

A. Are you saying that inspection program don't have an accident program?

Q. No. It didn't list the accident airplane.

A. I don't know the -- what did you mean by that?

Q. So the AIP lists the airplanes that are effective for the maintenance program.

A. Correct.

Q. The accident airplane was not put in their certificate until 2015. The latest revision to the AIP that we have, that was given to us, that was active, is 2014.

A. That was prior. I don't -- I did not -- the accident aircraft I did not put onto the certificate. I did not --

Q. Certificate. Yeah. So it was already on --

A. (Indiscernible).

Q. I'm sorry. Go ahead.

A. I can't answer that question because I wasn't the one who did that.

Q. So when you became the PII, the accident airplane was already being flown. Correct?

A. Correct.

MR. CRUZ: Bill, I will throw it to you for now.

DR. BRAMBLE: Hi, Chuck. Do you need a break?

MR. CHUCK: No, I'm good for right now.

DR. BRAMBLE: I have maybe -- I don't know, 15 questions or so.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. So just following onto what Pocholo was asking you earlier, you mentioned that the GMM was supposed to be revised when -- after the op specs were updated but it wasn't. And I just want to make sure I have this correct. My impression, based on what you've been saying, is that they didn't revise the GMM in a more timely fashion because they didn't have enough staff and they were very slow.

And you did not force them to move faster on it because the compliance philosophy indicated that you were supposed to work collaboratively with the operator as long as they indicated a willingness to comply with your request. Is that accurate?

A. That's correct.

Q. Can you describe what was the compliance philosophy?

A. The compliance philosophy is to -- safety and I'm not really -- I don't have it in front of me what they put down as their compliance statement. Put it that way.

Q. Was --

A. (Indiscernible) with the FAA authorities.

Q. Was that a change in policy at the FAA?

A. Correct.

Q. When did that happen?

A. I couldn't tell you when.
Q. Do you know roughly what years that transition might have occurred?
A. That could have been back in 2014 (indiscernible).
Q. Is that still the approach to oversight?
A. Yes.
Q. When you were on the CMT for Rhoades, did you think of Rhoades as a troubled operator?
A. No, I did not.
Q. And do you have any idea why the next CMT would consider them to be a troubled operator?
A. I don’t know why -- I didn't know what the next CMT was doing.
Q. Have you spoken with them since you left the Rhoades CMT about what's been going on with their oversight of Rhoades?
A. No, I have not.
Q. Why did you leave the Rhoades CMT?
A. I bid for another position.
Q. Was that because -- well, why was that? Why did you bid for another position?
A. Different airlines.
Q. Was there an advantage to the new position?
A. It was the same type of -- you're a principal but it's just a bigger certificate.
Q. I'm just wondering what was the incentive to bid a different

operator. I mean, did you do it just because you wanted a change or was it like a career advancement or like why change?
A. Well, you could say it was more of a career advancement.
Q. Because it's a bigger, more complex operator?
A. Correct.
Q. FAA management didn't ask you to change?
A. It was a seniority bid.
Q. But what I'm asking is -- I just want to confirm whether FAA management said, Chuck, we want you to move from -- off of the Rhoades certificate and work a different one. Did they ever say that?
A. No, they did not.
Q. Did -- when you were the PMI for Rhoades, did Rhoades seem to have more maintenance write-ups than the other 121 operators that you've overseen in your career?
A. No (indiscernible).
Q. How competent did they seem to be at diagnosing and correcting maintenance issues compared to other 121 carriers you've overseen?
A. They were good.
Q. Pocholo mentioned a page that was inserted in the GMM about MEL extensions. But to your recollection, when you left the operator, how many MEL extensions were they allowed to do before they sought FAA approval?
A. From what I recall, it was one.

Q. How would you describe the quality of the company's general maintenance manual in general?
A. In general?
Q. Um-hum.
A. It needed work.
Q. What aspects of it needed work?
A. I can't recall what areas but I just know generally it needed work.
Q. Were you aware that it referenced an airplane type that the company had not operated since 2013?
A. Yes. That was supposed to be taken out. Again, that was -- should have been in the revision. So I don't know why it's there. Because they did have other aircrafts other than the 737.
Q. Because they did have the 737 in the manual. Is that what you're saying?
A. No. I said they had other aircraft other than the 737.
Q. I see. Was the 737 included?
A. I can't recall. I'd say yes but I'm not --
Q. If you're not sure, that's fine.
A. I'm not sure.
Q. Yeah, I don't want you to guess. How would you describe the quality of the company's aircraft maintenance manuals for the 737?
A. Are you talking maintenance manuals as the AMM?
Q. Yes.
A. From what I've seen, they were updated and they were, from

what I remember, good.
Q. Do you remember any issues with blank work cards or hyperlinks that didn't work?
A. No, I was not -- not that I recall.
Q. Did you identify any specific shortcomings in the AMM.
A. No, I did not.
Q. You and Pocholo discussed the CASS program a bit. And I'd just like to ask, how mature was the company's CASS program during your time on the CMT for Rhoades?
A. It was still developing.
Q. They were developing it?
A. No, it was still developing. It was --
Q. Oh, still.
A. It had a program. But as that -- working with them, it was getting developed even more. Trying to develop more into the CASS.
Q. Okay. So the CASS wasn't fully functioning at that time?
A. It was functioning. It was functioning (indiscernible) but as I said, this is a small operator. Personnel and stuff needed to be more updated, quicker, better.
Q. Was the carrier performing CASS audits?
A. From what I remember, yes, they did.
Q. Do you recall seeing any findings from the CASS audits?
A. I know there were findings but I can't recall what it was.
Q. Did you feel that Scott Mayural was effective in his role as

the chief inspector when he assumed that position?
A. I felt that he was effective.
Q. Did you feel he was qualified for the job?
A. Yes.
Q. What made you think that?
A. (Indiscernible).
Q. Do you remember any of his qualifications or experience that made him qualified?
A. Not offhand. Again, that was more than two years ago. I can't recall everything (indiscernible).
Q. Do you recall if he was working independently of the general -- or the director of maintenance. I'm sorry. Or did he work for the director of maintenance?
A. Oh, no. He should have been -- he's separate from the director of maintenance.
Q. Was he in fact separate?
A. What do you mean by back separate?
Q. Was he in fact separate? Was he separate or did he work --
A. Yes, yes. You would say that.
Q. So he didn't report to the DOM?
A. Not my (indiscernible).
Q. I'm sorry. I didn't catch the answer.
A. To my recollection, I didn't think so.
Q. What was the status of safety management system implementation at Rhoades when you were the PMI?

A. It was developing. 900 came in to help them develop it.
Q. The POI that was in place at the time of the accident said that when he became the POI in 2020, the previous CMT had identified a lack of resources of performing adequate safety assurance, meaning the time that you were on. But perhaps it wasn't you. It might have been someone else on the team. Had identified a lack of resources for performing adequate safety assurance. Do you know anything about that?
A. No, not that I recall. They probably could have. But we had the team of 900 in there developing everything. And we were just there to watch and assist in whatever ways.
Q. How was top management at Rhoades in terms of their receptiveness to the -- to safety management systems?
A. The director of maintenance was very receptive. I can't speak for the ops side because I only dealt with the maintenance personnel.
Q. Did you have any dealings with the CEO in your oversight work?
A. Other than saying hi, that's about it.
Q. What kind of a person was he?
A. To me, he was very personable. He said hi and talked and that's what -- the extent that I got from him.
Q. How would you describe the safety culture at Rhoades?
A. I feel the safety culture on the maintenance, again talking about the maintenance, I felt that they were very open-minded to

try to go ahead and do everything as safe as possible. Follow all the -- what they had on SMS.

DR. BRAMBLE: I think that's all I have for right now. Thanks, Chuck.

MR. CHUCK: Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Thanks, Bill. Mr. Muse?

MR. MUSE: No questions.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible).

MR. CRUZ: Dan Marcotte, Boeing.

MR. MARCOTTE: I have no questions right now. Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Tony?

MR. DICIOCCIO: Just one question. When you were witnessing the maintenance crew doing the troubleshooting, did you get the feeling that they would follow the troubleshooting verbatim or maybe skip steps? You know, troubleshooting would call out a borescope. You know, do you feel that they would go out and do that action?

MR. CHUCK: No, if they were troubleshooting, they followed it. And they would have the steps right in front of them. The times that I watched or seen, surveilled them on their tasks, they had it and they were going through the steps. Yes, I'm very reassured that they would follow each step.

MR. MARCOTTE: Thank you.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. I guess I have just one follow-up question. Before you

became -- or after you became the PMI and you were about to leave the position to go to Hawaiian, did you have any conversations with the incoming PMI or principals with regards to how Rhoades operated, what issues you've seen, and what they need to look out for?

A. No, I did not. It was temporaries that were put into place. So there was not a permanent PMI that was put into Rhoades Aviation when I left.

Q. Is that typical of the office to put temporary in there until they can fill the position or is that just a timing type issue? Do you know?

A. I can't talk about if that was (indiscernible) office. They put out bids. I know that.

Q. So more than likely, they -- so they may not have chosen the people to do the main principals at the time. Is that what I'm hearing from you?

A. Correct.

Q. Since you were -- I know Bill kind of touched on this and I want to see if you can recall. Do you recall an issue that was brought up in the CASS, like an example, that they actually took action on as far as whether it be a procedural issue or an issue with the way aircraft is maintained or communication between pilots and -- can you recall of any type of issue like that?

A. No, I can't recall. It might have been. But I can't say.

MR. CRUZ: I think Bill had to drop off. Hold on. I got to

check.

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah, apologies, guys. I have to drop off to finish something on another case before I go on leave today.

MR. CRUZ: No worries. You got any more follow-up questions, Bill, or you done?

DR. BRAMBLE: I don't. I think we've covered my areas of interest. Thank you. Thank you, Chuck.

MR. CRUZ: Yep. I guess that's all I have. What about Mr. Muse, any follow-up questions?

MR. MUSE: No questions from me. Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Mr. Marcotte?

MR. MARCOTTE: Nothing from me. Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Tony, any follow-up questions?

MR. DICIOCCIO: Nope, no, thank you.

MR. CRUZ: I have this MS Shared Office. Who is that?

MR. LENHART: That might be me, Ron.

MR. CRUZ: Sorry, Ron. I completely forgot about you. Do you have any questions? My mistake, Ron. I apologize.

MR. LENHART: That's the computer. But no, I don't have any questions at this time. Thanks.

MR. CRUZ: Mr. Chuck, thank you very much for your time. And Matt, thank you for your time. I appreciate it. We will end the interview at 3:00. Do you have anything for us, Mr. Chuck? Is there anything else you want to say that we didn't ask you?

MR. CHUCK: No, thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Thank you.

MR. CHUCK: Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Thanks, everyone. Can the team kind of stay on? I have a couple of things to discuss. Thanks, Matt.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Stanley Chuck
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Via telephone
DATE:	October 13, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Katie Leach
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

Interview of: REZA JOHN LESANE, Principal Maintenance Inspector
Rhoades Aviation

Via telephone

Friday,
September 24, 2021

APPEARANCES:

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National Transportation Safety Board

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

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DAN MARCOTTE, Air Safety Inspector
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TONY DICIOCCIO, Customer Technical Services Manager
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I N T E R V I E W

(12:12 p.m.)

MR. CRUZ: Today is September 24, 2021, at around 12:12 p.m. My name is Pocholo Cruz. I'm the maintenance investigator with the NTSB, and I'm leading the Maintenance Working Group for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174, involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810. Assisted by another NTSB investigator, Dr. William Bramble.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents, and promoting transportation safety.

NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA. It has no regulatory enforcement policy.

I would like to have Dr. Bramble and each of the maintenance members briefly introduce themselves.

Dr. Bramble.

DR. BRAMBLE: I'm William Bramble. I'm a human performance investigator with NTSB.

MR. MUSE: I'm Stephen Muse with the FAA (indiscernible).

MR. MARCOTTE: I'm Dan Marcotte with Boeing, air safety investigations.

MR. CRUZ: And we also have Tony DiCioccio from Pratt & Whitney.

Okay. Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we'll send the recording out for transcription, and

party members will have an opportunity to review the transcription to correct it for any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation to determine probable cause, and prevent reoccurrence. Our goal is not to assign fault. We're here simply for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents.

Having said that, however, we cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity, and a transcription of the interview will eventually be part of the public docket for the accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time, and everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person who is asking the questions. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person has had his turn.

Please answer the questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so. And if you realize you've misstated something, or want to correct something, please do. You're entitled to have a representative of your choosing. Is there someone you would like to have as your representative?

MR. LESANE: Matt's good.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. Mr. Picciotti, please introduce yourself.

MR. PICCIOTTI: Yes. Matt Picciotti with the FAA also, Chief Counsel.

MR. CRUZ: Great.

Reza, do you have any questions?

MR. LESANE: No, none.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. If everyone is ready, we'll begin.

INTERVIEW OF REZA JOHN LESANE

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. For the record, could you please spell and state your name?

A. Reza John Lesane, R-e-z-a J-o-h-n L-e-s-a-n-e.

Q. Mr. Lesane, what is your date of birth?

A. 10/25/1947.

Q. Okay. And what certificates of ratings and licenses do you hold?

A. AMD, Airframe Powerplant.

Q. And could you for -- could you please briefly describe your professional background?

A. I've been Rhoades PMI for since May of 2012 in a temporary position; and I think May of this year I was made permanent. Prior to that I was a geographic inspector from 2010 to 2020.

Q. So correct me if I'm wrong. Make sure I get it right. You were a Rhoades PMI temporarily starting in May 2012?

A. I'm sorry. 2020.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. You were a temporary from 2020?

A. Right.

Q. And became the permanent PMI in May of 2021?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. So when did you start with the FAA?
A. November 1, 2010.
Q. And then what was your job prior to starting with the FAA?
A. I was a quality assurance for Department of Marines at Kaneohe.
Q. And what were the dates of that employment?
A. I was a quality assurance under CH-53 helicopter there, and that was a contract for two years, I believe.
Q. Okay. So you don't remember when you started, from what to what?
A. I left there a month prior to joining the FAA. So I left there in October of 2010.
Q. Okay. And you started there when?
A. I started there in 2008, I believe.
Q. Okay. As a PMI for Rhoades Aviation, what is your duties and responsibilities?
A. My duties and responsibilities as the PMI I'm responsible for the maintenance requirements, the ten elements of the CAMP, the inspection manuals. I don't know. I've got to think about the rest of it. There's so much there.
Q. Do you do ramp inspections?
A. Yes, I do ramp inspections. That's part of the maintenance ramp inspection. Basically just ensure Rhodes is in compliance

with the regulations.
Q. Okay. Is Rhoades Aviation the only certificate that you oversee?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you have any assistants by any chance?
A. I don't have an assistant, but there's a PAI and a POI. There's three of us.
Q. Okay. So I'm going to ask you about your work program. Can you please explain how your work program works?
A. My work program is in a CAP, and it runs every quarter on certain things. It's predetermined. It runs quarter on things, and every quarter it changes and whatnot. So I perform all the work in the CAP.
Q. What is CAP? I'm sorry.
A. Certificate Plan Action, I believe. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay. And the CAP, does that basically determine what tasks, what --
A. Yes.
Q. -- you have to do --
A. Yes.
Q. -- operator?
A. Yes.
Q. And how do you know which is critical? If there's something --
A. It's in a -- it's an order on criticality high marks down to,

I think, high, medium and low.
Q. Okay. And what if -- can you add to that, to the CAP --
A. We can --
(Crosstalk)
A. I'm sorry. We can add EDCTs into our plan. We can do that. But that CAP, the only thing we can do to that CAP is we can change the time. Say if it's due March the 31st, and we need more time, we can move it to the next quarter, but we have to justify why we're moving it.
Q. Okay. How do you determine what part of the Safety Assurance System Program needs to be reviewed, or is that automatically put in there for you?
A. I think that's automatically. I have never reviewed it. I think that automatically goes in there.
Q. Okay. And I need to ask this because I'm not too familiar with it. What's the relationship between the Safety Assurance System, the FSIMS, SPAS, and PTRS?
A. The FSIMS is our working rule, the FAA rule order for (indiscernible). SPAS, I don't think SAS relate to SPAS. We can look up stuff in SPAS, and relate it to aircraft -- carrier. We can look up PTRS PAS (ph.) because we no longer use PTRS. And what was the other one, please?
Q. I guess it's SAS, right? So you're saying that basically all the PTRS has to be (indiscernible) put in as PAS?
A. Yes. All the PTS interest now goes into SPAS -- I'm sorry --

goes into SAS.
Q. SAS?
A. Right. Goes into SAS.
Q. Okay. So how is the data for the results that's put in a program analyzed? Is it you that analyzes what goes into that or some body else does?
A. Somebody else does.
Q. Okay. And if they have results from that analysis, how do you get feedback to you? Is there any feedback back to you? Somebody analyzes the data that you put in there?
A. No. I have never received any feedback.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. The only feedback I get is when if it's wrong, if I input some stuff wrong.
Q. Right. The data that goes in there, to your knowledge somebody else analyzes it, but you don't get anything back, if they say, hey, you need to do more of this, or here's a problem as part of your surveillance as far as the operator is concerned or anything like that?
A. I've never received that.
Q. Okay. All right. I guess I would like to talk to you about Rhoades' GMM. What's the latest revision to their GMM?
A. Three.
Q. Revision Three?
A. Revision Three.

Q. And what is the date of Revision Three.
A. It's (indiscernible).
Q. Oh, that's the latest revision.
A. Right.
Q. Okay. I'm sorry. I need to rephrase that. What is the revision at the time prior to the accident?
A. Two.
Q. Two. Okay. And do you recall what the date -- what was the last revision? When was it done?
A. I don't recall the month, but I think it was in 2013.
Q. 2013.
A. Right.
Q. Okay. When was the last time the FAA did an audit of (indiscernible) GMM?
A. My memory, 2010.
Q. 2010?
A. I'm sorry. 2020.
Q. And did you do the audit, or who did the audit? You did?
A. The PAI and myself.
Q. And what were the results of the audit?
A. Shocking.
Q. Can you elaborate, please? What issues did you see?
A. Well, the policy in the GMM was vague. They reference a Convair that was no longer there. It left in -- the Cond left in 2013. The GMM -- I'm sorry, the general maintenance -- the

general manager was no longer there. He left in 2017, I believe.
Q. Do you recall the name of that general manager?
A. Racha (ph.). That's all I can tell you.
Q. Racha. Okay. Got it. I'm sorry to interrupt.
A. That's all right. And there was a lot of changes in maintenance that was not reflected in -- was not reflected in the GMM, a lot. They still had their main base of operation was Indiana. They still had everything referred to Indiana was in there. It was just a lot. I don't remember all of that stuff. All I know it was, it was bad.
Q. Okay.
A. But I will tell you this, when I signed the ferry permit for the Convair to leave Rhoades in 2013, I did tell GMM now is a good time to revise your manual.
Q. You did tell the general manager?
A. No, the DOM.
Q. DOM?
A. Right. That now it's a good time to revise your GMM.
Q. And who was the DOM at the time?
A. Mike Kimball.
Q. Oh, okay. And this was in 2013?
A. 2013.
Q. Okay. And, I guess, let me ask you this. Prior to being made permanent, or you said you were also temporary --
A. Right.

Q. -- PMI, did the previous PMI say anything about the Rhoades certificate to you as far as maintenance, or how they do things, or their manuals at the time?

A. No, nothing.

Q. Nothing?

A. Nothing.

Q. Okay. I guess I need to -- why hasn't the FAA pushed the (indiscernible) to revise the GMM since 2014 or 2013 or --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- the record, you're talking about him or CMP?

MR. CRUZ: No, the CMP, the principals.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah. Just to make sure --

MR. LESANE: I don't have an answer for that why Rhoades -- why the CMT, probably CMT, CMT probably before that did not push Rhoades to do a revision on their GMM. All I can tell you this is that when I came on in May of 2020, and I looked at the manuals again, again I brought up to the DOM, we need a manual revision. I suggest to you, you give me some temporary revision now to bring this manual up. Nothing was forthcoming.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. You mentioned -- I just want to make sure I heard your clearly. In 2013, you already mentioned something to the DOM --

A. Yes.

Q. -- to take out --

A. The Convair.

Q. The 2013 --
A. That was 2013.
Q. Okay. And you were a temporary -- why were you involved with Rhoades in 2013?
A. The certificate was located in Indianapolis.
Q. In where?
A. Indiana somewhere. I can't remember where. Certificate was located there, and I was the geographic. So they contacted my FLAM to have me to go watch that and do that. I was the DO of resource, general maintenance and resource guy.
Q. Okay. You were stationed here?
A. Yes.
Q. In 2013 you were doing the geographic work --
A. For Rhoades.
Q. For Rhoades.
A. Yes.
Q. In Indiana?
A. Right.
Q. Okay. But you weren't really assigned with -- that was just part of your job as a geographic to work that --
A. That --
(Crosstalk)
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. I didn't understand how that worked. Okay. Thank you for clarifying that. Okay. So currently what is the MEL

extension procedure for Transair?
A. Right now, they don't have one. I amended that.
Q. Prior to the accident?
A. Prior to that is -- when I came on certificate, and I looked at that GMM, they had a bulletin in the GMM that allowed them to do three MEL extensions, and I believe the D-76 -- I get the numbers mixed up.
Q. Yeah.
A. Only allow you to do one. I took that away from them. I took that. I had them rescind that bulletin because they only allow one. And during that one time when I was reviewing the MEL records, it was out of hand. It was out of hand. Stuff was being MEL cleared, MEL cleared, MEL cleared. It was being abused.
Q. Okay.
A. So I took that. I sent them a letter. They wasn't authorized no extension. All extensions come through me or the PAI until further notice.
Q. Okay.
A. All right. And I sat down with the DOM, and I said, look, Mike, you only got five airplanes. There's no reason for all of these extensions. All your five airplanes do not fly at one time. The one that's giving you the history of the MELs, why don't you set it down, fix it, and fly one of the other airplanes instead of doing all of this, this thing. And basically what it was, it was just, it was just shot-gunning. Change something, clear it, and

then put it back again until the crew (indiscernible) it back. And then he came back, and he said to me, it's the environment the airplane is flying in. I said, Mike, the airplane don't know what environment is in. How come Aloha, which is a 37 operator, don't have these MEL discrepancies. You've got something else going on you need to look at. So, and when I did that, all of a sudden, no MELs. They start setting the airplane down, fixing it. I'm sorry. No MEL extension. They set the airplane down, and fixed it.

Q. So it was obvious basically that before you took the job, they already had it in their manuals to do three extensions are allowed?

A. Yes.

Q. So the previous principals allowed that to be written into their GMM?

A. I don't know if the principal knew about that because let me put it this way. That bulletin they put in their manual for that, for that three extension was not approved by the FAA, and all bulletin must be approved, stamp approved by the PMI or the PAI.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Just for clarification. He didn't originally say it was in the manual. He said there was a bulletin.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No. It's in the GMM.

MR. LESANE: Right. It was placed in the GMM.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. You're making a distinction

between the GMM and the bulletin, and you're saying the bulletin wasn't approved, right?

MR. LESANE: Yes.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. Sorry to interrupt.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. But the GMM had the three extensions in there?

A. The GMM has one extension in there.

Q. Okay. All right. Sorry. Lost my place.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sorry for interrupting. I just didn't want to -- I didn't want to confuse what he was saying by repeating back something was different --

MR. CRUZ: That's fine.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: -- in the question.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. All right. Let's talk about the CASS program that they have. When was the last time the FAA audited their CASS system?

A. I think the PAI and myself we did it in 2020.

Q. 2020?

A. 2020.

Q. Do you have a month, perhaps a month?

A. Pardon me?

Q. Month?

A. I think it was -- I can't recall the month.

Q. Okay. And based off of the -- what were the results of that CASS audit that you guys did?

A. They have never done a audit. I don't know. We couldn't find a audit they did concerning the CASS.
Q. Okay. Did you guys do your own audit of the CASS system?
A. We looked at the CASS system, yes.
Q. As part of your DCT --
A. No. We just looked at it because we couldn't -- we asked for audit for the CASS, and they couldn't produce any.
Q. Okay.
A. So we went to look -- we started looking at the CASS. And one of the CASS meeting we were looking at how they were tracking items in the CASS meeting and whatnot, and the CASS meeting minutes was not up to par. It wasn't doing anything. It was just going through the motion. It wasn't tracking anything. It wasn't tracking. They were tracking parts changed, you know, but they wasn't tracking engine change, and none of that kind of stuff. So we brought that up to them. We talked to actually the chief inspector when the last time he did an audit, and he couldn't tell us.
Q. This was the previous chief inspector?
A. Right.
Q. Okay. Yeah.
A. Yeah. He just couldn't tell us. He didn't know. And everything on my part on the AIP, the CASS, I was in the process of relieving that chief inspector.
Q. I'm sorry?

A. I was in the process of relieving him.
Q. Okay.
A. Because he was -- the check team asked questions about him, and I looked at his resume, and I don't see how he got that position, you know, and whatnot. So --
Q. So your opinion he wasn't qualified --
A. He wasn't qualified.
Q. -- to do that job?
A. To do that job, right.
Q. Okay.
A. And I found out at the time too that he was reporting to the DOM.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. So that was a no-no. You couldn't do that. But I couldn't break that. He always had to go to the DOM for everything, but then he -- and then he developed health problems. So he left on his own, and then they brought in the current guy and whatnot. But the CASS was -- I don't know what to day about the CASS. I mean, it just wasn't there.
Q. Okay.
A. It wasn't catching anything.
Q. So, obviously, you've already answered some of my questions here but, obviously, there was a lot of concern for you as far as the data that was being presented during the CASS meetings?
A. Yes.

Q. And you and the PAI attend those meetings on a monthly basis?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So you brought up some of the issues with CASS with the chief inspector. What was his response to those issues?
A. Oh, he got hostile.
Q. The previous chief inspector?
A. Oh, yeah. I mean, he got mad. He got mad. He fired back at (indiscernible) and I, and we were trying to give him credit for some stuff. What damn audit you talking about? I didn't do no audits. Well, we know that, Scott. We tried to give you credit for something. So but --
Q. Okay. So do you know how -- they were doing any alerts or anything like that? How would -- they doing, you know, alert conditions for its components or systems or anything like that in CASS? Do you know?
A. No.
Q. They weren't doing any --
A. They weren't doing any of that.
Q. No root cause analysis on anything? Engine shutdown rates?
A. The only time they would report something on -- say on mechanical interruptions --
Q. Yes, MISRs.
A. Yes. They would do that.
Q. Okay. Would they do SDRs too on there?
A. The only -- they did -- they had one, and they never

submitted an SDR until I caught it. And when I brought that up to the DOM, he said, well, they were supposed to do that, yeah, supposed to, but they didn't do it. And I said, it's clear on what you must report on the SDR, right. And then they submitted the SDR for it.

Q. Okay. Is there any place in the CASS where you've ever seen them have action items for each department, and status, and follow-up, and what the status of let's say some issues that they're tracking or anything like that in there?

A. No.

Q. Is that something that would be typical for --

A. Yes.

Q. -- to have?

A. Yes, it would be. It would be very helpful. And I even brought it to the chief inspector on your CASS, you know, you don't have anything from last CASS for minutes what was carried on from the last time. We gave you stuff to carry on from the last time. Where is it?

Q. Yeah. And his answer?

A. If (indiscernible) put it on there to bring up now in the CASS meeting, you know, and all that. So --

Q. And who would typically give the CASS presentation?

A. There's a guy there by the name of Ben, Ben. His last name is T-o-r-i-d-o, I believe.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.
Q. And is he the one that gathers the data, I guess?
A. He's just the record clerk.
Q. Okay. So there is no -- so that is just basically putting data up for (indiscernible) basically, right?
A. To review, yes.
Q. Do you know if anybody analyzes the data that's being put up?
A. No.
Q. Is there somebody that's supposed to be analyzing that data?
A. The CI should be looking at it.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And the CI -- basically, you just basically said the CI may not be -- maybe over his head?
A. The current CI --
Q. Currently --
A. Currently now --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- that came on, on July of this year.
Q. Yeah.
A. He seems to have the situation well under hand. He's making a lot of changes right now. The prior CI, no. He just didn't care.
Q. Didn't care or didn't know how to do his job?
A. Both. Didn't know; didn't care.

Q. Okay. And do you know during the CASS were they tracking -- how were they tracking chronic items on the aircraft?
A. They wasn't tracking it until Ace and I brought it up to them. They didn't even know what a chronic problem was.
Q. Did they have a chronic system in place for the -- in the GMM or anything like that that you know of?
A. No. I haven't seen one. They might be in this revision. We haven't finished the review --
Q. Revision 3 you're talking about?
A. I'm talking about this one, the third one.
Q. Yeah.
A. The previous two, I have not seen it.
Q. Okay. Do you know whether the accident airplane had any chronic items on it?
A. I can't answer that. I mean, I can't answer that with a yes or no whatnot.
Q. Okay.
A. I do know prior to that they did have hot engine issues.
Q. Hot engine issues?
A. Right.
Q. On the accident airplane?
A. Aircraft.
Q. Okay. And why do you say you knew -- you know that they had hot engine --
A. Because I remember seeing a long page write-up. I think it

was on that airplane that said it was 600, 600 degrees.
Q. Okay.
A. And I think it was on that airplane I reviewed something there.
Q. So you're not sure?
A. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay.
A. Right.
Q. I guess, typically after the CASS meeting there's a, there's a SIEM meeting after that or a -- is that a safety meeting that happens after the CASS meeting?
A. Oh, yes, the safety meeting.
Q. Okay. And in the May 2021 report, there's a section in there that mentions with regards to pilots not reporting issues with the airplane (indiscernible). Do you recall that?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Can you explain what you thought when you saw that in the safety meeting? First of all were you aware that that was in the work?
A. I was aware that I heard rumors about that.
Q. Okay.
A. All right. And I believe that was brought up in the safety meeting after the CASS. Mr. Raja (ph.), not Raja -- Teimour handed us a letter. I don't have it. I never got a copy of it. Vigorously denying that, that that never happened whatnot; that it

was a misunderstanding, you know, that -- but it wasn't, it wasn't.

Q. Okay. And have you heard anything similar on the maintenance side being said not to write anything up?

A. You mean telling the pilots that?

Q. Or, no, just the maintenance side, the DOM or anybody else or any --

A. No, I have not.

Q. Okay.

A. I do know in that meeting I did make the comment to the chief pilot with the owner sitting there was that pilots are allowed to write stuff up, and nobody should feel threatened about writing stuff up because you don't want an airplane to be on the ground or something like that. And then I told the chief pilot that the more information your crew, your pilot gives maintenance, the better chance we are for them to fix it. But you just can't put something in that (indiscernible) take off 600, and that's all, taxi back to gate, you know. What was the N1, what -- give them something. That's what you have to do on that, and that was one of the biggest problems when I reviewed the log page that I saw with the crew. And I just got the feeling that they just didn't want to explain everything because there is a retaliatory atmosphere at rules. There is a thing that if you report stuff, you were gone.

Q. You mean in the pilots or in maintenance?

A. All over.
Q. All over rules?
A. All over rules. There was that environment.
Q. And who do you think is making that environment the way it is?
A. That's Teimour. Teimour run that place with a iron fist. You go to the meeting, the only people who will speak is Teimour, nobody else.
Q. That's the owner?
A. That's the owner. Nobody else says anything. Teimour can set up to us, and tell us a lie, and this guy next to him know it's a lie, he doesn't say anything. That's the kind of environment you have over there.
Q. Okay. Is there something the FAA can do about that?
A. If it is, I haven't found it yet.
Q. Okay. I'm just curious.
A. Yeah.
Q. All right. So let's talk about your surveillance duties. What's your relationship prior to the accident with the Transair management?
A. My relationship was pretty good. Kimball, the DOM, we have a good working relationship is because I don't tolerate a lot of his BS. I mean, I'm very -- I try to be very tactful with him. His mindset is this is the way I've always done it, all right, or this is the way I have done it at Sky West or Sky King or something

like that. And I keep telling him this is a different horse here, you know, and all that. The prior CI started out pretty good, and then he became very hostile toward not only me, toward the PI, the POI, and all of that stuff. So that's okay there. Teimour --

Q. Why did that switch turn? Do you know?

A. Pardon me?

Q. Why did that switch turn from the --

A. I think it -- you know what? It could be because he was going through some personal issues, right? I didn't push him. I know we -- I talked to him about it, and he didn't want to discuss it. So I just left it alone.

Q. Fair enough.

A. Right, you know. Teimour, when I was geographic, I dealt with him a lot. So we had a pretty good -- we still have a pretty good rapport. I just try to correct him in a nice way, right, and all of that stuff.

Q. So you feel like you're walking on eggshells with him?

A. No, I don't walk on eggshells with him.

Q. Okay.

A. I just -- let me put it to you this way. I don't lose my temper with him. I try to keep everything professional. Otherwise, I don't, I don't want to say to Teimour, you know Teimour, you're full of shit. I don't want to say that to him, right. So I try to keep -- be professional with him. The Director of Safety, Orlando, Orlando is in that position because

of longevity with the company. He used to be a mechanic. He was assistant DOM. He used to be the chief inspector. He was the DOM. He's in that position --

Q. He's used to be a DOM?

A. Yeah. He used to be the acting DOM for awhile.

Q. Before Mr. Kimball showed up?

A. Before Mr. Kimball showed up, yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. But he's in that position because of longevity with the company. I think he's one of the longest employees at the company.

Q. Oh.

A. Right. David Seest --

Q. He's the director of safety?

A. No. David Seest is the director of operation.

Q. Operations.

A. Yeah. He knows what he's doing. The only issue I have with him is that he was trying to fly an airplane that he -- and he let his license expire, and that wasn't a problem for him, right, until I told him that I wasn't going on the flight, and if you go, you're going to be in big time violation, right. But that's how Rhoades rolls, right. And who is the next one? That's it. I get along with all of them, but instead of them trying to comply with things, they would rather give you -- they would rather blow you off than comply with it.

Q. Okay. Does the director of safety, does he have the qualifications or the experience to be the director of safety?
A. No.
Q. Why do you say that?
A. Because he doesn't know what he's doing. That's why everything director of safety is so backlogged now. He doesn't know.
Q. Okay. And just for the record, who is your typical primary contact with you go visit Rhoades?
A. The DOM and the CI.
Q. Okay. If you had to choose one primary issue that you have with this operator, what would it be?
A. I'm sorry. I didn't hear you.
Q. If you had a primary issue with this operator since the time he took over the certificate, what would it be?
A. Compliance issue.
Q. Compliance with?
A. The regulation.
Q. Okay. And I'm sure that's come up numerous times with them?
A. Numerous times. I think -- god, I don't know how many letters we wrote. Compliance action letter, I don't know how many we wrote. I think we up to, I think we up to 24.
Q. Since you became the permanent DOM?
A. Yes.
Q. 24?

A. 24. We keep a tracking long on all compliance letter we sent. We assign numbers to them. I think were up to 24. I'm not sure of the number.
Q. And since we only see some of the LOIs that you have sent this year, and I know there's at least five that's open, I believe. I don't know. Because I only see -- we haven't gotten any -- we've asked the FAA about the response letters from Rhoades based off of those compliance letters that you've sent out, and we haven't really gotten that. So I don't know how many are still open, but we know of five LOIs that are currently open. I know that some of those have been from the previous years that you guys are still asking for information about. Is that, I guess, it's not typical, obviously, but you have not gotten any more responses as far as those letters, I take it?
A. I think you're right. I think there is five LOIs out, and I think we got response to -- I'm not sure how many we got response to.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So in your opinion, do you think this operator is short-staffed with regards to the maintenance departments, chief inspector department?
A. Short-staffed?
Q. Yeah.
A. Let's just say they have a hard time getting good people.

Q. Is it because of the area that they're in, or there's not enough people to fill those spots, or what do you say they have a hard time of?
A. Salary.
Q. Salary?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What about experienced people? Are they all experienced people?
A. If you, if Rhoades trying to get experienced people, they have to come off the pocketbook. They have to open up the pocketbook. The last two guys they hired, the chief inspector, and the engine guy, I personally know both of them. They don't work cheap. So he had -- so Rhoades had to open up the wallet for those two guys. That I can tell you that. I do know that.
Q. Okay.
A. All right. The rest of them, I don't know how much they paid, but I know it's not that much because if they were paying a lot, and they could get on some place else, they would jump ship. Especially when Hawaii was doing this massive hiring. So --
Q. We were told that there's some mechanics that jumped ship; is that true?
A. We asked that question to the DOM, and he said no, nobody has jumped ship yet.
Q. Okay. So have you heard from your POI in regards to mechanics not maintaining the airplanes properly?

A. Mark and I have discussed a write-up, and I explained to him what went on here, and he was satisfied with that. Because he asked me about that, and I said, well, you know, the biggest thing about this, Mark, is that when a crew write up something as info, maintenance can sign that off, info noted. They don't have to go into details. I don't like it, but that's just the nature of the beast. So --

Q. Okay. Could you describe any issues you may have witnessed in regards to Transair's engine maintenance program?

A. What engine maintenance program?

Q. According to the AIP, they have an engine maintenance program.

A. The only engine maintenance program I know they have is the one Apex do, and that's the vendor.

Q. So they do the overhaul and -- of those engines, right?

A. Yes, they do the overhaul off wings of the engines.

Q. Okay. And what about the engine maintenance program that's in the AIP?

A. If you read that AIP, that AIP will tell you, if you read it, it will tell you -- what's the word they're using in there? If called for.

Q. Okay.

A. Right. All Rhoades maintenance work toward the engine is related to checks.

Q. Right, right.

A. All of it is related to checks. Nothing is related to troubleshooting of whatnot, but it's all related to checks when the airplane is in check.
Q. Right.
A. And I'm not a fan of that because it's telling them if called for.
Q. Got it. But they do have by the Pratt-Whitney maintenance program, they have that in the checks part, right?
A. Please repeat.
Q. Pratt-Whitney has a maintenance program for the JT8s?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. I guess that's what I'm getting at, is that -- have you witnessed any issues with regards to that type of maintenance program, the Pratt and Whitney maintenance that is approved by the FAA in (indiscernible)?
A. No. I have no issues with the Pratt and Whitney JT8D maintenance program.
Q. Okay. That's what I was getting at. Okay. Have you witnessed any of their engine health monitoring for the engines? What is their, what is their procedure for engine health monitoring?
A. I think they -- every time the airplane is on the long flight they do an engine condition monitoring check.
Q. Okay. And what does that entail?
A. From what I can gather, they just make notes. They just put

some reading in the aircraft logbook, N1 fuel flow, I think it is, stuff like that.

Q. Okay. And then what happens to that data? Do you know?

A. No, I don't know what happens to that data.

Q. Okay. Do you know whether they send it out to have it analyzed?

A. I can't say. I don't know if they do that.

Q. Okay. Have you or any of your principals done any audits of their heavy maintenance facility in Taiwan?

A. No, not yet. I was planning on going when this is over with. And what I mean when this is over with, I mean Covee (verbatim).

Q. I'm sorry?

A. I mean Covee-19.

Q. Oh, Covid-19?

A. Yeah, Covid-19, yeah.

Q. Are you familiar with the maintenance training program of Rhoades?

A. Yes.

Q. Do they have one?

A. Minimum, yes.

Q. And what typical training, recurrent training is done?

A. RII. You know, that's a good question. RII is done recurrent. I think a little bit of Hazmat is recurrent. That's about all I can recall now. I do know we have brought that up to them too that some recurrent training was not up-to-date and all

of that, but I can't recall what the topic of those training is.
Q. Do they GEN classes too or no that you know?
A. No. There's no GEN -- I do know there's no GEN --
Q. How about any engine classes?
A. No.
MR. CRUZ: That's all I have for now.
Bill.
Oh, do you want to take a break?
MR. LESANE: No. I'm good.
MR. CRUZ: Okay. Bill.
BY DR. BRAMBLE:
Q. I just wanted to clarify a couple of things first. I think you misspoke on one thing. I just want to clarify for the transcript. You said when you came on in May 2020, and you looked at the manuals again you brought up to the DMI that we need a manual revision. Did you mean the DOM?
A. No. DOM, DOM.
Q. Okay. I thought so. And you mentioned that you thought the CMT had written Rhoades compliance letters, and Pocholo asked if you thought that those letters had been written since you became the permanent PMI, but that was just this spring, right? So did you mean 24 letters since you became the interim -- since 2020?
A. Since May of 2020.
Q. 2020.
A. When I became the interim.

Q. Interim.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Of those 24 letters, you guys were discussing how many LOIs there are, and you agreed there were 5. You thought there maybe were 5. Were those 5 included in the 24 letters or are those 24 of a different type of letter?
A. I think the way I understood that was the compliance action letter we generated was up to 24, maybe, maybe a little bit less, okay. Now, if you want to know LOI generated from those letters because all the LOIs, the five LOIs did not generate from those compliance action letters.
Q. So they're separate from the 24 compliance letters?
A. Far as I know some of the LOIs are separate from that, right.
Q. So the 24 compliance letters would include things like hazard letters, or what would they be? Are they just called compliance letters?
A. Yeah. I think we just call them compliance letter.
Q. What's a compliance letter?
A. That's a letter that they -- contrary to the regulation.
Q. Is it sort of like warning them that they're not in compliance?
A. No, no. We do follow-up on it.
Q. But, I mean, is it like the first step of notifying them?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And then they either -- do they then rectify it or you

move on to another step?
A. In the compliance letter, we give them, I believe, 10 days to respond to us.
Q. Okay.
A. That's what we do in the letter. So if they respond to us, say, in 10 days, and they rectify it, that's good, right. But it's a compliance thing. So a compliance, I believe, the way I understand this thing, and excuse me because I'm not that up to par on SAS and the compliance action thing, but I believe you can either go forward with it or you can close it with a letter of correction.
Q. Okay. So the 24 compliance letters would not have included letters of correction? They were just letters you sent them notifying them of a problem with compliance?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Were there more of those in 2021 than 2020 during your time on the certificate?
A. That I can't answer. I know it started in 2020 when it was just Mark and I. And then, I think, a few months later Ace came on, and the compliance action letter increases.
Q. Did the company complain to you guys about the compliance letters?
A. Teimour did complain that he was getting too much letters from us.
Q. What was your response back to him?

A. It is what it is; you going to get them.
Q. And did he complain to your boss about it?
A. Not then, no, he didn't.
Q. Did he do it later?
A. He did mention one thing about Mark writing a 10- to 12-page letter.
Q. Who did he mention it to?
A. I think at that time it was -- I don't know. We had a big management change here. So at that time, I think he wrote it to -- I don't think he wrote anything. I think it was barely mentioned in a phone call or during a meeting or something like that. And I think Tiffany or Marsha was on the line. Because we did have a couple of meetings with Rhoades with everybody.
Q. And did -- how did your management respond to that -- well, first of all, what did Teimour say to them about it?
A. I just got the basis of it that he didn't like -- he says his people didn't have respond to a 10- to 12-page letter.
Q. And what was the response back to him?
A. I can't recall what management said to back to him. To me that was just nonsense to me because I thought the letters was trying to help him on how to fix things. I thought the letter was very helpful.
Q. And did your management pressure you guys to lay off?
A. No.
Q. All right. You mentioned a pilot report about fearing

termination for writing up a maintenance issue during a safety meeting that was just discussed or during a CASS meeting.
A. That was -- during the safety meeting after the CASS.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Right.
Q. And when was that?
A. Oh, that I can't tell you.
Q. Okay. And I think you said Teimour tried to say that that was a misunderstanding, and you said it was not.
A. Right.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. What makes you say it was not a misunderstanding?
A. Because I know Teimour.
Q. And did he already have the letter to employees prepared when you were at that meeting?
A. Yes. He showed us one, but he said it was on the bulletin board in the company. And on the way out of the maintenance office, I did notice it on the bulletin board.
Q. So at the safety meeting where that was discussed, they had already addressed it with a letter --
A. Yes.
Q. -- the bulletin board?
A. Probably to the safety meeting.
Q. Okay. Had you heard about that from other employees at

Rhoades, that kind of issue?
A. I have heard that people were scared to write up stuff because if they write up stuff or complain about stuff, they would be terminated.
Q. Mechanics or pilots would say that?
A. This was mostly on the loader side, the guys that load the airplane. This was mostly on that side.
Q. Have you heard about pilots before or rumors about pilots?
A. I've heard rumors that pilots were afraid that the chief pilot had passed the word that if you write up stuff you were gone or you were -- I won't give you the hours or something like that. I have heard that.
Q. Okay. Have you heard about pilots being pressured to delay write-ups until they got back from trips instead of writing them up before they left?
A. Yes.
Q. How did you hear about that?
A. Who told me that? I think it was the prior CI had mentioned that to me that -- because they have no (indiscernible) maintenance personnel. And now that you mentioned that, I do remember in 2013 when I did en route on them I got to Kaneohe at 2:30 in the morning. And while they was unloading the airplane, I walked around, and I found some pretty bad stuff, which had developed during flight, and I told the captain, and he didn't -- he was terrified of writing up. He was terrified. He wanted to

bring the airplane back to Honolulu, and then write it up. And I said, okay, I'll see you. I'll go over here and catch Hawaii.

Q. You remember who that captain was?

A. No. He's gone already.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. And then for the issue, it was just a big, it was just a big fuel leak.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So after the CI left that you had a lot of conflict with -- first just get the name straight. Who was that? The one that started out good, but then near the end he was having health problems.

A. Oh, that was Scott Mayrio (ph.), M-a-y --

Q. I think I got it here. Scott Mayural.

A. Yeah. There you go.

Q. Okay. So Scott stepped down, and then who was supposed to replace him?

A. They didn't have a replacement for about 20, 25 days, maybe 30 days.

Q. Okay.

A. Because I sent Mike a letter, and I told him I gave him 30 days to fill that position.

Q. Was there somebody in between they were going to put in that position that got violated for an RII that wasn't completed

properly?
A. Oh, yes. That was Jernigan (ph.). Yeah, yeah.
Q. Do you remember exactly what he did wrong there?
A. He replaced a fuel control on an engine, and didn't -- that's an RII item, required inspection item.
Q. And was -- there was no RII inspection?
A. Right.
Q. Did he sign it off as an RII?
A. No. He just signed it off as a mechanic.
Q. Okay. You mentioned you had trouble getting the chief inspector to be independent of the director of maintenance. Is that the case now? Do you feel like the current chief inspector is now independent of the director of maintenance?
A. I would like to say no, but to answer your question, I do feel that Ron is little, little, he is timidated (verbatim) by Kimball. I do feel that. Because before he makes a decision, he runs everything to the DOM.
Q. All right. We understand that there were some auditors brought in to help support the SMS program at some point over the last year. Do you know anything about that, SMS auditors?
A. Last year?
Q. Within the last 12 months.
A. I don't know about. I know they brought in Mike, but he wasn't an SMS auditor.
Q. What would you classify his position as?

A. He was just a regular auditor. He only did try to do audit of maintenance, cargo, and that kind of stuff. Because he didn't know anything about SMS.
Q. Are you talking about Mike Ramirez?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Did you have any -- many interactions with him?
A. The only thing was when he told me that Kimball refused to let him audit the Maintenance Department.
Q. Okay. Who did Ramirez work for?
A. Orlando. He's gone now though.
Q. So he worked in the Safety Department as an auditor?
A. Right.
Q. Okay. And his job was to audit what?
A. I thought his job was to audit maintenance operation and whatever audit do with whatnot. I didn't think he was part of auditing SASS -- I mean, sorry -- SMS.
Q. And when did he take that position? When did he leave?
A. I don't know when he take that, when he took that position, but I think he left last month, I believe, or the month before that he left.
Q. Okay. What do you know about Mike Kimball keeping him out of the maintenance audits? What was that about?
A. All I know is that from what Mike told me he went over to maintenance to do an audit, and Kimball ran him out. This is not your department. Get out.

Q. Did you know Captain Okai, Henry Okai?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever hear anything about him getting criticized or yelled at for landing an airplane right away instead of following the checklist in an emergency? Declaring an emergency, and landing right away instead of following a checklist?
A. Are you talking about the captain that was flying 810?
Q. Yeah.
A. I do -- I don't know him. What I brought up says wait a minute, this guy is climbing out of Honolulu, and I'm a maintenance guy. This is just me. I brought it up. This guy is flying out of Honolulu. He's at 1500 feet, 2,000 feet. He loses an engine. The other engine is running hot. He want to turn to come back, and he's told to run a checklist? What's wrong with that?
Q. Have you heard of him being criticized in the past during an emergency for landing right away instead of doing a checklist?
A. No.
Q. All right. So we heard a lot of reports from pilots about high EGTs during the company's -- during takeoffs in the 73s, and they were takeoffs with derated thrust, and they were saying it would go up in the yellow during the initial climb. Had you heard anything about recurring issues on that?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know what the company did to address that problem?

A. Nothing. I brought up to Kimball during the CASS meeting, why don't you perform engine wash? The state turn off my water. That was his reply. So I said to him, I said United Airline engine wash, triple seven on hard stand one and two. Why don't you take your plane over there and engine wash it. No response. And I said, borescope. Why don't you borescope the engine? Because when the engine is running hot, Mike, it's telling you something. They don't even do borescope.

Q. You told us that -- the director of maintenance told us that they were allowed to run the engines in the yellow or even the red range for up to five minutes at a time. Do you under -- do you know if that's correct?

A. No, I don't think that's correct.

Q. When I asked him if he thought that was cumulative or if he thought that was per incident he said it didn't specify. Does that make sense?

A. No, it doesn't.

Q. Okay. So they didn't have any borescope qualified mechanic on staff?

A. Correct. And I told him, when I mentioned Borescope to him, I told him, I said, look, when I was at Northwest I didn't have any borescope qualified mechanics. I would give Hawaiian Airline a PO to have their guys come over and borescope.

Q. Why do you think he didn't want to look into the engines further?

A. I don't know. I think their mentality is just run it until it drops, you know. I mean, I was surprised to learn that the engine on 8010 -- 810 been on that wing for two years, and not once was it borescoped. And Ace I went back through all the log pages, and the continuing log pages looking for borescope.

Q. All right. So given your experience, I'd be curious to hear your take on what the first officer of the accident flight found when he did the walk-around. He found evidence of leaking fluid on the left main gear tire and ground around it. Did you ever see the -- you probably haven't seen the (indiscernible) have you?

A. No. This is the first time I heard about that.

Q. Okay. See if I can pull that up here.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a quick question. Do you know whether they have a borescope equipment? Does the --

MR. LESANE: No, no, they don't. Or at least I didn't see one when I did my DCT on tooling.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Note the first officer took of a leak on the tire and on the ground at the -- at 810 right before they departed on the accident flight. And he had the mechanic on duty, Ricky May come and look at it. The captain looked at it, and they checked the reservoir for the actuator, and they turned on the interconnect, and they didn't see any active leak, and the reservoir was within acceptable levels, and they decided it wasn't an issue. It was a old leak because there was no wet fluid. Do you think that's

something that should be written up in the maintenance log?
A. According to 43, anything you find you put in the maintenance log.
Q. Even if it's determined not to be an active leak?
A. That's not the pilot discretion. He puts it in the log. Let maintenance make that determination.
Q. Okay. And if maintenance is brought out, and is involved like that, so kind of like a mechanic did make a determination, but that should be documented; is that what you're -- that thought process?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So if they did not write that up in the logbook, you feel that was inappropriate?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What do you think about the quality of the facilities where maintenance was performing its work?
A. It could use improvement. It can be improved some.
Q. Was it adequate?
A. Yeah, it's adequate.
Q. Okay.
A. Barely adequate.
Q. What aspects of it would you want to see improved, if they were to upgrade it, or what are the biggest issues?
A. I think the biggest issue, they should get rid of all the Shorts stuff in the hangar.

Q. Okay. What do you think about the quality of the Boeing maintenance manuals they were working with? Were the instructions in the manuals clear and comprehensive and adequate to address issues they encountered?
A. The Boeing manual, if you go to the Boeing fleet page, everything that TEW referred to Rhoades Aviation, and it's just a generic portion of it because they don't want to pay the money to Rhoades to keep it better. So --
Q. You mean Rhoades doesn't want to pay the money?
A. Money to Boeing, yeah, to maintain it better, or whatever, whatever Boeing does. Because, you know, I mean, Boeing can maintain a lot of stuff in their manuals. But to the AMM that we look at, that Rhoades look at, it's adequate. I think it could be more. I could never find out that if there's more -- that Boeing made changes to those manuals. That's what I'm working on to see if Boeing made any changes to those manuals on the TEW side.
Q. Okay. Are you aware of any recurring issues with cabin pressurization?
A. Oh, boy, big time, yes.
Q. What was the nature of that problem?
A. That, earlier as I explained to the runway deferral items, it was all cabin pressure.
Q. Okay.
A. And when I took that away, and I wrote the letter to Teimour, I put -- I think I started from 306 November 306 how many times it

was deferred clear, deferred clear, 326, 809, 810 and 737. I gave them all that data on clearing (indiscernible) all of it was pressurization.

Q. So that was the justification for taking away --

A. That one extension.

Q. Okay. So one pilot told us that he had leaking hydraulic fluid, and before departing Honolulu, and called maintenance. Maintenance came out, counted the drips, and told them it was within parameters, and he took off, and they lost the hydraulic B system on the way out to somewhere, Maui or something. And then they had to figure out how to get the airplane back. Did you hear anything about that?

A. I think that was 810. I think that's when 810 returned from Taiwan.

Q. Oh. Well, no. This was a Hawaiian issue that we heard about.

A. No, no.

Q. It happened within the state.

A. Yeah. When 810 came back from Taiwan, they put it in service. Then it went to Kona, Maui, and had a big time hydraulic issue.

Q. Oh. All right.

A. I think that's what it is. I don't know. I didn't hear anything about prior to takeoff. I know when they got to Kona, Maui, they didn't have any hydraulic.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible) report?

MR. LEZANE: I don't think it is. But that's a good question. I need to check that.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Or it's at MISR?

MR. LEZANE: It's on the MIS, yes, MISR. It was on the MISR. But back to your question, if the pilot noticed something, and he called maintenance, by the time maintenance get there, it should already be written up in the logbook.

DR. BRAMBLE: Who do you think was encouraging pilots not to write up maintenance issues?

MR. LEZANE: Wallace. Wallace and Teimour. I think Teimour told Wallace, and Wallace told the pilots.

DR. BRAMBLE: Is that just what you're surmising or do you have any evidence of that?

MR. LEZANE: I don't have any evidence. That's what I'm surmising.

DR. BRAMBLE: I think that's it for me right now. Thank you.

MR. LESANE: You're welcome.

MR. CRUZ: Mr. Muse.

BY MR. MUSE:

Q. I've just got one thing for you. In your opinion, do you think this carrier is willing and able to comply with the federal regulations to --

A. No, no.

Q. Neither one?

A. Neither one.

MR. MUSE: That's all I got. Thank you.

MR. MARCOTTE: Dan Marcotte from Boeing. Not a lot, just a few follow-up questions.

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. The first one Pocholo was talking about the Pratt maintenance program, MPD, and you said you didn't have any issues with the Pratt. I want to clarify, how do you think Rhoades performed to the MPD? Were they following it and --

A. I think to a certain extent they were following it. I also think that when they read something, they interpret it to mean what they want the outcome to be.

Q. Can you give me an example?

A. Like the C1 blade (indiscernible). I think with the C1 blade issue, and that's another one of the LOIs on that one. They were using -- we determined that Pratt and Whitney reference they were using was wrong, and they used that because it benefit them on the max limit. And when we proposed to them this is the one you should be using, they were very adamant that the prior one they used is the correct one. And I said to them, look, I talked to the Boeing Support Center, and we looked at these pictures on this thing here. They don't agree with you. So who you think I'm going to go with?

Q. The Boeing Support Center or the Pratt Support Center?

A. I'm sorry. Pratt. I'm sorry. I'm sorry. Pratt. And so

they were very adamant that they were within limits. We know they are not within limits or whatnot. So I think that they read it to interpret it, to interpret it what is best for them. If they don't want to change something, let's go with this one. But that's my feeling of it.

Q. Okay. Thank you. I think the auditor's name was Mr. Ramirez?

A. Yes. Mike.

Q. You talked about earlier. And that the MO -- maintenance director, director of maintenance (indiscernible) do you think Mr. Ramirez was qualified to an audit of the Maintenance Department?

A. Yes, I thought (indiscernible).

Q. Okay. Also, you know we were talking about (indiscernible) in the past few days. We've been talking with surges and stalls with other people. I guess my first question, do you know, was there a history of surges or stalls that you know if with the Rhoades 737 engines?

A. It was a history of compressor stalls.

Q. Okay. On the accident airplane?

A. No. On different airplanes.

Q. Okay. All right. Now, when you were going through logbooks, and we were, you know, you were talking about high EGTs, and Bill was asking about -- or Bill was -- higher EGTs during climb, initial climb going into the yellow. Did you see any evidence of

that in logbooks?
A. I saw a few of that, and reduced power. I also saw in some of them that we are questioning, that Ace and I are still questioning, because it looks like, it looks like it has some item in a write-up on the high EGT has been doctored.
Q. How so?
A. It looks like, for example, one of them looked like the initial write-up to me is 660, and somehow now it's 600. But, again, we, Ace and I talked about this. Should we talk to the pilot about this? And what is he really going to say when we talk to him? I mean, he's not going to incriminate himself, and say you know what it was really 660, but I changed it to 600, you know, and all of that stuff. So but we did notice that on one of the logbooks.
Q. Okay. So let's just say -- so I have a maintenance background, and I was writing in a logbook, and I decided I didn't like the write-up, and I was going to scribble or doctor something, generally, I'd put my initials or something to indicate I'm the person who made that change.
A. Correct.
Q. Right. Would you expect the pilot to do the same thing probably?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. I would expect them to do the same. That's why I wanted --

that's why (indiscernible).

Q. Okay. (Indiscernible) you said you'd like to see them clean up the short stuff in the hangar. What do you mean by short stuff?

A. In the back room, they have a lot of old Short's parts.

Q. Oh, Short's airplane.

A. Short's airplane parts, yes.

Q. Short stuff I --

(Crosstalk)

A. I'm sorry. I should have said Short's airplane.

MR. MARCOTTE: Okay. Yes.

MR. LESANE: You're welcome.

MR. CRUZ: Tony, do you have any questions?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, I forgot about him.

MR. DICIOCCIO: Yeah, a couple.

(Indiscernible) engine maintenance (indiscernible) in your opinion is the troubleshooting (indiscernible) or just something else has been signed off (indiscernible) but, yet, the manuals (indiscernible) eventually, and our manuals our maintenance (indiscernible).

MR. LEZANE: No, none of that.

MR. DICIOCCIO: Okay. I don't have any more questions. Thank you.

MR. CRUZ: Okay. I do have a quick follow-up.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. Regarding the engine stalls, have you heard of pilots playing with the throttles, dropping them back and forth causing engine stalls during taxi or during -- during taxi?
A. No, I have not heard about that. I do know Mike Kimball during the CASS meeting, he brought up the thing was that the pilot should be advancing the throttle slowly. Because when you push then up fast, it causes compressor stall. And I disagreed with him on that, and he got mad at me because I disagreed with him on that. And I just told Mike, I says, you know, these engines supposed to have enough power to go around emergency if necessary. That means to me the pilot should be able slam that thing forward to the firewall without redlining that thing. So he got mad at me. But I have not heard that pilots playing with it on taxi out to cause compressor stall.
Q. You had known that Mike put out the letter to the pilots with regards to that factor?
A. He put out a letter. That's what I was discussing when I disagreed with him on that letter.
Q. I got you.
A. Yeah.
Q. So you knew about that?

A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. But in the letter, I don't think he mentioned, anybody

mentioned to me that they were doing this with the throttle.
Q. Okay. Because I've got the letter here. I don't know whether you've seen it or not, but obviously you have. Yeah. We've interviewed some people, some mechanics, and they've said they've heard people playing with the throttles, and causing, I guess, some engine surges with regards to backfiring or whatever on the engine. I just wondered whether you've heard that from any of your maintenance guys or any mechanics that you possibly talk to or Mike or whoever?
A. I did. I didn't even now you could do that, and I ran a lot of engines. I ran full engine DC-10, 747, and I -- all my engine I ran are crack engines, right. And I didn't know you could do that -- cause surges and all that stuff.
Q. Is it because of the leakages possibly? I mean, I'm not a --
A. I'm not sure. I'm not sure. I got to check around on that. I have never heard --
Q. You mean there's a delay when you --
A. The Pratt and Whitney response time on the engines is very smooth. I do know Airbus had a problem with the response time on the 330 when it came out, you know, but as far as the Pratt, no, I've never heard delay when you advance the throttle, delay on it. And, like I said, I have never heard that if you play around with it you can create surges. I've never heard that.
Q. Okay. So let me ask you a hypothetical question. I know that this is your own opinion. If you were the CEO or owner of

this company, and you're trying to fly -- and you know the issues that you're having, what would you do?

A. Make some changes. Have to make some changes.

Q. Okay. And within your opinion, what changes need to be made?

A. He needs complete 119, new 119 personnel. And those 119 personnel needs to be not people that's going to tell the CEO what he wants to hear.

Q. All across the board?

A. Right. And 119 is the chief pilot, the DOS, the DOM, the chief inspector and director of operations. That's what he needs.

Q. Does he need more personnel besides the 119s? Do you think they have enough people to do the job?

A. For the day flight schedule the way they fly, they have enough maintenance personnel.

Q. Okay. What about the people that have to do -- that analyze the data as far as maintenance is concerned?

A. Yes.

Q. They have enough people?

A. No. They don't have enough people to do that.

Q. So like the chief -- like the people underneath the chief inspector you say they need more people?

A. There's nobody under the chief inspector. They don't even have one designated inspector. We're trying to make them get one.

Q. Didn't they just hire a engine guy that's also the chief, like an inspector?

A. From what I understand, he is -- Catpo (ph.) is the manager of power plant.
Q. Okay.
A. Which --
Q. So they have an engine guy now?
A. Right. So they put him under the chief inspector.
Q. Okay.
A. Right.
Q. Okay. And my understanding is too that they have a -- they hired a new CASS manager; is that correct?
A. Yeah. That was my understanding too, but today from what I was looking at the organization chart, she is the -- she's supposed -- she is under the SMS title, but I thought she was the CASS manager.
Q. Okay. All right.
A. So I'm getting clarification on that too.
Q. Okay. So do you think the FAA has done everything possible to help Rhoades Aviation become a better and safer airline?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You asking him or --
(Crosstalk)
MR. CRUZ: I'm asking him.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.
MR. LESANE: Can you repeat, please?
BY MR. CRUZ:
Q. Yeah. Do you think the FAA principals have done everything

possible to help Rhoades Aviation become a better and safer airline?

A. I, you know, I mean, hell, I'm just going to say no. And if you're referring to principals, I got to go with no on that.

Q. What if I say FAA? Is there something else the FAA could have done? Your opinion of course. I've asked they not speak.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: On behalf -- like, policy or big picture?

MR. CRUZ: Yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Can I just interject?

BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

Q. Can you elaborate on why you say no?

A. I -- you mean on the prior CMTs and whatnot?

Q. Well, just what prompted your no answer?

A. Yeah, I think that -- I feel that more should have been done. That's all.

Q. Prior to you?

A. Prior to us, yes.

Q. Okay.

A. But, again, I don't know what transpired. I really don't know what transpired. I really don't know what happened with Rhoades since 2013, I -- when I left -- when I didn't do any more work on that certificate. And I think that certificate was transferred here in 2014 or 2015, something like that. So I can't speak to that. If I -- if more work should have been done on

Rhoades? Yes. I would have to say, yes, more work should have been on Rhoades -- should have been done on Rhoades.

Q. Okay. And I realize that you weren't -- you didn't have a certificate when it first transferred here, right?

A. Right.

Q. It would appear based off of that, that you, the principals were already behind the power curve trying to get them up and running and --

A. Yes.

Q. Right?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And based off of the number of letters, correction LOIs, with a -- I know there's quite a bit this past year alone, and they're -- I believe they're still open. I'm not sure. I don't know what Rhoades has given you guys or not. Is there a point in time -- because some of those letters are LOIs, is very specific that the number of days that you expect Rhoades to respond, 7 days, 14 days, that type of thing. For a small carrier like this, is that -- is there any way that the FAA would give any leniency as a -- of how to respond when you have so much on their plate that they're trying to fix? You're giving them a very short amount of time to fix it.

A. No. Don't get it confused.

Q. Okay.

A. The 7-day or the 10-day or the 14 days is just for them to

respond to give us an action plan. Not to fix --
Q. Oh.
A. Not to fix things.
Q. Okay.
A. And at first they were thinking that.
Q. They were thinking that they had to finish it in --
A. Seven days.
Q. Okay.
A. But what they were -- they were not reading the letter, right. They were not reading the letters, that's all.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So there is time for them to fix it?
A. Yes.
Q. Even though they are short-staffed, and don't have --
A. Yes.
Q. -- personnel to help fix?
A. Yes.
Q. It's just developing a plan within that timeframe that you're asking for basically a plan?
A. Yes.
Q. So it could take them three months, but give statuses or whatever to -- as the plan gets --
A. I'm not going to give them three months to fix regulatory items.

Q. Understand.
A. Okay.
Q. Understand. And that was just an example.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Right. That's all, just the 7 to 10 days, whatever it is, give us something. I'm very lenient with Rhoades. If you want an extension, in my thing I'm very clear, if you want an extension to the response time, send me your letter. But I want to see in the letter what have you done to deserve this extension. You see? So if you give me step, I did this, I did this, I have did this. But Rhoades come out, they want extension, they don't give you nothing, right. They just said, oh, we just need more time, and that's when we deny it.
Q. Got it.
A. Right.
Q. Okay. I go to Revision 3. I saw a little bit of the letter from you guys as far as Revision 3 is concerned. There's quite a bit of issues there that you've raised with them based off of that revision. Is it typographical, procedural? Are those the issues that, I guess, the whole issue with the revision of that GMM, is that a big, is that -- am I correct, am I correct in reading that letter that you guys sent it in for Revision 3?
A. Which letter are you referring to? Because we haven't sent them a letter back for Revision 3. Are you talking about prior

letters?
Q. No. There was a Revision 3 that was sent September 15th, September 17th.
A. Was that Revision 3 to the AIP then?
Q. Yes.
A. Yeah, the AIP.
Q. AIP.
A. Yeah, okay, okay, yeah. Now repeat your question.
Q. As far -- what is the AIP revision? And I know -- what type of paperwork did they give you for Revision 3 that you guys have a letter to them for the AIP having issues? What were the issues based off of that revision? Is it because of typographical errors, not very thorough with the way that you asked them to revise it?
A. You mean the letter I sent them?
Q. Yeah.
A. All those items in that letter is what we found wrong with the AIP.
Q. And was that a complete revision of the AIP or just certain sections?
A. For our record, it was a full in depth of the AIP.
Q. Okay. So that includes the engine maintenance program and everything else?
A. That includes everything.
Q. Okay. All right. I'm sure you are aware that they hired

somebody to do their manuals?
A. Yes.
Q. And was that the first time that they've used those people in giving you what they revised on their behalf?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Have they given you the GMM to look at?
A. Actually in the process of that now.
Q. Okay. So you're doing that now. So it's the GMM and the AIP?
A. Right. The AIP was returned to them as unacceptable, and we're in the process of finishing up the GOM now, and we're going to return that to them.
Q. Okay. Have they responded to your letters yet? No?
A. For the AIP?
Q. Yeah.
A. No, they have not.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay. I guess that's all I have. Do you have anything else?
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have a couple, yeah.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.
BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
Q. What was wrong with the AIP revision that you guys sent back to them recently?
A. Oh, a lot of stuff. I can't remember how many items. I think it was three pages.

Q. Okay. So in conversations with the DOM and other personnel at Rhoades, they made it sound like the only things that you guys found objectionable in the revised AIP were things like typos and formatting, and page numbering. Was there, was there substantial stuff, actual problems with the content?
A. I think what Rhoades give you was the content we found when they first submitted the GMM for revision. This, that, this latest one that we're working -- I'm sorry -- the AIP, right?
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah. The one that returned was not typos.
Q. The one that, the one that you guys rejected?
A. Yes. That was more than typos.
Q. Okay. Can you give me just sort of a brief thumbnail on what was wrong with that?
A. First of all what caught my attention was they omitted check C3 and 5C. That was one of the first things that caught my attention, the schedule task inspection. And before I went any further, I called Ron, the CI, and I said, hey, the -- your AIP is missing 3C and 5C. And he said to me, yeah, we know that. And I said, well, why did you send it to us if you knew that? That was one, that was sending it back anyway for that, you know. They knew. And Rhoades' attitude is -- and I know Teimour have Lucille, Ron and Kimball under a lot of pressure to get the AIP out. Because he knows once the AIP is accepted, approved by us, he gets his D89 back, his ops specs D89 back. And he thinks that

soon as we approve the AIP, we give them the ops specs. And I keep telling Teimour, you've got to send us a letter requesting it back. We just don't give it back, okay. So, and I know he got them under a lot of pressure for that because he's been down now for two months or some weeks. He's got a lot of pressure on that. And they just throw stuff over the fence to see if we catch it. And the AIP, I can't recall everything that was missing out of it. It's in the letter for them to go ahead on. One thing we noticed that they reference a OIP. Well, okay, Ron, where's your OIP? What? Where's your OIP? I don't think Rhoades need one. Ron, did you have a OIP in Aloha? Yeah. What makes you think Rhoades don't need one? Right? And if you don't need it, why is it referenced in the AIP. So found out. So I said, okay. So Ace and I did some checking around. I called some people I know in the FAA, and I said, hey, let me run this by you. Oh, yeah, they need one because none of Rhoades' airplanes, all of Rhoades' airplanes has been operated by foreign carriers. The rule is clear. You need one. So that was one of the issues. Another issue is with fuel tank inspection. Another issue was EWIS, Electrical Interconnect Wiring. They didn't have none of that stuff in the AIP.

Q. Isn't all that stuff -- should have been in there previously?

A. Yes.

Q. Previously as in 2013, 2014, around that timeframe?

A. Yes. I think that program was developed after TWA 800. I

think that's when they was developed.
Q. Yeah, yeah. But it should have been on there previously all this time, correct?
A. Right.
Q. Are you saying it was never in there?
A. No, no. What I'm saying it was there it just didn't have layout what it include. Like 212 --
Q. Oh, it didn't have the FAR references?
A. Didn't have the FAR reference. It didn't have policies and procedures or none of that.
Q. Does it have to have? Is there a regulation that says you have to have FAR references on it?
A. Yes, there is.
Q. Okay. I don't --
A. Yes.
Q. -- that's why I'm asking that.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So just certain little things like that, but it was there previously, it just wasn't, I guess, laid out the way it --
A. The way the FAR says it's laid out. There's regulations for manuals, how your manuals should be laid out.
Q. Okay.
A. Right? And it wasn't laid out that way.
Q. So it's there. It just needs to be massaged?
A. Yes.

Q. It's like --
A. Yes, and we gave them what to massage it with.
Q. Oh, okay. Question on the OIP. Is that something --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, I'm sorry.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Still got just a couple left.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: All right.
BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
Q. All right, Ray, were you previously on a CMT at other 121 carriers?
A. I5PA, Asia Pacific Airline.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Any others like that?
A. No, just that one.
Q. How many --
A. I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. Northern Air Cargo and Anchorage.
Q. Okay. How many years with each of them as the PMI?
A. No. It wasn't the PMI. I was on the certificate as the CMT with the CMT.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. Northern Pacific and Anchorage, I think two years. And I5PA was just temporary six months, Asia Pacific just six months.
Q. Okay. And then one more question. We heard from the prior

PAI on the Rhoades' certificate that about the FAA's shift to a compliance program, and then a compliance philosophy approach to doing surveillance, and it was, it was moving toward kind of working more collaboratively to fix things, and not do enforcement actions right away. Did you live through that change? Do you remember anything about that?

A. I know about that change, yes.

Q. Okay. So one thing I'm wondering is did that shift in -- do you think it is plausible that that shift in policy could have prompted the prior CMT principals to sort of not be as insistent about immediate changes?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: If you know. I don't want you to guess.

BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

Q. Yeah, if you know. I mean, if you don't know, you don't have to speculate.

A. No.

Q. Okay. You don't know?

A. I don't know.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: All right. I'm done. Thank you.

BY UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

Q. Is that something that would typically be already, already being done back in 2013 and 2014 when they moved the certificate here from Indiana? Because they've always complained about flying 737 (indiscernible).

A. I don't know. I thought, I thought it should have been done when they got the first 737, which is November 306AL.
Q. Yeah.
A. Right. That's when I thought it should have been done.
Q. So, it was, obviously, 2013 or --
A. 2013 or 2014 when they --
Q. Right.
A. -- got that, yes.
Q. So if that was done, shouldn't, I guess, you're asking them for the OIP now; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Those letters. Isn't that something that the FAA would have since it was done in 2013 or 2014?
A. If one was created --
Q. Right.
A. -- by the certificate holder, and if the prior -- if the principals requested. Well, the OIP, I believe, has to be accepted or approved by the principal.
Q. Right.
A. Right.
Q. So is that a criteria to have an OIP before a certificate is given?
A. That I can't answer. I don't know that. I would have to research --
(Crosstalk)

A. Yeah.
Q. -- don't know too much --
A. Yeah.
Q. I was asking because you were asking for them for an OIP, right?
A. Right.
Q. Which we just discussed probably should have been done or was done, who konws, back in 2013 or 2014, right? So the FAA would have had a copy of that because, obviously, you wouldn't have given the certificate to a carrier without that, correct?
A. You could speculate that that is correct.
Q. Okay.
A. But like I said, I don't really know. I would have to research that.
Q. Okay.
A. I do know, right, I do know the regulation tells me on OIP that if your aircraft you have was operated by a foreign carrier, you need one.
Q. Right. No, I was just curious because you're asking for OIP that, you know, they've had these airplanes for the longest time. It should have been done beforehand, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And a copy, obviously, would have gone to the FAA based off of your requirements --
A. Yes.

Q. -- for them to get a certificate?
A. Yes. If it's approved or accepted by the FAA, it should have a copy. Front page should be stamped.
Q. Right. So would -- the FAA typically keeps a copy of that; is that correct?
A. Of their manual?
Q. Of the OIP?
A. We used to keep copies of the hard manuals. We don't do that anymore.
Q. Okay. Are they electronic now?
A. Pardon me? They're online, yes.
Q. They're online.
A. Right.
MR. CRUZ: Okay. So we've asked you a lot of things today. Tony, are you -- do you have any more questions? I'm sorry.
MR. DICIOCCIO: No questions. Thank you.
MR. CRUZ: Okay. We've asked you a lot of questions today. Is there something you want to tell us that we haven't asked you yet with regards to Rhoades Aviation and their certificate?
MR. LESANE: Nothing I can think of.
MR. CRUZ: Any safety recommendations that you would like to propose?
MR. LESANE: Not at this time.
MR. CRUZ: Okay. Well, thank you very much for your time.
MR. LESANE: You're welcome.

MR. CRUZ: And it is now -- what time is it?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: 2:03.

MR. CRUZ: 2:03.

(Whereupon, at 2:03 p.m. the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Reza John Lesane
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Via telephone
DATE:	September 24, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Katherine Motley
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

Interview of: BYRON SCOTT MASTERS, Frontline Manager
Federal Aviation Administration

Via telephone

Thursday,
September 23, 2021

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I N D E X

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I N T E R V I E W

(1:03 p.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: Today is September 23rd, 2021. It's 1:03 p.m. My name is William Bramble. I'm a human performance investigator with NTSB. And I'm assisting the maintenance working group led by NTSB investigator Pocholo Cruz for accident investigation number DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting safety. The NTSB is not part of the DOT or the FAA and has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I'd now like for Mr. Cruz and each of the maintenance group members to briefly introduce themselves. Mr. Cruz?

MR. CRUZ: Yes, I'm Pocholo Cruz. I work for the NTSB. I'm the maintenance group chairman for this accident.

MR. MUSE: Stephen Muse, Honolulu CMO, aircraft maintenance.

MR. ZHAO: Yeah. Hank Zhao, Honolulu (indiscernible).

MR. LENHART: Ron Lenhart (ph.) chief inspector, Rhoades Aviation.

MR. MARCOTTE: Dan Marcotte from Boeing air safety investigations.

DR. BRAMBLE: Is there anybody in the room that you object to being present?

MR. MASTERS: No.

DR. BRAMBLE: Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After

the interview, we'll send the recording out for transcription and the party members will have a chance to review the transcript for -- and correct it for any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent recurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're simply here for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents.

Having said that, however, we can't offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity. And a transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for the accident investigation. I just wanted you to know it's not a private conversation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time. Everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person who is asking questions. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-ups for each person or after each person has had a turn. Usually, Pocholo and I end up asking most of the questions. The other guys might have some follow-up questions.

Please answer all the questions to the best of your recollection. If you don’t know, say you don’t know. If you don't understand a question, just say so. If you realize you misstated something, just let us know. We'll correct it.

You're entitled to have a representative of your choosing at any NTSB interview. Is there someone you'd like to have as your

representative?

MR. MASTERS: Matt.

DR. BRAMBLE: Matt, would you introduce, please?

MR. PICCIOTTI: Yes. Matthew Picciotti with the FAA.

DR. BRAMBLE: Thanks. Does anyone have any questions? Let's go ahead and get started then.

MR. MASTERS: Sorry. Just a question for me.

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah, sure.

MR. MASTERS: I don't think it's ever mentioned about note taking or anything like that. Is that -- am I allowed to take notes or do you require the notes be destroyed after the interview or not -- you know, I mean, it's kind of standard for the FAA. So I didn't know if it was standard for you.

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. You know, that's a good question. And strangely enough, in 20 years, I don't know if I've ever had that request.

MR. MASTERS: I'm unique.

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. Well, I suppose if it lives in your brain, it can live on your page. So yeah, I guess so. I would encourage you not to share outside of the investigation anything you hear here that may be privileged information. But I don't have any objection. Do you?

MR. CRUZ: No.

MR. MASTERS: And it doesn't have any bearing on confidentiality. Does it?

MR. CRUZ: No.

MR. MASTERS: Unless I show it to somebody which I probably -- well, I know --

DR. BRAMBLE: Is there a reason why you would want to share that with anybody, I guess?

MR. MASTERS: I would absolutely not want to share it with anybody. It would probably just be for me to job my memory. In any interview, you're always like, what did I -- did I answer the question properly or was there clarity, in other words, in the question that you ask.

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah.

MR. CRUZ: I mean, typically, we would let you take notes but then after the interview, we would typically destroy them.

MR. MASTERS: Okay, that's fine.

MR. CRUZ: I have no problem with you taking notes while we're doing the interview. But after the interview, typically, we keep all the notes or destroy them.

DR. BRAMBLE: That's true among the group members usually. Yeah.

MR. MASTERS: That would be part of the record, I guess, or --

DR. BRAMBLE: Well, we -- when we don't record -- hang on (indiscernible) back on the record. When we --

(Off the record.)

(On the record.)

DR. BRAMBLE: We're back on at 1:09. Scott, can you please state your full name --

MR. CRUZ: Byron. Is it Byron or is it --

DR. BRAMBLE: No, you go by Scott?

MR. MASTERS: Byron Scott Masters. I usually go by Scott though. But either one will do.

INTERVIEW OF BYRON SCOTT MASTERS

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Yeah. So if you could just state your full legal name and spell it for us, that would be great.

A. Byron Scott Masters. B-y-r-o-n S-c-o-t-t M-a-s-t-e-r-s.

Q. You go by Scott?

A. Correct.

Q. How old are you?

A. Fifty-nine years old. Sixty next month.

Q. We'll keep you 59 as long as possible.

A. Yeah.

Q. What's your date of hire with the FAA?

A. You want service comp date or --

Q. Yeah. Well, unless that was with a different federal agency.

A. No. They -- because I was in the military, they adjusted my service comp date back to 2003, 10/28/2003.

Q. When did you actually start working for the FAA?

A. I started working for the FAA in 10/28/2007.

Q. Can you give us a brief overview of your aviation -- your

background that led to your job at the FAA?
A. Yeah. I guess it started with the Navy. I did an enlistment in the Navy. Got out after four years. Did some active duty while I was finishing a degree. Started with Delta Airlines in 1985. I retired from Delta in 2007, when I joined the FAA. In the FAA, I started with the DFW CMO. Then went over to the American Airlines CMO. Then in 2017, I came to the Honolulu CMO. I've been there until present.
Q. Were you the -- well, what is your current job title?
A. I'm a frontline manager.
Q. In the Honolulu FSDO?
A. CMO.
Q. Or Honolulu CMO.
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who is your supervisor?
A. Tiffany Chitwood.
Q. She's the manager of the CMO?
A. Yeah, she's the office manager.
Q. Do you supervise anyone right now?
A. I oversee the Hawaiian Airlines certificate or certificate management team, I guess.
Q. Were you a principal inspector for Rhoades Aviation?
A. Yes. I was a principal avionics inspector from 2017 to 2019.
Q. What kind of a company were they when you came on in the certificate?

A. I think much as they are now. They seem to be agreeable. They had some challenges with staffing and technical expertise.
Q. They had already brought on the -- Rhoades had already transferred here from Indiana at the time.
A. Yes.
Q. How many aircrafts did they have in 2017, if you can recall, on the Rhoades side?
A. They had four aircraft in 2017, I believe.
Q. The 3-7 200s?
A. All 200 series. Yes.
Q. Who did you deal with most often at that operator?
A. Mostly with the director of maintenance.
Q. That was who?
A. Mike Kimble.
Q. What -- how frequently did you interact with him and in what ways?
A. Initially, from like 2017 to 2018, I would say every day. Their office was about 150 yards behind ours. So we would usually walk over there. After 2018, I was selected for a leadership program that required about 30 percent of my time. So I would say it probably dropped down to twice a week from 2018 to 2019.
Q. Did you have the same fellow members of the certificate management team throughout that period that you were on the Rhoades certificate or did they change out?
A. It was the same. Yeah. Nobody changed until, I think,

Stan Chuck left shortly before I became a frontline manager.
Q. Yeah. One thing we noted was that in 2020, we've been told that pretty much the CMT changed for Rhoades. Was that just a coincidence or do you happen to know -- was there a reason or --
A. I think it was just other opportunities. Of course, the PMI left for the Hawaiian Airline certificate which is a little more high-profile certificate. So I would say it was -- even though it was a lateral move, it was probably a more sought-after job. Looks better on the resume, I guess. Yeah. The POI, he went to another opportunity in, I think, it was UAS certification, which is kind of leading edge now. Certainly something that's exciting to be in. And myself, I left for a management opportunity after completing my program.
Q. And when did you leave the certificate again?
A. 2019.
Q. Do you remember the month?
A. I had a detail prior to me leaving. So my actual permanent assignment started on November 24th, 2019.
Q. Your permanent position is a frontline manager?
A. Yes.
Q. Was there an interna PAI that replaced you or -- who became the PAI after you?
A. I think it was vacant for a while. Then Mr. Muse had a six-month detail.
Q. At the time, you guys were using SAS during that period or

not yet?
A. Yes. We were using SAS.
Q. How did you sort of organize your activities for overseeing them? I mean, in terms of using the SAS. Describe to me how you used that to organize your activities on an annual basis with them.
A. It's pretty much an automated system. In other words, it schedules stuff on a six-month high priority, medium priority, low priority. So the automation automatically puts those into every quarter, moving sequentially through the years. So when they would come up through the automation, there would be discussions about assignment and who can perform those particular (indiscernible) activities.
Q. Were there any -- what was your relationship like with the (indiscernible) folks at Rhoades?
A. Mostly agreeable. Of course, there's always some differences in interpretations of the guidance. So sometimes there were some teaching moments. And sometimes there were some discussions exactly about how to interpret the regulations or the guidance. And sometimes there was just curiosity about why. But for the most part, I guess not a lot of conflict that we saw.
Q. Did you interact with the CEO at all?
A. Very rarely. And then, usually just in a passing basis. We'd run into him in a hangar and -- at least on the maintenance side. They were kind of in a different building. They were in

hangar one and most of the maintenance stuff was going on over into hangar two.

Q. Who was the chief inspector at that time?

A. There were a couple. Initially, I can't remember the guy's name. He left, went back to California, I think. He became like a technical advisor. I think his name was Richard. So when I first came to the certificate it was maybe Richard. And then it was vacant. And then they brought -- I think they made Orlando Debrum, if I'm saying his name correctly. I always had a little --

Q. Debrum.

A. Debrum?

Q. Debrum.

A. Debrum. Okay. So he was there for a while. Then he was replaced by another chief inspector. I can't remember his name other than know that he was an FAA inspector for a while downstairs in the FSDO. And probably somebody said his name, I would be -- oh, yeah, but he was the last chief inspector when I left the certificate.

Q. Were there any particular challenges for them as far as being in compliance with the requirements?

A. Well, we had a bunch of big initiatives. The SMS part 5 rule was coming. And we also had the ADS-B rule that launched. Very challenging. That one was very challenging because they didn't have an STC that fit the 737 200. It was just too old. So they

had to modify an existing STC. I think it was for a 300. So that kind of came right down to the wire as far as meeting the deadline for the rule. But just because it wasn't tailor made for the 200.

It generated a lot of nuisance -- well, I won't say nuisance message. It generated a lot of stuff that they had to work directly with the STC holder and engineers and stuff to get that right with how it interfaced with the transponders and different equipment. Because almost every one of their airplanes are different to model series, I guess, or customer code as the Boeing guys would say.

Q. How about the SMS rule? Did you have any involvement in helping them implement that?

A. It had already kind of gotten -- they had kind of gone down the road with that. But -- so when I came in in 2017 is right about the time our safety and oversight branch 900 came in to verify that their manuals contained all of the requirements of the part 5 rule, all the different regulatory requirements. So I sat in on a lot of those meetings while we went through their manuals and with 900 and starting with 5.1 and went all the way through all the rules. So yeah, that was my involvement with the SMS launch.

Q. Do you remember what their strategy was for sort of creating their SMS and how it related to what they had in place already?

A. I don't know. Yeah. I don't know that one.

Q. How did morale seem to be in the maintenance department when

you were the PAI?
A. I didn't see any negative type of behaviors in the morale. It seemed like the AMTs were willing to talk with us and discuss things. They just -- other than a few core people, I think, we would see avionics guys come and go. You know, Mike was always there. Is it Mike Johnson? He was one of the people -- their maintenance rep at their repair stations, he seemed to be consistent through the whole time I was there, or tech rep. I'd see a few of the AMTs and stuff that I would recognize.

But they smiled, they were happy, they didn't -- like when I was in American Airlines, they didn't run and hide every time they saw us walk into the facility. So I'd say we had a pretty good relationship with them. And they didn't seem particularly cautious about sharing information with us.

Q. During your time there, did you get any whistleblower complaints from employees or former employees about the company or anybody calling you with safety concerns?
A. No. But they did have a safety reporting system that was in place. So those would be discussed at their safety meetings.
Q. Did you attend the safety meetings?
A. I did.
Q. How often were those held?
A. Second Thursday of every month. They usually combine their CASS meeting with their safety meeting.
Q. What did you think of their CASS briefings?

A. You know, they kept adding to -- initially when I first got there, we pointed out some things and we brought some things up to their DOO and their DOM. I think they continue to add stuff to their CASS briefings. They didn't have a reliability program, but towards the end, it's like they added a lot of their parts stuff or reliability wanted to know what parts were failing and what parts -- tear down reports, stuff like that. I saw that kind of improving. They would add sometimes results of their audits into the report. I've seen better and I've seen worse, I guess, in my career.

Q. Who was giving those presentations if you can recall?

A. It was usually led by their publications -- I don't know if -- records managers. I'm not sure what his title was. Ben Toribio (ph.) maybe. I'm sorry. My memory is -- I'm sorry, I don't recall. But --

Q. That's okay.

A. -- it was always led by him.

Q. Mike Johnson was not -- was he -- you said he was the CI at one point near the end of your time or was that not -- was that afterward?

A. No, I think he was -- if I recall, I think when I left, he was the assistant director of maintenance.

Q. Oh, right. Yeah. And --

A. I think he was a supervisor before that and then I think he did get the title of assistant DOM.

Q. Then how about Scott Mayural? Was he a PI?
A. That is the name I couldn't remember as the last chief inspector before I left. Scott Mayural. I should have remembered. It's the same name as me.
Q. Did he present on the CASS program or was it still the publications manager you think?
A. When I was there, he never presented. And if they did, it would only be because Ben wasn't there. But I can't remember being at a meeting where he drove or led the CASS meeting.
Q. Then how about the safety -- the SMS side of the meeting? What was the typical sort of things that were discussed? How was that structured?
A. After the CASS meeting ended, the safety meeting would start. And normally, the director of safety would bring out all the safety reports. They would discuss the old reports, what their status was, who the process owner was, what corrective actions they had started. And they'd also talk about the ones they closed. Then they would discuss all the new ones. Kind of who had been assigned to process owner for looking into those.
Q. Do you happen to recall how many reports would typically be discussed per meeting roughly?
A. They might have one or two new ones. Maybe one or two in process and maybe two closed ones or one. It's never a huge amount. Maybe less than ten.
Q. Did it seem like that process was identifying meaningful

risks and creating good mitigation strategies?
A. On some. I think some it seemed like they were diligent in addressing and finding the root cause and implementing some change, whether a bulletin, a briefing, safety letter, I guess. Others, you know, there were always a couple we weren't so happy with where we would jump in and maybe intercede and ask some questions about whether they believe that was enough to mitigate the risk down to an acceptable level.
Q. Who seemed to come up with the mitigation strategies? Who seemed to sort of take the lead on those kinds of discussions?
A. I think usually at the table it would basically say if it's an ops issues with ground operations, the station's VP or somebody would say, I'll take that one. It was kind of on -- if it was maintenance -- you know, it was apparent it was a maintenance issue then the DOM would usually take it. David Seest, the DOO would -- if it involved flight ops and stuff, he would take those. So it's kind of done, you know, what we would say in the FAA, by specialty.
Q. Do you think they had a good handle on sort of what their top hazards were for their unique operation?
A. No.
Q. What makes you say that?
A. Well, we had a lot of conversations with them about a lot of stuff that needed to be addressed, it wasn't getting addressed. On several occasions, we recommended maybe that contractors could

help to speed along some of the processes. It was always received. And they were -- we'll kind of think about that. But I don't think there was ever any -- as a business decision, I don't think there was ever really any action, movement on that.

Q. What were the things that weren't getting addressed?

A. Manual revisions, sometimes -- I would say the main thing is manual revisions. The thing that jumps out would be manual revisions. They did use contractors for major repairs, damage tolerance assessments, damage tolerance inspections. They did employ an engineering firm for that. But at the time, I believe they only had one person in tech pubs. No technical writers. I think they did hire one person in the records department to work on their GMM, which was in revision.

Q. The manuals that needed work were which ones?

A. GMM mainly. A lot of the -- a lot of this -- the deep dive into their manuals and stuff came about from their CHEP inspection that happened for the cargo focus team. Then the CHEP inspection, the full CHEP inspection. So a lot of those were identified in those inspections.

Q. What time period was that?

A. August of 2020.

Q. So that was after you left?

A. Yes.

Q. Were you aware of deficiencies in the manuals before that?

A. We pointed out some stuff. Normally, we would spot check

stuff as far as in their comms system mainly. Because the comms system is what they were using for tracking of time control items. So aging aircraft inspections, LOVs, if there's DTIs from their major repairs that come back from the engineering. So we were -- kind of the continuing operational safety stuff.

Q. How do you -- how did you decide sort of how much to -- how forceful to be about making them upgrade manuals and that sort of thing?

A. Usually when we did inspections, if we found anything -- back then before -- now, we have SMS letters like hazard letters, template letters, we have SMS letters, we have CAs, client's action letters. Back then it was normally documented on what we called a record of inspection, ROI. So we would communicate what we found in those letters after every quarter ended in SMS or SAS oversight model.

Q. Ended in the SAS oversight module? Is that what you said?

A. Yeah, yeah. At the end of the quarter, after all of the DCTs were in, the negative findings would normally be communicated in a record of inspection. Now, they would be a hazard letter or an SMS letter depending on where they fall in that category. However, the template letters back then weren't available.

Q. When did those -- when did the hazard letters and SMS letters and the client's action letters, when did they come into being as a tool that you could use?

A. There was a divisional -- they call it CCTC, consistency --

gosh, I lose the acronym. I don't recall the actual date. However, it's --

Q. Do you remember what year it was?

A. A year ago maybe. I mean, it's -- they're all template letters that are uploaded to our SharePoint. So there -- actually would have a date on there I think when they were approved and loaded. Actually, I think it was my predecessors who worked -- on a project team that worked on those letters. Predecessor as an FLM; not as a PAI.

Q. Are those letters unique to the CMO in Honolulu or is it system wide throughout the U.S.?

A. I think they're -- I know they're division wide. I don’t know if they're -- if they've been adopted in other divisions, I guess, other than the western Pacific.

Q. What did you think about the adequacy of the maintenance department staffing?

A. I think it was a consistent challenge for them. You know, they're competing for staffing in Hawaii which is a very -- in short supply and competitive. There's other employers that maybe offer better benefits or higher wages. From my conversations with the DOM, they basically told me they always had job announcements on some different aviation websites. And he discussed the -- discussed it with us frequently the challenges they had at getting technicians.

Q. How would you describe the quality of the maintenance

facilities where they performed work?
A. I'm sorry. Can you -- did you say the quality of the maintenance facilities?
Q. Did you feel they were adequate?
A. Yeah, yeah. They were adequate. They were consistent with other facilities in the airport.
Q. The quality of the maintenance manuals?
A. Their maintenance manuals were customized by Boeing for a while. They had -- they paid Boeing to customize their maintenance manuals. However, I think right before I left, if I recall, Boeing announced that they would no longer support the customization of the 737 200 AMM. I'm not sure about the other ones, the IPC. But until then, it would've fallen into the hands of the operator to make sure any revisions that come out get incorporated into the maintenance manual when that customization stopped.
Q. How confident were you about the quality of the maintenance that Rhoades Aviation performed?
A. You said quality again?
Q. Yes.
A. You know, when we would go out there, if they were doing an engine change, they had the AMM where they could reference it or the copies out there. We would check the revision levels. They're 50-year-old airplanes, 40, 50-year-old airplanes. So I know they had challenges getting parts and getting vendors for

parts. That was always a concern.

I know they had a lot of bad out of stock. I don't think they were actually tracking (indiscernible) failure rate. But there were a few concerns that came up when were there. Bearings with the -- nose wheel bearings and stuff. I think they implemented a new job task card. And they actually scrapped a lot of bearings. And bought new ones that seemed to correct that failure.

It was different for me coming from American. A billion-dollar company that has teams of engineers and they're tracking everything and overhauling everything. There's 350 shops and 2 million square feet of hangar for them.

So it was a little bit of an adjustment for the age of the aircraft and the problems. But without working on another certificate that had six airplanes that were fifty-years-old, you know, it's hard to compare for me. But it seemed like though when those kind of things happened, they did show a willingness to -- like for the bearings for one instance, they did show a willingness to make sure that they corrected that.

Q. I'm trying to remember if I already asked you if you were aware of any recurring maintenance issues. Did I already ask you that?

A. No, no. To be honest, I guess.

Q. Well, let's hear it.

A. I didn't want to skip a question there but --

Q. Were you aware of any recurring maintenance issues at Rhoades Aviation that seemed to have difficulty addressing when you were PAI?
A. I think just the ADS-B, a big challenge. Everything else was addressed usually. I mean, they have -- in their CASS, they had recurring section or a page where they talked about recurring problems and I can't remember what their threshold or their baseline was to make it onto the CASS report. But they did have that at least when I was there.
Q. They did have the CASS report?
A. Yeah. A CASS report with repetitive maintenance issues that they would log on there when they started -- when they experienced any repetitive. And -- yeah, then I don't know what -- if it was three write-ups or three repeats or something. But there was definitely a number value where they would track those. I guess would be a good word.
Q. What was that time period when they were tracking those, when you were -- when they were dealing with the ADS-B issues? What year was that?
A. Gosh, it's in the reg. I can't remember the reg. But --
Q. Around the deadline?
A. Yeah, the deadline was --
Q. For ADS-B (indiscernible)?
A. Yeah, yeah. And I can't remember the date and year but it was not that long ago because we're still getting reports on ADS-B

reporting issues, transmission issues.

Q. I think -- well, one last question from me is how would you describe the organizational safety culture at Rhoades when you were the PAI?

A. Needs improvement.

Q. What makes you say that?

A. I just think they could do a lot more. They were starting to launch, I think -- or just launched an electronic version of the safety reports. I think getting more of that data in would have been valuable. I think maybe increasing the communications with their -- and this is my opinion -- increasing the communications with their workforce. Because I saw a lot of communications within the Honolulu area but I wasn't so sure that all that was getting out to some of their field locations at their other airports.

Q. Anything else?

A. No.

DR. BRAMBLE: I think that's it for me for right now. Do you want to take a break? Bathroom break?

MR. MASTERS: I'm good if everybody else is but --

DR. BRAMBLE: How is everybody else? Anybody need a bathroom break or you good. Well, Pocholo?

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. I'm going to try to delve into your work program for a minute just to be able to understand how you as an FAA inspector put

together your work program. So how do you develop your work program for the year typically? I understand that 2017 to 2019 is when you were the PAI.

A. It was the -- we relied on the automation, I guess. From the automation, there's an AITT and there's a AAA. So the AAA you can categorize with a risk. And we call it risk-based decision-making. The risk gets elevated if it's regulatory. But it's the principals who do that AAA assessment.

From that AAA assessment, the automation allows you to select several different actions whether it be corrected on the spot, notified the operator, regulatory non-compliance, compliance action. There's a lot of radio buttons that you can select. Now, there's -- well, I guess, back then, we communicated that a lot in letters, a lot of face-to-face interaction, a lot of telephone calls, I guess. I mean, the operator was so close back then.

Normally, if you had a concern other than something that was regulatory, you would just walk over there and say, hey, we just finished this DCT and we were talking to your guys in the stores and we noticed there was some parts sitting on the ground. That's not per your manual. You know, they need to be up and on something. So that would be an example of that.

If it fell into the category of our compliance philosophy, I guess that's -- that changed, too, from a compliance program to a compliance philosophy. So we -- the compliance philosophy asks you that if they have a compliant attitude, that we work with

them, you know, to correct that problem. And as long as they're willing to work with us, we don't need to go to maybe an enforcement letter. Of course, that's always the option if they believe or if they don't want to correct the problem or they can't correct the problem or they're saying we're not going to correct the problem. So that's module four. So that goes into recordkeeping. In other words, we have a date that it was found, a due date. Those can get extended or they can go red.

I mean, some -- right now, there's a big discussion going on about whether something red is really something that we have to come and deal with as a performance indictor because they're being tracked if something is overdue. So some inspectors believe that they leave it -- if it goes red, if they haven't gotten a suitable corrective action or response from the operator, they let it go red. Because it's a reminder that we're expecting something; this corrective action hasn't happened, we haven't performed the follow-up, we haven't done the audit. So leave it that way now.

We just had some direction that (indiscernible) are tracking overdue items, now don't let them go red. You know, you just need to extend the date. In other words, as you're working towards a root cause analysis. Your SMS comes into play, too. So they should be using their SMS, accepted SMS program to address it also. I guess, in a nutshell, our automation, our SAS oversight tool is our number one go to safety oversight system.

Q. Typically, the automated system that you have just spits out

some work programs that you guys need to do. Is that correct?
A. That is correct. It will go by fiscal year. You have all four quarters. It may schedule two data collection tools in one quarter. Then the next quarter, you might have four in that schedule. Unless the principal decides to move them which they can do. If they say, hey, deicing -- this deicing DCT came due in August, well, we know we're not going to see any deicing until maybe --
Q. Right.
A. -- January/February. So they can choose to extend that out. But other than that, it's -- it automatically schedules these data collection tools.
Q. If there is something critical -- because obviously, it's an automated task. Right? You know the operator more than anything than an automated tool would know. Can you schedule a specific task to be done because you know it's critical to their operation and to make sure that they're in compliance?
A. You can add custom data collection tools. And you can go and pull specific questions and kind of drill down into the issue.
Q. Just for my education, what's the relationship between SAS, FSIMS, SPAS, and the PTRS?
A. Well, PTRS has been sunsetted. Now, everything goes into SAS. What used to go into PTRS is now considered a SAS OWL item. OWL standing for office workload list. So instead of doing a PTRS, those PTRS codes are contained in a dropdown in the SAS OWL

now. So if I wanted to review a manual and I could put in a PTRS code 33.03. I could say I received this manual for review. I would document my work in the SAS OWL, the same as I would in PTRS. But PTRS got sunsetted.

Q. Is there a typical work program that's -- that each inspector needs to do every year or do you rely on the automated system to let them -- to develop that for the inspector?

A. Yeah. So usually the principal inspectors would -- they would -- we have a work program for each inspector. So the principals -- if they have -- say in Hawaiian we have -- we have assistant principals. We have some PPMs. So the principals would usually go and assess the risk. If they decided that they needed to add some extra DCTs, they would recommend that assignment to the frontline manager which would be myself. They would say, hey, I think we got to go do more ramp inspections or we need to do more in fueling. So they would add those.

They would recommend an assignment. It would come to me for resourcing. I would look at it and I would maybe usually talk to the principals, the inspector. And I'd say, hey, okay, let's do this. And I would resource them. So that's how those additional inspections would usually get done if it required additional inspections during any given quarter.

Q. During your time as PAI for Rhoades, what's the primary issue that you saw that the operator was struggling with?

A. Staffing. Staffing. Keeping people, getting people, being

fully staffed. Probably turnover.
Q. Is it keeping -- just keeping people or keeping qualified or getting qualified people?
A. I think they -- they hired A&Ps. And they had some people who didn't have A&Ps that were trying to get that experience to get their A&P. What I saw happening a lot of times would be somebody found a higher paying job. They either went over to Hawaiian Airlines or they found a job on the mainland. They're tired of being on the rock, in other words.
Q. Sure.
A. They're ready to move back. They -- so you always have that in Hawaii where something happens with your family or it's (indiscernible). So I like to say the average person stays two to -- maybe two to five years in Hawaii. And they move on. So that was probably what was driving the staffing issues. We have the same problem in the FAA here.
Q. Yeah. Since you were the PMI, the previous -- or PAI, how would you characterize the relationship between maintenance and the ops organization while you were PAI?
A. Adversarial.
Q. Adversarial between the maintenance department and the ops department?
A. Not between the whole department. I would say between the director of maintenance and the director of operations. There seemed to be a lot of butting of heads. And it's kind of typical

in the aviation industry that -- at Delta Airlines where I worked, the -- we never talked to the pilots in the maintenance department. Avionics never talked to the maintenance guys. The line guys would never talk to the hangar guys. So there's a little bit of that siloing, I guess.

Q. Who was the director of ops when you were the PAI? Do you recall?

A. David Seest. Seest. I'm not sure.

Q. Then the DOM is still Mr. Kimble?

A. Yes.

Q. Can you describe any issues you may have witnessed in regards to TransAir's engine maintenance program while you were there?

A. They were -- they did quite a bit of interchanging. I know they were trying to get some dash 17s to replace the dash 9s. Some conversations about their contractor, I think, who did their overhauls in Florida. Just that he was thinking -- he'd been around a long time. He was thinking of going out of -- getting out of the business and Mike had some concerns that -- where they would find another overhaul facility. Other than that --

Q. Do you think they're maintained properly to air worthiness as far as the engines are concerned?

A. Well, when we saw them -- the times we observed them dropping an engine, they had -- we would look at the paperwork, we would look at the torque wrenches to make sure they're calibrated. We would look to make sure that their RAI inspector was there who

usually Mike Johnson. So yeah, from our observations, we never saw anything that wasn't done per the AMM, ICAs.

Q. (Indiscernible) have you ever seen them file a monthly mechanical interruption summary report?

A. I'm sorry. Can you repeat the question?

Q. Yeah. Have you witnessed them filing any monthly mechanical interruption summary reports?

A. We did get MISR reports. I think that was mainly handled by the PMI. But I saw -- they didn't make PTRS entries on it.

Q. You said that you were -- they have a chronic program with -- according to what you recall. Is that correct?

A. I'm sorry. Say that --

Q. You said that you recall that they have a chronic program?

A. Chronic?

Q. Yeah. Like a chronic -- if they have an issue with --

A. Oh, repetitive --

Q. Yes.

A. Yeah, yes. They did on their CASS report, at least when I was there, they had a repetitive items entry on that or a page where they documented that on our table, I guess. Where they documented that during their CASS meetings.

Q. Do you guys do any audits of their CASS while you were there?

A. Other than our DCTs that we have in the oversight model, oversight of their CASS is usually incorporated in the questions from our data collection tools. I'm not sure which DCT that falls

into.

Q. You guys -- based off of what I'm hearing from you is that you don't recall doing a CASS audit then. Right?

A. I do not. No.

Q. When you were the PAI, have you ever done an audit of a maintenance facility in Taiwan?

A. I did. I did do a facility inspection when they added them as an A&P.

Q. Any issues or --

A. Yeah. We had some issues. We always have issues when you do a repair station. The easy pickings are the training department. Make sure the people who are working on their aircraft have been trained in the 121 operators maintenance program. You usually always -- when you look through the paperwork, you'll ask to see -- you'll pick five guys and you'll say, show me the training records on this guy.

I think there were a couple of guys where the training records were missed or we couldn't find the training records. The repair station, if I remember, said, yes, they've been trained. And of course, you're like, well, then show me the record. They're like, well, there's obviously been a misfiling of the records.

But usually those are communicated to the repair station and to the certificate holder at Rhoades in this case. When we leave, I think they were documented, if I remember -- all those were

documented on a letter that was presented them after we -- after I completed the A&P facility.

Q. At the time that you were the PAI, did you ever write an LOI, I guess, at Rhoades, or anything?

A. No.

Q. Going back to the CASS program, I'm assuming you were present for the CASS -- the monthly CASS meetings. Correct?

A. Yes. We always try to attend those.

Q. Do you think that the information being presented to CASS was very comprehensive or informative as far as how they pursued their operation and how they maintained their operation?

A. You know, one of the things that they tell us in the FAA is that not every organization is the same and that their programs have to fit the scope of their certificate. But four, five airplanes, I wouldn't expect them to have a very intricate, I guess, CASS program.

And going back, I guess, to my previous statement is that I think as these deficiencies became known or how they thought they could improve them, or feedback they got from the different members, I think they were trying to scale it up a little bit. It did get scaled up in the couple years I was there. We can always do things better, I guess. And there's probably things they could have done better or maybe it's even better now. It's been a couple of years. I haven't seen one of their CASS reports.

But normally, the CASS, it captures the problems you're

having. And if you're identifying problems, then you include it in your CASS program. Identifying the problems, I guess, is a big part of that.

Q. Yeah. I understand that, obviously, they had limitations with personnel. Right. I mean, that's part of the -- do you know whether TransAir was setting alert conditions for components or systems for their CASS? And were they tracking that?

A. I do not.

Q. Do you know, were they doing any risk analysis or anything like that with regards to some of their components?

A. With regard to their components? I do not.

Q. Let's talk about their GMM. Based off of this accident, the last revision to the GMM was in 2016. I know that you mentioned that they have issues with regards to the revisions to their manuals. Is there a reason why the FAA didn't push them to revise their manuals more and in a quarterly/semi-annual basis with regards to some of the information that's in the manual that needs to be revised?

MR. PICCIOTTI: Just -- he's speaking on behalf of him. Not the FAA as the whole.

MR. CRUZ: Right, okay. I'm sorry.

MR. PICCIOTTI: Yeah, sorry.

BY MR. CRUZ:

Q. Just -- I take that back. You yourself, since you were the PAI at the time from 2017 to 2019 --

A. Yeah. When I came on the certificate, you know, it's not easy to see that their manual, even from when it was certified back in 2015, was probably not fully revised there. There were several manuals that we did get revised. One of them was a deicing manual. They were still using a deicing manual from Indianapolis. So one of the first things we did is get rid of it because their holdover tables hadn't been revised for several years. So we got rid of that.

I mean, we worked on these problems as we found them. The GMM -- the deficiencies in the GMM were identified. They were sent a letter. They were working on the manual. Then they would lose a manual reviser. Then they would bring somebody else to finish it. Then it would go to their DOM. And the DOM says, oh, I've seen things in it. I send it back to them.

So in other words, they had a compliant attitude. They were working on it. So that's pretty much how it went while I was on the certificate. It was just back and forth. And then, staffing. And then, back, and forth. So they would send us something. We'd reject it. They would go back to fix it.

It would go back to their -- a guy, Shannon, I think his name was. We would check with updates, where you are with the manual. They would say, oh, Shannon has got the manual. He's got chapters this, and this, and this done. He's sending me over there to look at them. Oh, I found problems with them. They went back to Shannon. I mean, that's kind of how it would go with the operator

and whether it be the GMM or any other manuals.
Q. I guess, is there anything from an FAA standpoint that would say, enough is enough as far as going back and forth so many times and not having it revised?
A. Well, they're doing that now. Yeah. Normally, an LOI would come if they refused to revise their manual or if they're not saying they're trying to revise their manual.
Q. Sure.
A. So with our compliance philosophy, as long as they're trying and they're making an honest effort, and we can see that they're doing that, then we collaborate and we just try to help them along and do what we can. But we can't write their manuals for them.
Q. Yeah. Well, obviously, you guys know that since this accident, the latest revisions of that manual is 2016.
A. Yeah.
Q. Obviously, there's a lot of issues with regards to some of the content in that manual being very much up to date. Right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you recall when you were the PAI, what was the MEL extension procedure for Rhoades?
A. They had a form, an extension form.
Q. How many extensions are they allowed?
A. I don't know that there's a number. Usually, it's a risk-based decision. I would find anything -- in other words, you would ask them why do you need the extension. Oh, we got a part

shipping from the mainland and the lead time is two weeks. That may be justification. Or we keep troubleshooting this wiring problem and they show you the work (indiscernible) log, they show you the log pages, they show that they're running into issues with whatever they're dealing with. In other words, it's an analysis, I guess.

Q. If you had to approve an extension for them when you were the PAI?

A. Yes.

Q. Was it more than one extension that you allow them to do, or two, or three, or -- how many? If you recall. On that one particular route.

A. Usually, they can do the first one. Everything else goes to the FAA for approval. Any additional, they have to get approval from us.

Q. Do you recall what is the maximum number of approvals that you -- that the FAA approved for them?

A. I don't recall the maximum number. No.

MR. CRUZ: I will go with -- I'm sorry.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I have no questions.

MR. CRUZ: No questions?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No questions at this time.

BY MR. MARCOTTE:

Q. Hi, I'm Dan Marcotte from Boeing. It's been a while since we (indiscernible).

A. Yeah.
Q. You mentioned something that I'm trying to get a little clarification on. It was a change in philosophy. If I understood, you used to have -- or the FAA at the time with a policy philosophy or whatever. It sounded as -- you know, if saw someone was making a good faith effort, you'd work with them and -- if they have a compliance mindset. They're trying to get better to do the right thing. So what was the change in philosophy and when did the -- when did it occur?
A. Oh. I think I was at American Airlines. Because we wrote a lot of LOIs in American Airlines. In other words, if you just -- you did your inspections, you came back, and you can tie that to a regulatory requirement -- before the compliance philosophy, first, and then compliance -- no, compliance program, then it changed to compliance philosophy. Prior to that, it was just -- you went straight to an enforcement action, an LOI.

The compliance program came along. Gosh, I don’t even remember the year. But I know it was before I came here in 2017. It was probably maybe a year or two -- so 2015/2016 range. Anyway, so the -- and I actually don't know why the change was made. But the change was made. And I think it was maybe because between A4A and the FAA and all of this, all of these LOIs weren't really getting the results. Of course, there was a difference -- I don't know if it was a difference across the agency. But a difference between the certificate holders. I do know that. That

U.S. Air says, why, you know, we get 200 a year. And American says, well, we get 1500 a year. Why are we getting more than you.

So I think from that, the compliance program was born where we want to work with you if you're making an honest effort, if you're trying to fix it, you're doing the best you can, we're going to help you and collaborate and practice (indiscernible) just to make sure that we're getting a fix and not just -- so I hope that answered your question.

Q. Yeah, no, it did. So that was the philosophy in place when you (indiscernible) with the compliance. You know, if they're trying hard, working well, you don't give them the LOI.

A. Correct.

Q. Try to keep them moving. And that sounds like that's still the basic philosophy.

A. Correct.

Q. Great. So I guess, the next was -- like you say, they're trying to update the manual or make a revision to something or -- they're trying to make an improvement it sounds. Would it be fair to say that now you probably have a little more informal communication to help them along? Like, maybe they send you an informal draft or something first. They're -- hey, here's the direction we're thinking of going before they actually draft something and send it. Is it a little more collaborative than just the -- go fix it? The letter campaign.

A. Yeah, yeah. Now we have the template letters. It depends on

what part of their GMM you're addressing, whether it's approved part or it's an accepted part. If it's an accepted part, well, then at sometime in the past, that was reviewed and accepted in the GMM. Sometime in the past, it was reviewed and approved in the GMM. It's usually a little bit harder to -- if the FAA approves a section -- in other words, the operator is always going to come back and say, well, you approved it, why is it now not good enough. Why is -- why was it good then and it's not good now.

Of course, our job is in some ways being a salesman and making them aware of the -- sometimes it can create safety issues. So we encourage them in any part of it, whether it's approved or accepted -- especially if -- it's kind of easy if the regulatory requirements are changed. But if it's like an advisory circular for say, ETOPS, even though ETOPS is an approved program -- but it's a little bit -- if the guidance changed, we bring them a new guidance, we tell them what the guidance is, we encourage them to -- if they get rid of equipment, or they don't have it anymore, well, then why do you want to this big manual that contains stuff that you don't use anymore. Even though they'll say, well, how can we violate that part of the manual because we don't even have that equipment anymore.

So if it's going to be a regulatory finding that we sill have RII issues for Convair 640, you know, we don't have Convair 640, so we can't be not following our approved manual or accepted

manual. That's why we use the compliance philosophy and we encourage them to keep those up to date and remove information that no longer would be of value to them.

Q. Finally, on the CASS meeting -- you attended the CASS meetings. I heard you always try to be at them. You also received the meeting minutes?

A. I think they emailed out -- after the CASS meeting was over, they would email out the meeting minutes from the CASS and the actual CASS record. I guess, the presentation that they put together.

Q. Do you remember if the minutes -- do you think they captured discussions or action items or --

A. They did. I think on the back of the page at the time, they had action items that they would roll forward or new items and old items. Sometimes they would roll with the report, or other times they would -- the next report would come out and it would say, this action item was closed.

MR. MARCOTTE: That's it. Thank you.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Just one follow-up on the compliance program versus compliance philosophy. You mentioned that sometime around 2015/2016, that the compliance program came into being, approximately. And that subsequently, that changed to compliance philosophy. Can you describe the difference and when that happened?

A. I didn't really see any fundamental change other than they didn't like the word program. And they liked philosophy better. That's the way I understood it at the time. Maybe it fit more in with the -- what they were trying to convey.

Q. So it was mostly sort of a naming convention.

A. Semantics, I think.

Q. But it was the same approach to compliance, roughly?

A. Yeah. In my mind it was, but without kind of laying the documents side by side, I couldn't tell you exactly if there was content that changed.

Q. Do you remember when that name change occurred?

A. I don't. No, not --

DR. BRAMBLE: Pocholo, do you have anything else?

MR. CRUZ: Nope.

DR. BRAMBLE: Steve?

MR. MUSE: No, sir.

DR. BRAMBLE: Hank?

MR. CHIAO: Good.

DR. BRAMBLE: Dan? Okay. In that case, is there anything that we haven't asked you about that you'd like to share with us?

MR. MASTERS: No, I think we had a good sharing here.

DR. BRAMBLE: We always offer everyone the opportunity to make any safety recommendations they have in their minds anytime we're doing an accident investigation. Is there anything that's -- that you'd like to suggest for us to consider for a safety

recommendation?

MR. MASTERS: Hire more FAA inspectors and assistants. It does get challenging especially with vacations and stuff like that. When you have a three principal certificate. People go to training like me. I entered a program for a year. It would have -- it would have been nice to have some assistance. It all falls down to the last man standing which would be -- if I left, it would be the PMI. If the PMI left, it's me. And then the POI, well, nobody can do that pilot stuff. So I don't know what would happen then. That's it.

DR. BRAMBLE: With that, we will call this concluded at 2:22 p.m.

(Whereupon, at 2:22 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Byron Scott Masters
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Via telephone
DATE:	September 23, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Katie Leach
Transcriber