DCA21FA174

OPERATIONAL FACTORS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE

Attachment 2

Rhoades Aviation, Inc./ TransAir Personnel Interview Transcripts

May 4, 2022

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:	*	
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TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
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Interview of: AMIN DATOSI, Captain

Rhoades Aviation, TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. ETCHER: Hello, Captain, my name is Shawn Etcher, I'm an operational factors investigator with the NTSB. I'm working with Mr. Bramble here, who is a human performance investigator, he'll introduce himself in just a moment, and folks from Boeing and the FAA. We're here to work the event that occurred the other night involving 810.

In case you don't know, we're an independent federal agency, we're tasked with determining a probable cause to transportation accidents. The ultimate goal is to make things safer. So, we're not going -- we're not part of the FAA, nothing like that, we're just an independent agency, and so we have no regulatory or enforcement powers. So, you can just -- our goal, like I said, is just to make it safer. I'll go around and have people introduce themselves and then we'll continue.

Mr. Bramble?

MR. BRAMBLE: I'm Bill Bramble, I'm a human performance investigator with the NTSB, and I'll be assisting.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, a Boeing safety pilot.

MR. KANAE: I'm Clarence Kanae, aviation operations inspector at the Honolulu certificate management office, FAA.

MR. ETCHER: And Captain, is there anybody you object to being present during this interview at this time?

CAPT DATOSI: I'm sorry?

MR. ETCHER: To object?

CAPT DATOSI: Oh, no. I didn't hear what you said, I'm sorry.

MR. ETCHER: No, I just wanted to make sure. So, as we said -- as we were talking a little bit ago, we're going to record this, and after the interview we'll be sending that out for transcription. When they transcribe it, all of us party members will have an opportunity to review

the transcript to make sure it's correct with typographical errors. We're not going to change any of your content, obviously.

As I said before, the purpose of the investigation is to determine a probable cause and to prevent the recurrence, we're not going to assign fault, that's not our job. But we're simply here just to get your insight into the crew, into the operations, the airplanes, things like that. However, as part of everything, we cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity, and the transcript of this interview will actually become part of public docket later on. And so, it will be public -- the transcript will be public.

As we were talking a little bit ago, each of us group members will have an opportunity to ask questions. We'll ask the questions one at a time, and everybody has been instructed not to interrupt the person who is asking questions at the time. The one rule I always have is if we ask a question and you don't understand what we're asking, ask for clarification because if you give me an answer -- any of us an answer that we don't understand, we're going to ask for clarification. So, it's a two-way street.

CAPT DATOSI: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: But the main thing is, if you don't know an answer, I don't know works just fine. So, don't think it's not a checkride, you have to have every answer, we just want to get an understanding. Now, you are entitled under the regulations to have one representative of your choosing. Is there someone here with us today that you would like to have represent you?

CAPT DATOSI: Mr. Bill.

MR. ETCHER: Mr. Bill, would you kindly state your name and title?

MR. KATT: William J. Katt, attorney with Wilson Elser Law Firm.

MR. ETCHER: Okay, and as previously, by all means you can direct to not answer questions. But you can request a short break, and please, feel free if you need to.

You can also.

CAPT DATOSI: Sure.

MR. ETCHER: If you need to use the restroom, if you want to talk to Bill, please, just ask for a quick break and we can do that.

CAPT DATOSI: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Does anyone have any questions?

MR. KANAE: No questions.

MR. ETCHER: All right. If we're all ready, we'll begin.

INTERVIEW OF AMIN DATOSI

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So, for the record, can you please state and spell your legal name?

A. Sure. Amin Datosi, A-M-I-N, last name, D-A-T-O-S-I.

Q. Excellent, and how old are you?

A. 34.

Q. 34? What is your job title?

A. Captain on 737.

Q. Okay, and are you -- is that your only role at TransAir, or do you have other duties?

A. That's my only role.

Q. Okay. How long have you actually worked at TransAir?

A. Three years and one month.

Q. Three years and one month? Can you tell us your -- what kind of airman certificates you have and any type ratings?

A. Yeah. I have ATP, with type rating of Saab 340, and Boeing 737.

Q. Okay, and just a ballpark, what's your total time?

A. 4,000.

Q. Okay. How much of that is in the 737?

A. 18 hundred.
Q. Okay, and is all that --
A. 17 or 18 hundred.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Is all that as PIC? Or is some of that as first officer?
A. No, most of it is SIC, so about 1,100 as SIC, the rest is PIC.
Q. Okay. How long have you been a captain on the 737?
A. One year and one month.
Q. All right. What's your FAA medical certificate? Is it a first --
A. First class.
Q. When was it issued?
A. March this year, so a couple months.
Q. Okay. Any limitations or restrictions?
A. No.
Q. So, you're one of those specimens of health, huh?
A. I guess so; so far.
Q. All right. Can you just kind of give us a really brief overview of your flying experience?
A. Yeah. I started my flying out of Denton, Texas, did all my initial training, private, instrument, commercial, all around Texas. Then I was a flight instructor for about two years -- one year and-a-half, somewhere there, to get my 15 hundred hours. Then I was working for 135 operations out of Addison, Texas, flying to Austin, El Paso for about six months. Then I was working for a regional airline, PenAir, flying Saab 340 out of Denver, Boston, and Portland, and Alaska. Then moved to Hawaii, got the SIC job here, and then I got promoted to be a captain.
Q. Excellent. What's the requirements here to become a captain?

A. It's about -- so, it really depends on your ability, but legal requirement is FAA legal requirements. There is nothing written in our books, as far as I know, for upgrading from SIC to PIC that it's on top of FAA minimums.

Q. Okay. Do you typically see them upgrading people based on seniority, or is it a different -- what do you see?

A. What I have seen in the past couple years, it first goes by seniority, and then on top of that, ability of that guy -- or that person. So, it really depends on the person, on their training, how well they do on simulator, how well they do on flying, actually. So, it's not like okay, this guy got the hours, so we can upgrade him. That's how I've seen it.

Q. Okay. All right. So, part of why you're here is to educate us -- me. These guys are smart, I need educated on how TransAir works, what a day in the life of a pilot here is like. So, that's why we're kind of hoping.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And we know you also had flown, potentially, with some of these crew members. So, we just kind of want to get a good picture of that, and that's what we're here for. So, with that in mind, what is in your chain of command here at TransAir? Do you like it -- is it go by Rhoades Aviation? How do you guys?

A. Legally, we go by Rhoades Aviation, but it's the same company, it's a TransAir under one roof. So, Rhoades and TransAir, it's the same company, but different certificates as far as I know. So, Rhoades is 121 part, and the payroll, everything is coming from Rhoades, and part of that is TransAir, which is 135 mostly. So, that 135, we don't have to do anything with it, we are just pretty much Rhoades Aviation.

Q. Okay.

A. But under the same name, so it's just the name. So, yeah, chain of command, pretty much it's different -- very different on 121 and 135 certificates. So, we don't do anything related with

135 operations, so I do not know anything about that part.

Q. So, under the 121 part --

A. Uh-huh, which is Rhoades.

Q. -- what is the chain of command?

A. Okay. That's going to be -- for me, it's Wallace. I go -- so FO go for operations side.

Q. Right.

A. It goes FO, Captain, Captain goes to chief pilot, which is Wallace Horibata.

Q. Okay.

A. And then from Wallace goes to -- what's his name, David Seest, which is our DO, and from DO it really depends on what the issue is, but there are a couple -- DO reports to the CO, which is Tim Moriahi (ph.). That's the chain of command in our side, but every, like, side has a different chart.

Q. Okay.

A. So, for our operation, it's like that, yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. How do you categorize staffing here at TransAir? Are you guys overly staffed, do you feel like you're working a lot? Understaffed? Kind of help me understand how you perceive it?

A. How I perceive it, it depends really. FO side, we are pretty good on the staffing, like, we are not short or anything, we have enough people working even -- we have a lot of people I would say. Captain side, we have just enough to just do the schedules. How I see the schedules, I don't see anybody overwork, but I don't see, like, a lot of reserve people. I've worked at many places, it's like every other place.

Q. Okay.

A. Just enough people to cover the schedule.

Q. Okay. All right. So, just enough people to cover the schedule, so do you find yourself

having to work on days off?

A. I volunteer sometimes.

Q. Do you?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. When was the last time you volunteered?

A. Last week, the day when accident happened.

Q. Oh, okay, and what were you flying?

A. I was the plane landing when he was taking off -- the 810 was taking off.

Q. So, you were flight 809?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Okay. So, we'll talk about that here in just a minute. All right. But that was on a -- you volunteered for that?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Okay. If you had a concern here -- you can pick a concern, maintenance, weather, scheduling, whatever your concern is, how do you bring that to the right person's attention?

A. I would just speak about it.

Q. To who?

A. Depends on the problem. It goes on chain of command again, it really depends what the factor is, what the problem is. If it's a safety, I did already safety reports on some stuff, and probably FAA got it, too. (Verbatim) Yeah, it really depends what the issue is. We have the safety form that we can submit, people talk about it. I actually did a safety report before and I asked the DO if they received it, they talk about it, and I see that has been talked about.

Q. Okay. Do they give you feedback with your concerns?

A. Yes, actually, they did because I asked for it. But yeah, they did.

Q. Okay. Has any of your concerns ever not been addressed to your satisfaction?

A. Not really. Everything -- it doesn't matter my -- what my satisfaction is, but it matters that the issue was solved, so --

Q. Okay. All right. Do you guys have any kind of a safety -- like, a ASAP program, or an SMS program, or anything --

A. That's what I was just talking about. We have the form SI -- whatever, I forgot the name. But yeah, actually, we have the box, it's sitting outside of dispatch office, by right-hand side, it's on the wall. So, there's a form in there, you just fill it out, you put it in the box, and also, we have the same thing on the website that -- FAA get's a copy of that too.

So, whenever -- if there is a safety issue, if we do the safety report, FAA gets a copy, the CO gets a copy, and DO gets a copy of that safety, should -- if you do it on the website. If you do it on the paper, of course, it goes on the chain of command, which goes to the safety guy of our company, and then they talk about it.

Q. Okay. All right. Do you have to put your name on those, or can you do any of them anonymously?

A. You could, you don't need to put the name down, but I did put my name down.

Q. Okay. If you have a concern about maintenance, go to an aircraft to fly it --

A. Uh-huh.

Q. -- and you have a concern about maintenance, what do you do? You're the Captain, so walk me through?

A. Okay, sure. Depends -- first of all, if the FO goes through the -- on the airplane and does the checks most of the time, so that really depends what the issue is. Let's say we have a leak on the engine, okay? So, first FO see it, he's supposed to let me know, and then I go check it out to see what's happening and what the problem is. Then I'm supposed to talk to the maintenance on DOD. Depends on the person, we have, like, I guess more than ten people working as a maintenance, every airplane as their maintenance assigned for that plane that flied that day.

So, he's on the plane anyway -- or outside of the plane, we don't need to go grab him. I talk to him, put it in the logbook, and then he checks it out. Depends on what the problem is, needs further investigation, or further actions or not -- whatever, they're job depends on the situation, it will get addressed that way. So, it really depends what the issue is. But the first thing I do, talk to the maintenance, and put it in the book. That's how it's supposed to be.

Q. Okay. I know most airlines, that's how it's supposed to be, okay. I flew a while back as well, and you always had your buddies in maintenance, and people were guilty; we all are, we're human, right? Sometimes we don't get it into the logbook. Does that happen here often? Or is any type -- your example you gave was a leak in the engine.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Did -- does that always get put in the logbook for -- by you? I know you can't answer for others.

A. By me, yes. By me, it's always, yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. It's just me.

Q. Can you refuse an airplane?

A. Yeah, sure.

Q. Have you?

A. Okay, let's talk about that.

Q. Sure.

A. Refusing the plane is different than -- okay, you cannot refuse an airworthy airplane, let me put it that way. But if the airplane is not airworthy by the meaning of airworthy, if it's not, you cannot refuse. So, if the airplane is airworthy -- so, you have to fly it, but if it's not airworthy, you cannot refuse it in your opinion of airworthy. (Verbatim)

Q. So, it's all based on your opinion of airworthy, or --

A. Legally.

Q. Okay.

A. So, if you write it in the book and they say okay -- they say this is good to go, then depends really what the issue is. It's really up -- depends on the situation. I can't say it's always like that or -- it really depends on the situation. So, there's a leak in the engine, let's put it that way.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. There is a leak, you write it up and you say okay, I don't want to fly, I want to go home. Not going to happen because okay, they're going to fix it, they're going to address that issue and fix it. Okay, they sign it off, now you have to take the airplane because it's airworthy again. So, it really depends on the situation. The maintenance does they're job, you're okay, and now you go check that airplane out, is there anymore leak? Okay, there is more leak, you're going to write it up again.

I did that before, I wrote up the airplane, I went out, I say it's not good, I turn back in. So, it happened to me before, I turned the airplane right back in. So, yeah, you could refuse it if it's not airworthy, but if the airplane is airworthy, you have to take it.

Q. Okay. So, the airplane you refused, you brought it back -- I shouldn't say you refused, you brought it back.

A. Yeah, exactly.

Q. Was there any concerns from management that you did that? Did you get --

A. No. They actually talked with our DO that day, same day, that I have this issue -- whatever issue was, I don't feel safe taking this airplane. They supported me that day, and even they said yeah, if it's like that just write it up again. That's exactly comes from our DO, write it up again. I said so, I don't look bad? He said it's what it is, like, it's old plane, everybody knows, things happen, things breaks, and yeah, just write it up again.

Q. Okay. Now, like I told you, I've flown in an airline before, and I knew whenever I got a

certain aircraft, I didn't like it because it always felt like there was issues with it. I think it just didn't like me, maybe, I don't know. But do you ever feel that way with any of these airplanes? Do you have planes that you're just like oh, I got to fly that one?

A. No. All of them the same. They got everything, sometimes some stuff breaks or something happens, and it's everywhere. Issues are everywhere, but as long as they get fixed, I have no problem with it. It's -- there is no certain one that I say okay, I don't like that one, and even if there is, that's my personal preference. But not as a safety or such a thing, yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. So, you mentioned earlier that you were flying flight 809 that night, in bound, can you kind of describe to me what you heard?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And kind of the night itself?

A. Okay. Very clear, easy night. Actually, before that I met with both of the crew that night. So, before heading out, I met with both of them; Greg Ryan and Okai. I met them one hour before accident. So, that's the start from there. I met Greg Ryan, he looked (indiscernible), we talk about 15 minutes in the parking lot, then we head back in. Okai was doing his briefing with his FO -- with Greg Ryan when I left. We joked around a little bit, but -- yeah. I left, went to Kahului, I came back. About 2,000 feet I saw the airport, I called the visual, there was a UPS airplane in front of me. That's when I hear the 810 took off, but there was a delay, I guess I would call it, on a call to ATC. Because when -- usually when we take off, about a thousand feet, 11 hundred feet, ATC goes straight or contract (ph.) and say your altitude, I didn't hear that call.

So, after a minute or so, I hear Henry said we lost engine, and Tower said okay, you want to come back? And I heard Henry say no, we have to run some checklists, and okay, yeah -- I said yeah, that makes sense. That's a part of our training, actually, to do checklists before doing anything so we don't just come right back in. Yeah, that was actually one of my simulator trainings, that we have to run the checklist before doing anything else, that's what Boeing said.

That's part of our training, we don't just come back and land. But yeah, that's what I heard.

I still had the runway in sight, I was about five miles to seven miles out, I would say scattered clouds at maybe 2,000 feet, something like that. I still had the runway in sight when I landed 809, so initially they cleared me for visual after UPS, and then when 809 ask for -- 810, sorry -- asked for emergency, and they said okay, come back, land, and they sent me to -- heading 240, so that's a (indiscernible) this way, they sent me the other way. And then what happened -- then Henry said we have to run the checklist, so they said okay, if you're still two hours to 809, that if you have -- still have the runway in sight you can come and land, and then when I landed, I still heard everything you hear on the ATC. So, yeah.

Q. Okay. So, you talked to the crew about an hour before the flight?

A. Yeah.

Q. Where was your flight to?

A. Kahului.

Q. Okay, and how long is that flight typically?

A. 30 minutes to 40 minutes.

Q. Okay. So, you just go there, and were you on the ground there very long?

A. Ten minutes.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. Ten to 15 minutes, really depends how fast they are.

Q. Okay. All right. You said you heard Henry?

A. Yes.

Q. Which is the Captain?

A. Yes.

Q. Correct?

A. That's correct.

Q. Okay. How did you know that was him and not the first officer?

A. I know the voices. You got to realize my voices -- I already got text message from my friends up in China that they say we heard you, you were on 809 that night. So, it's easy.

Q. Okay. I just wanted to make sure that we knew how you could recognize that. Okay. Did you see 810 at all visually?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Okay.

A. While I was doing the visual, I saw it taking off.

Q. Okay. Did you see anything abnormal? I mean, like, did you --

A. No, it's not --

Q. How'd you recognize it, I should say.

A. That's the only plane that was taking off.

Q. So, you saw the lights?

A. Yeah, I saw the runway, and the only plane on the runway, so that's 810.

Q. Okay. There was no -- any other indication?

A. I couldn't see, no.

Q. Okay.

A. It's not that clear, it's still night, so -- yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. Excellent. So, do you -- have you ever flown with either of those crew members?

A. Both of them.

Q. Both? When did you fly with the Captain?

A. Last time or first time?

Q. Last time?

A. Last time, one year and a couple months ago.

Q. So, you -- were you a captain or an FO?

A. FO.

Q. Okay, and how was that experience that you can recall?

A. Pretty by the book guy -- very by the book.

Q. Okay.

A. Like, everything has to be whatever he taught in the ground school or whatever our book says; exactly the same, like, not even one higher or like -- everything, like, by the book.

Q. Okay. All right. How about the first officer?

A. Pretty educated guy. He knows his things, definitely. I just flown with him a month before that -- oh, no, maybe a week before the accident or something. Pretty educated, pretty good guy, and he knows his things on the books. He is a part of writing our manuals, so he knows his things, what we're supposed to do, how is, like, those things written on the book.

And even, like, we had the issue a month before that, like, hazmat paperwork, and he was, like, asking about the hazmat people, how this is working, like, how it's supposed to be. And there was an issue and -- it got solved, by the way. But yeah, he knows his things, and that's not a part of his job, but he knows everything about flying, about airplanes, about our SOP. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So, he's an educated, smart guy, but when you were flying with him -- and we'll just talk about him because that seems to be the most recent one. Do you recall that he called for checklists?

A. That's usually captain's job to call for checklist.

Q. Even if he's the pilot flying?

A. Mainly, yeah. Depends, really, what checklist you are talking about. So, all the checklists on the ground is pretty much captain's job. When he's flying, it's just we have a descend checklist, that's -- pilot flying asks for it. What other checklists, let me think about it. Before landing checklist, that's the other checklist -- yeah, that's the other checklist, captain flying asks

for it. And what's the other one -- after takeoff checklist. So, those three are the only checklists that captain flying is asking for. But yeah, on top of it.

Q. Okay. All right, and that's pilot flying or captain flying?

A. Pilot flying.

Q. Okay. I just wanted to make sure I had heard it correct.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. All right, thank you. Do you remember your route that you flew with the first officer?

A. I do not.

Q. Okay -- and it's okay. I told you, I don't know is perfectly fine. So, it seems like you guys kind of fly kind of the same places a lot?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And you said he's a really smart guy, how is piloting ability? Was he a good stick and rudder type pilot?

A. Yeah.

Q. Or was he -- was there concerns you ever at?

A. No, not at all. Actually, he was my partner when I was upgrading in the simulator, too. Very good, I'm amazed at how his flying skills are because I heard he was off for some time before he got this job and was doing his own things. And yeah, I'm amazing how his flying skills are, like, he's great.

Q. Okay. Do you ever socialize much with him outside of work?

A. No, never.

Q. Do you socialize with many at work outside of work?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. Unfortunately, not here.

Q. No, it's okay. I just figured I would ask just in case. So, he's a good stick and rudder, good pilot, did you enjoy your time flying with him?

A. Yeah, of course. I enjoy flying with him always.

Q. Okay. Did you guys have any concerns that night with the airplane, with weather? Any --

A. I do not recall, it was a while ago. So, we don't have weather here, but other stuff might have been. I don't recall that night.

Q. Okay.

MR. LEE: Just --

MR. ETCHER: Sure.

MR. LEE: When you say that night, you meant the night they flew together?

MR. ETCHER: Yes, I apologize. I meant you and the first officer.

CAPT DATOSI: Exactly, that's what I said. I don't recall, it was a while ago.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you for the clarification.

MR. LEE: Thanks.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. All right. So, you said you were in training with the first officer?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. He was your partner when you were upgrading?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Let's talk about training for just a little bit.

A. Sure.

Q. How would you classify the training?

A. Pretty good, especially the simulator and Wallace are pretty helpful. They put us through the scenarios -- not this type of scenario, but normal kind of scenarios, we go over that; a lot have even got a lot of single-engine work. I wasn't good at it when I got hired when -- it's my first jet

job, so when initially I got hired, I had no clue how to fly the jet, so it took me a while to get used to it as an FO. He worked me through it, so simulators pretty good.

After you finish simulator training, then they put you up in IOE flying with check airmen, that's another part of it. It takes about -- anything between -- I forgot the number, actually, in the book, but between three to 60/70 hours, same as any other 121 carrier. Yeah, that's pretty much how it is.

Q. Okay.

A. And then, of course, for captains you have the FAA, right, which is riding with FAA. Yep.

Q. Okay. I know in the airline world it's always something we never want to think about, but has anybody ever not made it through training that you're aware of?

A. Yes.

Q. How often does that happen? Or let me rephrase that, can you recall the last time you heard that happening?

A. One hour ago.

Q. I'm sorry, say that again?

A. One hour ago. I don't know if that person just left because of the accident, or -- but he was still learning his training. So, I'm not sure he didn't make it, or he left just because of -- solely because of accident.

Q. So, that was -- I mean, like -- I just want to make sure that I had it clear, one hour ago you had somebody --

A. I just heard it one hour ago.

Q. Okay. Before that can you think of a time?

A. Let me remember. Probably last year, don't me -- don't ask name, I don't recall, but last year.

Q. Okay. All right. I know you said you had an FAA check right -- you know, FAA came

and observed you.

A. Yes, that's better.

Q. How often do you interact with the FAA? Do they come for your -- on your jump seats very often? Or do you just see them --

A. That was my last interaction with FAA, just at jump seat with Mark.

Q. And that was a little over a year and --

A. About a year.

Q. About a year ago? Okay. Before that, did you have much interaction with any of the FAA?

A. Not really.

Q. Okay. Do you -- did they -- do you see them around at all?

A. Yeah, I do see Mark around.

Q. Okay. All right. So, when you upgraded, how long was your training? How long was your ground school?

A. Ground school, about a month -- no, wait. I have to think about that, that's a while ago. So, if I'm not mistaken, which I might, it should be about two weeks.

Q. All right, and during that ground school -- do you feel when you come out of ground school, do you feel like you're ready for the simulator? Or is there still a lot of --

A. That's completely different.

Q. Okay.

A. So, ground school is not only about your simulator -- it's nothing about your simulator. It's about the system of the airplane, it's about safety, culture, paperwork, those kinds of things, not how to fly the simulator.

Q. Okay.

A. Flying the simulator, that's a different story. You go and talk with Wallace before and

after sim, and he teach you that. That's not a part of ground school. Ground school mainly is about the system of the airplane, safety of the place, our paperwork, our rules, our responsibilities, those kinds of things, but not how you fly the plane.

Q. Okay. So, you brought up a couple things in there on your ground school that kind of gets my interest for a little bit. You talked about paperwork?

A. Yes.

Q. They teach you how to do paperwork. On the line, when you've done your paperwork, have they ever come back to you later and said hey, can you change these numbers, or can you make any changes to any paperwork later?

A. Not changes, no.

Q. Okay. So, not changes, have they had you do post actions to paperwork before?

A. Not post actions to the paperwork, either. Maybe -- I don't remember -- recall anything, but maybe there was lost something sometime. But that was the only issue maybe -- I don't recall when was that, but maybe something was lost, to find it, and can you help us find it? (Verbatim)

Q. Okay.

A. Do you have a picture of that? Because we usually take pictures of -- I do take pictures of what I sign, like load sheets, sometimes, like, hazmat paperwork, I take picture of those. So, yeah, I sometimes have a copy of that or something, or -- yeah.

Q. So, is that something you do, or is that something that a lot of pilots that you've hear do, take pictures?

A. I don't know about other people.

Q. So, why do you?

A. I just want to have, like, some kind of things that I am -- okay, sign in duties and maybe -- I don't know, I just do.

Q. I -- and not saying it's right or wrong, I'm just curious. I like to figure out why people do

things, it just helps educate me.

A. I take pictures of everything, I have millions of pictures in my phone.

Q. Okay.

A. So, yeah.

Q. All right. I know you've worked at other airlines; how do you feel like the safety culture here is compared to some of your past employ?

A. Safety, all 121 couriers -- carriers that I've worked for are pretty much the same -- I would call it exactly the same. They are pretty much the same, yeah.

Q. Okay. Do you ever feel like you can't bring something forward?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. No.

Q. You don't feel like there will be any retaliation to you or anything?

A. No there is not any pressure here. Even for the newer -- but you volunteer. Basically, they say okay, these days are on the table, you want to fly it or not?

A. Okay. Let me look at my little list here. So, you have no problem talking to anybody, have you actually had to go above the chief pilot before?

Q. Not above the chief pilot, but sometimes he's busy. So, about my pay right now, I have to talk to DO. It's not going above him, but yes. It just when he's busy or it's somebody else's job. But no, not going above him, but parallel, like -- because some stuff -- okay, like, pay things and those things, Wallace doesn't get involved that much. So, yeah, I talk to DO, yeah.

Q. How do you feel like your pay is here compared to other --

A. Higher.

Q. Higher?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. So, you haven't had to go above him, but have you -- pilots talk, right? We -- everybody seems to talk, and you seem to be a fairly small group -- how many employees do you -- how many pilots, do you know?

A. Do I know, or do we have?

Q. How many pilots are employed at the time? Sorry.

A. Oh, okay. Ten on captain side, 11 on FO side, so 21.

Q. Okay. Have you heard of any of them having issues by bringing stuff forward?

A. I do not.

Q. Okay. I think I've gotten through most of my questions now, but I know you've got to be tired of talking with me. Do you need a break or anything?

A. I'm good.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. So, I'll pass it over to Bill and you can help educate him.

CAPT DATOSI: Sure.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay, Bill Bramble here. You mentioned other 121 jobs that you've had, can you tell me where those were?

A. Just one 121 and that was at PenAir.

Q. PenAir, okay. And what was your date of hire at --

A. PenAir?

Q. No, at Rhoades?

A. June 4, 2018.

Q. Okay, and how many years at PenAir?

A. About one year and -- one year; one year and one month, something like that.

Q. Okay, and Shawn asked you when you were on arrival to Honolulu and 810 was taking off, you think you did see the airplane?

A. I think I saw it.

Q. And I think he asked you if you saw anything abnormal, and I think you said no, but it went by pretty fast. I just want to make sure, do you recall seeing anything unusual about that airplane?

A. No, it wasn't clear.

Q. Okay.

MR. LEE: I'm sorry, when you said it went by pretty fast, are you talking about the question or the airplane?

MR. BRAMBLE: I'm talking about the question.

MR. LEE: Okay.

MR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. It went by in a tumble of words and --

MR. LEE: Okay.

MR. BRAMBLE: -- just wanted to make sure that --

CAPT DATOSI: You got that.

MR. BRAMBLE: -- the question was clear, and the answer was as intended and so forth.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay, and in that -- in your last flight with Gregory Ryan on June 20th, did he appear healthy and alert?

A. Yeah, sure.

Q. Okay. Does he normally?

A. Yeah, always.

Q. Okay. How, in general, do you like working for Rhoades Aviation?

A. I like it.

Q. And is there a company manager at the company that is responsible for managing safety?

A. Yes.

Q. Who's that?

A. Orlando.

Q. Okay. What's his last name?

A. I do not know.

Q. That's okay, we can look it up. I know Shawn's discussed a lot with you about safety culture and so forth, but just to wrap that up, do you have any safety related concerns about the company at all?

A. Not really.

Q. Okay, and how confident are you about the quality of the maintenance work at the company?

A. They are actually pretty good at their job, but everything breaks.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. That's all I have. Thanks, Amin.

CAPT DATOSI: Oh, thanks.

MR. ETCHER: Rich?

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Okay. Can you tell me what the engine out procedures that you do for eight right, that's what the, you know, crew had to do, so --

A. So --

Q. Do you remember what that is?

A. That's a heading 220, 1.3 or 1.4 if I remember right, (indiscernible) out of eight right.

Q. Okay. What about captain's authority, what -- you mentioned that the -- your procedures say this, and the checklists say this, what's your thought about captain's authority?

A. What do you mean?

Q. What -- as the Captain, what -- do you have leeway to make decisions, or do you have to follow this exactly no matter what?

A. No matter what, we have to follow it.

Q. So, that's how you take it, okay. As far as -- do you guys have a company frequency that you dial in?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Was there any communication going on with the accident airplane and you airborne? Did they call the company, did they call --

A. I called.

Q. Okay, so you called the company?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, and did you hear Captain Henry talking to the company at all?

A. No.

Q. No? We understand that -- and I'm not sure who was flying it, but one of the airplanes over in Hilo had an engine problem in the past year or so that --

A. That's Henry, again.

Q. Okay. That happened to Henry?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. So, the lining went into the engine.

A. That's Henry.

Q. So, what -- do you remember any discussion about that? Has there been a lot of engine problems that you know? I mean, things break, they're old airplanes --

A. Exactly.

Q. -- they, you know, they're well maintained, but have you noticed any other engine issues?

A. Engine issues, not -- it's older plane, again, anything leaks. I had leaks in Hilo -- I had a few leaks, for a fact, in Hilo, I called maintenance. That we had this leak that was, like, two months ago, I don't recall what airplane, what time, what day -- yeah. I called maintenance --

first I called Wallace, I called maintenance, okay, because we are not supposed to call Wallace, that's our call. But -- so, I'm not that experienced guy, I want somebody to have opinion, I don't know stuff. So, a lot of things I don't know, I ask for other people -- what do you think about this? And they said oh, yeah, you have to do this, and then, yeah, I called maintenance, they said okay, we're going to send the maintenance guy there. They send the maintenance guy there, fix the plane, I don't know what the issue was.

But we have -- we do have those kind of things, yeah. I had at least three of those, I don't call it incidents, but issues, like, yeah, that engine broke; there was leak. There was -- oh, another one was I had the issue with the compressor stops, again in Hilo. I grounded the plane until they sent the maintenance there. Yeah, we have those kind of things, but yeah. We're still addressing, we ground the plane until it's fixed, they send the maintenance. I'm not sure what they do, but yeah, they say it's fixed.

Q. So, the compressor stalls, what -- do you know what the maintenance was done on that to fix that?

A. I do not know.

MR. LEE: Okay. That's all I have, thanks.

MR. ETCHER: Thanks, Rich.

Clarence?

MR. KANAE: Oh, thank you,

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Amin, thanks for coming in.

A. You're welcome.

Q. Thank you for your time. My question is, as far as the flight crew, both captain or first officers, is there a procedure for monitoring the cargo loading or offloading?

A. Okay, that's actually the load supervisor's job. So, for the crew, myself and Wallace

taught me that when I was doing my IOE, that I have the load -- we get -- first get the load sheet, okay. So, there are three -- two to three copies of the load sheet that we produce when they are doing the weight and balance. So, one of those copies goes to the cockpit right away, and we are -- I do mine toward the cans that are going into the plane, that's how I start the APU (ph.) usually. All the stations, I see that, like, last three cans or so at the stations, that's how I start the APU. So, I monitor the cans that they are going in, I have the load sheet in front of me. So, I usually do monitor, I'm not sure about other people, but that's what Wallace taught me.

Q. Okay, great. Good. And what's your involvement after you've watched the airplane being loaded?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. What's your involvement with the weight and balance, making sure that it looks accurate?

A. For a fact, we can't weigh those cans. So, yes, you may try it, but that's the cans, we can't do anything about it, weighing it or anything. We can just see the numbers -- the labels, that's all we can do, we can't really weigh those. But we can just say okay, that's a PBJ, that's a can, that's the only thing we can do, we can't tell how heavy they are unless something is just, like, very obvious. That's it.

MR. KANAE: Wow, very good. Okay, and that's all I have. Thank you very much.

CAPT DATOSI: Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you. We're getting about ready to start round two. The good news is it's a whole lot less questions.

CAPT DATOSI: Oh.

MR. ETCHER: So, we just kind of like to follow up. Are you good, you need a break?

CAPT DATOSI: No, I'm good.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Just a second ago, Clarence said something about the cans, and you said it's a can or it's a PBJ?

A. Yes.

Q. What is a PBJ?

A. Okay. That's the -- they build the cargo over the -- what's that -- cookie sheets, so -- what do they call those cookie sheets? So, it's not in a can, it's just on some aluminum thing, so it's open.

Q. Okay.

A. So, you can't see it, or there is a net over it, or it's secured by something.

Q. Okay. So, it's kind of a pallet type of a --

A. Yeah. It's a pallet type of thing, but it's not a pallet, yeah. Yeah, they call it PBJ.

Q. Okay.

A. And even the weight and balance, that's what they call it, a PBJ.

Q. Thank you, I just wanted to make sure because people call PBJs all sorts of things.

A. Sure.

Q. Have you ever, here, had to declare an emergency?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. For what?

A. Maui, because I had the -- let me remember -- fire alarm going off, but that was not very -- the other one -- rear valve for -- that's what I got, yeah, on a descent.

Q. Wow. So, what did you have to do?

A. I have to declare emergency, follow the checklist, yeah, and land in Maui.

Q. Okay. Was there any damage done?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. That was a false error, whatever.

Q. Okay.

MR. LEE: Did you say you had a fire? Or the fire --

CAPT DATOSI: (indiscernible)

MR. LEE: Oh, okay.

CAPT DATOSI: Yeah, that was a false indication.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Okay. I know the night of the accident you were flying 809.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Have you ever flown the accident airplane?

A. Yeah, many times.

Q. When was the last time, can you recall?

A. A couple of days before accident.

Q. How did that airplane feel to you?

A. Everything was normal.

Q. Everything was normal? It has Dash-9 --

A. Dash-9 engines.

Q. Are they ever -- did they ever give you, as a crew, any things you have to be concerned about?

A. It's -- everything in Dash-9 engines are slower, so it's like you're in a slow flight, that's how I call it. Everything is a slower pace, that's how I see it. That's the only difference. I'm not -- I wasn't worried about it, but it's slower as it intended to be.

Q. Okay. Is there any differences on the takeoff between the Dash-9 and the Dash-15?

A. Yeah, sure.

Q. What are those differences?

A. Actually, its ground rate and (indiscernible) manual, as far as I remember for reduced thrust, lowest reduced thrust on Dash-9 is 183, lowest reduced thrust on Dash-15 and 17 is 191. So, that's a big difference.

Q. Okay.

A. So, it's much less power on the reduced thrust.

Q. All right. Do you notice that on the climb out that the power decreased? Or the less power?

A. Less power, you definitely feel it, yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. Did you have any mechanical issues with 810 that night?

A. No. I don't recall.

Q. Okay, that's fine.

A. Probably not.

Q. I know that was a while ago, so my apologies. All right. When you upgraded and you were doing your IOE, who was your line check airman?

A. Wallace.

Q. He -- does he do all the line checks?

A. No.

Q. Who else does line checks?

A. Oh, what's his name? We had the other captain, he just left, like, two months ago for FedEx, but he was the line checks, and we have Ed Rinsma.

Q. Okay.

A. Does line checks.

MR. LEE: I think that's R-I-N-S-M-A?

CAPT DATOSI: Rinsma, yeah, I guess so, yeah.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. The last question I have here before the last round, and I --

A. Sure.

Q. I have some, really, last follow-up questions when everybody's done, but you said there was one airplane you flew that had a compressor stall?

A. Yes.

Q. How did you -- tell me, how did you know it was a compressor stall?

A. Because it made sound like compressor stall --

Q. Okay.

A. -- up in altitude.

Q. Okay. Did you feel it?

A. Yeah.

Q. What was the feeling?

A. A kick.

Q. A kick?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. A kick fast, a yaw?

A. No.

Q. Help me understand what your kick is.

A. Let me remember. We yawed for a sec (sic), a kick sound -- that's it, yaw for a sec, no indication on any of the engines, no indication at all. So, we -- I wasn't even sure which engine it comes from. So, compressor stalls, that's a thing, FO thinks it comes from his side, captain thinks it comes from his side. So, yeah, I did not know which side was it, but we assumed by the way it yawed to the right, it's left. So -- let me rephrase that. So, yeah, by the way it yaws, that's the side.

Q. That's the side of the compressor stall?

A. Exactly.

Q. So, which way did yours yaw then?

A. I do not recall, it's months ago.

Q. Okay.

A. So, I do not know really what was it, and what plane was it at all. So --

Q. So, was that going to an out station, or coming into Honolulu?

A. Going to out station.

Q. And just so I understand, when you landed did -- was it a --

A. I write it up? I asked maintenance to show up, and maintenance showed up, and did whatever their men are supposed to say, and we checked the airplane, and everything looked fine, and we flown it back here. It didn't do anything.

Q. So, it didn't act up again?

A. No.

Q. You didn't get another compressor stall?

A. No, and it was up in altitude, too. That was flight level 240.

Q. Okay. Do you guys normally go those high flight levels?

A. I usually go, not other pilots.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. All right. I think that's all I have for right now. Thank you so much.

CAPT DATOSI: Sure.

MR. ETCHER: Bill?

MR. BRAMBLE: Yeah, do you recall the name of the Captain who left for FedEx?

CAPT DATOSI: Brian Bell.

MR. BRAMBLE: Brian Bell?

CAPT DATOSI: Yeah.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. That's all I have, thanks.

CAPT DATOSI: You're welcome.

MR. ETCHER: Rich?

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Reduced thrust, you kind of mentioned something about that, what's the company policy? What do you guys do in practice?

A. Okay. We changed that practice just a month ago. It used to be a part of our load sheet. So, the computer used to produce a number for our reduced thrust, now with the policy change because -- I'm not sure what the reason is. They told us we have to find the reduced thrust ourselves, so we do it by the manuals now ourselves. So, that's a captain's job now to find it we (indiscernible), it asks you temperature and the weight.

Q. Okay. With the Dash-9 engines, are -- have you had any issues with high temps on engines on departure?

A. With reduced thrust, no.

Q. Okay. What about without reduced thrust?

A. We always do reduced thrust, we never do high power -- like max power.

Q. All right. That's because you're never at a weight that you need it, or --

A. It's always -- that's our policy, to do reduced thrust all the time.

Q. As far as weight and balance, would you know -- you know, typically flying to Kaho‘olawe, the weights of the airplanes, do you know kind of a ballpark what the takeoff weights would be?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. What would be a lot of weight, and then maybe between the different airplanes because some can carry more and less?

A. Uh-huh. The max weight on 810 is 107 -- for a night, let's talk about night because the

temperature was right. Usually at night it's 107/110, that's a max takeoff -- and for that plane, 810. Usually, we go around anything between 79 to -- max I've seen, that I recall, is 105. We are never almost ever close to max weight takeoff.

Q. Okay. Is there any flap settings that you guys -- what are your flap settings you use?

A. Yes, okay. That really depends on airplane again. With that plane -- with 810 I always use flaps two, with Dash-15 and Dash 17s, I've used flaps five.

Q. Okay. What's the benefit of leaving flaps two with the Dash-9?

A. It gives you a little bit more weight.

MR. LEE: Okay. All right, thank you. I appreciate it.

MR. ETCHER: Clarence?

MR. KANAE: Oh, thank you.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Amin, in comparison to the actual airplane with Dash-9 engines, can you relate to the simulator how close are they? I mean, is the training very similar? Is there differences?

A. Training is pretty similar, but I can't really answer how similar it is to that particular plane. But it's the same airplane -- same kind of airplane, everything is the same. All the pilot is different, that's pretty much it.

Q. What about the engine? You mentioned Dash-9 as just so underpowered.

A. Exactly.

Q. How about in the simulator, do they compare to that? Can you simulate the Dash-9 engine?

A. Probably not.

Q. Oh, is it a 15, a 17?

A. 17.

Q. 17? The simulator?

A. Yes, that's what I recall.

Q. Yeah.

A. I might be wrong.

MR. KANAE: Okay, that's all I have. Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So, just because we're about ready to wrap up, we always like to make sure, is there anything you can think of that you're like oh, if they would just ask me this it might help them, and we didn't? Is there anything you can think of?

A. Not really.

Q. Okay. So, if you were king for the day -- captains are always kinds, right?

A. I wish so.

Q. If you were king a day, is there something that you could -- you would love to see changed, or enhanced, or anything like that that you could just say this is what we're doing, this is why, and that you see as something that needs to be done?

A. In the company?

Q. Absolutely.

A. Or in my life?

Q. We don't want to go down that alley, let's just stay with the company?

A. No, I don't think so. Everything is as it's supposed to be, that's how I see it.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't see anything, like, particular.

Q. Okay. Like I told you early on, we're into this for safety, and we always like to learn, and pilots are the ones that's flying the aircraft, they're the ones running the route. So, they see things maybe differently, and it's always good to have that perspective. So, is there anything maybe not

even with the company, but just on your routes, or how you handle cargo, or -- that you would love to see a little safer?

A. I have to think about that a lot, but nothing for right now.

MR. ETCHER: Okay, well, perfect. I think we've -- you've helped us a lot, get a good idea of the crew and the company. So, we thank you for coming in and educating me. Sorry it took up so much of your time, but you really have been a huge help, so I appreciate it.

CAPT DATOSI: Any time.

MR. ETCHER: And we will end this at 2:20, Hawaii Time.

(Whereupon, at 2:20 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII
ON JULY 2, 2021
Interview of Amin Dasonti

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FA174

PLACE: Honolulu, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Carolyn Hanna
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
	*	

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Interview of: TEIMOUR RIAHI, President/Owner

Rhodes Aviation/TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday,
July 7, 2021

APPEARANCES:

WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operations Factor Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

WILLIAM KATT, Esq.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

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I N T E R V I E W

(2:15 p.m.)

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, this is an interview with Teimour Riahi on July 7th, and 2:15 p.m. and, am I saying your name properly?

MR. RIAHI: Yeah, Teimour Riahi.

MR. BRAMBLE: Teimour Riahi, okay.

MR. RIAHI: One of the better ones I've heard.

MR. BRAMBLE: My best try. Okay. My name is Bill Bramble, and I'm a Human Performance Investigator with the NTSB. Mr. Shawn Etcher and I are leading the operations in human performance working group for accident investigation number DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not a part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I would now like to have Mr. Etcher and each of the group members briefly introduce themselves, Mr. Etcher?

MR. ETCHER: Good afternoon. I'm Shawn Etcher. I'm the Operational Factors Investigator with the NTSB.

MR. KANAE: Hi, Teimour, Clarence Kanae with the FAA office

-- local FAA office, operations inspector here at the Honolulu CMO.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, Boeing safety pilot.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, today we will be using a digital recorder, after the interview we'll send that recording out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to review that transcription to correct it for any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent

reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're here simply for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that however, we can't offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity and the transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for this accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask them one at a time and everyone's been instructed not to interrupt the person who is asking questions at that time. It will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow up questions after that person has a turn. Please, answer all questions to best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question please say so, and if you realized you've misstated something, or you want to correct something please do.

You're entitled to a representative of your choosing, is there someone you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. RIAHI: Yes, so my name is Teimour Riahi and I'm the CO and owner of the Trans Executive Airlines of Hawaii Inc., and Rhoades Aviation Inc., and I have to my right Mr. Bill Katt as our attorney.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, and he's your representative?

MR. RIAHI: He is our representative, exactly.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. That being said we'll proceed with the questions -- let me pull that up.

MR. ETCHER: Do you want Bill's voice for the recording?

MR. BRAMBLE: Oh, yes. Mr. Katt, can you introduce yourself please?

MR. KATT: William Katt, I'm an attorney with Wilson Elser.

MR. BRAMBLE: Thank you.

INTERVIEW OF TEIMOUR RIAHI

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right, Mr. Riahi, can you spell your full name for the record please?

A. Sure, Teimour, first name last name Riahi, R-I-A-H-I.

Q. And where do you reside?

A. I reside in Honolulu.

Q. Okay. And do you also reside elsewhere?

A. No.

Q. And how old are you?

A. 69.

Q. Okay. And your job title at Rhoades Aviation or TransAir?

A. I'm the DO, President/DO.

Q. And when were you hired here -- or, when did you found the company?

A. I found -- which company? We have two certificates.

Q. So, why don't you give me an answer for each of them if they're different.

A. Okay, well in 1982 the Trans Executive Airlines of Hawaii Inc., TTP TransAir was formed on February 2nd, 1982. And -- oh correction, February 9th, 1982. And in 2011, I purchased a company by the name of Rhoades Aviation which later we reassigned it DBA TransAir in Indiana and Rhoades Aviation Inc. currently no longer operates in Indiana, and the corporate papers and everything has been transferred to Hawaii. So, Rhoades Aviation is a Hawaii company.

Q. And did you found TransAir in 1982?

A. Yes. I was the founder.

Q. Okay. All right.

A. And TransAir offers as a Part 135, and Rhoades Aviation offers and Part 121.

Q. Okay. You're the CEO of both companies, though?

A. Yes, I'm the -- they're sister companies, yeah. I'm a Director of Operations for the 135 operations.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. As to the, you know, FARs.

Q. For the 135?

A. For the 135, yes.

Q. Okay. And you're the -- but you're the -- you serve as the CEO of Rhoades

A. CEO of Rhoades Aviation, yes.

Q. Okay. Okay. Is there a different CEO for TransAir?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Do they have a -- who heads up that organization? Is there a President?

A. Well, it's a small operation so I head both operations.

Q. Oh, I see. So, you're --

A. Yeah.

Q. CEO and DO.

A. Yeah, exactly.

Q. I see.

A. Exactly.

Q. Okay. I'm sure that your duties are many, but if you could give us in a nutshell your roles and responsibilities for CEO for the two companies that'd be good.

A. Well, very simply put you know I oversee just about all departments making sure they have correct financial resources, they have the correct manpower in place. I set the coarse of the marketing and operations of the company. And I assure that we have qualified people in different positions to conduct what they're supposed to be doing.

Q. Okay. Can you provide a brief overview of your aviation background that led to your founding the company?

A. Sure. I went to school in England and in 1971, I got my first CAA, Civil Aviation

Authority, the British Civil Aviation authority pilots license, and after I finished my college I came to United States and I immigrated here and continued my flying and became a flight instructor at California, and then I came to Hawaii in 1978 and became a flying instructor out here at Honolulu, airport.

Q. Okay.

A. And the rest of my aviation career really was developed by the operating -- operation of the new companies I formed.

Q. Did you form other aviation companies before TransAir?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Just TransAir and --

A. Exactly. Trans Executive under the corporate name and the DBA was TransAir.

Q. Okay. And do you currently work for any other companies besides TransAir?

A. No. That's my full-time job, 100 percent.

Q. All right. Can you give us an overview of your certificates and ratings?

A. Oh, my personal aviation certificate?

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. Yes, I have an ATP, Boeing 737 type rates and short 360 type rating, and my certificate number is [redacted]

Q. Okay. And what's your estimated total flight time in big round numbers.

A. About maybe 10,500 plus.

Q. Okay. How much on the 737?

A. 737, approximately I would say, maybe 300 to 350 hours. Maybe a little bit more than that, up a little more.

Q. And how long ago were you typed on the 7-3.

A. 2017.

Q. Okay. All right let's talk about Rhoades Aviation. So, I have a number of questions sort of about size and scope, but I don't know if I should ask you separately for TransAir and Rhoades or --

A. Ask them, whichever question, whichever company you want to go first, yeah. I'll give information on both.

Q. Okay. So, I guess we'll start -- let me copy and paste questions.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. So, I can do them twice. All right, so Rhoades Aviation can you describe briefly for me the size and the scope of the company.

A. Well, the size of the company is, starting with the employees we have 230 employees. And it operates five, well minus one, five Boeing 737 minus one, so we're currently four in the possession of the company. And we have headquarters in Honolulu with neighbor islands of Hilo, Kuna, Maui, and Lihue as substations.

Q. Okay. And is a private or public company?

A. It's a private company.

Q. How many pilots at Rhoades?

A. How many pilots at Rhoades? I believe we have 24 pilots at Rhoades.

Q. And do you have bases outside of Hawaii?

A. Negative.

Q. Okay. Okay how about TransAir? Can you tell us the size and scope of TransAir?

A. Yeah, TransAir is again headquartered in Honolulu, and we have 59 employees, and about 13 pilots, and utilize full TransAir Rhoades Aviation utilize the same terminals on the islands of -- big island of Hawaii, which consists of Kona, and Hilo, as well as Maui at Kahului Airport and Lihue on the arm of Hawaii.

Q. Okay. And number of planes at TransAir?

A. TransAir currently operates six short 360 aircraft.

Q. Okay. All right before the accident did you have any significant flight changes planned at either company?

A. Yes. Recently we invested in purchasing a Boeing 737400, and this aircraft is currently at Commercial Jet in Alabama, Gunther, Alabama, and getting ready to go through a conversion. I was planning on adding that to the certificate as we retire more airplanes the time comes; we are planning on operating Being 737400s.

Q. Okay. Before the accident did you have any major staffing changes planned either in terms of management, changing management structure or number of employees overall, line employees?

A. Negative.

Q. And had you had any major changes in the last year or two in either of those areas in terms of numbers of planes or numbers of employees?

A. Negative on number of planes, and negative on number of management people. I have to explain there are some, we have temporary employees, like seasonal employees of course, this sort of every year we go through a certain number of those. So --

Q. And --

A. No major --

Q. No major increase or decrease in total

A. No, no, no. No major decrease.

Q. Okay.

A. Pretty much stable, you know.

Q. Okay.

A. If any increases there may have been less than maybe two percent higher.

Q. Okay.

A. Approximately two percent higher every year, three percent higher every year. In the past

maybe three years.

Q. Okay.

A. But, no major management change, though.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. However, recently I must -- very recently we hired a new Chief Inspector, Mr. Ron Lenhart (PH) as well as another qualified maintenance person at the maintenance department at Rhoades Aviation.

Q. Okay. All right and the seasonal fluctuation you were talking about?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. What's -- is there a busy season in and a slow season?

A. There is, yes. Our busy season is mostly during the holiday times.

Q. Oh.

A. Which for us extends -- you start from approximately November 15th, to about December 27th, 28th.

Q. Okay. And what are your biggest contracts as far as like FedEx and that sort of thing?

A. Yeah, we have -- our biggest contract by volume is U.S. Postal Service. Next to that is Federal Express Air, and others.

Q. How much of your work is made up of -- or your package volume is made up of the Post Service and FedEx, is that like half of the business? Or is it?

A. It's I would say approximately 55 percent of our volume is U.S. Mail, Operations, and other maybe 43, 45 percent FedEx. I would say FedEx Air and FedEx Ground put together approximately another 40 percent, 45 percent.

Q. Okay.

A. And the rest is just others, miscellaneous.

Q. Okay. Has Rhoades Air had any previous accidents since you bought the company?

A. No.

Q. And what about TransAir?

A. TransAir had one accident in 1996, Cessna 402.

Q. Okay. What happened there?

A. The report came as a parapet parlor center. The aircraft basically took off and made a right turn and hit the ground.

Q. Okay.

A. I believe the NTSB report still there.

Q. We'll look it up.

A. Would be, yeah.

Q. Well, before I go on to organizational structure, I guess I should ask also in the last, say in the last year have there been any major incidents? Near misses, almost accidents that you've had to investigate

A. No.

Q. All right. And the company's organizational structure, can you describe the chain of command flowing down from you for the Rhoades Aviation side?

A. Okay, well the 1-19 (ph.) position of course, we have right under me is my Vice President of Operations, Tracy Reasoner (ph.), and then of course you know there's Director of Operations, Director of Maintenance, Chief Inspector, Mechanics, Chief Pilots, and I go on, they would have their own people under them.

Q. Mm-hmm. And where does the Director of Safety fall in that chain?

A. That's an independent position that reports to me.

Q. Okay. All right. How did you select your Vice President for Operations, Tracy Reasoner?

A. Tracy Reasoner?

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. Tracy Reasoner's background is actually military, he was in the Marines, and I met Tracy close to about 17 years ago, 17 or 18 years ago I believe. Very capable person. Knows the operations very well. Person to get along with everybody, is certainly capable, a lot of good qualities, I don't know how to explain, there's a lot of good qualities about him.

Q. And what's his role in the company as the Vice President of operations?

A. Well, he reports to me, and we have of course daily, you know communications. I've set it up that everybody could easily report to him, and they report to me of course. But you know I should say something you know, I'm very sort of a hands on kind of a guy, and I mean, we have a lot of these charts, you know because we have charts, but we're not a typical you know large corporation where there's a lot of layers of managements you know, me and him are involved with everything and we check with everybody on a daily basis just to kind of get a feel for the company we get reports of the operations, air operations, ground operations, safety reports of course, you know.

Q. Okay.

A. So, again, we may have these titles --

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. But, to me titles doesn't matter, you know it's just like you know go see people, talk with them, see who they are, what they do, what they're doing right what they're doing wrong. Very hands on, our company's very, very hands on. And of course, I encourage that throughout the company, I encourage it to my maintenance department, I encourage that to the Director of Operations, the Chief Pilot -- the most importantly so was the communication.

Q. All right. How about David Seest, how do you select him for his role as DO and what is his role in that company?

A. Yeah, David Seest used to work at Rhoades Aviation at one time. At the time that I purchased Rhoades Aviation he was engaged with other employment, however, he was very highly

recommended and I approached him and he's been my Director of Operations since. Since the beginning. I should say he's the second because the few months we had someone else, I can't remember the name, but that person you know found other employment of choice and then David Seest came on at that point and he's been here with us since.

Q. Okay. And, how do you view his role in the company?

A. Oh, he has a very positive role in the company you know we meet with each other daily, we get along very well, and you know he's a good person, he knows the job he's nicely by the book which I like everyone to be. So, he brings a lot of good knowledge to the company.

Q. All right and how about Mike Kimble (ph.), how did you select him and how do you view his role?

A. All right, Mike Kimble the same, you know, Mike Kimble has worked me for about I think close to about six years now. And, his previous experience you know would launch carriers, what attracted me because he's not known each other from a previous life and he came to Hawaii and I realized he had a lot of good wealth of information about launching airplanes and just you know the type of equipment we fly, and as a result I decided to hire him. And he's been with us close to about five or six years now. Very capable individual.

Q. And I presume his role is to oversee what all the maintenance folks are doing?

A. he's the director of maintenance 121 and oversees all of the maintenance operations.

Q. Okay. And how --

A. With the help of his lieutenants --

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. And his staff.

Q. And how did you select Orlando as a Director of Safety position?

A. Orlando, again, he was working for us for quite many years you know under Part 135, and he was our mechanic, he was our director of maintenance on Part 135, he also became our chief

inspector on the Part 135, and then re-assigned him to prod 121 operations because of his experience and he was a mechanic until we assigned him with a safety position at Rhoades Aviation.

Q. Okay. And how do you see his role as Director of Safety, what are the kinds of things you expect him to accomplish in that role?

A. Well, I mean there's a specific description of what the Director of Safety's duties and responsibilities are in our Safety and Internal Evaluation Manual, SIEM. And he he's bound by that.

Q. Okay. How was he trained for that role?

A. His training for that role is really the long and wide experience of experience he's had in the business, the airline industry. Prior to joining us was working for Air Marshall Islands, and ever since coming to Hawaii he's worked for us for many, many years. Operating our maintenance department at the 135 level and wealth of experience that he transferred into 121 operations, so he understands the culture, he understands the safety features, and that knowledge helps him do his job as a Director of Safety.

Q. Okay. Can you describe your relationship with FAA in recent years, I guess let's focus on the last year or two?

A. I think I can never find even one inspector that I didn't like. I mean you like and dislike people, right? Human nature, but I've always had very good relationship with the FAA in the past. So since you said in the past between maybe one or two years, we've had in the past year or so, just over a year ago, our inspection team was changed to Mr. Mark Butin (ph.), Mr. Ray Lesane (ph.) and Mr. Ace Acevedo (ph.), and I think that they're very good people, they're very nice people.

Q. Okay.

A. On a personal level we get along very well.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. But, professionally I'd like to see things a little differently. I think the process could be improved.

Q. Can you give us some examples?

A. Oh, during my career during this operation, and that's the only operation I've been involved with, you know, never worked with any other airline. I've always been used to working with the FAA very straight forwardly, you know, the letter that we receive is no more than about maybe half a page, or maybe one page, or maybe one page and a quarter of the next page. So, it's very much to the point, exactly what it is, and I'm very used to that. I've always been used to that since I opened this operation 39 years ago. The team we have right now, again they have very good points, we do not disagree with the pints that they have, however, we've just been many occasions we've had to correct them, and they've been resisting accepting the fact that they were wrong. But, then again, they came around and they realized they were wrong about specific issues that we were discussing.

So, again, this team believes in really long letters, you know we were receiving letters like four, five, six pages long and I've got examples of it, you know. Eventually after so many of these letters, we had short notice to get back to them, five days and then consistently another two letters next day. Another six pages of it for another six pages, another seven days for that ten days for this, so I've brought it up to the attention of Tiffany Chitwood (ph.) who is the manager of the CMO Office and I requested if at all possible to reduce the discussions on these letters because we were all getting confused by the time that you read everything it becomes very confusing and we would have to spend a lot more time to digest exactly how that letter was supposed to be answered. And I truly said that look, you bombard us with all these letters, and it takes our eyes away from what's most important to do within our company, you know. To promote safety, and after that meeting I believe, they agreed with what I said, and the letters became somehow, less in content.

Mr. Butin was never happy about that, and I felt that he took a wrong, maybe wrong attitude towards me because I brought it up to the CMO Office. But, I mean, again the things that Mr. Butin said wasn't all totally wrong. We accepted you mostly everything was all manual contents and upgrades of the manuals, which we had no issues with you know, we agreed with you know with the fact that we have to upgrade our manuals to a point of satisfaction both for us and of course for the FAA. So, that's how I would describe my CMO, my CMT team. Again, great people, everyone of them is very nice, very courteous; but Mr. Butin, number one, he writes long letters, and number two, he talks so long not allowing anyone to get in and a typical discussion about something with him is like everybody has to be quiet, he talks about maybe 20 minutes in a row, and people get bored and they think, you know, it affects their ability to understand what the subject matter is.

And you know, jokingly I've brought it to his attention, and say can you keep it nice and simple, so you know people don't fall asleep, you know. But nothing personal at all, I think he's a very nice gentleman, he does a very good job. He wants to do a good job of course, you know and some areas we don't appreciate the fact that like -- an example, the day of the accident we were all very worried about our pilots, we were worried about the accident, you know what happened looking for all kinds of answers and we received this -- I think it's another four five letter from Mr. Butin that gives us another five days, seven days you know to adhere to something.

And, not complaining. I'm not asking to do that but just about everybody was so kind to ask about our pilots and you know show their grief to the team at Rhoades Aviation. We never had trauma or CMO office anything. I should say with the exception of when Mr. Kraus (ph.) called me and wanted to get some fuel samples and he showed his sorrow about the accident which I appreciated.

Q. How about the previous certificate management team? How was that relationship?

A. Excellent. We have never had any CMT team under Part 135 or 121 for that matter, that

we felt so differently, in comparison to the CMT team that we have today.

Q. And how's your relationship with Ms. Chitwood?

A. Excellent. I don't know Ms. Chitwood personally, she was the head of 135 a few years ago I believe, and you know she sat in some of the meetings that we had, you know, about the 135 certificates, she was very courteous, she's a very courteous person. Again, I don't have any official experience with Ms. Chitwood, but I believe she's a wonderful lady, very nice. Every time I've spoken with her, she's -- her notes as well as her voice is very friendly, and nice.

Q. Okay. Can you give me a brief overview of the company's safety programs and maybe how those have evolved over time?

A. Well, safety is a -- I mean you know, it's bred into a company, I mean an airline operation you know could be applied to any operation in fact, but especially with the airlines, you know. Without safety, we cannot operate. We pay very, very huge attention to safety operations and in support of that you know for many years now you know we have instructed everyone to attend a mandatory meeting on Tuesdays and Fridays and these meetings you know typically go for about two hours, two and a half hours, sometimes longer. And we talking about the safety issues, we talk about the operations, it's an open forum for everyone to bring in their opinions. But, the safety is a big topic always, we talk about our SMS, we talk about our reports -- you know we have an anonymous system that you know we get reports and we bring it up and see what we have.

We have a chart -- recently we've been working with Mr. Butin and the team, the CMT team replacing our SIEM, Safety Internal Evaluation Manual with a good version of -- it's actually a software called VOCUS that is a SMS VOCUS, it's an SMS program, and so far we decide to go into five phases of presentations, you know, to the CMT team. And so far, we run through three and

Mr. -- was very, very happy about that, he thinks that he's going to be really good, so we got two more phases of introduction of the this specific SMS tool that would eventually take over our

safety and email and internal aviation manual. And it's really good because anyone can get in there and look at all the reports there at any place that they are and they can put their input, anonymous reports can go right through that, and it gets assigned a number, it's a very complete program that our existing manual does not allow us to follow as efficiently as this software does. So, we've provided the idea to Mr. Butin, and Mr. Butin is very happy about it, you know he's like the presentations that we've had so far, which is three. We got one more -- actually two more to go, hopefully before he can approve that manual.

Q. So that would be a new safety manual that would replace the existing one --

A. It is.

Q. -- that is built around the VOCUS system.

A. Absolutely, yes.

Q. Okay.

A. That's right. We will no longer use the existing safety manual, and we use the VOCUS program.

Q. Okay.

A. So that's what the efforts are right now to --

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. To introduce that into the system, which I believe is going to be very, very -- well, it's been very well received so far by the FAA.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. But we got two more phases to go still.

Q. All right. So, what's your understanding of what a safety management system is? How would you describe that?

A. Well, safety management system is just about everything, you know. It's you know, you want to launch an aircraft you look to A, B, C -- A to Z of what you have to do to launch an

aircraft, and every one of these steps has a safety associated with it. So, it's not to do with the aircraft, it's to do with accidents, it's to do with personnel, to do with reports.

It's a culture, safety culture of the operations trying to find out what is right or wrong and accepting and encouraging every employee to putting their own thoughts, what they think should be done better as information really helps with the SMS to find the root cause and find the control for it and of course safety assurance. After that -- and then the monitoring system that your (indiscernible) the control that you put in place. So, it's a very, very good program. It's a new program of course to the operators 121 operators, but it's very efficient program, and we welcome that very, very much, we like that.

Q. Have you -- what kind of experience have you had in terms of from implementing SMS as you have so far, what kinds of things have you learned from doing that? Has it been -- has it provided new kinds of information that you may not have had before?

A. Yeah, well I mean -- I don't want to promote myself, basically, but I have always had these issues at hand, as a -- as someone that sits on top and not just myself, any CEO, you would have to have a really nice birds eye view of everything, and the safety is the biggest thing, because without safety you're going to have an injured employee, you don't want to have equipment that doesn't work when it's supposed to work, and anything and everything that promotes the operation of business on a daily basis is going to be very important to a CEO. So, in a way, we've always been doing except that you know, not in the format that the SMS has provided us, which is more comprehensive. So, that's my projection of the SMS system.

Q. Have you found any -- what is the benefit of having that more comprehensive format and -- I'm always interested in this because every company implements it in a different way and has different challenges and different scale and all of that --

A. Right.

Q. So, I'm just wondering -- like what's your experience been, in terms have you learned

anything new from this new type of approach. Or is it --

A. Well, I think the best thing about this approach is the company right because like I said I've been practicing my own type of SMS as a CEO watching over the operations and making sure is everything is nice and safe for every step of the way, but I think our employees have not been exposed to that in that sense. In the past, without the official SMS system introducing into one-to-one operations you see things maybe, employee see things and say something but now this is really a con -- it's a cultural change for 121, and I've heard some carriers having problem with it. We don't call ourselves the God given gift to the SMS we all are learning every day, and the fact that everyone becomes compliant and they understand you, every year it's going to get better and better.

Q. What is the -- what is sort of the nature of the cultural change that goes along with that? You'd mentioned that the -- it's a cultural change from 121.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. How is -- how are the cultures changing in these organizations that have these types --

A. It's organization. To me personally, organization. It makes people think twice before they take a step into in any direction, and watching the safety -- safety becomes a mandate that you have to look into, you have to observe, and the fact that when you mitigate things when you actually bring the safety items up for review and they realize that if you do not follow certain procedures, it has consequences that may not be very pleasant. So this is what SMS is bringing up to everybody's mind, it dissects everything, it opens it up. It's not just, hey don't touch the fire because it's going to be burn you. It tells you exactly why that thing going to burn you, how you can avoid that, it gives you the guidance. Guidance to provide safety for the operations, so that's the cultural change from before SMS and now the SMS injected into the 121 operations. We are hoping one day it's going to go into 135. Thanks God that we already have 135 operations, and these two companies are so close so, we actually

-- we're doing the same thing we did at 135 operation as well, we are trying to at 135 operations, too.

Q. Okay. It is our understanding that in the safety guidance or safety policy that you're named as the accountable executive for safety; is that correct?

A. That's correct, sir.

Q. Okay.

A. No existing manual.

Q. And what does that mean to be the accountable executive for safety?

A. Well, I mean, again, just making sure the safety policy of the company is carried out throughout the company. Assure that every manager that we have at different positions they understand the consequences of safety and they apply it to their operations and promote that throughout the company.

Q. Okay. Any particular challenges in implementing safety management system in your organization? Anything that you're like this part of it is tying us in knots we're having a hard time figure out how to implement it or how to make some -- get some value out of it?

A. You know, I mean. This is a very good standard program that they be promoting each and every day and our biggest concern is for people to be compliant and make sure that they understand that this is for their safety and for the safety of the operations. At any company there are people that come and go like for example, our biggest challenge would be probably to implement this with the seasonal workers, because they're there for a short time, they still have to go through training and but surprisingly, I was very surprised the past two years that we've had actually about -- maybe two and half years, maybe two and half three years that we've had -- actually, no, it's three years March 2018 I think. In the past couple of years even the seasonal workers are really on board, when we send them through the onboarding, what we call the onboarding program they go through a certain training, hazmat training, recognition, and all of that

so they're (indiscernible) into it, actually, they're -- but this is always the biggest because they're not 100 percent there, they're only there for a few days -- I mean not a few days, but few weeks maybe. But a lot of them appreciate that, and some people don't. We have them both, that's the honest truth of it. We have to watch a little bit more.

Q. All right. What are the biggest hazards for your type of operation given its unique characteristics?

A. Well, can you tell me one thing that is not a big hazard in aviation? To me everything is a hazard. Fueling an aircraft, fueling the fuel truck itself, training the pilots, training the mechanics, buying parts, all the things of our vendors, they're promoting the safety culture of the operation, it's an ongoing operation and again safety comes to the forefront of all of it.

Q. Yeah, so as an example.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. I worked an accident in 2002 with FedEx, it was a controlled flight into terrain accident short of the runway and it was very disappointing for them because they had identified controlled flight into terrain as a significant hazard for their operation --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Because a lot of their flying was at night, and they're going into a lot of airports, some of them maybe not as having as much infrastructure and so forth. So, they were trying to come up with ways to reduce the risk of controlled flight into terrain accidents on approach --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. -- and they had developed these special pages in their manual called salmon pages that had additional information about the airfield that might relate to those hazards.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. So, sometimes I've seen some companies that have prioritized a particular type of hazard like that may be unique because they're flying at night --

A. Right.

Q. For example, or because they're operating helicopters visually in close proximity to terrain or you know, things like that. So, I just wondered if there was anything about the way that your company operates that's kind of unique that you may have said, you know what, this aspect of it is something that we need to pay close attention and put in some mitigation strategies because of the unique aspects of what we do. Is there been anything like that that you can think of?

A. Very good question. We've been doing just about the same thing you know for years, since I founded the company in 1982, it's been predominantly over 99 percent of our flights is conducted at nighttime, and I think the unique challenge that's unique to us is always been the night operations because obviously the visibility is different in daytime operations. That's always been very unique to us, I mean the most unique thing about our company fly nighttime, over 90 percent of our operations are nighttime. But we have not had particularly an issue that would be concerning about flying night, except the fact of course flying night. But the fact that you know we go to known airports, we only fly into full measure airports, including Honolulu would be five. That's all I can say right now.

Q. Okay. And are there any recurring safety issues at the company's been trying to address, say in the months or maybe a year before the accident, anything that had been brought to your attention as, I don't know, a recurring issue --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Or something that was high priority for the safety team, anything along those lines?

A. Yeah, we identify safety items as they become evident, there has been some chronic issues with maintenance issues sometimes pressurization may be an issue. Or, so -- since we do cast (ph.) meetings as I mentioned earlier, we have weekly meetings two days on Tuesday's and Friday's of every week. We have extensive safety meetings and everything comes up. On top of that, we have cast meetings -- monthly, the safety committee meetings after the cast meetings so

everything is all right there exactly what happened in the past month that we bring up and we look at things that are times that there's been some chronic issues that we have addressed. So, the actual comes up in the cast meetings, and of course on our weekly, twice weekly meeting. However, we are again every day we're looking at the writeups that comes up with the airplane. In touch with my Director of Operations and Director of Maintenance and Chief Inspector on a daily basis inquiring about the writeups, inquiring about the parts, inquiring about the when the next engine going to be due. So, on top of that meetings, I'm also inquiring about all this other information most on a daily basis.

Q. Whoops, hit the wrong key. Is there anything over the last couple years that's kept you up at night that's been like you know this has been one thing that's been identified as a safety issue, and how do I go about solving that?

A. Honestly, I keep everybody else up at night, you know?

Q. Nothing keeps me up at night. Let me see -- I want to go back and explain a little bit more about -- you said I talk about chronic issues, right? Pressurization as I mentioned you know, has been written up on a chronic issue. But mostly it's been written by one person, and one person only. So, it felt that this person maybe had a different, I don't know maybe the ears a little bit felt differently, because most always was written up. And of course, the FAA knows about that, too. This is all information that we've shared with the FAA. So, the same airplane, you know when the pilot flies it, he has writeup on the pressurization and then someone else flies it after they corrected -- they changed something, of course, and (indiscernible) they have to you know, and the other crew doesn't have any issue on the ride up. Sometimes the pilot has that -- one of the pilots has the issue, but the other pilot doesn't have the issue. The same crew. So, it's all actually evident and it's under report, I just wanted to tell you about that going back a little bit about that.

Q. Mm-hmm. So, that particular issue you saw as more sort of an individual pilot issue?

A. Individual pilot issue, yes, very (indiscernible) very hard to explain that, yeah.

Q. Yeah. Okay, --

A. But there has been other times that truly, it has been -- has pressurization or any other issues, of course we understand.

Q. Mm-hmm. Okay. Has there ever been an issue where a safety issue is brought to your attention and you said you know what, we have to fix that immediately? Is there an example you can think of where you had to --

A. Well, there was a report that came out that pilots -- we have L1 door and right the door's on the side of the airplane, right? And the crew opens it up for air, of course they have to kind of load and everything else, and the rope wasn't there. The safety strap so they don't fall off, right? So, that was one thing that came up and said oh my God, I got mad, how can someone not think that they have to pull this up? And then we found out that he was actually done more than once that people said okay, just open the door, they don't put the strap on. So, that was a huge safety item that we immediately fixed, and there was another safety issue that was -- I mean, something that really caught my attention immediately and said like we have to have execute these right now, is the doors, the aircraft cargo door?

They have a hydrologic switches in certain part of the aircraft that is mostly operated -- we have maintenance only operate that, and for some reason they found out -- one of the (indiscernible) found out that these -- the thing was an arm position, so it shouldn't be in -- it was supposed be in the aircraft when the aircraft was supposed to depart, so they found it really good, so I immediately took action and said look from now on we're going to have pilots be the last one to go out there and check that one of the pilots before they fly, when they close the doors we require them to go and check the arm switch to make sure they're in their proper place before they depart, so that's another example I can remember right now.

Q. Mm-hmm, okay.

A. There may have been other things, I'm sure there must have been. I don't recall right now,

but --

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. Can't recall of that --

Q. Okay, and then real briefly, I think at some point someone mentioned you have another airplane in California. Is that part of Rhoades or not part of Rhoades?

A. It's part of our Trans Executive Airline Part 135.

Q. Oh, okay. Part 135, all right. How did you find out about the accident, and when?

A. I just arrived in Los Angeles and on a business trip, and just happened about a couple hours after that I found out.

Q. How did you find out?

A. My daughter called me. It had just had happened, you know, somehow.

Q. Do you know what time that was?

A. California time, I think it was approximately about maybe 5 o'clock in the morning sometime around that maybe, 5:30, 6 o'clock in the morning, Los Angeles Time, three hour difference currently.

Q. Okay, and then what did you do --

A. Approximately 2 o'clock in the morning here, and around --

Q. What did you do at that time?

A. I immediately contacted our Vice President, VP of Operations, Tracy, and I did not get an immediate answer at that time, and I started making phone calls to everybody to find out what had happened, and how. Talked to David, of course. David Seest.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. So me and David were talking a lot that day.

Q. Who was in charge of overseeing the response to that --

A. David Seest.

Q. David?

A. Yes. So, after that accident he decided, rightfully so, to ground all the Boeing fleet immediately pending further response to the accident and investigation, which I commended very much, good job he did that, yeah.

Q. Okay. One thing during our interview with Orlando Debrum was that the company may not have investigators, people who are trained to investigate safety related incidents and accidents? Do you have anyone in the company that's --

A. No, we don't have investigators, no.

Q. Okay.

A. We have safety auditors, but not investigators.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. To be honest with you we had one, but he passed away two years ago.

Q. I'm sorry.

A. Yeah, thank you. And he was working with us for many, many years. He was an insurance adjustor, perhaps you may know him, Perry Brown?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I know him.

MR. RIAHI: Perry, yeah. He was working for me for many years, many years.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, thanks Teimour, I appreciate all of the information. I'm going to pass the questions onto Shawn, for now.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you. Do you need a break for a little bit, need some water?

MR. RIAHI: No, I'm good.

MR. ETCHER: You're good?

MR. RIAHI: I got some more water here.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

MR. RIAHI: Thank you.

BY MR ETCHER:

Q. Well, thank you again, you've answered a lot of my questions I had when you were talking with Bill, so thanks for the open and honest discussion, that's helped.

A. Yes, pleasure.

Q. I just have a few questions.

A. Absolutely.

Q. Hopefully it won't take too many hours.

A. No, let it take, because this is so important to us.

Q. Well, I'm glad you think that.

A. Absolutely, we want to know exactly what happened. It's important not only to us but to everyone around the world what exactly happened. Something like this has never happened at least here in Hawaii I can tell.

Q. Well, hopefully we'll get you some -- get some answers for everybody.

A. Looking forward to that.

Q. When you were talking with Bill you did kind of explain the company -- you started back in 1982.

A. '82, yes.

Q. Tell me what kind of aircraft you started with and the transition to the different aircraft.

A. Sure. I started with a single engine Cherokee 6 and November 41612, and that aircraft was with us for a good three years, and from then, while we were flying that aircraft we started using Cessna 402s. I bought the first Cessna 402 from Royal Hawaii Airlines, you know they used to be a commuter in Hawaii. There was an A model, and then from then on, I buy more Cessna 402s.

In 1996, we received our first short 360 owned 827Bravo Echo. And subsequent to that, in 1998, we received another short 360, and a few more in the year 2000 and beyond.

Q. Okay. When you brought on the shorts did you start getting rid of 402s?

A. Yeah, of course, yeah, yeah. By this time the Cherokee 6 was gone, you know. And the Cessna 402s were out of the service, most of them. But I think we had about another one or two remaining, but as we brought in more short 360s the Cessna 402s were retired.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. When you had the Cherokee 6, was it just you flying it or did you have a couple pilots flying with you?

A. It was me flying myself, yes.

Q. Okay, okay.

A. I was the guy who picks up the cargo, the guy that weighs it, the guy that does the weight and balance, the guy that loads it onto the airplane, the guy that flies it over there to the neighbor islands, the guy that takes it off the airplane and the guy that goes and delivers it, all day.

Q. Okay.

A. I was the only pilot, yes.

Q. Okay, that helps, thanks. I think you were telling Bill how many employees you guys had.

A. Yes.

Q. Are they all based here in Honolulu, or is that counting employees out of state?

A. Negative sir, yeah. They are scattered around the island but the majority employed here in Honolulu in the headquarters.

Q. Any idea how many here at headquarters?

A. I can not really put a number to it right now. But, I would say better than say 65 percent of our employees are here in Honolulu, based in Honolulu.

Q. Okay.

A. With other 35 percent scattered around the islands.

Q. Okay.

A. On different islands.

Q. When you -- you obviously are very hands on, you've said that.

A. Yes.

Q. I assume that means you're at the office quite regularly.

A. Very, I don't sit in my office too long, I'm always out on the ramp checking airplanes.

Q. Okay.

A. We have two hangers, you know, Hanger 1, Hanger 2. And Rhoades Aviation maintenance is based on Hanger 2, and so, between these hangers I go run a lot offices, I'm in David's office all the time.

Q. Do you have employees coming up and talking to you, expressing concerns or anything? Kind of an open-door policy?

A. Yeah, I told you I have an open-door policy and I make sure everyone understand that. My door's always open, if you don't find an answer some place, please come knock on my door, come see me. I have a very open relationship with all of my employees and so, I encourage them, say I'm very friendly with everybody and just want to make sure they're friendly with their colleagues and making sure that there's a good positive working environment within the company.

Q. Okay.

A. That I believe starts from the top, so I've always tried to run the company like a family operations and everyone works the together, and if you have an issue let's just come discuss it how we can help, let's just basically that kind of an attitude that we have.

Q. Okay, all right. I think you were talking to Bill and you said your plan is to retire the 73200 series.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have a long-term plan on when that may happen? Are you talking the next year --

A. Well.

Q. -- or are you talking the next ten years?

A. Yeah, unfortunately accident, number 810A was one of our best airplanes and so but that was due to retire soon. But, you know, they have all different, you know, L-O-Vs, right? So as the LOV comes, we retire them, but mostly, I believe way before the LOV comes we're going to retire these airplanes. So, I've made a commitment and I've talked to all of the team members to operate the Boeing 737400s. We've -- I call the first Boeing 7400's and hopefully as we move forward you know we -- the plan is to acquire another 737400 reduce the fleet, the size of the fleet you know, since they're larger airplanes --

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. They're 737200s so it would actually be more efficient and more effective for the operation of the company to larger airplanes.

Q. Okay.

A. Reducing the size of the fleets.

Q. Right.

A. Right. The number, the size of number, I guess, right.

Q. You said your SMS program you're on phase 3 --

A. Yeah.

Q. Have you finished phase 3?

A. We finished phase 3 we are onto going phase 4, and then there will be another one, phase 5. There's one scheduled for this month with Mr. Butin and his team. And there will be one I think we are going to final; the final is going to be in August, and we hoping that we would be in the position that convince the FAA this a really good program and try to change our manuals from the existing one to the VOCUS program. So, we have changed -- we are phase 3. Phase 4 right now to come.

Q. Okay. I just want to make sure I understand, you're anticipating being through phase 4 in

August of this year, or phase 5 -- all the phases by August?

A. Phase 4 is going to be middle of July, I have to look at my calendar. And phase 4, we're planning done in august, and after that we're hoping we're going to have acceptance of the VOCUS program. Change from existing safety program to the VOCUS program.

Q. I just want to clarify you said phase 4 will be done in August, so I just want to make sure I understood --

A. Phase 4 is going to be in July, phase 5 is going to be in August.

Q. I just want to make sure I had it clear --

A. Yes.

Q. -- and I probably misheard that so my apologies.

A. Yes.

MR. KATT: You didn't.

MR. ETCHER: Oh, okay. Thanks.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. We learned something this week about your operation and in the airplane's maintenance logs. Crews can writeup an airplane.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. And are you -- are they encouraged to writeup planes if there's something wrong?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Okay.

A. Of course, yeah.

Q. But we also noticed, we were told that there's two kinds of writeups. There's an F Writeup, and then there's an I for Informational Writeup. Do you ever see those?

A. I've never seen an information writeup, to be honest with you, that's the first time I heard that. They didn't -- discussions that we've had. Writeup to me, I'm the old style, I was a writer,

you get a discrepancy log, something wrong, just write it up.

Q. Okay.

A. And then we have to make sure the maintenance works the writeup. Informational writeup -- maybe the talk something doesn't, maybe -- I'm a flyer myself so I may decide that something not exactly how it's supposed to be but I wouldn't -- maybe something that doesn't concern you so much, but I would just kind of bring it up. However, myself, I write things up. If something concerns me, I write it up.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay, I just wasn't sure --

A. But we don't have a program of informational status -- go talk to somebody, no. You got to listen, cut and dry. Some discrepancy, write it up. Maintenance has to work on it and see what --

Q. Okay.

A. -- how they can work it.

Q. Have you ever heard of any pilot -- you being a pilot --

A. Right.

Q. Have you ever heard of a pilot getting in trouble for writing an airplane up too many times? I know you talked about that pressurization issue.

A. No, no not at all. Not at all.

Q. Okay. I just wanted to make sure I kind of understood the whole environment.

A. Yeah. No, not at all. We encourage them, there has to be writeups it's a safety item. You know, if there's something wrong you have to -- must absolutely write it up to see what, we don't discourage people to not writeup I mean.

Q. All right.

A. It wouldn't be good people who do that.

Q. I know you -- you've talked about how you deal with -- you talked with the Director of Operations regularly.

A. Yes.

Q. The Vice President regularly.

A. Yes.

Q. And you may have said it, and I might have missed it, so forgive me if I'm re-asking a question, but --

A. Sure.

Q. How often do you talk to and interact with your Director of Safety?

A. You know what, very good question. Director of Safety's office was actually at -- right next to the Director of Maintenance at Hanger 2, which is the air service hanger, right? So, it was very important to me to be very close to them, so we vacated the office right next to my office, and I put all the Safety Department in the office right next to me.

Q. Okay.

A. So, yeah, it was very important -- that was the whole reason because I figured just sit right next to me because we're going to have to go a lot of -- I want to see you easily, I don't want you throwing dice a lot, you know. Ways of going back and forth --

Q. Okay.

A. As a result, I brought them right next to me, and he's currently -- he's been there for a good while now.

Q. Okay, well.

A. And he's team of course, yeah.

Q. Right. So, the whole --

A. He's right next to my office --

Q. Three of them -- is there three in there, four in there?

A. Yeah, so there's three people.

Q. Okay.

A. Full timers work in there, yeah.

Q. I'm trying to learn it also -- alrighty. I know you guys have your safety meetings every Tuesday and Friday?

A. Every Tuesday and Friday.

Q. And sometimes things can up has a safety report and there's items that are tasked to other departments to see what they need to fix --

A. Right.

Q. -- everything like that. Do you give them due dates to have that done, or does the Director of Safety do that? How do you guys' delegate that?

A. Yeah. Absolutely, yeah. So, the task -- first of all, every Department has to have a representative, so the rep is for every department is in the meeting. And so, the Safety Department brings up the issues that has been reported out of -- identified through the audits and we talk about that, it's all -- we have a mice monitor, so we put on the monitor so everybody can see it. And we assign to different departments like for example, there's a GSE that wheels missing, you know -- that's a safety item. Or, so -- we get the departments to comment about it, saying this is your guys so I want to get a report before this -- by the next session, which would be for a Tuesday it would be a Friday. If it happens on Friday, it has to be the next Tuesday. So, it's mostly the next day that we monitor it again. And we all try and encourage everyone to try and mitigate and see what they have to do with -- root cause, get the root cause analysis, and bring it up for us really by next meeting. We take very -- we give it a lot of importance to do that as soon as you can. But I don't crucify them for one reason or two they did not bring it in time so I encourage them to do what they can, I remind them how important it is that they have to kind of

bring it up so we can close that item and be ready for the next item that may come up.

Q. Okay. So --

A. We like a clean calendar. Everything at rest.

Q. Okay. Example I bring that you gave was the rope issue, people weren't putting that safety rope on.

A. Right.

Q. That came through one of these meetings, correct?

A. Right. Absolutely, yeah.

Q. And I think you said you were --

A. And (indiscernible) these guys are hanging over there and the rope is not extended. It's not attached. So that was an immediate item, so --

Q. So, did you expect that to be done by the next meeting then?

A. Oh, no. By the next day. The same day. It's something very simple that they can easily do, and follow-up with that.

Q. So, did you have to follow-up that day to make sure it was done?

A. and --

Q. Or, does your Director of Safety come in and talk to you?

A. No, it was on my mind, because we discussed it, and Bob made sure it's going to be done.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. I mean I have to go to the record to know exactly how it was disposed of.

Q. Okay. Okay.

A. But, very, very open communications, very important that we get the reports.

Q. Alrighty. We'll talk a little bit here about your interaction with your CMT.

A. Mm-hmm. I respect them all, they're nice people. I don't like the process that they have but that is between us.

Q. Well, if --

A. They could improve that probably.

Q. How could you improve their process?

A. Well, you know, a lot of things is the manuals, right? And, like for example, our GMM is a 400-page manual, 400 plus. It's very extensive, it has good content, but again, the way I see it is that I want direct communication with the inspector. To spend some time with us, side by side, because I believe it's good for them and it's good for us so let's just work it together. That's the way I look at that, like a project that we have to work together on. My problem is that a certain manual goes out the FAA and they feel maybe the first page, a comma is in the wrong place or maybe the format is bad, and they just throw it right back at you, and they don't go through the whole thing to kind of find out -- there used to be a time -- I don't know maybe the culture has changed at the FAA that I don't know about. That you know, the inspector looks at everything says okay, this is good, this is good, this is good, oh you know, we call these stickies you know, like small sticky notes? Right?

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. You put on the -- you send it out like that and we know exactly -- nothing is done by computer, you know, you have the sticky notes on the computer and then it comes. I don't know, maybe people have less interest invested in our -- in that type of operations and they want to throw it out -- so that system would throw things back and forth, back and forth, back and forth, back and forth, back and forth, extends the projects, you know. And, it's I believe the more direct communication, come and spend with me two hours today and we're going to go through all this 400-page (indiscernible) 400-page, probably about maybe 5 percent has an issue that has to be corrected. So, that's the way I look at that, and again I don't abdicate them, but I believe that process would be a lot more efficient and a lot less aggravating, and with a lot less pages of important paperwork that has to go back and forth, back and forth, write each other a letter, write

each other a letter, you know?

Q. Okay.

A. That's again, my opinion. My humble opinion.

Q. Well, sometimes things like this changes happen.

A. I'd really hope so.

Q. But I make no promises.

A. If I may, If I may just add to that?

Q. Yeah.

A. In case in question I mentioned that the date of the accident --

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. We received a few page letter about the same GMM that was listing from January of 2021 at some at what date, and what time we came aware to see you very precise, that this was wrong and then you send it back to us and then we can't February 27th, at 7:30 we can't -- all of that is just documented, you know? So, I received that letter on the date of the accident and so what I did, I went to Lorendo, and I said Lorendo, we only have so many days, seven days to respond to this letter. Can you please contact my POI and tell him to give us a little bit more time so we can do this. So, out of the seven days on this particular five-page letter, it was a Friday that we had an accident. It was Friday, Saturday, Monday was a holiday weekend, so three days was already expired, it wasn't a business day, and we still have to get that done and back to him by seven days. Having to go through what we have to -- and of course the time that we have to spend with your team, you know? So that was a typical issue that we had.

So, hopefully it can -- and then I ask Lorenda was very nice to put me in touch with Mr. Patrick, and I talked to Mr. Patrick, I said Mr. Patrick can you please contact your POI to ask him to give us a little more time, and he said yeah, I think it's legitimate I'm going to ask them about that. But I talked to Mr. Patrick yesterday and he said that he has to do his job and he basically

said no thank you, we cannot help you with that. So, we received a three letters yesterday, we received two letters today, and I've got hundred other letters we got to receive tomorrow and the day after. So, these are ongoing thing that we get a barrage of letters, you know? From our team, from hopefully the process is going to change. Again, nothing personal, they're beautiful people, all of them. But I don't believe this process is every effective, you know? If it's not effective for us, maybe it works for some other operators.

Q. Okay, well --

A. We're still a smaller company and what we have only so much resources and to be honest with you, I've been thinking we've got really great people working for us it's not easy to find good people. I don't want these guys to quit on the company because they do not want to work with certain inspectors. This is what I'm afraid of, and I have to tell you that.

Q. Okay and thank you for doing that.

A. Thank you.

Q. I know you've got a lot of communications from the FAA but, in any of the communications have they had any concern about like safety risks or issues that --

A. Yes.

Q. -- they classify as significant or moderate? Have you seen any communications about that?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. I think just about everything we receive from this team has been significant to have been many, many errors that we've had to teach them that hey, this is not the way that you're seeing it, the manual says different. The Boeing manual is different, you know. And I've accepted it after, so, at one point one of our aircraft was grounded because they misinterpreted the Boeing manual. But then that was clarified after.

Q. Okay.

A. And so, that's that relationship, yeah.

Q. Okay. I appreciate --

A. Again, not a bad relationship it's just that we've been hoping to change this to a better communication that you truly want to something, my team feels that FAA may not really want to work with them to get these issues solved. But, it's just a very nitpicking -- which is easy to do, it's easy just -- give me two hours of your time still with me and we can go through it really fast.

Q. Okay. Perfect.

A. Yeah.

Q. Looking through my list, like I said you've answered a lot of my questions --

A. Right, right.

Q. -- when you were talking with Bill, so I appreciate it.

A. Sure.

Q. And I don't have any right now, so I thank you much.

A. Sure.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, Clarence, do you have any questions?

MR. KANAE: Actually, I just have a few.

MR. RIAHI: Yes.

MR. KANAE: A few more.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Thank you for coming today.

A. My pleasure.

Q. And also want to thank you for your support in getting the fuel sample the other day.

A. Oh, it's a pleasure, of course, yeah.

Q. I want to make sure --

A. I'm very concerned to help any which way we can.

Q. Sure. And, so, I know you are going through some difficult times at this point, so, we talked about the safety program. There is a tool that the operator can use that's called a VARP.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Are you familiar with that?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you used that tool to indicate that you've found something during your -- say --

A. Yes.

Q. -- during your safety meetings --

A. Yes.

Q. -- don't want to disclose it to the FAA --

A. Yes. Yes. Of course, yeah.

Q. Could you --

A. Over the years we have -- I can't give you a name right in this moment, but there have been occasions that we have used the VARP system, yeah.

Q. So, you're familiar with that --

A. Very, yes. Absolutely, yeah --

Q. And that tool --

A. Sure, absolutely.

Q. And then so --

A. It's a very good tool, it's, I love it, it's beautiful.

Q. Yeah.

A. Just close it and fix it.

Q. Yeah, you've experienced using it --

A. Yes.

Q. And then any feedback from the FAA on any --

A. No, I mean it's a system that you file the VDRP and it goes through the system and they assure that things are done correctly and you don't have VDRP findings -- filings, I'm sorry, yeah.

Q. Sure.

A. So, we do use it, yes, of course.

Q. Thank you, Teimour, that's all I have.

A. Pleasure.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. I have one kind of follow-up from what Shawn was asking about and the reason why --

A. I forget, you're a pilot, I have to watch out.

Q. Well, yeah, but I writeup in the form informational writeup and the way that came to us is because we are asking about the reduced thrust on the aircraft where it would go under the yellow range –

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Or, touch the yellow range on a reduced thrust take-off. It didn't exceed any limits so, when you go to write it up the maintenance says well you didn't exceed any limits so you can't write it up. So, this is where the case is where we were told that the information you could just put it on the books so it could be tracked somehow.

The concern is somehow if you're hitting the yellow range on a reduced thrust take-off and maintenance doesn't want to write it up, how does that get tracked, and the engine is kind of showing you something is going on with the engine when you can't do a full redded take off without it possibly exceeding limits.

A. Right.

Q. So that's -- I think that's where the explanation about the I-writeup because it didn't exceed limits.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. And maintenance can't write it up because it didn't exceed limits. Do you have a concern about items like that where maintenance says it doesn't meet a limit, you can't write it up as a Fix Item, an F, but we can track it through informational -- it the aircraft isn't exceeded limit, is there, you know -- what's the concern and would that be something that would come through maybe the CAS system, or through a safety reported system to your level to be aware of that?

A. Right. So, number one, I'm very against anything that people do not want to writeup. You should write it -- if something concerns you write it up, so we can definitely as a regular writeup address that. That's a very interesting question, I wouldn't be -- if something like that comes up this point I don't know if an information because we don't have a system in our ways of doing work, we did our manuals that says you can do an informational writeup, you know, it's a writeup or another writeup. But, I'll have to investigate that to find out if maintenance has told them not to writeup because it did not exceed certain things. I haven't heard that, but have to look into it.

Q. Sure.

A. We don't encourage that at all. No. I mean I totally agree with you, if it's halfway reduced power and you're already going into the yellow on the way to red, then what's it going to do at full power?

Q. Sure.

A. Right.

Q. Okay, thank you then.

A. If I were that pilot, I would just take it for a nice request a tower give me maybe a minute to put into full power and see if it does go into the red, the write it up. You know, of course it depends on -- we operate different types of engines and they have different perimeters of course. So, yeah.

MR. LEE: That's the only question I had, thanks.

MR. BRAMBLE: We'll just go around for any miscellaneous follow-ups people have.

One thing that Orlando mentioned in his interview --

MR. RIAHI: Mm-hmm.

MR. BRAMBLE: -- Was that he didn't recall receiving any safety reports through the safety reporting system about maintenance. I'm just wondering is that consistent with your understanding that you guys have received, say in the last year or two, any maintenance safety reports through the safety reporting program?

MR. RIAHI: You -- honestly, I don't recall there may be one or two. We encourage everyone to file safety reports. In fact we have a open box at every hanger that has a lot of these clean pages out there and there's a big sign, Safety Reports. We encourage everyone to go there, and everyone knows where it's at. We do get safety reports from -- anything that comes through it gets filed and it gets addressed.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Yeah --

MR. RIAHI:

MR. BRAMBLE: I'm a little surprised to hear that because I thought that it would be surprising if they only came from the ops, you only got ops safety reports and you never got maintenance safety reports.

MR. RIAHI: No, no.

MR. BRAMBLE: But, he didn't recall.

MR. RIHAI: No, no. I'm sure there has been. I can tell you I'm positive there has been for sure, on the maintenance side, too.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

MR. RIAHI: But, you know, we encourage, I mean I always encourage everyone to write things up.

MR. BRAMBLE: Mm-hmm.

MR. RIAHI: How major or minor, just write it up so this goes out to the correct

department to investigate it.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, and --

MR. RIAHI: That's the culture that's the encouragement, and that's the policy.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

MR. RIAHI: Yeah, you should write it up if something doesn't work.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. So, along those lines literally in the last five minutes, our maintenance investigator emailed us a document that --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. -- must have come from his work collecting the maintenance documents.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. But, it looks like it's like a report from a safety committee meeting.

A. Right.

Q. It's dated --

A. May 21st.

Q. -- May 21st, and has an agenda about various --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. -- open safety issues, and safety concerns and so forth.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. And in his email he asked us to look at this report dated May 12th, 2021, that says Captain did not write discrepancies due to fear of losing job for writing discrepancies.

A. Uh-huh. And, that's an interesting one, yes.

Q. And it's marked closed, and it says something like, I can't quite read what that says --

A. Okay, I can explain that, yeah, yeah, okay.

Q. Okay.

A. I can explain that fully for you.

Q. Okay.

A. Okay, so there was an incident, we did receive report, an anonymous report that an aircraft departed Honolulu, he went to Hawaii, yeah, I think that's what it was. Well, from Place A to Place B, right? And then at Place B before departure the copilot walks around the aircraft and the captain walks around the aircraft and the copilot felt that there was something wrong with the one of the instruments on the aircraft, I think maybe a fuel gauge or something, whatever it was. And then brought it to the attention of the pilot. The pilot again, said that if I believe, there's -- I don't see anything wrong with that. And, there's exact (indiscernible) reports but we can actually get the report to get the exact wording and everything, but that's what I recall. And, took off from that destination, came to origin, which was Honolulu, and the co-pilot asked the pilot are you going to write it down and the captain allegedly tells the copilot, how the report was written, no I don't write it up because I'm going to get fired if I write this up.

And then that's what institute the report so, when I got ahold of the report the same day that we opened it up, I said oh my god, I've never ever seen a report like this. So, we start (indiscernible) at the meetings, I call the meeting and we call came in and said look, does anyone know about this? How did, how could this happen? Of course, this anonymous, we don't want to pursue anyone, but how could this happen because I said look, the copilot has as much authority as the pilot to write something up. We're not discouraging not to writeup, this is not a captain's job, copilot can do it to. And this copilot have every right to contact maintenance before take-off, and contact maintenance control and say hey look we have an issue here.

We need a mechanic, or say to the captain doesn't pay attention to that, the same person who wrote it had every opportunity to walk off that aircraft and identify contact with the aircraft operations or myself, or chief pilot to aware them of the situation, but, no idea why they actually -- everything's open to you, so why did you just get on the aircraft and came up if you thought there

was an open discrepancy, you know? So, I talked to -- we talked amongst ourselves. To be honest with you, it was a challenge for us. Hard to address that because it was just allegations and I've never heard that somebody, something's wrong with the airplane and they do not want to write it up. That was the first time I've ever heard that.

So, we could have sucking our fingers, why do you report something like that and then you jump on the aircraft and you come back with it? That's bad. So, I talked to, we couldn't really talk to immediate answer, hard to address that. But, what we decided was we definitely want to put it through our SMS system, and what I did, I said, team let me just contact our lawyer and -- you know our lawyer about aviation lawyers in Washington D.C., and I got him out of bed, I said look, sorry but I need your immediate attention to this. Can you look into this? He said okay, let me just take a look at it and I'll get back to you.

He got back to me and he said, Teimour, this is disturbing. I said I know, that's why I'm calling you because I have no answer how to address this with the only exception that we want to put it through the SMS, this has to be addressed. I'm disturbed even hearing this. So he said okay, let me find out. It took about two days that he called me back, we were contacting each other, what' the development and everything else. And he contacted me and he said okay, Alf talked to several people here, and we have another issue, another client, I believe it was Delta Airlines, that they had a similar situation and this is how they address that. They came up with this very nice letter to everybody which basically said, guys, all these tools are available to you, the company supports you, we encourage you, you have issues? You see something? Say something. You feel something? Come talk about it. You want to write something? Write it. You have every opportunity to talk to anybody in the company. We have an open-door policy.

So, but they said okay, we got this however we want to contact Delta Airlines to make sure that we can use this as a template and then write something, use some of the verbiage in this. It was a very, very extensive read, beautifully written letter, and send it to you, and send it to all of

your employees.

So what I did, I contacted Mark Butin -- and part if it actually was he was in a regular meeting that we had together after the meeting I pulled him aside I said look, look I received this, and honestly, it's making me very, very uncomfortable, but this is what we're going to do about it. We're going to institute this letter. I'm going to sign this letter out. We've made some changes to the original template and of course Delta Airlines agreed, said absolutely please use this letter. Absolutely, you're okay to use this letter -- well, parts of it, and so I talked to Mark Butin and he said wow that's a good thing, that's very good. He had not seen the letter yet, but I said this is our intentions, this is how we're going to address that.

So -- and that's what happened. We issued the letter, and I made sure, I told Tracey to assure, 100 percent talk to payroll. I said look hold this, because payroll is going to be in a few days, and make a copy of this to attach it to their paychecks of every employee that works for TransAir, and that's exactly what we did. We have a copy of the letter if you'd like to look at it.

Q. Mm-hmm. Yeah, that'd be great.

A. I don't have it with me but I can give it to you.

Q. Yeah, we can follow up on that.

A. Yeah. I'm glad we decided to address that.

Q. That's great. Yeah, so, since he forwarded that to me, I wanted to make sure you had a chance to address it --

A. Yes.

Q. And good to have that information.

A. Yes, that was one of those immediate actions that we said we take, I mean --

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. Solve them all yellow, this was a red item, a big red, and we immediately decided to do something about this.

Q. Okay. One thing I realized earlier that I neglected to ask, I asked you about all the other managers that work for you but I didn't ask you about the Chief Pilot. How did you select him and what do you see his role as?

A. Okay. I selected, Wallace Hollibard (ph.), he's a great friend. I did not know him personally before, although I had heard of him. He was a line captain at Aloha Airlines for many years, and at the time that we were looking for a new Chief Pilot he applied for the job and I realized that he was working in China. He was flying 737800s and 900s I believe for this Chinese company. And he came for interview and I'd heard of him before so he wasn't a total stranger but we'd never -- he'd heard of me too of course being on the field, everybody knows everybody. So, I looked at his credentials, his credentials were very impressive, and he interviewed extremely well. Very humble person, but I noticed that he's not a yes man. I like people who are not yes men, you know?

So, because of that I said okay, I'm want to hire you. Let's just -- do you want to work with us? But can you give me a commitment? That -- because I really want a committed Chief Pilot, and yes, he said I'm going to give you my commitment, I'm done with China. I was looking for a good job for myself to come back home. He had his family of course here while he was working in China for many years; seven or eight years he was over there. So that's how we met and we hired him and he's been just fantastic. Great person, he's tough, he's tough. Not everybody likes him, I'm telling you that because he's very much by the book and he's kicked my okobi, Hawaiian means the other side, you know, (indiscernible) many times and I appreciate that, I'll get better for that, and he flies with you himself. He's so committed. He tells you how to do things better, and of course in the pilot world there are natural pilots and there are maybe not very natural pilots. He works with the not very natural pilots to the end until he really feels comfortable to sign them off. He's very, very stingy about signing somebody off, and he's a tough chief pilot, and I'm very lucky to have him.

Q. Okay. So, when we do eventually talk to the FAA so we can speak the same language about the SMS implementation, what are the five phases? Do you happen to know what they are? Or do we have to ask Orlando?

A. The five phases, we can actually provide you with the a copy of phases that we talk to the FAA about.

Q. Okay.

A. It's generally, it's mostly topics and then it's like a small PowerPoint print.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. And it shows exactly how we're going to implement this --

Q Mm-hmm.

A. Introduction to it. How it's going to help us, the phases. It's mostly -- like I said it's just bullet points. But, every bullet point, we discuss that. It's not written. And Mark Butin, you can talk with him.

Q. So you know --

A. He's very excited about it to be honest with you. He's very excited about it. He likes that it -- he thinks it's really going to be very helpful in our safety department to have this.

Q. Okay. Do you know what the -- does the current phase have a name, or? Is it called --

A. It's phase, phase 1 through phase 5.

Q. Just numbers, okay.

A. Right.

Q. Okay. All right.

A. That's it. Phase 1 through Phase 5.

Q. And then --

A. I have a couple on my desk, I wish you were at the airport. I'd give it to you right now.

Q. Well get there soon, yeah. I'm sure we'll have a chance.

A. Yeah, it'd be no problem to provide you with a -- but they use just bullet points, there's more discussions, here's how we're going to do it, this is the phase it goes through.

Q. Yeah.

A. And of course, we have a presentation that goes on the monitor.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. The computer presentation --

Q. Okay.

A. -- to be sure this is the last thing that you sign in and these are the safety assurance programs, how you achieve them, where to file it. Everyone has a chance, get a password, you can get into it from anywhere and file your report. The honest report in according the flashes to the --

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. It's a very extensive program.

Q. Okay and my last question before I'll give these guys one more chance and then we have just a couple of wrap ups, but just for comparisons sake --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. -- the 737400s --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. -- how many cargo positions did they have? I know it was seven --

A. It has --

Q. -- for a total seven?

A. It has 12 positions.

A. 12, okay.

Q. It has -- 11 full positions and a full SAA position, plus one what we call a PAG position in the back end. The back sort of tapers sort of at the end.

Q. Okay.

A. It's a small position in the back side, so it's total position.

Q. Okay.

A. Plus, the belly, of course. But, we don't use bellies anyway, it's not very efficient.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. With that, I'm going to give Shawn a chance to ask any follow up questions he may have.

MR. ETCHER: I don't have any, thank you.

MR. RIAHI: My pleasure, Shawn.

MR. BRAMBLE: And Clarence?

MR. KANAE: I don't have any more, thank you.

MR. RIAHI: Oh, my pleasure.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Rich?

MR. LEE: Me either.

MR. BRAMBLE: Oh, wow. All right.

MR. RIAHI: Thanks, Rich.

MR. BRAMBLE: Well, with that being said, I'll just go to the close outs then, which is; is there anything we haven't asked you about that you think might be relevant to the investigation that you'd like share with us at this time?

MR. RIAHI: Let me think. You know, you asked about operations, you asked about my role, you asked about my managers. You about the culture, the safety culture. You asked about maintenance operations. You asked about overall view of the company, the equipment that we fly, the people. You asked about everything I can think of, I don't -- and thank you for the opportunity to let me talk about -- we have a very good relation -- you have a good question about our relationship with our local FAA and I'll say it to you as honestly as I can, but I wanted to reiterate the fact that this is not personal at all, because I personally like those guys. We joke about everything, but I'm hoping that the process is going to change and be at least a nice dialogue you

know.

MR. BRAMBLE: Mm-hmm. Is there anyone else aside from the people that we've interview that you'd think would be especially important for us to talk to? You have more time to think about it, but --

MR. RIAHI: Yeah.

MR. BRAMBLE: -- if there's anybody pressing on your mind that you think that you really need to talk to this person and you haven't asked to talk to them, we'd be happy to do that.

MR. RIAHI: Yes. I can't think of anyone else; I think you've got the best people that you've interviewed with. If you still decide that there's others that come to mind, I'd be more than happy to introduce them to you. But, going back to what I was discussing about the process of working with your CMT, it's crucial that the operator and the CMT work hand in hand together. There should be no feeling of animosity. It should just be open communications. I strongly believe a missed dialogue is a missed opportunity to resolve conflict resolutions. You know, that's -- It's important to not miss that dialogue.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right, and realizing that the information about the accident is very limited, but my last questions is; is there any -- do you have any burning desire to see a specific safety improvement made at this point based on your knowledge of what's happened. Or, beyond that, in general is there something that you particularly want to communicate to us that you think is not been raised with in the community as a whole.

MR. RIAHI: I think you raise just a bout -- extremely fabulous topics you know all throughout. You know, maybe the last thing I would like to do, I've been striving to hopefully get people back to work. I believe -- I love our government, but I didn't -- I was hoping they wouldn't give free money to people so they don't come to work, you know. We like to get more qualified people and add them onto our very qualified people on the staff, and we're striving to do that, and we are in the process of that.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

MR. RIAHI: And we're always looking for more qualified people, and we hope that we find them very soon this year.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, well unless --

MR. RIAHI: (Indiscernible) when I said more qualified not that our people are not qualified, you know.

MR. BRAMBLE: You mean additional?

MR. RIAHI: Additional qualified people, that's what I meant, if I may add that, please strike that you off the record.

MR. BRAMBLE: Certainly. Okay, is there -- do you guys have any additional questions?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right, with that being said we'll conclude the interview at 4:07 p.m.

(Whereupon, at 4:07 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Teimour Riahi
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	July 7, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Brittany Hay
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
	*	

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Interview of: WALLACE HORIBATA JR, Chief Pilot

Rhoades Aviation/TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

WILLIAM KATT, Esq.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. ETCHER: Good afternoon, Wallace. Thank you for coming in. My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an Operational Factors Investigator with the NTSB. I along with Bill Bramble here, he's the human performance investigator, are looking into the accident that occurred the other night, involving Flight 810.

As you may or may not know, the NTSB is an independent Federal Agency charged with determining the transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of any Department of Transportation, and it has no regulatory enforcement ability or powers.

I'd like to go ahead and let everybody introduce themselves, starting with Mr. Bramble.

MR. BRAMBLE: Hi, I'm Bill Bramble. I'm a Human Performance Investigator with NTSB.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, Boeing safety pilot.

MR. KANAE: Clarence Kanae, Aviation Safety Inspector Operations at the Honolulu CMO.

MR. ETCHER: And Wallace, is there anybody in here right now that you object to being here for this interview?

MR. WALLACE: No.

MR. ETCHER: Okay, thank you. So, today we're going to be using a recorder, and after the interviews are done, we'll send that recording out for transcription. When it comes back all the parties here will have a -- on this group will have an opportunity to review it and to make any typographically, typo errors basically, we'll correct those. We'll not change any of the content to it.

We're here to determine a probable cause, and we want to prevent this from re-occurring again just like I'm sure you as well.

MR. WALLACE: Mm-hmm.

MR. ETCHER: We're not going to -- our role is not to assign fault. We're just here simply to talk to you, get your insight on how the company works so we have a good record of it, and I can reference it later on as we -- as the investigation continues.

However, we cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity, and the transcription of this interview will eventually become part of the public docket.

Each of the group members here will have a chance to ask questions. I'll start, and then I'll pass to Bill. But as we're asking questions we do it one at a time and all the other members know that as well. So, you'll be carrying on a one-on-one conversation if you will.

If you can, we'd love it if the answer all your -- answer all our questions to the best of your recollection, but sometimes we may ask questions you may not understand. Ask for clarification, and if you don't know the answer it's okay. It's not a check ride, I know you're a smart guy, but I just always want to make sure you understand you can say I don't know.

You are entitled to have one representative of your choosing, is there someone here that you would like to have be your representative?

MR. WALLACE: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: And Bill, would you state your name and title?

MR. KATT: William Katt, attorney with Wilson Elser.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you. As we've discussed plenty, you can direct your witness not to answer questions, you can even request a short break to confer with your witness if needed, but along -- if you need a break, just say so. If you need a drink, bathroom, talk to Bill that's fine as well. All right? Does anybody have any questions?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Nope.

MR. ETCHER: Alrighty, are you ready to begin?

MR. WALLACE: I am.

MR. ETCHER: Alrighty.

INTERVIEW OF WALLACE HORIBATA JR

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So, for the record, please state and spell your legal name.

A. Wallace M. Horibata, Jr. W-A-L-L-A-C-E H-O-R-I-B-A-T-A J-R

Q. Thank you, and how old are you?

A. 57.

Q. Okay. And what is your job title?

A. I am the Chief Pilot for TransAir Hawaii.

Q. Does it go by TransAir, or does it go by Rhoades Aviation?

A. Rhoades Aviation, excuse me.

Q. Okay.

A. Rhoades Aviation.

Q. I just want to make sure --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. -- I have it clear it my head.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. When were you hired by Rhoades Aviation?

A. I went there going on past seven years now.

Q. Okay.

A. So.

Q. Were you hired on as the Chief Pilot, or did you have other jobs before that?

A. I was hired as the Chief Pilot.

Q. Okay. What is your airman certificates and ratings that you have?

A. I have of course my ATP, type rating and a Boeing 737, and a Flight Engineer rating.

Q. Okay, do you have any line check airmen, letters of authorization?

A. Yes.
Q. Okay, in what?
A. In a 737.
Q. Okay, thank you. And current medical?
A. First Class.
Q. First class. Do you remember the date it was issued?
A. No.
Q. That's all right. How many limitations or waivers?
A. Just have to wear corrective lenses.
Q. For near, far?
A. Oh, near.
Q. To see near, or?
A. No, I can't see far. I can see up close.
Q. Okay, I just wanted to make sure. I saw you pointing --
A. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.
Q. So, I just wanted to make sure. About how much total time do you have?
A. This is just roughly, I'll be over 17,000.
Q. And how about the 737? Big round numbers is fine.
A. 8,000.
Q. Can you give me a cliff notes version of your flying experience?
A. I have -- I got all my private instrument, commercial, multi-engine in Hawaii, and then I build time with the Civil Air Patrol, and then I got on with this company called Hutch Air, flying Cessna 208s, built some time there and I was very fortunate to get on with an airline called Princeville Airways, they flew twin outers. And then eventually they went to called Island Air. I flew there, and then I went to -- I flew to Twin Otter-8 and then after I went to Aloha Airlines were

I was flying 737 200s, the airline closed down and then I went to China for six and a half years, and then after China I got hired at TransAir Hawaii.

Q. All right, perfect. Give me just a nice day in a life of a Chief Pilot at Rhoades Aviation, tell us what you do every day.

A. Answer phone calls. I'm always available for my pilot's day or night, so I do get called. I work crew schedule. I also am the instructor for the simulator and airplane, so I'm away a lot in Miami. Yeah, that's about what it is.

Q. So, when do you -- when does your normal day start, or is it just a 24 a day job?

A. No, spot. I mean, in Hawaii, when I'm in Hawaii, it starts -- if there's a problem it'll start early in the morning because they call. I really want my pilot to know that I'm there if they need me, so they do call. David and I we rotate, if they can't get a hold of me, they'll call David, and vice versa. So, and then if I don't have to fly, then usually I'll come into the office about ten, and do what I need to do. But, if I'm in Miami it's a better timetable because when I'm up it's really when they're flying, so I have full rest in Miami when I'm there.

Q. Alrighty. So, they do call you when you're in Miami, you don't?

A. Yeah, they do.

Q. Okay. Perfect. So, kind of just give us a nice picture of the structure at Rhoades or TransAir, from the pilots all the way up to the top. Kind of what's the command structure?

A. So, we are of course FOs, we have our captains, we have two airplane instructors, check (indiscernible) myself and Ed Rinsma. And then we have two sim instructors which is myself and Bob Lander (ph.). And then we have David Seest as Director of Operations and then -- I'm sorry, after that it's myself the Chief Pilot, then David Seest, Director of Operations, and then he follows under Tracy Reasoner (ph.) the Vice President of Operations, yeah.

Q. So, it almost sounds like you have multi-hats that you wear, you're not just a Chief Pilot?

A. I mean I also do the trrainig, yeah. Mm-hmm.

Q. Okay. And do you do -- I just want to make sure, you do the ground school as well as the sim?

A. No, no ground school. I don't do any ground portion.

Q. Okay. And who do you have do ground portion?

A. Robert Lander will do our systems when we have new hires. We just had one of our captains that took some time off, but he came back. Cody Rogers (ph.), he's doing all the recurrent ground school, and we have Erwin Matsui (ph.), which you're going to meet soon because that's the man that will give you all the records. And he does indoc and if we need an instructor -- I mean ground school, also.

Q. Okay.

A. So, yeah.

Q. Alrighty. So, I know you worked at many places.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. How would you consider this, the pilot staffing here compared the other places you worked? Are you guys adequately staffed, do you need more staff for pilots?

A. No, I mean -- it's not, I think we always need more, we just had another pilot leave us for another job, but I knew about it. And then, of course, Henry. But we have pilots that are willing to fly a little extra on their red days. And I think you know about that, the red days, so. To help out, we're a small company so we all try to help out a lot, when we can.

Q. Okay. So, just for the record. What is a red day?

A. Our pilots work a 28-day cycle, 16 days is days off. 12 days is days -- excuse me, 16 days is workday. 12 days is days off. All of the 12 days seven days are consecutively. That's what we call red days. So, if they want to, I call them, if they want to work then I'll put them on.

Q. Okay. Do you ever have pilots tell you they don't want to work those days?

A. Well, I just had in there, yes. Yes, of course.

Q. All right, so they feel free to say no?

A. Oh, yeah, they do. They know I -- I'm not forcing them I mean, yeah, mm-hmm.

Q. Okay. If you ask pilots to work their days off and you get some that say no but you still don't have the flights covered -- what do you do, then?

A. We just do what we -- we just fly with what pilots we have.

Q. Okay.

A. Simple.

Q. Do you have to go fly then?

A. Well, not really now, but yes, I would if I wasn't involved in this thing, yeah of course. If I'm here, of course. Or David Seest, one of us. One of us would take up the load.

Q. Okay.

A. Yep.

Q. Okay. So, here at TransAir, Rhoades. If a pilot had a problem with anything, whether it's personnel, aircraft, you name it, what is their -- who do they talk to? How do they get that information to the people that need to get it to fix it?

A. Well, we encourage them to come to me first, of course. Once I hear what they have -- it just depends on the situation of course. If I can handle it, I will usually just handle it. If I feel I need to get the Director of Operation involved I will go to him and brief him what was involved, and then we'll try to figure it out and if we both can't handle it then we'll take it up the chain. Tracy will be next --

Q. Okay.

A. And then if he needs to, talk to Teimour.

Q. Okay. How many times do you get pilots coming to you with problems? On an average?

A. I would say maybe -- I mean problems can be anything, right? I mean I -- it can be anything they're not feeling well, I mean, or you got to call out sick. I would say maybe two or

three times the week, something.

Q. If -- have you ever had pilots come to you with concerns over maintenance of an airplane?

A. Yeah, I did.

Q. How often does that happen?

A. Let's say maybe two, two or three times a week, calling, asking. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Can you just kind of give me a broad kind of an idea what kind of concerns with the airplane would be?

A. Well, the most recent ones, sometimes they -- well most of the time they'll call when we have MELs, they just want clarification that this MEL is what it's supposed to be. You know we have M and O they have to do O portions then they just want to make sure they're following the whole correctly, so I think that's the majority the biggest thing they'll call me on.

Q. Okay.

A. To make sure what, this is an ML book is what it's supposed to be. For anything else like, if something else -- they'll usually just write it up, and then they'll call me after their shift to let me know that that was a writeup. Because when we have writeups, sometimes we have maintenance can't get ahold of them because they're not supposed to call them once they leave because they go into crew rest. So, they -- I tell them to let me know so I can talk to maintenance in case they want clarification so that's kind of how it works.

Q. Okay. When they -- when you get clarification do you always follow up with the crew?

A. Always.

Q. Okay.

A. Because, I tell them, if they -- if I can't get an answer I don't answer you, then you can go up the chain and go straight to David.

Q. Okay.

A. But I want to at least make an effort, and they know that.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. How many pilots do you here have on the 130 -- the 121 side flying the 73?

A. 20 -- not counting me and David, 20, 21.

Q. 21, how many FOs, how many captains?

A. We just lost -- so I think there's -- well, one captain is not qualified yet, so we have 9 and 12 FOs.

Q. You mentioned one just left --

A. Well, he came back yeah.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. Well, because he had, his father passed away. And the father had a lot of properties on the mainland, so he had to take care of that.

Q. Okay.

A. And we couldn't give him the time he wanted, so, you know. So, he just took a leave of absence.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, but he's back now.

Q. Okay. Since we're on the topic of personnel, how often do pilots -- how often do you hire pilots here?

A. We issue about two to three ground schools a year, before the pandemic of course. But we haven't -- we only have -- we did one this year because nobody left, because nobody was hiring.

Q. Right.

A. We usually run two to three, it just depends.

Q. How many is in the ground school at the time?

A. Like, it just depends on what we need.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. First Officers usually don't leave because they want to get upgraded. Captains come and go because it's not an easy job working cargo. Working the backside of the clock and it just -- sometimes, and it's hard with family life, you know. You got to juggle so many things, so.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. So, usually it's captains. Captains kind of try to see if cargo is meant for them. We get a lot of corporate pilots want to try something.

Q. Okay. This is always a tough question to ask. When was the last time one of your pilots quit, resigned?

A. Oh, we just had one -- I want to say a week ago, but I knew about this one. He talked to me, I mean it was going to happen, he was just waiting for a ground school call.

Q. Okay, so he left to go to another carrier?

A. Another airline, yeah.

Q. All right. How often do you have to discipline a crew or a pilot?

A. Not much, and most of the discipline is sometimes they don't call when they come in. We just had one that overslept, so I had to talk to them. I would say once every two weeks have a call to them.

Q. Okay. When you discipline them is it usually time off? Unpaid time off or --

A. No. I just usually talk to them.

Q. Okay, okay. Have you ever had pilots call you saying they're not flying this airplane or they're not flying with this crew member?

A. Yeah.

Q. How often does that happen?

A. Not often, but yes, I've had that before, yes.

Q. Okay. So, the airplane, you've had people -- captains call in and say they're refusing this

airplane or FOs?

A. Not really refuse to fly, because -- no, I mean refuse to fly with a certain pilot. But that will happen before because I put out a schedule, so they see who I put them with. So, they'll call me before that happens to let me know that they're not comfortable. I already know which pilots' kind of don't get along, so I try not to schedule them, you know.

Q. Okay.

A. That -- I really, don't really do that often because I know who I can fly together and who I can't. So, I already just schedule that way.

Q. Are there very many?

A. No, not at all.

Q. Give me a ballpark number.

A. One FO -- two maybe -- well the captain that left was one of them, and there's one more captain. So, one FO and one captain can't fly together.

Q. Okay. Just those two can't fly with each other -- the captain and the FO can't fly with each other?

A. Yeah.

Q. Or, they can't fly with --

A. No, no, no. They can't fly with each other.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. The captain can fly with anybody else.

Q. Okay, alrighty. When was the last time they got paired up together?

A. I'm just rounding up, I would probably -- more than five or six months ago.

Q. Okay, so it wasn't --

A. No.

Q. It wasn't in the more distant past. Alrighty.

So, talk a little bit about airplanes. More importantly, the accident airplane. Has there been any complaints about that airplane that you've heard from crews or crews don't like to fly it, or --

A. No. 810 was one of our best airplanes. The only thing was talked about was a fuel quantity gauge, it always dropped to zero, so when that happened, we had to put out an MEL and maintenance has to come with us to dip the tanks to make sure we that we know how much fuel is in there. But, engine problem, not at all, not that plane.

Q. So, the gauge went to zero?

A. Yeah, it dropped one of them -- I think it was the right side.

Q. Okay.

A. that it was just, but they fixed it, but that was the problem that I hear -- that I heard about that plane.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And for the record, that airplane is it a -9 engine?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Okay, what's the difference between a -9 and a -15?

A. Thrust.

Q. Thrust.

A. Thrust level. The amount of thrust.

Q. How many -- any procedural differences for the crew?

A. For -9 engines they will usually take off with flaps 2, -15 and -17 they usually take off at flaps 5.

Q. Is that a requirement?

A. No.

Q. For the company just --

A. Not at all.

Q. Okay. So they could -- a crew could take off with --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. With flaps 5?

A. Mm-hmm, of course.

Q. Why would they take off with flaps 2 versus 5?

A. Because when we figure out the thrust levers, I mean the thrust, reduce thrust -- it will be at a lower setting so it -- the EGT will be at a lower amount instead I went flaps 5, so that's the reason why we do that.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Has there been any concerns about the EGT on that one getting too warm?

A. No, not 810, not that I heard of.

Q. Okay. If a crew has a mechanical issue do, they always write it up in the book, or it sounds like you guys are a -- everybody knows everybody here.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Or do they just talk to the mechanic. What do you see, what do you expect your crews to do?

A. If there's a problem, they need to write it up. That's what I expect them to do, so usually they'll call me. They'll call dispatch have dispatch call maintenance because have -- always have two people working at nights, and EMP mechanic will call them up and they'll explain what the situation (indiscernible) is, and then they'll call me immediately to let me know what's going on.

Q. Okay. Okay. So, with 810 and the (indiscernible) engines do they -- or -9 engines, do you have any other airplanes with -9s?

A. No, that's the only one.

Q. Okay. So, let's talk a little bit about the accident crew.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. As a Chief Pilot you obviously know both of them. Have you had to discipline either one of them?

A. No.

Q. Has any, has there been any complaints about either one of them from other crew members?

A. Yes.

Q. And in general terms what were those complaints about?

A. Just getting along. Captain Okai was a very strict, not very strict, he was very by the book, and this FO just didn't like being told what to do. So I got caught on that. But Greg Ryan? No, not at all. Everybody loves flying with Greg, and that was the only time I ever heard any complaints about Henry.

Q. When was that complaint made against the captain?

A. Week, week and a half ago.

Q. Okay, alrighty. Has that -- I assume that was a First Officer that complained about the captain?

A. Correct.

Q. Has that First Officer ever flown with that captain, with the accident captain since then, or before that, or was it the first time they ever flew together?

A. No. I mean -- yeah that they haven't flown after that.

Q. Okay. Has there been -- before that were there more complaints from this First Officer or Captain, or the accident captain about each other? About flying with each other, or is it just that one event?

A. You know I heard -- I haven't heard -- I mean they didn't call me personally, but I heard from the pilots that there's some bickering going on and you know, but nothing that they said to me.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean calling me or anything like that, none, it was just that one.

Q. All right. I may have asked this already and forgive me if I did. Have you ever had to terminate a pilot here?

A. Oh, yeah, sure.

Q. For what reasons?

A. Not passing simulator training. We had one FO that was flying with us, and he was moonlighting working another job because, and he fell asleep at the controls so we terminated him. Some of them -- one was not always late he just said he had a hard time getting up at that time, so we had to let him go. One I think went a little cuckoo on us, great guy, passed IOE and he just lost it. HPD called us he was running Waikiki in his under -- I mean his pajamas. Yeah, I don't know what happened with that guy, he was a great guy, he did very well in sim, I think he was just -- I don't know. But yeah, we terminated him. That's about it in a nutshell, but I had to of course, yeah.

Q. That's the worst part about being a chief pilot, isn't it? Or one of the main --

A. No, I got used to that.

Q. So, when was the most recent termination?

A. I have to think about that, sorry. I haven't had one in a while.

Q. Okay, that's a good answer.

A. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Q. So that's okay, I don't expect dates exactly, so it's all right. I was just trying to get a nice idea.

A. Mm-hmm, yeah, I haven't had one in a while.

Q. Okay. Do you guys have a SMS program here at all?

A. Mm-hmm, yes.

Q. How does that work?

A. We -- you know it works if any pilot needs to write anything up or whatever, that we have a safety website that they can write safety report and that will go into a box that we all get to see and then we brief that every meeting we have a Director of Safety, I think you're going to meet him, Orlando. So, we'll get you all that, and then we always encourage by Mark Butin our POI that anything we need to use the SMS so, we -- to be honest we really argues in it a lot now. We haven't really before, but we are really now.

Q. Okay. Do pilots -- can they report thing anonymously?

A. Mm-hmm. Sure, of course. Yeah.

Q. Do you get any anonymous reports?

A. We get some. I choose to be honest; we don't get that often.

Q. Okay.

A. But we do get once in a while.

Q. Now, just a minute ago you said it goes into a -- we get to look at this box.

A. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.

Q. Who's the we?

A. Myself, David, Director of Operations, Director of Safety, I think maybe one or two other persons, but yeah. Because they report it, we report it when we have our meetings and what we reported and then what we're going to do about it and if what was fixed on it --

Q. Okay. Okay. Help me understand the protocol. If a pilot writes up an airplane, maintenance comes out and clears the writeup.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Can the pilot still refuse the airplane?

A. If they do refuse, they will call us, and I -- we need to know why they're refusing it. All right?

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. I mean if the mechanic -- if maintenance have cleared their aircraft, it's good to fly, unless there's something -- if there's something else, they're refusing we need to know why. And if we feel justified that it is, then write it up for whatever you feel uncomfortable about it.

Q. Okay, yeah. If a pilot refuses an airplane and they -- is it the pilot that calls you or is it the mechanic? You said they call --

A. No, no, no. Maintenance hardly calls me, it's my pilots.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So, if a pilot calls you and says he's refusing an airplane.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. And he gives you a reason, but -- give me a reason that would be an acceptable refusal. If they wrote it up, maintenance cleared it, but the pilots still didn't want to fly it, help me understand what would be in your mind, a good reason.

A. I would think maybe engine temperature.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean it depends on how they cleared it, I don't know really know how they cleared it, but I -- usually how I would do it, I would just tell them to take it out to the reef runway, bring up the power, see what you got. Max take-off, if you don't achieve it, send a red, bring it back, write it up. Simple.

Q. If it's in the red.

A. Yeah.

Q. What if it's into the yellow?

A. Well, we have tolerance for that, we can still take off.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Q. And when you say they take it out and run it up. Is that running it up to the full power?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Or to reduce thrust?

A. To see if we can get -- well, reduce first, if not bump it up one more time so we can make sure that we can get max takeoff power.

Q. Okay. All right. So, if a pilot does refuse the airplane --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Does he lose pay?

A. No, no, not at all. But, if the -- it all depends, I mean if they clear it and he still finds that he's uncomfortable, so I'll tell him to do what I just told you, and if it's within perimeters and he doesn't want to take it to (indiscernible) well we'll take him off that flight, of course and then we'll bring him in. I mean we want to know more. Why, why you didn't take it?

Q. Okay, yeah. Does that happen often?

A. No, not at all?

Q. Not -- doesn't happen at all?

A. No, no, no. I mean it has happened recently.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Since you guys have a nice tight pilot group --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. 20, 21 whatever else, doesn't sound like you have a lot of spare pilots.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. What if a pilot calls in sick? How do you cover that flight?

A. Well, like I said if there's no reserve, and David and I aren't available, we'll only going to run how many planes we have pilots that night. That's all it is.

Q. So, if you -- somebody calls in sick, how far in advance of their flight schedule or their report time do they have to give you?

A. Well, if anybody is calling in sick my (indiscernible)to them is call early in the morning so I can try to get someone else to fly. It's hard when you call me two, three o'clock in the afternoon, I mean most guys will sleeping by then. So, they all know to call if they're going to call -- or if they even start feeling that they're not feeling well I tell them to give me a heads up so at least I know I can plan ahead. So, they usually call by the morning.

Q. Okay. And if they call in sick, do you need a doctor's note?

A. Anything after three days consecutively they need a doctor's note, yeah.

Q. Okay, all right. Do they have -- do they accrue sick time?

A. Yeah, yeah. Mm-hmm.

Q. Okay, so they use the sick time --

A. Mm-hmm, yep.

Q. And if it's gone, their sick time is gone --

A. So, if they call in sick, I mean it's a long one they could use vacation and if it's something that's major then it can go TDI or whatever they need to, but usually we'll go sick leave and vacation.

Q. Okay.

A. Yep.

Q. Alrighty. All right. So, let's get back to a little bit of personnel issue, I know you had an IOE class --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. (Indiscernible) sorry, a new hire class.

A. Yeah, mm-hmm.

Q. How many months ago?

A. I would say about month to month and a half ago.

Q. Okay, so where is that, where are those pilots at in their training, are they still in ground school are they in the simulators?

A. No, no, no, no. They're all done, they're all finished. Cody Rogers was that new captain that I told -- not new captain, the one that came back to us.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. He was in the class, so he's all -- he's not done his IOE yet because he's busy teaching recurrent, Robby Lightholder (ph.) was a captain -- I mean the FO that left us to go to Aloha Cargo and he didn't like it there, so we hired him back. And we hired two FOs and they're currently in IOE training.

Q. Okay. And, do you do IOE or do you only --

A. If I'm here.

Q. Okay.

A. But, yes, I would do the mostly the captains.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. Alrighty. And, forgive me, I think I asked this and I've already forgotten, how many line check airman do you have that do IOEs --

A. Two.

Q. besides just you?

A. Oh, just myself and Ed Rinsma, two.

Q. So the two FOs are paired up going to be paired up with the other line check airman, then?

A. Yes, yes, correct.

Q. Okay. If a pilot has trouble during IOE or OE or upgrade training, what's the -- how do you guys deal with that?

A. Every flight, myself or Ed, we write a report, progress report on the pilots. And we submit it in a box and myself and David will take a look at it.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, so and then if we feel we need to bring them in, and I usually call like Ed every morning after he flies just to talk to him, especially if I'm away so I know what's going on and how we do things is if Ed does the training, he won't sign them off, I will sign them off and vice versa. If I'm training a pilot, he'll do the last flight to make sure everything is what it's supposed to be.

Q. Okay. Alrighty. We have the joy with talking with the accident first officer this morning and he had mentioned that he was working on the weight and balance manual.

A. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.

Q. Is that something you tasked him with -- or how did he get assigned to work on the weight and balance?

A. We asked him.

Q. Okay.

A. We asked him if he could help out with doing, it was things before that even, to help us with our manuals and things like that.

Q. Okay. Why is that weight and balance manual being redone, revised, whatever word we're going to use?

A. The weight and balance was developed by another pilot that had left us, and when we changed FAA POIs and things, he found some discrepancies in it, so we need to re-do it right now.

The last POI, I don't know the reason why he didn't catch it, I don't know that, but this one kind of caught some things in it that we need to re-work it, so Greg and everyone was tasked to try to fix some things in that.

Q. Okay. What kind of discrepancies?

A. Mostly it was just getting our V speeds, so now we use the speed cards reduce thrust on the engines, so we have to manually do that now and I think that's about it. And there was also some things about wet landing wet runways, that we never implemented it to that. So, the distance and things like that because the pilots have to do it themselves. So, we wanted to have it kind of like programmed in there, so they didn't have to keep going to the books if we had manuals ready that we have ever have to pull that out like that, yeah.

Q. Programmed in there, is there a computer program the pilots use?

A. Yes, yes there is.

Q. The pilots use it or?

A. Well, how it works -- is so I like I think when you guys were there yesterdays, the captains will do that performance sheet, that little sheet. I don't know if you got mine -- I gave you one, yeah. So, they'll get that, then they'll give it to the Load Supervisor, and he'll plug in all the numbers, and that will pop

-- and then he'll put all the cargo weights of each section and that will spit out the take-off weight, the landing weight, the thrust settings we get now, the v-speeds we get now, stab trim that will get -- he will get that and the CG, he'll get that.

Q. You get the thrust settings, you being the pilot?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. You being the pilot?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. How do they do that?

A. They use an RAM, and we -- depends what runway. So usually eight we take-off, and then we go to our weight, whatever our weight is for taking off that night, and then we go to the temperature and then we use max climb same weight, and then we determine the two and then the higher temperature, we use for reduced thrust.

Q. Okay. Alrighty. The night of the accident, how were you informed of the accident?

A. I was informed by Amin Dasonti (ph.) he was in 809 coming in, so he called me as soon as he landed saying hey, what happened. And then another captain and FO was in their airplane getting ready to take off, and they called me also right away.

Q. Okay.

A. And then I got a call about five minutes later by dispatch.

Q. Okay. And what did dispatch tell you? Did they tell you the same thing the other crews did?

A. Yeah, they did.

Q. Alrighty. So, on that night, once you got notified of the accident. What is your guys' protocol?

A. Well, David Seest is the person who needs to be in call. He wasn't answering his phone because I know he worked late that night, so he's sleepy so we tried to call around to Director of Safety, he was still sleeping. Those two are the main persons involved in this. So, I just tried to text and call everybody as I possibly can, and David was the first person to call me back. So, I guess he was just bombarded by all these texts that was going on, and I brief him real fast. I told him he needs to get

-- talk to dispatch ASAP. So, he did that, and then finally everybody started getting up and started heading out to company.

Q. Okay.

A. Because at that time I was in LA. So, I was up at that time already.

Q. Okay. Were you in L.A. for business or --

A. I was, well -- that makes Teimour and I are supposed to fly our VIP planes and be ready. So, I was there waiting for -- actually, he just landed, he just came in that night. So, he was out cold because I saw him sending emails late at night, too. So, the next day we're supposed to fly our VIP 200 to Redding, California. That's why I was there.

Q. Is that where your VIP?

A. It's in Chino, California.

Q. That's where --

A. Stationed, yeah, it's over there.

Q. Is that under the 121 certificates?

A. No, it's under 135.

Q. Okay. And how many 7-3's do you have on the 121 side?

A. Five plus the 400 eventually.

Q. The 400? What --

A. Sorry, 737400.

Q. Oh, okay. So you've got new ones coming?

A. Well, it's not new, but.

Q. New to you?

A. Yeah, new to us.

Q. Okay.

A. Yes, yes.

Q. How many of those -- you just got the one coming?

A. Just the one yes, for now.

Q. When do you think that will be here?

A. Well, I just flew it to Delton, Alabama where it has to be converted to cargo. It's all

passengers.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. So, I would think about three months, then it has to go and get painted. I wouldn't think it would be here any earlier than the end of this year, probably.

Q. Is that going to require new training for your crews?

A. Oh, yeah. Of course. Difference training.

Q. And who's going to do that training?

A. I will.

Q. Okay. Alrighty. So, you notified people here of the accident. As part of that -- if you were here what would have done? If you weren't in LA, what would you have done once you were notified of the accident?

A. Oh, I would have went in to work, yeah.

Q. What would you do once you go in?

A. Well, I'm not really part of that inspect -- I mean that team.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. David Seest is, Director of Safety is, and I think there's a couple other people under the Director of Safety portion that will be alerted.

Q. Okay.

A. So, but -- basically just making sure everything -- whatever they need and talk to the pilots because they're all really shocked. I mean they -- especially Amin, and they actually heard everything going on. Those pilots that were listening on the radio, because I went on ATC live tonight, I was monitoring that, too.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, so.

Q. All right so, after the accident did you guys continue to fly?

A. No, we did not.

Q. Were you grounded by the FAA or you did that on yourself?

A. No. We were not grounded, we did that ourselves.

Q. Okay. Is that, are you still self-grounding or are you going to --

A. We're self-grounded we're going to slowly start back up.

Q. When are you going to start back up?

A. That's not yet determined.

Q. Okay. All right. Just a few questions on loading and I'll let the other guys -- you've got to be tired of looking at --

A. No, no, no, I'm fine. No, no, I'm good. I'm good.

Q. It's not nice to lie, but that's okay -- loading the aircraft.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. You guys load the cans or all pallets, or how do you guys do it?

A. All cans. There's also capable of belly loading, forward and aft, under, but that's rare when that we do that. But it's mostly all cans.

Q. Okay.

A. So -- and PVCs, those flat sheets they usually put -- they had those and stuff like that. Usually that will go in there. But it's mostly all cans.

Q. Yeah, okay. Is there anything special to loading the PVCs? Now, what's it called?

A. Yeah, PVC, it's just --

Q. PVC.

A. It's just a flat sheet that they stack the boxes on, they throw a net over it, and they lock it all down. So, no, it's nothing, I mean it's nothing special.

Q. Does it have it have to be in a specific zone or loading area?

A. Well, the -- whoever's doing the loading, I mean the load sheet will figure out -- I mean

they know what -- where to put the -- what weight and where it's supposed to go.

Q. So, if it's a pallet it doesn't matter which zone, it's the weight that --

A. Yes, it's the weight.

Q. So, they could put a pallet --

A. Unless there's hazmat.

Q. Okay.

A. So, hazmat, it just depends what kind of hazmat, so just say an example if we have hazmat, and it's on the top deck like not in a pitch, then it has to be accessible to us. So, it will mostly be in zone one. If it's not, that kind of hazmat then we can put it anywhere but of course we will know where it is.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. That's the only thing I can think of that would be specific in a certain area, yeah.

Q. So, you do the training.

A. Mm.

Q. Do you -- is it part of the training for crews to confirm where all the cargo is, or to watch the cargo being loaded?

A. Wow. It's not really in our books, but when I train them, yeah, I expect them to, I mean its -- they should be watching making sure that the right can is going in the right position of course. And I'm -- all of them do that.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, they all do that.

Q. So once the cans are all on board, or the PVC --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. -- are all on board, the doors closed, do your crews close that door and secure it?

A. Only on neighbor islands, because in Honolulu, only maintenance and pilots are allowed to close the doors. So, on the neighbor islands we don't have maintenance, so the FOs are required to go and close to cargo doors and lock them up once they load us up, yeah.

Q. Okay. How do they verify that the door is closed?

A. We have two kinds, we have one plane I think you saw 809 has that solid wall --

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. So, we have these lights in there and when you guys come, I can show you, but when I'm moving, closing it, those lights will turn off, locking it. And then we have a light in our cockpit that says cargo main door so when that light goes on -- the ones that have the net, they will close it and then there's a lever outside the door that they got to close, and then we verify with a light in the cockpit that the door is closed.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. I think you've helped me a lot so far. I'll probably have some more questions on round two, but --

A. I'm sure you do.

Q. -- Mr. Bramble will have a go.

A. Okay.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. So, Wallace, when did Rhoades Aviation begin implementing SMS?

A. We always had it. I mean we always had it we just was never really using it. Our ex-POI wasn't really strict on that with us. But, when Mark Butin, our new POI came in effect, he really pushed that on us. I mean we always, we had it. We just -- we used it sometimes and not sometime, but I mean now we use it constantly. So. Like, I can't give you an exact date.

Q. Do you know roughly how many years it's been around since you've been hired or after that?

A. Yeah, I would think so, maybe five years, yeah.

Q. You think it's been around five years?

A. Yeah, I think so.

Q. Okay. All right. And it is required for you guys because it's 121?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. And it was your POI Mark that sort of encouraged the company to be more actively engaged?

A. That's correct, yes.

Q. Okay. And do you have a vendor that's helping you with that program? Like, another company or service?

A. No, we do everything ourselves.

Q. I thought there was maybe like a software program or something?

A. Oh, yeah. I'm sorry, they -- I don't -- I can't tell you that answer what we're using.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, because we have these two other gentleman that take care of all that, yeah.

Q. Okay. Do you know what the major components of the SMS are at your airline? Like, what are the parts of it? What does it do?

A. Well, it's just like right now we're doing an SMS each department so we can give it to our Director of Safety to get our planes online. So, flight-ops has one, maintenance has another, we have cargo doing one, and what David just told me we need to write how basically how we can basically never have this happen. That if everyone know that, so but our department that's what we're doing right now.

Q. What does that involve, what are you guys doing to figure that out?

A. I know right now maintenance has, and you guys saw that they changed all the fuel filters, they checked all the oil filters, I will personally take both planes out and do a run-up to check that and (indiscernible) everything done so far that he wants to take the planes flying, so I think I'm going to do that also, take it up with him. Let's see what else we're going to do. There's other things that David had, I'm sorry, I don't really, yeah. I've been kind of little bit out of touch with that right now, so.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay, we can speak with him.

A. Yeah, if you can find -- he will know more.

Q. Okay.

A. Because I know he's working on that right now, because we're trying to get our planes up.

Q. How often were you holding safety meetings prior to the accident, say this year, 2021?

A. So, we have Monday -- we have two meetings a week that we all meet. Our people. And of course, the Director of Safety is there so they bring up anything that's what happens, anything that's open. Anything that's closed. And then we have once a month cast meeting that we have with the FAA. So, they're there and we have to go through all any safety things that happened. How we fixed the problem, well if it's still open, so it -- I would say a lot per month we talk about it. Yeah.

Q. The cass meeting, that's the maintenance side?

A. Yeah, maintenance and us are together. But the weekly meetings that twice to, we have the Director of Maintenance comes. Yeah, he comes to those meetings.

Q. Okay. So, the First Officer from the accident flight told us that 810 was leaking some fluid on a main gear before the accident flight departed, and that he took a picture of it --

A. Mm-hmm

Q. And sent it to maintenance or maintenance and someone else.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Were you aware of that?

A. No, I was not aware of that.

Q. Okay. Do you know what was done to evaluate that problem by maintenance?

A. Well, you know, I think it was is Ricki (indiscernible) handling that problem. You know they have their own things that they look at to determine if the leak is something that needs to be warned. I know for a fact that they count per second how many drops it's dropping out and that determines if it's a leak or just something, so what did I -- I saw the picture, it looked like it really wasn't leaking it just maybe it did leak at first but it wasn't leaking then, and I really believe if Henry and Greg saw that it kept on leaking they wouldn't have taken it. So. I mean we have oil that comes out too sometimes. You know, it's -- so.

Q. Okay. We also had some reports from that -- or, from a different FO and maybe another pilot I can't recall, saying that the EGT readings on the 810 airplane were looking a little bit high, like maybe up close to the yellow or into the yellow.

A. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm.

Q. during the D-rated thrust take-offs.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Do you know anything about that, like is that an issue, is it something maintenance had to look into, or?

A. Well, like I said we have a certain temperature for the -9s so it would be 580, and that's allowed for five minutes. So, in reality they're still legal to take-off with that, even if it's in the yellow it's just a caution range for us. But, if it's in an red range, you know, as long as it doesn't exceed 580 for five minutes we're still good.

Q. Okay. Do you know why it was higher than some of the other airplanes?

A. No, I couldn't tell you that.

Q. Okay. All right. How much have you flown with Greg Ryan?

A. Not too often. I can't recall, I can check later, wouldn't allow someone flew it in but, not for a while.

Q. Did you -- have you done checks on him? Like line-checks.

A. Oh, of course, of course. When he first joined us -- well first things started with simulator training and then IOE training.

Q. Mm-hmm. And you did the training with him in the sim?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And you did his IOE too, or no?

A. I think I did some of it, I didn't do all of it.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And can you describe his capabilities as a First Officer compared to other First Officers at the company?

A. Very capable. We were supposed to upgrade him. He was planned to be upgraded next. Yeah. He just needed 100 hours more and then we're going to upgrade him. Yeah, so.

Q. Okay. So, Mr. Ryan has a full-time job outside of Rhoades, he has --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. -- a law firm and I was just wondering if there were any concerns about his ability to obtain adequate rest?

A. Not at all. When we interviewed I asked the same question.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. That his company, he has people that run it, and he just monitors. Any big problem they call him, same. So, he said there's concern, it's not like he has to go in there every day because he's too -- he also seems supportive for me and he was gone like two weeks and I asked him and he said no problem. I have people that run it, I just monitor it. So, yeah, not at all.

MR. KATT: I think I'm in the wrong line of practice.

MR. HORIBATA JR: Yeah, so.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Last time you saw Mr. Ryan before the accident, when was that?

A. I can't recall, I talked to him on the phone.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. Because he's working on all these things, so he does call me, but I can't recall the when the last time I seen him.

Q. Okay.

A. Because I was on the mainland, also.

Q. Yeah.

A. Yeah, so.

Q. And did he call you -- he didn't call you about that oil leak, or the fluid --

A. No.

Q. Fluid leak.

A. No, I didn't know anything about that until today. They don't call me for everything, it's just things that they're confused or they just need clarification on, they call me.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And how about Henry Okai, have you flown with him a similar amount in terms of checking and training and occasionally in the line --

A. Yeah, I did do a line check with him. I did a line check with all my pilots. You know Mark came up, Mark Butin our POI, came up with all these things that he wanted us to make sure we're doing so I jump sitted on majority of the plane rides to make sure they're following it and understand what David sent out to -- and they -- so I did. I can't recall when, I can check on that. But yes, I did ride with him, I did.

Q. Okay.

A. And then last year -- this year I think he did go to sim I think, I can't recall when was it.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. But, yeah, I seen him in simulator also, I did his (indiscernible).

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So, you -- have you seen him flying enough that you have a sense of his capabilities as a pilot?

A. Yes. I do.

Q. All right. In general, how does his capabilities of pilot compare to other captains at the company?

A. Slow. Slow and -- he just, everything is done by the book, yeah. So.

Q. Okay. And what makes you say that he's slow?

A. Not slow, it's just he takes -- you know he just wants to make sure everything is correct, everything is good, that's not a -- they all do that but it's just, it's a just a little bit slower in some people, you know?

Q. Mm-hmm. Okay. Is there any specific example you can think of that made you think that?

A. Briefing. Takes a while to brief. You know, he's just -- because he -- he's slow, so. He just wants to make sure everything is correct, so, I can't fault anybody on that. Even like when we take him simulator, he takes a little longer to get everything set up because he's checking and

double-checking things to make sure and of course like that I can't fault him on that, either. So, those kinds of things. Some of other captains of course they're way faster, you know, setting up and things like that.

Q. Okay. So, Kim Mercado mentioned that on July 1st, he flew Henry Okai's last flight with him during that shift because it was his impression that Okai was not getting along with the FO that operated the previous two flights with him?

A. Ah, yeah, I don't think that's. That's not correct at all. It wasn't Okai who wasn't getting along, it was both of them wasn't getting along.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, it's not totally Okai's fault on that. I did talk to both of them that night and it was -- and you're going to meet her tomorrow, Gina Moore.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So, it was partially her fault also. And they called, Gina called me after the second flight and said that she preferred not to fly with him again. So, I called Ricardo up, but he was on flying that day, I said if you could just change, I can't get another crew out there right now. So, just change crews, captains and let's just finish the night out. So, that's why I made the change.

Q. Okay. Do you know what the reason for the conflict was?

A. You know to be honest I had a talk with both of them just recently, and they were good friends, and I don't know what happened. I explained that to them. Henry when we do flight control check in our manual it says check free of movement, it doesn't say go to the full stop forward, or go to the full stop back. Well, Henry wanted her to do that, and she didn't want to do it. She just felt, just do it this way, that's what the books says. So, when Henry got to that in the runway, he did it himself, and she didn't like that. So. And then, it's just -- she didn't like the way he was talking to her, you know, it's just -- there was a conflict going on, and that's the one I talked to you about.

Q. Those are the two pilots that weren't getting along that you were talking about? Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Were there other FOs that had conflict with Okai?

A. No, I had another captain conflict with Gina, not Okai. Everybody likes flying with Okai because he's so easy going, so.

Q. Okay. And was the nature of the conflict with the other captain -- between the other captain and Gina similar to this?

A. No, totally opposite -- I mean no, it wasn't.

Q. Just a different?

A. Yeah, just something different, yes.

Q. Okay. All right.

A. It had nothing to do with flying.

Q. Okay. All right, so in terms of personality you said Okai, you felt Okai wasn't -- it had -- he was an easy-going person?

A. Oh, definitely, yes.

Q. And, did you have a sense of his command style? I know you didn't fly with him as an FO, but did you have a sense from the other pilots what he was like as a captain?

A. Oh, yeah. In the simulator you can easily see that, right? Because that's what I look for in our captains, take control of the cockpit, make sure they follow our procedures, situational awareness, so. I mean, you can pick that up easily if he's a captain, if he's a good captain. If he makes sure CRM is in there, so. Yeah. Henry had all that. So. And the airlines he flew before, he was a captain, so.

Q. Okay, that's the other thing we noticed. In his resume he had a number of employers that he was at for a short period time

-- a relatively short period of time. Do you know why that is? Or is that not unusual?

A. No, it depends. I know he was flying overseas. I think the last job, so that was a contract job and I think that even the one before that was another contract job. So, but the rest I don't -- I can't recall why he changed so many positions, I mean, he'll be here tomorrow so you can ask him those questions.

Q. Okay, but that wasn't a -- did you participate in hiring him, or now?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Was that, in terms of seeing his resume did it stand out from that standpoint?

A. We asked, of course we ask why you change jobs so much. Because we're looking of course, everybody's looking for somebody that is -- will stay with them.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. We asked that of course.

Q. Do you recall his answer, or?

A. No, I can't, no.

Q. Okay. All right, and the last time you saw him before the accident? Was it within a couple of days, or?

A. No, no, no. It's been longer than that.

Q. Okay. Just estimate then.

A. Yeah. Mm-hmm.

Q. Okay. All right, how do you personally like working for the airline?

A. If I didn't, I wouldn't be there. Yeah, I think it's a very good airline, so. Teimour supports us, he supports me, so. I really, that's just where I want to stay until I retire. And, you know.

Q. How does pilot pay at Rhoades compare to what other 737 pilots make? Is it competitive?

A. Well, I think we're competitive, of course. A couple good things about us, we fly in a nice area, we don't deal with weather as much. We drive to work, we drive home. So, we're in our own beds every night, and I think for the amount of hours we work per month, about 28 days, it's a

good job. You know, they average probably 30 to 40 hours a month, yeah.

Q. Of duty time?

A. Yeah, yes.

Q. Okay.

A. Well, block time. I mean flight time. Total time.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Duty time will be a little longer than that.

Q. Oh, right.

A. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.

Q. That's months not weeks.

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. All right. Block time. And what's your sense of the organization culture with respect with how to the organization handles safety issues and balances safety and production?

A. Well, we, you know -- I can't speak for everything but from the flight operation sides, we encourage our pilots, if there's something wrong to write it up, and we never push them to take anything that they feel is unsafe, and once we write it up we want to make sure that it gets right signed off correctly. So, David and I do check those things. You know, see how they signed it off and then make sure of everything else, but. I mean I feel I fly their airplanes, so it's not like I'm worried about it. So, I feel it's good with the safety aspect of it. I mean our planes are old, don't get me wrong, I mean they're old, they're not new, so. We're going to have things that we're going to fly with MELs but it's nothing unsafe, you know, so.

Q. Okay. And as the Chief Pilot do you feel supported by management and able to make safety related decisions without their --

A. Fully. Fully, yes.

Q. Okay. All right. Do you have any, I know it sounds like this is a bit repetitive, but I just

want to make sure I get clear questions and answer in response.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. to all of these specific aspects of it. Do you have any safety related concerns about the company?

A. No.

Q. And how confident are you about the quality of maintenance at the company?

A. Fully, like I said I fly the aircraft.

Q. All right, that's it for me, thanks. Rich?

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Okay the only thing I have to ask about is the EGT on 810 --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. About the flaps two setting.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. To reduce thrust all the time, and it possibly having issues being close to the limits. You know you have the time frame within the yellow, but if that's happening every time on D-rated take-offs, is there any concern that the plane will not be able to do a full rated take-off?

A. I understand, so, what we -- what I tell to encourage that if that happens, we won't do a writeup, but we'll do an informational writeup. So, they would say, to set an example, we set reduced thrusts the temperature did not go into the red limit, but it was in the yellow for this certain amount of time then we request if we -- if they can get bleed -- duct pressure -- whatever as much information. So, maintenance has information that engine might be trouble so they can take a look at it. So, I do, yes. I do encourage that they should do informational writeups. Yeah. And I (indiscernible) another thing that's maintenance to decide that. But I always tell them if you feel uncomfortable, take it to the runway and bring up the thrust, see if you get max thrust. If you don't get it or you don't feel comfortable, bring it back. And maintenance always encourages that,

you don't feel comfortable just bring it back. You know, we have never had any problems with that.

Q. Has anyone ever taken you up on that? Taken it out to the reef runway and run it up?

A. I don't get all the information. I mean I don't get calls on all that. I just -- I would presume sometimes they do, but I don't hear much planes coming back, yeah. To be honest.

Q. Okay, that's all I have.

A. Mm-hmm.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. I just have a few questions, Wallace. Thanks for your time.

A. Mm-hmm. No, no, no.

Q. As far as the weight and balance, how much are you involved with making -- ensuring that the weight and balance calculations

-- especially with the cargo loads, are accurate?

A. So, we -- that performance sheet that I showed you.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. We look in a book called Runway Analysis Manual that we will get the max take -- the max -- we'll get these numbers for climb performance -- I mean climb weight max take off weight for that runway, and landing weight, okay? So those four numbers we get, we give that to whoever's making our load manifest sheet. He'll plug those numbers into a computer and then he'll individually put the cargo, whatever load is in zone one, zone two, zone three, and then he'll bill that. So, when we get that sheet we honestly can see what our max take-off weight, if we exceeded that, our max landing weight if we exceeded that. Our CG's within limits, we get all that. Like I said, we get our thrust setting now, we do our v-speeds now, so we are doing all those things ourselves.

So, I feel comfortable, I mean, you know I mean, you can clearly see -- and then also the load manifest, if something's not right, it'll come out red. So, the pilots know that that's showing red something's not right.

Q. When you say it shows up red?

A. Like say example, they put the wrong plane.

Q. No, I know -- where does it show --

A. Whatever mistake it is?

Q. Is it a dispatch or is it/

A. No, it's on a load manifest sheet.

Q. Got it.

A. Or, when they plug in the number -- say they plug in numbers that is not corresponding for that aircraft, they can't put it in there.

Q. Mm.

A. The program will stop it.

Q. Okay, so, in the terms of SMS, those are some of the controls.

A. Right.

Q. okay. Very good. Can you name -- for SMS purposes, when you have your discussions with your managers you come across SRAs, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. Can you name a few SRAs that really stick out that are probably high risk?

A. We had one, that an FO walked under a K loader, yeah, that was high risk. It's just, the other side was just super busy, and he walked under, and people saw him and they wrote him up. Let me see, which one -- that we took care of. We had another one, the doors was left open maintenance opened the service door because it was hot, but they didn't' put the rope on there, so the doors just open, so that was a red item. Safety, somebody could fall right out and break their

neck. So, that was one. Let me see --

Q. Okay, that's good. So, what were the corrective actions that the company made?

A. For the First Officer that walked under we changed our manuals saying that -- not changed it, we sent a bulletin out saying you know nobody should be in that area. We also let cargo -- K-loader person he has to keep an eye out now, and if somebody's getting near that they need to let them know. We also did remedial training on that First Officer, let him know what he did wrong and what stuff he should not do. So, we did that. As for the cargo door, I mean the service door, they're allowed to open it, but cock -- I mean just open it, they can not fully open it now. Yeah, they're allowed to open it, but they can't open it fully, so in case somebody can't fall out. Yeah.

Q. Okay, very good. And my last question --

A. Mm.

Q. And it's a -- as you're all getting ready to take off --

A. Mm.

Q. -- one of the last things on your check list is your take off check. Take off briefings.

A. Yeah.

Q. Could be either the captain or First Officer.

A. Right, right.

Q. Can you just run through what was your briefing about on that please?

A. So, this is the one -- well we have two briefings, right? We have the, when we park, we have the full briefing. But, then we have one on our taxi check list, that briefing is really in case anything changes on our first brief. Say like, they give us a different heading, or a different altitude. So, usually we'll just say, Left Seat Take-Off 5,000 feet, 1-4-0 heading complete. Or, some people don't have to say anything, they just say complete. It's really just in case something changes because we have give a brief while we're loading up --n I mean while we're at parking.

Q. Sure, but is there one that on take-off should you have a failure of the engine --

A. Oh, but that's done way before -- I mean that's done when we're at parking. When we're doing our full brief --

Q. I see.

A. Any kind of emergencies like you heard him he says 2-2-0 heading that's our protocol if we lose that engine on that runway, he's supposed to 2-2-0, and head to Alana.

Q. That's done on the ramp

A. Yes, on the ramp, that's a full brief, yeah. Whoever's flying would do that brief. Fire, if we got to do it on board, that's all talked about at that time.

Q. Okay, great. Thank you Wallace, that's all I have.

A. Mm-hmm, thank you.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Okay, I just got a few questions. Do you need a break?

A. No, no, I'm good, I'm good, I'm good.

Q. This usually takes twice as along.

A. It's all right.

Q. Thank you. You were just talking about the single engine departure, the 2-2-0 heading, and you said out to Alana, is that a hold?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Is that a company procedure? Or is that a published procedure with air --

A. It's a company procedure, it's our RAM, (indiscernible) manual. Yeah.

Q. How far out is Alana?

A. 13.9.

Q. 13.9? Okay.

A. Off the Honolulu VOR (ph.), yeah.

Q. Alrighty. We were talking about engine take offs and all that, or -- engine power at take-

off, and correct me, but you guys do reduced thrust take-offs?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Do you ever do full thrust take-offs?

A. The only time we do that, we do what we call triangle. So say we go Honolulu, Maui, Hilo, so we have to take more fuel, and usually they'll put more cargo on because we're going to two destination. So, sometimes we -- that -- we get to almost max power take-off, but that's the only time that we do that. Most of the time we're way under, so, reduced thrust is more than adequate.

Q. Okay. Is there a typical weight for a flight to Maui that an airplane's taking off with, or is it --

A. Usually, it's about 100,000 pounds.

Q. Okay.

A. Roughly. Anything over that to us is considered heavy because we don't usually take off that much. And we take -- you know we don't have as much fuel in as most other airlines do, yeah so.

Q. Where are the storage, the container, the cans? Where are they weighed when they're loaded?

A. So, it just depends. So, let's give an example, the mail. Right, we carry most of the mail. So, the mail is at the post office it's taking off, whatever big containers. Our guys will take it out of the big containers and load it in our smaller containers and then that will be transported back to our company, and we have a scale outside that fence -- you know when you guys went to the fuel truck, you saw that fence?

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. There's a big scale on the ground over there, so they weigh that.

Q. Okay.

A. That -- if we get freight from UPS at FedEx, I mean basically they have weighed it, but we do weight it again. Because we sometimes we had some problems with that. Yeah, so we do weigh them again now.

Q. All right, and how often is that scale tested for accuracy?

A. I can't tell you that, that's a question for Bobby Soon (ph.) because he's in charge of that.

Q. Alrighty. You had a --

A. I know it's kept up to -- I mean they check it of course, yeah.

Q. Okay. Okay. You said something about, when we were talking about the yellow --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. -- you know the thrust --

A. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm.

Q. -- into the yellow, and you called it an informational writeup? Or something that you --

A. Yeah, yes, correct.

Q. How does maintenance clear one of those?

A. Well, it's not clear. It's just for them to know what happened, so they will use that information and maybe they'll look into further why it's becoming in the yellow. Maybe something -- but I don't know, but it's really for us pilots to tell maintenance is something needs to look at, but it's not a warrant to ground an aircraft, but it's just something that they should look at.

Q. Where is that writeup actually done?

A. It's in a book, so in our logbook we writeup, and if it's a writeup we will write our name and everything. But if it's just an informational, we'll just put an I, so they know that's information writeup.

Q. Okay.

A. That's all, it's the same book that we use, with just different letters that we put in there.

Q. So, but the I, that maintenance doesn't have to clear --

A. Correct.
Q. -- is that considered an open writeup then?
A. No, it's not. It's just information for them.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. And if it's a writeup then we'll put F, which means Flight Crew, so they know that's a writeup. Yeah.
Q. Okay. All right. How often do you guys look at FDR data for crews complying with your policies, or do you?
A. Well, like I said, I check them when they're in sim. Is that what you're asking?
Q. For I --
A. What.
Q. For the flight data recorder --
A. Oh, oh.
Q. Do you guys ever look at that to see --
A. Well, we can't -- with the 200's we can't pull those kinds of things up. I know what you're talking about, four cards, stuff like that? Yeah? No, we can't we don't have the capacity to do that.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. I would. I think our 400 will have that.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, so, yeah. But the 200s don't have that.
Q. Okay
A. Yeah.
Q. There's a -- there's something you said about the FO that got upset with the captain because she didn't do the full range, and he wanted the full range?

A. Yes.

Q. What is your requirement?

A. It just says check freedom of movement, so it doesn't specify full forward or full aft, but I talked to her, I said you know the captain wasn't asking you to do anything unsafe, not anything out of SOP, that's just what he wants, you should have done it. And you shouldn't get mad if he does it, right? So.

Q. How do you -- do you do the sim training?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. What do you expect crews to do in the sim? When they're doing --

A. I expect them to do what's in the book. If they want any extra, then they should brief that.

Q. Okay.

A. Right, to the let the other person know that this is what I want, yeah.

Q. So, you want them to do it in the book, so, a quick back and forth and that's all you expect of them, or do you want them to see the full --

A. Well, like I said that's required what's in the book. That's what she was telling me.

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. That's what it says in the book so that's what I did. But then I told her, well Henry wanted it this way, and he's not wrong either, so, when he stopped the aircraft and did the check you shouldn't have gotten upset about it because you didn't want to do it, so he did it.

Q. Okay.

A. So.

Q. Alrighty. Dealing with humans as we are, and pilots not always do we have a successful check ride. What's your guys' bust rate for check rides and flight checks and all that?

A. Bust rate is not too many, yeah.

Q. When was the last time you busted somebody in the sim, or unsatisfactory had a sim run?

A. Let me see, I just had one. Maybe about three or four months ago.

Q. Okay, and what caused that to be unsuccessful?

A. Low visibility weather, and he didn't get an alternate, take-off alternate.

Q. Okay. Okay. Correct me if I'm wrong, but you said you saw the photos that the accident FO had taken of the liquid?

A. Yeah, I just saw it today.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Where was that liquid?

MR. KATT: I just got it.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Where was that liquid located?

A. I don't know what -- it was the landing gear area, but I don't know if it was left or right of it.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, yeah. But it was the landing gear area.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. Think it was the right side.

Q. Okay. Alrighty. You said you're going to take the to the -- two airplanes you have here out to the runway --

A. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm.

Q. -- and check and all that, and your CEO, President --

A. Mm-hmm, mm-hmm, mm-hmm.

Q. Owner, forgive me, he's thinking you're going to go take him up and fly?

A. No, he wanted to go up and take it up to fly just so we can -- really like I said you know, with SMS we want to make sure we show that we did as much as possible before we release it to the crews.

Q. Okay.

A. So, that's something I think is a concern that you heard from everybody about achieving power not in a red. So, we want to do that and then we also want to do, take it in air and just fly it, see how everything is.

MR. ETCHER: Is your CEO, Teimour --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Teimour.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. -- is he a pilot as well?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. On the 7-3?

A. Yeah. On the 135 side, he's too old to go 121, but he's current. I just gave him his check ride.

Q. Okay.

A. He's current on the 121 side. I mean 135 side, excuse me.

Q. Okay. Okay. So, you do both 121 and 135?

A. All I do 135 side I just do training.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, I don't do checking on that. All my checking is on the 121 side.

Q. Okay. I know in your position you get to interact with the FAA on a regular basis, can you -- you just had a change in the POI or your POI change?

A. Yeah, we just did.

Q. How long ago?

A. Less than year, yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, less than a year. Yeah.

Q. How often do you interact with the POI?

A. Not too often. David is the point of contact for our company but I just -- he just came off the simulator with us, he -- we have Bob Lander like I told you he's the other sim instructor. He already, Mark had already observed me, of course, did all my training, so he wanted to observe Bob Lander, so I just seen him, maybe about less -- about a month ago. He was up in Miami with us.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. And I also did extended training, ET, you know all stalls and all that's required so he observed me during training with one of my pilots doing that, too. Stalls and all that stuff, slow flight, things like that.

Q. Alrighty. Last question from me, I think, and then I'll let these -- just to make sure nobody has any -- I know you've talked about taking the airplane out, running it up since the event, but has there been any other safety things that you've been looking at since this event that might need change, or? I know you were looking at just checking the engines.

A. To be honest when I listen to the tape, I mean Henry did what he was supposed to -- both crew, excuse me, did what they're supposed to do. Yeah, I mean they flew the right heading, they went to the altitude they were supposed to accelerate and get the flaps cleaned up, and it -- they did the checklist, and unfortunately we know what happened after that, but yeah. As I saw, they did exactly what they were supposed to have done.

Q. Okay. Alright, well I appreciate it, and I'll let, just to make sure --

A. Mm-hmm.

MR. ETCHER: Bill?

MR. BRAMBLE: I don't have anything, thank you.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. One thing about the cargo, I think if I'm not sure if this is accurate, but normally the first

flight of the day is scheduled like cargo for sure, and then as it progresses through the night it's cargo might still be showing up. So, like the third flight of that day, the flight might delay off of what the -- I know you're schedule, but, what's put on the schedule. How much concern -- or is there a concern with cargo showing up, being rushed, showing up late and then getting put on the airplane and then running that through that whole process you talked about with the red area, computer, or is there a time where you don't get to put in the computer where cargo shows up to the airplane and now it's put into the --

A. Mm-hmm. No, I see what -- no. There's no -- okay, so let's go back so, the first three flights are almost guaranteed going to fly. The next flight if we don't have cargo then we might do a triangle. Instead of having two separate flights, and the last flight, the 515 and 5 o'clock flight, the Maui and Hilo, that will go clockwork, because that's the mail that's coming to us, that's the one that cannot be delayed. So, the only flight that might be delayed is the ones in the middle but the first two the Maui's that will guarantee go for sure. The Hilo might no-go -- they might add a can, Hilo can, it just depends on how much freight, but the -- Hilo and Maui the five o'clock and the five fifteen site, that will go almost as clockwork, that's the mail coming to us. Yeah, so that one needs to go to the islands. As the weight and balance sheet, to be honest, Bob Leeman, I trust him fully has been doing this forever and like I said anything doesn't come out right, he won't -- it won't give him numbers, it'll be red and he can't complete it.

Q. So, the red he puts the cargo away to another computer --

A Mm-hmm, yes.

Q. -- in his office.

A. Correct.

Q. And relies on the computer to show if it's in the red or not?

A. Correct, yes. Correct.

Q. So, as the like the last-minute cargo that's going to be loaded on the third flight of the day,

and it's way someone gets that weight and information to him to put into the computer.

A. Mm-hmm, correct.

Q. There isn't a manual way to just go through straight without putting it into the computer.

A. No, it's all through your computer, so like I said, the mail will come from the U.S. Post Office, they'll target over there. They're all go to out scale, and each can they're radioing ham saying this can is 3,000 pounds, blah blah blah this. So, he's over there already putting it in. Yeah, so, before the cans even get to us, he'll have the final weight before they move already, yeah.

Q. Okay, thanks that's all --

A. And you know like I -- tomorrow you know he'll be here, so you can talk -- I mean he's been doing this a long time, too. So.

MR. ETCHER: Clarence?

MR. KANAE: Nothing from me, thank you.

MR. ETCHER: All right, well, thank you again for all the time you've given us, educating us -- you didn't you educated us well yesterday as well, so I'm glad we got it on record, too, just so I can remember it a little easier. Just got a few following here -- if you're thinking you know we've asked you every question under the sun, great. But, is there something we should have asked that we didn't? That you're like, man this might help them, that's?

MR. HORIBATA JR: You know, I really, I know you guys talked a lot about safety and stuff, but like I said, I wouldn't fly, I wouldn't be here if I felt like this company wasn't safe. We fly older aircraft you're going to expect MELs and things like that, but I trust our maintenance program, Teimour is -- backs me and David up fully, and like I said, we tell the pilots if they feel something's not right just bring it back. Mike Kim our Director of Maintenance had numerous times tells them, just bring it back. There's no pressure on you guys, just bring it back. So, I don't know really what happened on this day. I mean I'm waiting for you guys to determine that. I want

to know of course, too. I just, I'm just happy they're here with us. I talked to Henry today and you know, everybody listens to it and he has never stopped beating himself up -- he said yes, I mean thank please, throughout the emergency. He never changed his tone, so I'm just happy they're here.

MR. ETCHER: We are, too.

MR. HORIBATA JR: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: The last question, I know you're in a position that you can make change, but sometimes you've got those above you that say oh maybe we shouldn't make that change. But, if you were the king for the day, are there any changes you can think of at the airline that you would like to see made and you could just make it happen?

MR. HORIBATA JR: If I was -- and we had the resources, I would probably get more planes, so we can dominate the skies here. They need you know reliable people. Aloha has their problems, too, you know. I would like to do that, you know. What's it called? Ohana Airlines, they closed down. They were doing cargo ATRs, but they're no longer doing it, you know. So, that's kind of what I would do.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

MR. HORIBATA JR: If I could.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

MR. HORIBATA JR: Yeah.

Mr. Etcher: Alrighty. Well, it's -- we've kept you here a long time it's already 5:43, so we appreciate your time, but we can call this interview done and appreciate your time.

(Whereupon, at 5:43 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII
ON JULY 2, 2021
Interview of Wallace Horibata Jr

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FA174

PLACE: Honolulu, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Brittany Hay
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
	*	

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Interview of: DAVID SEEST, Director of Operations

Rhodes Aviation/TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday,
July 7, 2021

APPEARANCES:

WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operations Factor Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

WILLIAM KATT, Esq.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

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INTERVIEW

(9:08 a.m.)

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. This is an interview with David Seest on July 7th, at 9:08 a.m. My name is Bill Bramble and I'm a human performance investigator with the NTSB. Mr. Shawn Etcher and I are leading the operations and human performance working group for accident investigation number DCA21FA174, involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation, or the FAA and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers. I would now like to have Mr. Etcher and each of the group members briefly introduce themselves.

Mr. Etcher?

MR. ETCHER: Good morning, thank you for coming in and talking with us. My name is Shawn Etcher, I'm an operational factors group chairman for the NTSB.

MR. KANAE: Hi, David, I'm Clarence Kanae, I'm with the FAA, assigned to the Honolulu (indiscernible) at the Freedom Management Office (ph.), and my specialty is operations.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, Boeing safety pilot.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, today we'll be using a recorder, and after the interview we will send that recording out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to review that transcription to correct it for any typographical errors. Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probably cause and prevent recurrence. Our role is not to assign fault, we are here simply to -- for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, however, we can't offer any confidentiality or immunity, and the transcript of this interview will be -- eventually be part of the public docket for this accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions and we'll ask them one at a time. Everyone's been instructed not to interrupt the person who's asking questions and there will

be an opportunity for everyone to ask follow-up questions after each person has a turn. Please answer the questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so, and if you realize that you misstated something or you want to correct something, please do.

You're entitled to have one representative of your choosing, is there someone you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. SEEST: Yes, I'll have William Katt, --

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

MR. SEEST: -- my rep (sic).

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, and Mr. Katt, can you introduce yourself?

MR. KATT: Yeah, William Katt of the law firm of Wilson Elser.

MR. BRAMBLE: Thank you.

Okay, if everybody's ready, we'll begin with the questions.

INTERVIEW OF DAVID SEEST

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. Mr. Seest, can you provide your full legal name, please?

A. Sure. David Alan Seest.

Q. Is it -- can you spell Alan?

A. A-L-A-N.

Q. Okay, and Seest?

A. Yes, S-E-E-S-T.

Q. Okay, and where do you reside?

A. In Honolulu, Hawaii.

Q. Okay. Do you have residences elsewhere?

A. No.

Q. Okay, and what's your mobile number?

A. [redacted]

Q. Okay, and how old are you?

A. 52.

Q. Okay, and your job title at TransAir or Rhoades Aviation?

A. Is director of operations.

Q. And when were you hired at Rhoades?

A. That would've been about 2012.

Q. Okay. What are your roles and responsibilities -- well, let me ask you first, what other positions have you held at Rhoades?

A. I was a chief pilot a long time ago, and that was a previous position.

Q. Anything else?

A. Just line pilot.

Q. Okay. Can you tell us sort of the sequence in terms of which years you did each of those roles?

A. Let's see, I previously worked for Rhoades before 2012, but I came back to the company after a hiatus. So, I was chief pilot previously before I came to TransAir.

Q. Oh, okay. Which years did you work for that -- them before that?

A. Maybe around '99 to 2009, maybe? I'm not sure.

Q. Okay, and then you left Rhoades and then you joined them -- was it after the certificate came here? Or --

A. After, yeah.

Q. Okay. So, when you worked for Rhoades before, where were you based? When you worked for them as chief --

A. Columbus, Indiana.

Q. Okay, and in that previous period you were a line pilot and a chief pilot?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay. So, then you came here to work for Rhoades TransAir in Honolulu in 2012?

A. Yes.

Q. And were you hired as director of operations?

A. No.

Q. Can you tell us, what was your progression from 2012 to now?

A. Just hired as a trainer -- an instructor -- I guess, instructor pilot and line pilot then DO.

Q. Okay, and do you recall which years that those changes happened?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Okay.

A. I really don't.

Q. Do you know which year you became DO?

A. I do not, not with certainty.

Q. Okay. Can you give us a ballpark, just so we know how long you've been in that role?

A. Yeah, maybe a year or two after I came to Hawaii.

Q. Okay. So, it's been a while?

A. Yeah.

Q. It's not like it was last week.

A. Right.

Q. Okay. Can you tell us about your roles and responsibilities as DO?

A. As DO? Yeah. I'm responsible for operational control, probably number one. I supervise the chief pilot and the -- also the dispatch -- the flight following operations. Let's see, the main departments that I oversee -- I do the -- responsible for the drug testing for the company and for security of the company.

Q. Anything else you want to list or is that the -- pretty much it?

A. Yeah, that's the main --

Q. Okay.

A. -- duties.

Q. And you mentioned the drug and alcohol testing, that's one thing I've been meaning to ask you about. Did -- was the accident crew drug and alcohol tested after the accident?

A. The captain was not because he was in the hospital too long. The FO was drug tested.

Q. Okay, and when did that happen?

A. Maybe about 24, 30 hours, maybe, after the accident.

Q. And was that at the company office?

A. We send them to a collection site.

Q. Okay, and have you received the results back from that yet?

A. No, not yet.

Q. Okay. All right, can you give a brief overview of your aviation background and what lead to your working here?

A. I started out in the maintenance field and then finally had hours to become a pilot, and started flying, let's see, in Florida, and ended up as a flight engineer. Finally, back in Indiana for Rhoades and then in Honolulu.

Q. Were you working in aviation between when you worked for Rhoades in Indiana and then when you came back to work for -- in Honolulu?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Who'd you work for then?

A. A company called East (ph.), they -- a contractor in Afghanistan.

Q. Was it an aviation company?

A. Uh huh.

Q. What'd you do for them?

A. Pilot.
Q. How many years did you do that?
A. About a couple -- about two.
Q. Okay. Was that a cargo-type operation, or is it something you can talk about or --
A. It was everything.
Q. Okay. All right, do you have any other employers now besides TransAir Rhoades?
A. Say it again?
Q. Do you have any other employers besides Rhoades now?
A. Oh, now? No.
Q. Okay. Can you give us an overview of your certificates and ratings?
A. A&P and dispatcher, ATP, all the engine land (ph.), commercials, single engine sea, commercial land, flight engineer.
Q. Okay, and type ratings?
A. DC3, Super DC3, Convair 240, 340, 440, and Boeing 737.
Q. And what's you estimate total of flight time?
A. I'll say 65 hundred.
Q. How much of that time is on the 737?
A. Probably about 1000.
Q. And how long ago were you typed on the 73?
A. Seven years ago.
Q. Okay. So, you're an FAA certified dispatcher?
A. Yes.
Q. And what's your role with respect to the flight following center at Rhoades? Do you supervise them?
A. Yes, I supervise -- I'm the supervisor and dispatch the -- I say dispatch but it's -- you

know, we're actually supplemental, so it's not a dispatcher, it's a flight following only. But, yeah, I supervise the flight following supervisor and all our flight followers.

Q. Is there any difference in your experience between how the flight following center works and how a certified dispatch office works?

A. I haven't worked in a certified dispatch office, you know, I only went to school to become qualified. But we try to run it more like a dispatch center than just a simple flight following to the support the -- you know, the pilots as much as possible.

Q. In what ways do you go sort of above and beyond what would be required for flight following?

A. We give them their weather, we check the weather, we, you know, we're checking their NOTAMs behind them, and before they get there. We're following their flight plans for them, we coordinate fuel when they need it, hotels when they need it, calls to different departments, coordination, maintenance, chief pilot.

Q. Okay. How about the loading crews, do you oversee them?

A. No.

Q. Who oversees them?

A. That would be the operations managers on duty.

Q. Can you give me a name?

A. Bobby Lehman at Honolulu, yeah.

Q. Okay. All right, so, primarily the people you're responsible for overseeing are the flight followers and the pilots?

A. Right.

Q. Is that right?

A. Well, not directly to the pilots. The chief pilot is under me, chief pilot oversees the pilots.

Q. Okay. Any other groups of employees that you may have -- be above in terms of the chain

of command?

A. No.

Q. Okay. That was no?

A. That's no.

Q. Okay.

A. You looked at me, so I didn't know if there was something I missed.

Q. No, I just want to make sure, for the recording, that it was clear.

A. Okay.

Q. Any challenges for Rhoades in the last year in terms of staffing?

A. We've been pretty good on staffing I would say. Of course, COVID has helped; help keep plenty of people coming our way as well.

Q. Okay, and any challenges in the last year in terms of air fleet -- aircraft fleet size, or composition, or just the availability of aircraft to meet the need?

A. Yeah, usually we have two or three, you know, airplanes on a night, it seems to meet the needs. I don't get too involved in how many -- how much cargo or lift is needed.

Q. Any challenges in the last year in terms of aircraft maintenance?

A. Nothing that jumps out at me, I guess.

Q. Okay. Anything you can tell me about TransAir's safety management efforts or safety program?

A. We were happy to have the SMS, currently even looking at a whole computerized system called VOCUS and look forward to using that. I think it'll make it easier on everyone, more streamline.

Q. Can you spell the name of that?

A. V-O-C-U-S.

Q. Okay. How long has the company had a safety management system?

A. It's been maybe two years -- two-and-a-half? Let's see, maybe two-and-a-half to three years now.

Q. Can you tell me about the -- well, first of all, what is your role with respect for to that system? Do you -- are you involved with implementing and running it?

A. I'm involved in making sure my departments that are under me meet the safety goals and handling any hazards that come up, finding the mitigations, and making sure they're handled.

Q. Can you tell us about the evolution of that system and how has that changed over the last three years in terms of, you know, how you do your safety role?

A. It's a whole different mindset than what the FAA used to have. I think instead of the violation type thing into -- FAA is using more of a root cause and want the owners to -- operators to find their own problems and fix their own problems since we're the best ones at, you know, that are on the ground every day to see it. So, a fundamental change in the thinking and culture. With SMS the whole point is to find the problems and mitigate them.

Q. How has that shift been working out for you guys? Do you feel like it's been effective to -- or more effective for the company to be more active in doing that?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Can you think of any examples of how it's made a difference?

A. Probably, you know, people are more apt to bring up issues -- feel more comfortable bringing up issues. Just -- everybody's more open to talking about things in general with SMS.

Q. Okay. How about the FAA, can you describe the quality of your relationship with the FAA over the last three years?

A. Very good. Extremely helpful and good insight on the couple different (indiscernible) we've had.

Q. Who are your current -- who's your current POI?

A. Mark Butin.
Q. Spell his last name?
A. B-U-T-I-N.
Q. And do you know who your PMI is?
A. It's Ray Lesane.
Q. How do you spell his last name?
A. L-E-S-A-N-E.
Q. Okay. Do you have a PAI, too?
A. Yeah, Ace Acevedo. Don't ask me to spell it.
Q. That's okay. Okay, so, has that team been the same for the last three years or has it changed?
A. No, they changed here about -- let's see, maybe a year-and-a-half ago.
Q. What happened at that time?
A. They changed out the teams.
Q. The whole team?
A. Yeah, the whole team. I think, like, they do a lot of time, they switch.
Q. Okay. Who were the -- who is the previous POI?
A. John Murakami.
Q. And how about the PMI?
A. Stan --
Q. Blanking on his last name?
A. Yeah.
Q. That's all right.
A. Yeah, I guess it's been a while.
Q. That's fine. We can ask the FAA, but at least we got a first name, so --

A. Yeah, we always saw him monthly.

Q. Yeah. So, when did this change occur; the shift in the nature of the interaction with the FAA in terms of them being more collaborative and less enforcement oriented?

A. I don't know, whenever the FAA had their -- had the big shift to SMS -- when SMS came out.

Q. So, the software program, the VOCUS, that's -- when is that coming online for you guys?

A. Very soon. We're -- hopefully -- maybe this month.

Q. And how did the SMS program work before that? Like, what were the pieces of it?

A. It's just paper instead of digital.

Q. What components did the program -- does the program have? Like, what does it involve?

A. Reporting policies and, of course, how to mitigate items. You know, we have our SRM safety management worksheet that we use to determine a risk and how the -- what level the risks are at, it includes fatigue, it includes, I mean, the whole structure for the program: who's in charge, different departments for safety, who's the overall in charge, responsibilities.

Q. Who are those people in the different departments, and then who is the overall safety --

A. Orlando Debrum. He's the -- our safety officer for 119, and then the other people are the 119 department heads.

Q. Can you list the other 119 heads for me?

A. Yeah, so, you have Mike Kimble (ph.), the director of maintenance, and Director Cucci (ph.), the chief inspector is now Ron Lenhart (ph.); he just came on board.

Q. And yourself?

A. And myself, yeah, the DO.

Q. Anyone else?

A. And Wallace.

Q. Is that all of the 119 positions?

A. Miss anybody -- all five?

Q. Yeah.

A. Okay.

Q. Okay. Is there a senior manager accountable for safety, or is that Orlando?

A. Orlando, and then, of course, the accountable executive is the final.

Q. That's Orlando, or is that --

A. Temar (ph.).

Q. Okay.

A. The accountable executive, yeah.

Q. Okay. So, what kind of safety meetings to you participate in with other Part 119 people?

A. Okay, yeah, we do a -- we do twice a week; we have meetings on Tuesdays and Fridays, and we discuss any safety items that come up. And then we also have our monthly staff meetings, and the Safety Department, Orlando will usually give -- be the one to give a report.

Q. How long has that schedule been in place?

A. Probably a couple years.

Q. Okay, and how long do those meetings typically last?

A. Oh, a hour or two hours, average hour-and-a-half. There you go.

Q. Are there minutes kept?

A. No, not usually.

Q. How does the company -- how do you track hazards and mitigation strategies that are identified in those meetings? How do you track that stuff?

A. The Safety Department has a list.

Q. Okay. So, what's a typical week look like for you as the director or operations? Sort of -- how do you divide your time among different activities?

A. Monday through Fridays, sometimes some weekends if I need to, and come in and check in

with Wallace, check in with Flight Following, usually swing by Training, see whatever they got going on, anything they need; any issues I can help sort out. And probably on to one of those meetings: the weekly meetings, departmental meetings, safety meetings, probably a FAA meeting in there, a few phone calls with -- maybe a phone call with FAA, you know maybe deal with HR issues if Wallace needs any help with any of that. Who knows, maybe look at pay; helping with pay issues or something. Then, you know, long-range planning, trying to look at hirings, staffing, and probably on to manual update, upkeep, any had through emails, always, working on any hazards that came in.

Q. Okay. Can you give me any examples of hazards that came in where you had to think of a mitigation strategy?

A. Oh, what's something recent -- I don't know. I'm drawing a blank -- we had a -- somebody had a switch on the cargo door that was supposed to be in a certain position before flight, so, that was one thing they turned in.

Q. What'd you do to mitigate that?

A. That was a bulletin to remind all crews to check -- they needed to check that before flight.

Q. Okay. Was that something somebody relayed directly to you, or what -- did that come up through the safety reporting system?

A. I think it was anonymous on the -- through the safety reporting system.

Q. How many safety reports like that -- how many reports do you get through the safety reporting system, say, in a week or month?

A. Tough call -- I'll throw out -- one a week.

MR. KATT: Wait a minute, you just said you'll throw out one a week?

MR. SEEST: No, we don't throw out, we --

MR. KATT: Isn't that what he said?

MR. KATT: Yeah, I don't think he means he throws them out, I think that he --

MR. SEEST: That is correct, sorry --

MR. KATT: He's saying I'm throwing it out for you that I do one a week.

MR. BRAMBLE: Yeah --

MR. KATT: I just wanted to clarify.

MR. BRAMBLE: Do you guys need a conference?

MR. KATT: No, I just --

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, you can't answer for him.

MR. KATT: No, I'm not, but --

MR. BRAMBLE: But I understand -- I think he intended the statement --

Would you like to clarify your statement?

MR. SEEST: I'll clarify that, sure. I meant that my best guess is maybe once a week.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

MR. SEEST: That's what I meant.

MR. KATT: Sorry, I didn't mean to be -- it just was obvious to me, so --

MR. BRAMBLE: No, it's okay.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. Are you aware of any recurring issues with 737 engines -- your 737 engines running hot during takeoff?

A. We've had some writeups on those. I don't know about reoccurring, but different airplanes have had writeups on those.

Q. And what's been the company's action on that?

A. I don't remember on each one or anything, but I know they typically have to test run the engines or something like that. If it's -- whatever adjustments they need to make, they make. I know sometimes when the engine gets hot, they'll -- they have to do a wash (ph.) to, you know, bring them back into performance levels. They have changed engines as well in the past for

running hot.

Q. Is it fair to say that's primarily handled by the Maintenance Department?

A. Yep, of course.

Q. We heard that led to some aborted takeoffs, do you know anything about that?

A. About what aborted?

Q. About -- we heard that there had been some takeoffs that were aborted because of that issue. Are you aware of any recurring instances of that happening?

A. We had the one airplane that had an aborted takeoff, and the following -- I think it was the following day it had again. That was an incident that I'm aware of.

Q. How long ago was that?

A. Was it a month ago, maybe?

Q. Do you know if that was the accident airplane?

A. I don't believe so.

Q. Okay. Are you aware of any conflicts between your pilots and the maintenance staff?

A. There are some conflicts. I would say no more than I've seen in any of the other companies I've worked for; it's a little bit normal. Places where that goes on, generally, they're all a pretty good team.

Q. Okay, and are you aware of any recurring issues with the accident airplane in terms of its air worthiness or its functioning?

A. No, and, in fact, it's probably everybody's favorite airplane. It flies great and hardly have any, you know, writeups with it. It's just a sold, good airplane.

Q. Okay. All right, how well do you know Captain Henry Okai?

A. Just on a DO-pilot level. I talk with him in passing.

Q. Do you -- have you flown with him?

A. Yes.

Q. How much have you flown with him?
A. Maybe twice.
Q. How'd that go?
A. Very nice. Yeah, good -- seemed a good flyer, nice to talk to.
Q. Okay. How would you describe his performance compared to other pilots in the company?
A. Probably average.
Q. Do other pilots seem to like flying with him?
A. Everybody -- we had one pilot -- one FO that's not keen on flying with him.
Q. What about the rest?
A. I haven't heard any reports.
Q. What's your understand of the nature of the problem between him and that one FO? If you don't know, that's fine.
A. I don't know exactly. You know, most problems are communication problems, and every -- almost every personal type stuff. So, my guess is more the same, just from dealing with people my whole life. It seems communication is -- or lack thereof, maybe -- in this specific instance, I really don't know right now.
Q. Okay. Does it -- but are you aware of any sort of recurring history of problems with him getting along with people? Or does it seem like this is isolated?
A. No, very cordial and --
Q. Did you see the captain in the 24 hours before the accident?
A. I don't believe so.
Q. Did you talk to him at all in that period, you think?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Okay. How well do you know Greg Ryan (ph.)?
A. I know him a little better. He was helping us in the office to do some manual work, so, I

worked with him, and he worked in the next office over. But I would check in on him every day when he was there, so, I talked to him a little more. But I don't know him that well on a personal level.

Q. And how -- have you flown with him before?

A. Yes.

Q. How much would you say? How much have you flown together?

A. Maybe -- I would guess five times. Pretty much a guess, I just don't remember.

Q. And how would you describe his performance as a pilot compared to other first officers at the company?

A. Probably above average.

Q. What makes you say that?

A. Sharp guy, just --

Q. Seems smart? Seems intelligent?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. That's -- maybe a good studier, perhaps.

Q. Did other pilots seem to like flying with him?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. How do you like working for Rhoades Air?

A. I enjoy it, I do.

Q. What's satisfying or difficult about it?

A. As DO, I figure out the puzzles -- everyday puzzles, you know, how to organize things. I like doing -- figuring out solutions, I even enjoy flying these particular airplanes because there's not much automation. So, it's -- it goes right with my background of DC-3s.

Q. And what's challenging about your job with Rhoades?

A. Putting the puzzles together, figuring out the solutions.

Q. Do you have any particular recurring frustrations in your role that you wish you could eliminate?

A. I could use less emails; it's all part of the normal day-to-day job for me, as it would be, I suppose, for any other DO.

Q. Anything else?

A. I guess not.

Q. I forgot to ask you, what is your normal work schedule? What hours do you typically keep?

A. Maybe -- average maybe 8:00 or 9:00 in the morning to maybe 6:00, maybe 7:00 at night depending on the day, some weekends.

Q. All right, and how's the pay? Are you satisfied with your pay?

A. It's normal for my job. Everyone would like to make more money.

Q. All right. How would you describe the company's organizational safety culture?

A. Organizational safety culture -- really in tune, really like the whole SMS program we have going. I think it's one of the best things FAA ever required.

Q. Do people feel comfortable reporting safety-related concerns at the company?

A. I think so. We get safety reports that are turned in anonymously, we get safety reports that are turned in with names on them. They get turned in on our digital system, sometimes people turn them in on the paper system, some people just report them to me, and I would turn them in.

Q. When you get a safety report in and you decide at one of your safety meetings that you need to -- if you personally feel you need to implement some kind of mitigation strategy, do you feel supported by your direct supervisor in terms of getting the resources necessary to do that?

A. I do. You know, maybe not at the onset, immediately, so I have to make my case and sometimes I have to say okay, here's why we need to do this. Then once it's understood, then we

make a change.

Q. Who is your direct supervisor?

A. That would be Temar.

Q. And is he the person that has to make decisions about funding of safety improvements?

A. He does the funding, yeah.

Q. Okay. Can you give an example of a time you had to go to him and say look, we need resources for X safety wise?

Q. Maybe we need -- maybe I need to do X project over here, and -- but a hazard has more priority and say hey, I can't get this project done until, you know, the priority here is to get this hazard done. It's going to take me, you know, a day to do this first, and so, that gets pushed back and --

Q. Have there ever been any times where you've asked for, you know, specific changes -- specific equipment for the operations side or something like that for safety related reasons?

A. Equipment wise -- times when I've -- say it again?

Q. Have you ever had to ask for funding for, like, equipment --

A. Yeah, okay. Yeah --

Q. -- for safety?

A. I mean, sure. Like, I asked for a smoke hood, you know, a 500-dollar trainer -- so, that's the last thing, maybe, I got. Or computers, say hey, we need computers for instructors to do -- to help our manual writers write our procedures. That kind of stuff.

Q. Okay. All right. Do you feel supported by your manager and able to make safety-related decisions without fear of repercussions?

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you feel pressure from management to do things you feel are unsafe?

A. I've been asked to -- hey, can we have more airplanes, more pilots flying, you know, at the

request from -- if we have more cargo, sometimes I can accommodate, sometimes I can't. So, the requests come in, you know, from up above me and down below me, but I can't always do things if they're unsafe or --

Q. Do you have any safety-related concerns about the company?

A. The biggest one on my mind is our airplane in the water. That's a big unknown right now for me that -- I hope you guys can help out with. I'm trying on my end -- you know, we're looking at as many things as we can look at through our safety assurance system to mitigate anything that could be tied to that.

Q. Can you give me a -- can you tell me what you guys have been doing to mitigate anything that could potentially relate to that?

A. I've asked for engine runs on airplanes, the other airplanes. I've asked for -- looking at performance, looking at pilot training, looking at the fuel. Those are my big items.

Q. Have you heard the air traffic control recordings that have been publicly circulating, like on YouTube and so forth?

A. It's been hard for me to listen to that, but I have.

Q. And is there anything in terms of how that unfolded that gave you any insights in terms of, you know, engine out procedures or anything like that? Or any kind of mitigation strategies given the limited information that's available about what the nature of the problem was?

A. I don't have an answer myself from that. Even guessing is -- would be -- potentially wrong at this point, but I've been trying to guess. I've been trying to make educated guesses to point me in the right direction of our safety assurance. But I'm going to have to let you guys probably give me that final answer. But I will help as much as possible as I gain more insight and look over things as well.

Q. How confident are you about the quality of maintenance at the company? Do you have any concerns there?

A. Airplanes are older than some other airliners, so, maybe they have some more hiccups than brand new airplane would have. So --

Q. Do you feel that maintenance does an adequate job of addressing those hiccups?

A. They do, I think, a pretty good job. They come up --

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. That's all I have for you right now, Dave. Thanks very much. I'm going to pass things onto Shawn.

MR. ETCHER: Thanks.

MR. SEEST: Okay.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Do you need a break or some water or anything?

A. Nope, I got a little water left.

Q. You sure?

A. Yep, all good for now.

Q. All right, well if you do need one, please say so. You answered a lot of questions that I had when Bill asked, but I still have a few more. So, we'll -- hopefully won't take as long, how's that?

A. Yeah, okay.

Q. Earlier on -- I just want a little clarification. You said you knew the accident first officer because he's in -- been in the office.

A. Uh huh.

Q. And I think you said doing manual work.

A. Uh huh.

Q. Are you talking manual labor, or are you talking rewriting of your manuals?

A. Oh, yeah, he's -- yeah -- be writing manuals -- writing --

Q. I assumed that's what you meant, but I just wanted to make sure that he wasn't in there sweeping the floors or something.

A. Thank you for clarifying.

Q. No worries. I think you said early on in your duties that you have, your part -- part of your duties are drug testing, and I know you said you -- the first officer was drug tested. But before the accident, how often did you drug test you ramp, your pilots, how often did that occur?

A. They're -- I drug test them -- the initial before we offer them employment, and then we keep them on a random program. So, it's random, who knows when they might get selected. I couldn't tell you his history of randoms at the moment. But, of course, after any reasonable suspicion or incident -- accident. Never had a reasonable suspicion with either of them.

Q. So, can you think of the last time a random drug test was given to any of your pilots?

A. Almost -- January, February, March, April, May, June -- I think probably last month.

Q. Okay. Listening to your daily schedule as a director of ops, it sounds kind of busy and you also said you get lots of emails. Quantify to me what lots of emails are? Are you talking like hundreds, thousands? I mean, just kind of give me a ballpark so it gives me an appreciation of all you have to do.

A. I don't know, maybe in the morning, maybe 15 to 20 emails. Not a fortune 500 executive, so, that's a lot to me.

Q. No, that's fine. I just wanted to make sure we're both talking on the same page here.

A. Okay.

Q. So, I appreciate that. You said you're a licensed dispatcher, when did you become that? Or let me rephrase that, when did you get your certificated as a --

A. Maybe in the '90s.

Q. Okay. So, not recently, then? In the past?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. Since you oversee -- I'm sorry, flight following. I keep wanting to say dispatch, forgive me. But since you oversee flight following, do you know -- if an airplane has a mechanical

issue, does the flight follower find out about that? If it's on the ramp, let's say, and the pilots call maintenance, or however they get in touch with them, does the flight follower find out that the plane is on a mechanical issue?

A. Yeah, they're the first call pilots would make to let dispatch -- flight following know, and then flight following would advise maintenance and cargo operations that they may have to switch airplanes or something like that.

Q. Okay. Is -- do they call in on, like, the company frequency, do they call in on a phone?

A. Either way.

Q. Are any of -- is any of that recorded?

A. No.

Q. Okay. All your meetings you guys have and -- you know, you have your safety meetings I think you said twice a week? Did I get that?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Is the FAA involved with those meetings at all?

A. Not usually.

Q. Okay. Are they invited?

A. They can come anytime, yeah.

Q. Okay. All right, and I believe you said, and please, correct me if I'm wrong, I believe you said that there's no meeting minutes taken, is that correct -- at those meetings?

A. Yeah.

Q. How do you guys hold each other accountable -- if you were tasked with something, how do you guys hold each other accountable to make sure you've done what you were tasked with in an appropriate timeframe?

A. Usually Safety, they keep -- Safety Department, they have a summary of what's going on, and then -- so, the next meeting we look at what items are still outstanding, and what items are still

in progress.

Q. Okay, and maybe you don't have an exact number, but can you just kind of give me an appreciation of if an item is brought up in the meeting on Tuesday, I think you have meetings?

A. Uh huh.

Q. How long would you normally expect that to remain open?

A. It depends, it might be something that needs immediate action, it might be something that is just not a threat that can take longer to wait for a manual revision to come out. It might be something that will remain open for a long time because you do an immediate action, and maybe do a manual revision, and then you follow up with it for a month, or two, or three months. So, it might be sitting there open for a long time, or not, depending on what's going on with it.

Q. Okay. Well, let's use the example that you gave a little bit ago about the switch -- the cargo switch issue. How long did that remain open, or is it still open?

A. That one is still open because we did the bulletin and reminded the pilots what they needed to do, and then we'll finalize that one as we do a revision to the manual to maybe clarify that one. Then we'll monitor it after that, so, it will be another probably three months --

Q. Okay.

A. -- to monitor the -- that's the feedback loop.

Q. Okay. That helps me understand how the whole process works, so thank you. You say you produced a bulletin to the pilots; how do you know a pilot reads that bulletin?

A. They're required to read all emails that come to them before they go fly -- have read and understand and all that.

Q. Is there any box they have to check when they read it that says I've read and understand, or is it just an honor system?

A. No, it's just a requirement.

Q. Okay. Does every pilot have a company email address or is it their personal email?

A. Yes, company email.

Q. Okay. Do they have computer terminals out there that they can look at their company email at -- or on, or do they have to do that on their own personal --

A. Usually, they do it on their own phones, everybody likes that.

Q. So, there is no computer terminal they can do that out there?

A. Usually we -- yeah, usually we actually have a terminal in the flight following office.

Q. Okay. Considering how busy your week sounds, do you have an assistant?

A. I do have a lady that helps with the drug program.

Q. And is that the only assistant you have?

A. Of course, we have the flight following supervisor and, of course, the chief pilot, and -- yeah.

Q. Have you ever -- how long -- when you do a manual revision, do you have to get that approved through the FAA?

A. Yes.

Q. How long is that process, when you submit that to the FAA, before they respond back to you?

A. Depends, but sometimes within a week, sometimes 30 days. Depends on the length of the revision I turn into them; they have a lot to go through sometimes.

Q. Okay. Are they pretty responsive though? I mean, do they -- do you have to ask them multiple times, or is it you send it once and they kind of keep in touch with you?

A. Yeah, my side is pretty -- it's reasonable --

Q. Okay.

A. -- what they give back, yeah.

Q. How often do you interact with your POI, or with anybody from the FAA?

A. I'd say at least once a week, sometimes more.

Q. Is there any one particular person that you interact with more than any --

A. Mark Butin, he's the POI, so he's my main contact.

Q. Okay. Has he ever mentioned any concerns about, like, your manuals, or any other safety concerns? Has he ever mentioned anything like that to you guys?

A. Yeah. He does his quarterly DCTs, if he finds any hazards, he'll bring those to our attention in a letter or print them out. So, usually it's an official letter we get.

Q. What do you do with those official letters?

A. We respond to him. The first thing we do is we do our hazard mitigation and ASRs and look at the issue and how to mitigate it, then we get back with him with a plan on what we're going to do to fix it.

Q. Has he always accepted your plan, or has he required more?

A. Not all, we -- generally, yes, I would say, but probably there's been some where he -- why don't you do this a little bit different or something, yeah.

Q. Now, I know the last year with all the pandemic, it's added a level of challenge for everybody.

A. Of course.

Q. Has that added a bigger level of challenge dealing with the FAA, or has that really been kind of seamless?

A. It's harder, yeah, definitely harder not having, you know, maybe personal access, like, doing ding or Zoom calls, that sort of thing.

Q. Okay.

A. So, yeah, it definitely made it more difficult.

Q. Okay. Have they mentioned any concerns about maintenance or pilot training?

A. Yeah, you know, we have oversight as, like, our POI, he'll go to the simulator and review out instructions and then usually, if he sees anything that we should be doing right there he gives

immediate feedback, and then sends a follow-up correspondence of facial feedback, whether it be a hazard letter or whatever.

Q. So, your POI goes to your simulators, which are where?

A. Yeah, Miami.

Q. So, he goes to Miami for --

A. Yes.

Q. -- how often?

A. Not too often. I don't know, maybe recently he's been there every four months. He's been there two or three times.

Q. Okay. Your FAA guy is relatively new?

A. Relatively.

Q. Okay. So, your previous guy --

A. Pretty much.

Q. Your previous -- your former FAA guy, how was your interaction with him when you compare it to your new guy? Are they -- were they similar? Is one more strict than the other? Help me understand if there's a difference.

A. Both of them, I would say, were pretty sharp, knew their business, and the current inspector I would say is more prone to feedback, better writing, in that manner, than our previous one.

Q. Okay. Does that make it easier for you than the previous one? Or is it --

A. A little of both. In some ways it makes it easier that we get some more feedback, other ways -- sometimes then it's not so easy. I don't know, each one, I guess, was good in their own way.

Q. Okay. Let's get back to kind of the operations part. You made a statement that kind of perked my interest a little bit when you were answering a question for Bill, and you said generally it's a good team, you pilots, and mechanics, and all that.

A. Yeah.

Q. When I hear the term generally, it means it's not always.

A. It's not always, yeah.

Q. So, give me an example of what's -- what would not make a good team?

A. Pilots -- you know, difference in opinion, or maybe knowledge of the systems. They say hey, this is a -- we're getting ready to go and this is broken, and the maintenance says whoa, because you turned it too fast, or you landed too hard, or you -- so, you don't want it to be the pilot's fault that it broke. Or another example could be the pilots say hey, we're getting ready to go and this isn't testing. Oh, no, that's not how you test it, you should -- you always have to test it by doing this and this. He said well, no, maybe it should be tested this way. The difference of opinion on how to do it, you know, until somebody pulled out the book and is the winner. So, yeah, it can be like that until they consult with --

Q. All right. You also said that sometimes, you know, if there's an engine overheating issue -- I think that was the one Bill -- the example Bill gave, if you had an engine overheating. You know, you said sometimes maintenance will go out and test run them.

A. Yep.

Q. Is that maintenance that goes out and test runs them, or does the crew take it out with maintenance?

A. Maintenance goes out.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, they may ask the crew to drive it out there for them and they can do the run up or something and maintenance can sit in jump seat and, you know, write down recordings.

Q. Okay. So, you don't have any mechanics who are taxi qualified?

A. They do. I guess the pilots are there or something and they can use them, and they might ask them to.

Q. Okay. Where do they usually -- and maybe you don't know the answer and if you don't, it's okay, but where do they usually go do those engine runs, if it's here in Honolulu?

A. Reef -- the parallel to the Reef Runway.

Q. Okay.

A. Which is -- yeah, is far away from people.

Q. Okay. You said something earlier that sometimes for resources, sometimes you have to go make your case to the CEO, I believe, or the president?

A. To the -- yeah, CEO.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Have you ever went to make your case and they still say no?

A. Yeah.

Q. How often? Just give me an idea of how often you get yeses versus noes or vice versa?

A. Not too often. I make pretty persuasive arguments.

Q. Okay.

A. If I can -- I need to show there's a reason for what I want.

Q. Okay. You've been here a while, have you ever had any issues with the FAA putting you on a notice or giving you a warning that, you know, they may have to suspend operations for any reason? Has that ever happened here?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Your safety system that you have, your SMS, does that allow other departments to interact with each other? Or is it strictly -- how do you classify, does SMS go for just the pilots, or pilots, mechanics, loaders, flight followers? Are they all involved?

A. I don't know about interacting, but every department is involved with the SMS, so it's not just a pilot thing or anything, it's everybody that comes in goes through our SMS training. And as

far as interacting, I don't know.

Q. Okay. I wasn't sure if -- you know, sometimes whole, you know, departments, you'll have a stand down almost where they all come in, you know, various people from departments or whatever and interact to talk things through. And I wasn't sure --

A. Well, that's what we do in our daily -- our two weekly meetings, so, we have all departments there. And so -- you know, I -- to fix my problem I do need to get by in from other departments to help. So, that's very useful to have that communication, you know, because if it's something on the main side, I got to get them, and, you know, cargo as well.

Q. And that's at the department head level, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you give that information down to the pilots and to those under you, you know, kind of the safety items that come up?

A. I mean, each department would then send it out to their individual people.

Q. Okay. Do you?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. You might not know this answer so it's okay, the flight loading weight and balance form --

A. Yep.

Q. -- is that a computer software program?

A. Yeah.

Q. Who developed that?

A. That was a formal -- former pilot in our company.

Q. Okay. Former pilot, so how do you keep it up to date?

A. It doesn't take much up to date. We do have to change the pilot names in it, we have to, you know, once in a while we have to update the -- when a new airplane is weight and put the new

weight in it. So, then I do that.

Q. You do that?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay. I know you said you listened to the ATC records, maybe not too many times. But the first -- the captain appears to be the -- because he said he was the pilot monitoring, and he said they were going to a 220 heading. Is there a reason?

A. That's our procedure for engine failure at V1, departure out of Honolulu on that runway.

Q. Is that, like, a written procedure?

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that one you guys developed, or --

A. No, it comes from an engineering company, APG.

Q. Okay. Do -- is that procedure just something that TransAir does, or is that kind of a standard procedure across the --

A. I don't know what other companies do.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Have you ever shared that with Air Traffic Control?

A. I've talked to the Title B -- I don't know, I guess the supervisor, about it before at HCF, Honolulu Control Facility.

Q. Okay.

A. Tell them that's what are procedure is and ask them questions about how that affects them and if it seems to be an emergency, it's up to you to tell us what you want.

Q. Okay. Is that procedure -- is it in the jepp charts -- let me rephrase that. Do your crews have jepp charts or --

A. No, We use NOS.

Q. NOS charts? Is that procedure included in that?

A. No, it's in our manual -- our performance manual.

Q. Okay. All right. I know you said you -- sometimes as part of your duties -- I see my little note here -- that you deal with human resource issues sometimes?

A. Yep.

Q. Have you had to ever deal with terminating a pilot?

A. Yeah.

Q. When was the last time you had to do that?

A. It's been a while, been a few years, actually.

Q. Okay. All right. I know a couple years ago airlines were hiring like crazy, did you have a high turnover here or did people not leave here much?

A. Average turnover, probably, for our airline.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. We're not a steppingstone -- we're a little bit of a stepping stone to the majors, but there's also a lot of folks that we have that it's not a steppingstone.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. I think you've answered all of my questions right now, so, I appreciate it. Do you need a break before we move on?

MR. SEEST: I could use a break.

MR. ETCHER: All right, let me hit pause.

(Off the record)

(On the record)

MR. BRAMBLE: Back on the record at 10:39.

MR. ETCHER: I'm done, thank you.

MR. BRAMBLE: Oh, okay.

Clarence?

MR. KANAE: Okay.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. David, thanks for coming in today, and appreciate your time with us.

A. Sure.

Q. And I wanted to go back and just ask some questions, first of all, on your training responsibilities within the company. Could you state that once again, your responsibilities as far as training, training of employees? What kind of employees, pilots, loaders, etcetera?

A. The -- mainly I just watch over the chief pilot that watches over the training of the pilots, and I do the training of the flight followers -- or, you know, watch over, make sure they're trained.

Q. In your process of training, is it just flight followers and pilots? Do you actually have formal classes or --

A. More what?

Q. Is it formal classes that your give?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay, and let's see. So, hazmat, do you at all teach hazmat or --

A. I don't teach hazmat, our Training Department does hazmat training now. But the -- for the pilots, and the flight followers, we do give them hazmat training as well, of course. So, that ultimately falls under me.

Q. Falls under you? Okay.

A. Yeah, sure does.

Q. Okay. I'd like to now go into the topic of SMS, and your accountable executive is who?

A. Temar.

Q. How well is that communication between accountable executive and all of your assigned managers under the SMS program?

A. Pretty good, that's part of our meetings, you know, meeting with him. He runs the

meetings and usually the first thing we bring up is safety stuff that has come up.

Q. How well is your working relationship with the chief pilot being that you oversee him as well?

A. Uh huh.

Q. How is the relationship between you two?

A. Oh, work together very well, we're a good team. He works for me, but he helps me a lot by doing his job, and I give him a lot of input, feedback as well, suggestions, and, you know, help point him in the right direction.

Q. Okay, thank you. All right. In the sense of your flight following process, you're familiar with the term operation control?

A. Yeah.

Q. Who in the company has -- well, first of all, can you just explain in your own words what operation control mean?

A. Well, first, I'm the person in the company that's responsible for operation control, and so, I'm responsible for the termination, continuation, the diversion of all the flights. I delegate the authority of that to my flight followers, I can't delegate the responsibility, but I can delegate the authority, and they release the flights on my behalf.

Q. Is there anyone else in the company that has this --

A. No.

Q. -- authority -- operation control authority?

A. No.

Q. Pilot and command, for example?

A. No.

Q. Okay. While you're doing your instruction on board the aircraft, what documents normally are on the airplane?

A. While they're doing --

Q. What documents are on the airplane while you're doing your instruction, or what company policy documents should be on the airplane?

A. While they're doing the instruction?

Q. No, just documents on the airplane, I'm sorry, this is a different subject.

A. Yeah, we have a library that we keep on board the airplane, the manuals, and most of the company manuals, I believe, are in that library, you know, the flight manuals, the quick-reference manual, that's our emergency manual, you know, the maintenance manuals -- some maintenance manuals are on board, the MEL. There's a list but I don't have the list with me.

Q. Okay. Does the pilot -- or is the pilot authorized use of a iPad?

A. No.

Q. For any reason?

A. No, not yet.

Q. Keeping balance --

A. No, they can use, you know -- or whatever when they get on the ground, they can get the weather with them, or -- usually that's probably the only thing they would use it for is to get the weather.

Q. Is that part of the operations specification paragraph 0011 --

A. No, it would be just like using your phone or something after you land if you want to look something up.

Q. Okay. All right, and my last question is a flight question. We talked about the procedures in case there's an engine failure after takeoff out of Honolulu, you get a right turn to heading 220, what altitude and where would you all go to?

A. What altitude and where? I'd have to look at the procedure, honestly, to -- I don't fly very much. So, I know from the tapes and whatever that 220 and 2000 was said, and I think it's out to

Atlanta or something.

Q. Down to --

A. Out to Alana intersection, that may be in there, I'm not sure.

Q. Oh, okay. All right. And --

A. We review that -- we brief that, you know, before take -- every takeoff, so that's --

MR. KANAE: All right. That's all I have. Thank you very much, Dave, I appreciate it.

MR. SEEST: Yeah, of course.

MR. LEE: Over to me?

MR. BRAMBLE: Over to you.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. A couple things, you talked about a training department, what falls under the training department and who supervises that at the management level?

A. The pilot training or the -- we have a, you know -- so, we have a training department with a training manager, and then the pilot is -- we do our own training separately from that.

Q. Okay. So, there is no training department for the pilots it's --

A. We -- yeah, we have a training department, but it's separate from the company, you know, that trains general subjects. This is --

Q. Okay. Fly.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. How often -- you said you don't fly that often, how often do you fly?

A. Once every -- once a month recently.

Q. Do you fly as a the PIC or do you --

A. Yeah, usually.

Q. Okay, and do you fly in both seats?

A. Usually just PIC

Q. Okay. So, in both seats as a PIC?

A. No.

Q. No, just a --

A. Usually, I just -- usually just to the left seat as PIC

Q. Okay. Have you had any issues or had to abort or anything like that due to engine related issues?

A. I can't say that I never have, but I can't recall any. Certainly not recently.

Q. What about -- are you familiar -- I know you don't fly much, but familiar about a takeoff flap setting and the benefits between flaps two and flaps five and EPR setting.

A. Yeah.

Q. Are you -- is there any policy in the company about that? Or what's the --

A. Generally, we like to do reduce thrusts to help our engines. But flap wise, you can take off -- let's see flap wise, less flaps -- I think you use a less -- more of a reduced EPR with less flaps, at least with the Dash 9 engines.

Q. All right. The manuals are getting rewritten, why is that?

A. We are in the midst of several revisions after we had a CHEP inspection and they brought up some items that they thought should be changed, and so, we're in the midst of doing that.

Q. So, the FAA said that you need to change them?

A. Yeah, they brought up those items.

Q. Okay. And is FO Ryan the one that's working on those as, you know --

A. He's helping with one of the manuals.

Q. Okay. Is he getting paid to do that?

A. Yeah.

Q. He is? Okay. Is that one of the items you would take to the CEO and say we need our manuals rewritten, can you provide money to pay pilots to rewrite them? Is that -- would that be

one of the items you would take to them? Or is it just a given that you --

A. Not really. He's getting paid in the respect that he's already on salary.

Q. Oh, okay. So, he -- the -- FO Ryan would just not fly, and then work a fly day that he wouldn't fly on, and get paid for that day, is that how they would be compensated to that?

A. Yeah, just as if he had flown that day if he works that.

Q. Are you familiar with FDM or FOQA programs?

A. Not very much.

Q. Okay. You mentioned about when the EGT starts creeping up and maintenance needed to do something, and they would do an engine wash or things like that. Do you know how often that needs to happen? Is it --

A. No, just general experience. I know that from old airplanes I flew, they used to shoot walnut shells through the engine to clean them up.

Q. Yeah.

A. And so, I know that, and so I -- on these engines -- I think it's the water wash or --

Q. Okay.

A. -- something that I know.

Q. You mentioned about safety reporting and that you -- I think you felt like it -- people generally would feel comfortable doing that, you both anonymous and with written names on there. Is there something incentivize that -- what do you do from management level to incentivize employees, pilots to submit safety concerns?

A. Pilot meetings, when we have them, we bring that stuff up. If pilots come by me and mention something, I'll thank them, I always like to push that. Recently Temar sent out a safety thing -- letter -- I don't know, like, put some posters up about our safety system, and, you know, anything to spread the message.

Q. Have you interviewed or spoken with the accident crew about what happened? Because

you talked about -- I think you're trying to go through the -- your SRM process and trying to figure out what's going on. So, in conjunction with -- are you doing your own investigation? Have you spoken to the crew about the accident?

A. Only briefly with them. I haven't pushed them yet, I thought I'd let you guys talk to them before -- first before I sat down with them. So, I hope to do that soon to really debrief them on our side.

Q. Also, back to the maintenance, I think you said you're trying to figure out what's happened, how you can get through the process to keep this from happening, and maintenance is doing a lot of actions. Are you having something that's a -- kind of non-advocate go look at the maintenance, or is it just the maintenance department is looking at things, engine runs and doing maintenance on the engines and things like that? Is there --

A. During our meetings, basically, we sort of brainstorm -- help every department throw out some ideas -- to bring up some ideas, and some of the ideas, I thought, you know, that were brought up, say let's do engine runs, let's check the fuel, let's check whatever maintenance we do daily. So, it was kind of all departments getting together.

Q. But there's no one that's outside the maintenance that's monitoring what they're doing when they're doing that? It's just you brainstorming what you could do and they --

A. Yeah, they'll probably report back --

Q. Okay.

A. -- to us what they've done so far, what -- if they -- we'll see what suggestions they've taken and what they've actually accomplished, and if there's something else that comes to mind that we'd like to see done on our side, and then we would ask them to do that or --

Q. So, just one more question about when you're flying. If you're in an aircraft and you're doing a reduced thrust takeoff and it's constantly right there between the green and the yellow on every takeoff -- on a flaps two takeoff where you can set a lower EPR, what is your thoughts about

-- would you be able to do a full rated takeoff without it going into the red zone? I mean, what's your thoughts about that if during a reduced thrust takeoff out of eight right at flaps two --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- and gives you, like you said earlier, a lower EPR setting, do you think that that -- in that situation it was just into the yellow, or a little bit in the yellow, or right at the line between green and yellow, do you think that aircraft would be able to do a full rated takeoff at flaps five within its, you know, its certified limits is --

A. Yeah, I would -- I don't know. Whatever the weight says you have to use if you're doing a full power, then I would know. But that maintenance, you know, they watch the trends, obviously, the trend monitoring. So, I know that the difference between reduced thrust and full its, you know, just about this much on the thrust lever. So, it's -- you know, an EPR just a little bit more, so, whether that would -- I don't know if it was in the yellow, or bottom of the yellow, hard to say.

MR. LEE: Okay, that's all I have. Thanks.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. I have just a few follow ups.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Who runs the pilot training department?

A. That would be Wallace.

Q. Okay, does he have anybody else that's sort of, like, a dedicated training person?

A. Yeah. He has a sim instructor -- we have a sim instructor, and then Irwin is -- does most of our ground training. We have a couple of -- we have three people that can typically do ground training.

Q. So, Wallace's training staff consists of how many people for the pilot training?

A. For pilot training and for ground training he has three.

Q. Three total including the sim instructor?

A. Then -- that's for ground, and then the sim is one other besides himself.

Q. Okay. You said that the engine failure procedure was developed by an engineering company, what was the name of that again?

A. APG.

Q. Okay, what's that stand for? That's fine if you don't recall.

A. Something Performance Group -- Aviation Performance Group, maybe?

Q. Okay. Did they do some of you -- what do they do for you in general?

A. All the performance data -- takeoff and landing data, and departure procedure -- any special departure procedure data.

Q. Okay. You mentioned talking to some of the folks at the Honolulu Control Facility, do you recall who that was?

A. Names, no, not exactly. I just asked to speak to their supervisors, you know.

Q. And how long ago was that?

A. Probably talked to them a couple of years ago.

Q. Okay. Over the last year, how often has -- have your -- has your POI come out to visit you in person?

A. Tough question.

Q. In ballpark? Yeah, obviously, you can't remember the specifics, but --

A. I don't know with COVID it's definitely different. Before that, I don't know if it was once a week, once every couple of weeks. Yeah, we talk on the phone a lot, so -- emails.

Q. Have you seen him at all in person this year, so far in 2021?

A. Oh, yeah. Yes, I have.

Q. And how about last year, 2020? Did you see him in person last year?

A. Yes.

Q. So, you said you weren't very familiar with operational data monitoring. But does the company do that operational data monitoring or FOQA?

A. We do, we call it the trend monitoring on these arrow (ph.) of airplanes. The -- we do -- the pilots record the readings during flight and then we send the -- maintenance sends those to a company, and then they monitor the health -- they call it health monitoring of the engines.

Q. Okay.

A. EHM engine health monitoring.

Q. And what about the recorders, is there any kind of downloaded recorder data on the flights? Or you don't really have that capability?

A. Yeah, no capability on that operation side. We certainly don't have that.

Q. Okay. Does the company have any post-accidents external safety audit going on? Or is it considering doing something like that, like an independent safety audit? Or not at this time?

A. Well, we're a little early, but that's certainly something that we would look at. But right now it's in-house, we get the big facts, the big pieces together.

MR. BRAMBLE: That's all I have, I think, as far as questions.

Shawn, do you have anything else?

MR. ETCHER: I have just a few.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. You doing okay?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay, perfect. You talked about the pilot's record the engine health --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- and you guys send it off to a company, has there been any trend showing aircraft running warmer or hotter that you're aware of.

A. Not that I've bene made aware of. I don't typically see the results. They -- I guess if they find something, they're going to go out, you know, do what they need on the -- maintenance will do whatever they need to do.

Q. Okay.

A. But I don't get that information.

Q. Are most of your flights at night? Or all of them at night? Help me understand your normal flights when they occur?

A. I'd say most of them at night, but I don't know, maybe, 25 percent daytime.

Q. Okay.

A. Roughly.

Q. How often do you go into the office at night to interact and see how the operation works?

A. A little more in the past, I've been busy in the office lately. But previously I was on the line quite a bit, so, I'd keep pretty well attuned while I'm flying.

Q. Okay. Is there anybody on the management side that goes in at night -- from the flight ops side, goes in at night just to observe how everything is going?

A. Wallace is mostly in our -- of course, our auditors on the safety side would go in at night, but Wallace, since he flies the line part-time, then the chief pilot, he gives me feedback.

Q. Okay. You mentioned that you delegate authority to you flight followers, is that a formal process on file with the FAA? How do you do that?

A. It's a formal process, yes. I delegate them via an official letter then we put their names, actually, in our manuals.

Q. Okay, and speaking of your manuals, are they all paper, or are they electronic?

A. All paper.

Q. So, the pilots carry out a flight mag with all the manuals?

A. Yeah. Everything is on board, but they might carry on something if they wanted to. They have been assigned their own manuals as well.

Q. Who updates the ones on board?

A. The Tech Pubs department.

Q. How many is in that department, do you know?

A. Two, maybe three.

Q. Okay. Does that fall under you at all?

A. No.

Q. Okay. We heard from your pilots and others that in the maintenance logbook they can either choose to write up as, I believe, an F, or as an I for informational write up.

A. Okay.

Q. Do you guys track the I writeups?

A. Maintenance might. We don't on the ops side.

Q. So, during your safety meetings maintenance hasn't brought up that oh, we've seen a lot of writeups -- under informational writeups involving X?

A. No, I haven't heard that.

Q. Okay. I know you mentioned how many people you have in ground training, I think you said three and -- let me see if I can read my notes -- and maybe one, besides Wallace and the simulator. Are those --

A. One besides Wallace -- yeah.

Q. So, that -- I got five, is that -- oh, that's five separate people, or is, like, Wallace in the ground training and the simulator?

A. Wallace -- I didn't count Wallace in ground training just because he typically -- he could do it, but he typically doesn't. So, I guess it actually would be four.

Q. I just wanted to make sure there wasn't any duplicates in your count. I just wanted to have an accurate count.

A. Yeah, Wallace, Irwin, Bob, and Cody; so, there's four people that could potentially do it, five if you count me.

Q. And that's ground, or ground and simulator --

A. That's ground.

Q. Okay. Perfect, I just wanted to make sure I knew how those numbers can -- you know. I forgot to ask you before when we were talking about your bulletins that you produce out to pilots and, you know, remember I asked how you make sure they've read it, it's their responsibility?

A. Yeah.

Q. But how does a pilot -- if they have a question, how do they get their answers to those questions about the bulletins if there's something they don't understand?

A. Yeah, typically, it's -- that's Wallace, myself, or, you know, one of the instructors that's down there.

Q. Okay, and you mentioned you guys recently had a -- forgive me, a CHEP inspection with the FAA?

A. Yeah.

Q. Was there any concerns that they -- that the FAA labeled as significant or moderate safety issues or risks?

A. I think mainly the manuals that they wanted clarified, updated in the manuals and, yeah, mostly manual-type updates.

Q. Were those classified as moderate or significant, or do you know?

A. Yeah, we've been working on those type of things for a while. As far as the classification goes, some were, you know, true things, some they didn't know all the data -- all the information to -- yeah, I guess I couldn't tell you exactly how many or one they -- the classification on them.

Q. Okay, and it's okay, I don't want you to guess, I just wasn't sure if you had that information. You said you've been working on them for a while, can you help me understand what a while is?

A. Yeah, several months, it takes a lot of writing.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. I think you've answered all my questions. I appreciate it.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Yeah, just -- there was one other -- you listed out the ground training folks, I wonder if you could just tell me who the other simulator instructor is?

A. Bob Landa.

Q. Okay. And he is not one of the four people you mentioned that does the ground training?

A. Yes, he is.

Q. Oh, okay. So, there's four ground trainers, one of whom does some sim work, and then there's Wallace?

A. The simulators are Wallace and Bob, and then the people that do the ground training could be Wallace, Bob, as well, it could be Irwin, Cody, and me, in theory.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, that's helpful.

MR. SEEST: Yep.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, Clarence, do you have any follow ups?

MR. KANAE: I do, just a couple.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. David, you mentioned safety audits, are you involved in any of the safety audits within the company? I'm talking safety audits, SMS audits?

A. Typically, not.

Q. No?

A. Typically, not.

Q. Okay. All right.

A. I can be, though. I could do an audit for them, but --

Q. Do you remember when the last one was accomplished?

A. Oh, it seems like they're doing them all the time. I have a schedule, you know, they --

Q. Any particular findings in your readings that would've brought up hey, we got this safety

issue?

A. On any department?

Q. Any part of the company itself?

A. The recent -- I'm drawing a blank right now with you guys all staring at me, but --

Q. That's okay, I understand.

A. How stupid -- we work through these all the time.

Q. Nothing you recall at the moment that sticks out that are real safety issues?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay, that's all right.

A. Sorry, yeah.

Q. Let me ask you my final question.

A. Yeah.

Q. In the weight and balance calculations --

A. What's that?

Q. In the weight and balance calculation process --

A. Yeah, okay.

Q. -- when the flight followers actually get the weights from your load manager --

A. They don't typically -- flight followers don't -- wouldn't typically see of the loads.

Q. Right, but they do see the number -- when I say the numbers, they do see the weights of the cargo that's placed on the airplane, correct?

A. The -- no, they usually just -- it goes from the load supervisors that prepare the weight amounts, and then that would go out to the pilot.

Q. Okay. However -- okay. So, let me rephrase -- maybe I should rephrase how I'm asking it. So, the weights that are calculated for each flight, does it correlate with the -- with a particular airplane? When I say airplane -- because some airplanes have a Dash-9 engine, 15, 17s, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. So, is that weight calculation included with the model of the engine?

A. Is the weight -- oh, I see, you're talking about when the pilots look up the model of the engine when they get the performance numbers, the max weight that they can carry, and they would give that information to the person preparing -- the load supervisor preparing the weight and balance. And so, they would use that information to -- you know, for, like, the max takeoff weight, and -- if that's what you meant?

Q. Yes.

A. Yeah, I mean, they get the weight and balance, basically, when the airplane is loaded because we keep a copy of the weight and balance, you know, before the airplane departs. So, that's when they get the weight and balance.

MR. KANAE: Okay. I believe you've answered my question.

MR. SEEST: Okay, if not, ask me again.

MR. KANAE: No, thank you. Thanks, David. That's all I have, thanks.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right, Rich?

MR. LEE: Okay. So, you said they get the weight and balance when the airplane is loaded, who's they? Which they are we talking about?

MR. SEEST: The flight follower.

MR. LEE: Okay.

MR. SEEST: They get the weight and balance.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, I don't have any more questions.

Shawn, you good?

MR. ETCHER: Yes, sir. I'm good.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right, you guys are good?

MR. KANAE: Good.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. Is there anything we haven't asked you that you think might be relevant to the investigation that you'd like to volunteer at this time?

A. Nothing comes to mind. If we find stuff I'll definitely let you know.

Q. Is there anyone else that is not already on our list that you think we should definitely speak to?

A. I think you've hit the main people who can give you the most information.

Q. Do you have any suggestions for safety improvements that you would particularly like to convey to us?

A. Safety improvements --

Q. Recognizing that it's very early and you may not have enough information to decide, but I just want to give you the opportunity in case you have something you're particularly passionate about that you want to tell us should be changed?

A. No, probably -- nothing that we haven't already put into place or --

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Well, that concludes the interview then. It's 11:16 a.m. and thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 11:16 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of David Seest
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	July 7, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Carolyn Hanna
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *		
Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
	*	
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *		

Interview of: ORLANDO DEBRUM, Director of Safety

Rhoades Aviation, TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

APPEARANCES:

WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factor Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

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INTERVIEW

MR. ETCHER: Good afternoon, Orlando, my name is Shawn Etcher, I'm an investigator with the National Transportation Safety Board. I'm the chairman on the NTSB's Operational Factors group, and I'm doing that along with Mr. Bramble here who's the chairman on the Human Performance group and he'll introduce himself here in just a moment.

Our role here is to learn what we can about the accident so we can assist the investigation, and hopefully prevent this reoccurring to anybody. As part of our process, we're going to record this interview, if that's okay with you?

MR. DEBRUM: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: And then we're going to have that audio sent out and have it transcribed. When it comes back from transcription all the party members here will get to look it over for typographical errors, but we will not change any of the context of the statement, we're just going to correct any typos. So, the words that you say will be on the transcript.

Each group member here will have a chance to ask questions, but we've all be instructed to -- we each ask questions one at a time. So, you're not going to get bombarded with lots of questions from us at one time, we're going to do it one at a time. Nobody's going to interrupt, so take your time answering questions. If you don't an answer, it's okay, I don't know is fine. Or if you need clarification on something please ask.

MR. DEBRUM: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: We don't want you to guess at an answer, just ask for clarifications. We -- the only thing we ask is that you answer all of the questions as best as you can. If, you know, just tell us what we -- help us learn what your job is, things like that. So, I'm going to go around the room right now having everybody introduce themselves.

We'll start with Mr. Bramble.

MR. BRAMBLE: I'm Bill Bramble, I'm a human performance investigator with NTSB.

MR. DEBRUM: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Thanks.

MR. KANAE: Hi, Orlando, I'm Clarence Kanae with the FAA here in Honolulu, certificate management office, operations is my specialty. Thank you.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, Boeing safety pilot.

MR. ETCHER: So, that's everybody here who's going to ask you questions. Is there anybody that you don't want to be in part of this process? Are you okay with all of us?

MR. DEBRUM: No, I'm okay.

MR. ETCHER: Okay, great. Now, I do -- I want you to understand that if -- you know, this process is not -- we have no enforcement activity, we can't enforce anything against you, we have no enforcement powers like the FAA or DOT. However, we can't guarantee you confidentiality or immunity because this transcript will actually become part of the public docket with this event.

MR. DEBRUM: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So, we just want to make sure you're clear of that. The good news is you're entitled to one representative to be in here with you. Do you have a representative that you'd like to be in here with you?

MR. DEBRUM: Yes, Mr. Bill Katt.

MR. ETCHER: Bill, would you please?

MR. KATT: William Katt of Wilson Elser.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Does anyone have any other questions?

MR. KANAE: No questions.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Are you ready to begin?

MR. DEBRUM: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: All right.

INTERVIEW OF ORLANDO DEBRUM

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. As I always say, I start with the hardest questions first, get them out of the way. Can you say and spell your legal name?

A. My name is Orlando Debrum, Junior. O-R-L-A-N-D-O D-E-B-R-U-M, Junior, J-R.

Q. Excellent. How old are you?

A. I'm 52 years old.

Q. 52, all right. What is your job title?

A. I'm the director of safety.

Q. Tell me what the director of safety at TransAir -- what that job entails?

A. That job, I'm in charge of, you know, making sure that, you know, we identify hazards if there's any hazards on all our persons throughout the company, make sure that, you know, if the reports come in, we process the reports, and then we report everything to the accountable executive. If there's any report that needs anymore investigation, then we'll assign it to each process owner (ph.), and then come back to our twice-a-week meeting. Then we'll go through the process and see if we need anything to change in our manuals on our process or procedures and all that.

Q. Okay. How long have you been at TransAir?

A. This will be the 16th year.

Q. How long have you been the director of safety?

A. Since 2017.

Q. Since 2017?

A. Uh huh.

Q. You got a month in there or is it just --

A. May.

Q. May?
A. That's when the other one retired -- May, June, yeah.
Q. All right. What did you do before that?
A. I was the acting chief inspector.
Q. Okay.
A. Yep.
Q. And did you do that your whole career before that or how did you get hired on here?
A. I was hired as a mechanic.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, in 2005 I was hired as a mechanic and that was before the Boeing, so, it was on the 135 side.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So, how long were you a mechanic before you got promoted to the next level?
A. I was a mechanic until 2011 when they sent us out -- 2011 when they sent us out for the Boeing training, you know, over in Indiana, and that's when I transitioned from 135 to 121.
Q. Okay, and then --
A. But I was still a mechanic at that point, yeah.
Q. Okay, and then when they transitioned to the 121 -- when did you become the chief inspector?
A. At first, I was -- I became the director of maintenance before the chief inspector.
Q. Okay.
A. So, in 2013 when we got the first Boeing, our director of maintenance resigned, so, I was put in place as director of maintenance.
Q. Okay.

A. And then I was the director of maintenance for -- until 2014 when our current director of maintenance was hired on, and then that's when I went back to, like, a supervisor.

Q. Okay. Do you have any airmen certificates? Are you a pilot?

A. No.

Q. No. Do you have any FAA certificates at all?

A. I have an A&P.

Q. A&P?

A. Yeah.

Q. No IA, correct?

A. No IA.

Q. All right. Help me understand kind of the day in the life of a director of safety?

A. The director of safety, we come in -- I mean, we go in, we -- first we check if there's any reports that comes in. If we have any reports then we start doing our process of doing all the paperwork, making sure -- we'll send report (indiscernible). Well, what am I going to do with it because I have two auditors that I meet with them first (ph.). Then, I -- then at our meeting -- the twice weekly meeting, Tuesdays, and Fridays, then I present the report.

Then if it's -- depends on the severity of the report, if it's a high-risk one then we have to deal with it right away, try to fix whatever the problem is. If it's something that we need more time to fix then I'll assign it to either maintenance, the ops -- the process owners, and then they'll go back, do more investigating, then come back with it, then we'll close out if it needs to be closed out. If not, then we'll continue to work on it until we get the process of something that needs to be closed.

Q. So, help me understand how you, as the director of safety, or maybe you have people under you that help, but how do you categorize something as a high risk, or not a high risk, or another category?

A. High risk is if something that you know it's a hazard, if the hazard's going to cause something, you know, like, it will -- if the outcome will be, like, a catastrophe or something, so, we have to deal with that right away.

Q. Okay. So, is there a scale that you guys use, a point system, I mean, or is it just what you --

A. Yes, we have a matrix step -- in our manual we have a matrix step we'll follow in the severity and the, you know, the frequency.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you visit that manual often to determine that or --

A. Yes.

Q. -- do you -- have you done it so much that you don't really --

A. Yeah, we visit it all the time.

Q. Okay. How do you get some of that information -- you know, is it people reporting?

A. Yeah.

Q. So, how often -- how many reports do you get?

A. We get reports -- it depends on -- sometimes we get two or three a week, sometimes we get more, sometimes we get two, four a day. So, we get two types of reporting systems, we've anonymous and then we've got the paper that people can report on.

Q. How often -- give me kind of an idea and -- you don't have to give me an exact number, but how many anonymous do you get versus those that put their name on it?

A. Anonymous -- I don't get much of anonymous, ten to one that people put their name on it.

Q. Okay. So, let's say a mechanic, or a pilot, or somebody makes a report, where do they get the form to make the report? Is it paper or electronic? I'm sorry, I forget if you said.

A. There's a paper form -- there's signs where we have paper forms that they can get right next to the trainer's office in hangar one. They have it in hangar two where they can fill out the

form and then put it in -- there's a safety box that we provide. And then we have the online, an anonymous safety reporting system that they know -- I mean, we tell them that it's there, they can always use it if they want to. It can be anonymous, it can be -- they can put their name on it.

Q. Okay. Do you feel like, you know, personnel have no problem putting their name on it, I guess? Or I mean --

A. They have no problem, yes.

Q. Okay. That was really a poor form of a question but thank you for giving me an answer there. When you get these reports from a pilot or a mechanic, give me the process -- when you open up the form and you're looking at it, tell me what you do or your team -- do you have a team, first of all?

A. Yeah.

Q. How many is on your team?

A. There's the three of us.

Q. The three?

A. Yeah, I have -- it's me, and one auditor for ops, and one auditor maintenance.

Q. Okay. So, you guys -- one of the three of you get the report, right?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Tell me what you do with that?

A. We get the report, and then we present it to the company in our meeting -- like I said, on our twice-weekly meeting we present the report to the company. We say okay, we have this report, and if it's something from maintenance we say okay, this will be assigned to maintenance, and we'll pass on to maintenance. And if they can fix that right away, they'll come up with a solution right away, if they need more time to it they say okay, they're going to report back; it's either on the next meeting or the following meeting.

Q. How do you keep track of the -- do you task them with that and keep track of it or how is

that --

A. Yeah, we have a tracking for each report.

Q. Okay.

A. Yep.

Q. So, how is it -- how do you guys hold each other accountable to accomplish that -- those tasks?

A. We have -- every week we have a list of reports that we present okay, this report was brought in last week, okay, we'll -- if it's a maintenance report we'll talk with maintenance, okay, what did you do, what did you accomplish, what did you find. Do we need to close this report today or do we need more time to investigate more on the report?

Q. Okay. So, you've looked at the report, you've tasked it with somebody, somebody comes back with a finished fix to it, do you take that information and respond to the person that reported it? Or -- how do they find out?

A. We meet the whole safety committee, which is the -- actually the (indiscernible) to management. We all take a look at it, if everybody agrees with the solution that come up and we close the report. If it's something that needs to be changed in the manual then we'll assign to the manual owner to -- we need to do a temporary revision, or we need to change things on it right away. So, that's how it works.

Q. Okay. But -- let me give you an example, let's say I'm one of your pilots and I write up a safety report and I turn it in, and you guys go through the process, will you ever let me know what the fix was to the problem I gave you?

A. The process owner -- if it's a pilot's writeup, they -- once we close the thing then the pilot -- the director of operations will let this pilot know that this has been fixed, yeah.

Q. Okay, so, you don't, but the head of that --

A. Yes, head of the --

Q. Okay, now I get it. Thank you. All right. So, have you ever had a report come in that needed a policy to it or a policy change? You know, they wrote up a safety concern and your guys' outcome was oh, we need to change this policy?

A. I'm sure -- yeah, I'm sure there's one that came in but I can't -- there's one regarding changing, you know, like, the loading manual, like, something like that. Okay -- because all the equipments are in the loading manual as well, the movement of equipments and everything. That is what I can recall, if you want me to point to detail on that I'll --

Q. I was just trying to get an example and I --

A. Yeah, so is -- yeah, I have.

Q. Okay. So, if there's a change to the manual, a policy or whatever, and the manual owner -- I think is what you called them?

A. Uh huh.

Q. If they make that change, do you get to see that change?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you guys have, like, a FOQA or an SMS-type program at --

A. FOQA?

Q. FOQA program or --

A. No, we don't have FOQA.

Q. Flight operation quality assurance, you don't have that, right?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Do you have an SMS program?

A. We have the SMS, yeah.

Q. Tell me about your SMS?

A. Our SMS is -- I mean, our SMS is -- well, I mean, we have some -- I would say -- wouldn't say it's perfect, but we have been improving it because it's a new system. I mean, it just got started back in 2018. So, we're -- it's a good system, we're working on it. But to make it better we come up with a VOCUS program, we're looking into -- we're into the phase three of that to even make it better -- work better.

Q. With a VOCUS?

A. Like a -- it's a digital-like program that we need to add it to SMS to make -- so, that we can do it better.

Q. And I just want to make sure the term was VOCUS?

A. VOCUS is the program, yeah.

Q. Could you spell that?

A. V-O-C-U-S.

Q. Okay, thank you. I just -- I wanted to make sure I heard you properly.

A. Yeah.

Q. So, thank you. Okay, so, you're in phase three?

A. Yeah.

Q. What does that entail?

A. Phase three is the -- it's a validation of the program. So, where we give our designs to the FAA, now they're going through it, and if everything is all good then we move onto phase four.

Q. Now, you said something that kind of piqued my interest a little bit ago, that -- when I asked about your SMS you said it's not perfect. What's not perfect about it?

A. It's -- I mean, we've had some letters from FAA that, you know, we're missing items. But I mean, we've answered the letters and we've been -- how would I put it -- we've answered their concerns and we're coming up with mitigations that we can clear their requests.

Q. Can you give me some examples of what their concerns were?

A. Oh, like some of our manuals.

Q. Okay, and what was your mitigation to that?

A. We're revising -- we're doing revisions on the manuals.

Q. Okay. All manuals or just some?

A. Some manuals.

Q. Do you know which ones?

A. I know it's, like, GOM -- there's no -- the GOMs probably our loading manuals, yeah.

Q. Okay. Now, you said the FAA sent you letters, and you guys responded, do you respond directly to the FAA?

A. Yes.

Q. How is your interaction with them?

A. Oh, it's good.

Q. It's good? How often do you interact with them?

A. Often, I would say, yeah.

Q. Help me understand, daily, weekly, monthly?

A. Sometimes daily, sometimes weekly, it depends on -- I would say weekly. Every week we interact with the FAA.

Q. And is that interaction face to face or is it --

A. Sometimes it's face to face, sometimes it's electronic; on phone.

Q. Okay. Does the FAA ever come down to your office and talk with you or do you have to go there?

A. Yeah. No, they come down and we talk a while.

Q. Okay. In the past -- let's say, in 2021, since the beginning of the year, have you guys made any changes to any policies or procedures that came out of -- say, to a report or that you noticed as a high risk and that required your -- you to make a change right away?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. Not that I know of.

Q. Can you think of the last time you made a procedure or policy because of something that --

A. I cannot recall right now, I have to get back to you.

Q. Okay.

A. I cannot recall that.

Q. That's all right. I don't want you to make stuff up. I don't know works too. For a moment let's step away from your job, if you will, with SMS and all that. But did you know the accident captain or first officer?

A. Not personally, no.

Q. Have you ever met them or talked to them?

A. I've met them, I'll talk to them, greet them, but personally I don't.

Q. Okay. Do you interact with pilots, like, in their recurrent ground or recurrent training? Do you ever interact with them, go in and talk to them?

A. No.

Q. No? Does anybody from your department, your group?

A. Yeah. Well, in our -- I would say in audits -- when we're doing audits, yes, we interact with the crew. But nothing in the training and all that.

Q. Okay. Do you ever take a jump seat? Do you ever sit in the jump seat and go on a flight?

A. Yes.

Q. How often?

A. Well, before I would say I've done it four times, but not lately after the COVID.

Q. Okay. So, the four times has been --

A. Oh, that's two years ago.

Q. Okay. Well, I just wanted to make sure.

A. Yeah.

Q. You mentioned COVID, has that given you some challenges in dealing with your job -- how you deal with your job?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. No.

Q. Did it give you any challenges with the FAA, dealing with them?

A. No.

Q. It was pretty consistent?

A. It was -- yeah.

Q. Okay. So, you talked about the FAA had some -- could I say concerns about the manuals? Is that a good paraphrase or maybe you have a better word? You guys are working on your manuals because the FAA --

A. Not concerns, I would -- they were just saying that they probably need revision, you know --

Q. Okay.

A. -- outdated.

Q. Okay. Did they have anything they mentioned about maintenance?

A. No.

Q. No? Okay. How about any issues with pilot training that they mentioned?

A. That I don't know.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. That's all right. I don't know, like I said, works just fine. Okay. Let's kind of

start talking a little bit about the accident --

A. Okay.

Q. -- airplane if you could, and policies around that? Have the -- has part of your risk -- did you guys get any safety concerns about high EGTs -- high temp EGTs or engine issues? Or flight control issues or anything like that?

A. No.

Q. In the past --

A. We didn't get any reports on those, no.

Q. Okay. Do you guys -- and correct me if I'm wrong, you guys -- if a crew has a maintenance log, they can write up an F maintenance item or an informational maintenance item, correct?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Do you guys as safety -- do you look at those informational writeups just to kind of learn the health of an airplane or what crews are seeing?

A. No, only if something is recurrent, like, more than two or three times, then we'll look into it. But if it's only informational then we don't get any report on that.

Q. So, the two or three times, is that if it's a F --

A. Chronic -- it's a chronic, yeah.

Q. Okay, but is that an F writeup where maintenance has to do something, or two or three times even on an informational writeup?

A. Not informational writeup. If it's on a maintenance writeup, yes.

Q. Okay. So, you guys don't get anything about informational --

A. Yeah.

Q. Oh, okay. Have you heard of any airplanes having a hot temperature -- engine temperatures, or any kind of problems with the accident airplane?

A. Not with the accident airplane, but there was one before which the engine was changed.

Q. What was that one about?

A. It was overheating.

Q. Okay. Do you remember which one?

A. No, I don't remember.

Q. Okay. But you don't think it was the accident airplane?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. It wasn't that one.

Q. All right. So, we've learned a lot about your company during this week so far, and we appreciate you guys helping us understand the operation. But it -- and maybe it's my misunderstanding, but you guys do a lot of night flying, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you come in at night as a -- you know, to oversee any safety there, or do you mostly work during the day?

A. I mostly work during the day. And during our -- when we're doing our audits, that's when we come in at night, but most of the time it's during the day.

Q. Okay. What's your normal work hours?

A. 8:00 to 5:00.

Q. 8:00 to 5:00, all right. So, on the accident plane -- I'm sorry the accident flight, the crew mentioned to ATC that they were on a heading of 220, did you happen to listen to the ATC tape -- ATC recordings at all?

A. No, I haven't.

Q. Oh, okay. There was a mention that they were on a 220 heading, do you know why they'd be on that?

A. Heading to -- they said heading 220, from what I've learned is when they have a problem, they go to that heading.

Q. Okay. So, did you know about that procedure until the accident flight at all?

A. No.

Q. Okay. That's all right. Do you interact with ATC at all -- in your position do you ever reach out to the ATC --

A. No, I do not.

Q. Okay. All right. That makes it easier. So, the crew that was flying it, help me understand the loading process. Does the crew observe that, or do you even know if the crew observes the loading of the aircraft?

A. I cannot answer, I don't know.

Q. That's all right. You are in maintenance, correct.

A. Uh huh.

Q. All right. So, when you guys were loading an aircraft -- when the aircraft was being loaded, did you, as maintenance, have to observe anything?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. No.

Q. Were you guys required to even be at the airplane?

A. Well, be around the airplane, but to help serve the loading, no.

Q. Okay. All right. Do you know the loading of the cans, and the pallets -- or the cookie sheets, sorry -- do you know much about that process for the weighing of all that?

A. I'm not going to add -- I really don't know --

Q. And that's okay.

A. -- the whole process of it, no.

Q. Okay, no problem. Remember, I don't know is just fine.

A. Yeah.

Q. I'm just trying to make sure I get a good picture of it.

A. I don't want to guess the wrong answer. Yeah, I don't know.

MR. ETCHER: I understand. Okay, well, I think I'm done for the moment. I'm going to let Mr. Bramble ask you some questions.

MR. DEBRUM: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Do you need a break before he goes on?

MR. DEBRUM: No, I'm good.

MR. ETCHER: You're sure?

MR. DEBRUM: Yeah, I drank a glass of water.

MR. ETCHER: Please.

MR. BRAMBLE: Just go off the record for a second.

(Off the record)

(On the record)

MR. BRAMBLE: -- at 12:50.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Well, thank you, again. I'm going to let Mr. Bramble kind of ask some questions now.

MR. DEBRUM: Okay.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. Yeah, Orlando, what training did you get for your job as director of safety?

A. I got a -- the safety training from my work experience, that's how I was assigned to the director of safety when the first person retired.

Q. Who was the previous director of safety?

A. His name was Steve Prankerde.

Q. How do you spell his last name?

A. P-R-A-N-K-E-R-D-E.

Q. Okay. So, you had some -- did your training come primarily from work experience, or did you -- did they send you to classes?

A. From work experience and they sent me to this course that was given to us, yeah.

Q. Who provided that course?

A. Mr. Mike Kimble (ph.).

Q. Who does he work for?

A. He works for the company.

Q. Oh, okay. What's his job?

A. He's the director of maintenance.

Q. Okay. What did that cover, that SMS course?

A. It covers the whole process -- the whole SMS process.

Q. Okay. All right. Can you describe for me what SMS is?

A. SMS is Safety Management System where we, as a operator, check our own processes and see if there's any risk or any hazard that we cannot identify, and make sure we mitigate those, and make sure that there's no recurring noncompliance on the work that we do -- on our daily work that we do.

Q. How is that -- how is SMS different from what the company might have done before SMS?

A. Well, it gave us a chance for us to identify anything that we -- any hazard that we have in our company. Like, before the FAA would come in, and they'll do the audits. But this one we audit ourself, we audit each process and make sure that there's no hazard or any risk involved.

Q. So, what components does the SMS have at the company?

A. It's got the policy, the safety risk management, safety assurance, and safety promotion (ph.).

Q. Can you give me some details for each one of those in terms of what the company has for each of those components?

A. Safety policy is -- give out our objectives to safety, and then the safety risk management is, you know, we -- if we find any hazard then we go through the process of -- excuse me --

Q. Uh huh.

A. -- yeah, we go through the process of doing -- I mean, if there's any hazard identified, we'll bring it in, we'll go through the safety, we analyze it, and then we see if there's any risk associated with that hazard. And then if it's something that needs change or revision to the system, then we go ahead and process it through its process owner, and then we make changes to the system.

Q. Okay, and what's safety assurance about?

A. Safety assurance is -- continues auditing, checking even after safety risk management, if there's any improvement on whatever process was put in place.

Q. Okay, and then can you give me an example of how you check -- how do you audit and check?

A. We did -- we have audit schedules that we do, and then even on -- with safety reports we can audit if it needs to -- it's something we need to audit, we'll audit it after it was assigned to its department. Then we'll go back and audit if that process -- they're doing the new process or --

Q. Okay. What's an audit consist of? Like, what kind of audit activities do you do?

A. We do our standard audit is -- for each department we have an audit that -- we audit their records, we audit their work, the performance, we audit -- well, their performance, their records.

Q. So, do you do some auditing yourself?

A. Yes.

Q. So, the last time you did an audit, what was that like? What did -- like, kind of walk me through what that activity was?

A. Well we -- first, we let the department know that we're going to be come, we'll assign

them okay, we have this audit that we're going to do to this element. So, we let them know this is what we're going to do and we'll give them what needs to be done: all the paper work, all the references, the questions that we'll do with the audit. And then, on the day of the audit we'll work with the department on the audit.

Q. And so, how often do these scheduled audits happen with flight ops or maintenance?

A. It differs. Some it's like -- I would say we have, like, four ops, and maintenance we have scheduled audits, like, probably three to four each a month. Four each.

Q. Okay. So, three to four for ops and three to four for maintenance per month?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay. Does that happen about weekly for each of them?

A. Sometimes we do, sometimes it takes longer, yeah.

Q. Okay. So, what's an example of an audit element in flight ops that you'd check for example?

A. In flight ops -- well, in flight ops there's loading, that's an element.

Q. Yeah.

A. That's one example.

Q. And then how about in maintenance?

A. In maintenance it's R, double I, major repairs.

Q. Okay, and so, how does that audit help you determine whether or not your risk controls are working?

A. Depends on the findings.

Q. Okay. How do you decide what the elements -- the audit elements should be?

A. The elements?

Q. Uh huh.

A. We schedule. We get it from the FAA website, we have a list of elements that we need to

audit, so, then we list those according to our schedule for the year.

Q. Okay. So, earlier you were talking about manual changes --

A. Uh huh.

Q. -- that you guys do, and I think Shawn asked about some policy changes, which, I guess, was included in some of the manual changes. Do you sometimes do other kinds of changes in the company in terms of equipment, or the design of things, or if you need some new safeguard of some type that involves buying something and installing it, or anything like that?

A. Can you clarify that? I'm not really sure.

Q. Yeah. I'm just wondering, when you identify a hazard, do you think of solutions in addition to policy and procedure changes?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Can you give me an example?

A. Well, like you said, like, we equipment or -- yes, we do get those if we need it, yeah.

Q. Can you think of anything that's happened in the last year where, you know, you've had to do -- you've done a change that is sort of a physical change, or equipment change, or something?

A. When you talk about equipment change, are you talking about -- they give me so many, like, ground equipments or --

Q. So, I'm just wondering -- like, let's say somebody identified a hazard in one of your safety meetings and you all were coming up with mitigation strategies or risk controls. So, some risk controls that you might apply would be procedural, and some might involve sort of general policies, but then others might involve changing something in the work environment that's, you know, that's physical, the way it's designed, or what type of equipment you're using to do a particular task, or that sort of thing. And I'm just wondering if you could give me an example of some kind of a change that involves something other than a policy and procedure? It might even involve, like, maybe you think there ought to be two people involved in a task instead of one --

well, I guess that's kind of -- that's a policy issue. But is there anything besides a policy and a procedure type change?

A. No, I really can't recall right now.

Q. Okay. That's fine. When are the biggest hazards for your type of operation?

A. When?

Q. For your -- what are the biggest of hazards --

A. What are the biggest --

Q. -- as far as the safety risk management process goes, sort of, like, one of the top hazards that your safety department is concerned about, like, mitigating that are sort of related to the characteristics of your operation?

A. The past or right now?

Q. Prior to the accident. So, you know, when you guys go through your like of hazards that you've identified, and what you're doing to try and mitigate them, what are the top ones you have?

A. It's the manuals -- the manual revision. That's the one we're working on.

Q. Okay. So, the manuals are the top hazard to the operation?

A. I'd say -- yeah, it's the revising the manuals that's the top.

Q. Okay. Is there anything else, like, do you guy know of any issues that you feel like might be sort of the highest risk that you might need to do something about that -- to avoid future accidents?

A. No, I don't. Nope.

Q. Okay. So, you're not sure? You guys haven't identified any top hazards?

A. I haven't --

Q. Or top risks?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Can you tell me what the most common kinds of issues are that are reported -- kind

of safety issues that are reported as far as your maintenance safety reports?

A. Maintenance safety reports?

Q. Yeah. Do you have sort of a most common kinds of reports that you get in the maintenance area for safety reports?

A. In the maintenance area, no, I haven't received any maintenance safety reports.

Q. Oh, okay. So, the anonymous reporting system, you don't get anything --

A. I don't get any -- I get some, but it's nothing on maintenance.

Q. Oh.

A. Yes, I don't get any from maintenance, yeah.

Q. Okay, and no names that sent to your or --

A. No, no names.

Q. No anonymous or names?

A. No anonymous or names.

Q. Okay. And that's in -- how long have you been the director of safety?

A. 2017.

Q. Okay. So, in four years --

A. Oh, you're talking about the -- I am sorry, I thought you were -- I have received, yeah, a maintenance report before.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So --

A. But not never, I thought you were talking about recently.

Q. How long do you think it's been?

A. It's been, I would say over six months.

Q. Okay. Do you remember the last one you got?

A. No, I don't remember the last one I got, but we have it on record.

Q. Okay. How about operations safety reports, what are the most common kinds of issues you get in there?

A. We get, like, sometimes I -- the switch -- the power switch -- main switch, it's on the on position and it's supposed to be off.

Q. For what?

A. For our cargo door. Or -- I mean, I'm trying to recall the other one that I -- right now I cannot really --

Q. You can't recall any other ops?

A. Yeah, we have our regular, but I cannot recall right now.

Q. Okay. I'm just scanning down through some of my questions here because Shawn already covered some of this stuff, so --

A. That's fine.

Q. Let's see -- all right, how did you find out about the accident?

A. I got a call from the flight follower.

Q. Okay, and what -- when was that?

A. It was at -- that was Friday morning at 1:50 if -- I believe 1:55, something around there -- 4:45, 55.

Q. Okay, and then what did you do?

A. I got a call and then I got a text, Captain Okai said okay, I'll put it in the water. So, I went to work, I went straight to TransAir.

Q. Okay, and then what?

A. Now -- upon arriving, I met with the director of operations who was already there, and then we started planning our emergency response plan -- excuse me.

Q. Okay. Is that, like, a standard checklist?

A. Yeah, there's a checklist that we go through okay, we started, okay, I ask him did you notify FAA? He said yeah, did you notify NTSB? Yes. And we go through the checklist, okay we need to set up a command site where we're going to do all of the meetings and --

Q. All right, so, let's set aside the accident night for a moment and I'd like to ask you about your safety investigation capability. So, as part of your safety assurance process, do you have a safety investigation capability in the safety department?

A. What do you --

Q. So, if there's an incident, for example --

A. Oh, yeah, we will run all of those through our safety program.

Q. Can you recall the last time that the safety program investigated a safety related incident to see what could be learned from it?

A. No.

Q. Is that something that's sort of in your purview as the director of safety that you would normally do, or is that somebody else's responsibility?

A. Like, if you -- if there was a prior incident?

Q. Like, let's say a crew said we had a near miss with another airplane on approach and they report it to you, and they said, you know, this was a close call, we're very concerned about it. Would you have, like, an investigation process where you can appoint someone, and they would investigate it?

A. Oh, yeah, if we have that happen, yes, we will assign it.

Q. Okay.

A. We will assign someone to do it.

Q. And so, can you recall a time when that's ever happened?

A. No. Well, we haven't had something like that.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And how about in maintenance or loading? You never had an incident report where there's been sort of a near miss that, you know, maybe something that could've been an accident if it wasn't caught, or something where, you know, you wanted to go in and investigate and see what lessons learned you might have?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So, it sounds like the safety assurance focuses more on the audits and less on the incident reports?

A. Yeah, if there's reports, yeah -- if there's a report on a major thing, we will do an investigation on it.

Q. Okay.

A. But if we don't get any major report on any major issues, then --

Q. Then you won't typically --

A. Yeah, I mean, we will proceed when -- we will investigate, but if there's a major one, we will, like, go in depth and we'll take time to process the whole thing.

Q. Has that ever happened since you've been director of safety?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. Not that I recall.

Q. Okay. All right. How do you like working for Rhoades Air?

A. Oh, I like it. I like working there. I wouldn't be there this long if I didn't like it.

Q. And what do you like -- what's satisfying or difficult about your job?

A. Satisfying and difficult?

Q. Uh huh. What do you enjoy about it and what do you find frustrating?

A. Well, I enjoy working with all of my coworkers. I mean, they're -- everybody, you know,

we help each other, we're willing to help. What's frustrating, myself, if I don't get things done, but that's about it.

Q. It's frustrating that you --

A. Yeah, I might not be able to do things on time and all that, but --

Q. Yeah, okay. And how would you describe the company's organizational safety culture? Like --

A. It's a safe company, yeah.

Q. What makes you say that or feel that way?

A. Because I see -- I mean, I work there, I see how we react if there's any concern, when we bring it up to management, the accountable executive, we always figure out a way to solve.

Q. Okay, and the accountable executive is who?

A. That's Mr. (indiscernible).

Q. And do you feel supported by management and able to make safety related decisions without fear of repercussions?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Do you feel pressure from company management to do thing you feel are unsafe?

A. No, actually, I pressure them, they don't pressure me.

Q. You pressure management?

A. Yeah. Well, maybe, I mean, if I see something that's not right and they don't get reports on time -- I mean, results on time.

Q. And do you have any safety related concerns about the company?

A. No.

Q. How confident are you about the quality of the maintenance of the company, any concerns there?

A. I was a maintenance -- I was part of the maintenance before, so, I'm pretty confident with

the maintenance department. I mean, I've been working with all -- I worked with them before, I know.

MR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. Okay. All right.

Clarence? Do you have anything?

MR. KANAE: Orlando, do you need a break or --

MR. DEBRUM: Yeah, or -- can maybe -- if --

MR. KANAE: Take a break?

MR. DEBRUM: We can take a break?

(Off the record)

(On the record)

MR. BRAMBLE: On the record at 1:20 p.m.

And Clarence, do you have some questions?

MR. KANAE: Yes.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Orlando, thanks for coming in today. I appreciate your time. I'd like to start off with, you mentioned the safety auditors --

A. Uh huh.

Q. -- one of them is you, you have an ops auditor, and airworthiness auditor. Who are these personnel, please?

A. One is Mike Ramirez --

Q. He is the --

A. -- he is the airworthiness, and the other one is Valerie (ph.) Pilapenko.

MR. BRAMBLE: Can we get a spelling on --

MR. DEBRUM: Okay, P-I-L-A-P-E-N-K-O.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. These gentlemen are experienced in safety in the air?

A. Yes, one was a pilot before, and then the other one -- I think the other one was a Ex-FAA. Yeah, Mr. Ramirez (ph.).

Q. Oh, okay. Thank you. As far as SMS, is it regulatory?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Under what regulation?

A. Under 4.5.

Q. 4.5, okay. You also mentioned the SMS components, which was pretty impressive, I've got to say. One of the components is promotion of safety -- safety promotion. How is it -- how does a company promote safety aviation, and to whom to they -- I'm sorry, how do they?

A. Yeah, we have a training department that we teach SMS, and then we do the management as well as each employee. And then we do -- we have a newsletter that we send out every quarter that promotes every safety thing, as well as -- we have cards signed, like, we put all the -- everything on SMS on this, we got the pillars (ph.), yeah. So, each employee has these cards on SMS, and they get the training -- SMS training. Then, they -- we offer them -- I mean, we give them the newsletter every quarter.

Q. So, you have on that card the SMS pillars?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Interesting, okay. Thank you. One of the terminology you use in SMS is controls, are you familiar with that?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. So, can you give me an example of controls that might be needed in a risk assessment, for example?

A. Okay, like, okay, let me see -- let's say loading, if it's okay, we need to -- the loading, okay, if they see that okay, they don't -- they use trucks to go right back up to the belly to load,

then that's a hazard, you might hit the plane. So, the control that we would put in place is okay, we're not going to use the truck, we'll use belt (ph.) loader to pull up. That's a control that would be to change from truck to using equipment that would be safe to load the airplane.

Q. Okay. Have you encountered any situation whereby maintenance, for example, stated in their safety meetings that the company needed order more of the correct parts?

A. No. I recall there are waiting parts, but not need to order more parts. (Verbatim)

Q. Could you expand on waiting parts?

A. Waiting, like, they order, they're waiting for parts to come in, they go part of the airplane is not flying down, is it okay if we have parts. It's either they're sorting the parts or they're waiting for the part to arrive.

Q. Okay. So, if an aircraft has an MEL --

A. Uh huh.

Q. -- that requires an aircraft part, and the part is not in, but the MEL is going to expire, what happens in that situation?

A. They will request an MEL extension, and they will search out the part. Now, sometimes -- this is Hawaii and parts, you know, sometimes it's hard to locate parts. So, they will search out the parts, but they will ask for an MEL extension. If it's approved, they will extend the MEL, if not then the plane is grounded until we get the part in.

Q. Okay. Thank you, Orlando. And your accountable executive, what's the relationship between yourself and the accountable executive?

A. Oh, we work well together.

Q. Do you ever have conflicts --

A. No.

Q. -- on wanting to accomplish a safety issue or anything?

A. No, every -- actually, he told me anything you need, let me know, I'll provide it.

MR. KANAE: Thank you, Orlando. That's all I have.

MR. DEBRUM: All right, you're welcome.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Just a few things kind of to follow up on what Clarence said about the other safety people, do you have a flight safety officer or a chief of flight safety?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. No.

Q. So, the one auditor that used to be a pilot --

A. Uh huh.

Q. So, as far as the flight-side audits, what -- give me an example, is there -- is it actually -- does the auditor that used to be a pilot jump seat in the audit during flight? What is done during the flight?

A. Yeah, there is audits that each require for him to jump seat, and he will do it. In fact, he just did that about a week ago.

Q. And you mentioned he used the FSIMS off of the --

A. The DCDs (ph.), yeah.

Q. Okay. You kind of talked about your training for SMS, and the chief of maintenance gave you the training?

A. Yes, he taught that course.

Q. Okay. So, you have not received any formal training from and accredited --

A. No.

Q. Okay. Do you have any recurring safety meetings with, like, the airport or other companies that the airport puts on a monthly safety meeting? Is there anything like that that you attend?

A. No.

Q. So, nothing outside the company?

A. Nothing outside the company.

Q. Any safety meeting outside the company? Do you know -- you know, the FAA has some mandatory reporting that has to happen, do you -- are you familiar with that? Like, for example, I do an abort on the runway, there's going to be a required report that has to be filled out --

A. Yes, it -- we have that in our system.

Q. Is that your responsibility within safety to make sure that happens?

A. It -- well, if there's a problem with takeoff, we'll get the form, we'll get the report on safety, and then we'll bring it up to the committee.

Q. Would that be an example of something you would do an investigation on?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So, do you have trained safety investigators that have attended formal training to be a safety person?

A. No, we don't have any safety investigators.

Q. Do you recall any aborts kind of lately in the past six months that your company has had?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember --

A. But not on the accident plane, not there.

Q. No, but do you remember --

A. Yes.

Q. -- what the aborts were for and any process that you (indiscernible) in the investigation.

A. It was -- the one I remember was aborted for generator going off flight.

Q. Generator going off flight?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So, nothing engine related that you remember?

A. We have reports on engine related, but I don't -- I have to see when that happened.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. Because we do have -- I think we had two engine related aborted takeoff.

Q. I think I remember you saying that you didn't have any maintenance related safety items in the past --

A. No report -- no safety reports, yeah.

Q. Do you mean a safety report from a maintenance person, or --

A. Or any anonymous, yeah -- any that's anonymous.

Q. Okay. Oh, so, nothing anonymous from a maintenance person?

A. Uh huh.

Q. But was there any maintenance items that was written up by maybe a pilot that was a safety concern?

A. Pilot? Yes, there may be one, yes, by a pilot, yeah.

Q. Do you remember what the details or how that was taken through the SMS process, the risk hazard assessment, and the mitigation --

A. Well, I wouldn't say it was a pilot, actually. Let me see. But I do recall that report. Yeah, it's a -- they reported that they had issues with the airplane, but it wasn't written up.

Q. So, the flight crew had issues with the airplane, and the captain didn't write it up, or --

A. Well, they mentioned it to the maintenance, but they didn't put it on the record -- they didn't put it on the book.

Q. Okay. So, what would be the process to --

A. The pilots would've written it down.

Q. Okay. Back to the mandatory reporting -- FAA reporting, do you remember any MEL for hydraulic failure in the past six months or year?

A. I don't recall.

MR. LEE: You don't? That's all I have, thank you.

MR. DEBRUM: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Just a few questions.

MR. DEBRUM: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: We'll go around a second time. It usually doesn't take as long, but are you good to start? Okay.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. You mentioned that you didn't have any safety reports from maintenance --

A. Uh huh.

Q. -- whether anonymous or with their name on it. How would you know, if something comes in anonymously, which group it come from?

A. Well, I --

Q. Be it maintenance, or flight ops, or ground, how would you know if it's anonymous. I'm just trying to --

A. There's no name, no nothing, it would just -- it either comes with a name or it just says anonymous. It won't say, like, John Doe, that's -- yeah.

Q. Okay. So, you couldn't -- I just want to make sure I understand, so, you wouldn't know if an anonymous comes from a pilot, or a mechanic --

A. No.

Q. -- or a ground person?

A. No, I wouldn't know.

Q. Okay. Who are you reportable to -- who do you report to?

A. The accountable executive.

Q. All right, and you said you had a good relationship with him?

A. Uh huh.

Q. All right. If you come up with a change that needs to be done but it costs money, changes got money sometimes.

A. Uh huh.

Q. But it costs, you know -- has that ever been an issue with getting changes done? Has there ever been a time when he's like no, that's too much? Okay.

MR. BRAMBLE: We didn't have an audible response.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Oh, could you actually --

A. Oh, no.

Q. No?

A. No.

Q. Thank you. As part of your risk assessments, you live on a beautiful island near the water, are birds any part of your risk assessments?

A. Birds?

Q. Yeah, birds, wildlife at the airports, do you guys take that into any consideration?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Do you have a mitigation for that? Or do you guys -- have you developed anything?

A. Well, no.

Q. No? Okay. Have you had bird strikes?

A. Not that I recall, lately.

Q. Okay. Can you give me an idea of what lately means? I just want to make sure --

A. I mean, before, maybe, like, the last two or three months I haven't received anything on bird strikes.

Q. Would you expect --

A. I would, yeah. I would if there was any.

Q. All right. So, in the past two weeks, you know, about a week before the accident -- maybe two weeks before the accident. How many flight ops audits have you guys accomplished?

A. Last two weeks I would say -- I'll have to check, but I would say one or two -- we've done one or two flight ops.

Q. How about for maintenance?

A. Three or four.

Q. In the past two weeks?

A. In the past two weeks, yeah.

MR. BRAMBLE: Before the accident?

MR. DEBRUM: Oh, before the accident, yes.

MR. ETCHER: Yes, thank you.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. I know you said you don't -- you haven't received a lot of safety reports from maintenance?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Do you get more reports from flight ops or from ground folks?

A. Yes.

Q. Which do you get more from?

A. Ground.

Q. Ground?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Give me some -- just some nice --

A. I don't know, like, you know, it can be -- like, safety reports can be, like, small stuff or, like, big stuff, you're thinking okay, they still check on all the equipments. The dollies, you know,

they're not in the locked positions and stuff, yeah, reports like that.

Q. Okay.

A. Or the ULDs still have the old tags in their pocket, yeah. Reports like that we get.

Q. Okay. Do you share that safety quarterly report with every employee at TransAir, or is it just --

A. It goes out with the newsletter -- it will -- they will be in the newsletter.

Q. And how is that made available to all employees?

A. It's sent out email, it's posted on the bulletin board -- on the company bulletin board.

Q. Okay. All right. Where is your physical office located? Are you in hangar 1 or hangar 2?

A. Hangar 1.

Q. Hangar 1? Do you have pilots or people walk in and bring things to you? Safety concerns -- just walk in your office and bring you safety concerns?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. I mean, they come in, they realize, you know, we talk stories, but to bring in concerns, no, they usually do it through the reporting system.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you have kind of an open-door policy? Do you --

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Let me rephrase, that was really a bad question. Do you encourage pilots, and ramp, and maintenance --

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. -- to just come in and bring things to you?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. Have you had any -- has the FAA been concerned with some of the risk that they would classify as significant or moderate when it comes to, you know, like -- I believe they may have done an inspection not that long ago, are you aware of that?

A. Inspection on --

Q. Like a CHEP inspection? Have you heard of that?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Did they give you any, like, significant or moderate concerns that they had for risks or safety issues?

A. No, not to safety.

Q. Okay. Not to safety, did they give them to somebody else?

A. Yeah, I don't know if there was any significant on maintenance and ops.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't know. But for safety, no.

Q. Okay. I just -- I wasn't sure if you knew of other ones.

A. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: So, I appreciate the clarity there. I think you have answered all my questions but let me go around just to make sure nobody else has any follow ups.

MR. DEBRUM: None of us --

MR. ETCHER: Yeah.

Mr. Bramble?

MR. DEBRUM: I am part of the team, I'm excited.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Do you recall in the last year or so any incident involving aircraft pressurization? Or maybe a crew might've turned down a flight because they were concerned that the pressurization was MEL'd out and it was hurting their ears?

A. I recall that, but I cannot say exactly when.

Q. Okay. Was that the subject of a safety report?

A. It was because it was written up multiple times -- recurrence, yeah.

Q. So, is that how it came to your attention --

A. Uh huh.

Q. -- because it was written up in the maintenance log multiple times?

A. Yeah. If there's multiple writeups then it is for us to look into it.

Q. Okay. And what was done in that circumstance?

A. Well, the maintenance, they did their work, they changed components and that's how they close it out, they help check it. We had another pilot fly with it and the report came out and he felt it's good.

Q. Okay.

A. But when exactly, I don't know.

Q. All right. But no one filed a safety report?

A. No.

Q. Okay, and the CHEP findings -- the FAA CHEP findings, are you familiar with the contents of that? Like, did they provide you a list of findings or --

A. They provide -- I know that -- to safety, no. I didn't get any list of findings, but they did it for maintenance and ops.

Q. Was any of that forwarded to you for evaluation?

A. During that meeting, I mean, we have the list, but it wasn't for me, it was for ops and maintenance.

Q. Okay.

A. And then we discussed it and discussed what we're going to do with that.

Q. During which meeting?

A. During the -- usually one Tuesdays and Fridays on each week -- two times a week. We have the management -- well, we call it management safety meeting, so, we discussed those at those meetings, and also on the monthly CASS and safety meeting with the FAA.

Q. That was another question that I was going to ask you. So, the CASS program, that's another required safety program, is that correct?

A. No, the CASS is based on the maintenance, but we audit the CASS program.

Q. Is that continuing -- what does CASS stand for?

A. Continuing Analysis Surveillance System.

Q. Okay. Is that a required program?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Okay, and so, that's run by the maintenance department?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay, and then how does the safety -- how do you as director of safety -- how do you interface with the CASS program?

A. We -- the CASS program has its own audits, and the safety program audits the CASS to make sure that they're doing their own audits.

Q. Okay, and when they find things, do they bring those things to your attention?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. They do.

Q. Can you think of any examples?

A. No, I cannot think of any right now.

Q. So, this might -- maybe this will help, so, I'm curious on the pressurization example, because there were multiple writeups --

A. Yes.

Q. -- is that something that was flagged by CASS?

A. It was, yeah. It was by chronic writeups, yeah.

Q. Is that -- was --

A. That's part of CASS, yeah.

Q. Okay. So, that issue of the pressurization, multiple writeups, is that what brought that to your attention?

A. Yes.

Q. Through the CASS program?

A. Through the CASS program.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, I think that's all I have. Thanks, Orlando.

MR. DEBRUM: Thank you.

MR. BRAMBLE: Hopefully, that'll be my last shot at it.

MR. KANAE: I just have one, Orlando.

MR. DEBRUM: Okay.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Just an example, if you had a problem employee and it appears that it is affecting safety, how would you -- how would that be handled with a problem employee being late all the time, or not following instructions, or company policies?

A. Uh huh. Well, it depends on the -- if the department writes up a report on that then we will go the process, and then we'll discuss it with Human Resources, and then we'll see. But the department will -- the one will -- initiate the process by writing a report on that particular person.

MR. KANAE: Okay, thank you.

MR. DEBRUM: You're welcome.

MR. BRAMBLE: Yes, sir.

MR. LEE: Maybe just a couple.

You got an A and AP, you worked in maintenance for quite a few years with the airline, and you've been working on the 737s for a while.

MR. DEBRUM: Uh huh.

MR. LEE: When you were still working as a mechanic in maintenance, was there any struggles with the older aircraft mainly around the engines? Do you remember multiple writeups, or more than -- even more than normal maintenance requirements, do you remember any of that as when you were in maintenance, or even as you moved into safety? Is there any concerns about the engines and the way they're performing?

MR. BRAMBLE: Rich, can I just ask to you like -- are you asking about when he was -- before when he was in maintenance or now? Or the entire period?

MR. LEE: The entire period, his experience in the company with maintenance.

MR. DEBRUM: No.

MR. LEE: No?

MR. DEBRUM: No.

MR. LEE: Okay, that's all I have.

MR. ETCHER: Any other questions by anybody?

MR. KANAE: No more, thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Bill?

MR. BRAMBLE: No.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

Well, Orlando, thank you so much for coming in and talking with us.

MR. DEBRUM: Yeah.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. I just -- I always like to end two questions, so, you can see the end is near, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. You've given us a lot of information, but is there anything you can think of that we didn't ask but we should've that might help us understand the events surrounding this?

A. I think I've heard -- yeah, no.

Q. You can't think of any questions?

A. I can't think of anything.

Q. Okay. So, I know you're in safety and you're kind of an important person, but if you were the king of the day at the airline, is there something you would love to see done or changed to make things better, or you could just say make it happen?

A. I can't think of anything.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. All right. Well, again, I appreciate your time, thank you so much. I know you're a busy man, but I do appreciate you coming in and talking with us.

MR. DEBRUM: Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: And we will call this finished at 1:47.

MR. DEBRUM: I hope I helped out with your investigation --

(Whereupon, at 1:47 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Orlando Debrum
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Carolyn Hanna
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

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Interview of: EMILIO EVANEZ, Flight Follower

Rhodes Aviation/TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

Tuesday,
July 6, 2021

APPEARANCES:

WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

WILLIAM KATT, Esq.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

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INTERVIEW

(8:00 a.m.)

MR. BRAMBLE: This is interview with Emilio Evanez --

MR. EVANEZ: Yes, that's correct.

MR. BRAMBLE: -- on July 6th at 8 o'clock in the morning, Hawaii Standard Time. We begin with our standard preamble.

My name is Bill Bramble, and I am a human performance investigator with the NTSB. Mr. Shawn Etcher and I are leading the operations in the performance group for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA, and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

Now I'd like to have Mr. Etcher and each of the group members briefly introduce themselves. Mr. Etcher?

MR. ETCHER: Good morning, Emilio. Thank you for coming in. My name is Shawn Etcher, I'm the operational group factors group chairman for this interview.

MR. KANAE: Good morning, Emilio. My name is Clarence Kanae, I'm with the FAA at the local Honolulu Certificate Management Office. Operations is my specialty.

MR. LEE: I'm Rich Lee, a Boeing safety pilot.

MR. BRAMBLE: Today we're going to be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we'll send that recording out for transcription, and the party members will have a chance to review that transcription to correct it for any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probably cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're here simply for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents.

Having said that, we cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity, and the transcription of the interview will eventually be part of the public docket for this accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time, and everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person who's asking the questions at that time. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person has had a turn.

Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand the question, just say so, and if you realize you misstated something or want to correct something, please do.

You're entitled to have one representative of your choosing. Is there someone you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. EVANEZ: Bill is my representative.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. And can you identify yourself?

MR. KATT: William J. Katt from the Law Firm of Wilson Elser.

MR. BRAMBLE: Does anyone have any questions?

MR. KATT: No questions.

MR. EVANEZ: No questions.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right. If everybody is ready, we will begin with the questions.

INTERVIEW OF EMILIO EVANEZ

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Emilio, can you tell me your full legal name, please?

A. Emilio Clive Evanez, III.

Q. And can you spell Clive?

A. C-L-I-V-E.

Q. And Evanez?
A. E-V-A-N-E-Z.
Q. How old are you?
A. I'm 32.
Q. And what's your job title at TransAir or Rhoades Aviation?
A. Flight following.
Q. When were you hired?
A. February 7th, 2020.
Q. And what are your roles and responsibilities as a flight follower?
A. As a flight follower, we make sure everything in the flight is safe. We check the weather, check the NOTAMS, make the flight plan for the pilots to go over and agree on. If there's any discrepancies, we would change the flight plan to what is safe and legal.
Q. Anything else?
A. Follow the flight, stay in radio contact with them as much as we can and make sure the flight gets to their destination.
Q. All right. Can you give me a -- well, let me ask you first. Are you a certified dispatcher?
A. No.
Q. Does the company have any certified dispatchers?
A. I believe so.
Q. Do they work in the same center or the same office that you do?
A. Yes.
Q. So you have some who are certified dispatchers and some who are just flight followers?
A. Mainly as flight followers we -- mainly we don't have a dispatching license. But there is, I believe in the company, who has a dispatcher license.
Q. Was there somebody like that on duty when the accident flight departed with you? Were they

on duty with you?
A. So we were under the director of operations. So if anything -- if we have any questions, we would call the director of operations with any concerns.
Q. Were you the -- I guess what I'm trying to get at is, were you the only person on duty in the scheduling office dispatch office?
A. Yes, that's correct.
Q. Okay. Can you give us a brief overview of your aviation background that led to your working at Rhoades?
A. I have my private pilot's license and issue-man (ph.) license. I have my degree at Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University, and I work in Army Aviation as a mechanic in operations as a reserve.
Q. What's your degree from Embry-Riddle?
A. Business of Aviation.
Q. Do you do your reserve duty at a base around here?
A. Wheeler.
Q. Do you work for any other employers besides the reserves -- is it Air Force reserves?
A. Army. Army Guard.
Q. So besides the Army National Guard and Rhoades, do you have any other employers?
A. No.
Q. So you said you have a private pilot -- is it a private pilot single engine and instrument rating?
A. Yes. Fixed wing.
Q. Okay. Any other certificates or ratings?
A. Not at this time.
Q. What's your total flight time?
A. About 140 hours.

Q. Can you tell us, in your own words, what happened the night of the accident from the time that you arrived at work until the time that the emergency response concluded?

A. Okay. So I came into work. I start at 10:30 so I came around there.

Q. P.m.?

A. Yes, that's correct. I'm the overnight flight follower on Mondays through Fridays. So I came in. I set up my computers -- turned on the computers, put into our flight schedule. I check our emails for the dispatch -- for the flight following emails. Checked the weather NOTAMS.

So I get everything set up, and then there's a cargo supervisor. He sets the schedule so I usually wait for him to make the schedule for the line-up for the flights. Let's see what else -- the weather NOTAMS. There's a logbook to make sure they're signed off airworthy.

And then the pilots come in at their show time. First pilot was Amin and I believe his FO was Kim Mercado. I'm trying to remember everything. So they came in. The cargo manager gave us our line-up. So they were first. They were going to Maui. I let the fueler know what fuel it pumped.

And then I made their flight-plan, and he looks over it, agrees with it. And if they agree with it -- if there's any discrepancies, we'll fix it there. If he agrees with it, he'll sign it, I'll initial it, we'll put the time.

Q. Do you recall specifically if that's what happened that night? Because you said we normally -- he will. But did that happen?

A. Yes. So you want all the events from --

Q. You're doing fine. It's just because you said, he will do. So I wanted to make sure that that's what exactly happened.

A. Yes. So they went on to Maui. This is the first aircraft, 810, they went out to Maui. They didn't have any issues.

The second show for pilots was Henry and Greg Ryan. Their show time was 12:15. They

both usually come early. They came in. We had some small talk, like, hi, how are you doing, and stuff like that.

I prepared their flight release. Henry looked over the logbook, made sure it was signed off. He looked past pages of the logbook. So I gave them the release and he goes over the release. He does his pre-flight flight briefing in the room with Greg Ryan.

And then the plane -- they say it's ready to get loaded. Greg Ryan goes out to the plane to do his pre-flight. Henry was looking over the book. It was just a normal day. Nothing out of the ordinary.

Then he went out to the aircraft. The cargo manager supervisor does the weight and balances and he'll give it them the weight and balance to sign.

Q. Just real quick -- you said, he will give them, but is that what he did?

A. Yes. So it came from the cargo supervisor.

Q. Sorry to interrupt. I want to make sure for the record that it was clear that that is what happened.

A. Yes. So everything was normal. So they blocked out -- I believe it was 1:23. So I normally put in the block-out times. When they block out, I put in the times that they blocked out. There was nothing out of the ordinary. They taxied out.

The next flight came in. I was working on the package for the next flight. About 1:30 -- I think it was 1:32 -- they took off. 809 was actually coming in. They were on final. So I usually call out, 809 is on final, to let the ground crew know that they're coming in -- on the mic.

Amin let me know that over the Honolulu ATC, that 810 is having engine issues. So I try to get them on the radio on our company radio. I call out, 810, come in. And there's no response. I'm trying to get to see what their intentions are.

So at that point, to my knowledge it was just -- they lost one engine. So to what I know, his intention was just to come in. But 809, Amin, then let me know that he heard over the ATC

that the aircraft -- their words was they possibly have gone down in the water. They couldn't get radio contact with them.

At that point, I called ATC and I asked them on information for 810. The air traffic controller told me that they possibly went into the water. They didn't have radio contact with them, but they called the Coast Guard.

And at that point, I followed my emergency procedure. I called David Seest, Wallace, the director of operations, the vice president -- sorry, Tracey Reasoner. And I made sure they were all aware of what's going on.

David Seest came into tour and we gathered information. We heard over the radio that the Coast Guard found two life jackets. That was a good sign. And from there we're working with the HEF (ph.) on the status of the two pilots.

Q. Did you have any involvement in helping to coordinate with the evacuation (indiscernible) the hospital, or no?

A. It was already coordinated with the air traffic controller, Coast Guard, so no, I didn't have any coordination to that.

Q. Okay. Is there anything else that you want to add about what happened that night? Or does that pretty much sum up what you recall?

A. That's what I can recall.

Q. Okay. When you said that the Coast Guard found two life jackets, did they find two life jackets floating without people?

A. That I don't know. It was just said over the radio that I got from another aircraft, that they heard from the air traffic controller.

Q. All right. Real quick, before we go back to what happened earlier -- on the emergency response plan, what was that? Do you have a post-accident emergency response plan checklist or something? Is that what you were following?

A. We have a -- yes, there's a binder of what each individual should do.

Q. And was there a section for accident?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Okay. So on that list was for you to call those individuals. Was there anything else you had to do? Or was that the main thing? Were those your duties in that circumstance?

A. Guard the phone. And give any information passed down. Make sure nobody -- as far as the flight following office, pretty much man the flight following office, pass any information that I know, answer the phone.

Q. Okay. So let's back up to when Amin and Kim Mercado came in. You said they went to Maui, and you said it was 810. Are you sure that was 810?

A. No, it was 809.

Q. 809.

A. Yes, I'm sorry if I said 809. But yeah, it was 809 that Amin was in.

Q. Okay. And then when Henry Okai and Greg Ryan came in and began preparing their airplane, 810, did you --

A. No, this is at -- sorry, 810, you said. Okay. Go ahead.

Q. So when they came in and they're getting their paperwork -- reviewing their paperwork, do you recall if there were any write-ups in the CAN (ph.), in the maintenance log?

A. There was no MELs. As far as -- there was no MELs for that at that particular time.

Q. And no open maintenance items?

A. Not that I know, no.

Q. Okay. Did you physically look at the maintenance log?

A. I normally check that it was signed off or airworthy. And I checked the back of the canisters and open MELs and there was none for that aircraft.

Q. And who would've signed it off as airworthy that night?

A. The mechanics.
Q. Do you recall which mechanic? Was it Ricky?
A. I believe that it was one of the day mechanics. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay. Do you recall seeing in the log any informational items? I know sometimes -- we were told that sometimes people will write things, and there aren't open maintenance items but sort of an informational item to mechanics?
A. Yeah, I didn't go through that. I don't go through that. But usually, the captain does. I saw him going through the maintenance item -- the logbook.
Q. Okay. Did the captain make any comments about the airplane, the load, the flight plan?
A. No, there was nothing that gave me an indication that anything was wrong.
Q. And how did the two pilots look?
A. They looked fine. There was no indication that anything was wrong with them.
Q. Did they look healthy and alert?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. About what time do you think the first officer went out to do the pre-flight inspection?
A. I don’t have a time on that, but they did their pre-flight brief and then he went out.
Q. You told me earlier that they usually come in early. Both of those pilots?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you recall when they arrived that morning?
A. I believe around 12:00. Their show time is 12:15. I don't have an exact time on when they came in, but around 12 o'clock.
Q. Okay. How long do you think the pre-flight briefing made in the dispatch center lasted? The two pilots together.
A. Right. About 8 to 10 minutes.
Q. Does that include the time that you guys sort of exchanged greetings and made small talk?

A. No, that was before they did the briefing.

Q. Okay. Do you have a sense of how long after the first officer left that the captain left the dispatch office?

A. I don't recall. He was continuing to look at the logbook, I would say about 5 to 10 minutes after. I don't have an exact time on that. As I recall, he was looking at the logbook and then he went out.

Q. Did either of them come back in after that?

A. I believe the -- no, nothing after that that I recall.

Q. Can you physically see the plane taking off when it does take off?

A. No.

Q. After the first officer left to do the pre-flight, did you hear anything from either crew member about any issue with the airplane having to do with leaking fluids or anything with the main landing gear?

A. No.

Q. Did you personally see that accident airplane that morning? Did you go out and walk around it at any point that morning?

A. No.

Q. What can you tell me about the captain in terms of his personality? What kind of guy is he?

A. Henry is a really thorough -- he looks at everything. Like the flight release, he'll look at everything. Maintenance records, he'll look at everything. The maintenance book. I think he's a really thorough person. Checks everything. Things come up, he'll question it, make sure he's going by the book, making sure everything is checked on and correct.

Q. Does it seem like the other pilots get along with him? Does he seem like a friendly guy?

A. Yeah. As far as I know he gets along with the other pilots.

Q. And how about Greg Ryan? Same questions.

A. Greg is a very -- also the same. He'll go through the flight release and also the logbooks. He's very thorough. If he finds something, he'll bring it up to the captain. He's a very sharp guy, I believe.

Q. And the pilots seem to get along with Greg?

A. Yes. Greg gets along with, I believe, everybody. He's a really good guy.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right. That's all I have right now. I'm going to pass the baton to Shawn.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you.

Emilio, first of all, thanks for the information you've given us. I've got some questions to kind of dig in there but before we start, I want to say thank you for your service with the Army Reserve. I appreciate you and my family appreciates all that you guys do for the country.

So help me understand, in your terms, the difference between a flight follower and a dispatcher.

MR. EVANEZ: Dispatcher have the license to be a dispatcher. As far as flight following goes, we try to do the same thing. We try to mirror the same thing as a dispatcher. But we're consider flight following as we don't have a flight following license.

MR. KATT: You don't have a dispatcher license.

MR. EVANEZ: Sorry -- dispatcher license. Sorry about that.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Thank you. I was getting ready to ask that for clarification. Okay. What kind of training did you do to become a flight follower for TransAir?

A. We went through the same ground school as pilots for four weeks. We were in the ground school with them.

Q. Did you have any flight following training before you came to TransAir?

A. Flight following training? No, just my private pilot and issue-man. And I also do operations

in the military side similar to a dispatcher in the civilian world. But they just have different job responsibilities.

Q. Are you certificated in the military to do that job? Or is there a certification requirement for that?

A. We have to go to school and get that MYS (ph.) for the job.

Q. Do you know if that certification transfers to the civilian world? Sometimes pilot's license will transfer to some of that.

A. Right. It can.

Q. Does yours?

A. You'd have to -- it's similar in that you have to take the test. It can help you get the license, but you still have to take the FAA test. So you don't automatically get it, you still have to take the FAA test.

Q. The written test or the actual practical test?

A. I believe both. It just gives you the experience, but you still have to do the tests.

Q. That helps. Thank you.

A. Yeah. So it doesn't transfer, it gives you experience.

Q. Excellent. I know you said you were private pilot airplanes, single engine plane with an instrument rating?

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. Are you working on any other certificates or ratings?

A. Not at this time. I was doing my commercial single-engine. At this time, I'm kind of focusing on -- I'm busy with military stuff, going away and working. So at this time, I'm not doing any flight training.

Q. All right. When was your most recent training here? Was that when you just first came on last year? Or did you have recurring training requirements?

A. We do our recurrent training.

Q. Do you remember when you did yours last?

A. Let's see. It was kind of like -- you just do memos and stuff like that. So not actually sitting down and doing the training.

Q. So it's a -- I just want to make sure I understand -- it's a lot of memos you read as part of your training?

A. Or emails, they'll send emails out. But nothing as far as sitting down, recurring like ground school or anything.

Q. So it's not a -- and please don't let me put words in your mouth, correct me if I'm wrong -- it's not a formal classroom setting training?

A. No.

Q. When was the last time you did this training? Going through the memos -- is that something someone has to sign off that you did it? Or do you just --

A. No, it's just emails.

Q. Okay. So do you just flight follow the 737s, or do you flight follow any other aircraft type?

A. We help the shorts and we follow their flights also, if they're flying and we're on duty.

Q. So on a typical night, how many airplanes are you following or monitoring at a time -- in the air, on the ground?

A. Usually about four. So three Boeings and one shorts aircraft.

Q. Is that in the air and on the ground, or is that just in the air?

A. Both in the air and on the ground.

Q. Okay. Have you ever sat in any of the airplanes' jump seats?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that a requirement for your training at all? Or is it just something that you decided to do?

A. I'm not sure if it's a requirement, but we normally jump seat in the aircraft after we get trained.

Q. So did you do your last jump seat in last February, March timeframe? Or have you done it since then?

A. That's correct, last jump seat would be about March.

Q. Of 2020?

A. 2020, yes, that's correct.

Q. Okay. Do you remember if that was on a 737?

A. Yes.

Q. It was?

A. Yes.

Q. How was that like to you? Sitting on the jump seat? Enjoying things -- just tell me what that was like for you.

A. It was a good experience.

Q. Did the crew have any mechanical issues or any challenges that night that you can recall?

A. No, not that I --

Q. I know it's been a while ago, but I just wanted to get a good understanding.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. If you had something you noticed that was of concern to you in your office, who would you report that to?

A. I would report it to David Seest, who's our director of operations, so we work under him. If there's anything that's in question, doesn't seem right, safety concern, we'd go and report to him. Call him to make sure that everything's good.

Q. Have you had to do that?

A. Are you referring to that night or just in general?

Q. In general and that night as well.

A. No. Aside from later when I had to call him.

Q. Before the flight departed?

A. No.

Q. Then how about previous?

A. Previously? Usually, I would call him to see if there's anything in question regarding regulations or anything. Say, like, the weather station was down, or some kind of NOTAM that I needed clarification on, I would usually call him. And also, if the pilots had something that they needed to clarify as far as operation goes, they can also call him.

Q. Can you remember just in the distant past, when was the last time you had to reach out to Mr. Seest and ask a question?

A. It's been a while. I was on an annual training in June. I would say over a month. It was probably something -- I can't recall, but a lot of times the weather station goes down in Maui or something, or a specific NOTAM that could affect a route, a flight, to make sure that we follow what is legal and safe.

Q. Okay. Were there any issues that night that you could recall? Like the weather station's down, or anything like that?

A. No. The weather was good. Maui was just -- the temperature was unreliable, but we have an alternate temperature source. Other than that, there was no NOTAMs that majorly affected the runways, navis (ph.). The weather was reporting good that day.

Q. And just a little bit ago, you said in June you were doing annual training.

A. Um-hmm.

Q. Is that annual training here in TransAir or was that --

A. It was the military. Yes.

Q. Okay. Sorry, I just want to make sure I get that clarified.

A. Yeah. So I was away for about two weeks. And then I was back for -- that was two weeks, that was my second week back.

Q. So when you're flight following an airplane, what tools do they give you here to be able to flight follow?

A. So as far as flight following, we have our company radio, so we're monitoring the company radio. I always have open FlightAware and Flightradar24. We have accounts with them, so they can show us where they're at and stuff like that.

Q. Is that adequate for you to do your job? Is it hard to use? I just want to make sure that you have the right tools to make your job easier.

A. Yeah. Having both of them is really helpful.

Q. All right. Where do you get your weather source for the crews?

A. The Aviation Weather Center.

Q. How does that work for you? Is it user-friendly? Does it get you what you need?

A. Yeah. It's user-friendly.

Q. Okay. I know when you were talking to Bill about going through when the crew comes in and they look over the flight

plan -- do you have to sign off the flight release as well? Both of you take responsibility for the flight? Or is it just the crew that signs it? I know you said you initial it, I believe.

A. Yes, we initial it and put the time.

Q. But do you initial it on the line of -- is it a dual responsibility?

A. It's a dual responsibility between the director of operations and the pilot on the ground, I believe.

Q. So your initial is just -- help me understand the reason for the initials. Is it you're accepting the responsibility for the director of operations? What's the purpose of your initials?

A. That I checked that everything was safe, legal, and the pilot looked over it, and they agree to the flight plan -- that it was legal and safe.

Q. Being in the office when crews come through, you probably get crews saying lots of -- talking

with each other and with you. Have you ever heard of crews coming in unhappy about a plane they got? Talking about being a problem plane or plane issues or anything like that?

A. When they have MELs, they have to let me know what they are. So I put the MEL information on the flight release. I'll put a time and initial it. They'll go over the MEL and make sure they follow it along with the maintenance personnel.

Q. Do you ever hear a crew coming in and saying something like, ugh, I got that airplane? As if they don't like flying the specific airplane? Pick an aircraft number.

A. Not that I recall. I only work with when they let me know if there's MELs.

Q. Do you ever hear of crews getting changed out or a conflict with each other? Personnel issues? Are you ever aware of that?

A. There have been times.

Q. And when you hear about that, what do you do?

A. Well, I don't authorize that. They have to go talk to Wallace, and he authorizes that and lets me know if I have to change out a crew. It's not my responsibility to change out a crew because they don't like each other. They have to go talk to Wallace.

And if Wallace says this crew is going to change, then I don't know the reason behind it. I just let them know that they're going to change.

Q. Does that happen often?

A. Not often.

Q. When was the last time that you can think of?

A. Actually, the night before.

Q. Did that involve any of the accident crew members?

A. I believe Wallace had me switch crew that Henry was with with another crew-- he was with Gina Moore, and they switched.

Q. Did he give you any reason, or just that they switch?

A. No. I had no information about it. I just made the switch.
Q. So you said that the crew were scheduled to report at 12:15, correct?
A. The active crew.
Q. I'm sorry.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. But then you said the plane left at 1:23?
A. Yes, that's correct. They blocked out.
Q. So it normally leaves -- what time would it normally leave if they arrive at 00:15. What time would a plane normally block out?
A. So they're scheduled to come in 45 minutes prior to when it's scheduled to go. So it was scheduled to go at -- on the schedule it was scheduled to go at 1 o'clock. But it's typical that it goes a little later.
Q. So on the night of the event, was there a reason it went a little later?
A. Not that I was aware of. The cargo loading, they were loading. So when they're done loading is when they'll get ready to go. So no issues as far as I was concerned of why there was a delay. As far as I know, they were still loading it.
Q. Do you guys cancel flights very often for any reason? That was a bad question. My apologies. Do you guys cancel flights?
A. So the schedule changes -- because it's cargo, so it changes throughout the night. As far as cancelling, if there's a maintenance issue or an aircraft is down, then the aircraft won't be used. But other aircraft -- they would use the runway to have other aircrafts take the load that needs to go.
Q. So the flight may not be cancelled, per say. Just an aircraft swap? Or would they actually say, we were supposed to fly this flight from Honolulu to Maui and back, we're cancelling it. Do they ever do that?

A. I don't understand the question.

Q. That's okay. Let me try and reclarify that. You have a flight the night of the accident that went from Honolulu to Maui and was on their way back. Correct?

A. Yes.

Q. So if that flight had a mechanical issue and the airplane was down for whatever reason. Wasn't going to be fixed, wouldn't be able to go fly. Would they have cancelled that flight from here to Maui and back? Or would they just delay or whatever, and put another aircraft on it?

A. They would have another aircraft take it.

Q. Okay. Have they ever had staffing issues to get a flight crewed with a captain and first officer that you're aware of?

A. You mean as far as not having enough crew members?

Q. Correct. For a flight that they couldn't get a captain for, they couldn't get an FO. They didn't have enough crew members. Do you experience that?

A. No.

Q. Seems like you guys fly similar routes?

A. Yes.

Q. Is there a standard fuel load or standard max weight that route will allow you to do?

A. Yes.

Q. From here to Maui and back, what's the standard fuel load?

A. So our standard fuel is 14,000 to go to Maui and back. And we also have a standard plus where if you need additional fuel.

Q. Can a crew add more fuel?

A. As long as it's within the weight limit and if a crew member wants to add fuel, then yeah.

Q. Does that happen very often?

A. If there's a need for it. I wouldn't say it happens often, but if there's a certain situation where

it's a need for it, it does happen. But I wouldn't say it happens often.

Q. All right. On the night of the accident, I think you had said early on when you were talking with Bill that you knew the crew had lost an engine, the accident flight. How did you know the crew lost an engine?

A. 809 -- that was Amin -- he gave me the first indication because he was coming in and he heard over the radio that 810 reported that they lost an engine.

Q. So you found out from the company aircraft that was --

A. Correct.

Q. All right. When Bill had asked you about each pilot -- the accident captain and the accident first officer -- you used the term, the captain was very thorough. I think you even used that term for the first officer. Are all the pilots here thorough, or are they more thorough, in your words?

A. I would say moreso.

Q. I just -- I don't want you to analyze their ability. Just in your words, why do you give them that moreso classification? What do they do that stands out to you?

A. I would say they're very detail-oriented. Both pilots are very detail-oriented. They look at each detail and stuff like that.

Q. Do you have other pilots not really go through the maintenance logs or not be as thorough?

A. Not that I notice.

MR. ETCHER: I think you've answered all my questions right now, so I appreciate it. And I'll pass it off to Clarence.

MR. KANAE: Emilio, do you want a break? Are you okay?

MR. EVANEZ: I'm okay for now.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. First of all, thank you for your service. Do you have any active-duty time?

A. No, no active.

Q. Thank you for your service in the National Guard. You mentioned you're also a flight operations specialist.

A. Yes, that's correct.

Q. MOS 15 Papa, by chance?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Interesting. Great. In the military, you folks use the Blue Force Tracker. Is that correct? To follow the aircraft that you're responsible for flight following in the military?

A. Not necessarily, sir.

Q. Okay. At TransAir, Rhoades, you have FlightAware and flight schedule up on the screen at all times, correct?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. Can you also describe the training that you receive regarding weight and balance? You sit in the class with pilots, correct?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. You were also with pilots.

A. Yes.

Q. When it comes to the topic of weight and balance, can you describe what kind of training is involved? Let me be more specific -- do you all go through a weight and balance form? Or do you go through a computerized system to calculate weight and balance?

How in-depth do you get into weight and balance?

A. We have a section for weight and balance. But for me, the cargo supervisor does the weight and balance. And he'll give that to the pilot to look over.

Q. Okay. And also, when the fuel is given to the flight followers, you said it's in gallons or is it in pounds?

A. In pounds, sir.

Q. Does the airline also use kilograms, by chance? Or is everything in pounds? Weights and/or fuel. Is there any difference between kilograms and pounds?

A. We always use pounds.

Q. Is also there a flight-following manual? Flight follower's manual that's available for the flight followers to go by?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you heard the term Operational Control?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you explain, in your terms, what operational control means?

A. You are responsible for the flight before it takes off.

Q. And who would have operational control for this particular flight, for example, the 810? Who would be responsible for making sure that the flight was authorized?

A. As far as operational control, it would be the director of operations and the pilot.

Q. Pilot meaning?

A. The captain, sir.

MR. KANAE: That was very clear. That's all I have, Emilio. Thank you.

MR. EVANEZ: Thank you, sir.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. All right. I just want to ask you about the MEL process. So you talked about, you get the cannon. And for example, over the past couple days, there was one time with a pressurization issue which would possibly derive an MEL, which could impact the flight plan, correct?

So do you remember any other time where you have an MEL that impacts your planning? Walk me through that process of what you would do in that case.

A. So if there's an MEL, we'd go to the MEL book. Maintenance would go through it. The pilots would go through it and they would follow the MEL.

For me, I would note down the MEL information that's on the placard and it would be on the flight release. So we would go through what the MEL states and if it affects anything operational. We'd follow that if we have to adjust our flight plan or our altitude or fuel planning.

Q. Do you remember pressurization MEL which would reduce the altitude you'd go to and possibly impact planning? Have you had to deal with that in the past, an MEL similar to that?

A. In the past? Yeah, there have been pressurization MELs.

Q. Would that possibly also impact how much cargo you'd be carrying?

A. Yeah, it depends on what the MEL would say in the weights. If we need any more fuel, or less fuel, or go to a lower altitude.

Q. So when the can is in there, and there's an MEL on there when you show up, you work the flight plan to that point. And then the captain comes in and reviews it and fills out some part of the load sheet. And that load sheet goes to the load supervisor to do the cargo part of it?

A. No. The load supervisor does the weight and balance. And if there's anything that would affect that, we would let the load supervisor know. Like if they'd have to have less fuel or...

Q. Okay. Do you look at the cargo loads -- would you recognize if a cargo load was a little bit different from flight to flight or day to day? Do you look at the cargo that in-depth, or not?

A. Normally, I don't do the cargo loads. That would come from the supervisor. They would only give me the sheet later to file.

MR. LEE: All right. Thanks, that's all I have.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Just to confirm, your MOS is 15 Papa Papa? Is that what you had said?

A. Yes. 15 Papa.

Q. Just one P.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay.

A. I actually have two MOS.

Q. Okay, what are they? 15 Papa --

A. 15 Uniform.

Q. Okay.

A. Chinook (ph.) Repair.

Q. And have you witnessed any sort of disagreements or disputes between pilots and mechanics about whether the airplanes are airworthy?

A. I have not witnessed any.

Q. And the incidents with pressurization, can you recall any examples?

A. Not off-hand.

Q. Do you recall anything about a crew ever turning down an airplane because of a pressurization problem and having to get a different crew?

A. No, sir.

Q. Do you recall hearing about any engine problems with 810 in recent times?

A. No.

Q. Do you recall any maintenance issues with 810?

A. Not that I can recall. It was flying that week and there were no issues that I was aware of.

Q. And what days -- in the week leading up to the accident, which days were you on duty? How many of those days would you say?

A. I start on Sunday at 10:30, which is our Monday. And that was my last day of work, Friday. So four days overnight.

Q. So you were on duty for four consecutive nights, and the fourth night was the night of the accident.

A. Fifth.

Q. Fifth night. Okay. And during that period, you don't recall any MELs or any maintenance issues with the accident airplane?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. And you were on duty between the hours of 22:30 and what time?

A. I was there until 06:30.

Q. Each of those nights?

A. Yes, sir.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Shawn, do you have anything additional?

MR. ETCHER: I just have two.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Just a little bit ago, you had said if there was an MEL issue, you would send that information of a limited payload or whatever to the cargo -- cargo supervisor?

A. Yeah. Cargo supervisor.

Q. Cargo supervisor. Thank you.

A. Sorry, actually manager.

Q. Manager? Okay. Have you ever had a time where you sent them a weight penalty that they had to make a choice to take off cargo or fuel?

A. There have been times. Not anything recent. Not that they had to take anything off. So normally they would know before they start loading -- if they take less fuel or something that affects their cargo loading. There's no issues with that.

Q. Which do they normally do? Do they put less fuel on or do they just keep off some of the cargo?

A. It would depend on the situation.

Q. When do they fuel the flights?

A. Usually before the flight is going to go.

Q. So do they fuel it once the crew is there? Or are the planes fueled earlier than the shift before the crew is even there yet?

A. They usually fuel -- when the fueler gets there, they'll get the loads for the aircraft and they'll fuel the aircraft.

Q. I just want to make sure I understand. The crew may not be there when they're fueling? Or is the crew usually somewhere around there?

A. The crew -- not sure if they. Usually when the fueler gets in is when he fuels.

Q. When does he usually get in?

A. I believe around 11 o'clock.

Q. Okay. Do you guys haul mail as part of your cargo?

A. Yes.

Q. So do they usually cancel flights with mail on them? Or have you seen one of those get cancelled or delayed?

A. There's times where they get delayed.

Q. But the flight itself -- the mail goes?

A. If one plane can’t do it, it'll get put on another plane.

Q. And it's okay if it leaves late?

A. I mean, that's beyond me, but yeah.

Q. That was a very bad question, I'm sorry.

A. I'm sure it's not good for the contract, but if it's late for the safety of flight, there's nothing we can do. It has to be done.

Q. There's no concern if it's late because of the safety of flight?

A. It has to do with safety of flight and it gets delayed. I've never experienced any issue.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you so much for answering all of my questions. I appreciate it. Clarence?

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Thanks. Emilio, do you recall within the couple months of any flights or any aircraft aborting takeoffs?

A. Aborting takeoff. I believe -- I don't remember exactly what day, but let me see. I believe there has been. But I don't know exactly what day.

Q. How many aborts can you recall?

A. There's only one that I can think of.

Q. Sorry?

A. There's only one that I can think of.

Q. Can you give us an estimate timeframe? Was it a month ago, two months ago?

A. It had to have been between four to six months ago. I'm not sure.

Q. And that would be in the log as well, right? If we wanted to look at the flight schedule, for example. Would that be annotated on the flight schedule dating back to that timeframe?

A. Yeah, it should be.

Q. Okay. How about, let's say, for a situation, do you get notified if there's a last-minute change? The flight's about ready to leave, but then you get a call from the director of ops saying hold the flight, we've got some changes. We need to take X number of piles of cargo. Can you maybe just run through a last-minute change scenario on what happens? Has that ever happened to you?

A. Sorry. Can you --

Q. Has it ever happened to you where you had last-minute changes for a flight that was already scheduled to depart where it got delayed because of the changes? For example, they want to put more cargo on it. Either on another station or in Honolulu, have you ever experienced any situations like that for last-minute changes?

A. Normally if they're ready to go, not personally, no. Like a last-minute change where they're ready to go, no, I haven't that I can think of.

MR. KANAE: Thank you, Emilio. That's all I have. I appreciate it.

MR. LEE: I have nothing else.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Just one or two more. How do you like working for the company?

A. I like working for the company.

Q. Do you feel supported by management in making safety-related decisions?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. Is there a way for you to report safety concerns to management?

A. Yes, there is.

Q. What is that mechanism?

A. So there's -- if I wanted to make a report, you can write a report. There's -- right by the safety officer's room, you can do a written report. You can also do an anonymous report online.

Q. Okay. Who's the safety officer?

A. Mr. Debrown [sic].

Q. Dave Brown?

A. Debrown [sic] is the last name.

Q. Is it Orlando Debrum?

A. Yes. Sorry.

Q. Okay. Have you ever had to make a safety report?

A. If there's an incident, I'll do an incident report. As far as that goes, yeah.

Q. So you have submitted a safety report before?

A. Like an incident report. If something happened, I would just write down what I saw.

Q. Have you ever done that in the past? It's okay if you can't recall.

A. Nothing that's unsafe that I'd probably report on.

Q. Have you ever submitted a safety report through the safety reporting system?

A. No.

Q. Okay. All right. Unless anybody else has any follow-up questions, I'll go ahead and just ask you in my close-outs, which are, is there anything that we didn't ask you about that you'd like to tell us that you think might be relevant to our investigation?

A. No.

Q. Is there anybody that you especially think we need to talk to?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any suggestions for safety-related improvements that you think we should be looking at?

A. No.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right. With that, we will conclude the interview at 9:11 a.m.

(Whereupon, at 9:11 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: *RHOADES AVIATION FLIGHT 810* ACCIDENT IN HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Emilio Evanez

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FA174

PLACE: Honolulu, Hawaii

DATE: July 6, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Tahura Turabi
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

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Interview of: KIM MERCADO, First Officer
Rhoades Aviation/TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday,
July 5, 2021

APPEARANCES:

WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operations Factor Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

WILLIAM KATT, Attorney
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

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INTERVIEW

(2:42 p.m.)

MR. BRAMBLE: -- an interview with Kim Mercado, and it is 2:42 p.m., Hawaii Standard Time on July 5th. Okay, my name is Bill Bramble, and I'm a human performance investigator with the NTSB. Mr. Shawn Etcher and I are leading the operations in human performance working group for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174 involved Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA, and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers. I would now like to have Mr. Shawn Etcher and each of the group members briefly introduce themselves.

Mr. Etcher?

MR. ETCHER: Good afternoon, my name is Shawn Etcher, I'm an operational factors investigator. Thanks for coming in.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, and I'm a safety pilot for Boeing.

MR. KANAE: I'm Clarence Kanae, aviation safety inspector with the Honolulu Certificate Management Office.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. We're going to -- we're using a digital recorder, and after the interview we'll send that recorder -- that recording out for transcription, and the party members will have an opportunity to review that transcription to correct it for any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault, we're here simply for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, we can't offer any guarantee of confidentiality of the interview or immunity, and the transcription of the interview will eventually be part of the

public docket for the accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions, we're going to ask them one person at a time, and everyone's been instructed not to interrupt the person that's asking the questions. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person has had a turn. Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so, and if you realize you misstated something or want to correct something, please do.

You're entitled to have one representative of your choosing, is there someone that you would like to have as your representative?

MR. MERCADO: I'll have Mr. Bill Katt to represent me.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, can you state your name?

MR. KATT: William J. Katt from Wilson Elser Law Firm.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, thank you.

And does anyone have any questions before we begin?

MR. MERCADO: I don't.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right. With that being said, we will begin with the questions. I'm going to start this time.

INTERVIEW OF KIM MERCADO

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Can you please tell us your full name?

A. My name is Kim Mercado.

Q. Okay, and can you spell your last name, please?

A. Mercado, M-E-R-C-A-D-O.

Q. Okay, and how old are you?

A. I am 30 years old.

Q. Okay, and what's your job title at TransAir?
A. I'm a first officer on a 737 Department 21 side of the Trans Rhoades.
Q. Okay, and what was your date of hire with TransAir -- or Rhoades?
A. July something of 2016.
Q. Okay. What are your roles and responsibilities as a first officer?
A. I'm here to assist the Captain to the best of my ability, to fly -- safely the aircraft.
Q. Any other positions or roles at the company?
A. No, that's it.
Q. Okay, and can you give a brief overview of your aviation background that led to your working at Rhoades?
A. I did my private here in Hawaii, then moved to Vegas to finish up all my ratings, my instrument, my multi-engine add-on, my multi-commercial over there, too. Then went back here to Hawaii, got hired on the short side of TransAir, and then from there I built up my time and experience. Then when I got the experience needed, I moved into the Boeing.
Q. Okay, and do you work for -- do you currently work for any other employer besides TransAir?
A. No.
Q. And give us a brief overview of your current certificates and ratings?
A. I am type rated on the Shorts 360, I'm also type rated on the Boeing 737, and I'm -- I have an ATP certificate.
Q. Okay. What's your estimated total of flight time in big round numbers?
A. Right now, it's about, maybe 2700.
Q. Okay, how much of that is 737 time?
A. Roughly, maybe about 1100.
Q. Okay, and how long ago were your typed on the 7-3?

A. 2000 -- and let's see -- I think I was typed on 2008 -- no, '19.

Q. '19.

A. Yeah, '18 or '19.

Q. Okay, '18 or '19.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. It's our understanding that you flew with Captain Henry Okai on July 1st, 2021. Can you please describe for us what you recall about flying with him that day?

A. Well -- yeah, that day I was originally scheduled to fly with Shawn Morgan (ph.), which is the other captain, and then on Henry's last trip to Maui, I was switched to him. So, the FO that Henry was flying with, I got switched with that FO, so I flew with him. So, that day he was, you know, kind of mad because of -- he got paired on the FO that he didn't really want to fly with, so, when he saw me, he kind of felt relaxed and, you know -- I don't know what is the right word, but he felt comfortable, I guess. So, then all throughout the flight it was okay, so, no issues about him doing anything unsafe, so.

Q. Okay, and you said he got kind of mad because he got bared by the FO, what does that mean?

A. Bare?

MR. KATT: Paired.

MR. LEE: Paired.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Oh, paired? Oh, I'm sorry.

A. Paired, yeah.

Q. Okay. So, he didn't like flying -- why wasn't he happy about flying with that FO, and why were you swapped with him?

A. Well, I'm not really sure because I don't really know the FO. But he told me about, you

know, that the other FO wasn't being professional, and knowing Henry, I know even if he doesn't like the person, as long as both are professional, he's okay.

Q. Uh huh.

A. So.

Q. Did he tell you anything more about the nature of the disagreement, or the conflict, or the --

A. No.

Q. -- behavior he didn't like?

A. Not really.

Q. Okay. Were you on reserve? Like, how did you get selected to go?

A. Oh, I was flying that day too. So, I was on the -- let's see, I think I was on the second show. They were on the -- I was on the second show, and they were on the first show. So, I think they already did two Maui round trips, and they have a third Maui round trip. So, at the third one I jumped in and switched with the FO.

Q. Okay. Did you have any conversation with the FO at that time?

A. No.

Q. Did you see her or him?

A. No, I didn't see -- I saw Henry, but I didn't see the FO because our plane -- our original plane was already to go, so the FO jumped right straight to the plane. So, I was in dispatch at that time.

Q. Okay.

A. So, I didn't really see her.

Q. Okay.

MR. KATT: Did you get a date on this? I didn't --

MR. BRAMBLE: July 1st is the date we're talking about.

MR. KATT: Okay. I'm sorry, I missed it.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. All right. So, the flight that you had with Henry was a flight to Maui, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And about what time of day was that?

A. I can't remember the exact time, but when we got back it's daylight already. So, I'm not -- I don't know what time is it exactly.

Q. Yeah, I'm sure we can get the schedule, I just wanted to confirm that the schedule matches the general timeframe of the call.

A. Okay, yeah.

Q. So, it's sort of, like, the end of the night into the day?

A. Yeah, that's our last flight.

Q. Okay.

A. Of that day.

Q. Okay, and do you recall anything unusual about the flight?

A. Unusual? No, not really.

Q. Okay. Do you recall what airplane it was?

A. Oh, it was the same airplane, 810.

Q. And did the airplane appear to be operating normally?

A. Yes, within limits, I would say.

Q. Was there anything that was approaching limits or -- so, that was unusual, or --

A. The engines are a little hot, but they're not -- I mean, they're still below the yellow line, so --

Q. Okay. Would you say they were -- I'm going to defer to you guys on the technical aspects on that. Do you have a recollection of any particular recurring issues with that airplane that you

can think of?

A. 810 -- well, 810 the shimming down for that one is always an issue on the nose gear. Yeah, that's pretty much what I can think of in the engines. So, they're -- yeah, they're -- well, actually most of them are always like that.

Q. Most of the --

A. I meant most of the time that I fly with that 810, yeah.

Q. With the 810? Okay, so, the shimming issue on the nose gear and then the engines being in the yellow area?

A. No, they're not in the yellow. It's just barely in the yellow.

Q. Okay.

A. But, you know, that's almost hitting the limits on the yellow side, that's it.

Q. Okay, and that's the engine gas temperature indication?

A. EGT, yeah.

Q. Okay. Have you heard any explanations for why it was reading like that?

A. No, not a really good explanation. Yeah, no, I don't recall any explanation with that because usually the Captains are the ones talking to, you know, the mechanics. They usually write them up and then the next day we just read what they answered back.

Q. Okay, and did you ever see that being written up?

A. Yeah.

Q. And did you ever see what was written back by maintenance?

A. I couldn't give you an exact answer on that one.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you observe that in other 737s operated by the company?

A. Yes, but I couldn't remember which aircraft are those (ph.).

Q. Okay. Do you recall whether they were other airplanes with Dash-9 engines, or --

A. Let's see -- no, I think 810 is the only one that has a Dash-9.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, I think 810 is the only one that has Dash-9.

Q. Okay. Did you do a preflight inspection on that airplane?

A. On that day?

Q. Uh huh.

A. Like, July 1st?

Q. Uh huh.

A. I did a quick walkaround, yeah.

Q. So, that walkaround, was it a shorter one than you would do at the beginning of the day because it was already --

A. I wouldn't say it's shorter, but I would say I did it faster than normal. But I pretty much checked everything that I would check on the regular one.

Q. Okay. I didn't know if the procedure was abbreviated for subsequent flights or now. Do you recall seeing anything on the outside of the plane that looked amiss?

A. No, not in the -- not on that day.

Q. Okay, and did you see something amiss on the other days? I'm just checking because you said not on that day, like --

A. Oh, I mean I've seen some fluids leaking on the tire, so, that's one.

Q. Which tire?

A. Let's see -- probably the left tire.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you recall what type of fluid it was?

A. No, I don't recall.
Q. Is this something that had been written up or addressed?
A. That, I'm not too sure, though.
Q. Okay. Do you recall if the airplane had any writeups or MEL items when you arrived to operate it with Henry?
A. MELS, no. I don't remember any significant writeup, you know, that would make me kind of ask Henry what's wrong with the airplane or something.
Q. Okay. All right, have you ever experienced an in-flight emergency while working at Rhoades?
A. Me, personally, no.
Q. Were you thinking of somebody else had one?
A. Oh, Henry.
Q. Henry, is there -- you're thinking of the day of the accident?
A. Yeah, well he had one -- he declared -- well, he did an aborted takeoff before because one of the aircraft -- I forgot with the 326, one of the aircraft -- so, I think the engine blew or something, so, he aborted that one.
Q. Okay. Any others you've heard about recently?
A. Recently, well, he made a -- no, that's it.
Q. The aborted takeoff with 326, how long ago was that, roughly?
A. Today is July -- maybe about January, February, something like that.
Q. Of which year?
A. This year.
Q. Okay. All right, how well do you know Henry Okai?
A. Oh, I've flown with him since he got hired. So, I -- I'm not sure what year he got hired because people here come and go. So -- but ever since he got hired I've been flying with him.

Q. Is it fair to say you've flown with him many times?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Okay, and are you friends outside of work?

A. No.

Q. Okay. How would you describe his capabilities as a pilot in general as opposed to other captains with the company?

A. He's pretty solid, that's what I can definitely say about him. He's more of the cautious captain I would say because he -- compared to the other captains he's the slowest, I would say. Slowest in a way that he checks everything first, you know, he wouldn't start the left engine right away after starting number two, you know. So, yeah, he's thorough. He's a checklist guy, definitely a checklist guy.

Q. You think he'd be able to think on his feet if something unexpected happened?

A. Yeah, definitely. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Did other pilots like flying with him?

A. I can't really say that for myself. But personally, I like flying with him.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And, so, summarizing what you said it sounded like he was cautious, checked everything first, and was a checklist guy. Is there anything else you can say about sort of his command styles a captain, and how he interacted with you as a first officer?

A. He's very professional with me, very polite when asking, you know, he's very open on suggestions, too.

Q. Okay. Did he appear healthy and alert before you departed on that flight?

A. Yes.

Q. And how did he perform during that flight?

A. I don't know what to call that. But normal, I guess.

Q. Okay. How do you like working for Rhoades?

A. Me?

Q. Uh huh.

A. Oh, I like working for Rhoades because the boss gave me so much opportunity, so, I kind of feel grateful for that.

Q. How's the pay compared to what other 737 FOs make?

A. I'm sorry, can you repeat that again?

Q. How's the pay compare -- how much you get paid?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Is it about the same as other FOs at other companies that fly the --

A. Oh, I don't know.

Q. Okay.

A. I wish I knew.

Q. And what do you like about working there and what's difficult about the job?

A. Well, I like working their schedule, you know. We get, like, a week off every, like, three weeks, so the fourth week is an off week. That's what I like.

Q. And what's difficult about it?

A. Something difficult about it is, I mean, this happened. That's difficult, you know. So, that's one.

Q. How would you describe Rhoades Aviation's organizational safety culture? What is the feeling around the company in terms of how it approaches managing safety? I'll leave it at that for now and see what you have to say about it.

A. Safety wise, let's see -- well, there are some stuff that, you know, I don't find, like, safe. (Verbatim) On -- like, on the cargo side, sometimes we're really short on the ground crew. So,

they just kind of just rumble around, you know, scatter around and stuff like people.

Q. They rumble around, scatter around stuff, what's that mean?

A. Oh, I mean it's very unorganized on, like, on the ramp side.

Q. I see.

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that something that has been discussed amongst the pilots and/or management, and do you know if there were any efforts to sort of address that issue?

A. Uh huh. I know it's been on the talk.

Q. Can you tell me more about that? Like, how has it been raised and how has it been discussed?

A. Oh, just for, like, a good example is when we're taxiing to the hangar, we've been told not to go in if we don't see all the marshalers (ph.) inside, so, you know, we just wait there until we see all the wing walkers come in.

Q. Okay. What company manager is responsible for managing safety at Rhoades?

A. I'm sorry, can you --

Q. Is there a point person at Rhoades for managing safety who's --

A. There's a director of safety.

Q. Okay, who's that?

A. I think that's Orlando Debrum.

Q. Okay, and is there a way for you to report a safety concern to the company if you have one?

A. Yes.

Q. What avenues are available to you?

A. We have an online safety report thing. They also have a paper one that you can sign -- or fill out and then put it in, like, a drop box in the -- inside the hangar.

Q. And can you do that anonymously?
A. Yes, I believe so.
Q. Okay. Have you ever submitted a safety report?
A. I did once if I remember correctly.
Q. Can you tell us the nature of that report?
A. There's this one incident where they're giving us this airplane where the pressurization has a problem. So, we didn't want to take the airplane because it's really hurting our ears, so, we had to write a safety report. But we didn't fly that plane because they said it's flyable, but we didn't really want to fly it because the pressurization issue is consistent on that one.
Q. Okay. So, you -- the Captain you were with and you decided to decline the airplane?
A. Yeah.
Q. And then you filed the safety report and what happened after that?
A. I can't remember what happened after that. But technically we didn't fly it that day. So, if -- I believe another crew came in to fly, but I don't remember who -- which crew came in.
Q. Okay. What -- how -- when did that happen?
A. That's tough -- maybe last year.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And who were you flying with that day?
A. I was flying with Victor Antonov.
Q. Antonov?
A. Yeah.
Q. Like the airplane?
A. Yes.
Q. Did anybody reach out to you afterward about the safety report?

A. Nobody reached out to me.

Q. Okay. So, you don't -- do you know if anything was done about it?

A. Well, I don't even remember which plane was that one because, you know, I know for these airplanes one will have an EPR problem, the next day the other has an EPR problem, so.

Q. Yeah, this was a 73, right?

A. Yeah, 737-200. Yeah.

Q. All right. Do you feel supported by management and able to make safety related decisions as a pilot without fear of repercussions?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you receive any punishment or did anything negative happen as a result of your declining that airplane?

A. No, not really.

Q. So, just to clarify, you said no, not really, did anything negative happen? Is it no or is it --

A. Oh, no.

Q. Okay. All right.

A. It's firmly no.

Q. All right. Do you feel pressure from company management to do things that you feel are unsafe?

A. No, I can decline whenever I want. So, if -- yeah.

Q. Okay, and do you have any -- oops, I already asked you that I believe. Did I ask you do you have any safety related concerns about the company? I know you mentioned the ground crew.

A. Yeah, that's it.

Q. Okay. All right, anything else you want to mention in that area --

A. No.

Q. -- in terms of safety issues, concerns?

A. No.
Q. Okay, and how confident are you in the quality of the maintenance at the company?
A. Personally, no, not much confidence on the maintenance side.
Q. Okay, and why is that?
A. A lot of the stuff that are getting written off are -- you know, they just sign it off with no real, I don't know, fix on the problem. So, there are electronic writeups too.
Q. Okay. Is there -- can you give an example of why you think that? Like, is there a particular issue you've seen recur before that --
A. They usually say they are waiting for parts, you know.
Q. Is there something besides the nose gear shimmy and the hot -- the slightly elevated EGTs on the Dash-9 that you've notice that it involves a recurring issue where it seems like they're not fixing it and they say they're waiting for parts?
A. Let's see -- we had an issue with the center fuel tank before on that airplane too. So, it's showing that it has fuel, but if you try to turn on the pumps, the pumps are not pumping anything.
Q. Okay. What airplane was that do you recall?
A. 810.
Q. Okay. How long ago was that issue a problem?
A. It's just this year too.
Q. Okay, sometime this year?
A. Uh huh.
Q. Was it, like, within the last month or more like longer ago than that?
A. Probably longer ago than that.
Q. Okay. Any other recurring issues that you can think of that seem particularly noteworthy?
A. No.
MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, I'm going to pass the baton to Shawn, thanks.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. You doing okay, need a break?

A. Yeah, I'm okay.

Q. You're sure?

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. Thank you so much. So far, you've kind of helped me understand from a pilot's standpoint, so, I appreciate that.

A. Uh huh.

Q. I have a few questions, so, forgive if you've answered them, but it didn't sink in. So, please just educate me if you will. I noticed you've been here, I think you said, since 2016?

A. Yeah.

Q. When do you expect to upgrade?

A. When do I expect to upgrade?

Q. Uh huh.

A. I don't expect to upgrade anytime soon.

Q. Do you want to upgrade?

A. Oh, I want to, yeah. But I don't expect to upgrade soon.

Q. How do they determine who upgrades?

A. That, I don't know.

Q. That, you don't know?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. How would you categorize staffing -- pilot staffing here? Do you feel like there's enough pilots? Do you feel like they're short staffed?

A. Right now, actually, we're -- we have enough FOs. I think the Captain side, they're short, though.

Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you, as a first officer, refuse to fly with a captain?
A. Can I? I think I can, but I haven't done it yet.
Q. Okay. Is there any captain you would rather not fly with if you could help it?
A. Oh, yeah. But I would still fly for them.
Q. Okay.
A. You know, it's part of the job.
Q. But you said oh, yeah, so, give me an example of why you necessarily wouldn't want to fly with someone?
A. Just because, you know, you kind of don't like some of the attitudes but I would still fly for them, you know. We're all professional.
Q. Okay. Can a captain refuse you?
A. I think they can.
Q. Have you ever been refused?
A. Luckily not.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Have you heard of anybody being refused?
A. No.
Q. Okay. I know when I've flown in the past, there's always planes, when I saw they're on my line I dreaded it because I didn't like the plane, it didn't like me, whatever. Do you have any planes here that you'd rather not fly in for whatever reason?
A. No, not really. No.
Q. Okay.

A. I mean, I fly all of them, so.

Q. Okay. How many planes are there, do you know?

A. There are -- I think one is in Taiwan right now. We have 810, 306, 326, and 809 here in Honolulu, and I think 306 is on the maintenance hangar. So, we have three and then the 810, so, we have two right now.

Q. Okay. All right, and that's just here in Honolulu?

A. Uh huh.

Q. But companywide, how many 737s?

A. Five, I think.

Q. Five?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. You said 810 has a -- I think you said it was -- let me get the right phrase -- within limits but pushing the yellow?

A. Uh huh.

Q. So, when was it getting up towards the yellow? Was it just on takeoff? Was it climbing?

A. Oh, on takeoff -- most notably on takeoff.

Q. Okay. Was that, like, a normal full power takeoff? Was that a --

A. No, that's a reduced --

Q. It was?

A. That's a reduced take off.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Make sure you let him finish his questions before you answer.

MR. MERCADO: Oh, I will. Sorry -- I'm sorry.

MR. ETCHER: He's reading my mind.

MR. MERCADO: I'm sorry.

MR. ETCHER: No, you're good.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He doesn't want to step over your question, you don't want step over his.

MR. MERCADO: Exactly, I'm sorry.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So, it was a reduced thrust takeoff?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Do you always -- let me rephrase that, not you. Does the airline always want you to do a reduced thrust takeoff, or do you guys do normal takeoff powers?

A. Most of the time we use reduced takeoff thrusts.

Q. Okay. How do you figure reduced takeoff thrust, or is it provided to you?

A. We figure it out on our runway -- our ramp book.

Q. Okay.

A. So, yeah, temperature and stuff like that; the weight of the aircraft. So, we come up with those numbers.

Q. Okay. So, you -- back to the yellow, it was within limits but into the yellow or pushing yellow. If it goes into the yellow, is there a timeframe it can be in the yellow before --

A. I kind of confuse it with the yellow line on our limits. I think oil, it can be, like, at 15 minutes. But in the yellow, I can't really answer you perfectly on that one.

Q. Okay, and that's okay. I don't know -- this isn't a check, right. So, it's okay.

A. I know.

Q. No problem. So, it was pushing in the yellow, was there any other gauge indication showing, you know, getting towards the upper limits or lower limits?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. When would you look -- you know, you noticed they were in the yellow, what drew your attention to it? Was it a light -- a caution light? Was it -- what drew your attention to notice that it was getting into the yellow?

A. Oh, whenever we, you know, set takeoff thrusts, you know, like, if I'm taking off, I'm just going to set it up to whatever EPR setting we have, I kind of glance down. So, then after we take off and I ask for climb power, and I noticed that those needles are on the yellow -- or getting yellow.

Q. Okay.

A. So, yeah.

Q. Okay. You use the term when you flew with the Captain.

A. Uh huh.

Q. You used the term a faster preflight.

A. Uh huh.

Q. What do you mean by a faster preflight?

A. I just walk fast.

Q. Okay.

A. But I didn't skip any preflight item, you know.

Q. When you do a preflight do you -- I mean, it's nighttime, so I guess you have a flashlight in your hand?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you also have a checklist in your hand, or you just -- you've done it enough to know?

A. I've done it. We don't carry checklists during the exterior preflight.

Q. All right. Have you ever written up an aircraft?

A. I think I did, but I don't remember what I've written up.

Q. Is it okay for a first officer to do maintenance writeups?

A. I think we can.

Q. Okay.

A. So, I did once if I remember correctly. But I don't remember the writeup, though.

Q. Okay. If you were the Captain who wrote up an aircraft, and I think you said the next day you'll come in and you'll look to see what they did to fix it?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Do you always look, or is it just the Captain that looks at how they cleared the writeup?

A. Oh, it's usually the Captain that checks it and I kind of trust the Captain. But sometimes I kind of check too. So -- I can't remember what kind of write up that would've been. Oh, one of the time they just -- for example, the pressurization issue, if they have written that up the next day, their plane can still fly, so if they're waiting for a part they're just going to defer it.

Q. Okay. Do you get a lot of deferrals on your airplanes?

A. Yeah, we do.

Q. Okay. How do you, as a first officer, know that something is deferred?

A. For example, like, the issue of pressurization, they defer the whole system, so we're going to fly unpressurized.

Q. Okay. So --

A. Or I'll check on the -- oh, sorry.

Q. No, please. Go ahead.

A. I'll also check the MELs, make sure, you know, it's actually deferrable.

Q. Okay. So, you go out to the airplane to do a precheck, can you just look at the inside of the

airplane and see if something is deferred? Or is it only just located in the maintenance logbook?

A. Oh, no, there are stickers on the -- whatever equipment is deferred.

Q. Okay.

A. Or MEL'd.

Q. Okay. So, it kind of sounds like you guys do kind of the same flights typically, is that a pretty close, accurate statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. I know sometimes when I would do kind of the same flight over and over again it kind of gets redundant, you kind of get used to doing it. Do you guys, at every flight, pull out a checklist?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you do a thorough briefing? Do you -- you know, kind of walk me through a normal flight.

A. Yeah, so, come in today, come in to check in with dispatch and I usually -- captain usually comes up. In my experience the Captain always shows up first. So, he's been briefed by the dispatch already, and, you know, he's going to brief me of what's wrong -- or what's MEL on the aircraft, you know, or what limitations we have on that aircraft because of those MELs. Then after that, weather -- usually Hawaii weather is really good, so I come -- I personally go -- I ask the Captain that I'm -- I'll tell the Captain that I'm going to check the airplane and I do my preflight, wait for the Captain, he does his. So, after that we do our checklists as profiled.

Q. Okay. Is there any point in that checklist where you guys talk about your takeoff and what to expect and when to --

A. Yes. There's a brief phase part on the checklist.

Q. Okay.

A. So, that -- brief what we're going to do in an emergency, if we need to come back, which

runway or with -- you know, whichever runway is the best to land.

Q. Okay. I think Bill had asked you about declining an airplane, and you guys said that the pressurization one that you declined, and I was -- you said there was nothing -- there's no punishment for declining an airplane, right?

A. I didn't get any.

Q. Okay. If you refuse an airplane and you're not doing that flight, do they take it out of your pay?

A. No.

Q. No? There's no pay loss?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Have you ever heard of anybody having any punitive issues or declining?

A. Punitive?

Q. Punishment of any kind?

A. Oh, okay. No, not that I can think of.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. How would you classify the training here? Do you feel like it made you well prepared to fly the line?

A. Training, yeah. I mean, ground school is really good, the SIM is hard with Wallace. So -- he wants us -- he's always pushing us to be, you know, be ready for any emergency. So, SIM and ground school is good.

Q. How does he always push you to be ready for anything?

A. Oh, he's going to give us anything in the SIM.

Q. Okay.

A. I've seen one training session where he failed one of the reversers in flight, so the buckets

went out then he lost hydraulic to. At the end of the approach, he lost the -- I think he lost the generators too, so it went black. So, that's how he trains us.

Q. Okay. So, does he give you multiple failures? Is that kind of how trains, giving you multiple failures in the simulator? Or does he -- at a time, or is it just, like, one failure and then you work it, and then another failure later?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Did he do your IOE?

A. Yes.

Q. So, he does both the SIM and the IOE?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay. Is there anybody else?

A. Right now there's one more, Ed Rinsma, he's a check airman, so he's doing the IOEs, too.

Q. Okay. All right, and during training in the simulator, pilots know you're going to get a V1 cut, it's going to happen in a lot of simulators, right?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Has it happened -- did it happen to you?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. When you got a V1 cut, it's on the runway and you take it off, and get airborne, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Have you ever lost an engine in the simulator or in real life after the airplane has left the ground, but before a thousand feet?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that -- was that in real life or in the simulator?

A. Oh, in the simulator.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, the simulator.
Q. Okay. So, what was that like?
A. Because it's a SIM you're kind of ready.
Q. Okay.
A. So, it was -- I did okay. So, I was able to climb and do what we're briefed on a V1 failure -- or after a V1 failure.
Q. Okay. In the simulator, are all of your flights simulated out of Honolulu?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Uh huh.
Q. All right. Have you ever seen birds on takeoff coming out of here?
A. Yes.
Q. Big birds, little birds? Help me understand the birds?
A. Both. We have owls sometimes, small birds -- a lot of small birds on the airport.
Q. Have you ever hit on in flight or on takeoff?
A. On landing.
Q. On landing?
A. Yeah.
Q. And what did that do?
A. Oh, it killed the bird.
Q. Did it hurt the engine? I mean, damage the airplane?
A. No, not the airplane.
Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.
Q. All right. As part of your training did you get CRM?
A. Yes.
Q. How was that?
A. CRM are -- CRM training for our company, I can say it's good. I mean, I've been working with all -- with CRM pilots, so I can't complain in that one.
Q. Okay. Is the training you got in the -- I think you -- and correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you said you flew the Shorts 360 here?
A. Uh huh.
Q. Was your training in that any different -- besides the airplane, but was there any expectations different in the 73 versus the 360?
A. Yes. I mean, we're more systematic on the Boeing side, I would say.
Q. And what do you mean by that?
A. Oh, I don't know. It's really hard to compare those two sides. But we have more training on the Boeing. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Did you get CRM training in the Shorts?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Is it the same CRM?
A. It's different.
Q. Oh, is it?
A. Yeah.
Q. Different good? Different bad? Just different?
A. Just different.
Q. Okay. The night of the -- the night before the accident when you flew with the Captain -- the accident captain, how would you classify his checklist usage?

A. Complete, like, from before start -- or before takeoff -- or before start checklist all the way to after landing checklist -- or parking checklist.

Q. Was it always he pulled out the checklist card and went line by line, or was it off his memory?

A. No, he -- I'm the one reading the checklist, so he's checking. I'm checking too, so making sure that everything's being hit by the checklist.

Q. Is it -- when you read the checklist are you talking about just on the ground or are you also talking in flight?

A. In flight. Well, I mean ground and in flight.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you always read the checklist in flight if you're the pilot flying, or is that the pilot monitoring?

A. The pilot monitoring is the one reading the checklist.

Q. Okay. Did you get to do any of the flight -- when you flew with the accident captain did you actually -- were you the pilot flying on any of those flights?

A. Yes, I've flown both legs.

Q. Okay. But on that night -- in 810 the night before the accident or however -- that time you got to fly with him, did you actually fly one of the legs as the pilot flying, or were you both -- pilot monitoring on both legs?

A. No. I remember correctly, I was flying both legs. So, I was pilot flying both legs.

Q. Is that normal?

A. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. I think you've helped me a lot, so I appreciate that.

MR. MERCADO: Uh huh.

MR. ETCHER: Back to you, Bill, or do you want to go around?

MR. BRAMBLE: Let's go around and give them a shot.

MR. LEE: Sure, I have questions.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. You're talking about the engines on 810, how they creep up in the yellow band, is it both, are they symmetrical, is one worse than the other, do you remember?

A. I think one is a little better than the other. I think the right is a little better on the -- compared to the left one, but I'm not a hundred percent sure.

Q. Okay. As far as the reduced thrust takeoffs, have you ever done, like, a bleeds off takeoff, you know, on a normal -- it's not deferred, it's the systems operating on all. Do you ever do bleeds off takeoff?

A. I'm trying to recollect my thoughts. A bleeds off takeoff, those are, like, the max takeoff? Is that what you're talking about?

Q. Yeah, the max off takeoff.

A. No, I don't remember.

Q. Do you think 810 can do a full-rated takeoff? Could it -- I mean, everything's reduced thrust and then it seemed like you're saying you have to reduced thrust takeoff after you climbed out and got into the yellow band. Do you think that if you did the full-rated takeoff on an 810 -- what would you think would happen to the EGTs on a normal full-rated takeoff, not reduced thrust?

A. I mean, if it's hitting the yellow just on reduced, I don't think we can -- yeah, I think it's going to push it.

Q. Yeah, okay. As far as takeoff flap setting, what can you tell me about what flap settings you would use? Is it different between airplanes for your takeoff? What's --

A. We usually takeoff flaps two on -- in Honolulu, and then we'll take off flaps five on the

airports.

MR. LEE: Okay. That's all I have. Thank you.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, Clarence?

MR. KANAE: Thanks.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Yeah, Kim, you mentioned earlier that you had some concerns about the ramp personnel. Could you explain that again, please?

A. Oh, because sometimes they -- the ramp guys, like, for example, the same thing that I said earlier, when we're pulling into the hangar, we need a wing walker and a lead marshal that's leading us in. But sometimes they're not there, so we just stop there, and we'll be waiting. Sometimes they use flashlights instead of the real wands, so we still don't move and that's happening. So, that's one.

Q. Okay, great. Thanks for clarifying that.

A. Yeah.

Q. Also, too, is it part of the company's procedure that you or the Captain monitor the loading of the aircraft -- cargo loading.

A. Yeah, if the load supervisor is not available, we can actually make sure that the aircraft's being loaded properly.

Q. And this is both outside of Honolulu and in Honolulu?

A. I believe so.

Q. Okay, and then lastly, on the last flight of the day after you get done flying, are the aircraft refueled?

A. Are the aircraft refueled? I'm not sure, like, on the last flight of the day? That, I'm not sure. But every time we land, I see the fueler fill our aircraft. So, I can't really tell you if, you know, they fuel it after the end of the flight -- or end of the day.

MR. KANAE: All right.

MR. MERCADO: Yeah.

MR. KANAE: That's all I have, Kim. Thank you very much.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. I just have a couple cleanups and then one other thing to ask about. So, you corrected yourself, you recalled that you were the pilot flying during the flights -- the out and back that you did with the Captain on July 1st?

A. Yeah.

Q. And so, I'm just curious how the checklist worked on that flight. Did he read them and then --

A. Yeah, he did read them.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And then you were checking while he read them?

A. Well, not in flight. I mean, in flight I was the pilot flying, but on the ground, I was the -- reading the checklist and he's the one checking.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And so, we have pictures of the engine -- the EGT gauges.

A. Uh huh.

Q. And I was wondering, you know, if I was to show you this picture, there is a cursor here and you can actually mark on the -- by pressing on here you can actually mark on the gauge, you know, by kind of drawing with the pointer. You won't see it until you release the button on the pad.

MR. KATT: Can you a little more light on that screen?

MR. MERCADO: Yeah, it's kind of --

MR. BRAMBLE: Yeah, let me make it lighter.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. And what I'm after basically is just to -- since we don't have -- I don't know if we'll have FDRs and I don't know how detailed -- how many data frames -- or how many parameters that we're going to have. So, I was wondering if maybe you could give us an idea of how far up in the yellow you were kind of seeing that on takeoff if you can recall?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay, if you can't recall that specifically then that's fine. But I thought maybe if you looked at it you could give us something we could tell our systems people in case it's relevant, I don't know if it's relevant. All right, brightness. Okay, that's too bright. That's washing the color right out. Okay, that's better. All right.

Yeah, so, first, I guess just take a look and see if you can visualize it, and if not, if you feel like you can't recall well enough then we won't have you mark it or anything. But if you think you have an idea of kind of the range it was up into, maybe the peaks you were seeing, then it would be great if we could make some kind of indication on there so I can share it with the systems investigators.

A. Yeah, this is a little different.

Q. Oh, yes, I should clarify. So, this is actually the sister ship, 809, it's not the same as -- same airplane. If this looks like a different display, I can pull that one up, we have some old pictures of 810, but they're not as good. So, if this looks different, I can show you what we have for that.

A. Yeah.

Q. Let me pull that up and see if it looks more familiar.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay, is there an EGT gauge? Unfortunately, no, there is not a picture here showing EGT. Yeah, sorry. I don't think we have exactly what we need for an 810, so if those look like they're not the same then --

A. Yeah, they're kind of --

MR. BRAMBLE: Then we won't talk about that.

Shawn, do you have anything else you'd like to ask?

MR. ETCHER: I just have a few and it won't take long, I hope.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Did you fly the night of the accident?

A. I did.

Q. What were you flying?

A. I was flying 809, I think.

Q. Did you hear the accident crew on departure? Were you --

A. Oh, I'm sorry, I was thinking about July 1st.

Q. Oh, my apologies.

A. So, this is July 2nd, the night of accident. Yes, I was flying with Amin in 809.

Q. Okay.

A. So, we were on approach and then I heard them take off -- and then when we were on a visual approach to runway four right. And Henry didn't really declare an emergency, although that kind of says it when he said they had an engine fail there. So, immediately Tower told us to get out of the way, so we got back there at op, and -- yeah, I was there.

Q. Okay. Did you see the airplane at all?

A. We saw them took off. (Verbatim) We saw the light -- I mean, their landing lights were on, so we saw the aircraft took off.

Q. Did you see anything abnormal? I know it's dark and all that but --

A. No, not really.

Q. Okay.

A. All we see was -- we saw was light. Then after that we got vectored out, so they were kind of on our tail so we couldn't see them after that.

Q. Okay. I know you guys fly a lot of the standard routes.

A. Yes.

Q. What would be a -- I hate to you the phrase, normal takeoff weight that you would expect on the route to Maui?

A. Depending on the aircraft, though. So, takeoff weight could range to about 85,000 to 100,000 takeoff weight depending on the aircraft.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Have you had a hundred-thousand-pound weights?

A. I did, yeah.

Q. How's the airplane feel?

A. Heavy.

Q. Heavy?

A. Yeah.

Q. Still performs okay?

A. Oh, yeah. It performs, but it's -- it climbs slower than when it's empty.

Q. Okay. I'm a little confused -- just -- and I should say confused, maybe it's just questions in my head. Takeoff flaps, is there a standard procedure for -- you always use flaps --

A. A standard procedure?

Q. Yeah.

A. We don't have a -- I don't think you can call it standard procedure. It's the Captain's

discretion of whatever flaps takeoff he wanted to go, you know. So, I'm just saying that we usually took -- takeoff from Honolulu with flaps two, and we take off from the other islands at flaps five.

Q. Does it matter if it's a Dash-9 engine, a Dash-15, or a Dash-17 engine with the flaps?

A. No.

Q. Have you seen captains vary depending on the engines, or --

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. Not really.

Q. Okay, last question I have. Loading pallets, cargo pallets versus the cargo cans?

A. Okay.

Q. Is there any specific loading requirements for a pallet? Like, can it only go in a certain zone?

A. No, but the pallets, they tie them on a cookie sheet.

Q. Okay.

A. So, that's pretty much the difference between the can and the --

Q. So, they could put a pallet clear in the most AF zone?

A. I've seen them done that before. (Verbatim)

Q. Okay. Do they teach you guys loading of the pallets to make sure there's certain -- is there certain things you can't put in certain areas?

A. I don't know.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. That's all I have. Thank you so much.

MR. MERCADO: Okay, yeah.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Okay. You mentioned about -- I think 810 had a center fuel tank?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Weren't your words, though, that there was fuel in the tank, and you'd turn the pumps on, and the pumps wouldn't pump?

A. Yeah.

Q. Can you -- do you remember any other detail about that?

A. I mean, it's difficult to say if there's anything different than that. It's just that it's showing fuel in there, but --

Q. About how much fuel?

A. About a thousand pounds.

Q. A thousand pounds?

A. Yeah.

MR. LEE: Okay, all right. That's all I had.

MR. BRAMBLE: Clarence?

MR. KANAE: Yeah, just a follow up.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. On the cargo itself, do you know what kind of bulk cargo that you all carry on the bottom of the aircraft -- in the bay area of the aircraft? I mean, or did you mail --

A. Chickens.

Q. Chickens?

A. Yeah, that's it. That's the constant, or newspaper.

Q. Okay, I was just wondering if you --

A. Yeah.

Q. And that's noted also on your manifest?

A. Yeah, it's -- yeah.

Q. It just gets weights or descriptions?

A. Description and weights.

MR. KANAE: Oh, interesting. Okay, thank you.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. I mean, I actually -- I think I found a picture that is better. There is a picture of the actual airplane from 2016 and -- so if this helps you give us an idea of how hot it might've reading. I also have it set up so that you can mark it with the mouse pointer tip, if you want to, with yellow. But just take a look at the EGT gauges and see if you have any memory of what you were seeing in terms of, you know, what was it going up to on takeoff?

A. Okay. Oh, I'm trying to zoom, but it wouldn't.

Q. Unfortunately, you can't. Yeah, I can crop it and zoom it more if you like? Do you want me to make it bigger?

A. Yeah, if you could.

Q. It'll be blurry, but it'll be bigger. Okay. It's bigger and it's set to mark it up if you so desire.

A. Okay. All right, it's probably around -- this is five, ten, 20. Probably about around 515.

Q. All right. Can you make -- just click the very point of the mouse tip in that area and then release it because you won't see it when you click it until you release it? Did it work? Maybe try a little more to the left side of the pad?

MR. KATT: Bottom left of the pad is where the little --

MR. BRAMBLE: You might have to drag it a little bit while you're pressing the button to make a line. I found it kind of difficult to use, so you if you need to do it over, I can zero it out. Is that roughly --

MR. LEE: Can we describe for the record where that is?

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Yeah, so, what I see on here is that you were seeing it on almost two ticks above the five on

the left side, is that right? Two tick marks above the five almost?

A. Almost two.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And then --

A. It's like between the ten and 20 lights.

Q. Okay. Oops, I'm looking at the wrong thing, I'm sorry. No, wait. No, that's right. Okay, and about one tick above the five on the right-hand side, is that correct?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. All right, thanks, I appreciate that. That will be helpful. Okay, so, I think that concludes the questioning. We have just a couple of close-out questions that we usually ask. One is, is there anything that we haven't asked you about that you think is -- that you'd like to tell us that you think would be relevant?

A. I don't know.

Q. Okay. Is there anything that you particularly think would -- anyone that you think we should be sure to speak with that you --

A. No, I can't really think of anyone.

Q. Okay. Do you have any suggestions for safety improvements that you want to relay to us?

A. No. Yeah.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, thanks for your time, and we will go off the record at 3:52, Hawaii Standard Time.

(Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Kim Mercado
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	July 5, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Carolyn Hanna
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
	*	

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Interview of: KIM MERCADO, First Officer

Rhoades Aviation/TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday,
July 5, 2021

APPEARANCES:

WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operations Factor Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

WILLIAM KATT, Attorney
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

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INTERVIEW

(2:42 p.m.)

MR. BRAMBLE: -- an interview with Kim Mercado, and it is 2:42 p.m., Hawaii Standard Time on July 5th. Okay, my name is Bill Bramble, and I'm a human performance investigator with the NTSB. Mr. Shawn Etcher and I are leading the operations in human performance working group for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174 involved Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA, and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers. I would now like to have Mr. Shawn Etcher and each of the group members briefly introduce themselves.

Mr. Etcher?

MR. ETCHER: Good afternoon, my name is Shawn Etcher, I'm an operational factors investigator. Thanks for coming in.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, and I'm a safety pilot for Boeing.

MR. KANAE: I'm Clarence Kanae, aviation safety inspector with the Honolulu Certificate Management Office.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. We're going to -- we're using a digital recorder, and after the interview we'll send that recorder -- that recording out for transcription, and the party members will have an opportunity to review that transcription to correct it for any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault, we're here simply for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, we can't offer any guarantee of confidentiality of the interview or immunity, and the transcription of the interview will eventually be part of the

public docket for the accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions, we're going to ask them one person at a time, and everyone's been instructed not to interrupt the person that's asking the questions. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person has had a turn. Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so, and if you realize you misstated something or want to correct something, please do.

You're entitled to have one representative of your choosing, is there someone that you would like to have as your representative?

MR. MERCADO: I'll have Mr. Bill Katt to represent me.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, can you state your name?

MR. KATT: William J. Katt from Wilson Elser Law Firm.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, thank you.

And does anyone have any questions before we begin?

MR. MERCADO: I don't.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right. With that being said, we will begin with the questions. I'm going to start this time.

INTERVIEW OF KIM MERCADO

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Can you please tell us your full name?

A. My name is Kim Mercado.

Q. Okay, and can you spell your last name, please?

A. Mercado, M-E-R-C-A-D-O.

Q. Okay, and how old are you?

A. I am 30 years old.

Q. Okay, and what's your job title at TransAir?
A. I'm a first officer on a 737 Department 21 side of the Trans Rhoades.
Q. Okay, and what was your date of hire with TransAir -- or Rhoades?
A. July something of 2016.
Q. Okay. What are your roles and responsibilities as a first officer?
A. I'm here to assist the Captain to the best of my ability, to fly -- safely the aircraft.
Q. Any other positions or roles at the company?
A. No, that's it.
Q. Okay, and can you give a brief overview of your aviation background that led to your working at Rhoades?
A. I did my private here in Hawaii, then moved to Vegas to finish up all my ratings, my instrument, my multi-engine add-on, my multi-commercial over there, too. Then went back here to Hawaii, got hired on the short side of TransAir, and then from there I built up my time and experience. Then when I got the experience needed, I moved into the Boeing.
Q. Okay, and do you work for -- do you currently work for any other employer besides TransAir?
A. No.
Q. And give us a brief overview of your current certificates and ratings?
A. I am type rated on the Shorts 360, I'm also type rated on the Boeing 737, and I'm -- I have an ATP certificate.
Q. Okay. What's your estimated total of flight time in big round numbers?
A. Right now, it's about, maybe 2700.
Q. Okay, how much of that is 737 time?
A. Roughly, maybe about 1100.
Q. Okay, and how long ago were your typed on the 7-3?

A. 2000 -- and let's see -- I think I was typed on 2008 -- no, '19.

Q. '19.

A. Yeah, '18 or '19.

Q. Okay, '18 or '19.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. It's our understanding that you flew with Captain Henry Okai on July 1st, 2021. Can you please describe for us what you recall about flying with him that day?

A. Well -- yeah, that day I was originally scheduled to fly with Shawn Morgan (ph.), which is the other captain, and then on Henry's last trip to Maui, I was switched to him. So, the FO that Henry was flying with, I got switched with that FO, so I flew with him. So, that day he was, you know, kind of mad because of -- he got paired on the FO that he didn't really want to fly with, so, when he saw me, he kind of felt relaxed and, you know -- I don't know what is the right word, but he felt comfortable, I guess. So, then all throughout the flight it was okay, so, no issues about him doing anything unsafe, so.

Q. Okay, and you said he got kind of mad because he got bared by the FO, what does that mean?

A. Bare?

MR. KATT: Paired.

MR. LEE: Paired.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Oh, paired? Oh, I'm sorry.

A. Paired, yeah.

Q. Okay. So, he didn't like flying -- why wasn't he happy about flying with that FO, and why were you swapped with him?

A. Well, I'm not really sure because I don't really know the FO. But he told me about, you

know, that the other FO wasn't being professional, and knowing Henry, I know even if he doesn't like the person, as long as both are professional, he's okay.

Q. Uh huh.

A. So.

Q. Did he tell you anything more about the nature of the disagreement, or the conflict, or the --

A. No.

Q. -- behavior he didn't like?

A. Not really.

Q. Okay. Were you on reserve? Like, how did you get selected to go?

A. Oh, I was flying that day too. So, I was on the -- let's see, I think I was on the second show. They were on the -- I was on the second show, and they were on the first show. So, I think they already did two Maui round trips, and they have a third Maui round trip. So, at the third one I jumped in and switched with the FO.

Q. Okay. Did you have any conversation with the FO at that time?

A. No.

Q. Did you see her or him?

A. No, I didn't see -- I saw Henry, but I didn't see the FO because our plane -- our original plane was already to go, so the FO jumped right straight to the plane. So, I was in dispatch at that time.

Q. Okay.

A. So, I didn't really see her.

Q. Okay.

MR. KATT: Did you get a date on this? I didn't --

MR. BRAMBLE: July 1st is the date we're talking about.

MR. KATT: Okay. I'm sorry, I missed it.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. All right. So, the flight that you had with Henry was a flight to Maui, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. And about what time of day was that?

A. I can't remember the exact time, but when we got back it's daylight already. So, I'm not -- I don't know what time is it exactly.

Q. Yeah, I'm sure we can get the schedule, I just wanted to confirm that the schedule matches the general timeframe of the call.

A. Okay, yeah.

Q. So, it's sort of, like, the end of the night into the day?

A. Yeah, that's our last flight.

Q. Okay.

A. Of that day.

Q. Okay, and do you recall anything unusual about the flight?

A. Unusual? No, not really.

Q. Okay. Do you recall what airplane it was?

A. Oh, it was the same airplane, 810.

Q. And did the airplane appear to be operating normally?

A. Yes, within limits, I would say.

Q. Was there anything that was approaching limits or -- so, that was unusual, or --

A. The engines are a little hot, but they're not -- I mean, they're still below the yellow line, so --

Q. Okay. Would you say they were -- I'm going to defer to you guys on the technical aspects on that. Do you have a recollection of any particular recurring issues with that airplane that you

can think of?

A. 810 -- well, 810 the shimming down for that one is always an issue on the nose gear. Yeah, that's pretty much what I can think of in the engines. So, they're -- yeah, they're -- well, actually most of them are always like that.

Q. Most of the --

A. I meant most of the time that I fly with that 810, yeah.

Q. With the 810? Okay, so, the shimming issue on the nose gear and then the engines being in the yellow area?

A. No, they're not in the yellow. It's just barely in the yellow.

Q. Okay.

A. But, you know, that's almost hitting the limits on the yellow side, that's it.

Q. Okay, and that's the engine gas temperature indication?

A. EGT, yeah.

Q. Okay. Have you heard any explanations for why it was reading like that?

A. No, not a really good explanation. Yeah, no, I don't recall any explanation with that because usually the Captains are the ones talking to, you know, the mechanics. They usually write them up and then the next day we just read what they answered back.

Q. Okay, and did you ever see that being written up?

A. Yeah.

Q. And did you ever see what was written back by maintenance?

A. I couldn't give you an exact answer on that one.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you observe that in other 737s operated by the company?

A. Yes, but I couldn't remember which aircraft are those (ph.).

Q. Okay. Do you recall whether they were other airplanes with Dash-9 engines, or --

A. Let's see -- no, I think 810 is the only one that has a Dash-9.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, I think 810 is the only one that has Dash-9.

Q. Okay. Did you do a preflight inspection on that airplane?

A. On that day?

Q. Uh huh.

A. Like, July 1st?

Q. Uh huh.

A. I did a quick walkaround, yeah.

Q. So, that walkaround, was it a shorter one than you would do at the beginning of the day because it was already --

A. I wouldn't say it's shorter, but I would say I did it faster than normal. But I pretty much checked everything that I would check on the regular one.

Q. Okay. I didn't know if the procedure was abbreviated for subsequent flights or now. Do you recall seeing anything on the outside of the plane that looked amiss?

A. No, not in the -- not on that day.

Q. Okay, and did you see something amiss on the other days? I'm just checking because you said not on that day, like --

A. Oh, I mean I've seen some fluids leaking on the tire, so, that's one.

Q. Which tire?

A. Let's see -- probably the left tire.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you recall what type of fluid it was?

A. No, I don't recall.
Q. Is this something that had been written up or addressed?
A. That, I'm not too sure, though.
Q. Okay. Do you recall if the airplane had any writeups or MEL items when you arrived to operate it with Henry?
A. MELS, no. I don't remember any significant writeup, you know, that would make me kind of ask Henry what's wrong with the airplane or something.
Q. Okay. All right, have you ever experienced an in-flight emergency while working at Rhoades?
A. Me, personally, no.
Q. Were you thinking of somebody else had one?
A. Oh, Henry.
Q. Henry, is there -- you're thinking of the day of the accident?
A. Yeah, well he had one -- he declared -- well, he did an aborted takeoff before because one of the aircraft -- I forgot with the 326, one of the aircraft -- so, I think the engine blew or something, so, he aborted that one.
Q. Okay. Any others you've heard about recently?
A. Recently, well, he made a -- no, that's it.
Q. The aborted takeoff with 326, how long ago was that, roughly?
A. Today is July -- maybe about January, February, something like that.
Q. Of which year?
A. This year.
Q. Okay. All right, how well do you know Henry Okai?
A. Oh, I've flown with him since he got hired. So, I -- I'm not sure what year he got hired because people here come and go. So -- but ever since he got hired I've been flying with him.

Q. Is it fair to say you've flown with him many times?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Okay, and are you friends outside of work?

A. No.

Q. Okay. How would you describe his capabilities as a pilot in general as opposed to other captains with the company?

A. He's pretty solid, that's what I can definitely say about him. He's more of the cautious captain I would say because he -- compared to the other captains he's the slowest, I would say. Slowest in a way that he checks everything first, you know, he wouldn't start the left engine right away after starting number two, you know. So, yeah, he's thorough. He's a checklist guy, definitely a checklist guy.

Q. You think he'd be able to think on his feet if something unexpected happened?

A. Yeah, definitely. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Did other pilots like flying with him?

A. I can't really say that for myself. But personally, I like flying with him.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And, so, summarizing what you said it sounded like he was cautious, checked everything first, and was a checklist guy. Is there anything else you can say about sort of his command styles a captain, and how he interacted with you as a first officer?

A. He's very professional with me, very polite when asking, you know, he's very open on suggestions, too.

Q. Okay. Did he appear healthy and alert before you departed on that flight?

A. Yes.

Q. And how did he perform during that flight?

A. I don't know what to call that. But normal, I guess.

Q. Okay. How do you like working for Rhoades?

A. Me?

Q. Uh huh.

A. Oh, I like working for Rhoades because the boss gave me so much opportunity, so, I kind of feel grateful for that.

Q. How's the pay compared to what other 737 FOs make?

A. I'm sorry, can you repeat that again?

Q. How's the pay compare -- how much you get paid?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Is it about the same as other FOs at other companies that fly the --

A. Oh, I don't know.

Q. Okay.

A. I wish I knew.

Q. And what do you like about working there and what's difficult about the job?

A. Well, I like working their schedule, you know. We get, like, a week off every, like, three weeks, so the fourth week is an off week. That's what I like.

Q. And what's difficult about it?

A. Something difficult about it is, I mean, this happened. That's difficult, you know. So, that's one.

Q. How would you describe Rhoades Aviation's organizational safety culture? What is the feeling around the company in terms of how it approaches managing safety? I'll leave it at that for now and see what you have to say about it.

A. Safety wise, let's see -- well, there are some stuff that, you know, I don't find, like, safe. (Verbatim) On -- like, on the cargo side, sometimes we're really short on the ground crew. So,

they just kind of just rumble around, you know, scatter around and stuff like people.

Q. They rumble around, scatter around stuff, what's that mean?

A. Oh, I mean it's very unorganized on, like, on the ramp side.

Q. I see.

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that something that has been discussed amongst the pilots and/or management, and do you know if there were any efforts to sort of address that issue?

A. Uh huh. I know it's been on the talk.

Q. Can you tell me more about that? Like, how has it been raised and how has it been discussed?

A. Oh, just for, like, a good example is when we're taxiing to the hangar, we've been told not to go in if we don't see all the marshalers (ph.) inside, so, you know, we just wait there until we see all the wing walkers come in.

Q. Okay. What company manager is responsible for managing safety at Rhoades?

A. I'm sorry, can you --

Q. Is there a point person at Rhoades for managing safety who's --

A. There's a director of safety.

Q. Okay, who's that?

A. I think that's Orlando Debrum.

Q. Okay, and is there a way for you to report a safety concern to the company if you have one?

A. Yes.

Q. What avenues are available to you?

A. We have an online safety report thing. They also have a paper one that you can sign -- or fill out and then put it in, like, a drop box in the -- inside the hangar.

Q. And can you do that anonymously?

A. Yes, I believe so.

Q. Okay. Have you ever submitted a safety report?

A. I did once if I remember correctly.

Q. Can you tell us the nature of that report?

A. There's this one incident where they're giving us this airplane where the pressurization has a problem. So, we didn't want to take the airplane because it's really hurting our ears, so, we had to write a safety report. But we didn't fly that plane because they said it's flyable, but we didn't really want to fly it because the pressurization issue is consistent on that one.

Q. Okay. So, you -- the Captain you were with and you decided to decline the airplane?

A. Yeah.

Q. And then you filed the safety report and what happened after that?

A. I can't remember what happened after that. But technically we didn't fly it that day. So, if -- I believe another crew came in to fly, but I don't remember who -- which crew came in.

Q. Okay. What -- how -- when did that happen?

A. That's tough -- maybe last year.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And who were you flying with that day?

A. I was flying with Victor Antonov.

Q. Antonov?

A. Yeah.

Q. Like the airplane?

A. Yes.

Q. Did anybody reach out to you afterward about the safety report?

A. Nobody reached out to me.

Q. Okay. So, you don't -- do you know if anything was done about it?

A. Well, I don't even remember which plane was that one because, you know, I know for these airplanes one will have an EPR problem, the next day the other has an EPR problem, so.

Q. Yeah, this was a 73, right?

A. Yeah, 737-200. Yeah.

Q. All right. Do you feel supported by management and able to make safety related decisions as a pilot without fear of repercussions?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you receive any punishment or did anything negative happen as a result of your declining that airplane?

A. No, not really.

Q. So, just to clarify, you said no, not really, did anything negative happen? Is it no or is it --

A. Oh, no.

Q. Okay. All right.

A. It's firmly no.

Q. All right. Do you feel pressure from company management to do things that you feel are unsafe?

A. No, I can decline whenever I want. So, if -- yeah.

Q. Okay, and do you have any -- oops, I already asked you that I believe. Did I ask you do you have any safety related concerns about the company? I know you mentioned the ground crew.

A. Yeah, that's it.

Q. Okay. All right, anything else you want to mention in that area --

A. No.

Q. -- in terms of safety issues, concerns?

A. No.
Q. Okay, and how confident are you in the quality of the maintenance at the company?
A. Personally, no, not much confidence on the maintenance side.
Q. Okay, and why is that?
A. A lot of the stuff that are getting written off are -- you know, they just sign it off with no real, I don't know, fix on the problem. So, there are electronic writeups too.
Q. Okay. Is there -- can you give an example of why you think that? Like, is there a particular issue you've seen recur before that --
A. They usually say they are waiting for parts, you know.
Q. Is there something besides the nose gear shimmy and the hot -- the slightly elevated EGTs on the Dash-9 that you've notice that it involves a recurring issue where it seems like they're not fixing it and they say they're waiting for parts?
A. Let's see -- we had an issue with the center fuel tank before on that airplane too. So, it's showing that it has fuel, but if you try to turn on the pumps, the pumps are not pumping anything.
Q. Okay. What airplane was that do you recall?
A. 810.
Q. Okay. How long ago was that issue a problem?
A. It's just this year too.
Q. Okay, sometime this year?
A. Uh huh.
Q. Was it, like, within the last month or more like longer ago than that?
A. Probably longer ago than that.
Q. Okay. Any other recurring issues that you can think of that seem particularly noteworthy?
A. No.
MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, I'm going to pass the baton to Shawn, thanks.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. You doing okay, need a break?

A. Yeah, I'm okay.

Q. You're sure?

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. Thank you so much. So far, you've kind of helped me understand from a pilot's standpoint, so, I appreciate that.

A. Uh huh.

Q. I have a few questions, so, forgive if you've answered them, but it didn't sink in. So, please just educate me if you will. I noticed you've been here, I think you said, since 2016?

A. Yeah.

Q. When do you expect to upgrade?

A. When do I expect to upgrade?

Q. Uh huh.

A. I don't expect to upgrade anytime soon.

Q. Do you want to upgrade?

A. Oh, I want to, yeah. But I don't expect to upgrade soon.

Q. How do they determine who upgrades?

A. That, I don't know.

Q. That, you don't know?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. How would you categorize staffing -- pilot staffing here? Do you feel like there's enough pilots? Do you feel like they're short staffed?

A. Right now, actually, we're -- we have enough FOs. I think the Captain side, they're short, though.

Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you, as a first officer, refuse to fly with a captain?
A. Can I? I think I can, but I haven't done it yet.
Q. Okay. Is there any captain you would rather not fly with if you could help it?
A. Oh, yeah. But I would still fly for them.
Q. Okay.
A. You know, it's part of the job.
Q. But you said oh, yeah, so, give me an example of why you necessarily wouldn't want to fly with someone?
A. Just because, you know, you kind of don't like some of the attitudes but I would still fly for them, you know. We're all professional.
Q. Okay. Can a captain refuse you?
A. I think they can.
Q. Have you ever been refused?
A. Luckily not.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Have you heard of anybody being refused?
A. No.
Q. Okay. I know when I've flown in the past, there's always planes, when I saw they're on my line I dreaded it because I didn't like the plane, it didn't like me, whatever. Do you have any planes here that you'd rather not fly in for whatever reason?
A. No, not really. No.
Q. Okay.

A. I mean, I fly all of them, so.

Q. Okay. How many planes are there, do you know?

A. There are -- I think one is in Taiwan right now. We have 810, 306, 326, and 809 here in Honolulu, and I think 306 is on the maintenance hangar. So, we have three and then the 810, so, we have two right now.

Q. Okay. All right, and that's just here in Honolulu?

A. Uh huh.

Q. But companywide, how many 737s?

A. Five, I think.

Q. Five?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. You said 810 has a -- I think you said it was -- let me get the right phrase -- within limits but pushing the yellow?

A. Uh huh.

Q. So, when was it getting up towards the yellow? Was it just on takeoff? Was it climbing?

A. Oh, on takeoff -- most notably on takeoff.

Q. Okay. Was that, like, a normal full power takeoff? Was that a --

A. No, that's a reduced --

Q. It was?

A. That's a reduced take off.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Make sure you let him finish his questions before you answer.

MR. MERCADO: Oh, I will. Sorry -- I'm sorry.

MR. ETCHER: He's reading my mind.

MR. MERCADO: I'm sorry.

MR. ETCHER: No, you're good.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: He doesn't want to step over your question, you don't want step over his.

MR. MERCADO: Exactly, I'm sorry.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So, it was a reduced thrust takeoff?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Do you always -- let me rephrase that, not you. Does the airline always want you to do a reduced thrust takeoff, or do you guys do normal takeoff powers?

A. Most of the time we use reduced takeoff thrusts.

Q. Okay. How do you figure reduced takeoff thrust, or is it provided to you?

A. We figure it out on our runway -- our ramp book.

Q. Okay.

A. So, yeah, temperature and stuff like that; the weight of the aircraft. So, we come up with those numbers.

Q. Okay. So, you -- back to the yellow, it was within limits but into the yellow or pushing yellow. If it goes into the yellow, is there a timeframe it can be in the yellow before --

A. I kind of confuse it with the yellow line on our limits. I think oil, it can be, like, at 15 minutes. But in the yellow, I can't really answer you perfectly on that one.

Q. Okay, and that's okay. I don't know -- this isn't a check, right. So, it's okay.

A. I know.

Q. No problem. So, it was pushing in the yellow, was there any other gauge indication showing, you know, getting towards the upper limits or lower limits?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. When would you look -- you know, you noticed they were in the yellow, what drew your attention to it? Was it a light -- a caution light? Was it -- what drew your attention to notice that it was getting into the yellow?

A. Oh, whenever we, you know, set takeoff thrusts, you know, like, if I'm taking off, I'm just going to set it up to whatever EPR setting we have, I kind of glance down. So, then after we take off and I ask for climb power, and I noticed that those needles are on the yellow -- or getting yellow.

Q. Okay.

A. So, yeah.

Q. Okay. You use the term when you flew with the Captain.

A. Uh huh.

Q. You used the term a faster preflight.

A. Uh huh.

Q. What do you mean by a faster preflight?

A. I just walk fast.

Q. Okay.

A. But I didn't skip any preflight item, you know.

Q. When you do a preflight do you -- I mean, it's nighttime, so I guess you have a flashlight in your hand?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you also have a checklist in your hand, or you just -- you've done it enough to know?

A. I've done it. We don't carry checklists during the exterior preflight.

Q. All right. Have you ever written up an aircraft?

A. I think I did, but I don't remember what I've written up.

Q. Is it okay for a first officer to do maintenance writeups?

A. I think we can.

Q. Okay.

A. So, I did once if I remember correctly. But I don't remember the writeup, though.

Q. Okay. If you were the Captain who wrote up an aircraft, and I think you said the next day you'll come in and you'll look to see what they did to fix it?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Do you always look, or is it just the Captain that looks at how they cleared the writeup?

A. Oh, it's usually the Captain that checks it and I kind of trust the Captain. But sometimes I kind of check too. So -- I can't remember what kind of write up that would've been. Oh, one of the time they just -- for example, the pressurization issue, if they have written that up the next day, their plane can still fly, so if they're waiting for a part they're just going to defer it.

Q. Okay. Do you get a lot of deferrals on your airplanes?

A. Yeah, we do.

Q. Okay. How do you, as a first officer, know that something is deferred?

A. For example, like, the issue of pressurization, they defer the whole system, so we're going to fly unpressurized.

Q. Okay. So --

A. Or I'll check on the -- oh, sorry.

Q. No, please. Go ahead.

A. I'll also check the MELs, make sure, you know, it's actually deferrable.

Q. Okay. So, you go out to the airplane to do a precheck, can you just look at the inside of the

airplane and see if something is deferred? Or is it only just located in the maintenance logbook?

A. Oh, no, there are stickers on the -- whatever equipment is deferred.

Q. Okay.

A. Or MEL'd.

Q. Okay. So, it kind of sounds like you guys do kind of the same flights typically, is that a pretty close, accurate statement?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. I know sometimes when I would do kind of the same flight over and over again it kind of gets redundant, you kind of get used to doing it. Do you guys, at every flight, pull out a checklist?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you do a thorough briefing? Do you -- you know, kind of walk me through a normal flight.

A. Yeah, so, come in today, come in to check in with dispatch and I usually -- captain usually comes up. In my experience the Captain always shows up first. So, he's been briefed by the dispatch already, and, you know, he's going to brief me of what's wrong -- or what's MEL on the aircraft, you know, or what limitations we have on that aircraft because of those MELs. Then after that, weather -- usually Hawaii weather is really good, so I come -- I personally go -- I ask the Captain that I'm -- I'll tell the Captain that I'm going to check the airplane and I do my preflight, wait for the Captain, he does his. So, after that we do our checklists as profiled.

Q. Okay. Is there any point in that checklist where you guys talk about your takeoff and what to expect and when to --

A. Yes. There's a brief phase part on the checklist.

Q. Okay.

A. So, that -- brief what we're going to do in an emergency, if we need to come back, which

runway or with -- you know, whichever runway is the best to land.

Q. Okay. I think Bill had asked you about declining an airplane, and you guys said that the pressurization one that you declined, and I was -- you said there was nothing -- there's no punishment for declining an airplane, right?

A. I didn't get any.

Q. Okay. If you refuse an airplane and you're not doing that flight, do they take it out of your pay?

A. No.

Q. No? There's no pay loss?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Have you ever heard of anybody having any punitive issues or declining?

A. Punitive?

Q. Punishment of any kind?

A. Oh, okay. No, not that I can think of.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. How would you classify the training here? Do you feel like it made you well prepared to fly the line?

A. Training, yeah. I mean, ground school is really good, the SIM is hard with Wallace. So -- he wants us -- he's always pushing us to be, you know, be ready for any emergency. So, SIM and ground school is good.

Q. How does he always push you to be ready for anything?

A. Oh, he's going to give us anything in the SIM.

Q. Okay.

A. I've seen one training session where he failed one of the reversers in flight, so the buckets

went out then he lost hydraulic to. At the end of the approach, he lost the -- I think he lost the generators too, so it went black. So, that's how he trains us.

Q. Okay. So, does he give you multiple failures? Is that kind of how trains, giving you multiple failures in the simulator? Or does he -- at a time, or is it just, like, one failure and then you work it, and then another failure later?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Did he do your IOE?

A. Yes.

Q. So, he does both the SIM and the IOE?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay. Is there anybody else?

A. Right now there's one more, Ed Rinsma, he's a check airman, so he's doing the IOEs, too.

Q. Okay. All right, and during training in the simulator, pilots know you're going to get a V1 cut, it's going to happen in a lot of simulators, right?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Has it happened -- did it happen to you?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. When you got a V1 cut, it's on the runway and you take it off, and get airborne, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Have you ever lost an engine in the simulator or in real life after the airplane has left the ground, but before a thousand feet?

A. Yes.

Q. What was that -- was that in real life or in the simulator?

A. Oh, in the simulator.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, the simulator.
Q. Okay. So, what was that like?
A. Because it's a SIM you're kind of ready.
Q. Okay.
A. So, it was -- I did okay. So, I was able to climb and do what we're briefed on a V1 failure -- or after a V1 failure.
Q. Okay. In the simulator, are all of your flights simulated out of Honolulu?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Uh huh.
Q. All right. Have you ever seen birds on takeoff coming out of here?
A. Yes.
Q. Big birds, little birds? Help me understand the birds?
A. Both. We have owls sometimes, small birds -- a lot of small birds on the airport.
Q. Have you ever hit on in flight or on takeoff?
A. On landing.
Q. On landing?
A. Yeah.
Q. And what did that do?
A. Oh, it killed the bird.
Q. Did it hurt the engine? I mean, damage the airplane?
A. No, not the airplane.
Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.
Q. All right. As part of your training did you get CRM?
A. Yes.
Q. How was that?
A. CRM are -- CRM training for our company, I can say it's good. I mean, I've been working with all -- with CRM pilots, so I can't complain in that one.
Q. Okay. Is the training you got in the -- I think you -- and correct me if I'm wrong, but I think you said you flew the Shorts 360 here?
A. Uh huh.
Q. Was your training in that any different -- besides the airplane, but was there any expectations different in the 73 versus the 360?
A. Yes. I mean, we're more systematic on the Boeing side, I would say.
Q. And what do you mean by that?
A. Oh, I don't know. It's really hard to compare those two sides. But we have more training on the Boeing. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Did you get CRM training in the Shorts?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Is it the same CRM?
A. It's different.
Q. Oh, is it?
A. Yeah.
Q. Different good? Different bad? Just different?
A. Just different.
Q. Okay. The night of the -- the night before the accident when you flew with the Captain -- the accident captain, how would you classify his checklist usage?

A. Complete, like, from before start -- or before takeoff -- or before start checklist all the way to after landing checklist -- or parking checklist.

Q. Was it always he pulled out the checklist card and went line by line, or was it off his memory?

A. No, he -- I'm the one reading the checklist, so he's checking. I'm checking too, so making sure that everything's being hit by the checklist.

Q. Is it -- when you read the checklist are you talking about just on the ground or are you also talking in flight?

A. In flight. Well, I mean ground and in flight.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you always read the checklist in flight if you're the pilot flying, or is that the pilot monitoring?

A. The pilot monitoring is the one reading the checklist.

Q. Okay. Did you get to do any of the flight -- when you flew with the accident captain did you actually -- were you the pilot flying on any of those flights?

A. Yes, I've flown both legs.

Q. Okay. But on that night -- in 810 the night before the accident or however -- that time you got to fly with him, did you actually fly one of the legs as the pilot flying, or were you both -- pilot monitoring on both legs?

A. No. I remember correctly, I was flying both legs. So, I was pilot flying both legs.

Q. Is that normal?

A. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. I think you've helped me a lot, so I appreciate that.

MR. MERCADO: Uh huh.

MR. ETCHER: Back to you, Bill, or do you want to go around?

MR. BRAMBLE: Let's go around and give them a shot.

MR. LEE: Sure, I have questions.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. You're talking about the engines on 810, how they creep up in the yellow band, is it both, are they symmetrical, is one worse than the other, do you remember?

A. I think one is a little better than the other. I think the right is a little better on the -- compared to the left one, but I'm not a hundred percent sure.

Q. Okay. As far as the reduced thrust takeoffs, have you ever done, like, a bleeds off takeoff, you know, on a normal -- it's not deferred, it's the systems operating on all. Do you ever do bleeds off takeoff?

A. I'm trying to recollect my thoughts. A bleeds off takeoff, those are, like, the max takeoff? Is that what you're talking about?

Q. Yeah, the max off takeoff.

A. No, I don't remember.

Q. Do you think 810 can do a full-rated takeoff? Could it -- I mean, everything's reduced thrust and then it seemed like you're saying you have to reduced thrust takeoff after you climbed out and got into the yellow band. Do you think that if you did the full-rated takeoff on an 810 -- what would you think would happen to the EGTs on a normal full-rated takeoff, not reduced thrust?

A. I mean, if it's hitting the yellow just on reduced, I don't think we can -- yeah, I think it's going to push it.

Q. Yeah, okay. As far as takeoff flap setting, what can you tell me about what flap settings you would use? Is it different between airplanes for your takeoff? What's --

A. We usually takeoff flaps two on -- in Honolulu, and then we'll take off flaps five on the

airports.

MR. LEE: Okay. That's all I have. Thank you.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, Clarence?

MR. KANAE: Thanks.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Yeah, Kim, you mentioned earlier that you had some concerns about the ramp personnel. Could you explain that again, please?

A. Oh, because sometimes they -- the ramp guys, like, for example, the same thing that I said earlier, when we're pulling into the hangar, we need a wing walker and a lead marshal that's leading us in. But sometimes they're not there, so we just stop there, and we'll be waiting. Sometimes they use flashlights instead of the real wands, so we still don't move and that's happening. So, that's one.

Q. Okay, great. Thanks for clarifying that.

A. Yeah.

Q. Also, too, is it part of the company's procedure that you or the Captain monitor the loading of the aircraft -- cargo loading.

A. Yeah, if the load supervisor is not available, we can actually make sure that the aircraft's being loaded properly.

Q. And this is both outside of Honolulu and in Honolulu?

A. I believe so.

Q. Okay, and then lastly, on the last flight of the day after you get done flying, are the aircraft refueled?

A. Are the aircraft refueled? I'm not sure, like, on the last flight of the day? That, I'm not sure. But every time we land, I see the fueler fill our aircraft. So, I can't really tell you if, you know, they fuel it after the end of the flight -- or end of the day.

MR. KANAE: All right.

MR. MERCADO: Yeah.

MR. KANAE: That's all I have, Kim. Thank you very much.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. I just have a couple cleanups and then one other thing to ask about. So, you corrected yourself, you recalled that you were the pilot flying during the flights -- the out and back that you did with the Captain on July 1st?

A. Yeah.

Q. And so, I'm just curious how the checklist worked on that flight. Did he read them and then --

A. Yeah, he did read them.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And then you were checking while he read them?

A. Well, not in flight. I mean, in flight I was the pilot flying, but on the ground, I was the -- reading the checklist and he's the one checking.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And so, we have pictures of the engine -- the EGT gauges.

A. Uh huh.

Q. And I was wondering, you know, if I was to show you this picture, there is a cursor here and you can actually mark on the -- by pressing on here you can actually mark on the gauge, you know, by kind of drawing with the pointer. You won't see it until you release the button on the pad.

MR. KATT: Can you a little more light on that screen?

MR. MERCADO: Yeah, it's kind of --

MR. BRAMBLE: Yeah, let me make it lighter.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. And what I'm after basically is just to -- since we don't have -- I don't know if we'll have FDRs and I don't know how detailed -- how many data frames -- or how many parameters that we're going to have. So, I was wondering if maybe you could give us an idea of how far up in the yellow you were kind of seeing that on takeoff if you can recall?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay, if you can't recall that specifically then that's fine. But I thought maybe if you looked at it you could give us something we could tell our systems people in case it's relevant, I don't know if it's relevant. All right, brightness. Okay, that's too bright. That's washing the color right out. Okay, that's better. All right.

Yeah, so, first, I guess just take a look and see if you can visualize it, and if not, if you feel like you can't recall well enough then we won't have you mark it or anything. But if you think you have an idea of kind of the range it was up into, maybe the peaks you were seeing, then it would be great if we could make some kind of indication on there so I can share it with the systems investigators.

A. Yeah, this is a little different.

Q. Oh, yes, I should clarify. So, this is actually the sister ship, 809, it's not the same as -- same airplane. If this looks like a different display, I can pull that one up, we have some old pictures of 810, but they're not as good. So, if this looks different, I can show you what we have for that.

A. Yeah.

Q. Let me pull that up and see if it looks more familiar.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay, is there an EGT gauge? Unfortunately, no, there is not a picture here showing EGT. Yeah, sorry. I don't think we have exactly what we need for an 810, so if those look like they're not the same then --

A. Yeah, they're kind of --

MR. BRAMBLE: Then we won't talk about that.

Shawn, do you have anything else you'd like to ask?

MR. ETCHER: I just have a few and it won't take long, I hope.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Did you fly the night of the accident?

A. I did.

Q. What were you flying?

A. I was flying 809, I think.

Q. Did you hear the accident crew on departure? Were you --

A. Oh, I'm sorry, I was thinking about July 1st.

Q. Oh, my apologies.

A. So, this is July 2nd, the night of accident. Yes, I was flying with Amin in 809.

Q. Okay.

A. So, we were on approach and then I heard them take off -- and then when we were on a visual approach to runway four right. And Henry didn't really declare an emergency, although that kind of says it when he said they had an engine fail there. So, immediately Tower told us to get out of the way, so we got back there at op, and -- yeah, I was there.

Q. Okay. Did you see the airplane at all?

A. We saw them took off. (Verbatim) We saw the light -- I mean, their landing lights were on, so we saw the aircraft took off.

Q. Did you see anything abnormal? I know it's dark and all that but --

A. No, not really.

Q. Okay.

A. All we see was -- we saw was light. Then after that we got vectored out, so they were kind of on our tail so we couldn't see them after that.

Q. Okay. I know you guys fly a lot of the standard routes.

A. Yes.

Q. What would be a -- I hate to you the phrase, normal takeoff weight that you would expect on the route to Maui?

A. Depending on the aircraft, though. So, takeoff weight could range to about 85,000 to 100,000 takeoff weight depending on the aircraft.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Have you had a hundred-thousand-pound weights?

A. I did, yeah.

Q. How's the airplane feel?

A. Heavy.

Q. Heavy?

A. Yeah.

Q. Still performs okay?

A. Oh, yeah. It performs, but it's -- it climbs slower than when it's empty.

Q. Okay. I'm a little confused -- just -- and I should say confused, maybe it's just questions in my head. Takeoff flaps, is there a standard procedure for -- you always use flaps --

A. A standard procedure?

Q. Yeah.

A. We don't have a -- I don't think you can call it standard procedure. It's the Captain's

discretion of whatever flaps takeoff he wanted to go, you know. So, I'm just saying that we usually took -- takeoff from Honolulu with flaps two, and we take off from the other islands at flaps five.

Q. Does it matter if it's a Dash-9 engine, a Dash-15, or a Dash-17 engine with the flaps?

A. No.

Q. Have you seen captains vary depending on the engines, or --

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. Not really.

Q. Okay, last question I have. Loading pallets, cargo pallets versus the cargo cans?

A. Okay.

Q. Is there any specific loading requirements for a pallet? Like, can it only go in a certain zone?

A. No, but the pallets, they tie them on a cookie sheet.

Q. Okay.

A. So, that's pretty much the difference between the can and the --

Q. So, they could put a pallet clear in the most AF zone?

A. I've seen them done that before. (Verbatim)

Q. Okay. Do they teach you guys loading of the pallets to make sure there's certain -- is there certain things you can't put in certain areas?

A. I don't know.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. That's all I have. Thank you so much.

MR. MERCADO: Okay, yeah.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Okay. You mentioned about -- I think 810 had a center fuel tank?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Weren't your words, though, that there was fuel in the tank, and you'd turn the pumps on, and the pumps wouldn't pump?

A. Yeah.

Q. Can you -- do you remember any other detail about that?

A. I mean, it's difficult to say if there's anything different than that. It's just that it's showing fuel in there, but --

Q. About how much fuel?

A. About a thousand pounds.

Q. A thousand pounds?

A. Yeah.

MR. LEE: Okay, all right. That's all I had.

MR. BRAMBLE: Clarence?

MR. KANAE: Yeah, just a follow up.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. On the cargo itself, do you know what kind of bulk cargo that you all carry on the bottom of the aircraft -- in the bay area of the aircraft? I mean, or did you mail --

A. Chickens.

Q. Chickens?

A. Yeah, that's it. That's the constant, or newspaper.

Q. Okay, I was just wondering if you --

A. Yeah.

Q. And that's noted also on your manifest?

A. Yeah, it's -- yeah.

Q. It just gets weights or descriptions?

A. Description and weights.

MR. KANAE: Oh, interesting. Okay, thank you.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. I mean, I actually -- I think I found a picture that is better. There is a picture of the actual airplane from 2016 and -- so if this helps you give us an idea of how hot it might've reading. I also have it set up so that you can mark it with the mouse pointer tip, if you want to, with yellow. But just take a look at the EGT gauges and see if you have any memory of what you were seeing in terms of, you know, what was it going up to on takeoff?

A. Okay. Oh, I'm trying to zoom, but it wouldn't.

Q. Unfortunately, you can't. Yeah, I can crop it and zoom it more if you like? Do you want me to make it bigger?

A. Yeah, if you could.

Q. It'll be blurry, but it'll be bigger. Okay. It's bigger and it's set to mark it up if you so desire.

A. Okay. All right, it's probably around -- this is five, ten, 20. Probably about around 515.

Q. All right. Can you make -- just click the very point of the mouse tip in that area and then release it because you won't see it when you click it until you release it? Did it work? Maybe try a little more to the left side of the pad?

MR. KATT: Bottom left of the pad is where the little --

MR. BRAMBLE: You might have to drag it a little bit while you're pressing the button to make a line. I found it kind of difficult to use, so you if you need to do it over, I can zero it out. Is that roughly --

MR. LEE: Can we describe for the record where that is?

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Yeah, so, what I see on here is that you were seeing it on almost two ticks above the five on

the left side, is that right? Two tick marks above the five almost?

A. Almost two.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And then --

A. It's like between the ten and 20 lights.

Q. Okay. Oops, I'm looking at the wrong thing, I'm sorry. No, wait. No, that's right. Okay, and about one tick above the five on the right-hand side, is that correct?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. All right, thanks, I appreciate that. That will be helpful. Okay, so, I think that concludes the questioning. We have just a couple of close-out questions that we usually ask. One is, is there anything that we haven't asked you about that you think is -- that you'd like to tell us that you think would be relevant?

A. I don't know.

Q. Okay. Is there anything that you particularly think would -- anyone that you think we should be sure to speak with that you --

A. No, I can't really think of anyone.

Q. Okay. Do you have any suggestions for safety improvements that you want to relay to us?

A. No. Yeah.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, thanks for your time, and we will go off the record at 3:52, Hawaii Standard Time.

(Whereupon, at 3:52 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII
ON JULY 2, 2021
Interview of Kim Mercado

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FA174

PLACE: Honolulu, Hawaii

DATE: July 5, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Carolyn Hanna
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *		

Interview of: GINA MOORE, First Officer

Rhoades Aviation, TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

Tuesday,
July 6, 2021

APPEARANCES:

WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

WILLIAM KATT, Esq.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

I N D E X

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INTERVIEW

(3:05 p.m.)

MR. BRAMBLE: So this is an interview with Gina Moore at 3:05 p.m. on July 6th. My name is Bill Bramble, and I'm a human performance investigator with the NTSB.

Mr. Shawn Etcher and I are leading the operations in a human performance working group for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probably cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA, and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I would now like to have Mr. Etcher and each of the group members briefly introduce themselves. Captain Etcher.

MR. ETCHER: Hi. Good afternoon. My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an operational factors investigator with the NTSB.

MR. KANAE: Hello, Gina. I'm Clarence Kanae, an aviation safety inspector. My specialty is operations, and I'm assigned to the Honolulu Certificate Management Office (indiscernible).

MS. MOORE: Nice to meet you.

MR. LEE: I'm Rich Lee. I'm a Boeing safety pilot. Thank you.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right. Is there anybody that you object to being present in the interview?

MS. MOORE: No. You're all good.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. So today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we'll be sending that recording out for transcription, and the party members will have an opportunity to review that transcription and correct any typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probably cause and prevent

reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're here simply to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents.

Having said that, however, we cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity, and the transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for this accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time, and everyone has been instructed to not interrupt the person asking questions at the time. There'll be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person has a turn.

Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so. And if you realize you misstated something or wanted to correct something, please do that.

You're entitled to have one representative of your choosing. Is there someone you'd like to have as your representative?

MS. MOORE: I choose William Katt.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Mr. Katt, can you introduce yourself for the transcriptionist?

MR. KATT: William Katt. Attorney with Wilson Elser.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Thank you. And that being said, does anyone have any questions before we begin the questioning?

MR. KANAE: No questions.

INTERVIEW OF GINA MOORE

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. All right. Ms. Moore, can you please state your full name for the record?

A. Gina Michelle Moore.

Q. Can you spell your last name?

A. M-O-O-R-E.
Q. Okay. And do you live here in Honolulu?
A. My permanent residence is Nashville, Tennessee. I live here when I'm working for TransAir.
Q. How old are you?
A. 51 and a half.
Q. Okay. What's your job title here at TransAir?
A. First Officer.
Q. And when were you hired here?
A. August 1st, 2019.
Q. Okay. What are your roles and responsibilities as a first officer?
A. To support my captain.
Q. Anything else you want to add?
A. As far as?
Q. Just generally. As a first officer, what's your job about?
A. We do pre-flight, post-flight, check lists. Sometimes I'm flying pilot. Sometimes I'm a non-flying pilot.
Q. All right. And can you give us a brief overview of your aviation background that led to you working here?
A. My first flying job was towing banners. After that, I was a flight instructor. I then became a barnstormer. After that, I sprayed crops. Then I flew skydivers. Then I flew aerial survey. And then I fly here.
Q. Okay. Do you currently work for any other employers besides TransAir or Rhoades?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Can you give us a brief overview of your certificates or ratings?
A. I have the Commercial Single Engine, Land and Sea. And then I have ATP for the multi-

engine -- no seaplane rating for that one, though. And then the type rating and the 737.

Q. Okay. And what's your estimated total flight time?

A. 13,000.

Q. How much of that in the 737 would you estimate?

A. Approximately 700.

Q. And how long ago were you type rated in the 737?

A. It would've been -- I think November of 2019.

Q. All right. It's our understanding that you operated four of the six flights of the accident airplane the day before the accident that we're investigating.

We're going to ask you some questions about how the airplane was performing. We're also going to ask you some questions about the crew that you were flying with because the pilot you were flying with was involved in this accident as well.

Let's have you describe for us how your day went in terms of flying the airplane. Why don't you just start with when you arrived at work and how that day progressed? Kind of give us an overview.

A. I don’t recall my start time. I think it was around midnight, it might've been a little before or after.

I arrived at work. We get our packet of -- I forget the official name of the packet but it's our flight plan, and weather, and list of NOTAMS and such.

Henry gave me a briefing. We went to Kahului. I exited and went to the plane to do pre-flight -- set the cockpit up, that kind of thing.

Q. Sorry. I had something (indiscernible).

A. No, it's (indiscernible).

Q. Okay. And so you departed Honolulu, flew to Kahului? Or not yet?

A. Well, I got to the plane, then we went to Kahului. I think we did four legs, like you said.

Q. Okay. How did the plane behave that evening? Did it operate normally?

A. For the most part. On takeoff, we're always looking for things to go in the yellow. It did approach the yellow. Never went into the red.

And then of course, when we get to 1,000 feet, we set climb power. And it was all in the green.

Q. Okay. Do you recall how far into the yellow you might've seen it go?

A. I would say it touched the yellow but didn't get into it any significant amount.

Q. Okay. Any unusual sounds or vibrations?

A. Nope. It -- pretty standard.

Q. And did you do the pre-flight -- the exterior pre-flight inspection at the beginning of the day?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. How did things look on the outside of the airplane?

A. Everything looked normal.

Q. Did you do more than one? How does that work when you're doing multiple flights? You do an abbreviated one at the
out-station? How's that work?

A. I do a walk-around every time I land. The same walk-around on the outside that I would do when we first started.

Q. So every one of those inspections was normal?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. Okay. Have you flown this airplane in the past?

A. I have.

Q. Any recurring issues with this particular airplane that stand out?

A. Nothing I can remember.

Q. Did you notice any leaking fluids outside?

A. There's always a little drip here and there.

Q. Anything that concerned you in that respect?

A. Nope.

Q. Okay. All right. What can you tell me about Captain Okai? How did that go? How did the trips go with him?

A. We ran all the appropriate check-lists. We didn't get along very well, so that's why we switched aircraft.

Q. Okay. Did you feel that he was doing something unsafe?

A. No. I didn't feel like I was unsafe. I just had my personal minimums of getting along with who I'm fine with.

Q. Okay. Can you describe Captain Okai's personality and his command style?

A. I'm not sure exactly how to describe.

Q. Okay. Did you feel he had good CRM and shared tasks and responsibilities appropriately?

A. Sharing a task -- he didn't like to share too much.

Q. Was there anything in particular that you felt like he was doing that was supposed to be your role as the FO?

A. Well, the pre-flight. I do the pre-flight before we start. But as I'm setting up the cockpit, he gets up and repeats my pre-flight.

So I don't -- I mean, it's up to him if he wants to repeat it. I just don't know anything why he would do that.

Q. Okay. Do other captains do that?

A. I haven't noticed it with other guys.

Q. Okay. Did he seem to make appropriate callouts? Well, let me ask you this -- who flew the four different flights?

A. It seems like Henry flew the first leg to Kahului. Then I flew back. Then I flew back to

Kahului. And then he flew back to Honolulu. So I did the middle two and he did the outer two.

Q. Okay. Did he not follow -- in terms of sharing tasks, if that was a problem area, were you finding that he was not following SOPs in terms of who's supposed to do what in callouts and that sort of thing? Or was that more just with the pre-flight portion?

A. Mainly with the pre-flight portion.

Q. Okay. So things seemed to be pretty standard in-flight.

A. Yeah. Nothing to note.

Q. Okay. And then when you asked to swap out with someone else, was the company accommodating? Did they make that happen?

A. I didn't specifically ask to be swapped. I just -- when I was first hired on, Wallace instructed me if I ever felt uncomfortable to text him and say I'm not getting along or I don't feel comfortable. And then he would take it from there.

So when I got to Kahului, I texted Wallace. And then Wallace responded with, when you get back to Honolulu, you'll fly with Morgan. And that's what happened.

Q. Okay. Would you characterize the disagreement that you had as being strictly about professional manners and the nature of what happened?

I'm just trying to make sure there wasn't anything extremely unusual or highly stressful that might've occurred that could've bothered him the next day, or something like that.

A. Nothing happened that he should've been worried about the next day.

Q. Okay. I think that's it for me for right now. I'm going to pass that on to you, Shawn. Thanks.

A. No problem.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Do you need a break or anything? Are you all right?

A. I'm good.

Q. Okay. Do you have a current FAA medical?

A. I do.
Q. What class?
A. First.
Q. Do you remember when it was issued?
A. July 1st.
Q. July 1st of this year?
A. Last year.
Q. Of 2020?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay.
A. I go for renewal this month.
Q. Okay. And how many limitations or restrictions?
A. (Indiscernible) glasses.
Q. Okay. Sounds like you had a wide-ranging career of flying.
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever been fired or terminated at any of those places?
A. Not necessarily. Whenever you spray crops is seasonal. So at the end of the season, they can either say, you can come back next season, or not. And I have not always come back every season.
Q. Okay. So they didn't renew your contract. Is that the right way to put it?
A. Yes.
Q. All right. I know that when I used to fly, there were certain airplanes I got I was never thrilled about because they always felt like those planes didn't like me or I didn't get along with them. There was always some issue that I didn't appreciate.
A. With the airplane?

Q. Yeah. You just have planes that you just -- I don't know. You always feel like every time you fly, there's something wrong.

Did you ever feel that way here?

A. No.

Q. Okay. I think you were telling Bill that when you were taking off, you had looked and you went up on the thrust -- or the EGT. What happened with the yellow? Was it on the EGT?

A. EGT.

Q. You went up into the yellow, or almost to the yellow.

A. Just touched it.

Q. Just touched it. Does that happen often?

A. Can't say it happens often. I can say I've seen it before.

Q. When was the last time you saw it that you can recall?

A. I don't recall.

Q. That's all right. If you don't know, that's okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you remember on that flight, were you doing a derated or reduced thrust takeoff? Or was it --

A. Yes.

Q. It was?

A. Yeah. We do reduced EPR takeoffs.

Q. Okay. Do you remember what the flap setting was, by chance?

A. It was either 2 or 5.

Q. Can you or the captain -- whoever's flying or whatever -- can they choose the flap setting?

A. The captain usually chooses the flap setting. I do that during the pre-flight before we go.

Q. Okay. Do captains typically choose one or the other? Or is it based on something, do you

know?
A. A lot of captains will choose 2 out of Honolulu but 5 out of Kahului. It seems like Henry chose 5 but I don't remember what he chose. I don't want to --
Q. I appreciate your honesty, so thank you. If you went up into the yellow on EGT -- said it was barely touching --
A. Um-hmm.
Q. -- when it went up there, was there any kind of a limitation that is associated with the yellow band?
A. In the past when I would report it to maintenance, they would say that you're allowed five minutes in the yellow.
Q. Okay.
A. So whenever we go through 1,000 feet, we set the climb power. And when I set climb power, it stopped touching the yellow and became green. So it was less than five minutes.
Q. Okay. I understand -- and please correct me if I'm wrong -- that TransAir has a write-up system that you can write up a mechanical issue or you can write up an informational issue.
A. Yes, in the maintenance log.
Q. Sorry. Yes, in the maintenance log. Is that something, when it touches the yellow or approaches the yellow, that's written up into the maintenance log even as informational?
A. I don't recall on that particular night because I was switched aircraft. So I didn't end the day with Henry. So I don't know what was written up.
Q. Okay. Have you seen it touch the yellow or go into the yellow before on other flights?
A. In the past I've seen it touch the yellow on all of the airplanes, not just 810. But I don't recall what was written in the log book.
Q. Okay. If it's written up as informational, do the captains, during pre-flight, tell you about informational write-ups?

A. Yeah. Whenever we do our briefing, usually they have the maintenance log out, and they go back several days and they go over past things that have happened.

Q. Okay.

A. And that would be on any aircraft.

Q. So on the day you flew 810, you guys did a pre-flight. Did the captain mention anything the previous few days that he looked back for informational write-ups?

A. I really don't remember.

Q. Okay. That's all right. It was a few days ago. I understand.

A. Yeah. A lot has happened since then.

Q. Yeah. I can only imagine. All right. You had said something to Bill, and forgive me if I misquoted here --

A. Sure.

Q. -- but you were on a pre-flight and you say things drip, or something like that. Help me understand, what kind of things do you see dripping?

A. I've seen all kinds of things drip. Fuel, oil, hydraulic fluid.

Q. So when you see something dripping, what do you do?

A. Well, there's a mechanic that's with the aircraft whenever I arrive. So I bring him over to look at it and he determines how many drips per second or minute, and then determines if he does anything.

Q. And is that on all drips? Or is that on hydraulic drips, and with fuel he does something different?

A. It would be on all drips.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. I always bring stuff to the mechanic and tell the captain.

Q. Okay. All right. How would you classify staffing here? For pilots, I mean. Is there enough

pilots? Not enough pilots?

A. I guess you guys are familiar with General Aviation. I'm used to flying non-stop every day, all day. I have a lot of time off, so I feel like I want to fly more.

In my regard, I wish I would fly more. But I know there's regulations of duty time, rest periods, and such. People do want to take vacations and such. So with that respect, there may or may not be enough pilots.

Q. Okay.

A. Hard for me to say.

Q. Do they ever call you in on your days off?

A. Yes.

Q. Is that often? Can you just give me an idea of how often you get called in on your days off to cover someone?

A. I don't have really a frequency. I know that Greg was doing a lot of manual writing, so I would take his shifts. But it's something that I think Wallace knew I wanted to fly. So it wasn't ever a problem. It's kind of a given.

Q. Is there a benefit to flying on your days off other than logging more hours?

A. If you fly on the red week -- I guess you're familiar with our schedules, we have the red week -- we get extra money.

Q. Okay. If you woke up one morning or one evening and you weren't feeling well, what do you do?

A. If I -- this actually happened once. I woke up at 4 o'clock in the morning and was just throwing up. And I texted Wallace because I was supposed to be -- I had the day shift. Wallace said he would take care of it and he found someone to fill in for me.

Q. So you guys have a day and a night shift?

A. Yeah. We have day runs as well as night runs.

Q. Okay. How often do you swap from a day run to a night run?

A. He usually schedules it by the week. So you have a whole week on days and then you alternate because -- the day shift, the FedEx feeds you. You get lunch.

Q. That's a benefit, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you ever feel pressured to complete a flight? You ever heard a, we've got to get this flight out, you've got to go?

A. Occasionally.

Q. Is it a lot of pressure, or you just feel like they just want to get it out as close to on-time or close to the schedule that they had developed?

A. I don't know what you mean.

Q. So you say you feel some pressure to complete a flight.

A. Right.

Q. Explain to me what you mean by the pressure.

A. Some of the rampers have colorful language and if you don't move fast enough, they'll express it. They want us to take off on 26R at Charlie instead of taking the time to taxi to 8R. Just stuff like that.

Q. Who's they? The rampers want you to take off on 26R?

A. It's the -- I guess approximately three or four months ago, it was suggested it would save time if we took off on 26R at Charlie.

So Bobby Leeman (ph.), he provides us two flight manifests -- log manifests -- so that if the tower or the ramp controller -- ground control -- allows us to take off at 26R at Charlie, we have the paperwork for it. So it's pretty much expected.

Q. All right. And then the paperwork you have is the performance paperwork for your --

A. Yeah. They do -- a load sheet has your weight and balance on it. Stuff like that.

Q. All right. I know you said you had concern with flying with the captain that one night and you sent a text. If you ever have concern, is that how you do that? The policy here of how you communicate your concern up the chain?

A. If I'm on-duty when something happens, my first contact is Wallace. If I'm off-duty, I'm sure he'd appreciate a phone call instead of a text, because a text you can only abbreviate.

Q. Okay. Is there any formal procedure if you have -- a written procedure that you can communicate concerns you have, whether it's with the airplane or personnel?

A. Well, if you have -- how do I say -- if it's something beyond talking to Wallace, and I feel concerned of safety, we're supposed to file a safety report. But that's more of a broader -- me and Henry just didn't get along, so it wasn't a safety report kind of issue.

Q. Okay. But forget about Henry and what you did there. I was saying like if you went out and had a safety issue with the airplane and there's something written up or was written up in the -- whatever. You can kind of come up with whatever safety issue you want, and it didn't get addressed to your satisfaction. Is there a formal way to get that up the chain of command so the safety (indiscernible) can be addressed?

A. The only way I would know to do that is file a safety report.

Q. Okay. Is that an anonymous report or can you put your name on it? Do they want your name on it?

A. I think you have the option of either.

Q. Okay. Have you ever done those?

A. I have.

Q. Can you give me a ballpark on when was the last one you filled out?

A. I filled one out on the master switch to the main cargo door. It was being left in the on position. After we'd landed at our destination, I was the person that opened the door. And if it's on already and it for some reason activated in-flight, then the door could possibly open. The main

cargo door.

I don't recall when I filed it. It was some months ago.

Q. Okay. Thank you for the example. Speaking of the door, do you ever observe cargo (indiscernible) operations on the aircraft?

A. Yes.

Q. And what do you usually look for during that, when you're watching them? Is there anything specific you're looking for?

A. That they don't bang the sides of the plane. There are signs posted, don't slam the cans up against the walls. Look at the locks. Look at the doors held up by actuation so I hope it doesn't sink. I look for that.

Q. Okay. All right. So you've been here several years. Is it an upgrade based on seniority? Is it based on -- how would you get to be a captain here?

A. I think the Part 121 regulations require me to have a thousand hours of jet time, or 121 time, or so forth. I just have 700 hours, so I have a little bit more to go.

Q. So when you hit that thousand-hour mark, you'll get upgraded? Or is there other --

A. I'm sure there'll be an evaluation. I'm supposed to go to simulator at the end of the month. So I'm sure during that time, Wallace will tell me what areas I need to work on or what have you for captain.

Q. Okay. All right. Do you get along well with the chief pilot?

A. Yeah, I like Wallace. He's one of my favorites.

Q. Okay. I know you asked to be removed from the flight with Henry. But do you have the ability to not fly with somebody on a regular basis if there's a captain you're like, I do not want to fly with them?

A. I didn't ask to be removed from Henry.

Q. I'm sorry, I just misspoke.

A. It's okay. I just texted Wallace, said we weren't getting along. And Wallace chose to switch us. But there's not a formal no-fly list.

When I was first hired on, Wallace said if I have any trouble at all, tell him. And that's what I do.

Q. Okay. Speaking of the night when you texted Wallace about that, did you -- on the way back to Honolulu did you and Henry discuss your text? Or did you mention anything to him?

A. I didn't mention it to him.

Q. Okay. All right. The airplane 810. I know we said it touched up into the yellow. How did its acceleration feel normally? Is it slower than the other ones because of the engine size?

A. It seems like (indiscernible) dash nines, so it's a little doggish.

Q. But -- and forgive me if Bill asked this -- do you ever feel any weird vibrations flying or any weird sounds?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. Okay. All right. I think that's all the questions I have right now. I appreciate all the info you've given me.

A. You're welcome.

MR. ETCHER: All right, Clarence.

MR. KANAE: Hi, Gina.

MS. MOORE: Hi.

MR. KANAE: Thank you for your time today.

MS. MOORE: No problem.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Looking at your resume is pretty impressive. 13,000 hours of overall flight time. That's a pretty good accomplishment.

A. Thank you.

Q. My first question is, on your pre-flight, do you normally check the lower cargo bins for cargo, or any significant damage, or anything of that nature?

A. Yes. We open the doors to make sure there's no stowaways.

Q. Do you check if there's cargo in there or not? I mean --

A. Yes.

Q. -- after they've loaded, do you actually look at it?

A. After they've loaded? No.

Q. Okay. All right. Looking at the manifest itself, do you have any concerns about the actual weights of any of these cargo weights at all? Any concerns like, this one's really (indiscernible)?

A. Not really. I have faith in the loaders.

Q. And you mentioned that the EGT indications on some of the flights were close to yellow or touch yellow. If you're flying the airplane with a lighter load than, let's say -- coming back from Kahului, the load is lighter, correct?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. How is the performance on the engines? Do they still bump the yellow on the EGT?

A. No. It was just leaving Honolulu.

Q. Just coming out of Honolulu. All right. Have you ever experienced an abort takeoff in any of the route (indiscernible)?

A. Yes.

Q. (Indiscernible)?

A. Yes.

Q. When did that occur?

A. I want to say it's maybe a couple months ago. There was one, and then it seems like I had one with Henry maybe six months ago or so.

Q. At what airports, for example?

A. Honolulu.
Q. At Honolulu?
A. Um-hmm.
Q. What runway?
A. 8R.
Q. 8R. Okay. What happened after the abort takeoff? I mean, you taxied back, of course, right?
A. Yeah. We notified the tower, we aborted, and then returned to the gate. We call it the gate, but the hangar.
Q. Um-hmm. And did you notice if -- did maintenance come out and do anything? Did you witness maintenance perform any maintenance on the aircraft?
A. Now, they met the aircraft. But once we boarded, they switched us to another airplane. So I didn't hang out and watch them do anything.
Q. I see. And then they took the load off of the aborted aircraft onto your current airplane?
A. I don't recall where they moved the load. I just remember that we switched airplanes. So I don't know.
Q. Okay. Thank you for your time, again. That's all I have. Thank you.
A. You're welcome.
MR. KANAE: Okay, Rich.
MR. LEE: Hi. Good afternoon.
MS. MOORE: Hi.
BY MR. LEE:
Q. Just a couple things. On the aircraft 810, you said on the reduced thrust takeoff, it touched close to the yellow.
A. Um-hmm.
Q. Do you think if you -- could you have done a full-rate takeoff without it exceeding limits?

What's your thoughts about that?

A. I think we would've had -- I would not have had confidence in doing a full power takeoff on the aircraft.

Q. Okay. Thanks. As far as cargo, do you have a wag (ph.) on what's heavy and what's not heavy? What's your -- do you have an estimate when you look at the load sheet? Do you look at the cargo or do you look at the performance to say this is a heavy weight takeoff?

And then if you do know the amount, what is the amount that you see that's a heavy weight takeoff, cargo-wise?

A. Yeah. Usually, leaving Honolulu we're anywhere from 90,000 pounds to 100,000 pounds. And then coming back from our

out-stations, most of the cans are usually empty, so we're usually 75,000 pounds to 85,000 pounds.

Q. Okay. So if you were over 100,000 pounds, would you think, that would be kind of heavy today? Is that your cut-off?

A. Yeah.

MR. LEE: All right. Thanks. That's all I have. Thank you.

MS. MOORE: You're welcome.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. Gina, I have a few more for you. So Clarence was asking you about rejected takeoffs. You said that -- you recall two events.

A. Um-hmm.

Q. And you said they were at Honolulu Runway 8R. Was it both events there?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Did you ever find out what the cause of the issue was?

A. I do not recall.

Q. What prompted the aborted takeoffs?

A. I don't remember specifically. I would assume, if I can use that word, they got hot.
Q. That the engines got hot?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Okay. And how would you know that, if they got hot?
A. By looking at the gauges.
Q. Which gauges?
A. EGT.
Q. Okay. What criteria would you use to abort a takeoff based on an EGT reading?
A. If it was in the upper part of the yellow or into the red.
Q. Okay. I don't know if I specifically asked you about this last time but, the day before the accident, when you were operating 810, did you recall any maintenance write-ups or MEL (ph.) write-ups on 810?
A. I don't specifically remember. It seems like we did have an MEL, but I don't recall what it was.
Q. With respect to Henry Okai, how much have you flown together? Have you flown together many times in the past?
A. Yeah. Me and Henry made friends. We would eat Thanksgiving dinner together. Always fun to hang out with.
Q. Okay. Can you describe his capabilities as a pilot in general compared to other captains with the company?
A. I don't really know how to compare one person to another.
Q. Did he seem proficient to you?
A. Yeah, he seemed proficient.
Q. Okay. And during your flights together, the day before the accident, did he appear happy and alert?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. How do you like working for Rhoades in general?

A. I'm very proud to work for Rhoades. They're Indiana based. I met Jack Rhoades 30 years ago. World War II guy.

Q. Is he still involved with the company?

A. He's passed away.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. That's how it became available to be here.

Q. I see. All right. What's satisfying or difficult about working here?

A. Satisfying? Being able to fly. I do appreciate flying Pratt & Whitney's. I've been able to be given the experience to fly the round engines. They're turbo props, and now they're jets.

Discouraging? Probably communications.

Q. What makes you say that?

A. Not having a do-not-fly list. Being able to talk to Wallace, but I don't always necessarily get feedback. I guess you're supposed to have expectations, and a way to measure your expectations, and then a way to be able to change something when you don't meet your expectations. So it doesn't always come together.

Q. Okay. So it's kind of like a performance management and supervision standpoint is where you've got communication (indiscernible)?

A. Me and Henry had -- we weren't getting along. We were having a communication problem. I reported to Wallace. My expectation was him to say something like, why aren't you getting along, or, get Henry on the phone, or whatever. But I didn't expect to be switched to a different aircraft.

Sometimes I don't know what to expect whenever I bring something to the attention of Wallace or the captain.

Q. Okay. Did Wallace ask you why you wanted to switch? Or did you never have a conversation with him about that?

A. I didn't ask to be switched. I just told him we weren't getting along.

Q. I apologize, I made the same mistake.

A. Then he said, well, you'll change to another plane. I'm like, okay, whatever. But we didn't really address the problem of not getting along.

Q. Okay. So you never discussed with Wallace why you wanted to be switched?

A. Well, I didn't want to be switched.

MR. BRAMBLE: I'm sorry.

MR. KANAE: (Indiscernible).

MS. MOORE: I just told him that yeah -- we weren't getting along. And so in my eyes, I would expect him to maybe address why we're not getting along or maybe talk to Henry and all three of us talk, or whatever.

So I didn't -- so instead it was just a, oh, just switch airplanes.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. And there was no further conversation between you and Wallace about why you weren't getting along?

A. After I got back to Honolulu, he instructed me to give him a call and talk about it.

Q. Okay. How's the pay here? Is it competitive?

A. I have no idea if it's competitive. I enjoy my paycheck. I spend it with happy thoughts of stuff. Do I want to make more money? Eventually. But right now I'm good.

Q. Okay. And how would you describe the company's organizational safety culture?

A. Organizational safety culture.

Q. Yeah. Do you want me to elaborate a little bit? Okay. How would you describe the company's stance on balancing productivity versus safety in its operations? And how do they go

about managing that?

A. I guess it would determine that area of safety, whether it's a human person -- lately, they've instructed us to wear the neon clothing. So that's new from our safety program.

But then, on the other hand, you might have something else where they're like, can you write that up when you get back? That kind of scenario.

Q. All right. So you see it as a positive that they're asking employees to wear neon clothing. But then you feel like sometimes there might be a negative because they might be asking to delay a maintenance write-up? Is that what you're saying?

A. Yeah. They'll say, that's something that can be written up on your way home versus before you leave home.

Q. Okay. Can you describe an example of that?

A. An example.

Q. That you've experienced.

A. Sure. Behind my seat, there's circuit breakers. The previous crew had damaged the circuit breakers. I pointed out to the mechanic, and he asked the captain to write it up when he gets back.

We get back. The captain talked to the mechanic. The mechanic said he was going to fix it. The captain did not write it up. And the mechanic didn't fix it.

A couple hours later, I get a phone call asking why I broke the circuit breakers. I said I didn’t break the circuit breakers. I referred Wallace to the captain. The captain told Wallace what happened and that was the end of it.

Q. So the circuit breaker panel was damaged?

A. Yeah. The first officer's seat -- the top of it has a bar across it where the seatbelts go through. They had hit the circuit breaker and damaged it.

Q. Do you know which airplane that was?

A. I don't know. That was a long time ago.

Q. How long ago was that?

A. Just estimating, maybe a year.

Q. Okay. Are there other examples of things you thought were a concern and it was suggested that you might want to delay writing them up?

A. One time, the hydraulics was leaking -- the B (ph.) pumps. I pointed it out to the mechanic and he said it wasn't dripping fast enough to be out of limitations. So we took the flight anyway to Kahului. We get -- the B pump light comes on in flight. We were on the QRH, land in Kahului, and then they issue an MEL from Kahului to get it back.

Q. Got any other examples?

A. No. Sorry.

Q. It's fine. I just wanted to make sure that you had the opportunity to share.

A. Sure, no.

Q. All right. Is there a company manager responsible for managing safety?

A. Yes. Orlando.

Q. Okay. Do you have any interactions with him?

A. I've met him I think a couple of times, but we haven't ever had talks or speaks or anything.

Q. Okay. And you said you had filed a safety report about the cargo door switch being left on?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that an online safety report?

A. No. There's forms in the hangar so I just wrote it out.

Q. Okay. How long ago was that?

A. Maybe a couple of months.

Q. Okay. Does the -- do all the 73s have the same switch that you could potentially make that mistake on any of them?

A. No. Just a couple of them do.

Q. And did 810 have that switch?

A. I think it did.

Q. Okay. Do you feel supported by management and able to make safety related decisions as a pilot without fear of repercussions?

A. Sometimes.

Q. Would you like to elaborate? Are there times you don't feel supported?

A. Well, whenever you are accused of, say, the circuit breakers being busted up, you don't feel like you're supported if someone accuses you of that after you've already reported it was broken before you left.

Q. Okay. Are there other incidents that made you feel that way?

A. Sometimes when you tell a mechanic something's broken, they'll invalidate that it's broken. So it's hard to feel supported by your mechanic.

Q. Okay. Does that relate to the examples that you gave about the leak?

A. Yeah, it relates to those.

Q. Okay. Are there other instances of that other than the ones that you've described? Or are those the primary things that made you feel that way?

A. That's all that I can remember right now.

Q. Okay. All right. So I hear what you're saying about maintenance and maybe them -- I hear you saying that they might make you feel like your concerns about an issue might be not valid.

What about company management? Do you feel pressure from company management to do things that you feel are unsafe?

A. Well, you have the management of the whole company. Then you have the management of ramp, management of flight. Sometimes the management of ramp doesn't exactly always agree with management of flight.

Q. Does your chief pilot or director of operations ever insist that you do things as a pilot that you

feel are unsafe?

A. No.

Q. Okay. How confident are you about the quality of the maintenance work at the company when they do work on the airplanes? Any concern there?

A. With some respects, I have confidence in them. The biggest thing that I guess is -- one of the lead mechanics refuses to fly on the airplanes. And I'm sure it bothers no one but me.

But it just seems odd that if you work on a place and you're not wanting to fly on that plane, that it's hard to have confidence in that person.

Q. Did he ever explain why he doesn't want to fly?

A. No.

Q. I assumed it was a he. I shouldn't have assumed that.

A. No, you can assume it. It's a he. A standing comment made whenever an airplane is broken in an out-station is, don't send this guy because he won't fly on the planes. But yet, he's a lead mechanic.

Q. All right. What's his name?

A. Michael Jernigan (ph.).

Q. How do you spell Jernigan?

A. I don't know.

Q. Jernigan. (Indiscernible). All right. Aside from those issues, do you have any other safety-related -- well, I shouldn't characterize those issues. Do you have any safety-related concerns about the company?

A. No.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right. I'm going to go for another round. Shawn, do you have any additional questions?

MR. ETCHER: I just have very few.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. I don't remember who was asking about the RTO you did, and they asked, do you remember why --

A. Rejected takeoff?

Q. I'm sorry. Aborted takeoffs. Sorry, I was writing in my short-hand. My apologies.

A. No, that's good.

Q. But you assumed it was hot. Why would you assume that?

A. Because I don't 100 percent remember. It's been a few months. I don't recall ever aborting for any other reason.

Q. Okay. I just wanted to figure out why you said assume. So thank you.

A. Yeah. I assume it was hot. I don't recall any other reason.

Q. Okay. So the night you'd flown with Henry and you texted Wallace and explained your concerns, he said when you get back to Honolulu to give him a call. Did you give Wallace a call when you got back to Honolulu?

A. I gave Wallace a call at the end of the day when I got back to Honolulu. Because I still had to do the one flight out and back with Morgan.

Q. So it wasn't as soon as you landed it was Honolulu. You finished your day and then gave him --

A. Right.

Q. Okay. How did that call go?

A. Pretty straightforward, I guess.

Q. Okay. Can you paraphrase what he said or give me an idea of how it went?

A. He said things like, what you should get out of this situation is you always have to listen to your captain. He said that you have to do whatever he says. He said I have to start flying with

people even though we don't get along. Things like that.

Q. Okay. Your circuit breaker -- accusations of the broken circuit breaker panel that went on. And you said the captain told the mechanic and the mechanic said he'll just fix it. But the captain didn't write it up?

A. Huh-uh.

Q. Does that happen often?

A. I wouldn't say often but I've seen it before.

Q. Besides circuit breaker panels, what other things have you seen?

A. I don't know. Say the pressurization seems to be an ongoing thing, and they don't always write it up. They'll just tell them what happened during the flight.

Q. And pressurization being an ongoing thing -- are you decompressing? Help me understand about pressurization.

A. It just sometimes will -- the cabin will climb in the descent. Things like that.

Q. Okay. All right. Another thing that kind of gave me some questions is the -- I think you said something about, there's a mechanical issue, and they say, write it up on your way back.

Give me an idea of how often that occurs.

A. I don't really have an estimate.

Q. When was the last time it happened to you, that they said that? Well, maybe not you -- told you as a crew, as a collective people, I guess.

A. I really don't remember.

Q. That's okay. I don't want you to make stuff up. It's all right.

A. Yeah. I don't recall.

Q. Okay. Can you refuse an airplane?

A. I would say no.

Q. Okay. Why would you say no?

A. Because I don't think I've ever been in a situation where we've refused an airplane.

Q. Has there been situations where you would like to refuse the airplane?

A. Not that I recall.

Q. Okay. If you refused to do a flight, whether it's an airplane, whether whatever -- there could be many reasons, I don't know. I know you guys don't have bad weather all the time over here in Hawaii, but I assume you do get some unkind weather once in a while.

A. Yeah.

Q. If you refuse to do a flight, can you do that?

A. I'm not sure. I haven't ever refused anything.

Q. Okay. Well, that answered my last question, because I was wondering if you'd ever done that. So you're reading my notes, I get that.

I do appreciate your time. Thank you so much.

MS. MOORE: No problem. I hope I helped.

MR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. Clarence, you have anything additional?

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Just a couple. Does the company have safety programs in place?

A. Yes, they have a safety program.

Q. Could you tell us what they are?

A. As far as the summarization of it is, if you see something, say something. And you have a way of saying something via a safety report online or on paper.

Q. Have you heard of the term SMS; Safety Management System?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you had training on the Safety Management System?

A. I don't think I've had a classroom type training. I've been given things to read on my own, but nothing formal, I don't believe.

MR. KANAE: I see. That's all I have. Thank you.

MR. LEE: One other thing. I know you talked about -- you remember two aborts that you did and the assumption was that it was a high temperature. I just want to make sure that it was engine-related both times. Was it engine-related?

MS. MOORE: Yes.

MR. LEE: And you seem to think it was probably because the temp was possibly going to (indiscernible)?

MS. MOORE: Yes.

MR. LEE: Okay. All right. Thank you, that's it.

MR. BRAMBLE: All right. Unless anybody has anything additional, I think I'm good.

MS. MOORE: Excellent. So I guess, keep your cards?

MR. BRAMBLE: Yes --

MS. MOORE: I positioned them so that's where you're sitting.

MR. BRAMBLE: Let me just turn off the recording here.

MR. KANAE: We could switch seats.

MR. BRAMBLE: It is 4:12 p.m. and we're ending the interview.

(Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Gina Moore
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	July 6, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Tahura Turabi
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
	*	

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Interview of: ROBERT LEHMAN, Night Operations Manager

Rhodes Aviation/TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

WILLIAM KATT, Esq.
Wilson Elser Moskowitz Edelman & Dicker LLP

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INTERVIEW

MR. ETCHER: All right, good afternoon.

MR. LEHMAN: Good afternoon.

MR. ETCHER: My name is Shawn Etcher; I'm the Operational Factors Investigator with the NTSB for this event. I'm working with Bill, who's the Human Performance Investigator; we're leading this group as we begin that investigation into Flight 810.

Just so you know, the NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and we really want to promote safety.

MR. LEHMAN: Uh-huh.

MR. ETCHER: And so that's why we're here; is we want to learn from you so we can make improvements if there's something that we need to make improvements on. However, we're not part of the DOT or the FAA, so we have no regulatory enforcement powers at all.

I'd like to actually go around the room, have everybody introduce themselves to you so you know what their job title is and it helps with the transcript as well. We'll start with Mr. Bramble.

MR. BRAMBLE: I'm Bill Bramble; I'm a Human Performance Investigator with NTSB.

MR. ETCHER: Clarence.

MR. KANAE: Hi, I'm Clarence Kanae with the FAA, I'm an Operators Inspector, Aviation Safety Inspector and I'm assigned at the Honolulu CMO, Certificate Management Office.

MR. LEE: I'm Rich Lee; I'm a Safety Pilot for Boeing.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. All right. So that's who all's going to be asking you questions.

MR. LEHMAN: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Now you know all our places. Is there any of us that you object to being in here?

MR. LEHMAN: No.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. I just want to make sure. So as I told you earlier, we're using a digital recorder and after the interview we're going to send it out to be transcribed. When it comes back to us, we're going to go through it to fix typos.

MR. LEHMAN: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: We're not going to change any content but we just want to make sure the typos are fixed so it reads correctly.

MR. LEHMAN: Uh-huh.

MR. ETCHER: And so we don't assign fault and however we can't guarantee any immunity or anything like that with this. So we just want to make sure you're clear that we just want to learn from you like there's no necessarily any immunity --

MR. BRAMBLE: Or confidentiality.

MR. ETCHER: Or confidentiality. That's the word I was trying to speak. This transcript will actually become part of the public record --

MR. LEHMAN: Uh-huh.

MR. ETCHER: -- later on so it will get out publically but the transcript will and so we just wanted you to be aware of it. We ask that you answer all the questions that you can.

MR. LEHMAN: Uh-huh.

MR. ETCHER: If you don't know an answer, I don't know works really good.

MR. LEHMAN: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: If you need clarification on anything please ask because --

MR. LEHMAN: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: -- I'm going to ask you to clarify something if I don't understand it --

MR. LEHMAN: Uh-huh.

MR. ETCHER: -- so it's a two way street.

MR. LEHMAN: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: You're entitled to one representative of your choosing. Is there someone here that you would like to represent you?

MR. LEHMAN: Katt.

MR. ELSER: William Katt, Wilson Elser.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you. Does anybody have any questions?

MR. LEE: No.

MR. KANAE: No questions here.

MR. ETCHER: All right. We'll get started then if you're ready to get started?

MR. LEHMAN: Oh, yes, please.

MR. ETCHER: Alrighty.

MR. BRAMBLE: You just might want to confirm that that's your choice of representative because you, you gestured but you didn't say it.

MR. KATT: Yeah, you didn't say it on the record.

MR. LEHMAN: Oh, I've got to say it on the record?

MR. KATT: Yeah.

MR. LEHMAN: Okay. Bill --

MR. KATT: Yeah.

MR. LEHMAN: -- is my representative.

MR. BRAMBLE: Great.

MR. LEHMAN: Is that the way?

MR. ETCHER: Gotcha.

MR. LEHMAN: It's not like I've done this before so --

INTERVIEW OF ROBERT LEHMAN

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Okay. No, it's all good. So I always start with the really tough questions first.

A. Yes.
Q. Can you state and spell your legal -- your full name?
A. Robert Joseph James Lehman, L-E-H-M-A-N.
Q. Thank you. Do you like to go by Robert?
A. Bobby.
Q. Bobby, alrighty. How old are you?
A. 52.
Q. All right. Are you employed at TransAir or Rhoades Aviation?
A. Well, they're both the same company so, yes.
Q. Which would you like us to refer to?
A. TransAir.
Q. TransAir, okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. What is your job title at TransAir?
A. Night operations manager.
Q. What does that mean?
A. I oversee the cargo side of the things, basically what gets dropped off, talk to customers directly, give them a timeframe of when their volume is going to be delivered. I also make up the flight -- I wouldn't say flight plan but kind of layout the night, what destinations we're going to go to first based on what kind of volume we're getting from the customers because that's one of the things we don't know until the last second FedEx will drop at a certain time, UPS will drop at a certain time but they're not always the same time every night, it's always different.

So maybe FedEx is late tonight and they have -- then they drop and there's a whole bunch at Hilo, so I have to go to Hilo first, you know what I mean?
Q. Okay.

A. So that's just basically how it goes.

Q. And just -- it sounds like a very busy job?

A. It is.

Q. So kind of walk me through a way in the life of your job.

A. I start at 10:00. I come in, I organize. Well, I have a little meeting with my supervisor, my load supervisor, my load builder and since I've just came on I kind of know who my crews are going to be that night, flight crews, who's going to be flying.

I'll know what planes are available for me based on if they haven't been in the shop or something that they're able to fly the night and basically I'll ask -- some people start earlier than that, I'll ask if there's anybody has called in, something like that, just so I can figure out what my team is going to be that night.

Once that's organized I go into my office. First I actually go past the dispatch office, confirm again what planes are available to me and then he always is asking what do you think the order's going to be and I give him the same answer all the time, I don't know yet, I need to start calling customers to see what time.

Because a lot of the time we're giving -- when you live in Hawaii everything comes from the mainland and flights might be delayed so all the flights that are coming into here, into Honolulu, all that volume needs to go out to other islands.

Well, they're all coming, maybe there's a delay in California, Ontario, California or something, so that plane's coming in late. So that's why I don't know those things until I show up and I call the customer and then the customer goes, yeah, we're going to be late, this stuff's not arriving until two. And I'm like, okay, well, now I guess since I have other stuff here I'll go to Maui first.

So I start planning that out. That takes like 45 minutes; it's a lot of customers to call. So once I get that situated then I go back to dispatch, I let dispatch know this is the order, and then he

says, okay, what planes are we going to use?

I like to use the planes just based on how they're parked because they're all seven positions or eight, it's not a big difference. So based on how they're parked we kind of like to launch them closest to the runway or the taxiway and then work our way backwards. So that's usually -- and I get that information from dispatch. He's already walked out there and he's, he's made like a little map for me.

And once that's done I go inside the office and I start letting my -- we have walkie-talkies, so I'll start contacting my people, okay, start building from Maui. Maui's an eight position plane start building a PBJ, I need a PBJ built. Okay, that's the position number eight, it's a smaller version of a PAG.

And so they'll start building that and then we just wait for drops and once the drops are coming, some we have to build, some are already built for us. Like if it's from UPS or from FedEx it's already inside their cans, it's already weighed on their scale.

And one of the things we always do is UPS, FedEx, Hawaiian and FedEx Ground, even though they have their own scales and they're calibrated by the same people, we always verify one can from each company every night to make sure that the weights are matching so the scales aren't off.

And that gets done right off the bat when it's ready to drop and then we start putting the things together. So we have my load supervisor, actually my build supervisor in the parking lot, they write down what goes in -- let's just say we're building a cookie sheet, he'll write down all the different things that are going on that cookie sheet.

Q. Okay.

A. And we confirm that with the person that's like a load supervisor's checking, checking their volume off and once that's tied down then I go out there and I verify that the nets are tight and everything is looking good. Nothing, you know, Hazmat's all in the right direction, arrow's

up, and just start our night.

So we got everybody else coming like the pushers and the guys they come in there like, 11:45 and that's when we start.

Q. Okay.

A. Our first flight usually launches about 12:15 if we can, if we can do it right so that's pretty much it.

Q. So it's kind of a busy start to your evening?

A. Yeah, but it's been this way for 10 years so I'm getting used to it.

Q. How long have you worked at TransAir?

A. Ten years.

Q. Ten years.

A. Yeah, but I've been in the aviation business for 32.

Q. What did you do before TransAir?

A. UPS.

Q. Same thing at UPS or something else?

A. Everything at UPS moved up the ladder, yeah.

Q. Okay, all right. So on the night of the event how was the cargo dropped, was it normal, busier than normal, less than normal?

A. FedEx dropped early that night. They gave us their volume before FedEx Air so automatically it's due at 4:00. I have to know that too. I need to know when our customer tender times are supposed to be.

So even though they dropped something maybe early or late, we still try to meet their tender times at the outer island because they have package cars waiting for them, you know, and I've got to do sort and all that stuff.

So FedEx Ground dropped early so we decided to take four, four cans of the FedEx

because they dropped four bellies and that was the first ones to go. Right when we were putting the weight and balance together FedEx Air dropped and I said, well, great, I've got one position open for FedEx Air. They're not due in until six but we can, we can start the night right and put one on there as well.

And then I had the two builds from the parking lot, which is where we build our stuff. And it was a PAG and a can and there was just regular express trucking and Norpac, which is fish. And that was it, we put our builds together, put the weight and balance together, started loading so -- but that was actually the second plate of the night so you guys know.

The first one was actually at first Maui and that was the second Maui.

Q. The accent flight was the second Maui?

A. The second Maui. The first Maui went out on time, second one was Okai, and that one went out on time as well so --

Q. Okay. So you kind of told us what was on the accident flight?

A. Yes.

Q. I just want to make sure it was clear.

A. Four ground cans, one air can, a can of fish and some express trucking and then on a PAG was some more express trucking.

Q. And what is express trucking, I mean?

A. It's pharmaceuticals, you know.

Q. Okay.

A. I guess stuff for Walgreens and different like, you know, CVS Pharmacies and stuff, maybe doctors' offices and stuff like that so --

Q. Okay.

A. We don't ever get to look inside they're all like black plastic wrapped so I couldn't -- and they're all in bins so I can't really tell you what's inside there so but that's what -- yeah. We've

had a couple open before, you know, coming off the truck so, yeah.

Q. So it sounded like it was a full -- the accident flight was a full, full loaded?

A. Yes, it's a seven position plane and we took off seven positions.

Q. Is that something you normally --

A. Always, we try to fill always the plane.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Alrighty. Is there anything that you -- besides hazardous material that you worry about as you're beginning your load build and --

A. Yeah, because we have a Hazmat girl there so she's always asking are we going to put Hazmat on this. FedEx did drop a Hazmat can so it was, I think 23 or 24 pounds, three boxes, and it was a consumer commodity which means you could put it anywhere on the plan but we chose to put it on the PAG, it was convenient and it was at position number one and it was right on the front side of it.

So it's accessible even though it doesn't need to be accessible, it was within -- it could be anywhere in that, on the position of the plane, but it would have went in number one so --

Q. Okay. So there was Hazmat on the accident flight?

A. There was Hazmat, yes.

Q. And it was 23 pounds?

A. 23 pounds, three boxes.

Q. Okay.

A. I could be wrong, it could be 24 but I couldn't remember. I can look it up but it's -- yeah.

Q. It's all right; we'll forgive you for being (indiscernible).

A. Yeah.

Q. Since you've got such a great memory knowing that, do you remember how much the

weight was planned for that accident flight or --

A. It was 19 -- well, I mean, the ground comes over and we were short people so we had a couple call-ins. So I went out there and I got the order of the ground cans and I got the weights because they sent over either a pamphlet inside the sleeve and they also sent out an email.

So we always compare that just to make sure there ain't no typos or anything like that. So once that was compared we knew that was going to go in the tail end of the plane which was seven, six, five and four.

The FedEx Air just showed up when I was doing it, that went in three and then the two builds from the parking lot went in number two and one. The can was in two, PAG was in one so --

Q. Okay. And you said that was about 19,000?

A. 19, 18 something maybe.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Which is -- it was -- that's actually light so --

Q. What's a normal load going to be?

A. Well, for -- I mean, if you -- you can go up to on that plane for 14,000 I believe it's take-off weight, yeah, it's probably within another 12,000 of going over max take-off weight so that's actually light.

Q. Okay.

A. So we were 12,000 pounds away from max take-off weight so --

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. You talked about when they bring a can over, they bring a couple cans you weigh one of

them to make sure it's accurate?

A. Yes. We always weigh either -- well, it doesn't matter which one you choose because they're always in -- there might be two in one train and three in -- it depends on how the drivers bring them over but we always personally, we don't let FedEx do it, we grab our own tugs.

We hook up, we bring them over to our company scale and we get -- we match them up. And we never -- if it's within a 60 pounds difference we always go with our, our weight.

Q. If yours was 60 pounds less you'd go with yours too or --

A. Yes, we'd go with ours because ours is the one we're loading and that's the one that the FAA has assigned for us to load.

Q. Okay.

A. So even though all of them are being done by the same people --

Q. Okay.

A. -- because they're right down the road from us so the same company does all our scales so --

Q. Do you know why 60 pounds?

A. Why do we have it within 60 pounds?

Q. Yeah.

A. That's what the old rule was at UPS so --

Q. Okay. And you just carried that over to here then?

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. I just wanted to make sure I knew where the 60 pounds came from.

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. Have you ever had a time when you guys were off by more than 60 pounds?

A. No, to be honest with you, like I said, they're all regulated and they're actually the same scales from the same company.

Q. Okay.

A. So and the reason we have the same scale is because I'm the one who told them to buy that scale so because I said, this is the one they have down the street and FedEx has it and ground has it, we should have the same one. Stay with the same company, this way there's no fluctuation so --

Q. Okay. Alrighty.

A. And actually we're really pretty close to every night to being right on the dot so it's pretty cool.

Q. How often do you guys have to calibrate that scale?

A. Data is not my department.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. I really know that's Bobby Soon (ph.)

Q. Okay.

A. He works the dayshift.

Q. Okay.

A. He does the calibration with the company.

Q. All right.

A. Because they don't calibrate during the night so and I would never see them so --

Q. All right. So I know you talked about how you -- is it you had certain ones in certain positions?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you do that based on just convenience of where it's offloaded or do you do it for a CG balance?

A. CG balance. I always try to keep it at 5.5.

Q. The CG of 5.5?

A. Yeah. Right, yeah, so --

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. What if you have -- forgive me the terminology, I think I heard it this week a triangle, a triangle flight where you take off and go from here to somewhere, somewhere (indiscernible)?

A. Yeah. So what we do is if say it's going to Maui and then it's going to Hilo and the first three positions are for Maui, well, the whatchamacallit, the outer station, we always try to put an AAY, that first can and then they can move it up.

Because an AAY, I don't know if you guys know our planes but they get narrow towards the front so they can't accept a regular A2 they have to have an AAY. So the AAY is trimmed a little different so we always try to make sure that one is the first can for the next island.

So because they can move that up and make the plan back into level. They usually fill that space anyway with, you know, either an empty or -- well, not all the time empty. A lot of the islands are sending stuff back.

Q. Okay.

A. So they'll fill that position up with weight so --

Q. Okay. I know you said sometimes they drop late?

A. Yes. It's never the same, every day is different.

Q. So --

A. I don't think I've ever had the same day.

Q. So when they drop late, how does that -- how does that affect your operation?

A. It doesn't affect, it doesn't affect because we have a lot of freight that we build ourselves. We have a company called Packair that we have a contract with.

Q. Okay.

A. And we get a lot of stuff and if we don't have FedEx Air or FedEx Ground then we just go to that. It's our go to after that.

Q. Okay.

A. We have three days to move it so it's not a rush but if nothing's there we're not going to send out a plane empty, you know what I mean, we want to fill those positions because we don't make money if it's sent out empty so --

Q. Is it very rarely that the airplane goes out with just two cans on it?

A. The only time -- well, I would say it was rare up until maybe last year when the pandemic hit and now if it's usually mail, like we have a contract with the government and if there's two cans of mail then we'll still send it, it's a contract. So even if it's one can of mail we'll send it so --

Q. Okay. Where does the mail go, does it go up on upper deck or lower deck?

A. It never goes on lower deck, they don't like double handling so --

Q. What do you mean by that?

A. Well, any company, even FedEx Air or UPS doesn't like double handling which means that somebody put it into a can and now you're taking it out of a can and then it's got to go from out of your belly into another can, so it's considered double handling.

A lot of the times packages after they've been touched so many times they don't come, you know, like you packaged them, they're all dented. You guys probably get stuff to your house, you know. Now you know when there's like, you know, a big scuff mark or something on the box it's probably because it was double handled.

So a lot of the companies tell us, please don't do that and UPS has that policy as well. We do not like to put anything in the belly so --

Q. For them or period?

A. Period.

Q. Okay. I just wanted to make I understood.

A. Yeah, I know. Yeah, that's, yeah, we -- you just don't do it.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Every now and then I'm sure airplanes have mechanical issues --

A. Yes.

Q. -- and they have to swap out an airplane?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. If they had to do that, how does that affect you, is the flight cancelled, is it just a (indiscernible)?

A. No, the route won't be canceled. We might have to combine something if it's possible, if not we actually just skip that route all together and go like -- we don't go very many places, we only -- Lihue's always a short, 135 side.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So Hilo, Kona -- actually Kona's always at the tail end of everything. They're not a concern until the end. So really the only thing we go to because we have a mail contract is Maui and Hilo, Maui and Hilo, Maui and Hilo.

So if Maui goes down we just go around to the next plane in Hilo. We just -- you know, the next plane goes to Hilo and the mechanics will either tell us we have another plane or they'll work on that plane to get it up and running and then we'll go back to Maui but we just basically skip it and just go to the next row.

Q. Does that happen -- how often does that happen?

A. Well, as a company as a whole I don't think we try to make it happen at all. It rarely happens. I mean, I don't know, maybe a couple times a month maybe, two.

Q. Okay. Can you remember the last time it happened?

A. That we had a plane go down like permanently or just for a couple of minutes or so?

Q. Can't fly the night for whatever reason?

A. No. I mean, we've been running two planes because they had one in the hangar they were working on, they wouldn't release it to us until it was done, so we've been running two planes fine for a while.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you ever have to cancel a flight for mechanical reasons that had a mail contract to it or is the mail always the one that got --

A. No, I mean, mail takes priority, don't get me wrong but we never cancel, we never cancel flights if we have options. Yeah, still like today we don't have a belly system right now, right.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So we use alternate modes of transportation which is Aloha. We charter them.

Q. Okay.

A. So we don't have to use our airplanes, we've been getting by all this time by using other companies, UPS, Aloha, Hawaiian, whatever. I have all their numbers so I'm just on speed dial. Yeah, I need, I need a charter to Maui, okay.

Q. Do they ever come to you for a charter?

A. Yes, all the time.

Q. All the time as in daily or all the time as in (indiscernible)?

A. No, now I wouldn't say all the time as a charter but for positions, yes, because they want to fill their airplanes too and maybe I have some empty spots. We're very friendly here in the Hawaiian Islands so even though we might be in competition with each other we always sit there and try to fill our airplanes.

So if I have three spots to Hilo I'll call up UPS and say, hey, guys, I've got three more

spots for Hilo and they'll be like, you do, hold on, let me call Paul. Paul works at Aloha. And he says, Paul, I gave you six cans, what time is your plane leaving? Seven o'clock. Well, Bobby's leaving at five. Okay, I'll give him the three. So it's -- we do that.

Q. Okay.

A. So we all work together.

Q. Okay. That helps me understand how this whole system works.

A. Yeah, it's really good. We didn't do that in Chicago at O'Hare but we do it here so --

Q. Okay.

A. We're all friends so --

Q. Okay. Have you ever had so much cargo on a flight that you had to offload fuel that you're aware of?

A. No, never had that because to get to, to get to that point where you have to -- the max weight I've ever gone was 20,400 on a plane fuel wise.

Q. Okay.

A. So that's like a combo. We never ever had that much volume, they don't get that heavy. You would think they, they average around 3,000 pounds.

Q. The cans themselves?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. Okay. And this night had five --

A. Night it was seven positions but five cans.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And do you remember what the pilot, I'm sorry, what did you call it, PBJ, no?

A. A PBJ?

Q. Yeah.

A. That's not on that plane.

Q. Oh.

A. That's an eight position plane, these are seven, 810s a seven position plane. 809, the one that came in right before --

Q. Uh-huh.

A. That was an eight position plane that had a PBJ on it.

Q. So there was no, there was no pallet or PBJ on --

A. The PAG on this one.

Q. PAG?

A. Yeah. There's a PAJ, there's a PAG and there's a PBJ.

Q. Okay.

A. They're all difference sizes and different airlines and different planes will have different ones as well.

Q. I was getting those turned around.

A. Codes, yeah.

Q. That's why I was just making sure. Thank you for educating me there. What kind of training do you give the staff that actually -- do you give the training to any of the staff that loads?

A. Actually we have a training department. I will kind of like keep on training as they go but they go through a training department.

Q. Okay.

A. So if they have any questions, you know, because we get new hires all the time especially lately because we, you know, nobody wants a job anymore, I guess. So, yeah, so they go through the training department but those trainers aren't there during the night.

They'll have that training during the day and then they put -- after two weeks of training they'll put them on nights but they still might have a question or two,

you know. So, of course, being in the business a long time I've already gone through the same training, even though I had that training many, many years ago and keep on consistently going through training annually.

I know exactly what he's referring to because I've been through the same training class. So if they have a question about that then I'll answer it or I'll show them. It might be one of those things you have to show somebody so --

Q. Okay. When is the last time you went through training?

A. Three months ago.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Alrighty. So you get on some new hires here?

A. Yes. I heard it's like that crazy everywhere now, FedEx is telling me the same thing UPS.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So when you get a new hire do you help train them on the actual doing the work or --

A. Well, they do the same thing on the night as they do in the day so what they do is they usually take a separate airplane that sits off to the side they're not using and they'll train them on that particular aircraft.

Q. Okay.

A. So once you get trained on the particular aircraft, we only have two different styles, one is an eight position, like I said, and one's a seven. So there's only one difference and that is you have an extra position at the tail.

Q. Okay.

A. And that's pretty much it; they're all the same so --

Q. Okay. So during the night loading do you ever go out and just watch --

A. Yes.

Q. -- to make sure they're putting the cans?

A. Yes, yes. I do do that, I audit once in a while, I go out there and audit my people.

Q. Okay.

A. So it's just that's a good practice to do.

Q. When was the -- did you audit the night of the accident?

A. No, I was loading. I was -- actually I was loading a short for Lihue.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, I was out there actually supervising the short for Lihue. Me and Michelle were both over there because we had no, no other planes going out at that time. We had, we had an order of Maui, Maui, Lihue, Hilo that was our order planned for that night. So the Maui, Maui left, we were working on the Lihue. Hilo was never even started yet.

And, again, we could only do one plane at a time, we don't have a big crew so, you know, we were working one at a time. We were doing the Lihue, we were just about wrapping up when we heard that there was -- 810 was returning back to hangar, so which, you know, we were figuring it got either a flat tire or a light went out or something, we didn't know what it was for.

So we had -- I asked Michelle to go get the marshalling crew and they went over there to wait for it and I continued to load Lihue so --

Q. How did you find out that the accident occurred?

A. I believe it was on the PA system because we have -- I think it was on the PA system. It could have been Michelle actually calling me too but I think it was on the PA system because she would have heard it.

But see we were far from where we were so I think she actually called me up as well. Don't remember exactly because we were way up. I don't know if you've been to the airport by us so all the way where the Medevac planes are --

Q. Uh-huh.

A. That's where we were, we were way up there, which is as far as you can go from the hangar and the hangar speaker is directly going towards the seven-threes where they're parked, so I'm all the way over there.

Q. Okay.

A. So I know I Heard something but I was surprised because 809 came pulling in and I thought that was 810. I didn't look at my phone or flight aware or anything because I was busy loading this plane and I just saw the plane and I go, okay, it's back, it's safe, you know what I mean, but it wasn't that plane it was 809.

For a distance and I don't have great eyesight planes look alike so and then that's when, I believe, Michelle called me and said, Bob, did you hear? And then I was just like, what? And she goes, plane's in the water, and I was just like, whoa, okay.

So I stopped the movement of everything and I had to run over to dispatch and confirm that so that's what I did.

Q. So once you confirmed it what did you do next?

A. Well, the pilots were still in there for the short and I told them, I said, well, you've got to get ahold of the -- what do you call it, the -- sorry guys, tired. Like not the fire department, the Coast Guard, because if it's in the water we're supposed to get ahold of the Coast Guard.

And he said I've already made all the calls. And I was like, okay. And I didn't know anything, what was going on or something like that. And I said, okay, we need to have -- make sure all the right people are called.

So I tried to give a call to Wallace, David Sease (ph.), all the people that are in pretty much managers or command at work and got everybody, got ahold of everybody and they all came in so --

Q. How did you know to do that, was it just off the top of your head or --

A. Yeah, to be honest with you, even at UPS we never had to do something like that before so it was kind of the first time. But I just thought it was for the best interest to make sure that we had everybody here instead of just me, because it's all going to be like heavy shouldered and I was just like, okay, this is something I need to share the load.

This is too important. I could misstep or something like that so we better have a brain trust, everybody here.

Q. Okay.

A. So that's what I did.

Q. So was there any guidelines anywhere, any checklist to (indiscernible)?

A. They have one and I believe he followed it.

Q. Okay.

A. The dispatcher has one, yes.

Q. Okay. Now the accident flight had Hazmat on it?

A. Yes.

Q. Does that require you to do anything, notify anybody differently?

A. Well, I notified every single customer because it was just consumer commodity, it's not, it's not considered a hazard like you would think it was. But I called everybody. I called FedEx; I let them know about their product. I called FedEx Ground; I let them know about their product. I called Express Trucking and let them know. The only one I couldn't get ahold of was the Norpac, which is fish. It's frozen fish.

Q. Okay.

A. So it was the only one. Until this day I never got ahold of them so I'm pretty sure Daisy, who works the dayshift, was able to let them know so --

Q. Okay. But if there is Hazmat onboard this, not just commodities but (indiscernible)?

A. Yeah. If it's something different, yes, yes, yes.

Q. Who would you notify?

A. You've got to notify the dispatcher for one and you've got to also -- there's two people, the people that -- oh, God, Environmental Protection Agency, so, yeah.

Q. Okay. I know you're tired, you've got to be tired of looking at me and talking with me, so I'm going to pass it off --

A. I'm just tired in general.

Q. Well, and I don't want to keep you any longer. You've really helped me understand --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- what you guys do and what your responsibilities are.

A. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: I'll let other guys ask and we'll go around twice so I'll have another chance, don't worry. Bill.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Yeah. So, Bobby, one of the things that we have been hearing from both crew members is that their recollection was that the airplane was heavier than usual and but from the true paperwork or the loading paperwork, but it sounds like you're saying it was actually lighter than usual?

A. Yeah, it's lighter than usual.

Q. Okay.

A. For a Maui trip, it really doesn't go over 20,000 to be honest with you, and we were under 20.

Q. Okay. Yeah, maybe they just misremember what it said on the trip (indiscernible)?

A. Well, I mean, they, they just flew the night before as well so, you know, they've been flying.

Q. Yeah.

A. I think Okai did fly the night before so and he had the same plane so, yeah.

Q. Yeah, okay. And can you tell me about any interactions that you had with those two pilots (indiscernible)?

A. Okai comes in and he's a really nice guy. He came in.

MR. KATT: He's talking about the night of the accident.

MR. BRAMBLE: The night of the accident?

MR. LEHMAN: Yeah, yeah. I'm sorry, yeah.

MR. KATT: That's all right.

MR. LEHMAN: Yeah. So he came in because they have to give me, it's a piece of paper that looks about this size and it's called a performance sheet and that's where I was just talking about the bleeds and if it's a wet runway and all that, he fills all that out.

So he came in and he always calls me boss. Said, how you doing, boss? And I'm like, I'm doing good, how are you? And he's, I'm doing good. And it was going to be his first run because Amin (ph.) went on the first, first time, the first Maui; he was going on the second.

So he went over and I looked all over his numbers. We confirm because I read off like a checklist, I go, all right, bleeds on, yeah, yeah, yep, so just in case he makes -- he made a mistake or something, we're just going over verbally.

And once he did that I inputted his numbers. Once that was printed out I said, okay, we're ready to load. And then the load supervisor comes in. I tell that over the radio. And then she goes inside dispatch and always tells dispatch a load is starting now, because we like the pilots out there when we start loading.

We don't like to load anytime without a pilot out there, either an FO or the captain so -- because they get a copy before it's even signed so they can observe too and then the load supervisor has their copy so they can watch the load go in, verify the cans, verify the ticket.

There's a ticket that goes in a pouch and once that is all done usually you have your FO looking over your shoulder looking at the load as well. And then once the load is completed that's

when she signs every position and she'll go down and check the bellies, make sure for -- she checks them before too.

That's one of the things they -- before you go out to the plane and start loading topside you need to do a security check of the plane, make sure the bellies doesn't have anything that you didn't put in there, you know.

And then once that's done she goes and does the topside and then again goes down to make sure that the bellies are -- if we are clean, if we do have something in there, it's in the proper position, if it's locked down correctly and then the doors are closed. So that's part of the -- and they sign off on that too so -- and then they go back upstairs, they see the captain.

The captain goes over if there's Hazmat, you know, they go over the Hazmat paperwork and pretty much that's it. If there's anything that they need to say to each other they'll get it over right there.

And then usually maintenance comes in after that and they talk to the captain. Then they get their things straight and they have to sign a piece of paper too saying that their checklist has been checked off. And once that is done everybody walks down the stairs, they close the door, and we're ready to roll so --

And the FO -- I don't know if you know this but the FO on this plane he does always do this walk arounds so he did the bellies himself as well. Ryan's really good at that. I don't think he's ever missed a day of not doing that.

Q. Okay. Did you speak -- I guess you had to speak but the captain because you guys reviewed the performance sheet?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. And where were you?

A. They all come into my office.

Q. Where is your office?

A. Three doors down from dispatch.

Q. Okay.

A. It's probably, to be honest with you, about the length of this room from the three doors.

Q. Okay.

A. Because the offices aren't that big.

Q. And so the captain and the FO came in or just the --

A. No, just the captain.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. Because the captain is always the one that has to give me the performance sheet, he's the one that fills it out.

Q. And how long did that take, about that discussion?

A. Thirty seconds, really, I mean, he knows I'm busy and he's busy. He's got to do what he's got to do but we go over that first, yeah.

Q. Did he mention any concerns or any problems?

A. No.

Q. Did he look healthy and alert?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Okay. And the FO, did you talk to him?

A. No, I did not talk to Ryan that night.

Q. Okay. And did he look healthy and alert or did you happen to look at him?

A. I didn't even get a look at him. I do have a camera in my office like a closed-circuit so I see dispatch just because I want to -- sometimes if I'm looking for a pilot I need to know where he is, if he's in the dispatch or did he maybe go to the bathroom.

So I'll wait until they come back into dispatch because that's where they all sit. They all hang out in there and just sitting there just waiting for their flight to be ready. So I did see him on

camera when he showed up so but that was it. I never talked to him that night.

Q. Okay. All right. I think that's all I got. Thanks.

A. Thank you.

MR. BRAMBLE: Clarence.

MR. KANAE: Well, thank you.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Bobby, thanks for coming around today and I appreciate your time. Does the company have a cargo handling manual with procedures?

A. Yes, loading manual?

Q. If that's what it's called, loading manual?

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. LDM, yeah.

Q. Okay, great. And could you just describe the cargo loading process --

A. Yeah, from start to finish?

Q. (Indiscernible).

A. If it's a can that's been generated by another company, we'll say FedEx Air, they load their own can. They'll transport over to us. They'll give us an email and also there's an electronic ticket that's inside the pouch that has been generated by their scale system and that will be printed out and it will show the gross weight and it also will have on there the actual can number like SAA304 whatever four, five.

And then it will show a tare weight on there as well. So that's the tare weight of the can. So we get all that information but they also send it in an email. So I always verify and I've taught my guys that no matter what they say on an email, somebody's typing it, like he's doing right now, right, you could have a mistake very easily hit a nine over a zero.

So we always make sure that the tickets match the email and that's the way to make sure it's safely done.

Q. Okay. So, for example, a ULD -- the ULDs that come from UPS --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- you're just taking the weights that they give you or do you weight the actual ULDs as well before it gets loaded on your aircraft?

A. Well, we -- like I said, as I said previously, we'll take one can from each company, okay.

Q. Okay.

A. One can because this has been confirmed with the FAA because I've told them what we do and our guy said it was good and we have record of it every day of every single scale that we have, it's on my report that I do.

And we do one FedEx, we do -- if UPS drops on us we do one UPS and FedEx Ground so --

Q. Okay.

A. Hawaiian too sometimes but very rare or Aloha, very rare but we do take them.

Q. And you were mentioning that the actual scales --

A. Yes, they all match, yeah.

Q. -- are the same companies?

A. Same company that makes it, yeah. Same company manufacturer.

Q. Who does the calibration on those scales?

A. That, like I said, that's something that's --

Q. Like you said, Bobby --

A. Yeah, Bobby Soon is probably the one that's in charge of it because he's the manager in the daytime.

Q. Okay.

A. So (indiscernible) probably put him in charge so -- but there is a sticker that shows, you know, that it's been (indiscernible), yeah.

Q. Okay, good. Is there any concern with tail tipping? Do you know the term tail tipping?

A. Yeah. I've saw Evergreen get tipped without a tail stand.

Q. So is there any procedures for tail -- to prevent tail tipping?

A. Yeah, always make sure before a load starts that the tail stand's in its place. You never load anything.

Q. Is --

A. Go ahead.

Q. -- is that in your manual?

A. Yes, it is, yes.

Q. Okay. What about damage criteria on any of the straps or ULDs?

A. Yeah. So if it's a ULD it can't be more than three inches wide. If it is any kind of cut in or it's basically going to -- we'll take it out of service, we'll red tag it. We have red tags that we put in there and that goes to maintenance which is down at Hangar 2 and they'll either put a plate in there and put -- like drill holes in whatever, replace it, and then they reweigh it so that the tare weight changes.

Q. So the company has their own repair?

A. Yes, they do it at Hangar 2.

Q. Repair process?

A. Yeah. Now if it's a strap or something, no, we'll probably buy a new strap. It won't -- you can't really repair straps.

Q. Okay. And you mentioned the different types of ULDs used to include the --

A. AAYs, yeah, and SAAs, that's the only things we use on our planes.

Q. Okay. And does, does the company own these or do they --

A. Yes, yes.

Q. They own them?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. All right.

A. There's 75, 75 SAAs and there's 25 AAYs, I believe.

Q. All right. And --

A. But the thing is, like you were asking, not all of them are in service. We take them out of service because if they've been damaged. We had one incident in Maui where a wind -- just wind took it and crushed the side of it. It's not repairable so they turned it into a storage unit.

Q. I see.

A. Yeah. They don't, they don't use them.

Q. Is there anyone else that actually confirms the actual weights of these containers when they come from UPS or --

A. Yes, my load supervisor takes the weights. They're, not load supervisor, it's a different term, the supervisor that's on duty that night so whoever it is because it's different people.

Q. And you mentioned that the company also has another company, sister company that builds cargo?

A. Oh, a sister company. They're not a sister, they're -- we kind of have like -- they bring in the freight. They're like a freight forwarder, it's called Pacair. They'll bring specific air cargo, they'll bring it in and again when they bring it over it's not in cans it's all loose pieces and we have to -- like last night it took us like an hour and a half to scale everything.

So we basically scale every single piece they do and then you have to write it with big marker the weights and stuff and then an airway bill is connected to that piece too so--

Q. Okay, all right. Is each ULDs -- are they tagged with a weight on it?

A. Yes. Yes, I'm the one who --

Q. So --

A. -- I'm the one who does the tags.

Q. Okay, great.

A. Yeah.

Q. And then who verifies that that is the actual can that sits on station 1, 2, 3, et cetera.

A. Well, I'm the one who actually goes out and tags the cans as well because, like I said, I've been in this business a long time, I take safety very seriously. So I go out and actually go to the can, make sure that the -- remember I told you FedEx has their own digital readout.

I compare the can number, compare the weight, compare the destination and it's the same -- I'll tell you this, it's the same as if you'd load a belly, okay. If you got -- the first piece that you take out of that can, if we do have to load a belly, you make sure it's the right destination and, of course, you pull the tag before that as well.

So you don't sit there and start loading half a freaking belly and you find out, oh, my God, this is Hilo and I'm supposed to be loading Maui. No, it's on the package itself and it's on the tag, so that's the first thing you do.

So it's always there's little things you need to do before you ever send a can to a plane. So you see these tags that I put in, I pull the one, the original out, I put ours in and it has a placement. And then what I do is I tell the tug driver that hooks up, you are going straight to the plane and you're dropping off position number two.

And when it gets to the plane the load supervisor has a piece of paper, the same exact weight and balance, and she can see it from up there, the can's approaching and she'll sit there and say, okay, two is confirmed and they'll put on there.

So they won't put it on the K loader unless it's actually confirmed and once it's confirmed on the K loader they'll bring it up to the plane. So that's the procedure, it's in our manual.

Q. So let's say you're not there that evening.

A. Yeah. So on Saturdays -- Fridays and Saturdays I don't work but the same position is done by Michelle, who's the supervisor on the weekend that does it.

Q. So she has the same training and --

A. She has the same training.

Q. -- qualifications --

A. Correct.

Q. -- as you?

A. Yes. And she does weight and balances as well so --

Q. Oh, okay, okay. And, let's see, okay. That's all I have at the moment, thank you.

A. Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Thanks. Rich.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Just about the different airplanes, you had talked about the different positions that airplanes --

A. Yeah, the 809 and the 810, those are different, yeah.

Q. And then do you know that the engine ratings are different from --

A. Yeah, the different engines, yeah.

Q. Okay. And obviously we'll put some sort of constraint on the -- how much cargo you put on, right?

A. Oh, yeah, of course, yeah. Either Dash 9s or -- yeah.

Q. So 18, anything below 20 is kind of lightweight as far as for all three airplanes, or do you think that the Dash 9 which is --

A. Well, I really -- to be honest with you, I'm not into that mechanicals and aviation. I didn't design the program. David has been part of this program. We're on Letter R, I don't know if you guys seen the program but if you look at the bottom it says Letter R. I don't know if you have a

copy of it.

But that gets checked off by the FAA, it doesn't get released to us weight and balance people until it's actually been confirmed by the FAA. So it's a program and the program does everything. It will go red no matter what if it's not in specs on anything so --

Q. Okay. It is, that's the program, it's different than an Excel file, it's not an Excel, is it?

A. It is an Excel file.

Q. An Excel file.

A. Yes.

Q. So that's the program you were talking about?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. I think we might have a copy of that.

A. And the captain can't even sign his name on it, it actually blanks out all the places where you would sign your name, that's why it won't let you do anything unless it's in specs.

Q. While you're out there, you know, supervising a load -- do you -- have you ever noticed any like maintenance issues with the plane like? Have you pointed out like fluid leaking somewhere or, you know, if you get out there and whoever's checking the belly --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- you know, going through their checks, what if they see something --

A. To be honest with you, I mean, we tell our, our people all the time, if you see anything don't let it go. We always have to tell maintenance. Now me personally I've never seen anything to tell maintenance about but I can't say that of all my employees because I've never interviewed all my employees to ask them that question.

But that is our company policy if you see something. Oh, it could be just FOD, you know what I mean, because there is FOD once in a while, we have because of all the engines blowing that way especially from the Medevac planes they're coming all this way. And have you been on a

ramp?

Q. Yeah.

A. Where they have the fence line there?

Q. Yeah.

A. We do FOD walks over there all the time and we find garbage all the time up against the fence line because there's always FOD being blown our direction. So, yeah, guys, we have garbage cans out there to put FOD.

But leaks and stuff, we always say if there's anything that you see that's not normal go tell a mechanic.

MR. LEE: Thanks. That's all I have.

MR. ETCHER: Alrighty. I just have a few questions and then if it's okay unless you need a break?

MR. LEHMAN: No, that's all right.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. You said that you sign off the form, the loader signs off a form and the captain signs off a form?

A. Well, I don't sign, I don't sign it. Weight and balance, there's a section where I'm just signing that I did the weight and balance.

Q. Okay.

A. Okay. But Nicky is my load supervisor, she does all the different signatures, that's each container that goes in each position she initials and she'll initials the bellies. Now if by chance say we're doing topside and the bellies, simultaneously because we want to rush this plane out, right, okay.

Well, we have another load supervisor that will monitor the bottom bellies but it's a

different signature, that person who has signed off on that needs to sign that as well. So say I am helping her out that day, she's up topside I'm doing the bellies. I go upstairs after I've confirmed that the bellies are in position and I'll sign it, the belly part.

Q. Okay.

A. So we make sure that everybody's doing their job correctly.

Q. So that signed piece of paper that you signed and she signed --

A. And the pilot gets one.

Q. -- and the pilot signed?

A. Yes.

Q. How many copies?

A. Two copies.

Q. Two copies. And the pilot gets one and --

A. And dispatch.

Q. And dispatch gets the other?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, alrighty.

A. And they also get the checklist. We have as checklist, a pre-checklist. That pre-checklist is saying we have done all the security checks of the airplane so --

Q. Okay. And dispatch gets that as well?

A. Yes, they get that too.

Q. Okay, alrighty. You had mentioned something about the first officer on the accident flight and how he's never missed checking the belly or he's never missed --

A. He's really good at that because he's part of the safety committee.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, he's part of the safety committee. He's really good at that.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Have you ever seen FOs, maybe not?

A. No, I'm not out there enough to notice that but when I've done bellies before he's always over my shoulder.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. So, seriously, he's like right there. And he's always like monitoring, you know, just -- I don't know if he's just curious but I think it's because he's really safety conscious.

Q. Well you said he's on the safety committee?

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that -- what, is that a company group?

A. It's a company group. I'm not actually a part of it but I know he is a part of it because he comes in and he asks me questions once in a while, just different things that new employee, have we had him trained and stuff like that, and I said, yeah, he's gone through 10 (ph.) he's gone through the training, so --

Q. Okay. Is there anybody that's in your group that is part of that committee?

A. No, it's all management.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, and it's basically, to be honest with you because we work nights, I don't even attend a lot of the meetings because I'm sleeping and that's what happens is the guys that work day are all part of these groups.

Q. Okay.

A. You know what I mean, because they're awake.

Q. Okay.

A. So, yeah. I used to be but I'm like this and it doesn't really help so --

Q. Understood. The weight and balance program that you use --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- you said you're on Dash R or --

A. Dash R, yeah.

Q. Okay. What were the changes to get you to Dash R, to Dash R?

A. To be honest with you, a lot of it is the new employees, so it actually has a dropdown menu for the pilots and the copilots so when you add new people to the program, to the workforce it will have new names, otherwise it doesn't have a name and you'll have to put a dash, it's like just a dash and you can fill it in then so --

Q. Okay.

A. But David always tries to keep that up-to-date but also that there's anything changes there always -- this is how David told me, he says, when he created this file in the system that even though he has a new system, maybe a new letter coming out he goes through the same checks all the way down just to make sure, because Excel sometimes will screw up, you know what I mean?

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So he goes through that whole process again. Even though he's only changing this he still goes through every step, one through 100.

Q. So he developed your weight and balance software program?

A. Yeah. He, I think he's the co-owner of it, to be honest with you. The guy that actually used to be a pilot as well, that used to work for Rhoades Aviation.

Q. Okay.

A. But then came over to work for us for TransAir for maybe four years. He doesn't no longer. But when that happened, it basically became David's program.

Q. Okay.

A. They worked it together but because he doesn't work here anymore now what was David's,

because they used to share duties in putting ones out, you know, check and stuff.

Q. Have any of the changes been for something other than adding new employees?

A. Yes. They'll change it for different engines, if you put a different engine on a plane, I believe so --

Q. Okay.

A. Like again I'm not in maintenance but I believe they changed it recently when they had an injury, change so --

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. But again they cannot just change it, they have to actually -- FAA comes in and I believe they monitor, they go through it together and it takes almost two weeks before it even gets -- and then once it comes then they publish it and says, okay, all outer stations please delete the old file and then managers have to sign off that it's all been deleted and the new one's in place.

Q. Okay.

A. Because they won't let you use the old ones anymore.

Q. Okay. I know you work nights but do you ever see the FAA come out?

A. Oh, yeah, he was just here the other day so we had a big meeting up in the conference room.

Q. At night?

A. No, it was daytime. I had a long day. They said my boss saw me behind the desk still and he goes, hey, you're still here, come on up and join us. I wish I had an exit door behind. So I was like, yeah, okay.

Q. Do you ever see them at night?

A. No. I don't personally. I do see people that work for the government at night. We have TSA come around, you know, that's just normal. They always want to see what they can get on a property or something like -- they want to make sure the goods are secure.

Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. So we do a good job with that.
Q. I just want to make sure for the record that you don't see FAA people at night when you're working the night shift?
A. No, I think it's more they come by when they have these meetings and stuff like that, you know.
Q. Okay.
A. I know we have a new plane that night be coming up so I think there's meetings about that too so --
Q. Okay. Well, I appreciate the help.
A. Yeah.
Q. I promised you I didn't have too many questions.
A. Yeah, no, no.
MR. ETCHER: I can keep going, I can talk all day but that would be bad. Bill?
MR. BRAMBLE: I don't have anything additional. Thank you.
MR. LEHMAN: Thank you.
BY MR. KANAE:
Q. I just have a couple more, Bobby.
A. Yes.
Q. The first one is, you mentioned belly cargo.
A. Yeah.
Q. How is that weighed? How do you --
A. We, for belly cargo we have actual individuals scales; I don't know if you've ever seen them, they use them on the postal side. They're metal scales. You do a test weight. There's a test weight we have. You test weight it.

Once that's test weighted then you take it out to the belly and each box that goes on there. That is a process we can do or there's a faster process and the faster process is you don't have to weigh each individual box, all right. This is how we did it at UPS.

Basically you load up the compartment, okay, and then you rescale it on the main scale because you started off on the number, right, and once you put that position in now you go back and you rescale it and you know how much that was in that position, do you see what I'm saying?

We just had an audit by the FAA. I'm sorry, there was FAA here two weeks ago but not for the 121 side, it was for the 135 side and they observed us doing that with the -- and they approved everything because that's how we loaded our short.

Because we have compartment D, F, G, and I. We loaded up G, we re-weighed the can, went back, we know what's in G now. Now you weigh it for I. You start off with the first weight. You have to weigh that can first before you even go to the plane.

But to know what you put in there it's a faster process than trying to go ding, that will take you an hour so --

Q. So --

A. But it actually matches up perfect.

Q. -- so correct me if I'm wrong.

A. Yeah.

Q. The cargo compartment's in the bottom?

A. Yes. Yes, A, yes, yeah.

Q. Is considered bulk, a bulk cargo compartment?

A. Correct. No, we don't ever put any Hazmat down there, it always goes up top.

Q. And no ULDs can fit in there?

A. No, no, no, no.

Q. Correct?

A. No, this is all loose packages.

Q. Exactly so --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- so you're saying you take, you take one, one package, weigh it and then move it together?

A. Yes. If it's, if it's just individual, a couple pieces --

Q. Yes.

A. -- yeah, then we put it on an individual scale and we'll put it in there.

Q. And then how do you, again, one more time --

A. If it's, you're filling up pretty much say the back of the plane or the front of the plane --

Q. Yes, yes.

A. -- the whole bellies are going to go. To know what's in four that's what we consider the back, the start of the back.

Q. Okay.

A. Four, five and six you would weigh the can first, take it out to the scale, the whole can, just to make sure that you're right, you're starting off on the right number and then you load up four. Then once you're done with four you weigh it again, okay, and now you know what four was because now you know what your total is before, do you know what I'm saying?

So you're just -- it's just basic math and I'm really good at it. So you do the four, you go back and you can now load up six and if you need to go in five and again, you weigh it again. Every compartment you always weigh again because all you're doing is you're going to have a different gross weight and then you might have set off your first one, and then you might have set off your second one and you'll know exactly and it comes down to the perfect numbers.

Q. Okay, okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. I just wanted to clarify.

A. Yeah, FAA was -- they wanted to see how we did it and the guy was -- there was two of them and they were just like, you guys are fast with this, and it's because it is a fast process. We developed it at UPS and it works perfect so --

Q. Okay, okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And then my last question.

A. Yeah.

Q. Does the company handle any special cargo? Do you understand what special cargo is?

A. No, I don't know what special cargo is.

Q. It could be machinery, it could be a vehicle.

A. No, we don't do vehicles or anything like that. Everything has to fit in a can or it has to fit on a PAG and if it's in a can it's usually -- we don't take like live animals and put them in cans or anything like that, you know.

MR. KATT: That's probably good.

MR. LEHMAN: Yeah. If anything that we take is usually just boxes, food produce, stuff like that. We do have newspapers, contracts, the fish I told you we lost, frozen fish, stuff like that.

MR. KANAE: Automotive parts?

MR. LEHMAN: Automotive parts, if they were say, ordered on Amazon maybe but I don't know if we'd go through like, a specific auto part place. I don't think we have a contract with that. It would have to be something that would be through FedEx or like I said, they take Amazon.

You know, we don't know exactly everything that's in that can, what customer ordered what but they're allowed to take it, I'm pretty sure we're allowed to take it. So it goes -- it's usually just all Amazon. It's Amazon, Amazon, Amazon so --

MR. KANAE: Great, Bobby, thank you very much.

MR. LEHMAN: Yes.

MR. KANAE: I have no further questions.

MR. LEE: I don't have anything else either.

MR. LEHMAN: Oh, I get to go to bed.

MR. ETCHER: Now let me start the next round. No, I'm just kidding.

MR. LEHMAN: Oh, my God.

MR. ETCHER: No, I'm just kidding.

MR. LEHMAN: Oh, God, I need another one.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Hey, thank you again for all your help. I just have a few really quick closing questions for you.

A. Yes.

Q. Is there anything you can think of that we didn't ask that you're like, oh, I wish they would ask this, it might help them?

A. No, but I would like to know what you guys find. I really -- I mean, I'm really big on safety. I've been in the aviation business for -- it's going to be 33 years, and this is the first time and to be honest with you, it hit me hard so --

Q. Well, the good news is everything we find will actually become public at some point.

A. Well, that's good because I've been watching all the videos and everything because I'm trying to learn.

Q. Yeah.

A. Because I have pilot friends and they all called me all from like the Chicago Area, Tampa, and they're all calling me going, dude, your pilots rock, you know what I mean, because this is like the first time there was ever a water landing at night and people survived.

And they go, can you -- I mean, if you guys are Hawaiian, I don't mean to -- they're like, are they from the Island? I go, no, I think they're both from the Mainland. Oh, that's because they're Mainland guys, man. And I was like, okay, one flies for Jet Blue, you know, they're all captains and stuff.

But they're all like praising these guys and I'm like, they want to know how they're doing. I was telling them all the time, oh, he just got out of the hospital. Oh, my God, that's so cool, you know, because they couldn't believe it.

They're pilots themselves and you don't ever want to think that's going to happen but if it does happen, now in the back of your mind you're thinking, I'm going to survive, you know what I mean, because somebody else did. So that's really cool but, I mean, I really was paying attention to their stay in the hospital and monitoring that and telling my friends who are pilots so --

Q. Okay. You will find out because it's all -- everything we do is going to be public at some point, it's going to be a little bit down the road.

A. Yeah, because I'm very interested, very -- and all my friends are interested. So they're all like, we want to know what happened too, so --

Q. Okay. The last question I have is if you were king for a day and you can make any change you wanted to TransAir, what would you do or would you?

A. I would get a raise.

Q. Everybody (indiscernible) money but --

A. Well, I'm doing a lot of hours. If I was king for a day, I would probably get bigger airplanes because our airplanes are too small for the business that we're doing. 737s are too -- they're old and they're too small. I would get a seven, six.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, because that's what we had at UPS and they -- 24 positions and you can just do one Maui run and you're done. None of this seven, seven, it takes all day. So, yeah, that's what I

would do, I would probably have a larger fleet but more capacity so --

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Well, perfect. I appreciate your help. And it is 2:39 and I'll turn this off because we're complete. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 2:39 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII
ON JULY 2, 2021
Interview of Robert Lehman

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FA174

PLACE: Honolulu, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Wade Donovan
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *		
Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
	*	
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Interview of: NICOLETTE DETOL, Cargo Admin/Loads Supervisor

Rhodes Aviation/TransAir

Honolulu, Hawaii

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

CLARENCE KANAE, Safety Inspector of Operations
Federal Aviation Administration

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing

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INTERVIEW

MR. ETCHER: Well, good morning. Again, I'm Shawn Etcher, National Transportation Safety Board. I'm an operational factors investigator. I along with Bill here were part of a group that's investigating the event that occurred the other night. We brought you in here because you had interaction with the flight, and so we want to understand your job, how it all works, and all that interaction. So, that's why we wanted to talk to you. Case you're not aware, we are an independent agency with the Federal government. Our job is to determine probable causes of transportation accidents, and the ultimate goal is just to keep them from happening again.

We're not part of the FAA, we have no regulatory enforcement action, nothing. We're totally independent. So, you don't have to worry about us doing anything. However, we can't guarantee you immunity or confidentiality or anything, because all we do here -- we're kind of a transparent agency. We put it all out publicly so people can learn.

I'm going to go around the table here, let everybody introduce themselves to you, I'm going to start with Bill.

MR. BRAMBLE: I'm Bill Bramble, I'm a Human Performance Investigator with NTSB.

MR. KANAE: I'm Clarence Kanae with the FAA. My specialty is operations, I'm an Aviation Safety Inspector.

MR. LEE: I'm Rich Lee, a Boeing safety pilot.

MR. ETCHER: Those are all of us who are going to ask you questions. Is there any one of us that you don't want present in the room? We're good with everybody?

MS. DETOL: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Today we're using a digital recorder, once we're done with the interview, we're going to send it out to a transcriptionist and it's going to be transcribed for us. Once we get the transcription back, we're all going to look at it here on the group to make sure and correct any typographical errors, but we are not going to change the content. We just want to

make sure the words are spelled correctly, but what you say is what you said.

Again, we're not going to -- we're not here to assign fault, but we just want your insight into the operations, anything you can about this event.

Each of us group members will have a chance to ask you questions. We're all going to ask questions one at a time, and everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person asking the questions or interrupt you as you're answering them.

We'll go around kind of once around all four of us, and then we'll go around a second time just so if there's any follow up questions. But typically, the second round is a whole lot quicker.

You are entitled to have one representative present with you. Do you have a rep that --

MS. DETOL: Yeah, William right here.

MR. ETCHER: William, would you state your name and title?

MR. KATT: William Katt. Attorney at Wilson Elser law firm.

MR. ETCHER: Alrighty. Do you have any questions right now?

MS. DETOL: No, sir.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Remember as we're talking to you if you need a break just say so, we're happy to take a break, let you get a drink, confer with Bill over there if you need. If you don't understand a question, just ask for clarification. Because if you give me an answer, I don't understand I'm going to ask for clarification from you. So, it's a two-way street that way, alrighty? And if you just don't know something, I don't know works just as good as anything. All right, is everyone ready?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: All set.

INTERVIEW OF NICOLETTE DETOL

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. All right. We're going to start the questions with the toughest questions.

A. Okay.
Q. Can you state your full legal name and spell the last?
A. Full legal name, Nicolette Jean Owang Detol. I'll spell the last, D-E-T-O-L.
Q. Okay, what's your age?
A. 22.
Q. Alrighty, what is your job title?
A. Cargo Admin/Load Supervisor.
Q. What does that -- help me understand what that means.
A. So, I'm Cargo Admin so I work office when I'm not on the ramp, meaning I help with the manifest so that the outer islands can see what we're sending on each plane, and also the input of all of our shipper's freight and the numbers via manifest wise for the outer islands to see and then when I'm on the ramp I'm a load supervisor for the Boeings and I load all my airplanes in accordance with my weight and balances.
Q. And you're only on the Boeings?
A. Yeah, only on the Boeing.
Q. Okay. Is there someone else that does the other aircraft?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Alrighty. How long have you been doing that job?
A. I've been doing this almost going on two years now.
Q. And how long have you been employed at TransAir?
A. Oh, two years, two years.
Q. Two years? So, you got on --
A. I've been doing it yeah, both for two years, yeah.
Q. Okay. Are you a pilot at all?
A. Mm-mm.

Q. Okay, no problem. When you got hired on what kind of training did they give you to do your job?

A. We got training via Tim, Tim Carter our trainer on different -- all the trainings that we need to be in accordance with what we have to learn, sorry.

Q. You're doing fine. How was that training in your opinion? Did it -- when you finished that training were you ready to do your job?

A. Yeah, it helps you understand better what we're supposed to be doing and so we have insight, so I can know okay, here's what I need to do. And if we ever have questions, we can always go back and ask him.

Q. Who can you go back and ask?

A. Tim.

Q. Tim?

A. The trainer.

Q. Okay. Alrighty. So, why did you get involved with doing this type of work?

A. This is actually my first job.

Q. Oh, wow.

A. I actually got hired at a job fair, and so there was no reason why I picked this job it was just the first job that came to me that I was able to get a position at and --

Q. Okay. Alrighty. Do you feel like in the loading department of the aircraft, do you guys feel like you're adequately staffed, or -- do you feel like you've got enough help to do your job the way it needs to be done?

A. Oh, yeah. Yes.

Q. If you had a problem or something you needed clarification on who's your supervisor?

A. Bob Lehman.

Q. Can you go and talk to him with problems?

A. Yes, anything -- any one little question we have we go to him because he runs our night --

Q. Okay.

A. So, anything we need to know --

Q. Do you always work the night shift?

A. Yes.

Q. And what is that shift hours?

A. 10 till 6 unless otherwise later until fully deplane.

Q. Okay. So, walk me through, when you get to work at 10 o'clock --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Walk me through a day in a life of what you do.

A. So, I start my night with checking our emails because I am office too, right? So, I have to check our emails to make sure we don't have any other -- like anything coming dropping late, so we need about it, like animals for example, or -- and then after I do that, I get our -- we call it the master. Basically, it's sectioned off by island and it's sectioned off by island and then by shipper of who we have that night, and I double check all of our freight with our paperwork to make sure all our numbers add up properly for that. For each shipper and each island, make sure we have any big size pieces that we need to note for, or like you know any live animals anything, everything I have to check the manifest -- like basically manifesting and double checking our weights so that when it goes into Bob everything is accurate. Everything is double checked.

Then after I do that, I assist with any scaling of freight, we have another girl that does the scanning of freight, but I also help assist her with that, and in between that we'll get a call from Bob asking what is going on tonight, asking for a rundown, how much weight do we have for each airplane -- not each airplane, each island and again, asking if there's big freight because we need to accommodate for it, and then Bob will come in and we'll turn in our master to him and then he runs down with us. Okay, we have these aircrafts available to us, or -- and also Bob will ask me

who's working for pilots wise so we can know what's going on that night. Basically, just a run down over the phone and before he comes in everything, so we know, okay when he comes in, we need this done, this done, this done.

Then when he comes in give him the paperwork he goes inside, talks to dispatch and the mechanics and everything to get the night started. And then I -- when he's ready I'll go and get the weight and balance from him and then as we start our night to start our first airplane.

Q. Okay. So, during the night when you start your first airplane, are you in the office, are you on --

A. No, I'm ramp, then I switch to being on the ramp and becoming my Load Supervisor position and --

Q. Okay.

A. And that's, yeah --

Q. And where do you do that? Where do you do the load supervisor position?

A. On the plane, on the plane so -- I'm Boeing, yeah? So, we -- when he gives me my weight and balance, I double check with him to make sure that our pilots are right, that our fuel is right, and that our island that we're going to in the aircraft are on is right. And then, I go up to the plane and load in accordance with what he's given me.

Q. Okay.

A. Okay, yeah, that's it.

Q. You had more, I'm sorry I didn't mean step on --

A. No, that's it.

Q. Okay. You said you checked to see if you have animals on board?

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you guys' transport live animals, frozen, all of that?

A. All of the above.

Q. Where do you put the live animals?

A. In the belly, but on that certain airplane we didn't have anything in our belly, yeah.

Q. Okay. How often do you get live animals?

A. We -- not often, but for the mail purpose, sometimes mail the mail side will have like chickens, and we will accommodate for them and put them in the belly. But, besides that, no.

Q. Okay. Seems like a weird question, but how do you weigh the live animals?

A. The mail comes over with their numbers, they will have scaled them the animals and the chickens.

Q. So, you take their weight?

A. Mm-hmm.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Very carefully.

MS. DETOL: Yeah.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. You mentioned you sometimes go help with scaling of the freight?

A. Mm-hmm, that's at the beginning of the night.

Q. Help me understand what that means.

A. All of our shippers drop off the freight and we have to move and check that the weights. The shippers that come from by trucking we have to scale the freight itself, so it gets taken off the truck and goes to the scale and it's by island and so you check, you scale it, you write it on the freight, and then it goes onto Bob's master. Then, for example, for our FedEx and our FedEx Ground, we take one of the cans onto our scale to see the weights that they've given us and see how close in match they are. If for example if it's higher we take our weight and if it's pretty even, we can take the weight that they've provided with us.

Q. If you're weight is higher, you take your weight? Or, if it doesn't matter, if they're weight's higher you still take your weight?

A. We will always take our weight, because that's the weight we see in scale.

Q. Okay. How often when you get those FedEx cans, how often has their weight not been correct?

A. No, there's has always been pretty accurate, pretty even with ours. I believe it's like 60lbs or more we take our weight, if not we can take their weight.

Q. Okay. Have you had any times where the total weights been in error? When you've entered it? How often does that happen, when you measure the can or the ULB or whatever you guys want to call it, that that weight has been off, whether it's FedEx, UPS, or any of the others?

A. Usually like 12 pounds difference.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So, let's talk about the night of the accident. Were you loading that airplane?

A. Yes.

Q. So, you were up on the airplane?

A. Mm-hmm, yeah, but not -- during the load yes, I'm up there but we checked the whole entire -- I checked my whole entire airplane before and after and during the load --

Q. Okay.

A. -- to make sure everything is where it's supposed to be.

Q. Okay. So, did you check the belly of your Boeing?

A. Yes. Before I go up to load my airplane I check the belly to make sure that there's nothing in there, and I make sure that my tail stands are all on and then I go upstairs and I hand one of my load sheets to the pilot so they can run through their numbers and then I go and I watch my cans come onto the airplane to make sure it's the proper can and when it gets onto the loader we check the tag on the thing, on the side, we check the tag that's in the can on the loader to make sure it's the proper position, proper island, proper weight and match my weight and balance. We lower it

onto the airplane in that position, make sure all the locks are secured properly, and move onto the next position.

Q. Okay.

A. Same thing.

Q. So, just for the record, when you check the airplane that night, the belly, was it empty?

A. Empty.

Q. Was there anything in there? Okay. Was anything loaded in the belly?

A. No, we didn't have anything in the belly on that airplane.

Q. Okay. How long does it take you to load a plane, how long did it take you guys to load the accident plane, do you remember?

A. 15, 20 minutes I believe.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And how much -- how many cans or pallets or that, do you remember on that plane?

A. Yeah, we had seven positions filled all seven positions on the airplane.

Q. Do you remember was it all pallets, was it all cans?

A. No, we had four FedEx Ground cans, one FedEx Air can, one can of freight, and the front cookie sheet. One cookie sheet in position one that had our pharmaceuticals.

Q. Okay. I know it's been a while ago, but do you remember what -- how much weight was all that cargo?

A. I'm sorry, I haven't looked at the weight and balance.

Q. That's okay -- I was just --

A. (Indiscernible).

Q. I don't know works just fine, I just figured I'd ask. So how -- when you load the plane do you decide which can goes where, I think you said you look at a sheet?

A. No, well Bob Lehman decides where everything will go on that airplane. I only follow in accordance with what he's given me, the weight and balance sheet. Which was generated from the system to make sure that everything that goes is in proper place.

Q. Okay. Is there any max weight restrictions in any specific zone?

A. Yes. You have max weights.

Q. Are they all the same or are they different?

A. It varies on each airplane, yeah.

Q. Okay. Do you remember the accident flight, where all the zones the same max weight?

A. I'm not sure.

Q. That's okay. So, when you load a can, do you have to verify that the weight of the can --

A. Yes.

Q. Does not exceed it?

A. Yes, yes. On the load sheet it has the max, even in the aircraft it has the max weight that it can hold.

Q. Where's it at in the aircraft?

A. On some of the aircraft it's on the floor, and on some it's on the wall.

Q. Okay. So, it's easy --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- to see?

A. It's, yeah.

Q. Alrighty. Is there -- I know you guys are kind of unscheduled cargo flight, but there's always -- they put a time down that they want a flight to leave

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. If that time comes and goes but you're still not fully loaded is that putting pressure on you?

A. No.

Q. No? Nobody talks to you later -- have you ever had that, let me ask that first. Have you ever -- like let's say a flight was supposed to leave at two in the morning and it's 2:15 and you're still loading cargo --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Does anybody come and talk to you after that saying, hey the flight left late? From what we had determined is a target time?

A. Yeah, the mechanics will act like, oh -- when it likes it's estimated time of departure.

Q. Okay.

A. They'll be oh, give us like five minutes we're still, you know, taking care of something, taking care of a certain position or --

Q. Okay. Does anybody -- do you -- is there any punishment, or is there any write-ups or anything if a flight leaves late from what they have projected to you? So, like if a flight left at 2:15 and it was supposed to leave at 2? Does that go into your file that oh you got that flight out late?

A. Oh, no.

Q. No?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Why do the mechanics come? You said the mechanics would come and say how soon, and is there -- what's the mechanics purpose to be there?

A. To make sure that the aircraft is -- their portion of the aircraft is -- I'm trying to figure out the words to properly -- the mechanics check their portions of the airplane to make sure that it's safe to fly.

Q. Okay. Does the mechanic do anything in the loading process? That you know -- are they part of that loading process, do they make sure the cans are in the right place or do they shut doors?

A. Oh, they shut doors.

Q. Okay. Alrighty. How often do your flights depart after what you guys had intended them to depart? So, like my example the 2 a.m. departure, how often do they leave after that? Is it often? Is it nothing you guys really track much?

A. Oh, no we track all of our times, the only reason why a flight would maybe leave late is some type of mechanical that has to be taken care of.

Q. Have you ever had an airplane that had a mechanical issue and you had to offload it --

A. Yes.

Q. And load it onto -- and how much of a challenge is that for you?

A. No challenge, because you just take it off and Bob will give us another load sheet for the next airplane to follow.

Q. Okay. Have you ever heard of any of the pilots complaining about an airplane?

A. I'm not sure.

Q. Do you interact with the pilots often?

A. Yes, during the load only, though.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you interact with the accident pilots?

A. Yes, just to hand them their paperwork.

Q. Okay. I think I'm good for right now, I'm going to let Bill ask questions now if that's all right. Do you need a break? Do you need some water?

A. No, I'm good, thank you.

Q. You sure?

A. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: All right.

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Nicolette, Shawn was asking you about late departures and the accident flight was scheduled to depart at 1 o'clock and on the company records it indicates it pushed back at 1:23, is that unusual or is that common?

A. I can not -- I don't -- can you repeat your question?

Q. Yeah sorry, so the accident airplane left 23 minutes after the scheduled time, I'm just wondering if that's unusual.

A. No. No.

Q. Okay. Do you know why it left later than 1 o'clock?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Can you describe your interaction with the crew? Did you guys have any conversations?

A. I walk up to my airplane -- the airplane, and I hand them the load sheet so they can look over it, and then I only see them at the end to sign off everything is properly safely locked down before they leave, and they sign off the paperwork for their load sheet.

Q. Is that what happened with the crew on this flight?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you guys discuss anything other than the loading?

A. No.

Q. And how did the captain look?

A. Normal.

Q. Alert and healthy?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. How about the FO.

A. Same for him.

Q. Okay, how well do you know those two pilots?

A. Only during work.

Q. Are they easy to work with?

A. Yes.

MR. BRAMBLE: Okay, that's all I have, thank you.

Next, Clarence.

MR. KANAE: Oh, okay.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Nikki, thank you for coming in this morning and appreciate your time. I wanted to ask you about the cargo operations. You kind of gave us a description, but before you can go into it, what about your training? When was the last time you received your training?

A. It's usually every six months to a year to -- depending on what -- how long the reoccurrence is, six to a year, and we get that every six to a year.

Q. Okay. Every six months to a year?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Okay. In the training, does it include different types of cargo restraints such as straps, nets --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. And the types of ULDs (ph.) that you use --

A. Yes.

Q. Have you all encountered a situation whereby uncertified ULD is brought to the aircraft? Can you identify any problems with perhaps a ULD that's not certified, and it may not fit into an aircraft for example?

A. We don't get any ULDs that wouldn't fit into our aircraft, and all of them were certified because they all have labels on them. FedEx, UPS --

Q. How much training do you get in identifying ULDs? Unit Load Devices vs the cans?

A. Like different cans that we can on the airplane?

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. We get trained on which ones can fit in what positions and load in accordance with that.

Q. Okay, okay. And as far as the scales, since you're involved with weighing, weighing the cargo freight -- who actually does the calibrations on the scales in your company? Who does that? Who checks the scales to make sure that they're, you know, been checked?

A. Oh, I'm not too sure.

Q. I'm sorry?

A. I'm not sure, I don't know.

Q. Oh, you're not sure, okay. All right. Also, in your training what about the weight and balance process -- can you explain the training and your weight/balance?

A. I don't do weight and balance, I don't do that portion of -- Bob Leeman does all the weight and balance stuff, yeah.

Q. Okay, all right. Are you familiar with special cargo?

A. Special loading cargo?

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. Yes.

Q. And what would that be?

A. Special load cargo like for example in hazmat? Or just anything in general?

Q. Anything in general other than hazmat, for example machinery, cars, things of that nature. Something out of the ordinary, long objects like poles and things of that nature.

A. We don't -- specifically know exactly what our cargos are, we know where they've come from via the shipper but if it's in a box, we don't know what's in that box.

Q. Okay, all right. If there are any last-minute changes to the flight for by example, either one of this cargo to be shipped over to Hawaii for example, and you have to delay the flight for that.

What's the process for last minute changes? Is there a process for that?

A. Any last-minute changes we'll get a note, weight and balance automatically and we'll be told over the walkie talkie that we will be waiting for something to get put into a certain position. You're talking via the topside?

Q. The full process, so it'll probably come from operations, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. Hey well --

A. Yeah, we will have to stop our load to wait for it, and then when we get a weight and balance, we will load in accordance with what he gives us.

Q. Have you had that experience before?

A. Yes.

Q. And did that happen that night?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So, if the load is late and you all go ahead and load it, do you double check the weight balance? What happens to the previous weight balance calculations?

A. There's a new one -- the previous one would be discarded, but the new one would have all the proper weights and I'll do the same thing that I did with the first one, double check everything to make sure that all the -- everything lines up again and then we'll load up properly.

MR. KANAE: Okay, okay. Thank you for your time, that's all I have, appreciate it.

MR. BRAMBLE: Clarence? Rich?

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Just a couple things, when you're checking the aircraft prior to the load starting, have you ever seen any type of issues when you're opening the doors if there's a maintenance type issue, what would you do if you found something either -- the cargo door actuator wasn't working or something similar to that, what would you do if you found some sort of maintenance or

mechanical issue with the cargo loading items?

A. I would go to my mechanic and let him know, I would say hey I am having issue with maybe the cargo door, or the belly door, I'm having issues opening it, can you help me? And so, they'll come down and --

Q. Have you ever had an instance like that? Where there's some sort of maintenance issue with the cargo loading part of the door --

A. Yes.

Q. -- or the -- and do you know if it would be written up in the forms, or in the tech log for the airplane?

A. I'm not sure.

Q. Or -- okay. You mentioned you helped with the scaling and your policy is that if you get three cans from UPS that you weigh one of them, what if the weight is off on that one? It doesn't -- you said it doesn't happen often, but what if the weight is significantly off on the one can, what would you do with the other two? Would you weigh the other cans just to make sure, or is it just one for each shipper and that's it?

A. I'm not sure how to answer that right now. We would -- wait can you repeat that?

Q. I'm trying to set up an example that you're I guess policy is that --

A. It is only one can, yes.

Q. One can. So, what if that one can is out of your tolerance, it's outside of the 60 pounds?

A. It probably raises a red flag for us, and be like okay, let's double check our other cans so we would probably go and --

Q. And do you know if that's in your policy to do that or is it just makes sense to do that.

A. Makes sense really.

MR. LEE: Okay, I think that's all I have.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Okay, thank you Nikki, I just have a few more questions I have, and we'll go around just one more time, but you doing all right? Need a break or anything? Alrighty. You were talking about your training as every six months to a year, when was your last training?

A. A couple months ago --

Q. Couple months ago --

A. I'm not too sure when, yeah.

Q. How long is that training?

A. They go for about an hour or two.

Q. Is it instructor based or is it a video, or is it an online training?

A. Both. Yeah.

Q. Both video/online instructor --

A. Yes.

Q. -- so, it's those three (indiscernible) okay?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Have you ever received a can that's been damaged?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. What -- is there any special procedures you do?

A. For me, no. I mean if I see it then yes, but --

Q. Okay. What would you do?

A. They have red sticker tags, we tag our can, and we take it off -- sorry, are you asking if it's coming on the airplane, or just in general if we see a damaged can?

Q. If you're out there loading up an airplane and you see one come out that's damaged.

A. Oh, they'd have to take it off the airplane because it's not safe to fly.

Q. Okay.

A. And tag it red.

Q. All right, and then would you offload that onto another can then, or --

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. How -- has that happened?

A. Not recently, no.

Q. Okay, but it has happened?

A. I don't know.

Q. Okay, that's all right. Are there certain airplanes that can have certain cans, like in the 7-3 are they all -- do all the 7-3s take the same can?

A. Yes.

Q. There's no different cans for them?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Are there -- I know you said there's -- are there two different kinds of cans? I know you have the cookie sheet, but can wise, is there some that fit in spots?

A. Yeah, there's an AAY that can only fit in position 1. All the other cans can fit in the same positions.

Q. Okay. So, the AAY can only fit in position 1?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. But all the other cans can fit in all the positions?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Ok, how do you know when you get an AAY can?

A. I'm sorry, I take that back. The AAY can fit in all positions, but we can't fit our regular cans in position 1, only position 1 can fit the AAY.

Q. Okay.

A. Sorry.

Q. No, you're good, thank you for the clarification. How do you know when you get an AAY

can?

A. They're labeled different, AAY.

Q. Okay. Alrighty. That night when you were loading the accident flight, did it seem -- this is kind of weird questions because I know you don't lift the cans, but did it seem like more cargo on that flight than normal?

A. No.

Q. Did you notice any difference?

A. All normal.

Q. All normal. But do you remember the cargo weights?

A. Of each can?

Q. No, the -- in general.

A. (Indiscernible).

Q. Do you remember each can?

A. I know what the cans were, I don't know the can numbers.

Q. You know the can numbers?

A. No, I don't know the can numbers.

Q. Okay. So, what do you mean you know what the cans were?

A. Like, it was the FedEx Ground cans, and the FedEx Air cans.

Q. Oh, okay. This might be a weird question because it's been a while so it's okay, but do you remember -- you had FedEx Ground cans FedEx cans, do you remember the loading sequence they were in?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. What load -- how did you load those? Which ones went in the back zones?

A. We had the four FedEx Ground cans in the back, the one FedEx Air can in the middle, and the free can in position 2, our pharmaceuticals in 1.

Q. All right. How did you know they were pharmaceuticals?

A. Because those are one of the common shippers, we get every night. We get pharmaceuticals every night.

Q. Are they labeled --

A. Yes.

Q. -- different, too? How are they labeled?

A. For the pharmaceuticals?

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. We get a shipper, regular shipper that we get every night and he drops off pharmaceuticals. That's how that we know that they're pharmaceuticals and they're labeled by island. I mean you get paperwork from the shipper explaining that they're pharmaceuticals.

Q. Is there any stickers like a hazmat sticker or anything?

A. For the hazmat yes there's a sticker.

Q. But not for pharmaceuticals?

A. Well, there's pharmaceuticals and then there's the pharmaceutical hazmat, and of course the hazmat will be labeled properly.

Q. okay.

A. And then regular pharmaceuticals it just has the sticker for which island it's going to.

Q. So, that night was it just regular pharmaceuticals?

A. There was both.

Q. There was both, okay. Alrighty. The last question and I'll let everybody else, just to make sure they don't have questions. You say when load it you make sure that they're locked into place.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. How do you do that? Help me understand.

A. You put all the locks up and then you kick the locks to make sure that they're all the way

up.

Q. What do you mean kick the locks up?

A. With your foot.

Q. Okay.

A. You just some -- they're metal locks. Sometimes when you pull it up with your hand, they don't always go up all the way that's why it's procedure to always kick our locks to make sure they're all the way up. So, we kick all of our locks.

Q. Okay.

A. Just a tap with the foot, we all have steel toed shoes on, right? So, you kick your lock, and you know that it's all the way up.

Q. Okay. All right I have one more question. Have you ever had the lock not be up?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. And it -- how would you know; I just want to make sure --

A. You can see that they're not all the way up yet.

Q. Okay. Did you have any issues with that that you can recall on the accident night?

A. No, no lock issues on that night.

MR. ETCHER: Okay, perfect. I know I said that was my last question but, I'm done now, thank you. Bill any questions?

BY MR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Yeah, just a few about the company, Nicolette. How do you like working for Rhoades Air? Or, TransAir?

A. Like, me personally?

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. It's a job that pays right now. I enjoy it, I like every day I learn something different. I've definitely learned a lot in the last couple years that I've been there.

Q. What's satisfying or difficult about working there?

A. What's satisfying is knowing that I'm loading on the airport, I think it's so cool to be like, right up there by the airplane. You know, not a lot of people can say they've worked with airplanes the way I work with the airplane. I think that's pretty cool. Nothing dissatisfying really, I've learned a lot of knowledge from working there.

Q. And how would you describe the company management's attitude in respect to safety?

A. To safety? Everybody goes and to do the job safely for all of us.

Q. Do you know what company manager's responsible for managing safety?

A. I'm not sure.

Q. And if you have a safety concern is there a way for you to report it to management?

A. Yeah, we report it to our boss.

Q. Okay. Any other way?

A. To the trainer.

Q. Okay. They're in kind of safety reporting system anything like that, is there a form you can fill out or anything like that?

A. I'm not sure.

Q. Okay. And have you ever had to report a safety issue to your boss or your trainer?

A. No.

Q. Do you feel pressure from the company to do things you feel are unsafe?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any safety related concerns about the company? Okay. That's all I have, thank you.

A. Thanks.

MR. BRAMBLE: Clarence?

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Thank you. Thank you again you're probably very tired and got yourself a couple hard questions. So, as a cargo loading supervisor are there the same type of personnel on the other stations?

A. Same as?

Q. After you watch the loading of cargo, offloading of cargo --

A. Yes.

Q. Employee -- (indiscernible) etcetera

A. Yes. Every island has their own operation.

Q. Do they -- when I say they, I meant the other island stations, do they generate their own weight and balance sheets for the pilots etcetera?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Have you ever had flight crews -- is it normal for the flight crews to come out watch you all load the airplane?

A. Yes.

Q. And did that happen?

A. Sorry, there was a fly.

Q. We've been trying to catch him all this time, we haven't been successful. The night of the incident did any of the pilots come and watch the loading of the aircraft? Did they come and talk to you about it or anything?

A. Not that night, no.

MR. KANAE: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Can we clarify that?

MR. KATT: Yeah, that's two questions.

MR. ETCHER: Clarence, you asked did they come out and watch, and did they talk to you? Can you just clarify?

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Let me rephrase that then, did the flight crew and observe the loading that night?

A. For the accident plane or just in general?

Q. Accident aircraft.

A. No.

Q. Okay. As a general question, if the locks were inoperative, what would be your procedures?

A. Like, not working? We have to stop our load because we need all of our locks to work. We would have to ask maintenance for assistance in fixing our lock.

Q. Should that particular station where the locks are not working, and you can't put a unit load device in that position, what's the process for that?

A. When a specific lock isn't working you have to void the two positions which we can't put freight in either of those positions because each compartment locks holds a certain amount of weight. So, if one lock isn't work you have to void that position and the position before it.

Q. Has that ever happened before?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, and my last question is, on the bulk cargo compartments, which are (indiscernible) to be the lower compartments, how are those individual boxes or freight, how are they weighed?

A. Everything is always weighed the same way on the scale, before it gets put into the airplane and so it would have been weighed and then it'd be put on our weight and balance and put it in with accordance in the belly.

Q. And how are they secured?

A. By the cargo nets that is in the belly.

Q. Is there a pre-flight procedure to make sure the cargo nets are not defective?

A. I'm not sure.

Q. If you were to go -- when you do your inspection on the belly --

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. -- cargo compartments, are you also checking for the nets to be serviceable?

A. I'm not understanding your question.

Q. Are the nets not torn or broken?

A. Yeah, all of the nets have to be properly -- sorry -- they're not broken that's whey have to be secured properly, if not, we can't put anything in there.

MR. KANAE: Okay, thank you Nikki that's all I have.

MR. LEE: I don't have anything.

MR. ETCHER: All right. We want to thank you so much for coming in and helping us understand how the process works. I always like to end with a question or two at the end. Is there anything you can think of that we didn't ask me this kind of question it might help clarify a few things?

MS. DETOL: No, we're good.

MR. ETCHER: And the next one is if you're Queen for the day and you can make any change you wanted at your job at the airline is there any you would make?

MS. DETOL: No.

MR. ETCHER: Besides more sleep?

MS. DETOL: No, I don't think so, not really.

MR. ETCHER: Well, I appreciate you coming, and we are finished with this interview at 38 minutes past.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII
ON JULY 2, 2021
Interview of Nicolette Detol

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA21FA174

PLACE: Honolulu, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Brittany Hay
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

Interview of: FRANCIS YUDA, First Officer

TransAir Executive Airlines of Hawaii

Honolulu, Hawaii

Monday,
September 27, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing Commercial Airplanes

CLARENCE KANAE, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

RYAN FISKEL, Pilot Party Representative
TransAir

WILLIAM KATT, Attorney
Wilson, Elser, Moskowits, Edlman & Dicker LLP

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I N T E R V I E W

(12:23 p.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: So the recorder's on. Today is September 27th, 2021, and it is 12:23 p.m. And my name is William Bramble. I'm a Human Performance Investigator with the NTSB, and Shawn Etcher and I are leading the operations and human performance work group for accident investigation number DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades Aviation flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety, and the NTSB's not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I'd now like to have Mr. Etcher and each of the operations group members briefly introduce themselves. Mr. Etcher?

MR. ETCHER: And good afternoon. I'm Shawn Etcher. I'm the operational group factors group chairman with the NTSB. Thanks for coming in today.

MR. YUDA: Thank you.

MR. KANAE: I'm Clarence Kanae. I'm with the FAA Operations, run a safety team in -- based here in Honolulu Certificate Management Office.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, Boeing Safety Pilot.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Huh?

MR. LEE: Boeing. Boeing Safety Pilot, yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, thanks everyone. One second. All right. Mr. Yuda, is there anyone you object to, to being present for the -- present for this interview?

MR. YUDA: No.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we'll send the recording out for transcription, and the party members will have an opportunity to review the recording -- or, the transcription, rather -- to correct different typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probably cause and prevent reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're here simply for you to share your insight in the goal of preventing accidents.

Having said that, however, we can't offer or guarantee confidentiality or immunity, and a transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for the accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask them one at a time. Group members have been instructed not to interrupt a person who's asking questions, and there will be an opportunity for each group members to ask follow-up questions after each person's had a turn

Please answer our questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so. If you don't know, you can say you don't know. If you want to correct

something, just let us know.

You're entitled to have a representative of your choosing at an NTSB interview. Is there someone present who you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. YUDA: Mr. Katt.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Mr. Katt, can you introduce, introduce yourself --

MR. KATT: William Katt at the Law Firm of Wilson Elser.

DR. BRAMBLE: Thank you. Okay. If everyone's ready, I will begin. All right.

INTERVIEW OF FRANCIS YUDA

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Mr. Yuda, can you please give us your full name and spell it for us?

A. Francis Nicholas Yuda II. F-r-a-n-c-i-s N-i-c-h, Nicholas, and then Yuda, Y-u-d-a, the second.

Q. Okay. And what, what do you prefer that we call you.

A. You can just call me Nick (ph.).

Q. Okay. How old are you, Nick?

A. 39.

Q. And what's date of hire for Rhoades Aviation?

A. August 1st, two years ago; so 2019.

Q. All right, and can you give us a brief overview of your aviation-related background that led to your working here?

A. Yeah, I went to Indiana State University, 2001 to 2006.

After that, I got a job flying banners. After banners, I kind of bounced around a little bit everywhere from Alaska to the Virgin Island, and then, eventually, to the citations in Michigan. And then, from Michigan, here.

Most of my background is seaplanes, just -- I got my ATP in seaplane, and I flew the Twin Otter in the Virgin Islands. And then, I was flying in Alaska, everything from the 206 to the -- yeah, just kind of just flying in. There's a 172, 206, Piper Super Cubs and then, flew to the Bahamas in seaplanes and the Grand Caravan. And then, from there to the Twin Otter.

And that's kind of what I thought I was going to do is just stay in seaplanes, and then, after years of doing that, I kind of got bored of it and went into jets. Then, the owner of the company that used to own Seaborne, now he started a company in Michigan, and then, gave me a call; asked if I wanted a job up there. And then, I took that, and then, it kind of fell apart.

So then, I applied, and Wallace, the Chief Pilot, gave me a call, conducted the interview, and hired me, and then, my start date was August 1st out here.

Q. Okay. What's your current job title at Rhoades?

A. First Officer for a 737.

Q. And what certificates and ratings do you own?

A. The certificates -- ATP single engine, ATP multi-engine land and sea, and then, commercial single engine land and sea.

Q. And how many total flight hours did you guys have?

A. I'd say 5,000.
Q. And how many in the seven three?
A. Nearly a thousand.
Q. Okay. Has anyone approached you about upgrading to Captain?
A. There's been some talks about it, but nothing official. I haven't hit my thousand hours officially.
Q. Okay. All right. Do you work the, the typical pilot schedule at Rhoades of two weeks a night and then a week off and a week of days?
A. Yeah. I'd say roughly about 15 days a month.
Q. Okay. And what do you find satisfying, difficult about working with Rhoades?
A. Satisfying that I get to be home every night, and then, difficult just waking up, you know, 10 o'clock at night to -- for midnight shift time or something.
Q. Were you on duty the night of the accident?
A. I was.
Q. Who were you, who were you flying with that night.
A. Shawn Morgan (ph.).
Q. All right, what do you recall about that night?
A. I went out, I did my pre-flight. They probably were nearly close to taking off at that time. I don't know if we were necessarily second or third show; I think we were third show. And I just got the clearance, and then, I switched back to the different frequencies.

So I actually wasn't listening to tower. I didn't hear anything. I was kind of just waiting on our plane to start loading when the First Officer from Amin's plane, so it was Amin and Kim. Kim came up the stairs into our plane and told us that the other plane, 810, had went down, and at that time, we turned it back on the tower frequency and just kind of started chiming in, just listening.

And then, every now and again, Shawn would ask the tower if they had any updates as far as location or anything like that, and we just kind of monitored the tower and listened to how Coast Guard was -- when they took off to go pick them up. Was, kind of -- just talked about it, you know.

Q. Okay. Which airplane were you, were you on?

A. I'm not sure exactly which one we were on. We never ended up taking off, so I don't really have it in my logbook. But there's not too many of the, the other planes. I'm not sure if it was 809 or 326, not for sure.

Q. Okay. And what time did you arrive that night?

A. I don't know. Probably around 11 or 11:30 I would say.

Q. Okay. Did you have any interaction with the crew?

A. I didn't even see those other guys that night before because they had already came in and went out to the plane, and they were in route. I didn't even see the other crew either.

Q. Okay. Had you flown with Captain Okai before?

A. Oh yeah, I've flown with him a lot. Yeah.

Q. And what kind of a Captain was he?
A. I would say he was good. He was thorough, very knowledgeable. I also had him for sim partner probably about a month before the crash, and we studied together prior to the sim at my apartment. And we were just going over the general questions of things that we might see during our sim session. He seemed to know everything pretty thoroughly.
Q. All right, did you enjoy flying with him?
A. I did.
Q. And when was your last interaction with him before the accident?
A. Days before maybe. Maybe the day -- night before. Maybe the -- I don't know. It was -- they seem to all kind of run together, but it was probably within the last week prior to the accident that we'd maybe flown together or seen each other.
Q. Anything unusual happen during your recent flights together?
A. No, pretty standard.
Q. Did Mr. Okai ever tell you about being reprimanded by the Chief Pilot for an incident involving something that caused him to make an emergency landing?
A. No, not really. I mean, maybe in passing he might have mentioned something, like, you know -- he gets in trouble here and there if -- you know. That's kind of the nature of the, the beast. You just kind of keep in a straight line, and if you step out of the line, you're going to definitely hear from, you know,

Wallace about it. He runs a pretty tight ship.
Q. Did you hear about that incident from anybody else?
A. No.
Q. All right, and did you know First Officer Ryan?
A. Not that well. I mean, we've only spent a couple of minutes together at a time. Mostly amongst other pilots, so it's all been pretty small talk.
Q. Okay. Were you aware of anything unusual about the condition of the airplane, 810, before the accident?
A. No.
Q. Were you aware of a history of any recurring maintenance issues on that airplane?
A. Recurring, I mean, no --
Q. Is there anything that stands out in your mind as it always has a problem with X?
A. No.
Q. Okay. All right, talking about the, the fleet of seven threes at Rhoades in general, were you aware of any issues with compressor stalls?
A. We've had compressor stalls. They get resolved fairly quick. If we ever did have one, it didn't seem to be an ongoing issue. We would report it, they would take a look at it. If they'd fix it -- they usually try to get it under control within a week. From just -- that's just from my, you know, mental timeclock. But there wasn't, like, any consistent, you know -- every time we

flew, we got them. You know? It's kind of like, a rarity.

Q. How often would you say that happened in, you know -- like, once a month or once every six months --

A. Not even once a month. I'd put -- I wouldn't even say it would be once every six months. It was just kind of like -- I'd say all the compressor stalls that I've experienced in two years -- probably six, and that's just through taxi or, you know, slowing down after landing if they didn't close the reversers fast enough.

There was a couple after a take-off that I had leaving Kona in which we just reduced the power and continued our flight, and we didn't hear anything more from it. But we, you know, obviously told maintenance about it.

And then, I had another compressor stall-ish kind of engine issue when Henry and I were flying, we sucked up the inner lining -- I think it was on our number two engine, and that was shortly after take-off. And then, we just declared emergency right in the memory items (ph.) and landed.

Q. How did Henry handle that situation?

A. Pretty good. I was flying, he had the radios, we were probably at about 600 feet and making that right turn off of eight right, and then, it just kind of started making really loud bang. Pulled it up. I lowered the nose. Kind of, you know, just evaluated the situation to see what we had.

He was controlling the throttle; he reduced the throttle on

that one engine. That didn't seem to help. We stuck -- we kept getting more backfires because, obviously, the sucking in that lining.

So I just turned to him, and I said, declare emergency. We're going back. And then, he declared emergency. They asked us what runway I wanted. I said four right, and then, we landed. But everything seemed to be pretty smooth. Yeah.

Q. Did you, did you feel that Mr. Okai, as the Captain, was efficiently involved in setting up to deal with this situation?

A. I'd say, yeah. I think when we talk about Henry, we talk about somebody that's going to have an open conversation. He's not going to dominate you, and he's going to listen to your input. So as long as, you know, I was -- you know, that was my stance.

He had to mentally process it and then, declare the emergency. So it wasn't like he wasn't on board for it; he just wanted to process it. He thinks before he acts, that's for sure.

Q. So you suggested that you do that, and then he thought about. And then, he transmitted over the radio?

A. Right, so I said we're -- first of all, it started banging. Then, I said, okay, and then, we still tried to continue. But it didn't take more than a couple seconds before it started banging some more, and at that point, us being that close to the runway, and I still had in sight being that I was on the right side; I just said, declare emergency.

Just seemed like the most logical thing to do right then, and

then, since I already had the field and the airport and the runway in sight; I just said, call it four right. We got it in sight. Cleared to land; we just came back and took a look at it. But I'd say he was on board.

I think, depending on who you fly with and what the, the connection between the Captain and the First Officer is and what their relationship is and how much, you know, you guys trust each other and work well together; you know, probably has something to do with the outcome of, you know, how efficiently you can get something done.

Q. Did you feel like you guys had a pretty effective working relationship and did have that trust?

A. I did, yeah. Because we fly -- this is such a small pilot group. You kind of get to know who you're flying with and, you know, what they're capable of; what they're not capable of; if they want to be honest with you; if they're tired or if they're not tired. You can kind of just pick up on little things within that, you know.

You can operate as one person, you know, or if you kind of own your, you know, own mission. I always felt like he -- Henry always was a one-person kind of operation; the two people, you know, coming together to operate the plane as one, you know, the best that you could.

Q. You mean, he wasn't like a one-pilot operation, like, sit-down and be quiet; he was, he was more trying to work together?

A. Right.
Q. Oh, I see.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Did you experience any issues with high engine temperature, EGT indications, on engines during take-offs?
A. No.
Q. And you didn't see -- the first thousand feet, you didn't see that EGT's gone into the yellow range sometimes?
A. Not really. I mean, no. Not that I can say. It didn't ever alarm me from my personal experience. I didn't necessarily really see it.
Q. All right, so you didn't see it, or it didn't alarm you when you saw? Just want to make sure we're clear.
A. I didn't really -- I mean, I've seen it, but maybe a couple -- handful of times. It wasn't like it was a regular thing, and it didn't seem to bother me.
Q. Okay. Did, did you ever write that -- did you or the Captain ever write that up?
A. The Captain was more responsible for writing things up. I just kind of gave my feedback on different issues, but I'm, I'm sure I've seen somebody write it up -- or either an informational, or they said, hey, look at this engine. You know, we feel like it's getting a little warm, and then, they'll look at it, I guess.
Q. Okay. Did you have any issue with hydraulic failures in flight?

A. No.
Q. How about hydraulic leaks on the ramp during pre-flight? You didn't notice any issues?
A. Maybe one -- once.
Q. Can you tell us about that?
A. I think there was just -- I think we were in Hilo or something. There was just some fluid. I think I was flying with Ed Rinsma in my IOE, and I just pointed it out. He looked at it. It didn't seem to be an issue. I don't even know what the whole outcome was about it, and then, we flew back. And I think they took care of whatever it was.
Q. And where did you see that leak?
A. It was, like, next to inside the -- the wheel well, I would say. Somewhere -- looked like there was -- where the, the wheels had went up, when they came out something was running down along, so it was somewhere around the landing gear.
Q. How much fluid would you say you saw up there?
A. It wasn't that much. I would -- just, like, a splash maybe, you know.
Q. So you made a, a circle with your hands, that was about six --
A. I'd say four or five inches maybe.
Q. Okay. And you saw that on the ground?
A. I saw it on the ground.
Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.
Q. And it was wet?
A. It was. It, it looked hydraulic fluid.
Q. Okay. All right. How confident were you about your quality of maintenance work at Rhoades?
A. I was confident.
Q. Were there any issues, then, with 737s in the last year that maintenance seemed to have particular difficulty diagnosing and repairing?
A. Pressurization. Also, the, the throttles to balance those out and keep them synced up. Sometimes we had some splits either in reverse or, you know, take-off. They just seemed to not be matched up sometimes.
Q. Do you know before the accident, who was responsible for managing safety at Rhoades?
A. I can't think of his name, but I know the face. So I would say yes, I knew who it was.
Q. Was it Orlando Debrum?
A. Yep.
Q. If you had a safety-related concern, how would you have communicated that to management?
A. I'd start with the Chief Pilot, let him know, and then, I would fill out the report and either drop it off online or in that box.
Q. Did you ever do that?

A. I did, yeah. I filled out a report when I was doing my pre-flight, I walked around, and I was walking --

Q. I'm sorry. Can you just repeat that; when you were doing your --

A. Pre-flight.

Q. Pre-flight? Okay.

A. I was walking around the plane -- or maybe it was my post-flight -- I was just kind of walking around, and they were offloading something. And they had this grate thing that they put in between the K loader and the plane, and that actually fell when I was kind of in that area.

It kind of fell, like, maybe from me to you -- probably six feet away. So I just filled out a report for that just to make sure that, you know, nobody walks under the K loader when they're, they're loading.

Q. And what happened as a result of that report?

A. I think they sent out a memo saying don't walk under the K loader.

Q. Were you satisfied with the outcome?

A. Yeah.

Q. What kind of safety-related communications did you get from Rhoades?

A. Every now and again, I think David Seest would send out a memo or an e-mail talking about, you know, the steps that we need to do. Pretty much, if we ever had any problems with anything, we

were always told to fill out a safety report.
Q. All right. Did you feel supported by management and able to make safety-related decisions as a pilot without fear of repercussions?
A. I did, yeah.
Q. Did you feel pressure from company management to do things that are unsafe?
A. No.
Q. And did you have any safety-related concerns about the company before the accident?
A. No.
Q. And how would you describe the organizational safety culture at Rhoades?
A. I would say they try, you know. They're putting in their effort to making things safer.
Q. Can you give us any examples of things that are -- they are doing in, in that area?
A. Yeah, I mean they -- it -- they did a change within the last two years of kind of you know, our ability to, I think, submit things online or at least they just came out and re-reminded everybody about it.

Besides that, I think Orlando's been walking around a lot trying to pay attention to the safety of the operation. I've noticed that they definitely put some effort into, you know -- otherwise, I never would have seen anybody or heard anything

about, you know, them trying to make things safer.

(Background conversation)

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Just for the record, Ryan, can you introduce yourself, and your role in the group?

MR. FISKEL: Yes, sir. My name is Ryan Fiskel. I'm the Pilot Party Representative for TransAir for the NTSB investigation.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. So, Mr. Fiskel is joining us now.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Did you get a, a -- did you receive a memo from the CEO attached to a paycheck at one point saying that you should feel free to report any maintenance issues without fear of repercussions -- or write-up any maintenance issues?

A. I don't recall that.

Q. And how was the relationships between the pilots and the maintenance staff at Rhoades before the accident?

A. Relationships Pretty typical, you know, aviation industry, maintenance, pilot relationship. I wouldn't say it was terrible. I'm sure it could have some room for improvement, but it wasn't anything to write home about.

Nobody's getting in fist fights out there, they're just discussing things, and everybody's, kind of got their own way of communicating. And you know, people get frustrated, so I'm sure they've said something.

And depending on the personality, they probably took it one

way or another, but I would overall, it was, you know, fair to good.

Q. Have you ever heard a flight crew saying they were afraid of being fired for writing up a maintenance issue?

A. No.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, I'm going to hand the questions off to MR. ETCHER: Thanks very much.

MR. YUDA: Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Are you doing okay? Do you need a break?

MR. YUDA: No, everything's good. Yeah, thanks.

MR. ETCHER: You sure? Okay. Great. Well, thank you so much for answering Bill's questions. That took a lot off my questions, but it -- I still have some.

MR. YUDA: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So, so bear with me for a little bit.

MR. YUDA: Yeah, no worries.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Who was in your direct chain of command?

A. What was that?

Q. Who was in your direct chain of command?

A. My direct chain of command?

Q. Um-hmm.

A. Captain first, then after the Captain, Chief Pilot.

Q. Okay. Was there ever a time when you flew, that you can recall, that you had to go around the Captain to the Chief Pilot

for anything?
A. No.
Q. Okay. How would you classify -- let me rephrase that. From your perspective, how would you classify staffing in the 737?
A. Classify staffing.
Q. You -- did you feel like you were more than adequately staffed? Did you feel, like, you were kind of short-staffed? Or over -- overly staffed?
A. I think, the time of the accident, I think we were adequately staffed. I never really felt we were overstaffed. If anything, maybe a little understaffed.
Q. Did you ever have to come in and fly on your, on your days off?
A. Yeah, yeah. I think everybody has. It wasn't required, you know. Anytime I'd decline, you know, I didn't really get any static about it, but you know, there was times when he would ask -- the Chief Pilot would ask us if we wanted to come in on red (ph.) days and things like that. But I was also a FO. I think the FO, we had, you know, more FOs than Captains.
Q. Okay. Did you hear of anybody complain about working too much or being called in all the time or anything like that?
A. Not really, but I mean, probably -- I think some of the Captains were probably working a little bit more than what they wanted to, but it wasn't, wasn't too bad.
Q. Okay. All right. Would classify the, the environment -- the

working environment here as a -- as an open-door policy? Would you classify more of a hostile environment? Kind of, help me understand, just in your terms, what do you think --

A. From what perspective? As the -- for the pilot groups or just an employee of TransAir or --

Q. Well, either as a pilot group or as, you, as an employee. Help me understand it.

A. I think it's a -- we're obviously in the Hawaiian Islands, so it's more of a relaxed culture. Flying is -- you know, we're still held at that high standard. You know, obviously, we want to make sure that we do everything correct and within the rules.

And then, other than that -- yeah, it's a cargo outfit, so we fly at night. So it's got a pretty good turnover rate, and a lot of people don't really fit into Hawaii too well. So there's, you know, definitely turnover I would say. You definitely, as an employee, know that some of the guys would probably leave, you know.

Q. Since you've been here, I think -- since -- forgive me, 2019? Two years? Is that what you said?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Since you've been here -- a rough estimate, how many pilots have left?

A. Rough estimate, I'd say -- well, I mean, before the accident or since the accident? Or after --

Q. Well (indiscernible) before the accident for now.

A. Before the accident, I would say probably five to seven guys left.
Q. During your time -- since you've been here, before the accident --
A. Before the accident, right. Yeah.
Q. Okay. How many did they hire before the accident then, during your time here?
A. Probably about five to six people.
Q. Okay.
A. Maybe seven, yeah.
Q. Okay. Now, you asked -- you had a look on your face, like, before or after that accident. Have there been some that have left since the accident?
A. Yeah, we've lost probably an additional seven probably.
Q. Okay. All right. Have you ever heard any reasons why?
A. I would just say job security, you know.
Q. Okay.
A. With the company being in question.
Q. And forgive me, Bill may have asked this, and you may have answered it but I didn't mark it off my list; did you ever feel any pressure to complete a flight?
A. I mean, not anymore than, I think, any other company. Obviously, this is the name of the game, so they want you to complete the flight, but they definitely wouldn't want you to complete the flight if it was anything safety or legal related,

you know. They don't want you flying illegally or flying unsafe.
Q. Okay. Have you ever had to refuse an airplane for any reason?
A. No.
Q. No? Have you heard of anybody refusing an airplane?
A. Not that I can really recall.
Q. Okay. So I -- and I don't think I got -- maybe in my head I didn't get a clear answer on the work environment. Would you call it a hostile work environment, an open-door, or relax -- I mean, I know you said something about relaxed, but --
A. I think it's pretty standard.
Q. Okay.
A. You know, not hostile. It's definitely not hostile.
Q. Okay. Did you feel that you could walk into the Director of Operations office and talk to him?
A. Yep. You could definitely talk to him, yeah. If you wanted to, you could to Teimour. So yeah, in that sense, I'd say it's pretty open.
Q. Okay. All right. Let's start talking a little bit about maintenance, the logbook especially. Did you get a look at the maintenance logbook very often on the airplane?
A. I looked at it, yeah. Not -- I wouldn't say very often. Obviously, that's more of the Captain's role to put the signatures in it and things like that, but from time to time; yeah, we would look at it.

Q. Okay. Did you ever see any -- forgive me, the term -- informational write-ups?
A. I, personally, have not seen any, but they kind of came in a little bit later in the two years that I was there because at first, everyone is, you know -- it's just either a write-up or nothing. Then, towards the end here, we've been trying to keep the other crews a little bit more informed, I guess, you know, about what's going on.

So that's when I've heard about them, but I don't know if I've actually seen one or not that I can think of.
Q. Okay. The Captain never pointed them out to you or anything, I guess?
A. I just don't think I really was flying a plane that they had wrote up one, you know --
Q. Okay. Let's talk about your duties as a First Officer. I -- please correct me if I'm wrong -- I assume you go out, and you do the pre-flight or post-flight, whichever --
A. Yeah.
Q. Kind of, walk me through what you're looking for on those -- on that?
A. Obviously, just anything from oil slicks to parts missing, screws, general things, tire, integrity, leaks; if any cab lights are staying on in the cockpit, or if any -- you know? Just a general overview condition of, you know, the legal documents and condition of the airplane.

Q. When you're doing the walk around, did you ever look into the, the lower deck area?
A. Oh, yeah. Every time.
Q. Every time?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did they ever use that, or did they use that often?
A. Depending on the plane and the cargo, yeah; we used it.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, every night.
Q. Every, every night?
A. Yeah, oh yeah.
Q. Oh, oh.
A. Yeah.
Q. What was usually stored down there?
A. In the lower compartments?
Q. Yeah.
A. Just whatever freight they wanted to put in there.
Q. Oh. Okay.
A. You know, if they put hazmat, they'd obviously let us know what position it's in, and then we'd look it over and make sure everything worked out good.
Q. Okay. So you've done your pre-flight, and if you found something -- I -- and I think he said you talked about the hydraulic -- you had a small hydraulic leak in Hilo? Did it get that?

A. It looked like some hydraulic fluid, I don't even know what the outcome really was.
Q. Okay.
A. I just told Ed Rinsma about it, he came and looked at it, made a couple phone calls to maintenance and everything seemed to work out good and wasn't any major concern.
Q. Okay. Do you know when he got back to -- I assume your next flight was back to Honolulu?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did he write, it up then by chance?
A. Anything that we ever had a write-up for was always written up wherever we were at.
Q. Okay.
A. So if he would have needed to write it up, he would have wrote it up there. We might have even stayed. I can't even remember if they had to send out a maintenance guy. It might have been one of the times that we had to go get lunch, and then, they came out with somebody who -- I don't know -- fixed it and rode it back.
Q. Okay. Did that happen often? I know you said --
A. Didn't really happen that often. I mean, there was issues and things like that, and I've spent a number of nights, you know, at an outpost station just waiting for maintenance to get there because -- but I wouldn't say it happened that often. I'm talking, over the two years, maybe three or four times.

Q. Can you remember the last time -- the most recent -- I'm sorry -- the most recent time it occurred?
A. Not that I can recall. I can't remember. It -- I think it was probably in Hilo for something, but I can't remember what it was.
Q. Okay. No problem. The accident flight was doing a Honolulu to Maui run. I assume -- and correct me if I'm wrong, you've done that run, too?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Just kind of -- what would you consider a normal take-off weight for that rate (ph.)?
A. Like an average?
Q. Yeah I mean, can you give me a --
A. I would say 90, 90,000 plus -- 95 to probably 103.
Q. Okay. What would you consider a heavy -- at what point would you say, oh, this is --
A. Anything over 100,000 in my mind I think is kind of heavy.
Q. Okay. Is there anything you'd do different for aa heavier end?
A. Not really. There's nothing in procedures that we would do anything different. It's just, you know, when you look at the numbers and things, you can see it's heavy.
Q. Okay. All right. Did they give you the weight balance to do, or was it given to you?
A. It was given to us. It was, you know -- they printed out --

I think there was some kind of program they use, and we verify; make sure all the -- everything's correct on it.

Q. How'd you verify it?

A. Visually. We looked at and made sure that everything that was on the sheet was where it needed to be, and you know, as far as the weight of the containers, they obviously have weighed all those. So we go back, you know, with what they put on the paper.

Q. Okay. Did you -- once you got the weight, did you have to plot it on the CG chart? Did you have to do performance numbers?

A. No, I mean, the program, is all automatic weight and balance. It's an automated program. Somebody obviously had made it. They paid some guy to keep it up, and that's the weight and balance.

Q. Okay. Did it give you your performance numbers?

A. Yeah. I mean, some of our performance numbers -- towards the end, we started taking some things out because the FAA was coming in, and, you know -- probably the last year of the incident, the FAA came in, and we got a new POI.

So they started looking through our manuals, and they said what they did and didn't like about that automated weight and balance. And you know, some of the things got taken out, so if it did, we'd have to look up our runway analysis information out of our manuals that were in the cockpit, other things like that, you know. The Captain usually did that.

Let's see. What else? We had a couple other numbers that we needed to look up, you know, that were originally on the program

at the beginning and then, later on, got pulled off.
Q. Did you guys have to calculate your EPR say?
A. I believe so, yeah. That was one that, I think, they did first initially, then it got pulled, and then we kind of started doing that by hand.
Q. Okay. Did you, did you ever do it by hand, or did the Captain?
A. Both of us. I mean, I've definitely done it by hand, yeah, and then, you know, it was kind of whoever had the available time to do it. And then, we'd look it up either together; one would look it up, confirm it; or vice versa.
Q. Okay. Did you usually calculate a normal EPR or a de-rated or reduced thrust?
A. It was -- yeah, usually, reduced, and then, we'd, we'd have the max as well, if we needed to use it.
Q. Okay. Did you ever take-off not on reduced thrust or E D rated?
A. No -- yeah, we did -- yeah, max take-off, power six (ph.) from time to time.
Q. Okay. How often? I know it's hard to know exact numbers, but how often would you guess that you -- or estimate that you did a normal?
A. Me, personally? I probably do one every, like, six months.
Q. Okay, okay. Can you think back when the last time you, you did a normal?

A. Max or reduced?
Q. A, a normal take-off, max normal -- a non-reduced take-off.
A. The max -- I can't remember.
Q. Okay.
A. I don't know exactly, yeah.
Q. Okay. Do you remember -- I know you can't remember when it was, but do you remember seeing the EGT getting hot or anything?
A. No, not really. I mean, the temps always, for me -- and this might just be me, personally -- I mean, I never saw anything get me too concerned. You know what I mean? If they started getting yellow or things like that, I -- you know, noted it, but by the time we were pulling back our throttles at a thousand feet, you know, it was going back down.
Q. So I just want to make sure it's clear in my mind: what would be too concerning to you? Is it --
A. The red. If it was in the red, that's too much for me.
Q. Okay. Is there a limitation on how long it can be in the yellow?
A. I believe there's a five-minute limit on take-off, power, and things like that.
Q. Okay. So I assume you, as a First Officer, have been the pilot flying out of Honolulu a few times.
A. Um-hmm.
Q. When you are the pilot flying, do you set take-off thrusts, or do you just push the throttles up and the Captain, then, fine

tunes it?
A. I set the take-off thrusts to, you know, the EPR setting, and then, I say, set take-off thrusts. And if he feels it's high or low, he'll tweak it.
Q. Okay. Have you ever had any Captains not push the thrusts all the way up to the calculated thrust setting that you guys were going to do?
A. Yeah, sure. I mean, sometimes, you know, you kind of, push the throttles up and you know, set take off thrusts, and I'll kind of just, kind of -- they usually push them up to right below it or close, and then, if, you know, if I need to just bump it up a little bit or pull it back, you know.
It's kind of just the Captain's preference on how they run that, but most everybody sets it exactly on the numbers.
Q. Okay. I think you said earlier that you a -- an experience with compressor stalls, and the lining had got sucked in and everything?
A. Um-hmm.
Q. I know we all hear compressor stalls maybe a little differently. How would you classify that sound?
A. I would say it's like a firework, like one of those ones that you shoot out of the little tube; just kind of like that going off -- like a boom.
Q. Oh, a boom? Okay.
A. Yeah.

Q. All right. Is it, like, one boom or, like, multiple booms, or --

A. It's usually -- it starts out with one, and then, if it's not, if it's not going away, then you'll hear another, you know.

Q. Okay. All right. Let's talk about your training for just a little bit. When you had your compressor stall issues, or any other issue, did it have you ready to, to deal with them, or did you feel like, you know, I wish they would have kind of trained that a little bit better.

A. I'd say -- I mean, you can always have better training; that's for sure. But I would say I was adequately prepared for it, you know.

It's one of our memory items, so obviously, if you have a compressor stall, you reduce the power. And then, you start digging in deeper with the QRH to see exactly, you know, if there's anything that you can do.

But I'd, I'd say the training was adequate, yeah.

Q. Okay. It -- and I just want to make sure -- the, the compressor stall is a memory item?

A. Yeah, it's on there.

Q. Okay. I just wanted to make sure I heard you correctly. Sorry, I'm getting old so.

A. No, no it's fine.

Q. All right. So when you had your compressor stall -- let, let me rephrase that. When you had the liner get sucked in, in the

engine, I know they never give you that in training, right? I assume not?

A. No, yeah, no.

Q. Okay. What checklist did you guys decide you needed to run?

A. That was a memory item. That was reduce the throttle until the --

Q. What memory item?

A. It's part of our memory items. It was -- I don't know the name of it off hand, but if I had the paper in front of me -- it says something along the lines of compressor stall.

MR. YUDA: Ryan, do you remember what it's called?

MR. ETCHER: Oh, it's okay. If you don't remember --

MR. YUDA: Surge or stall.

MR. FISKEL: It's --

MR. YUDA: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: It -- it's okay, we can, we can look it up. I just was trying to see if it was something -- just to help me, but I -- don't worry. We'll look it up. All right.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. You had to have been with Henry, right?

A. Right.

Q. Okay. Did he call for the checklist, or did you?

A. The memory item checklist, you, kind of -- you just kind of more or less do it. You don't have to necessarily say it, and then, you see -- obviously, when we started getting our

compressors to stall, the throttle was pulled back; he was already setting thrust pretty close to the time when all this happened anyway.

So he pulled back that, and then, you know, within five to 10 to 15 seconds later, it was still making noise. That's when I said, okay. Let's call them up. Just land.

Q. Okay. So that, that flight was with Henry, correct? The accident Captain.

A. Right.

Q. And you also did training with the accident Captain?

A. Correct.

Q. Month prior to the (indiscernible)?

A. Yep, it was in the month before the accident.

Q. Okay. So in the sim training -- we all know sim training, you get all sorts of engine failures to, to get really proficient and safe at engine failures.

A. Right.

Q. Is that how you guys ran in the sim, or did the pilot flying call what checklist they wanted and the non -- the pilot monitoring --

A. It's pretty similar. It's -- obviously, depending on the situation at the time, you're going to have variations of what's going on and things that need to be addressed first at that particular time.

We were -- what, 700 feet and at kind of a right-hand turn

when we got that, so we, obviously, were on the same page. And we were communicating well. Same thing within the sim when we were together and, you know, something would happen. We would, you know, call the emergency, call what we saw, call the checklist.

We hadn't even gotten our after-take-off checklist complete, so it was kind of one of those things where we'd just taken off, the gear was up, and that's about all we got to when we lost our stuff. So we did the memory items, and then, I had the airport in sight, cleared to land, dropped the gear, ran the before-landing checklist, and then addressed everything on the ground, you know.

Q. Okay. Is that how he ran it in the simulator though, also?

A. No, in the simulator it was the 220 and the heading go out, start exactly what Henry did the last, you know -- before. He was running when we ran the checklist, you know, and our flight, I just had the field in site. So I decided, you know, to land.

Q. Your flight was in Hilo, correct?

A. My flight was in Honolulu as well.

Q. Oh, it was in Honolulu.

A. Eight right, and then I circled back for four.

Q. Oh. Okay.

A. Yeah, four --

Q. Sorry, in my head I kind of messed up. I apologize.

A. No, that's okay.

Q. And in the training that you guys flew a 220 heading?

A. In the -- yep. In training, you lose an engine. But it's

kind of a different situation because, like you said, we don't have where we suck in the lining. We don't have the compressor stalls on the simulator. So it's kind of like, two different things. You know?

Mine was kind of compressor stall on the verge of losing engine, and his was a complete engine failure. So if we would have lost the engine completely, we would have done the 220 in the heading and then did everything else. I was just hearing a lot of bangs, and I just decided, you know, declare the emergency; there's the runway; let's get this thing down.

I don't know if we were losing an engine, but we had it -- we reduced the power quite a bit. So it was still running, but it was basically pretty low. I mean, it was putting out some power, but we didn't really want to push it. You know?

Q. So just, just so I understand because I like to play on the same sheet of music as you are. Why would you have done it differently? When you lose an engine, why would you go out versus you're getting a bang -- the compressor stall issues. Why -- is there a reason you would do it differently?

A. The difference is one's not producing any thrust, and that was just -- and then, mine -- I was getting compressor stalls. So -- surge or stall, reduce the throttle. At that point, it was banging so much that the only thing to do would be to land. You know, obviously, that was my, my -- my destination was airport anyway, and it was right there off to my right.

So I had insight; that's why I landed. When those guys lost their engine completely, they might have wanted to re-start it or just go by what the training was, you know, which is obviously go 220 outbound; declare the emergency; run your, your memory items and checklists and things like that.

But depending on the crew, you know, you'll go slower. You know? Some guys are quicker with it, you know. Some guys want to go slower, you know, to make sure they don't miss anything or whatever they feel safe. Basically, it's about the pilot's performance or what they're comfortable doing. You know?

And -- yeah, so I felt comfortable that I had the field in site, it was right there. We were low. I didn't feel -- it was night, I didn't feel like I wanted to go out in the middle of the ocean, you know, so that's what I did.

Q. Okay. Yep, just -- I just wanted to make sure I was --

A. No yeah, no -- it's --

Q. On the same sheet with you. I didn't want to assume something.

A. Yeah, no. You're not assuming anything. You're just trying to understand.

Q. Right, exactly. All right. Just a few questions to tag onto what Bill was asking earlier. You said there's talk of you making an upgrade at some point?

A. It's, like -- I think the talk is basically, like, we always want to upgrade our First Officers from within; you're coming up

on your hours; we're going to get the evaluations from all the Captains. If that goes good, then you're going to fly with the Chief Pilot and the Director of Operations, and after that goes good, then we'll upgrade you to Captain.

Q. Okay.

A. So that's kind of like, the talk. You know? Yeah.

Q. If they give you that opportunity, will you take it?

A. If given the opportunity, I would take it.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. When you upgrade, do they -- do you have to sign a training contract or anything?

A. There -- yep, there's now a new contract. If I were to upgrade to Captain, it'd be another two-year contract. I'm not really too sure on the, the dollar amount associated with that.

Q. Okay.

A. But there, there is some amount.

Q. Okay. All right. What -- with Bill, you had mentioned your, your engine compressor stall issues and things like that, and you, you used a term that kind of perplexed me: you said you released the power?

A. Reduced.

Q. Reduced. I heard released, so thank for this.

A. Yeah.

Q. I just wanted to make sure I knew what you were talking

about, so now I understand perfectly.
A. Yeah, no worries.
Q. All right. I know you said there was no real recurring issues with the accident airplane, 810, but was there recurring issues with the fleet -- with other aircrafts in the fleet?
A. I mean, besides the pressurization -- that's really the only one that I can think of that affected the whole fleet no matter what.
Q. Okay.
A. And the other ones were probably just airplane-specific things, like I had mentioned the throttles being split was a concern. But other than that, I mean, the aircraft are old, so you know, the recurring issues that seem to happen to one plane would, kind of -- I don't know what it would do.

It kind of almost go through the whole fleet, like if one thing seemed to be going bad on one, it might happen to the rest of them. For example, like the pressurization. You get in one plane, and your pressurization's not good. And then, the next one, it wouldn't be good. You know?

But it wasn't like everything was falling apart, you know. It was just the typical industry aviation, we're dealing with older aircrafts, so things would, you know, break obviously. And then, we'd have to fix them, so that's kind of what I would -- how I would sum up the, the maintenance program at TransAir.

These aircraft are pretty old. You know, things are going to

break, and you try to do your best. And you know, obviously don't break any rules, and don't fly unsafe. I think everybody's pretty much, from my opinion, on that same page.

Q. Okay. You mentioned the aircrafts -- they're not new. They've kind of aged. Did that cause you, you as a pilot or just you personally as a pilot, did that cause you to hesitate on writing something up because -- oh, it may be hard to get a part for this or --

A. Not at all. If anything, I would like to write more things up, you know, because that's just more things they're going to fix. So yeah, I wouldn't avoid writing things up. I'd say, hey -- you know, the Captain, I was, like, we need to get this written up, you know, and they'd be, like, okay.

Q. Okay. You didn't -- I mean, they always said okay? You didn't have Captains say nah?

A. No, yeah, they were all good about writing things up if, you know, I felt like something needed to be wrote up, they'd write it up.

Q. Okay. All right. How often did you get any communications from the Director of Safety, the Director of Operations --

A. Never anything from the Director of Safety. We got a lot of communications from the Director of Operations, just normal, you know, e-mails about little things that we should do or need to do or look out for this for the airport, this, and that.

So he was pretty vocal on just keeping everybody up to speed

and trying to, you know, communicate the best he could with, you know, what we had going on.
Q. How would they communicate that to you? Would it be just in a binder you've gotta sign, would it be --
A. It's usually e-mail.
Q. E-mail?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. So he would shoot an e-mail if thought anything -- and then, if they had any updates for us in the manuals, they would be in our mailbox.
Q. Okay. Speaking of updates to your manuals, how often did you guys get revisions for your manuals?
A. All the time.
Q. All the time?
A. All the time. Yeah, I just got one yesterday. I went back in, and I have a new revision manual in my, in my mailbox.
Q. And what was that revision -- to, to which manual was that, or was it to all of them or --
A. I don't know. It's out in my car.
Q. Okay.
A. I gotta put it in --
Q. Okay.
A. -- and take a look at it.
Q. All right, understand. The last question, and I'll let

others have a chance: you talked about there's always that tension maintenance, pilots, you know. You get along, but there's always, kind of -- I don't want to say breaks in this -- but there's always a little tension.

A. Right.

Q. Can you give me an example of what you would classify that as? You know, what, what kind of tension are you talking?

A. Well, I mean, it's just, like, one of the maintenance guys will walk up and say, what's broken, and they'll ask me because I'm kind of like a middle man because I'm the FO, and they -- usually the Captains who are writing it up, and the maintenance -- that's usually where the friction becomes because I think the maintenance looks at, like, oh, you're giving us more workload, or this, and that, you know?

And that's maybe where the friction is, and some of the maintenance would go, you know, what's going on? What's the write-up about? Like, why are you guys back? Like, what's going on? And I'd just say, I don't know, yeah. You might want to just talk to the Captain about that, you know.

Q. Did you ever have a maintenance guy say, no, I'm not -- don't write that up.

A. No.

Q. No? Okay. All right.

MR. ETCHER: I think you answered a lot of my questions now, so I appreciate it, and do you need a break or anything?

MR. YUDA: Nope, good.

MR. KANAE: All right, thank you, Shawn.

Nick, thanks for coming on.

MR. YUDA: Yeah, thank you. I appreciate it.

MR. KANAE: All right, I don't have that many questions, but I wanted to touch base on your compressor stall incident. I might have missed some of the answers that you were, that you were given -- that you gave, excuse me.

BY. MR. KANAE:

Q. During the compressor stall, did any of you notice engine indications?

A. There's -- it's like trying to catch lightning in a bottle. You can't see it. I mean, you can, but there's so many other things that are going on in the plane at such a low altitude that, I mean, I didn't personally ever see it.

But I've gotten feedback -- Oh, that was that engine because I saw, you know, some indication, but I was either flying or, you know, just happened to miss it when it happened.

Q. You were the flight pilot, correct?

A. I was the flying pilot, and even when we're taxing -- like, say if something happens when you're taxing, either, like, you -- slowing down, and there's a compressor stall because the buckets are out too long below 60 knots, that'll happen. Not very often, but I've seen it. I couldn't see it on the gauges fast enough.

Q. So did the Captain, being non-flying pilot -- did he notice

any of the engine instrument indication? Maybe going in to the red or --

A. I mean --

Q. Fluctuating, et cetera?

A. If something goes into the red or something's alarming, and somebody sees it, they obviously communicate it. I didn't personally have anything that I can recall where anybody could point to the gauge, and it was in the red for any kind of excessive amount of time or any time, actually.

Q. During that incident, was the emergency declared to ATC?

A. For mine, or his? For mine?

Q. Yeah.

A. Did I see anything go in the red?

Q. No, no did, did -- after take-off when the compressor stalled, you know, you decided to come back to land on the four right?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. Was there an emergency declared?

A. There was --

Q. To the tower?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. I might have missed that component --

A. Oh, no -- yeah, there was. Yeah.

Q. Thanks. And after the incident, was the Captain and you -- did you have to debrief with the Chief Pilot or Director of Ops,

or even the Director of Safety, on your incident?
A. Yeah, I mean, I believe Henry definitely was in communication with the Director of Operations, David Seest, as well as Wallace, our Chief Pilot, and then that was then connected to me through Henry. So it's kind of like, through a phone conversation, and then Henry, obviously -- we talked about it. And then yeah. Think it was pretty open communication.
Q. Was the write-up in the logbook about that compressor stall? Was that discussed in detail at all with --
A. I don't think we -- or go ahead. Finish what you were saying.
Q. No, that's all.
A. Discussed in detail with who? With --
Q. Yeah, was the discussion about this incident on the compressor stall, was it discussed in detail with the Chief Pilot, Director of Ops, or any of your management?
A. Yeah, I would say. Yeah, they definitely knew the whole story. I mean, yeah, they talked -- I talked to the Chief Pilot. I didn't talk to David. I also talked to the Captain, Henry, about it.

So I think -- yeah, everything was briefed and de-briefed, and I don't know exactly, you know, what took place on Wallace and Henry's end as far as, you know, that went.
Q. Okay. I just have a couple more questions. Was the -- any of the FAA personnel from the Certificate Management Team come by

-- POI come by and question you or the Captain about that?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Do you recall receiving Safety Management System training? It's called SMS.
A. SMS? I -- yeah, that sounds familiar.
Q. Do you recall having training in that topic?
A. Safety management?
Q. Um-hmm.
A. What's the last part? Safety Management System.
Q. System.
A. Do I -- yeah, I mean, I've -- it's in our training.
Q. I'm sorry.
A. It was in our training, so --
Q. Entertaining?
A. It was -- no. It was in our training.
Q. Oh, in our training. Got it.
A. Yeah, that's all I remember about it.
Q. Okay.
A. Just I remember hearing it, and then obviously, training.
MR. KANAE: Great. All right, that's all I have. Thank you very much.
MR. YUDA: That's it? Okay.
MR. KANAE: Thank you. Bill?
DR. BRAMBLE: Actually, Ryan. I think.
MR. FISKEL: Okay. Well, Shawn actually asked a few I had

about (indiscernible) emergency but maybe just a little clarification on a couple things.

BY MR. FISKEL:

Q. So who's idea was it for -- to declare the emergency?

A. That was my idea.

Q. Okay. And was it also your idea to pretty much, almost immediately turn back around and land on four right?

A. That was my idea, yeah.

Q. Your idea as well, and Henry, during this -- did he say anything about it, or did you just do it?

A. Well, he actually was kind of like, I was in, I was in command because we had that -- he was reducing the throttle, I was communicating that I was lowering the nose to build the airspeed in case we lost a whole engine completely.

Q. Right.

A. And then it seemed to stop for a second, and then it seemed to do it again. So at that point, I said, declare an emergency. And you know, I mean, after that, he was like -- and then, that's when tower came back, and they were, like, what runway do you want? And then, he looked at me, and he was, like, what runway do you want? And I was, like, that one because it's right there. So that was kind of you know -- that was, basically, the type of flying that I said Henry would do. Henry would respect the other person, you know, you're flying with and obviously listen and things like that. So if it wasn't my idea, we would have probably

just flew out.

Q. Of course.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

MR. FISKEL: Thank you.

MR. YUDA: Yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: One second. Okay, Rich.

MR. LEE: Sure. Just a couple of things.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. During your last recurrent, you were with Henry?

A. That's correct, yep.

Q. Do you feel like -- did you have enough time in the simulator as far as -- did you run out of time of doing procedures or any of your required training when you were in the simulator -- didn't -- did you -- how long was your recurrent, first of all?

A. I think it's three days.

Q. Yeah, so with the three days, did you have any --

A. I don't think that's long enough. I mean, for me, personally, I think it should probably be about six days. I think we were cutting corners on time -- not really, like, cutting corners on procedures, but we're -- you've got a lot to do within a short amount of time.

I mean, the bare minimum of what's required to do, you could squeeze in that time. Any of the other things that might go wrong -- like, if you have, for an example -- I don't know -- the sim

not working or something; it's hard to get what you need to get done in that time.

So whatever the recurrent time is that the FAA says that you should get recurrent on, I don't necessarily think it's long enough. That's just my opinion.

Q. What about this, this specific with, with Henry -- did you have any sim issues where you had downtime, or did you -- running the time where you were --

A. Nope, everything went smooth, and that was good. But I mean, with everything that we had going smooth as it could go, you know, fit in there perfectly. You know? Like, no real room for too much extra, you know.

Q. Back to the engine out procedures and -- or your compressor stall and coming back. So you ran the memory items; did you call for the checklist and finish the checklist of the memory items?

A. We did the memory items, and then we did the before-landing checklist. So we didn't call for the whatcha-call-it -- the QRH on the -- we just did the memory items.

Q. Engine had surge and stall?

A. Memory items which is reduce thrust, and then, it was -- yeah, declare emergency and land it.

Q. So --

A. Because it wasn't going away.

Q. Did you do the after-take-off checklist and then before land or --

A. We did --
Q. Do you remember?
A. We did -- I can't really remember. I mean, to be honest.
Q. (Indiscernible) but you're remembering a lot of details from the incident and so that happened a while back, so --
A. Yeah, that's probably, like, over -- I'd say it was over a year ago.
Q. Okay. Back to the -- kind of the performance procedure. How do you get your V-speeds for take-off?
A. The V-speeds for our take-off --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- were done --
Q. Do you do them? --
A. -- prior to the --
Q. Do you do them or --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You guys are talking over each other.
BY MR. LEE:
Q. Yeah.
A. Oh, no. Now, they're manually done, but prior to, you know, my -- I don't know. I would say when it switched over was about a month before the accident where we actually had to look them up ourselves, start putting them in, and they were higher numbers than what we were normally used to getting off the, the manual -- the automatic computer-based weight and balance. They had our numbers lower than when we were doing them manually. They were --

our take-off EPR settings were higher.
Q. Okay. When you're -- the new way doing it, the --
A. The new way --
Q. Higher?
A. They were higher because I think we were -- I don't know what it was, but I noticed that they were higher.
Q. Right. You mentioned that you'd seen the EPR -- or the EGTs go in the yellow sometimes. Was there -- did it -- was it consistent over the two years you've been working here, or was there a certain time period where you'd seen it more?
A. I think it was pretty consistent.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. You mentioned about -- you'd seen an issue with split throttles. Do you have any more detail about that, how often and was it a certain aircraft?
A. It was, from my recollection, it was two, two aircraft around the similar time, and I don't know. It just seemed to be -- they were kind of doing their own thing. The -- and I was flying the same plane every day, but every day that I got back it was, like, a little bit different as far as the split being either worse or just at different times during the flight. It seemed to be, you know, changing every day.
So if I was flying the night before, and I get in it tonight, and then the throttle seemed like it was a little bit different.

So it was, you know, going in one direction, and then, we would get it fixed here and there.

But I don't really know. It's, kind of -- yeah, it was just a weird one. It was -- you have to adjust them, and it happened in, in reverse as well as take-off, when we're setting our thrusts, as well as when we're pulling our thrusts back for landing.

We had to, basically, keep them split to pull them back, but it wasn't, like, you just kept them split and then sunk it bad like you would do -- say, like, in a Twin Otter; we would match them up -- sync them up, and then, we'd control our power settings all the way to landing. You know?

And here it just -- they didn't seem to match up. Like, if you were at a certain level coming in to land, and you were -- you thought you could just, like, drop them both back at the same thing; it didn't work. Like, the fuel flows were different; you'd start getting a little bit of a pull from one direction or another because, obviously, there was more thrust on one engine, not the other.

And it would just change from night to night, but I called up Wallace. And I told him -- I was, like, hey, this is going to be a safety issue. I can already tell, and then, he actually did a pretty good job; he made some phone calls, and then, eventually -- yeah, it got fixed.

Q. And as, as the worst split -- can you, you know, tell me how,

how much that was?

A. The worst split -- I mean, it was about a little over a gap. I don't know. I mean, you've got your whole throttle knob, and it was over a throttle knob.

But that's not even the real -- the real concern was when we were going into reverse and one engine was pulling up way faster than the other because sometimes you'd just crack them open, the buckets, and one engine, you know, within that much -- we're talking, like, centimeters -- if you cracked it a little bit more than just open; that engine would now rev up to almost red line.

Which then would pull your plane to that side when you were landing. So I told him -- I was, like, hey, this is definitely not going to be safe because somebody's going to, you know, get pulled off the runway if we don't figure out what's going on here.

And yeah, it took me some vocal -- I had to vocalize myself a little bit and make some phone calls, and then they -- finally got a -- you know -- got it adjusted.

But it's harder to adjust those reversers from what I'm told because you can't just spool up reverse, you know, on the ground and do a run and do an adjustment because, you know, you don't have enough air going through the front of the engine. You'll get compressor stalls.

Q. Yeah.

A. So you know, I was pretty satisfied with them, you know, obviously listening and then with the difficulty of being able to

troubleshoot that issue, you know, but they eventually got it resolved. So -- you know?

Q. So you -- so did you have to make calls to the Chief Pilot, Wallace, to get things -- or was it you and the Captain?

A. No, it was just me.

Q. Okay.

A. I just thought, you know, from the way that I could tell, it was just me, but I thought somebody was going to probably, you know, have an accident.

MR. LEE: Okay. All right, thanks, that's all I have.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, thanks. I don't have anything else. Shawn, do you have any follow-up questions.

MR. ETCHER: I just -- one or two maybe.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Forgive me I don't remember who it was, was -- had asked. On your emergency out of here, you declared -- you said it was -- let's go back -- let's do this, but you -- and then, you said something about -- I didn't know -- catch who it was; if it was up to them, they'd fly it -- we'd fly out on your emergency you did. Was that --

A. If it was up to Henry, I think he would done exactly what he did when he lost the engine and both engines. You know, he would have did the 220. You know, he's a very methodical, very, you know, by the book, methodical, you know, very thorough, slow.

Like, I can probably get done one of his checklists in, like,

30 seconds. Like, I can get it done -- it'd probably take him a little bit longer, you know -- a lot longer. So the things that I did before I landed, you know, I did them. You know?

And then, when he did them, he had so many other things going on that I didn't have, you know, obviously. So he followed the guidelines, and then, I think, from the way it went, you know, just -- that was what he was doing why -- while he lost the other engine. You know?

Running the checklist, which he's, you know -- he likes to do things real thorough, and he likes to make sure that he's doing everything in the right. And he needs that engine up there to last him another ten minutes.

Q. You said he's a little slower than you, a little more methodical perhaps. I don't remember the exact phrases, but during your event, was that a concern to you; that he wasn't doing something efficiently?

A. No, I mean, I've never been in a plane where I thought, you know -- because we weren't on fire, you know. Obviously, I wasn't in any kind of real rush; we hadn't lost both engines. But I just knew there was the airport, we might as well -- we're going to have to land it anyway.

Q. Okay.

A. So I kind of, just stayed within that traffic pattern area, you know.

Q. And my last question is, since you just went through

recurrent not that long ago, do you guys use your own procedures, Boeing procedures, or your sim training -- through your sim training app do you use their procedures?

A. We use company procedures.

Q. Company procedures?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. Have you ever compared those to Boeing procedures or anything else?

A. I mean, I've looked and glanced at a couple of the Boeing procedures, you know, and I, I felt they were pretty similar, you know. I think a lot of our manuals, we're getting them directly from, you know, whatever Boeing's using because we're using the emergency memory items just like Boeing wants us to use.

MR. ETCHER: Excellent, thank you so much.

MR. YUDA: Appreciate it, thank you.

DR. BRAMBLE: Clarence, do you have anything else?

MR. KANAE: No, I don't. Thank you.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Ryan?

MR. FISKEL: Nothing else, thank you.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, (indiscernible) --

MR. LEE: (Indiscernible).

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, I don't have anything either, so let's go to the last closeout questions. Is there anything, Nick, that we haven't asked you about that you'd like to share with us?

MR. YUDA: No, not that I can think of.

DR. BRAMBLE: And we always like to give everyone that we interview an opportunity to communicate any safety recommendations they have to us. Obviously, there's limited information available about this accident that -- do you have anything that you want to share with us at this time?

MR. YUDA: I'd just say the best thing that you could is probably just recurrent training, take a look into a little bit more -- just training always needs improvement, so I would add on something to -- you know, obviously, either more hours or -- I would say probably more hours. I think it's a little short.

DR. BRAMBLE: Anything else?

MR. YUDA: Nope, that's it.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, thanks. Well, with that, we'll call this completed.

(Whereupon, at 1:44 p.m., the interview was concluded.)


CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Francis Yuda
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 27, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Kali Haney
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

Interview of: RENO STORM, First Officer

TransAir Executive Airlines of Hawaii

Honolulu, Hawaii

Monday,
September 27, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing Commercial Airplanes

CLARENCE KANAE, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

WILLIAM KATT, Attorney
Wilson, Elser, Moskowits, Edlman & Dicker LLP

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I N T E R V I E W

(9:56 a.m.)

MR. ETCHER: Well, good morning again. It's 9:56 Honolulu Time on September the 27th. This is the interview with Mr. Storm.

My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm the Operational Factors Group Chairman for the NTSB involving this, this event. I'm partnered with Dr. Bramble, who will introduce himself here in just a minute.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA, and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

At this time, I'd like to go around and have everybody introduce themselves so you can know what -- who they are, who they're with, and also, for the, for the transcription. Okay?

MR. STORM: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Dr. Bramble?

DR. BRAMBLE: I'm William Bramble. I'm the Human Performance Investigator with NTSB.

MR. STORM: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Rich?

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, Safety Pilot for Boeing.

MR. KANAE: And Clarence Kanae, FAA Operations Specialist at the Honolulu Certificate Management Office.

MR. ETCHER: So that's everybody that's going to be here --

MR. STORM: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: -- (indiscernible) you and interviewing you today. Is there any of us that you would rather not have in here?

MR. STORM: No.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. So today we're going to be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we will send that recording out for transcription, and the party members, which is the four of us, will have an opportunity to review that transcript and to correct any type of typographical errors in case they don't necessarily understand the aviation terms we use.

MR. STORM: Um-hmm.

MR. ETCHER: The purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent recurrence. Our role is not to assign fault; we're simply here to -- for you to share your insight with us and, kind of, help educate us, and that way we can -- the ultimate goal is to prevent future accidents.

Having said that, however, we cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity, and this transcript will actually become part of a public docket when it's released publicly later on in the investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time, and everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person who is asking the questions. They're just going to get an opportunity for all of us

to ask questions, so that's why we can go around the room carefully.

We ask that you answer every question you can to the best of your recollection, but if you don't know something, I don't know, I don't recall, that works just fine. This isn't a check ride. We just want to know what you know. Okay?

If there's an opinion you have, please let us know that that's your opinion, just we understand this factor. Most importantly, if you misstate something, please just feel free to make sure we get that corrected and, and bring that forward. All righty?

MR. STORM: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: You are entitled to have one representative of your choosing. Is there someone here that you would like to have as your representative.

MR. STORM: No.

MR. ETCHER: Would you like Mr. --

MR. STORM: Oh, Bill.

(Crosstalk)

MR. STORM: -- yes.

MR. ETCHER: -- okay. So for the record, is there someone here you would like to have as your representative?

MR. STORM: Yes, Mr. Katt.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Mr. Katt, would you be so kind as to introduce yourself?

MR. KATT: Yes, William Katt of Wilson Elser here on behalf of the witness.

MR. ETCHER: All righty. Thank you much. Does anyone have any questions?

MR. KATT: You got questions?

MR. ETCHER: All righty. So if you're ready, we'll get started.

MR. STORM: Sure.

MR. ETCHER: I always ask the hardest questions first, just to get the hardest ones out of the way.

MR. STORM: Yeah.

INTERVIEW OF RENO STORM

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Can you please say and spell your whole name?

A. Sorry. Reno Storm or Reno Kaiolu Storm. R-e-n-o, K-a-i-o-l-u, S-t-o-r-m.

Q. Thank you, and how old are you?

A. 49.

Q. 49. What is your job title?

A. FO.

Q. FO?

A. As a 737 FO.

Q. Okay. At Rhoades?

A. At Rhoades Aviation.

Q. All righty. And when was your date of hire at Rhoades or

TransAir?
A. It's --
Q. What would you me to call them --
A. -- 2002 with TransAir.
Q. Okay.
A. And I flew the 402 for two years, then I flew this -- the Shorts for nine years, and then I've been to the 737s since 2016.
Q. All righty. About how many hours do you have in the 737?
A. Last time I checked it was 800.
Q. How -- I'm sorry --
A. 1,800.
Q. 800? 1,800. Okay. Thank you, sorry. Think I'm getting old and losing my hearing, so I appreciate that. What are your airman certificates and type ratings?
A. I have a ATP, and my ratings are: Shorts, commercial ATP.
Q. And are you type -- do you have a type rating at all with 737s?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Okay. What's your total flight time?
A. Shoot, I -- it's approximately 8,500.
Q. Okay. And do you have a current medical?
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Okay. And --
A. Second class.
Q. -- second class. Any limitations or waivers?

A. No, I -- eyeglasses.
Q. Eyeglasses?
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you think of when your last training event was at Rhoades or TransAir --
A. Yeah. I just came back from a simulator in July. I was there for three weeks up in --
Q. So --
A. -- up in Miami doing sim training --
Q. Okay.
A. -- and ground school.
Q. Okay.
A. We have ground school also first for two weeks or eight days, then we go back to sim. And then that was at -- yeah, that was in July.
Q. Okay. Of 2021?
A. Yes, this year.
Q. Okay. All righty. Were you flying the night of the event?
A. No, I wasn't.
Q. Okay. Were you off, or were you just --
A. I was off.
Q. Okay. I know you, kind of, give us a short cliff's notes version of your time here at TransAir. Can you, kind of, give us a cliff's notes version of your aviation history?
A. Pretty much just flew with TransAir flying the Shorts, and

then flying the 737 most of the time. That's pretty much it.
Q. Okay.
A. No other companies.
Q. When did you start part of the flight training?
A. 2000.
Q. In 2000?
A. Yeah, year 2000.
Q. In here at Hawaii?
A. Yep, at George's Aviation.
Q. Okay. All righty. How was the transition from the Shorts here to the 737; how did that transition go for you --
A. It was probably easy -- I mean, because I'd been flying for a while. It just -- it was a lot faster, of course. It's, you know -- but we had a lot of sim training before we even got a line.
So we were definitely ready before we got on, so we weren't just thrown out there. Yeah, it was pretty, pretty good training.
Q. In your opinion, did the, did the training -- when you came out of training, did you feel ready to actually be able to fly?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. All right. You've been here a while, with TransAir --
A. Yes.
Q. -- with Rhoades. Over that course of time, how would you consider staffing in the last year or the whole time you've been here?
A. Well, the staffing, it goes up and down. I mean, we -- as

soon as we hire two people, then two people quit. So I mean, it's always been, like, right at the edge of just the right amount of people.

But, yeah, there's -- it's -- for the office purpose, there's a lot of office people; there's more than enough. Of -- as for the pilots itself, it's pretty much braid thin.

Q. Okay. I think you said you -- and correct me -- 1,800 hours in the 737?

A. Yes.

Q. Are you in line to be upgrading any time soon, or is that something that --

A. Yeah. We're talking about it. Once I did -- I'm going to go to the 135 side for a while to fly their passenger jet, and then -- and once I get that done, out of the way, I can upgrade to Captain. So that you just can't have the all ones.

Q. And have they given you a date when they're going to have you go to that -- the 135 passenger jet side?

A. Yes. I'm going to be going up to ground school on the 8th of this month -- or next month, and that's for three weeks of ground school and then sim training. Then I come back and we'll work on the Captain side of the 121.

Q. All righty. And how long are they going to have you -- have they told you how long they're going to have you fly the passenger --

A. It's only when people are going to rent it out. It's not an

everyday thing.
Q. Oh. Okay.
A. So it's rent -- maybe once a month, if at that.
Q. Okay. All righty. So let's talk about your time here at TransAir or Rhoades. Does it -- do you want me to use Rhoades for the 737 side?
A. Yeah, sure.
Q. Okay. Just wanted to make sure it's easy, so we're talking about the same thing.
A. Okay.
Q. So with your time here at Rhoades, how do you come -- help me understand the management style at Rhoades. Did -- was it an open-door policy? Kind of --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- help me understand from your side -- from your viewpoint.
A. Manager -- management is really good. I mean, they're very helpful. There's -- I don't know how else to say it, but I thought it was pretty good.
Q. Did you feel comfortable to be able to go into anybody if you have any, kind of, concerns?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Have you had to do that?
A. No, I haven't.
Q. Okay. Is there a way you could address the concerns? If you couldn't get into somebody's office, is there a way to address --

A. You have to make an appointment, and then --
Q. Okay.
A. -- they'll see when you -- when your -- when they have time.
Q. All righty. When you're flying, on the Rhoades side, is there any crew members that -- or any Captains that you wouldn't necessarily want to fly with?
A. Not at this time. Not that I can think of.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Were there some on the TransAir side -- the turbo prop?
A. It's such a while ago. I don't remember anybody that I didn't want to fly with.
Q. Okay. Are there Captains you absolutely love to fly with?
A. They're all pretty much general.
Q. Okay.
A. It's, you know -- they're all good.
Q. All righty. Did you know either of the accident Captain or the accident First Officer?
A. I knew Greg just, like, in briefly, like a hi. I would cross paths, but I didn't talk to him. But with Henry -- yeah. I've known him for, like -- since he's been there.
Q. Have you flown with Captain Okai?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. How often would you?
A. Probably three, four out of the month.

Q. Okay.
A. Can you recall the last time you flew with him?
Q. No, I can't.
A. Okay.
Q. So you, you remember flying with him; how -- can you, kind of, help me understand what you felt with his flying abilities and, and as him as a Captain?
A. Yeah. He was a fairly good Captain. He always followed everything by the book. Yeah. I -- other -- I mean, just a -- he's a standard Captain, I guess. I don't know how else to say it.
Q. Okay.
A. But yeah.
Q. All righty.
A. Followed the procedures.
Q. All righty. So let's, kind of, get down in -- I always say get down in the weeds just a little bit here. Can you get -- let me be a fly on your shoulder. Kind of, walk me through what you would normally do -- I, I let me rephrase that: do you normally do a pre-flight on the aircraft?
A. I did.
Q. Okay. So can you, kind of, walk me through what you'd normally do as part of your pre-flight --
A. Sure.
Q. -- on the aircraft?

A. Yeah. We usually -- we get the -- in there, like, 45 minutes before our departure time. Then I go out to the airplane. Well, first we do the briefing in the office, and that will get a way for all the papers to come in.

Then I go out to do pre-flight at least a half hour before our departure time when the gates open, mechanical issue. Then I just do the standard walk around. I check the -- all the baggage compartments, make sure every -- nothing's on there, and of course, the -- all of the lights.

Come back in all of the circuit breakers and oxygen's all there, all that stuff.

Q. As part of your pre-flight duties, is it required exterior inspection?

A. It's all exterior, yep. First, we start with --

Q. Okay.

A. -- straights here.

Q. So is there anything you look for specifically on an exterior inspection?

A. Of course, the engine blades, and see if there's anything that's in the engine itself.

Q. Okay.

A. All the computer parts, make sure they're not clogged, and basically, any kind of dents. Is there -- in case someone crashed into the plane or something when no one's around. It's pretty much the main things we look for.

Q. Okay. Have you ever done a pre-flight and had any -- observed anything that appeared to me mechanically not working properly?
A. Not mechanically, no.
Q. Okay. Have you ever seen leaks, hydraulic leaks, fuel leaks around the aircraft?
A. Yeah. There's oil leaks, not so much hydraulic leaks --
Q. Okay
A. -- and not fuel leaks.
Q. Okay. So when you see an oil leak, what do you do?
A. We usually check the oil quantity itself, make sure it's not leaking at that time, and if it is, I -- of course, we tell the mechanics to put in a quart or something, make it to standards.
Q. Okay. Do you -- when you see these leaks, do you ever make an entry into the logbook maintenance records?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Who does? Or does anybody --
A. If the Captain is, but I tell the Captain and it's up to them to write it down. I'm not really sure. I don't recall anybody writing oil leaks down in the --
Q. All right. What are some of the things you observe Captains writing -- you know, writing up entries into the main logs?
A. We -- first of all, we talked about if should write it up or not, and it's most of the time is illegitimate things in it. I don't really tell them what not to do or what to do. So --

Q. Has there ever been any hesitations from a Captain to write something up for fear of retaliation from the company or, or anything like that?
A. Not that I can think of, no.
Q. All righty. Has there ever been a time that you're aware of, whether it's happened to you or to a Captain you were flying with, after flight something happened, and they're like, oh, we need you to change this paperwork. Have they ever asked you guys to modify any paperwork --
A. No.
Q. -- after the fact?
A. No.
Q. Okay. So since we were talking a little bit about maintenance here, are there different kind of write-ups? Do you guys use informational write-ups?
A. Yes, we, yes, we do.
Q. Okay. How do you denote the difference in the logbooks, or is it two separate books?
A. No, it's the same write-up page, you just put informational, and then -- yeah. A quotation or whatever you're going to write in so they know it's informational.
Q. Okay. Can you give me some examples of some informational write-ups that you've seen?
A. Shoot, not, not that I can think of right now.
Q. And it's okay if you can it --

A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. -- it's fine.
A. Yeah, not that I can think of.
Q. Okay.
A. We haven't done it in a while, so --
Q. All righty.
A. I can't think of anything.
Q. So walk me through -- you're sitting in the airplane and they're loading the, the cans for you all. What do you do as an FO when, when they're doing that?
A. I'm pretty much getting my clearance, the weather, making sure all of our stations -- radio things -- plays. That's pretty much it because it takes a while, takes about an hour, so we just pretty much sit there, and they do -- they work -- I mean, we brief the flight, of course, and then get all our numbers down, and then we just wait. Pretty much.
Q. Okay. Do you have to do a weight balance form?
A. We don't do it. We have a -- a dispatcher does it, and it's all computerized. They have a program for that.
Q. How do you get that information, the, the weight balance itself?
A. Well, most of the cans that come in, they're weighed already, and then the -- Bobby Lehman, the manager for the Loading Supervisor, he does all that. He gets all the weights down and he gives it to dispatch and then they do all the paperwork.

Q. Do you ever double-check the -- what they're putting on the paperwork is the same as what you --
A. Yes, because there's numbers on the cans, so each number on the can we would watch to make sure it's the right number because it's going on the sequence.
Q. Okay. Has there ever been a time that it hasn't been loaded in proper sequence that you've noticed and --
A. There's been a couple times, but it -- we always catch it, and they have to offload everything. So -- yeah, it's only maybe once or twice.
Q. Is that something that you catch -- you caught, or is it something somebody else caught?
A. Someone, someone else caught it.
Q. Okay.
A. That's the Load Supervisor. Sometimes they -- they're taking their eyes off of the whatever, and they -- all the guys are just throwing stuff on the plane.
Q. Okay.
A. But yeah, most -- I mean, a majority of the time we're all constantly monitoring what the angle is on the plane for, you know, the numbers.
Q. All right. So when you get your paperwork, and you've seen them load the cans, do you ever double-check the addition of the weights to make sure that it's correct at the bottom of the form, or --

A. That's the, pretty much, the Load Supervisor's job, so we --
Q. Okay.
A. -- we don't have any access to that.
Q. You don't have access to what?
A. To the numbers.
Q. To the numbers?
A. Yeah. We just --
Q. So what --
A. We just know what's on the sheet.
Q. Okay. And so you don't have -- I just want to make sure I understand it correctly for the recording.
A. Yeah.
Q. You don't have access to what numbers? The numbers on the can, the weights --
A. No, the numbers that they come in to -- into the office.
Q. Okay.
A. But we know what's on the sheet of paper that they bring out to us.
Q. Okay.
A. So we can't really double-check the numbers.
Q. Okay. So do you -- you've gotten quite a few hours here, is it -- am I pretty safe to assume that you've flown from Honolulu to Maui a few times?
A. Yes.
Q. Can you, kind of, give me a ballpark what's a typically

weight you see for that route, from Honolulu to Maui?
A. The weight? It's usually about -- cargo weight?
Q. The total take-off weight.
A. Oh, usually about 90 -- 95 or -- to 105.
Q. Okay. All righty. And when they -- when you get the weight, do they also give you the performance numbers, like your V-speeds and your EPR settings?
A. We do that.
Q. You do that?
A. Yes.
Q. How do you do that?
A. We have a chart we go by, and it's in our carriage book. It has all the numbers in there, and then our EPR settings and stuff.
Q. Okay.
A. So we just go by that, whatever weights they got, and we do it ourselves.
Q. All righty. And is that EPR setting -- is that a normal take-off thrust, or is that like a de-rated or --
A. It's a reduced thrust.
Q. -- it's a reduced thrust?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Do you always do a reduced thrust?
A. Not always.
Q. When would you not?
A. When we're heavy.

Q. Got it. Okay.
A. Yes, and (indiscernible).
Q. All righty. When's the last time you did a normal take-off -- a non-reduced thrust take-off?
A. Well, we have to do it, like, once a week, so we -- just to keep it -- so, yeah -- about maybe once -- I do it, like, once a week or --
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So you do it -- is that a company policy that is has to be done, or is that just something that you do --
A. Just, just something that the maintenance want.
Q. Okay.
A. So we do it for them.
Q. All right. Do they tell you when they want it done, or --
A. No.
Q. Okay. So --
A. Yeah. We just -- yeah. We just do it.
Q. Okay --
A. But it's -- yeah, it's not very often. Some of the Captains don't like to do it because the engines will be hot. And so we --
Q. How -- or -- what do you mean engines is usually hot? Help me understand --
A. Well, the engines are kind of -- they get hot really fast. People are scared to get into the yellow or into a later stages

that they're not comfortable with, so they just fly with it reduced.

Q. How often do you see it get into the yellow arc?

A. Not often. I, I don't recall the last time.

Q. Okay. Do you remember the accident airplane, 810? Have you ever flown that one?

A. Yes, I actually brought it back from Malaysia about a month or two before that and it was working fine.

Q. Okay. Did you have any engine temp issues with that one?

A. No, not at all. Not when I flew back.

Q. Have you ever heard of crews having issues with engine temps here?

A. Yeah. People get -- you know, you get -- you have to do, like, a really reduced take-off when -- because you can have it in the yellow for five minutes, which we do that sometimes, but it's only ever -- if it's daytime mostly. Nighttime is usually pretty cool.

Q. Okay.

A. But yeah, it could, not that I ever believed it. Just since that accident.

Q. Did you ever -- and I, I may have asked this, and I've already got the answer -- did you ever see an engine overheating for a warm -- a hot engine in 810, the accident aircraft?

A. It gets to the yellow sometimes, but this -- like I said, that's daytime only that I've seen it. I haven't seen it at

nighttime do that.
Q. Okay. And is that on a normal thrust, or a reduced thrust?
A. Normal thrust.
Q. Oh -- you've not seen it on a reduced?
A. Not reduced thrust usually. It stays in the green.
Q. Have you had other airplanes that you've seen it --
A. Not that I --
Q. -- hot engine?
A. Not that I recall, no --
Q. Okay. I know pilots have their favorite airplanes they like to fly and other airplanes that they'd rather never fly.
A. Right.
Q. Do you have one of those here?
A. I like to fly 810. That was one, one of my favorites, and then 737 CS is one I -- the second best.
Q. Okay. Why was 810 your -- one of your favorites?
A. Because it just flew nice. It was all trimmed out perfectly, all the rating was perfect, and -- just never had a problem with it. It, it flew good.
Q. Did you have any airplanes here that you'd prefer never to have to fly it again? Because you just felt like everything you flew with it, you know, it didn't make you feel good or --
A. No, not --
Q. All righty. When you get -- climb up and wait on the runway, you're getting ready to take off, since you're the pilot flying,

who sets the take-off thrust?
A. I set the take-off thrust for the pilot flying, and then once we start rolling, the Captain has their -- it has it on throttles.
Q. Okay. All righty. You're going down the runway here at, at Honolulu -- a guest on flight -- they took off on eight, right? And you hit V1, and you have an engine issue -- an, an engine failure. Let's just say that --
A. Um-hmm.
Q. Well -- what's going to be -- what do you expect to happen next?
A. Well, for -- if we're below 80 knots, we'll abort. Anything after that, we just take it out. I'd never had an engine failure luckily.
Q. Okay.
A. So like, usually, we'd start our procedures.
Q. All right. Is there any special procedures out of Honolulu for engine issue -- for engine failures?
A. Yeah. We just do an update your feed, do our memory items. Then we -- of course, we tell ATC -- say we've got an engine failure if that ever happens. Just do our memory items after take-off checklist and then hopefully just get (indiscernible) back around.
Q. Is there any special departure procedure off of eight right for engine failure, like ATC where you're expected to do something?

A. Just head into -- two two zero and up to what routes that they give us, usually 1,500.
Q. Has there ever -- have you ever heard of any engine failures here?
A. I've heard Henry had three. I've never heard of anything before that.
Q. Okay.
A. So -- I --
Q. So you, you heard he had three. Did you ever hear what the outcome was?
A. No.
Q. Okay. They never --
A. No, I never talked to him about it.
Q. Okay. Did the company ever send down any information about their engine failures?
A. No.
Q. All righty. Have you had any compressor stalls?
A. Got a few on the -- not on take-off but on landings. We're putting into, like, reverse and just -- that's not very common though.
Q. Okay.
A. Happened one -- once or twice.
Q. Can you recall when had -- when the, when the last one you had was? The most recent.
A. Oh, shoot. It's been maybe six months ago.

Q. And here's another question, might be hard to recall, so please tell me if --
A. Um-hmm.
Q. -- you can't: do you recall if the Captain wrote that aircraft up?
A. Yes, as a compressor stall. Yes.
Q. Was it here in Honolulu, or was it in an outstation?
A. Honolulu.
Q. Okay. And on that one, did you ever find out what --
A. No.
Q. -- they did to try and rectify that situation?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Okay. So I know we all say compressor stalls, but we all have different ideas of what a compressor stall is.
A. Yeah.
Q. When you have one, what's it sound like to you?
A. Sounded like a big backfire, banging, and a little bit yellow. Where -- that's pretty much it.
Q. I think you said in -- I just want to make sure I heard it right -- you said that was after you went into reverse?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. All right. All righty. Did your -- did the training you received here help you deal with a compressor stall, or they don't cover that in --
A. They don't cover that in training.

Q. They did not?
A. No.
Q. So I know recently you went through training. Was it July?
A. Um-hmm.
Q. This year? Kind of, tell me what did you guys cover in training within the simulator part?
A. Well, we have a sheet that he goes by that we'd do all the maneuvers and stuff, and we do pretty much everything standard. In our normal -- unusual altitudes, spin overs, steep turns. Mostly single engine flights. We do a lot of that. Then engine out approaches, not-persistent approaches. You know, whatever else he wants to throw in there.
Q. All right. All righty. How did you do on your training?
A. Good.
Q. Good?
A. Yeah.
Q. Good. Who did your training in the sim?
A. Wallace.
Q. How was that -- what is that like to have a Chief Pilot doing your sim work?
A. It's okay. I mean, overall -- he's a vet. That's where I started off when training me, so I had no thought about it.
Q. Okay. Have you ever had an unsatisfactory training event here? At, at Rhoades --
A. I --

Q. -- in the 737.
A. I can't remember, yeah. I don't recall doing that in this check ride so --
Q. Have you ever had somebody sitting on your jump seat observing you in flight?
A. Not me.
Q. Not you?
A. No.
Q. Your Captain?
A. Captain?
Q. Did you ever have one observing a Captain --
A. Oh, yeah. Wallace does it once in a while when they're -- that's pretty much it.
Q. Okay. Did you ever see the FAA come out and --
A. I've seen, but they never really rolled at me. So --
Q. I'm sorry, say that again.
A. I've -- they've had ridden with us but never -- not with me.
Q. Okay, okay.
A. So --
Q. Have you ever interacted with the FAA --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- folks?
A. Yeah.
Q. How were they to deal with?
A. The only person I've dealt with so far was Mark. I didn't

know that was the PMI, but he was good. He can -- he was in Miami with us with the sim training.

Q. Okay.

A. But yeah, no problems.

Q. Okay. And in your sim training, were you paired up with another Captain, or did you have a seat fill?

A. It's a Captain.

Q. Oh, it is?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. And normally I go up there to -- also for CS support for the Captains, so it's always the Captain and then FO.

Q. Okay.

A. It's not FO, FO.

Q. Okay. All righty. Have there ever been maintenance concerns here on your part? Have you ever had a concern with maintenance and what was being done to the aircraft?

A. No.

Q. All right. Has there ever been -- can you give me some examples of maintenance issues that you may have heard about that maintenance might have been having trouble figuring out what the cause was?

A. Maybe the pressure.

Q. Pressure?

A. Yeah. Sometimes the pressure goes off and on that -- yeah,

it's something that we've got to do all the time.
Q. Was that a particular aircraft, or was that just fleet-wide?
A. Not all aircrafts, yeah. I can't remember which ones.
Q. Did you ever have a pressurization issue?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Remind me to want to fly with you because you seem to have a, a good run in there. I know we talked about -- briefly earlier if you had a concern, you'd make an appointment to go talk to somebody.
A. Yeah.
Q. Did they have any other way for you to address a safety concern or any concerns?
A. Just by e-mail.
Q. Through what?
A. E-mail.
Q. E-mail?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Have you ever done that?
A. I haven't done it.
Q. Have you heard of anybody doing that?
A. Not that I can -- no.
Q. Okay. Do you know if Rhoades has a Director of Safety that you can go to if you needed to?

A. Yes, he's -- but I haven't had to.
Q. Okay. Who is it? Do you know?
A. I forgot his name.
Q. And, and that's okay. It's --
A. Yeah.
Q. It's hard if you don't --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- have a face to a name --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- because then it's hard.
A. Yeah.
Q. Does the safety department here ever send out communications about concerns pilots have had or anything?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever gotten any communication from the safety --
A. I don't know. I don't recall anything.
Q. Who do you normally get your communications from?
A. David Seest or Wallace.
Q. Okay. And is that verbally, or is that in an --
A. Both --
Q. Both --
A. -- verbally and by e-mail.
Q. Okay. I've just got a few more questions here, and then we'll let Bill, kind of, go. Have you ever had any manual revisions here at Rhoades for your manuals?

A. Manual revisions. Not that I can think of.
Q. Not that you can think of.
A. Yeah., yeah.
Q. Okay.
MR. ETCHER: And I think you've answered most of my questions right now. I've, sort of, taken my time going through my list --
MR. STORM: Good.
MR. ETCHER: I'm going to let Dr. Bramble --
MR. STORM: Okay.
MR. ETCHER: -- ask a few if you're -- do you need a break?
MR. STORM: No, I'm, I'm okay.
MR. ETCHER: Are you sure?
MR. STORM: Yep.
MR. ETCHER: Okay. Bill?
DR. BRAMBLE: Thanks.
BY DR. BRAMBLE:
Q. And Mr. Storm, are you aware of any episodes where Henry Okai may have been reprimanded by the Chief Pilot or other managers?
A. Reprimanded? No.
Q. Okay. Are you aware of any instances where he declared an -- declared an emergency before the accident?
A. No, I haven't been with him ahead of the time, but that I don't recall.
Q. Are you aware of anything unusual about the condition of the accident airplane before the accident?

A. No.
Q. Okay. How confident were you before the accident about the quality of maintenance for the Rhoades --
A. I was pretty confident. They're all pretty good, all trained mechanics.
Q. And all these questions apply to the year prior to the accident. Do you feel supported by management and able to make safety-related decisions as a pilot without fear of repercussions?
A. Yep.
Q. And do you feel pressures from company management to do things you felt were unsafe?
A. No.
Q. Do you have any safety-related concerns about the company?
A. No, I don't.
Q. And how would you describe the safety culture at Rhoades?
A. It's pretty good. I mean, first -- safety is one of their biggest issues or concerns.
Q. Okay. What do you mean by it's one of the greatest issues or concerns?
A. We would always talk about safety. There's -- they're pretty on it safety-wise.
Q. Pretty, what was that?
A. They're pretty safe. I mean, I don't --
Q. And can you describe the relationship between the maintenance staff and the pilots at Rhoades before the accident?

A. Their throw rate at any issues, but I can't -- there -- it's pretty -- I know everybody, every one of them, and I'm pretty sure everyone else has, too. I don't recall any disagreements.

Q. Have you ever heard of a flight crew saying they were afraid of getting fired for writing up a maintenance issue?

A. No.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. That's all I have, thanks.

MR. STORM: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Clarence? Clarence?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I'm -- no good. Are you blowing (ph.) this?

MR. KANAE: If you didn't get the chance.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead.

MR. KANAE: You sure?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

MR. KANAE: Okay. Thanks, Reno, for your time today, and I just have a couple questions.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. You were a Captain in the Shorts aircraft; is that correct?

A. Yes, I, I was.

Q. When do you expect to be a Captain in the 737? Do you have -- you meet the requirements now.

A. I do. Maybe sometimes in the beginning of next year, 2022.

Q. Okay. Have you discussed any operations issues with your

Chief Pilot, Director of Operations, or even Director of Safety?
A. No, I --
Q. And what, kind of, recommendations for that?
A. No, I haven't.
Q. No?
MR. KANAE: And, and that's all I have for now. Thank you.
MR. ETCHER: Thanks, Clarence. Rich?
MR. LEE: Sure. It's just a, a couple things.
BY MR. LEE:
Q. You mentioned you had a -- an issue or you remember an issue on using reverse thrust in the Honolulu -- is it typical for you guys to operate and use full reverse thrust on landing in, in Honolulu, or is it --
A. It's just some --
Q. Or it depends?
A. It's just something we do. You don't have to, but most Captains do just til we get off on the often then right sooner. But, yeah, O'hau is the one of the -- we don't really have to use, but we do. But all the other islands we use it for the short runways.
Q. Okay. So you recently went through the training. How -- the, the sim portion of your training, how, how many days was that your -- back in July? Was that your recurrent training?
A. That was my IVCP (ph.) check.
Q. Okay. And how, how many days is --

A. It's three, three days.
Q. Three days? All right. So two practice days and then checkride, right?
A. That's correct.
Q. Now, the procedures that you used in the sim, are those the same procedures that you use here on the line with Rhoades?
A. Yeah, except for the news route -- those the maneuvers, but all the, all the approaches; yes.
Q. It's just the normal procedures, like checklist items --
A. Yes.
Q. -- and things like that?
A. Yes, yes, we do.
Q. Okay. You mentioned that Henry is by the book, follows the procedures. Have -- when you've flown with him, have you noticed him doing extra things for safety reasons --
A. No.
Q. -- that weren't in the procedures, or --
A. No, I haven't.
Q. No, you don't? About getting to your speeds for your V-speeds for departure and your EPR setting, you mentioned you used speed cards?
A. No, we use our QRH, and we gotta, we gotta --
Q. (Crosstalk) QRH.
A. We also have the speed cards too.
Q. Is that -- have you always done it that way?

A. Just the -- with the past four months, I think.
Q. Four months? So --
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you know why there was a change?
A. I don't know why. But used to be sent out with -- from the dispatch from their computer program.
Q. Okay. So they used a computer program to give you the speed and the -- it changed --
A. Yeah
Q. -- about four months ago?
A. About that, yeah.
MR. LEE: I think that's all I have so --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Okay.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thanks.
MR. ETCHER: I've just got a few more questions. We'll go around one more time, but do you need a break or anything?
MR. STORM: No, I'm okay.
MR. ETCHER: You -- you're doing okay --
MR. STORM: Yeah, yeah.
MR. ETCHER: -- okay.
BY MR. ETCHER:
Q. Has anybody that you're aware of here ever been terminated or asked to leave?
A. There's a couple that were terminated -- this was a long time ago. I don't remember their names.

Q. Okay.
A. And for what, what reason, I have no idea.
Q. Okay. And I think, when we were talking earlier, you had said it seemed like there'd be two get hired on, and two people would leave?
A. Yes.
Q. Does that happen quite regularly? I, I had a little note because I wasn't sure I understood it exactly.
A. Doesn't happen all the time, but it seems like it happens quite a bit.
Q. Okay.
A. Every -- you're always -- especially when the pandemic was here, everybody stayed, but we didn't really get -- you know, people were just trying to roll on just get the higher companies.
Q. Okay. Do you have any goal to move on, or is this --
A. No, I think I'm too old now.
Q. Okay.
A. I'm just going to stay around.
Q. All right. All righty. Pilots love to talk, don't we? I mean, you know, it's just, kind of, our nature. When we get airborne, we like to talk amongst ourselves.

Have you ever heard of anybody -- and this is just something -- if you have heard of anybody getting -- I don't know how to say it nicely, but chewed out by the Chief Pilot or by somebody in management about something they had done?

A. No.
Q. You've not heard about that --
A. I -- no, they don't, they don't tell me that.
Q. Okay. Well, I was --
A. Yeah.
Q. No other pilots have mentioned --
A. Yeah
Q. -- that either?
A. No -- if they do, they keep it to themselves.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. All righty. Have you ever been corrected -- let's use that phrase -- by a Chief Pilot or a Director of Safety or anybody in management about something you may have done?
A. Nothing I recall, no.
Q. No?
A. Not -- maybe. Yeah, I don't recall.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. I didn't mean -- we're all pilots, you know --
A. Right.
Q. I get it, you know. I think the stakes are high.
A. Right.
Q. I had to go do the carpet dance at the Chief Pilot's office. I just wasn't sure if you've ever --

A. Yeah. I --
Q. -- had to do that.
A. No, I haven't done that.
Q. Okay. I can't remember who asked, but you said Henry was a by the book --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- kind of, guy. Is there any crew members here that aren't by the book, per say?
A. No, they're all pretty much by the book. I mean, that's -- they keep -- yeah, they have to, they have to. Most the times, yeah. Our --
Q. Are there -- I'm sorry, go ahead.
A. Because there's nobody that I know that's not by the book.
Q. Okay. Are there anybody in -- is there anybody here that had you do something maybe a little bit more than the procedure may call for, but it's just their, kind of, their little thing they like to do?
A. No.
Q. No?
A. No.
Q. And I -- forgive me if I didn't ask this: coming out of here, do you do flaps two or flaps by departures?
A. It all depends on the Captain. Usually, we put out flaps two. Flaps five aren't heavy. They're --
Q. And you said it -- it's up to the Captain?

A. Yeah, they -- usually, they tell it to dispatch what kind of flaps they want to use.
Q. Okay. Have you ever seen a Captain saying I -- flaps five? Doesn't matter their weight, they always like to do flaps five.
A. Not that I can -- not the names I can think of, but no.
Q. Okay, okay. Has there ever been anybody here that has received additional time off at all that you're aware of but, you know, they -- for doing something -- declaring an emergency or coming back too quick after declaring an emergency without having a checklist; has there been anybody that had time off or additional training because of something like that?
A. No.
Q. Not that you're with --
A. Not that I can -- no.
Q. All righty.
A. They all, they all discuss our lists.
Q. Okay. The, the company doesn't. Do, do pilots ever --
A. No.
Q. -- explain or talk about anything?
A. No.
Q. I know I asked earlier if there was Captains that you wouldn't necessarily like to fly with. Has anybody ever mentioned to you anything about the accident First Officer?
A. I'm sorry?
Q. Has anybody mentioned to you -- any Captain and former that

they ever mentioned anything about the accident First Officer?
A. Accident First Officer? No.
Q. No?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Because I know you -- I think you said you just met him a times in passing --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- but I wasn't sure.
A. Right, yeah.
Q. Okay.
MR. ETCHER: All right. I think you've answered all my questions. Let me just make sure --
MR. STORM: Sure.
MR. ETCHER: -- Dr. Bramble doesn't have any additional.
MR. STORM: Okay.
DR. BRAMBLE: I'm done, thank you.
MR. ETCHER: Okay. Clarence?
MR. KANAE: No.
MR. ETCHER: You -- you're all good?
All right. Rich?
MR. LEE: Nothing more.
MR. ETCHER: All righty. Well, you educated us a lot, but I always like to end on two questions.
MR. STORM: Yep.
MR. ETCHER: Is there anything that you can think of --

either like, man, this might help them if they would just ask me that, or, they didn't ask me that; I'm surprised. Is there anything like that that you can think of?

MR. STORM: Nope.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. And the one I always like to end on is: if you were king for the day --

MR. STORM: Um-hmm.

MR. ETCHER: -- and you could make any change --

MR. STORM: Okay. Just --

MR. ETCHER: -- no changes at all?

MR. STORM: -- not that I can -- no, not right now.

MR. ETCHER: Really?

MR. STORM: I can't think of anything.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. All righty. Well then we appreciate your time, and we will call this interview ended at 10:42 local time.

MR. STORM: Great, thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Reno Storm
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 27, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Kali Haney
Transcriber

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Carolyn Hanna
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
	*	

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Interview of: VICTOR ANTONOV, Captain

TransAir Executive Airlines of Hawaii

Honolulu, Hawaii

Tuesday,
September 28, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing Commercial Airplanes

CLARENCE KANAE, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

RYAN FRISKEL, Pilot Flight Representative
Transair

WILLIAM KATT, Attorney
Wilson, Elser, Moskowits, Edlman & Dicker LLP

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INTERVIEW

(9:49 a.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: September 28th, 2021, and it is 9:49 a.m. My name is William Bramble and I'm a Human Performance Investigator with the NTSB. I'm assisting the operations and human performance working group which I'm leading with Shawn Etcher. And the active accident investigation number is DCA21FA174, involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the DOT or the FAA and has no regulatory or enforcement power.

I'd now like to have Mr. Etcher, and each of the operations and human performance group members briefly introduce themselves. Mr. Etcher?

MR. ETCHER: Good morning. My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm the Operational Factors Group chairman for the NTSB.

MR. KANAE: Good morning. Clarence Kanae with the FAA locally here at the Honolulu Certificate Management Office.

RYAN FRISKEL: Transair pilot flight representative for this NTSB investigation.

MR. LEE: And I'm Rich Lee, Boeing, safety pilot.

DR. BRAMBLE: Is there anyone present who you object to being here for this interview?

MR. ANTONOV: Nope.

DR. BRAMBLE: Today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we'll send that recording out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to review the transcript to correct typographical errors.

Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent recurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're here simply for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents.

Having said that, we cannot offer any guarantee of confidentiality, or immunity. And the transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for this accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask one at a time. Everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person who is asking the questions at that time. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions.

Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't know, you can say you don't know. If you don't understand a question, just say so. If you realize you misstated something or want to correct something, just let us know.

You're entitled to have a representative of your choosing at any NTSB interview. Is there someone you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. ANTONOV: Mr. Katt.

DR. BRAMBLE: Mr. Katt, can you please introduce yourself?

MR. KATT: Yeah. I'm William Katt. Attorney with Wilson Elser.

DR. BRAMBLE: Do you have any questions, Victor?

MR. ANTONOV: Uh-uh.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. I'll get started.

INTERVIEW OF VICTOR ANTONOV

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Can you please state and spell your full name, please?

A. Yeah. I'm Victor Antonov. V-i-c-t-o-r A-n-t-o-n-o-v. Igor, I-g-o-r, middle name.

Q. Victor Antonov Igor?

A. Victor Igor Antonov.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Igor is your middle name. How old are you?
A. Thirty-six.
Q. What's your date of hire with Rhoades Aviation?
A. 2012, I believe.
Q. What's your current job title?
A. I'm a captain on the 737.
Q. What previous positions have you held with Transair or Rhoades?
A. I previously worked for Vincennes University Flight School. And I got hired and I came out here to fly the Convair 640 they had before they had the Boeing. So I was flying that first.
Q. Did you fly that for Rhoades or Transair?
A. The Convair was for Rhoades.
Q. Did you do any flying for them in Indiana or was it all here in --
A. No, all here.
Q. Who hired you?
A. Travis Brown. He was the old DO and chief pilot, I believe.
Q. What certificates and ratings do you have?
A. I've just got my -- the SIC type and the Convair 640, Boeing 737 type, and my ATP. The flight CFI (indiscernible).
Q. Any other ratings besides 73 and Convair?
A. Uh-uh. That's it.
Q. How many total flight hours?
A. About 5400.
Q. How much of that is on the 737?
A. 2800.
Q. All of the 737 time was here?

A. Yeah.

Q. Have you ever held any management positions at Rhoades or any other sort of collateral duties?

A. No.

Q. So in terms of your aviation-related background, did you do your primary flight training at Vincennes?

A. I finished it. I started at a Part 61 school and then got 20 hours. And then enrolled in the university and got all my ratings at Vincennes University.

Q. Then was Rhoades Transair your first job out of that school?

A. Well, I worked for the university for, I don't know, four or five years. Then got the job here at Rhoades.

Q. How many hours did you have when they hired you on here?

A. I had 750 hours or something.

Q. Do you work the typical pilot schedule here? Two weeks of nights, a week of days, and a week off, approximately, per month?

A. Yeah, sometimes. Most of the time I get that. The day flight only.

Q. You mostly only fly days?

A. Um-hum.

Q. How many days a week do you fly?

A. Five days a week.

Q. I'm sorry. I should have said how many days a month do you fly?

A. Seventeen, eighteen days.

Q. Those are mostly all days?

A. Mostly all days. Maybe one week I get a weekend that I start working at night.

Q. Oh, okay. So maybe one week you might fly nights for a weekend?

A. Yeah.

Q. How do you get to flying mostly days? Is it just because of your seniority?

A. Yeah. I would say that.

Q. Yeah. I think you're the only pilot we talked to who flies mostly days.

A. Well, recently, it's been a little different. I get one week at night, sometimes two weeks.

Q. Oh, okay. But before the accident, it was mostly days.

A. Yeah, mostly days.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: These guys (indiscernible) --

DR. BRAMBLE: It's -- we're right next to the kitchen, unfortunately. Yeah.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Oh, okay.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Let's see. What's satisfying or (indiscernible) about working at Rhoades?

A. Satisfying -- I'd say the people. We got a lot of good people here working at Rhoades. That makes it a fun job.

Q. What's the -- what are the challenging parts of the job?

A. Well, the planes are old. Don't offer much help. And they do break sometimes. But it's fairly -- you know, fairly easy. We only go to a couple airports. So I'm not that --

Q. Were you on duty the night of the accident?

A. No, I was on vacation.

Q. Had you flown with Henry Okai?

A. You know, I might have once. He was in the right seat. But it's been long ago. I can't -- honestly, I can't even recall. But if I did, it was just one time.

Q. How about Greg Ryan?

A. Yeah. I've flown with him plenty of times.

Q. What was he like as a first officer?

A. He was very good. He was very dependable and reliable. And any mistake I potentially made, you know, he could catch it.

Q. Were you aware of anything unusual about the condition of the accident airplane, 810, before the accident?

A. No.

Q. On the flight, in general, at Rhoades, are you aware of any recent recurring maintenance issues?

A. I think we had compressor stall and maybe like fuel gauge issues, quantity.

Q. That was across airplanes or one particular?

A. I think it -- no, it was different airplanes. Yeah.

Q. Back to Henry. Did you ever hear about him declaring an emergency and making a landing and then getting maybe reprimanded for the way he handled it by the chief pilot?

A. I have -- I heard about him declaring an emergency but --

Q. Prior to the accident?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you hear anything about him being reprimanded for the way he handled it?

A. Reprimanded, no.

Q. Did it seem like maintenance was able to address any write-ups in a reasonable time period?

A. Sometimes, yes.

Q. What were the exceptions?

A. I mean, we just sometimes have, you know, reoccurring issues with airplanes. Problems kept coming back.

Q. Which ones seemed to be the reoccurring issues?

A. The most one I could think of was the fuel gauge quantity and the compressor stall.

Q. Did you ever write up those issues?

A. Yes. I'm sure I have.

Q. And what happened as a result of your writing them up? Like what would -- what kind of feedback would you get? What action would seem to occur?

A. Nothing -- no feedback really. But next time I got on the airplane, it -- I still have the same problem. And it was cleared.

Q. It would have the same problem but it would be cleared?

A. Yeah.

Q. How many times would you say you experienced compressor stalls?

A. Two, three times. Mostly I heard about other people having them.

Q. When did they occur when you experienced them?

A. On takeoff.

Q. All three of them?

A. Yeah.

Q. Was it like a single stall or it would be --

A. It was multiple, multiple.

Q. And each occasion, it was multiple (indiscernible) --

A. Yeah, yeah. Except one time, we were going past 80 knots and we're going -- I heard a big boom. And the plane yawned and I rejected the takeoff. I thought that we lost the engine. And I think that was with this guy, Ryan Friskel.

Q. What airport was that at?

A. Honolulu.

Q. What happened after you got back?

A. Nothing. We made the write-up, gave the book to maintenance, and went and -- dispatch.

Q. Then you went to dispatch?

A. Yeah, we went to -- usually either sit in dispatch or in the pilot's lounge.
Q. What did they do to address that issue?
A. I can't tell you. Don't know.
Q. Was that the first time it happened to you?
A. Yeah. I've had some way, way back. But this is the most recent within maybe a year or so.
Q. When would you say that occurred roughly this recent --
A. Before?
Q. Well, actually, all three. That would be helpful. If you could tell us when they all three occurred if you can recall.
A. I can't. Just the most recent one was maybe within last six, seven months or so.
Q. Have you experienced any issues with -- before the accident, have you experienced any issues -- let me back up. Do you recall which airplane that was, the recent compressor stall event?
A. 809-TA.
Q. Have you experienced any recent issues with high EGT indications during reduced thrust takeoffs before the accident?
A. Yeah. I did. But it was still within limits. You mean like being in the yellow or --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- acceleration or the five-minute? Yeah. It was within that.
Q. So what portion of the takeoff did you see it in the yellow?
A. Just maybe around 80 knots or so. You know, it started going in the yellow.
Q. When did it come out of the yellow?
A. When I pulled the power back at 1,000 feet.
Q. And what's the five-minute limit?
A. Well, they're all different. I don't even -- I don't remember what it was for 810.
Q. How common was it to see the EGTs going to yellow during a takeoff?

A. Fairly common, I'd say. With a higher EPR setting.

Q. Do you have any -- did you have any concern about whether or not you could do a full -- takeoff with a full rate thrust?

A. I have thought of that. But I didn't do them.

Q. One of the pilots told us that maintenance liked the pilots to periodically do a full thrust takeoff. Did anyone ever ask you to do that?

A. Asked me? No.

Q. Did -- was that something that pilots were supposed to do -- or occasionally?

A. Yeah, I -- we're supposed to do one once, I think, every seven days. But I don't think that's written anywhere anymore.

Q. How did you know that was supposed to happen?

A. I -- from my recollection, we used to have an older logbook and I thought in the back of it -- like when you do the engine trend -- it said to do a max power takeoff every seven days.

Q. Did anyone ever -- did management ever say -- ever reinforce that or say you should do that every --

A. Yeah, yeah. They have.

Q. Who said that?

A. David Seest. It said it should be done.

Q. How come you didn't do it?

A. I mean, I have done it in the past. It's just recently I haven't done it.

Q. But before the accident, you hadn't -- how long would you say it had been since you've done that before the accident?

A. Maybe eight months.

Q. So how come you hadn't done it for eight months before the accident?

A. I just didn't really think of it. I used to try to do one, you know, every time it needed to be

done.

Q. Were you concerned about whether the engines could handle it?

A. Maybe slightly.

Q. What was the practice for writing up high EGT indications? Was it supposed to be written up if that happened during takeoff or was it not? We're unclear on whether that's a maintenance item or --

A. Well, it's -- as long as it's within limits, then it could be, I guess, an informational write-up. But maintenance -- I mean, if it's within limits, it's within limits. Unless it goes out of limits, then you write it up.

Q. Did you ever write it up?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Was that because it was out of limits?

A. Yes. One time was out of limits.

Q. Did it go in the red?

A. Yeah.

Q. When was that approximately?

A. Two years ago.

Q. When do you think the most recent time was that you wrote up engine EGT indications before the accident?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Do you think you did it at all in 2021?

A. Possibly, yeah.

Q. Was it typically one airplane that had that issue or all of them?

A. It went just different -- it kind of cycled through different airplanes. Some would run a little warmer than others, you know. Q. And when it did happen with a particular airplane, did

it happen every -- did it tend to happen every takeoff? When it was (indiscernible) --

A. No. Just when it was that -- to that EPR setting. Yeah. With the heavier airplane.

Q. Is a 2.01 EPR -- would you consider that to be a high EPR setting with the (indiscernible) engines?

A. 2.01, yeah.

Q. Is that like really high or slightly high or moderately high?

A. I'll just say it's high.

Q. Just high?

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you have any problems with hydraulic leaks or hydraulic failures?

A. No.

Q. Do you have any pressurization issues?

A. Yes.

Q. What airplane was that?

A. Probably all of them at one time or another.

Q. Did you ever write that up?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was done as a result?

A. I don't know. It was clear to our MEL.

Q. Did it seem like they were able to efficiently resolve that issue?

A. Sometimes. But not others.

Q. How confident were you about the quality of maintenance work at Rhoades Aviation before the accident?

A. Fairly confident.

Q. Was there anything that gave you doubts?

A. What gave me doubts is that we'd have, you know, a reoccurring write-up on the airplane.

Q. What were the issues that seemed to be reoccurring most often? What were some of the ones that stood out?

A. Well, most recently, pressurization, the fuel gauge, and that compressor stall.

Q. Did you ever hear about anybody feeling afraid of being terminated for writing up a maintenance issue?

A. I have heard people mention that. Yes.

Q. Can you tell us any more details about sort of what the context of that was, like, what kind of maintenance issues?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever feel concerned that you might be terminated for writing up a maintenance issue?

A. No.

Q. Were you aware of any instances of crews wanting to write up maintenance items and then having maintenance tell them to write it up when they got back from a trip instead of before they left?

A. What was the question? Did I hear them?

Q. Did you hear about any instances of crews finding a maintenance issue that they wanted to write up and then having maintenance tell them to write it up when they got back instead of before they left?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any examples?

A. No. I mean, it's nothing that's -- I think like a light or something but nothing -- no big deal. I mean, it's still a big deal. But that's what kind of things there were.

Q. Oh, okay. So they are things that were not safety related?

A. Not --

Q. Minor things?

A. Yeah, no. Minor. Definitely nothing safety related.

Q. Before the accident, who was responsible for managing safety at Rhoades Aviation?

A. Safety -- the director of Safety is Orlando. Yeah.

Q. Did you know anyone else in the safety department?

A. No. The newest guy we added, I think, is Valeri.

Q. Did you have any interactions with Valeri?

A. Yeah, I've talked to him.

Q. What did he do typically?

A. I think he was hired with the SMS program.

Q. Did he interact with you in his capacity as an SMS auditor? Did he ask you questions and things like that (indiscernible) --

A. Yeah, he did. He asked me about the pressurization thing. I think he actually flew with me to see if, you know, it had a problem. Yeah.

Q. Did it have a problem when he flew with you?

A. A slight one, but it did.

Q. If you had a safety-related concern, how would you have communicated that to management?

A. Well, talked to a chief pilot, or D.O. and -- or write the safety report.

Q. Did you ever have to do that, any of those things?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Can you tell us about that?

A. I know I had a safety report about the pressurization. That's the most recent one I remember. When the cabin went up and down 4,000 feet per minute. It was very uncomfortable

and disorientating.

Q. What happened as a result of your safety report?

A. I don't know.

Q. Did you get any feedback from the safety department or anyone else?

A. I think they said they're working on it and that's the last I asked.

Q. Who told you that?

A. Orlando.

Q. And then you -- so he told you or you asked him?

A. I think he -- I ran into him and said, we're working on it.

Q. And then you never heard anything else?

A. No. But the problem eventually went away.

Q. Anything else you can remember that you submitted?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever have to communicate any other safety concerns to management in other ways?

A. A long time ago, yes.

Q. What was that about?

A. There was some -- it was to do with loading.

Q. Was it like a misloading issue or --

A. Just -- you know, in our (indiscernible) program, we'd have like the -- we have an airport where we are and where we're going. So all the performance numbers are based on that. And sometimes the destination airport, you know, was a different one, which made it inaccurate. That was a while back, too, when they were getting the program together.

Q. How many years -- or what year was that, would you say?

A. Oh, man. Two years ago.

Q. And the pressurization report that you filed, when was that approximately?

A. Maybe a year or two ago.

Q. I'm sorry. I sneezed over you.

A. Bless you. A year or two ago, two. I really don't recall. You guys have access to that though, right?

Q. We'll look it up. Yeah. Just like to ask in case there's more than one so we know which one is you.

A. I see. I put my names on them.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. You'll find them.

Q. What kind of safety communications did you get from the company before the accident?

A. What do you mean safety communications?

Q. Did you get any kind of emails or newsletters?

A. Yeah. We used to have like a notebook. So if some kind of a bulletin came out for us to do something different, we'd have to read it and sign it; that we're aware of it. That was a while back. Recently, we've had emails go out to the crews.

Q. Do you recall getting any safety newsletters?

A. No, I don't.

Q. Do you recall ever getting a memo with your paycheck from the CEO saying that you should feel free to report maintenance issues without fear of repercussions?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. When was that approximately?

A. Four months ago, five months ago.

Q. Did you feel supported by management and able to make safety-related decisions as a pilot without fear of repercussions?

A. Yes.
Q. Sounded like --
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. That's a confident yes?
A. Very confident.
Q. Did you feel pressure from company management to do things you felt were unsafe?
A. No.
Q. Did you have any safety-related concerns about the company before the accident?
A. No.
Q. How would you describe your organizational safety culture at Rhoades before the accident?
A. I'd say it's okay, fair. I mean, the safety meaning like what? Fly with engines that compressor stall and -- or pressure from management to do stuff that we shouldn't be doing?
Q. Well, we -- you discussed things about the engines, compressor stalls that happened. So we know that. And then, you said that there was no pressure from management to do stuff that we shouldn't. So I guess what I'm asking now is, what was your sense of the atmosphere within the organization in terms of how -- in terms of management's approach to managing safety and balancing safety and productivity and welcoming information about safety hazards so that they could address them and learn from them?
A. Yeah, no. I'd say it's pretty good. Because I'm usually -- if I had a question with anything or a concern, I would go talk to David Seest.
Q. And he was responsive?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Can you describe the relationship between the maintenance staff and the pilots at Rhoades before the accident?
A. Not so good. No. I think the crews got a lot of attitude from maintenance if they had a

write-up.

Q. Did you in particular?

A. Yeah. I have. Well, not with all. But there's certain people that we didn't get along. And I thought it was because I had write-ups to where maybe other people didn't.

Q. Were there particular kinds of write-ups that you made that were -- that they were unhappy about?

A. No, no. (Indiscernible) just whatever it was. Maybe -- except, you know, the safety critical issues. They didn't -- they were okay with it.

Q. What kinds of write-ups would they be okay with?

A. Like, let's see -- I mean, they were okay with all write-ups, they just, you know, gave us attitude for certain ones.

Q. Which ones were the ones they gave you attitude about?

A. Maybe like a heading comparator flag coming on. And the heading indicators were showing properly. But maybe like little nuisance write-ups.

Q. Anything else?

A. Maybe like a nav light.

Q. How about the pressurization stuff?

A. Yeah, definitely pressurization stuff.

Q. What kind of stuff would they say when you wrote up things like the comparator, and nav light, and the pressurization?

A. Pressurization -- well, hearsay, but they just say that it's -- my ears are sensitive, too sensitive.

Q. Why is it hearsay? You didn't hear them say?

A. No, no. I just got the attitude.

Q. You did not hear them say that?

A. No, I did not hear them say it. It just -- other people told me. People I've flown with.

Q. Did other pilots have the same attitude from the mechanics or were there only certain ones that had trouble with it?

A. I think everyone at a certain time had the same issue.

Q. Why do you think they were unhappy about that -- those particular issues?

A. I think some pilots, you know, wrote stuff up and some pilots did not write stuff up. So they didn't understand why if this guy is not writing it up, why am I writing it up. Best guess.

Q. Did you ever hear of a flight crew saying they were afraid of being fired for writing up a maintenance issue?

A. Did I hear? I heard that, yes.

Q. Who said that?

A. Who said that? I heard one of my -- one of the FOs I was flying with, Myelin (ph.), say that about the (indiscernible). But -- yeah.

Q. Do you know what the issue was that he was afraid to write up?

A. I'm not sure if that was the engine failure had -- but I never had an issue or felt like I was going to get fired.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. That's it for me. I'm going to pass it onto Shawn. Thanks.

MR. ANTONOV: Okay. Can we take a pee break, maybe two minutes?

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Sure.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: Take a break.

(Off the record.)

(On the record.)

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Captain, do you want me to call you Captain --

A. Victor is fine.

Q. Victor, okay. I would like to make you comfortable if I can.

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Thank you for all you've given Bill so far. That took a lot of my questions. But I still have some that I'm hoping you can kind of help me fill in and educate me, if you will.

A. Okay.

Q. Just -- give us your time to the 737. Was that all as pilot and command or was that -- some of that as second in command?

A. All that was as pilot and command. (Indiscernible).

Q. I'm sorry.

A. No, go ahead.

Q. Oh, okay. So you've obviously been a captain for many years. How do you feel the training -- the FOs that you're getting to fly with, how do you feel like they are trained? Are they adequate? Is it -- kind of need some more?

A. Some are very good, you know. Some might need more. But I think a lot of guys that come fly from mainland that come from automation -- I mean, I've seen captains that had 15, 20,000 hours and they get in ours and they're lost for a couple days. Then they catch up. And especially if you get a new FO just has got his 1500 hours or so. Some might have a little more problems than others. But I mean, nothing -- I mean, I think they could still function, do their job. Yeah.

Q. Has there ever been a time you have flown with an FO that you've kind of either told them, hey, you're not doing this right, or you're doing something wrong, or even took it to a line-check airman or a chief pilot?

A. No.

Q. No?

A. I mean, I've told somebody that they're not doing something right in the past. But I never, I don't think, took it to a check airman or a chief pilot.

Q. You say you got to typically fly the day trips more than the night trips.

A. Um-hum. Most of the time here.

Q. Most of the time. Thank you. Which do you like better?

A. Is that even a question? Days, of course.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. I just wanted to make sure I knew what you liked better.

A. Yeah. Oh, yeah.

Q. Then I want to ask the next question. Why?

A. Why? I have a normal sleep routine.

Q. Is there anything different when you fly the day trip? Like is maintenance different or your dispatch, your flight follower, are they different, are they better equipped? Help me understand. Is there any -- other than sleep pattern, is there anything different in the day trip than the night trip for support?

A. For support -- I mean, yeah. There's -- people are there during the day. You know, all the maintenance. At night, maintenance is there, in my opinion, not to fix stuff but if they could defer MEL to get the plane out. But during the day, they work on airplanes. But no, dispatch is the same. All good guys and girls.

Q. So you said at night it feels like they -- please don't ever let me put words in your mouth -- but it seems like they defer things more in the yellow more than fix them? Maintenance that is.

A. Yeah, I'd say so. Yeah.

Q. Do you feel like sometimes some of the deferrals they try and do maybe aren't correct?

A. Yes, yes. I have had that issue.

Q. Can you give me an example? Help me learn.
A. Oh, man. I think the most recent one was with the fuel gauge that I didn't like how the MEL read. So I went digging for it.
Q. What --
A. Fuel gauge, yeah.
Q. So help me understand. You didn't like what it -- how it read. What does that mean?
A. Yeah, I thought that --
Q. Help me understand that.
A. -- we needed to have a maintenance on board the aircraft in order to go fly. So I asked very nicely and kindly to get a mechanic on board so we don't get stuck when we land.
Q. Did they give you a mechanic on board?
A. Yeah. That time -- particular time they did. Yeah.
Q. So what was the mechanic on board -- what was he -- what was his job going --
A. He needed to dip the main tanks to know how much gas we had in there. Jet fuel, not gas.
Q. I know you said you asked nicely and all that. But did they give you -- who did you ask nicely to? Maintenance, the ops? Who -- help me understand who you asked to have a mechanic.
A. Just maintenance. Whoever is on the airplane. Sometimes I'll tell -- well, I'll call dispatch and say, hey, can you get me a mechanic to come and sometimes I get, you know, no, because we're busy.
Q. That fuel tank -- the fuel gauge reading, that event, was that during the day or was that at night?
A. That was during the day.
Q. So help me understand what you would have done if they'd have said, no, we're not sending a mechanic with you. What would you
-- what would have been your next steps?

A. Well, I wouldn't have went. Because the way I understood it is we needed somebody to go with us. Then if any time I ever have a question -- because usually, you know, Erwin -- he's in our training department or was -- and David is at work, you know, during the day. So if I have a question with a MEL, I'll go to Erwin and say, hey, what do you think about this. He's like, eh. Then I'll go to David and we figure it out, make sure it's right.

Q. Now, I noticed with Bill's questions and with mine, you keep mentioning the director of operations, David. Do you ever go to the chief pilot?

A. He's usually in Miami doing training or he's flying. So during the day, he's home sleeping. So I don't see him and I don't want to call and wake him up. But I -- there's times when I work at nights and I know he's in Honolulu and I have a question or something I'm not sure about and I call him. He -- 99 percent of the time, answers. If not, I get a call back fairly, you know, quickly.

Q. How do you know when the chief pilot is in Honolulu, or in Miami, or in the office, or flying?

A. I -- well, I don't unless somebody that's going to training tells me. Or I know if he just get a new class, that he's probably going to be going. But nowhere I could look, I don't think, to see.

Q. How often, in your perception, how often is a chief pilot in Miami doing training?

A. Fairly often.

Q. Is that because you have a lot of new classes coming in or is that -- does he -- help me understand why he's there so often. Do you have that many new hires coming through?

A. Yeah. Well, we got somebody that comes -- somebody leaves, someone comes in. So he's -- yeah, between him and, I think, with the other guy, Bob Landa (ph.) that does the training in Miami.

Q. Have you ever been reprimanded here at Rhoades or Transair?

A. No. Can't say that I have.

Q. Have you heard of others getting reprimanded?

A. I've heard people being afraid but to -- for someone to actually get fired, you know, I've never heard that.

Q. Just so I make sure I have it clear, you're not aware of anybody getting terminated from here?

A. Yes, yes. Correct.

Q. How often -- just from your perception, how often does a pilot leave here to go somewhere else? Are we talking, you know, once a month, couple of years -- just kind of help me understand, considering this (indiscernible).

A. Well, I'd say it's -- for the most part, a revolving door. We get -- people leave, people come. You know, anywhere from a couple months to a couple years they leave.

Q. Are you guys -- do you guys have a training contract that they have to accomplish when they first come on?

A. They do now. I didn't have one. Yeah. Yeah, I think two years.

Q. If they last --

A. Two years, I think.

Q. -- two years?

A. No, it's -- now it is. The training contract is for two years.

Q. Oh, okay. But you did not have one. Correct?

A. I did not have one. No, sir.

Q. Earlier in Bill's conversation, you were saying that there was -- the pilot/mechanics' personality issues.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Is there certain mechanics that give you the attitude that you were talking about?

A. Yeah, yeah. That's correct.

Q. Can you give me a number? How many mechanics consistently would give you an attitude

issue?

A. Two, three guys.

Q. Are they line mechanics, is it mechanic managers, supervisors?

A. I don't know. Yeah.

Q. We understand that in the logbooks you can make a write-up. But you can -- you have the choice of making an F write-up or an I write-up.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Can you tell me the difference between the two?

A. Well, F is when something is broken, informational like the -- I guess, the -- maybe with the engine being in the yellow. You could write that in there to let them know. Because not all of them go in the yellow. So maybe so they know to check the engine or -- I don't know what they do. If something is wearing in it. But most of mine have been F write-ups. In fact, I'd say pretty much all of them has been F write-ups.

Q. I think with Bill -- probably I misheard it. But you said something about you only had write-up for a high EGT or was that just one that you could think of? And I apologize if I misheard it.

A. No. I'm sure I had more than one. Yeah. I just don't -- I don't remember. Not recently, I don't think. But maybe within a year or so. But I know they had -- I had one where I did write it up and I think they ended up checking the engine maybe. I don't -- yeah, that's a while back ago.

Q. And you said you had some compressor stalls?

A. Yeah, I have.

Q. I couldn't remember. Did you give a number with that in the last year or -- I couldn't remember how many you had or if you even said.

A. Yeah, I don't know if I've said. I know I've had them. But how many --

Q. And that's okay.

A. I mostly remember that other people have been having that problem. Yeah. At night. Because I was flying during the day.

Q. Were the compressor stalls more at night then than during the day?

A. Well, yeah. Because the airplanes flew more.

Q. Can you kind of give me an idea of the percentage of flying day versus night? Is it 10 percent day, 90 percent night, half and half? Kind of -- how much flying (indiscernible)?

A. Recently, maybe, what, 60/40. But before a couple years, I'd say it's, what, 20 day and 80 percent at night.

Q. And the 60/40, is that 60 night, 40 day, or 60 day --

A. Sixty night. Yeah. Forty day. Definitely more at night.

Q. The first officers you fly with during the day, are they more senior-type first officers, or are they more junior, or is it a whole mix?

A. It's a mix. It's -- yeah. I wouldn't say it's seniority based anymore.

Q. It used to be seniority based?

A. Well, that's what I've been told. But it's kind of convenience, I guess.

Q. Since you've had a compressor stall -- I think you said you had a couple.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Can you kind of give me an idea, in your mind, what that sounded like? I mean, you have -- everybody has different hearings of what they hear as a compressor stall.

A. A loud pop or a boom.

Q. Do you ever feel pressure to complete a flight? They have you all loaded up and you're like, no, this airplane is not airworthy or there's an issue with it. Is there ever a pressure, whether it's from the company or even a personal pressure, to, you know, I've got a load here, I got to get from point A to point B? Is there ever that pressure?

A. Pressure from the company?
Q. Sure. We'll start with that one.
A. Pressure, no. No. Maybe pressure from, again, maintenance. But that's it.
Q. What kind of pressure from maintenance?
A. Like, if you have an issue, you know, and freight is delayed. And they got to do paperwork before we can go.
Q. If you delay the flight, does flight ops ask you to explain why you left late?
A. Not usually, no. But I have explained it in the past when it was like seven hours delayed. But --
Q. So it's usually if it's a big delay? Like if it was 20 minutes delayed, would they have you come and explain it?
A. I don't think so. No. At least -- no, no. That's a fact. I think as long as you're within an hour or two, you're okay.
Q. So I know you guys kind of do a, for lack of a better phrase, kind of a hub and spoke pattern. Everything flies in and out of Honolulu except for a few --
A. Um-hum.
Q. -- triangle flights.
A. Um-hum.
Q. If you get to an out station and you have a mechanical issue, whatever it is, do they have maintenance at those out stations to help clear that or how do they handle maintenance at out stations?
A. No, they don't, unless they had somebody out there already that could come out. But usually, they have to fly somebody out either on another airplane or we got to sit there for a while to get a maintenance in there to deal with it.
Q. Has that happened to you often?

A. Fairly often. Yeah.

Q. So if they didn't have anybody out there working on another airplane or whatever, how long would you typically have to wait to have somebody come out?

A. Maybe anywhere from three to six hours in my personal experience. Yeah.

Q. That's great. Thank you for clarifying it's your personal experience. That helps. Do they have you guys do deferrals over the phone at all?

A. Yeah, uh-huh.

Q. How often does that happen?

A. Well, fairly often if we have a write-up and we can defer it to get out of there.

Q. Can you give me an idea of something that they would allow you to defer over the phone?

A. One of the nav lights, you know, the planes that have two of them in there. For that.

Q. Has there ever been a time that you've done a flight and you come back, and somebody calls you in and says, hey, we need you to redo your paperwork, after the fact, because there was an error or for whatever reason? Has that ever happened to you?

A. Yes, it has.

Q. Can you --

A. Elaborate?

Q. The last time or the most recent (indiscernible).

A. Not for a while. It's been pretty -- fairly good the last couple times. But sometimes the can number on the weight and balance is wrong. But the weight is correct.

Q. So it was just the can number (indiscernible)?

A. Yeah, and that's what I'm told. Yeah. I can't prove otherwise.

Q. Is there any way you can, for lack of a better phrase, audit the cans that are coming on to make sure you've got the right can number and weight with what they're telling you?

A. Well, me, usually not. I mean, if I don't have anything else to do, then I can stand. But

sometimes the FO will sit there and look at the, you know, cans coming in. But we got a load supervisor to check that off for us. We used to. We used to have to be out there and check every single can.

Q. How long ago did that policy change where you used to have to stand up there and now you don't have to?

A. Three years. Yeah.

Q. I know it's ballpark. It's a long time ago. I get that so --

A. Yeah, I can't remember what happened two weeks ago.

Q. I know you had -- Bill had asked if you ever submitted a safety report. And you said you had.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Just kind of an idea -- I know you said you put your name on it. Any ideas how many you've submitted in the last three years or last year or pick a time?

A. I think either beginning of this year or -- I think it was beginning of this year I did another pressurization. Yeah. But I think maybe I've done three or four of them. Yeah.

Q. And I know you had -- Bill had asked if you knew who the director of safety was and you did.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Do you interact with him often? I mean, I know you said you just kind of bumped into him or whatever but --

A. Yeah, no. I don't interact with him much. But when I see him, I'll chat with him.

Q. I know you said the chief pilot is in Miami a lot training. But how often do you go into his office or how often do you pick up the phone and -- how often do you interact with the chief pilot?

A. Not too often. He calls me when he needs me to fly. That's about it. Or if I have a

problem, you know, with the airplane, or I have a question with an MEL. Then I'll call him.

Q. So when you call him, how -- if you have a question on MEL and you reach out to talk to him, how responsive is he to that? Is he -- does he help you walk through it? Does he give you attitude?

A. No, no, no. He tries to help. He's fairly responsive if he doesn't answer the phone. Both him and David are good at getting back to you fairly quickly.

Q. So -- sorry to have you go back to the maintenance attitude. I just see my little note here. You said they -- some mechanics gave you attitude dealing with the pressurization issue.

A. Yes.

Q. Something about sensitive ears. I didn't quite get what you were talking about. What kind of attitude did they give you?

A. Yeah. Well, just -- like no one else has this problem. But you do. Although majority of the people, I think, flown with, they've experienced some type of discomfort. I've experienced a lot of it. So that's why I wrote a safety report.

Q. So just kind of -- when you would write up the pressurization issue, would you just say, you know, pressurization issue in the write-up, or would you say, noted on climb out, or noticed on descent this much of a climb or -- how would you -- how much detail would you give mechanics in the write-up?

A. I -- at first, I gave them differential pressure and whether we're at idle, descending, you know, what the cabin was doing. I mean, my opinion, pretty detailed. But when it kept happening over and over, then I'd land and say, auto mode in op, MEL, land somewhere else, standby in op. That type of thing.

Q. You've been here a while. You definitely probably have flown from -- to all the airports out of here, I assume.

A. Um-hum.

Q. So in your mind, Honolulu to Maui, about how long of a flight is that?

A. Fifteen, twenty minutes.

Q. What's kind of an average feeling weight that you would (indiscernible)?

A. Average -- I'm sorry?

Q. Average takeoff weight. When you left here to go there -- just kind of an understanding of what kind of a normal takeoff weight would have been.

A. 80, 90,000 pounds. Rarely we were very heavy or close to 120-4-5 at least when I flew. Not always.

Q. What would you consider a heavy load?

A. Oh, about 118,000.

Q. Was that for all aircraft or does -- did some aircraft have a less takeoff weight because of the engine size or --

A. Yeah, yeah. There's -- what is it -- 120-4-5, and 119-5, I think. 119,000. Yeah. It's been a while. I haven't thought of airplane for three months. So pardon me.

Q. Forgive me. 120-4-5, 119-5, what --

A. Yeah, 124,500 pounds and 119,500 pounds.

Q. And that's -- is that (indiscernible)?

A. Max takeoff. Yeah.

Q. I just wanted to make sure I knew what that was.

A. Yeah, but -- yeah, rarely you see that.

Q. Coming out of Honolulu, what flap settings do you use for takeoff. I'm sorry. When you're leaving Honolulu to go somewhere, do you have a certain flap setting for takeoff you use or --

A. Two. Usually flaps two.

Q. Can you use another flap setting?

A. Yeah, five or fifteen.

Q. Have you ever used a five?

A. Five. Yes, I have.

Q. What makes a difference between using a two and a five?

A. A higher rotation speed, lower EPR setting.

Q. Is that what you use to decide if you're going to use a flaps two or a flaps five or --

A. Yeah. Usually I go with flaps two because it usually gives us the most reduced EPR setting. So the least amount of effort the engines have to work.

Q. I just want to make sure I have a clear -- coming out of here with a flaps two, on a reduced EPR setting, you have gotten into the yellow arc before or not?

A. Yeah. We have gotten to yellow. Yes.

Q. Do you remember on the accident airplane, 810, do you remember getting into the yellow on that?

A. I do not. I don't think so though. I don't think so. I think last time I've flown, I think, 809. I did fly that one time before I went on vacation. But I don't recall it getting warm. I think -- 809 I think was getting in the yellow. I've flown that a lot. Yeah.

Q. I know when I used to fly, I -- there was planes I liked to fly and there was other planes I'd rather not have to fly. They always seemed to have issues. Do you have planes like that here that either you'd like to fly or you'd rather not fly?

A. No. I think they all kind of rotate with all the issues. Usually if one has a problem, a couple weeks later, the other ones start having a problem. That's kind of been my observation on that. But my favorite one to fly was the 737-CS. That was my favorite one.

Q. Why?

A. Well, because it had a PDCS in it. So you could program, you know, and get the numbers and speeds. That was nice. And it flew better. I don't know. Even though it's the same airplane, they all seem to fly slightly different.

Q. I understand that. So it's okay. I get that. You said a little bit ago that it seemed like issues would rotate amongst the airplanes.

A. Um-hum.

Q. Was it the same issues rotating or -- like if you flew one aircraft this week and then maybe two weeks later you saw the same event in another aircraft?

A. Yeah, yeah. I'd say that's accurate.

Q. If you got into an airplane -- let me rephrase that. Have you gotten into an airplane and you looked at the maintenance log and somebody wrote up and informational write-up about high EGT? Would that make you do anything different?

A. Well, as long as it was cleared, no. I mean, high EGT meaning it's still within limits. Right?

Q. If --

A. Yeah, or --

Q. -- somebody wrote up the EGT and they put a number --

A. Yeah. I've asked the mechanic, you know, what's this all about before. And if I wasn't satisfied with the answer, then I'd start calling Wallace, you know, and David.

Q. You said you'd see if it was clear. Do they clear informational write-ups?

A. Oh, no, no, no. I'm just saying in a write-up or like a MEL. Or even if they cleared a certain MEL, I still -- I'll ask about it. Yeah.

Q. But if you saw an informational write-up with somebody saying, EGT in the yellow, or however they would write that up, would you expect there to be -- the mechanics to sign something in the mechanic (indiscernible)?

A. No, no. I'd just watch to see if whatever it was didn't get worse.

Q. I know you said that you used reduced thrust out of there. And you -- forgive me. How long ago has it been since you have done a max takeoff or a normal thrust?

A. A while. Maybe close to a year. Yeah.
Q. So you typically do reduced.
A. Um-hum.
Q. That's more often.
A. Um-hum.
Q. Do you always set the EPR to the reduced thrust number or do you sometimes maybe don't set it all the way up to that reduced number? Sometimes maybe back just a little bit?
A. Well, I set it to whatever the weight balance tells me to set it to.
Q. So you do set that number. You don't set less than that number?
A. No, no.
Q. I just have a few more questions and then I'll pass it around if that's okay.
A. Okay.
Q. Do you have -- is there any way here that you can refuse to fly with an FO, saying, I do not want to fly with that FO? Do they have that policy here?
A. No, I'd say they don't. I'm not aware of -- but I never had to refuse anyone.
Q. Have you ever heard of anybody refusing to fly --
A. Yeah, yeah. I have.
Q. Is it usually a captain refusing an FO or an FO refusing a captain?
A. I think we've had both in the past. But I -- definitely, most recent, I think FOs didn't want to fly with captains.
Q. Is it usually a certain captain name that keeps popping up?
A. For some people. Yeah.
Q. So when you heard that captain's name, whomever that was, was that expected in your brain or -- in your mind or was that kind of a surprise that people wouldn't want to fly with them?
A. Some a surprise. I mean, I really didn't have a problem flying with anybody as long as they

kept me out of trouble. So frankly, I don't care. I mean if it happens with me, you know, then I could see. But somebody saying -- I've seen a lot of people talk over the years. I don't really listen to it.

If somebody says, well, you're not -- this guy does this, this, and the other, I'm not going to go in thinking that -- you know, I'm going to fly with the guy and see how he does. I'm not going to make my decision on if I want to fly with the guy or not until I experience working with him. In my experience, a lot of it is not true what people say. Or people saying that have got their own problems.

Q. That helps. I appreciate that. Are you a line-check airman here at all?

A. No.

Q. Is that something you would want to do, or no?

A. No.

Q. Why?

A. Because this is a revolving door operation and I want to have a schedule. I got a six-year-old and I want to be home.

Q. Well, I appreciate it. I think you've answered a lot of my questions. So I appreciate it.

A. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: And we'll let Clarence --

Do you need a break, Victor? Do you --

MR. ANTONOV: No, I'm okay. I'm okay.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. I don't have that many questions. Just a couple. Have you recently had any FAA inspectors on your flight to do an en-route inspection?

A. No.

Q. Do you know who your current principal ops inspector is?

A. Yes. It's Mark Butin.

Q. Has he communicated with you at all, have you communicated with him at all about any issues that may have arised [sic] maybe about procedures, training, flight conditions, et cetera?

A. No, nothing -- just seen him doing an audit or something when we were getting loaded. And we'll talk. He's -- I mean, he's fairly new so he's just kind of introducing himself. But --

Q. Great, okay.

A. That's it.

Q. Were you interactive with the previous principal operations inspector?

A. Yeah, yeah. I'd say I was. Yeah.

Q. Did he jump seat on your flights?

A. A lot.

Q. Did he bring up any issues maybe about procedures that I just got through asking you about?

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. No negative findings, negative --

A. No, uh-uh.

Q. Nothing negative. Have you had to go to the chief pilot and actually discuss issues about your maintenance communications with some of the mechanics?

A. Yes, I have.

Q. What was the outcome of that if I may ask?

A. Well, the last couple of weeks, I think, when we were flying, it was strange because they just -- you know, you'd make a write-up, give it to them, and they say, okay. There was no back talk or anything. It was smooth.

Q. So did it seem like the chief pilot actually had -- would get better results from maintenance? If you went to the chief pilot and said, hey, look, I wrote this up numerous times,

and he would say, well, let me handle it, take care of it.

A. I think so, yeah.

MR. KANAE: That's all I have. Thank you, Victor.

MR. ANTONOV: Yeah. You're welcome.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Ryan?

MR. FRISKEL: I don't have any questions at this time. I appreciate it.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Rich?

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Just a few things. You kind of mentioned that -- when we were asking about the max power takeoffs and the requirement (indiscernible) sit in the back, would say something. And there's the temp sheets for engine monitoring. Have you done engine monitoring, taking the data, and (indiscernible) trim, you know, when you trim up the airplane? Is that something that maintenance asked you to do for engine monitoring?

A. Well, I mean, we're supposed to do it. I think every 24 hours, whoever is in it first, and they -- if we go above, what, 17,000, I think, then to do it. Otherwise -- we used to do it all the time but we stopped because like a Maui flight is real short. You didn't have time for the engines to get stabilized.

Q. As far as a max power run, you said the forms seemed to say in there that it was a requirement. I mean, would you expect maintenance to put in the forms that the max power takeoff is required today? Did they give you guidance to do it or is it just you do it whenever you feel like it?

A. From -- okay, this is what I think I remember. That it used to say we should do one every seven days. Yeah. But now, I don't see it anywhere. So I mean, I have done them in the past. I -- with a lot of new guys, after they get fairly comfortable, you know, I let them do it so they can see it. But always when we're, you know, got empty cans on board just in case. Then I'll check that

box.

Q. The differences between day and night flying, do you see that there's a certain aircraft you won't -- that don't get scheduled during the day -- for example, a (indiscernible) is hotter temps and maybe can't carry as much cargo? Or is there a difference in the amount of cargo that you carry?

A. No, I'd say it's about -- you know, with every plane -- well, 810 wasn't put on if they could help it because it was running out of cycles. But besides that, it's -- whatever had the most problems that they needed to work on, you know, you flew the other airplane.

Q. So the only reason not to put 810 on the schedule is because it was running out of cycles?

A. That's my understanding.

Q. You talked about -- and I think Shawn asked you about the rotating problems on the airplane. Why do you think they rotate between -- you had pressurization issues on one airplane and two weeks later it's another airplane. Why do you think the same issue is happening on a different airplane?

A. I don't know. It's just time for that part to start failing. That's just been the trend in my opinion. You know, one has it. Maybe a couple weeks to a couple months, the other one will have a similar problem.

Q. I think this is the last question I have. As far as the EPR setting, I think you mentioned that you had just set whatever was the weight and balances at the current weight is on the weight balance sheet. Is that the current way of doing it? You get your -- all your takeoff performance on your weight and balance sheet or --

A. Well, no. Not anymore. They changed that while I was on vacation. Now we got to look at the runway analysis book to get the takeoff EPR and -- we can't use the speeds or the V speeds on the weight and balance anymore. That's been like that for a while. We have to use the speed cards.

MR. LEE: That's all I have. Thanks.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. I just have a few clarifications, Victor. Just so we can get a sense of the timing of some of the things you referenced (indiscernible) vacation. What dates were you on vacation?

A. I left end of June and I was gone pretty much all July. I think July 25th I went to Miami for recurrent.

Q. So end of June, you mean like around June 30th?

A. Yeah.

Q. You mentioned that you thought you did fly it before vacation but you don't remember it getting warm. I just want to confirm, were you talking about 810?

A. No. I was talking about 809. Yeah.

Q. Did you remember 810 getting high indications, high EGT indications before you left for vacation?

A. No. But that also could have been because we hardly had any freight onboard. But I do remember 810 having the fuel gauge because that's what I was calling around asking about the MEL.

Q. Which mechanics were giving you attitude about the write-ups?

A. I have to answer that?

Q. No, you don't have to.

A. It was Mike Jernigan (ph.), Marty -- I don't know. Ryan, what's his last name? Do you know?

MR. FRISKEL: Marty Hayes (ph.), I believe.

MR. ANTONOV: Hayes?

MR. FRISKEL: Yeah.

MR. ANTONOV: Marty Hayes. That's the -- I'd say that's the main ones.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Who didn't want to fly with who? Was that Gina and Okai? Gina Moore and Henry Okai? Or is there other people?

A. Gina, Okai. I think -- what is his name -- Nick had a problem with somebody.

Q. And you don't recall who that was?

A. Maybe -- I think it was Tim Kaiser (ph.).

Q. Anybody else that you know of that had a problem in particular with Henry or Greg Ryan?

A. No, no. I don't think so.

DR. BRAMBLE: That is all I have. Shawn, do you have anything else?

MR. ETCHER: I just have one clarification question. Rich had asked you -- and you were talking about the normal takeoff thrust. And you said you used to let the new hires do it so they could experience it. But you typically did it with empty cans just in case?

MR. ANTONOV: Well, yeah. Because most of the engine failures are -- not happen on takeoff at max power so I figured if I'm going to have one go, I'm going to be light so it's easier to control.

MR. ETCHER: Had that been an issue at Rhoades with an engine failure on a max takeoff?

MR. ANTONOV: No, no, no.

MR. ETCHER: That's all I had. Thank you so much.

MR. ANTONOV: You're welcome.

DR. BRAMBLE: Clarence?

MR. KANAE: I have no more questions. Thank you.

DR. BRAMBLE: Ryan?

MR. FRISKEL: Nothing further. Appreciate it.

DR. BRAMBLE: Rich?

MR. LEE: I'm good. Thanks.

DR. BRAMBLE: Just a couple of close-outs. Is there anything we haven't asked you about that you want to share with us?

MR. ANTONOV: No.

DR. BRAMBLE: Is there anything in particular that you want to recommend that you think should be changed?

MR. ANTONOV: Should be changed?

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. So we always offer people the opportunity to share their safety recommendations with us if they feel like there's something we should know about that needs to be changed. And granted, there's limited information available about the accident, this accident at this time. But we just always offer the opportunity.

MR. ANTONOV: No, I don't think so.

DR. BRAMBLE: Thanks very much. That concludes the interview.

MR. ANTONOV: Thank you.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Victor Antonov
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 28, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Katie Leach
Transcriber

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

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Interview of: CRAIG NG, First Officer

TransAir Executive Airlines of Hawaii

Honolulu, Hawaii

Monday,
September 27, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing Commercial Airplanes

CLARENCE KANAE, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

WILLIAM KATT, Attorney
Wilson, Elser, Moskowits, Edlman & Dicker LLP

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INTERVIEW

(8:00 a.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: Today is September 27th, 2021, and the time is 8:00 in the morning. My name is William Bramble, I'm a human performance investigator with the NTSB and with Mr. Shawn Etcher, I'm co-leading the Operations and Human Performance Working Group for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174 involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB's an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers. I'd now like to have Mr. Etcher and each member of the Operations Group briefly introduce themselves.

Mr. Etcher?

MR. ETCHER: Hi, good morning. Do you like to go by Craig? What do you want me to call you?

MR. NG: That's fine.

MR. ETCHER: Craig?

MR. NG: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Well, good morning, Craig. I'm Shawn Etcher, I'm the operational factors investigator with the NTSB.

MR. KANAE: Good morning, Craig. I'm Clarence Kanae, locally here at the Honolulu Certificate Management Office in Honolulu.

DR. BRAMBLE: Thank you.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, Boeing safety pilot (indiscernible).

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, thanks everyone.

Mr. Ng, is there anyone -- and did I pronounce that correctly?

MR. NG: Yes, that's correct.

DR. BRAMBLE: Mr. Ng, is there anyone in the interview room here that you would prefer not to be present in the interview?

MR. NG: No, that's fine.

DR. BRAMBLE: And today we'll be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we'll have the recording sent out for transcription and the party members will have an opportunity to review the transcription and correct for any typographical errors. Once again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and prevent recurrence. Our goal is not to assign fault, we're here simply for you to share your insight with the goal of preventing accidents. Having said that, however, we can't offer any guarantee of confidentiality or immunity and the transcription of this interview will eventually be part of the public docket for this accident investigation.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time. Everyone's been instructed not to interrupt the person who's asking questions at that time. There will be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-up questions after each person has had a turn. Please answer all questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, just say so. If you don't know, you can say you don't know. If you realize you've misstated something or want to correct something, go ahead and let us know about that too.

You're entitled to have one representative of your choosing. Is there someone present you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. NG: Bill Katt.

DR. BRAMBLE: Mr. Katt, can you please introduce yourself for the transcript?

MR. KATT: Yeah. William Katt from the law firm Wilson, Elser.

DR. BRAMBLE: Thank you.

Okay, if everyone's ready, we'll begin with the questions.

INTERVIEW OF CRAIG NG

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Mr. Ng, can you state and spell your full name, please?

A. Craig Ng, C-r-a-i-g N-g.

Q. Okay, and how old are you?

A. I'm 59.

Q. And what is your date of hire at Rhoades Aviation?

A. It was February 2018.

MR. ETCHER: Do you know what that sound is?

MR. LEE: Yeah, they've got a music thing in here.

MR. ETCHER: Oh, okay.

MR. LEE: (Indiscernible)

MR. ETCHER: Yeah.

MR. LEE: I don't hear it.

DR. BRAMBLE: It's louder, actually. Yeah, why don't you ask them if they can -- I'm going to pause the recording.

(Off the record)

(On the record)

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay, we're back on the record at 8:05.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. Mr. Ng, what's your job title?

A. First officer on the Boeing.

Q. The Boeing 737?

A. Yes, correct.

Q. And what are your -- briefly, what are your duties and responsibilities?

A. Basically, assist the captain with bringing the airplane from A to B and preflight duties typically, back each other up, you know, for paperwork wise or procedures, whatever issues come up.

Q. Okay. And what certificates and ratings do you have?

A. Oh, what do I have? Boeing 737 type rating, Dash 8100 type rating, glider, aerotow, commercial, multi.

Q. Okay. How many total flight hours?

A. Right around 18,000 something.

Q. Okay. Have you held any other positions at Rhoades besides first officer?

A. No.

Q. Okay. All right, can you give us a brief overview of your aviation-related background that led to you working at Rhoades?

A. Let's see, I started at private pilot license, private pilot rating in 1980, I think, back in high school. I finished getting my instrument commercial multi in the San Francisco Bay area, moved to the Caribbean, living in Saint Croix where I got my first 135 operation job flying Eastern Metro Express Twin Otters based out of San Juan. And then I moved to -- back to the Mainland after hurricane Hugo -- what was that '88, '90, something like that -- 1990. And then came here to Hawaii in '91 and I think my first commercial operation here was with Air Molokai, Part 135 operation Twin Cessna.

Which one was after that? The Hawaii air ambulance, flying Cessna 414's. That was about four or five years and then got hired on with Island Air as an FO in the Dash 8100, upgraded to captain, stayed there for about nine years. I left there when they started going under and when to Corporate Air, flying Caravans inter-island freight operation. And then after about a year of that, went to another air ambulance operator, AMR Air and flew King Airs and that was about three years, just prior to this job at island -- TransAir.

Q. Okay. Do you have any collateral duties other than FO at TransAir?

A. No.

Q. All right. Do you fly a standard, weekly pilot schedule? What's your schedule like?

A. Yeah. When we're operating, it's pretty much yeah, whatever the full schedule is. So, we typically do mostly night shifts and then typically have a week of day shifts and then a week off.

Q. Okay. How many weeks of night shifts do you do prior to your week of day shifts typically?

A. It depends. Depending on how many guys we have on staff, but typically it's usually two weeks of day shift -- sorry, two weeks of night shift before the day shift. Actually, I might be -- it's been a while, it might be two weeks of night shift, and then your week off, and then day shift, and then back to night shift. I don't know, I can't remember.

Q. Okay. Were you working the week of the accident?

A. No, I was off that week.

Q. How do you feel about the quality of training you received from Rhoades Aviation?

A. Satisfied, I mean, there's always room for improvement, I suppose.

Q. Okay. And what do you find satisfying or difficult about working here -- or working at Rhoades? I'm sorry.

A. Rhoades in particular? Mostly the -- how do I answer this, I guess the hardest part about working here is working night shift. You know, trying to sleep during the day, going to bed at 1:00 in the afternoon, set the alarm for 9:00, 10:00, 11:00 at night and then, you know, depending on how many flights you do that night, start over the next day. So, you might end up with one or two round trips that night or you might end up doing four or more. So, that kind of inconsistent freight loads is probably the hardest part.

Q. Anything else?

A. No.

Q. What do you enjoy about it?

A. So, along with that scheduling, sometimes you do two roundtrips a night, sometimes you'll do four or more. So, I enjoy getting that short number of roundtrips. It's nice sometimes and then the day -- the week off helps every month. Scheduling, I guess.

Q. Okay. Did you fly with Captain Henry Okai?

A. Oh, yeah. Yes.

Q. About how many times would you say? Was it many?

A. I hadn't flown with him prior to the accident in maybe a month or two. Total maybe a couple months' worth of flying together.

Q. What kind of a captain is he?

A. Very -- what's the word? I'm trying to think of the right word for him, but he's very -- what the hell is that word, not predictable, but very even mannered -- mild mannered, I suppose, not very excitable. So, you don't see him get excited or depressed, he's pretty even all the time.

Q. And how did you describe his proficiency compared to other captains that you've flown with?

A. Pretty company oriented, you know, tries to do everything by the book. He uses proper procedures, manuals, checklists, whatever.

Q. Did you -- did he ever talk to you about being reprimanded by the company for doing things?

A. Sure, in, you know, just casual conversation we'd talk about company issues.

Q. But did he ever say that he was chastised or reprimanded by his -- by the chief pilot for doing anything?

A. Yeah, but I guess -- how do you put this? I mean, that's basically management's job, you know, get -- you know, the company, it's basically -- how do I put this? Yeah, so to me, that's basically what the chief pilot does, you know, if the operation's not running smooth and something

comes up, you know, they try and fix it so that it does run smooth. So, you know, if you have an issue with the plane and call somebody about the issue, you know, they're basically going to try and fix it, you know, the best that they can so the operation runs smooth. So, sorry, did that answer your question?

Q. Did he relay any specific instances of being reprimanded or chastised by the chief pilot?

A. One that he had expressed to me was that he had a -- what was that -- oil bypass light come on at the parking position. And so, he took the time to wait to see if it would go out -- see if the light would go out after the engine ran for a few minutes, you know, to warm up and I guess at that point shut down and told maintenance and they took a look at it. But it caused a delay for the flight, so he got in trouble for that -- well, not in trouble, but that was I guess some kind of a reprimand for that. So, the next time it happened -- he was told okay, next time that happens, taxi out to the runway and then if it's still on, then you can come back and, you know, deal with it with maintenance. But he pointed out that he got reprimanded for that as well. So, even after doing it, you know, company procedure -- recommended procedure, still got in trouble for it.

Q. On a subsequent occasion when he taxied out of the runway?

A. Yeah, and then turned around and came back.

Q. Did that seem to affect his approach to dealing with maintenance issues?

A. Not really. I mean, he tried to do as instructed. To me that's what it seemed like, you know, he was trying to follow whatever procedure they had and, you know, do it to the best of his ability. But, you know -- so as far as affecting his maintenance procedure and practice, no I don't think it affected

-- I don't think it changed him.

Q. Did he ever talk to about having to declare an emergency in flight?

A. You mean for this particular one?

Q. Prior to the accident?

A. Prior to? No, not that I can remember.

Q. Did he seem to get along with the mechanics in the maintenance department?

A. For the most part.

Q. What was your last interaction with him before the accident? How long before the accident did you last talk to him or see him?

A. Probably -- maybe a week or two.

Q. All right. How well did you know First Officer Greg Ryan?

A. Just by -- not very well. As first officers, we don't fly together, so we don't really hang out. We don't get to talk much. Q. Were you aware of anything unusual about the condition of the accident airplane before the accident?

A. No, I don't remember flying that plane for a while. I know it was gone for maintenance for a while prior, it goes away, you know, for a C-check and it's always gone for months. And then when it came back, I don't think it had been back very long and they weren't trying to fly it very much because it was getting high time. So, I don't remember the last time I've even flown that plane.

Q. All right. On the planes that you had flown recently, are you aware of any recent history of recurring maintenance issues?

A. You know, it kind of gets blurry. Sometimes you fly -- so, typically we'll have three planes flying at night. Sometimes we fly all three of them, you know, jumping from plane to plane, so it kind of gets convoluted, you know, which airplane has which issues. None in particular that I can answer.

Q. But in general, across airplanes, do you recall any sort of recurring maintenance issues you were having to deal with regularly?

A. Let's see, what was a big one? Pressurization, sometimes it would hold -- airplanes would hold pressurization. Heading comparators, that would show up kind of frequent, I think.

MR. LEE: What was that?

MR. NG: The heading comparator, the bleeding edge flap indicators, fuel gauges, I don't -- that's about all I can think of right now.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay. Did it seem like maintenance was able to address those issues in a reasonable time period?

A. Sometimes. Pressurization was -- it seemed to take a while, you know, they'd change parts, move parts from one plane to another, put new parts in. That one seemed to take a while mostly -- most length of time.

Q. Okay. Did you experience any compressor stalls when you were operating airplanes?

A. Occasionally, yeah.

Q. When did that tend to happen?

A. I've had it happen pulling onto the runway, taxiing into position, I've had it climbing out, maybe through 2,000 feet. I think I remember it on occasion during operation on the reverser in landing.

Q. If you had to ballpark estimate how many times you'd encountered that, what would you guess? I shouldn't say what would you guess. What would you estimate?

A. A handful, maybe four or five times.

Q. Okay. What did you do when that happened -- or what did you and the captain you were flying with do when that happened?

A. Well, I remember the one -- when we were climbing out, taking off out of Honolulu, passing -- going around Diamond Head and we had a compressor stall at that point, so we decided to turn around and come back. That was the only one I think that was during flight. Everything else was -- seemed to be on the ground when it would stall the most frequent.

Q. What happened when you guys got back from that flight?

A. Basically, the captain just wrote up the plane, said I'm not taking this airplane.

Q. Do you remember which captain it was and which plane?

A. Shawn Morgan, I don't remember which airplane. Like I said, we -- all the planes -- you know, you're in and out of so many planes and doing multiple flights a night. It's hard to keep track of which ones are which. Shawn Morgan, though, was the captain on that one.

Q. What happened after he wrote it up and said he's not taking the plane?

A. I don't know if I remember. As far as --

Q. Well, that particular night, did they give you another plane?

A. No, they didn't have another plane to give us.

Q. Okay.

A. So typically, what will happen is -- you know, depending on what time of night it is, if it's, like, 6:00 or 7:00, 8:00 in the morning, you know, close to when the shifts are done, they'll typically -- you know, basically cut you loose to go home. But if it's early enough in the night, you know, they'll have you hang around and let the other crews do whatever part of the schedule and then we'll take a plane from one of them and finish whatever's left over. I don't remember what happened that night, though, that was too long ago.

Q. Okay. How long ago was that approximately?

A. Maybe last year. I don't know.

Q. 2020?

A. Yeah, maybe 2020.

Q. Did you ever get any feedback from maintenance or from management about that?

A. As far as like a reprimand or something -- scolding?

Q. Feedback on what they found or procedures for what to do? Any kind of feedback?

A. No, nothing on that one.

Q. Have you experienced any -- well, let me ask you about the ones that happen on the

ground. Were the ones that happen on the ground reported?

A. Yeah. It's always explained to maintenance, you know, to the best of our verbiage that we could tell them or -- other than being written up, you know, and both sometimes. You know, you write it up and try to explain to them hey, this is what it's still doing, you know, it's still popping or whatever.

Q. Were they all written up in the maintenance logs, or some of them just communicated verbally?

A. I'm not sure. I would imagine they're all getting written up, but typically the captains wait until after they park the airplane or whatever, you know, start talking to maintenance as they're writing it up.

Q. And have you experienced any issues with high EGT indications during takeoffs?

A. Yeah, I've seen that before too.

Q. How common was that?

A. Towards the end it was kind of common, you know, prior to the accident.

Q. So, towards the end, what time period is that, like, when it became more common?

A. Well, I'm thinking, like, 2021, as opposed to years prior we didn't see it as much.

Q. Okay. And what did you see in terms of high temperatures, how hot was it getting and how long did that last?

A. Typically, it would be in the yellow and usually, it would be until we brought the power back, climbing out of whatever -- a thousand feet and then would come down.

Q. Do you know if that was written up by the captains you were flying with on those nights?

A. Yeah, that was.

Q. Was it old, was it written up every time it was observed?

A. Pretty much, yeah. They were having a hard time with certain engines, I guess, that were giving them high temps during takeoff.

Q. How many times would you say you saw that in 2021? Was it, like, every time you flew or --

A. No, it wasn't that frequent and then it would depend on which airplane you were in. So, that was -- my issue was, you know, why does do it with this engine, but not these engines on these airplanes? It's kind of like a withdraw, like if you're -- if I worked five days that week, you know, you might only fly a particular plane once, one day out of the five days, you know, and sometimes you might fly three days or four days out of that five days that I work.

Q. Was it typically only one airplane that issue?

A. Yeah -- I'm trying to remember. Let me think. Yeah, it seemed like it was just -- I don't know. It wasn't the whole fleet, that's the thing. Half of the fleet, the engine temps would never get into the yellow and then there were one or two airplanes where it would. But like I said, I don't remember which, you know, planes in particular.

Q. And in the months before the accident, was -- with those particular planes, was it typically every takeoff or not?

A. I don't know. Like I said, if I'm working five days that week, I might only fly the plane once, one day that week. So, I don't know -- I mean, from what I see, it didn't seem to do it every takeoff.

Q. Okay. Would you call it common or infrequent with the ones that had the issue?

A. Not infrequent, but it wasn't every time. So, maybe half the time.

Q. Did you ever get any feedback from maintenance about what was done to address that?

A. Sure, you know, they tell you, you know, we changed this, changed that, tried different fuel control units, or whatever settings, whatever their maintenance manuals recommend.

Q. Did that seem to address the issue?

A. Sometimes, not all the time.

Q. All right. Had you experienced any problems with hydraulic leaks?

A. Sure, we've had some hydraulic issues.

Q. Can you describe that in more detail?

A. Okay, so I was in Maui one time with Captain Morgan again and we'd just pushed back, and set the brake, and one of the lines broke. And so, you know, basically we had to get towed back into the parking stall and have that fixed.

Q. Anything else that stands out?

A. I remember being stranded in Hilo one night and our plane was down for something, and so we had a rescue plane come to bring maintenance and parts, and when they parked, they blew a hydraulic line. Theirs was -- I think theirs was in the nose wheel though, ours was back in the main somewhere.

Q. Did you ever have a hydraulic failure in flight?

A. Not here. Not that I --

MR. KATT: You're asking at --

DR. BRAMBLE: At TransAir.

MR. KATT: Yeah.

MR. NG: Yeah, no.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Did you have a -- ever have an engine failure in flight at TransAir?

A. Yeah, I've had a couple.

Q. You've have two, you think?

A. Yeah, two that I can think of off the top of my head.

Q. When did that happen?

A. One of them was a long time ago, back in 2018 somewhere. I remember that was on a day shift, we were just coming into Honolulu, getting ready to land. And I guess it was more of a shutdown, it wasn't a failure -- it wasn't a shutdown, it was a

-- well, roll back -- flame out. This was a flame out because it was working fine and it was -- you know, we were close, we were maybe downwind from the airport and it -- the engine wound down.

The other one, we were climbing out, taking off out of here and going to Hilo and -- climbing out, going through 10,000 feet maybe something like that and, you know, bringing the power back to set, you know, climb power settings and the engine stayed at takeoff power. So, we ended up shutting that one down prior to landing -- turning around, coming back, and shutting it down prior to landing.

Q. Okay. When did the second one happen approximately?

A. Maybe a year later, 2019 sometime.

Q. Did you find out what happened -- what was wrong with the engines?

A. The second one was -- they said there was a leaking somewhere in the fuel control unit that had come loose and fell out of position or whatever. So, when we set the takeoff power, I guess that's when it fell out, so it wouldn't adjust -- you know, take control. The other one I think was -- what did they say that was? I don't remember what the first one was. Yeah, I'm not sure. I think it might've been fuel related also, but I can't remember. It wasn't, like, catastrophic or anything, it just rolled back and shut down.

Q. All right. How is morale in the workforce before the accident?

A. It was good. When I first started, we were pretty shorthanded, so it was kind of straining with the schedule. But, you know, at that point prior to the accident, it was pretty full staff. Ten captains and ten FOs, so it was a pretty manageable schedule.

Q. And actually back to the maintenance issues, discrepancies, and incidents, and failures and stuff like that, did any of those discrepancies -- maintenance discrepancies or malfunctions that we discussed, did they generate any concern for you, you know, about your safety as a pilot?

A. Not at the time, although I was -- I'd always wondered about, you know, recurrent writeups and pretty much all the airplanes are all setup the same. Some of them have different avionics

packages, but it was, like, more than one so they could swap certain parts with certain airplanes, but not with others. But mechanically, pretty much all the airplanes are the same, you know, why does this one work and this one doesn't? That was the biggest concern for me as far as maintenance.

Q. Were you -- did you feel like the amount of maintenance issues you encountered at TransAir was different than you had encountered at previous operators?

A. No, not really. I mean, the airplanes are old, we all know that, and it's -- some of the parts are harder to get. The pressurization thing was, you know, described to us as the airplanes are old and they're starting to get leaks, you know, even in the (indiscernible) I guess. So, they're harder to control, you know, certain -- that one in particular, you know, certain maintenance issues. But, you know, prior to this job, it was all -- I've only flown Props and Turboprops, so the jets, being higher, faster, and heavier, bigger engines, you know, it's a different animal from the smaller stuff that I'd been flying prior to TransAir.

Q. Okay. How confident were you about the quality of maintenance work at Rhoades?

A. You want a number? I don't know what to --

Q. However you'd prefer to describe it?

A. Probably about 90 percent. Like I said, I was disappointed that, you know, five airplanes are all the same pretty much, but this one works on this airplane and doesn't work on this one. You know, it's the same guys working on them, the same guys flying, I couldn't figure out the different, you know, why something would work and something else wouldn't -- or some other airplane wouldn't.

Q. Yeah. All right, were you aware of any instances of crews being asked to delay writeups until after they got back from a trip rather than before they left?

A. Delayed writeups, not really. I mean, basically -- I don't know, for me I would do the preflights outside the airplane. You got into the airplane when you first show up on shift, we'll do

our preflights, we'll go upstairs and setup our little nest on our side of the plane and then I'll go outside and do a walkaround. And then, you know, basically I would just tell the captain what I see or don't see, you know, if the airplane looks good or not and then leave it to them to decide if it's a worthy write up or not, or something that's grounding -- some grounding issue.

Q. Okay. Are you aware of any rejected takeoffs due to high EGT indications during takeoff? Has that ever happened before the accident?

A. I don't remember experiencing a rejected takeoff for a high EGT in particular.

Q. All right. Before the accident, who was responsible for managing the safety at Rhoades?

A. Managing safety?

Q. Uh huh.

A. With the title of safety manager? Evangelos, I thought was the manager of safety for the ground operation -- all the ground stuff. But otherwise, you know, our side -- the pilot's side, chief pilot, DO.

Q. Was there a director of safety?

A. Oh, what's that other guy's name? Orlando Debrum, I think and -- oh, what's that other Russian guy's name? Valeri, they -- I know they had some hand in safety as well, but I don't know if that was -- yeah, I guess that's the director of safety. Yeah, maybe Orlando; I guess he could've been.

Q. What was Valeri's role? Did you see him around much?

A. I'd see him, but I don't really know what he does. I know there was some program that he was working on. We were trying to get into this online thing with safety that -- I don't know if he's developing it, or trying to instigate it, or just seeing how to fit it into the program. But it hasn't really started yet, that SMS -- I think it's called SMS, something like that, safety management system or something like that.

Q. Okay. And if you had a safety related concern prior to the accident, how would you have

communicated that to management?

A. For me, I'd talk to the other FO's first -- or the captains first before going to management.

Q. And how would you bring it up to management if you were going to do that?

A. Well, it depends on what it -- yeah, it depends on -- I don't know. Yeah, I'd probably just take recommendations from the other pilots and see what they'd recommend -- if I should talk to management or not.

Q. Okay. Did the company have a safety reporting program?

A. Yeah. They had an online or paper information box that you could submit to.

Q. Did you ever submit anything?

A. No.

Q. Did you ever have to communicate a safety related concern to the management in some other way?

A. No, I mean, I unless I saw -- I mean, management, you're talking chief pilot, DO, if I talked to them casually, whatever, asking question -- you know, asking him as a question.

Q. Nothing stands out as far as you were concerned about something and wanted to tell someone in management about something that gave you a safety concern?

A. Yeah, not that I can think of, no.

Q. Okay. What kind of safety related communications did you get from the company?

A. Did -- that the company issued?

Q. Uh huh.

A. Well, pilot meetings, you know if certain topics would come up, you know, they'd discuss it then. Either that, or it would be through our email -- company email. They'd post whatever information, you know, for a new procedure or whatever, or us through our paper manuals. They'd issue bulletins, or updates, or revisions to other procedures or something they want to change.

Q. Did you get any kind of a safety newsletter?

A. Safety newsletter? Yeah, I think I remember see not even a handful. They'd come out -- God, was it online? I vaguely remember maybe two -- more than once, but not much more than that. I can't remember if it was, like, a -- I can't remember if it was an email, though, or if it was a paper thing, you know, like a flyer-type bulletin.

Q. Do you remember whether that contained any information that you found to be useful?

A. Sure, I mean, at that time there was issues with ramp operations at night. Using wands in particular, lighted wands, you know, on whatever ramp safety wearing reflective vest, or belt, or something.

Q. Okay. And in your time as a first officer at Rhoades, did you feel -- have you felt supported by management and able to make safety related decisions as a pilot without fear of repercussions?

A. Sorry, say that question again? Have I felt --

Q. Have you felt supported by management and able to make safety-related decisions as a pilot without fear of repercussions?

A. Yeah, I suppose.

Q. Did you feel pressure from company management to do things that you felt were unsafe?

A. No, it seemed like, you know, if we had an issue that we were concerned about, it would be accepted by the company as okay, that's whatever -- legit (sic).

Q. Okay. And how would you describe -- let me back up. Did you have any safety related concerns about the company before the accident?

A. No, just like what I said earlier about the -- my not understanding why this particular system would work on a particular plane, or not work on a particular plane whereas it worked on the other airplanes. That was the only -- that was the biggest thing to me.

Q. And how would you describe the organization safety culture at Rhoades?

A. Organizational safety culture, they had one, I guess, in place that, you know, was described in our manual as well as -- you know, we'd get occasional emails if something comes up whatever, speak up, say something. There's always room for improvement.

Q. Okay. Have you ever heard of a flight crew saying that they were afraid of being fired for writing up a maintenance issue?

A. No.

Q. At Rhoades?

A. Yeah -- no, I don't think so.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. That is the end of my questions, so I'm going to hand things over to Mr. Etcher.

MR. KATT: Hold on a second.

Do you need to use the restroom?

MR. NG: Yeah, can I go?

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah, sir.

MR. ETCHER: Please feel free.

MR. NG: Can I take a leak?

MR. ETCHER: We'll take a break at 8:55 for a moment.

(Off the record)

(On the record)

MR. ETCHER: All right, back on the record at 9:02.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. All right. Well, thank you again for giving all the information you did for Bill. That was very helpful. You took a lot of my questions away, but I still have a few, so if that's okay?

A. Sure.

Q. You mentioned your ratings as you have a 737 type rating, Dash 100 --

A. Dash 8.

Q. Dash 8100, sorry. Are you an ATP, commercial rated pilot?

A. Yeah.

Q. Which, ATP or commercial?

A. Commercial single. So, ATP with commercial single.

Q. Okay, excellent, and do you have a current medical?

A. Yeah.

Q. In what class?

A. Second class.

Q. All right. Any limitations?

A. Must wear corrective lenses.

Q. All right, perfect. Were you hired in directly into the 737 here at Rhoades or did you go the shorts version and then into the 737?

A. Yeah, just the 737 side.

Q. All right. Are you getting close to a captain upgrade here?

A. Yeah, I suppose. Yeah, at a thousand hours, they offer, typically, the right seat guys.

Q. Okay. Do you have that thousand hours, are you getting close?

A. Yeah, I'm 14, 15 hundred, something like that.

Q. Okay. So, help me understand how they decide? Or is it a seniority-based thing on who gets to be upgraded and who doesn't?

A. They actually asked me and I, you know, turned it down. I wasn't really interested in the position right now for this company.

Q. Okay. I got to ask, it's the nosey part of me, why would you turn down a captain position? It seems like a lot of people would almost beat each other up to get to it.

A. I guess for me, it's my -- what do you call that? I like the idea of not having to do a

medical every six months, do a check ride every six months, getting an EKG every six months. So, for me, I guess I'm lazy.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, I'll throw that out.

Q. No, that's -- hey, that's okay. That's a reasoning for you so that's perfectly fine. When you were talking with Bill, he was asking some things about training and you said there's --

A. (Indiscernible)

Q. I'm sorry. When you were talking with Dr. Bramble, how's that? You had said something about training and there's always room for improvement. Can you help me understand, in your mind, what were you thinking about that might need improved?

A. I don't know, anything particular in training?

Q. I'm not sure what -- you said, you know, there's always room for improvement and I just want to understand what you're thinking is something you might see as improvement in the training area, I assume, or maybe it's the company?

A. Off the top of my head, I'm kind of drawing a blank. I'm trying to think, you know, through ground school and simulator. I guess -- okay, one was going to Miami, that's kind of a long haul, especially if you're only there for a day or something like that. There was talks when I was hired back in 2018 where they would -- they had a simulator that they wanted to bring to Vegas, you know, so it would be a lot shorter trip to go back and forth. So, that's, you know, something that, you know, at the time seemed like would be a good idea if they had something closer so we didn't have to go 5,000 miles to do our training.

And then the sim is kind of -- yeah, it simulates the airplane sort of, kind of, but it's -- you know, it's a box, it's a replica. It's -- I don't know, I guess it's, you know, as somebody that -- you know, as a line pilot, when you fly it, it's -- especially when it's once a year or whatever, it's -- you just have to get used to flying it. But you're only limited to so many hours, so much time in

the box, too. So, you know, I've had issues with the sim where it's -- that particular one is hard to fly, but it is what it is. That's what's available to us for that 200 sim.

Q. Okay. So, since we're talking about training, we'll stay there for just a moment. When was your last check ride, recurrent -- I'm not sure what you guys call it here. When was your most recent one?

A. I had one this year in March, April, something like that.

Q. Was that ground school, was that simulator, was that line checks? Help me understand what it is here?

A. The March/April was sim, that was in Miami and then I did ground school -- I can't remember if it was before or after. But that was this year as well somewhere around that time.

Q. Okay.

A. That's my window, is between February, March, April, right in there.

Q. And that's for your yearly annual check ride?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Who did your sim instruction -- or sim training?

A. Was it Wallace this time? I think it was Wallace, yeah.

Q. How was that to have a chief pilot doing your sim instruction? Is that helpful? Is it more stressful? I mean, I know it's a check ride.

A. Yeah, I hate check rides. It's fine, I mean, he knows you and he's -- you know, the first one of course he's got to get to know you. But, you know, after you've been there for -- been in the box with him three or four different years, you know, he knows how you fly already, you know, so he knows if you're screwing up or not or whatever. It's fine.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't have any discomfort with it.

Q. So, when -- in your guys' training, do they -- and please don't let me ever put words in

your mouth, but are they training you with the TransAir, Rhoades way? Are they using a Boeing training syllabus? Or are they using a Pan Am -- I think is where the sim was -- syllabus?

A. Yeah. It's definitely no Pan Am. So, it's more of a combination of Boeing and Rhoades.

Q. Okay.

A. You know, we use the Boeing manuals for the QRH and then procedures -- yeah, I guess it's more of a combination of, you know, whatever they think is -- works the best -- or has worked the best.

Q. Okay. Have you ever had unsatisfactory check ride here at Rhoades?

A. No, not at Rhoades.

Q. I'm guessing by that you've had it somewhere else?

A. Yeah, I had an unsatisfactory when I got my instrument rating.

Q. The kinds where we all had them, right? All right. Have you ever heard of anybody here having unsatisfactory check rides here -- at Rhoades?

A. No. I mean, like no pass or go back?

Q. Right.

A. No.

Q. All right. When you do your check ride -- your sim work, are you paired up with another captain? Is there just a seat fill?

A. I've done both. Typically, they try to pair you up with a -- you know, as a regular crew, one FO, one captain. But I've done seat fill, I've done -- I don't think I've ever been paired up with another FO, though. I know they put captains together, it just depends on who's available, you know, with the scheduling, how many guys they can take offline to be at training.

Q. Okay. All right, do they have a way here at Rhoades -- so anything maybe it doesn't play into -- is there any captains that you don't want to fly with -- or that you would prefer not to fly with?

A. Prefer to fly with or prefer not to fly with? Is that the question?

Q. Either way, help me understand?

A. Well, okay, so one guy that I prefer to fly with is Victor Antonov, he'll be coming in tomorrow I think for you guys. We live kind of close to each other so we carpool, and so that makes it convenient and he's a nice guy, easy to talk to. He's been there for quite a while, so he knows the ins and outs of the company operation or whatever. We've had -- yeah, nobody in particular that I don't want to fly with. The rest of the guys are all good guys too and I enjoyed flying with all of them and the guys that have left recently. You know, they all have their whatever -- different personalities, but I got along with I think all of them pretty much.

Q. Okay. You said some of the guys that have left recently, has there been a lot of people leaving Rhoades?

A. It seems like, yeah, guys have moved on, you know, kind of getting other jobs.

Q. Okay. Just kind of -- so my brain can kind of have a number with it, how many has left in the last three -- last year? I'm sorry.

A. You know, I really don't know what the number is. But it seems like from these interviews that we've been doing and the last pilot meetings it's -- I don't know, maybe half of them that are left out of the -- you know, the high when we had, like, 20 guys, so I'm there's maybe, like, ten guys left.

Q. Any of them left as being on the verge of being terminated that you're aware of? If you're not, it's okay, I don't know or I can't recall is fine.

A. Yeah, they don't discuss that with us. It's more of, like, what you hear through the grape vine. But yeah, I don't know offhand in particular.

Q. That's okay. When you're doing -- we'll step away from training for a little bit. Kind of walk me through your preflight, all right, if you could. I know you said you get in, you make your little nest or mess over there.

A. Yeah.

Q. Kind of walk me through what you're looking for?

A. So, first, you know, we check in, it's 45 minutes prior to departure time is what we're supposed to check in. I usually check in 15 minutes prior to that and if the captain's there already then, you know, we discuss whatever, weather, or issues, or what airplane are we going to end up with, is it ready. Sometimes the books not ready yet and maintenance still has the book so they're still doing their thing with the book.

So, at that time, I'll typically go out to the plane and like you said, I'll do my preflight, setup my whatever -- headset and get my charts and all those things out. And then I look at the -- on my flow I'll do my oxygen masks and whatever, setup the instruments for altimeter settings, and get the ATIS depending on the time because we might end up being there for an hour and a half and I'll have the ATIS again. So, you get the ATIS three or four times sometimes before we actually leave.

But -- so, if I'm out there with the captain then I'll -- like I said, I'll just do my side of the cockpit. I do my setups with the radios and the altimeter and instruments, whatever -- maybe navigation if it's not set already, set the needles and the radio frequencies. Then I'll get up and do the rest of the cockpit for emergency equipment, life jackets, first-aid kit. What do you call that thing? What is it called? What's that smoke -- the hood?

Q. Oh, the hood?

A. Yeah, what do you call that thing? I forgot what the name of that is.

Q. Are you thinking of the protective breathing equipment, like a PB?

A. Yeah, the PB. That's what I was trying to think of, the PB. God, it's been a while. Okay, so then I'll go back outside into the galley and check for the other things out there, the O2 -- portable O2 bottles, the fire extinguishers. What else do we keep out there, flare kit -- flare gun kit, escape ropes for the doors. I'll check the main cargo area for the locks, and the doors for

security, the windows for security. Then I'll go downstairs and do the outside, you know, go around the nose and the right side of the airplane, through the wheel well, back out around the wing, around the tail, and then the same thing on the other side -- the left side of the airplane. It takes a good -- I don't know, half-an-hour, I guess, 20 minutes, something like that.

Q. Okay. You said you check the main deck area, right, for locks and security?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Do you ever look at the bottom deck -- the lower deck?

A. In the cargo hold?

Q. Yes, I'm sorry. Down low?

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you that on every preflight also?

A. Yeah, pretty much. They -- in the beginning, when I started in 2018, they used to fill those up all the time. But after maybe, like, 2019, 2020, they weren't using it as much except for oversized stuff that wouldn't fit upstairs or animals, you know, that go into the forward cargo hold. So, sometimes they'd have it open. But yeah, you still stick your head in there and, you know, see if there's anything out of place basically.

Q. All right. But you said they haven't really used that a lot since 2019, 2020?

A. Yeah. They don't -- they weren't using it as often as they were when I first started.

Q. Okay. So, if you're doing a walkaround -- and I think earlier, maybe Dr. Bramble had mentioned about, you know, have you ever seen a hydraulic leak or a mechanical issue of any kind, what do you do with that information? Do you go and grab a mechanic that -- let me rephrase that, is there a mechanic just around the airplane when you're doing preflight?

A. Yeah, typically, yeah there's two guys at night available to, you know, bring up issues with. So, if he happens to be out there while I'm there, you know, then I can go to him and ask him whatever. Otherwise, I'll, you know, go upstairs, and talk to the captain or whatever -- talk to

him if the maintenance guy isn't around yet and then we'll discuss it and let's go find whoever or wherever the maintenance guys at that -- you know, on duty that night. But yeah, just whoever's closest, the captain or the maintenance guy.

Q. Okay. So, you go tell the captain -- let's just assume you didn't see a maintenance guy and you go and tell the captain?

A. Yeah.

Q. Does he typically write that up so maintenance comes out to look at it? Just in your opinion, what do you see generally?

A. Depends on what it is. You know, like if it's -- I don't know, a broken bonding strip, he probably won't come downstairs to look at that, so, like, okay, I know what that is. You know, if it's something like a puddle somewhere, yeah, he might want to come take a look at it first, you know, so he can tell whatever -- maintenance, what he's writing up.

Q. Okay. Have you ever had a captain say I'm not going to write that up?

A. No, not in those words. I mean, there's things that are, you know, not safety a flight that I'm okay with if he did -- what is it? The gear inspection light for the main gear, there's a port in the main fuselage that you can take off a cover and you look to see -- look through the mirrors to see the -- if the gear is down and locked. Okay, so there's supposed to be a light for that to see the paint marking, if it's down and locked -- if the gear's down and locked. You can't get to it -- you can't get to that portal, you know, if you've got freight on board, if you've got cans or anything up there. So, you know, if they wanted -- hey, we'll write that up when we get back, you know, we're a little pressed for time. That's okay with me. But it just depends on what it is.

Q. Okay. And thank you for the example because I was going to ask give me an example.

A. Yeah.

Q. So, thank you for that. Now, I know we're kind of always talking about right here in Honolulu, but what if you're at Maui, or Hilo, or another outstation and I assume you still do a

preflight there -- a walkaround?

A. Yeah, post-flights. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Do you have pilots willing to write plans up out at outstations? Or are they like hey, let's -- we'll take that back to Honolulu and write it up there?

A. Like, are they willing to write it up --

Q. Willing's probably a really bad word.

A. I mean, are they --

Q. Do you see them writing it up at an outstation?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Oh, yeah? What's that mean?

A. Because you spend a lot of time outer island, you know, so you might get one flight and it's like oh, okay, I guess we're done tonight, you know, we're stuck here or whatever at Hilo until a maintenance comes out -- or whatever, send a maintenance guy out to fix our plane. So yeah, you get stuck out at them.

Q. When you get stuck, are you stuck for a full day? Or is it just you have to wait there at the airport until they send somebody in to fix it?

A. It depends. I've had both, you know, where you're basically there for six, eight hours waiting for them to figure out how to get a maintenance guy to you or getting parts to you. And then we've had times where it's hey, there's another flight coming in an hour already, you know, it's already scheduled that way. So yeah, sometimes it's fast, sometimes it's not so fast.

Q. Okay. Do they ever have to put you up in a hotel because it's taking a long time?

A. Yeah, I've had that on occasion, too.

Q. I think when Dr. Bramble was asking, you said you've had some compressor stalls?

A. Yeah, I've had some.

Q. I know this is probably a weird question, but how did they sound to you?

A. You know, I was afraid you guys were going to ask me that. I don't know what -- so for me, I don't know, sometimes it sounds to me like a tire. Like, was that a -- was that the engine or was that the tire? But, you know, it's -- but typically, the captain would be telling me that's the engine stalling. And then sometimes it sounds like on the road -- you know, on the highways, they have those little reflectors for the lanes?

Q. Uh huh.

A. You know, it's either white or blue for fire hydrants on the side roads. But it's like when the tire kind of goes over that and kind of skids off of it, it's like a little thump. Sometimes it just sounds like that to me. I don't know. It was -- like I said, this is my first jet job, so it's kind of new to me. The compressor stalls, that's different, you know, than Props -- the Turbo Props. I never heard a compressor stall on a Turbo Prop.

Q. So, help me understand something, you said it sounds like a tire. You're talking like a tire spinning down, or are you talking like a tire deflating? What do you mean by sounds like a tire?

A. Sometimes it sounds like a tire -- like, I couldn't tell if it's -- is that a tire popping or an engine stall?

Q. Okay.

A. And so, that's -- they'd -- the other guys, you know, that I'm flying with, they're telling me that's what the engine stall sounds like.

Q. All right. So, let's go back just a little bit to on the ramp.

A. Okay.

Q. Do you do the weight and balance for the aircraft as the first officer?

A. No, it's computer -- they do the computer.

Q. Okay. So, how do you get that? Help me understand how you as a crew get the weight and balance at walkup?

A. So, the captain puts in -- they call them these half sheets and it gives them the

temperatures, and, you know, whether the runway is wet or dry, and whether it's one of the heavy birds or the lighter birds, you know, if they're using the 107,000-pound landing weight or 105,000-pound landing weight. And they enter that into this computer program and then they put the freight -- I don't know how they do that part. But the total freight and then they separate it into certain cans because they have to move it around in the positions so that it comes out balanced. But anyway, the computer spits that out and then we look it over to check the numbers to see how they -- you know, see if it's in balance or the accuracy of the numbers, I guess.

Q. Okay. So, you read those up or you just kind of look like yeah, the numbers are right?

A. Well, they're supposed to fall within -- the computer has a -- what do you call it? Like, if there's an issue, like if the temperature's missing, it's supposed to flag it. Or if there's some other -- I don't know, the weather -- if the weather's not printed, it says it's in manual weather. So, you have to look up temperatures and things like that and it makes a note for the signature boxes for the captain and the load manager, I guess, where those two guys are supposed to sign. It blocks it or something so that it's a secondary warning if there's something wrong with the paperwork. Does that answer your question? Sorry.

Q. No, you were just kind of walking me through how you guys check and balance -- weight and balance.

A. Yeah.

Q. So no, that helps me understand. So, thank you. When they give you the weight and balance, do they also give you your performance numbers? Or is that something you guys have to look up?

A. Yeah, so what we look up is the speeds. So, we'll do our safety speeds and the landing for the flap setting that we're going to use. That has -- so that was recently changed, it used to -- they used to do it with the computer, the computer would spit it out and it would be taken from those -- you know, from that page and we just put it on our dials -- or on our air speed indicators. But they

changed that, I guess, so now we have to look it up with the card -- the actual speed cards with whatever the numbers are on the form for us to determine what those speeds are.

Q. Okay. Does it give you your EPR setting on that, do you know? Or do you have to look that up, too?

A. Yeah, we were looking that up. When they changed those numbers, then shortly after that they changed the EPR numbers, so we had to look that up too on the charts.

Q. Okay. Just because I know you guys kind of fly only to a select few airports around here, so it's not like you have hundreds of airports, right?

A. Right.

Q. So typically, a flight from here to Maui, what would you consider a normal flight weight regime? Or is it all over the map from the max takeoff weight to barely anything on?

A. Yeah, so typically, coming back from Honolulu, they'd basically be empty -- you know, just empty cans. But going to whatever island you're going to, unless you're going to, let's say, do a triangle, so you're doing two airports, then it would be relatively close to max weight. But I've never seen anybody -- I haven't had any where they're actually at max gross. You know, they're typically 90,000 or so, below max weight by -- typically, they're -- yeah, I don't know, 20,000 or more less than gross weight.

Q. Okay. Coming out of Honolulu, do you -- is it a flaps two or flaps five takeoff?

A. Captain's discretion, they use both.

Q. Okay. Is there a reason some choose one versus another?

A. I know some guys preferred five with the bigger engines because, you know, it can hand whatever extra drag, if any, you know, compared to the small-engine airplanes. You know, there's no issue, having the bigger engine, being able to carry the weight, or climbing faster, or both.

Q. Okay. All right, so do you guys always do, like, a normal takeoff power setting or do you do, like, a reduced thrust or a D rated takeoff thrust setting?

A. The D rated reduced, yeah.

Q. Always or --

A. Typical.

Q. Typical?

A. Typical, yeah.

Q. I think with Dr. Bramble, you had said you have seen it get up to -- the EGT get up into the yellow?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Is that -- I think you said on takeoff until you got up to a thousand feet or whatever. ?

A. Yeah, we pull back --

Q. Is that on a normal takeoff power setting? Or is that on a D rated reduced thrust takeoff?

A. The D rated.

Q. Did that give you any concern?

A. Like I said earlier, it's like why is this airplane in the yellow and these airplanes are not in the yellow? That was more of a peeve to me than --

Q. Okay. That's okay, I'm just trying to make sure I understand it in my head.

A. Yeah.

Q. I appreciate that. Just a few more questions and then I'll let the other guys have a chance to -- because they probably ask better questions than I do. I think earlier you said that you might've gotten more than one safety report -- or safety newsletter, that's how they communicate. You said -- I think you said something about they might put out a bulletin, a change to the manual or something like that. Did I hear that right?

A. Yeah, as opposed to, like, a safety newsletter or something like that, sometimes they just give us revisions, you know, that have some kind of change or whatever update. So, we have to enter -- insert those into our manuals, you know, manually.

Q. How often do you get those manual revisions? Just a ballpark.

A. I don't know. I think since I've been here, we've had a handful, so maybe one a year. Something like that.

Q. Okay. And when you get those revisions, are they pretty self-explanatory, the change, or do you have to sometimes go ask?

A. No -- yeah, they're pretty clear. Yeah, it's just like the -- what do you call those things, the CHEPS, you know, revisions. It's like remove and replace or sometimes you take out a whole section. Yeah, they're pretty clear.

Q. Okay. All right, how would you classify the working environment here and by that, I mean, do you feel like it's an open-door concept, do you feel like it's more hostile? Kind of help me understand, you know, if you had a problem, how do you feel that work environment is?

A. For me, it seems open door. I mean, that's what they call it in their manual, that's what they tell us during the pilot meetings, you know, hey, my door's open, come in and see us or whatever. So, Wallace is a little tougher, you know, on a typical -- you know, prior to the accident, he's in Miami doing training. He's always doing training, so if you want to talk to him, you got to email him or call him or whatever. But it's only now that he's been here on island. But yeah, for me, it seems if you need to talk to somebody, yeah, they're easy enough to get ahold of or go see personally.

Q. Okay. So, I know you said Wallace is in Miami a lot doing training, is there anybody left behind here in Honolulu when he's in training that you can reach out to and call in the middle of the night if you have an issue?

A. Besides him?

Q. Yes.

A. Yeah, David Seest, our DO. He's another one that's available to us. The rest of the guys, so -- yeah, so -- and then on the other side -- on the maintenance side, if talking to maintenance

were still unclear, you know, I was like well, what do you want to do? You know, these guys might call their DOM, Kimble -- Mike Kimble. So, between, you know, the maintenance side and our flight side, usually they figure it out.

Q. Okay. Have you ever had to call the chief pilot or the director of operations, David Seest?

A. I've been with guys that have called them, you know, for questions and whatever concerns. But I've never called them myself.

Q. All right.

A. That's more of a captain thing.

Q. Okay. And you said you've been with guys that have called them, how did -- from your side, as a viewpoint, I know you probably didn't hear the whole conversation, but how did it seem like it went?

A. You know, as you expect. You know, it's like either we could do it or we can't. So, like you said, I don't hear -- I mean, I get a translated version, you know, from the captain of what the other guy's saying on the phone. But either we're stuck, or we're going, or whatever, we're done.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. I think you've helped me a ton, so I greatly appreciate that. I will let Clarence ask you questions.

MR. KANAE: Okay, thank you, Shawn.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Craig, your flight time is very impressive, 18,000 plus hours.

A. Yeah, something like that.

Q. Was most of that in Part 135 operations?

A. Yeah, the majority of it because I've only 15 -- 14, 15 hundred here at TransAir and another maybe 5,000 at Island Air, so that was 121. But the rest of it's all 135.

Q. Okay. So, Island Air you were a captain?

A. Yeah, I was captain over there, too, yeah.

Q. Any reason why you didn't look for the majors by any chance?

A. Oh, no, I've been trying.

Q. You've been trying?

A. Yeah, it's more like when did I give up on it?

A. So, after -- yeah, I've been trying to get into the majors for -- you know, since 500 hours.

Q. Well, it's definitely impressive, I've got to say. So, if you were to compare Island Air to Rhoades overall -- I know Island is passenger only, scheduled --

A. Yeah, pretty much.

Q. -- Rhoades is not, they're supplemental, so there's no schedule and it's all cargo. How would you compare both airlines as far as an employee, as a pilot?

A. Well, I know I said it earlier with Bill, too, you know, it's like there's room for improvement. I mean, it's -- they're both 121 operators, TransAir has Props and jets, Island Air only had the Props. I guess Island Air was a little bit bigger, but not by much, they had more planes on the ground in service than TransAir has. But they -- it's a small enough company where there's transition, there's -- not transition, what's it called? You know, it's sort of like a flow-through, you know, there's guys coming and going, whether it's pilots, or maintenance, or even management. You know, the top changes except for TransAir, TransAir everybody stays the same in management.

But Island Air had a lot of management movement as well. So, you know, there's always people in training, you know, getting retrained. You know, at Island Air, like you said, it was passengers, so it's -- there's more involved, you know, they've got the same pilots, mechanics, ground workers, management. But at Island Air, they also had the passengers, and flight attendants, and customer service agents, venders, and all kinds of other people that they had to work with that -- I guess that are a little different than TransAir. Does that help at all? Sorry.

Q. Yeah, it does. It seems more complex, rather than flying cargo.

A. Yeah, as far as, you know, what's on board, yeah, it's definitely more complex.

Q. And so, let me move over to your preflight at Rhoades, did you all -- did you observe any of the loading processes?

A. Yeah, we watched that, too.

Q. Is that a requirement for first officers to -- or even the captain to monitor the loading of the freight or cargo?

A. Yeah. But I guess it was easier for the captains to see the -- like, they wanted us to keep track of the cans -- the whatever -- the numbers on the can, they have their own designator, so it's easier for the captain to see it. But, you know, from the right seat you can still see the train as it come -- what do you call those things -- the dollies -- you know, each can on the dolly, you can see depending on the light -- you know, if it's daytime or nighttime, you know, how much light's on the ramp. But you can see, you know, the cans as they're pulling up to the loader.

But -- so, like -- so, if you check -- if you look at your load manifest, you know, you can see the cans, but it's like well, wait a minute, what are they doing? They're doing the last can. So, it just depends on -- we're kind of, like, secondary to the load crew. They have a load manager on board, who's also supposed to be doing that, too, making sure the right cans go on the right positions because of their or whatever. But they'll bring them up on the trains -- on the dollies and they'll put them on, you know, not in exact sequence, so it's like well, I guess they're going to put this one on. Oh, no, they put the right one on, okay.

So, you kind of keep track of how they load that way and then, you know, as they're physically putting them onboard the airplane, you can tell if they're having trouble with it. You know, some of them, they kind of stick or depending on the weight of the can and how many guys are pushing the can because sometimes they can be short staffed too. But yeah, there's times, you know, when we can observe certain parts of the observation when we're not busy doing our own thing.

Q. Sure. All right, great. Also, you mentioned also that some of the aircraft that the company operates -- some of the aircraft have high EGT or temperature readings on takeoff. Is that mainly out of Honolulu? Or would you consider that throughout the different outstations as well?

A. To me, it seemed like it would be more out of Honolulu just because the weights are higher typically out of here. You know, when airplanes are empty, even though the reduced power setting might be at or near what we took off at out of Honolulu, it still seem -- didn't seem like it would be as high as, you know, when the airplanes are heavier.

Q. Okay. All right, and was there any flyaway kits in the bottom compartments? Flyaway kits meaning spare tire, extra oil, maintenance equipment?

A. No tires unless you're, you know, going to rescue somebody. But -- yeah and they don't really have a locker or anything for that kind of stuff, not in the belly. Occasionally, we'd see, like, extra oil upstairs in the galley area -- you know, the storage areas or whatever. Yeah, but nothing -- I don't --

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, unless the maintenance guys are coming with us, you know.

Q. You didn't see anything like spare pumps or anything?

A. Tools -- yeah, there's -- they don't have anything like that.

Q. Okay. Then my last question is do you recall Rhoades engine failure procedures after takeoff for set incline and from Runway 8 right out of Honolulu? Do you recall any procedures regarding engine failures that you were trained both in simulator or even perhaps simulated actually in Honolulu?

A. So, 8 right has that special departure procedure, which is a little bit different from the 8-left procedure. But basically, they both put you on a -- after 500 feet -- well, 8 right -- so, the 500-foot turn or 1.3 DME, you make the turn head 220, and then, you know, at that point we'll do our QRH and memory items.

Q. Would you head out to some other hold or would you -- does the procedure take you out to a holding?

A. It gives you a heading -- so, it gives you a 220 heading off of 8 right, but then, you know, at that point, you're doing your memory items and you're talking to ATC. So, that's where we typically describe, you know, hey, we've got an engine failure, we're going to do checklists and then requesting vectors back to whatever runway.

Q. Do you recall any altitude perhaps besides the heading?

A. I don't think it has it on the departure procedure. We typically went to 2,000 in the simulator.

MR. KANAE: Okay, that's all I have. Thank you very much, Craig. I appreciate it.

MR. NG: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Thanks, Clarence.

MR. KANAE: Thank you.

MR. KATT: It's 10:02, just so you know.

MR. ETCHER: Rich, do you have anything?

MR. NG: Oh, it's 10:02?

MR. LEE: This whole thing has gone quick.

DR. BRAMBLE: We only have five minutes until he's got to go get (indiscernible).

MR. LEE: That's fine.

DR. BRAMBLE: You can have five.

MR. LEE: No, that's okay. Do you want to wrap it up?

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

Anything we haven't asked you that you'd like to share with us?

MR. NG: No, I just hope I, you know, could give you guys some insight without being too confusing with my answers.

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah, we always offer everybody the opportunity to provide us any safety recommendations they have in mind. Granted, there isn't much known about the circumstances of this case publicly yet. But do you have anything you'd like to share with us?

MR. NG: No, none I can think of at this time.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, thanks very much. With that, we'll call this concluded.

MR. NG: Okay, thanks, gentlemen.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Craig Ng
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 27, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Carolyn Hanna
Transcriber

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
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Interview of: EDDIE RINSMA, Captain

TransAir Executive Airlines of Hawaii

Honolulu, Hawaii

Tuesday,
September 28, 2021

APPEARANCES:

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National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

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INTERVIEW

(8:04 a.m.)

MR. ETCHER: It is September 28th at 8:04 Honolulu time. This is the interview with -- Captain Rinsma?

MR. RINSMA: Rinsma.

MR. ETCHER: Rinsma?

MR. RINSMA: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Involving DCA21FA174, Rhoades Aviation, Flight 810.

Good morning. Again, my name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an operational factors investigator with the NTSB. Dr. Bramble and myself, we're leading the Operational Factors Human Performance Group, looking into the events surrounding Rhoades Aviation, Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the problem cause of transportation accidents, promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation nor the FAA, and it has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

At this time, I'd like to go around the room and have everybody introduce themselves and their, you know, who they work for so it gives you a better idea of who you're dealing with. I'll start with Dr. Bramble.

DR. BRAMBLE: I'm William Bramble. I'm a human performance investigator at NTSB.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, Boeing safety pilot.

MR. KANAE: I'm Clarence Kanae with the FAA operations at Honolulu Certificate Management Office.

MR. ETCHER: And that's everybody here that will be interviewing today. There is a TransAir Group member, as well, but he's not here at this point. So if he shows up, I'll have him introduce himself, as well.

MR. RINSMA: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: You are entitled to one representative of your choosing. Is there someone here that you would like to be your representative?

MR. RINSMA: Yeah, Bill.

MR. ETCHER: Bill?

MR. RINSMA: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Mr. Katt, would you be so kind?

MR. KATT: William Katt from the Law Firm of Wilson Elser.

INTERVIEW OF EDDIE RINSMA

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. All righty. So, Captain, is there anyone here that you wish not to be present during this interview?

A. No.

Q. All righty. Today we're going to be using a digital recording at the interview. We will send that recording out for transcription. When it comes back, the party members here will review that transcript for accuracy, make sure -- typographical errors, things like that. We will not change anything that you have stated.

A. Okay.

Q. The purpose of the investigation is to determine probable cause and to prevent reoccurrences. Our role is not to assign fault. We are simply here for you to be able to share your insights with the goal of preventing future accidents. Having said, however, we cannot offer any guarantee or confidentiality of immunity. The transcript of this interview will become part of a public docket when the case is nearing completion.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time. And everyone has been instructed not to interrupt other people as they're asking questions. And then once we go around once, there's going to be a chance for everybody to ask follow-up

questions, and part of the -- our process.

One thing we ask is you answer all the questions that you can to the best of your recollection. If you don't know something, "I don't know," "I don't recall," that's perfectly fine. This is not a check ride.

A. Okay.

Q. So, you know, we just want to learn from you. If you say something or misspeak and you want to correct it, please say so. It's perfectly fine. And if there's something that your opinion, please let us know that as well. Do you have any questions?

A. No.

MR. ETCHER: Does anyone else have any questions?

DR. BRAMBLE: No.

MR. ETCHER: All right. If you guys are ready, we'll start with the toughest questions first.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Can you please state and spell your full name?

A. Full name is Eddy, E-d-d-y, John, J-o-h-n, Rinmsa, R-i-n-s-m-a.

Q. Do you like to go by captain, Eddy? What do you like? What would you like us to call you?

A. Ed.

Q. Ed?

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. Ed, how old are you?

A. Sixty-three.

Q. And what is your job title?

A. Captain.

Q. Captain of the 737?
A. Yeah, captain, 737.
Q. And where are you employed?
A. At TransAir, Honolulu Airport.
Q. All right. What was your date of hire at Rhoades or TransAir?
A. 17th of May of 2017.
Q. Okay. And are you a line check airman?
A. Yes.
Q. How long have you been that?
A. About two and a half years.
Q. Okay. Do you remember when you got your check airman letter?
A. No, I don't know the date.
Q. All right. That's all right. What kind of certificates do you have?
A. ATP and flight engineer.
Q. Any type ratings?
A. Type ratings, 737, 727, 747, 200, CRJ, I think it's a CL-65, and that's it.
Q. Okay. That's it? That's a lot. So that's okay. Do you have current medical?
A. Yes.
Q. Is it a first-class?
A. First-class, yes.
Q. Any limitations?
A. Subject to wearing corrective lenses.
Q. Okay. Kind of ballpark of your estimated flight time total?
A. 14,000 hours.
Q. And do you know how much of that is in the 737?

A. About 2500 hours.

Q. Was that all here at TransAir/Rhoades?

A. No. A little bit at Kitty Hawk Air Cargo.

Q. Okay. How long have you been a captain here?

A. About three years.

Q. Okay. Can you kind of give us, like, a Cliffs Notes version of your aviation history so we know who you are kind of -- anything like that --

A. Oh, okay. Well, I started out as a flight instructor, and then went to the commuters, as they called it in those days, and then into the 121 world initially as a flight engineer, then first officer, and here, captain.

Q. All righty. This is always a tough question for us to ask, but have you ever been terminated or asked to leave any of your employers?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Let's start getting into a little bit of TransAir or Rhoades. Do you want me to call it Rhoades or TransAir? Which is easiest for you?

A. I generally just call it TransAir.

Q. Okay. All righty. Who is in your chain of command?

A. David Seest is the Director of Operations, and then Wallace Horibata is the chief pilot.

Q. Oh, okay. All righty. On average, how often do you -- since you are a line check airman, I assume you do OE?

A. OE, yes.

Q. How often do you do OE flights?

A. After new-hire classes being hired, quite frequently.

Q. Can you give me just kind of an estimate? Half the time, a fourth of the time, all of the time?

A. About a third of the time.
Q. About a third? Okay. So since you're doing OE a lot, how would you classify staff in here, pilot staff, for now?
A. Say again?
Q. How would you classify pilot staffing at TransAir?
A. You mean numbers?
Q. Yeah. Are you adequately staffed? Do you feel like you're adequately staffed, need more?
A. I think we're adequately staffed, but it's a constant hiring process. People, you know, leave for better jobs or they don't like being out in the islands, and they're constantly hiring.
Q. All righty. When is the last time you did an elite flight before the accident?
A. Before the accident? Probably about two weeks prior.
Q. And was that a new-hire FO or a --
A. It was an up -- it was a returning FO.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you do captain upgrades also?
A. No, I haven't yet, no.
Q. No?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Who does captain upgrades?
A. Typically, Wallace.
Q. Okay. If you're flying a line and you do have a concern, a safety concern of any issue --
A. Yeah.
Q. How do you communicate that and with whom?
A. There's a safety reporting system that we can do online or on paper. You can put your

name on it or do it anonymously even, and that goes to the safety department. I've also brought it up with David Seest, director of operations if it's something that I feel needs urgent attention.

Q. Have you ever filled out one of those safety reports, whether online or on paper?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. What kind of feedback? Or did you give feedback from that report?

A. Yeah, I got, I got feedback, positive feedback, and the issue was corrected fairly quickly.

Q. Okay. Do you guys have line check airmen meetings?

A. Yes.

Q. How often?

A. Oh, about once every six to nine months.

Q. And kind of give me an idea of what's covered in those meetings.

A. Typically, you know, the progress of students, if I can call them that, the, the candidates, what the issues are, what the problems are, that kind of thing, and then any new procedures that, that are coming out or anything that, you know, that, that needs highlighting that either David Seest or Wallace have noticed or -- you know, that, that needs attention to -- you know, brought to the attention of the line pilots.

Q. You mentioned you guys talked about new procedures. How often do you guys receive new procedures?

A. Not very often.

Q. So you've been here since 2017? Did I get that right?

A. That's correct, yeah.

Q. Okay. So since you've been here, how many times has any of the procedures changed or become new?

A. You mean in terms of a number of times?

Q. Yeah, just a rough estimate.

A. I don't really recall. Yeah.

Q. No, that's okay. That's all right.

A. I don't --

Q. All right. You also said during your meetings that they kind of discussed -- you know, I don't remember the term you used, problems or something like that. Is that problems with candidates or is that problems with aircraft? Is it problems with loading? Help me understand what kind of problems --

A. No, it's problems with the candidates, the IOE that, you know, a lot of the new people these days come from glass cockpits, and they have a hard time adjusting to steam gauges. And we've noticed, I guess, a trend there, that it's the same issues, flight director and auto pilot issues that new hires seem to have problems with.

Q. Can you give me an example of what you have seen new candidates have challenges with, with either the autopilot, flight directors? Kind of help me understand what you have seen.

A. Yeah. They don't understand how the autopilot works, and, and how it's associated with the flight director, and really on the 73-200 -- I don't know if you would know this, too, but the flight director is -- it's a misnomer in terms. It's only directing when you're tuned into an ILS and captured it or you're turned into a localizer -- I mean a VOR radial, and it's captured. For the rest of the time, it's just informational, you know? It's just you just set it where you want it to check for changes. It's not directing, not like new planes where it directs. I think that the new pilots that we're getting, particularly younger ones, they're used to the flight director flying the airplane all the time.

Q. Do you do any of the sim work or do you strictly online?

A. No, I don't, just online.

Q. Okay. So in your professional opinion, when the students come to you do an OE, are they well-prepared, kind of prepared? Kind of help me understand. When they come to you right out

of the sim and you get an OE with them, are they ready to do the flights or is it a lot of challenges for you guys?

A. Yeah, they're ready, they're ready to do the flights. Obviously, with people, some are more ready than others, they've obviously studied more. But no, they're ready. They understand the concepts, but the actual putting it into practice -- and in the simulator training, you don't do a lot of the -- you know, using the flight directors and autopilots like you would on the line because you're, you know, training for emergency procedures, and stuff like that. So once you're on the line, then it's a matter of them figuring out how to use this stuff.

Q. Okay. That helps. Thank you.

A. Okay.

Q. So when you go to do a flight, do you feel any pressure to complete that flight from anybody at TransAir or is it personal pressure to get the flight out and completed?

A. No, no.

Q. Okay. Have you ever refused to do a flight?

A. Not refused, but I've delayed flights for various reasons, maintenance issues, waiting until something is corrected or deferred. Not just refused a flight, no.

Q. Okay. Have you ever refused an airplane?

A. No.

Q. Do you feel like if you would refused an airplane there would be any kind of retaliation, or is it -- kind of help me understand. I know you've never had to refuse one, but help me understand if you would, what would happen?

A. No. They would, they would -- if what I'm thinking you're saying -- is for a mechanical reason the airplane, you know, wasn't able to fly, they'd swap me to another airplane or wait till another airplane came back. So, no, there'd be no repercussions. I never had been called up to say, you know, ask why I didn't leave on time or leave with that airplane, no.

Q. Okay. So kind of walk me through a day in the life, if you will, of your job day. Let's say you're doing an OE flight. Kind of walk me through what you would be doing. Let me be that fly on your shoulder, if you will?

A. Okay. Well, we show up at operations at least 45 minutes before scheduled departure time and get the paperwork, go through it with the, the FO, checking the route, the fuel, the NOTAMs. And then the FO proceeds out to the airplane to do the preflight. If he's, you know, a first-day IOE, obviously I go out there with him and watch him do the walkaround. They have already been trained on that, but that was back in ground school.

So then you go through the walkaround with them and then into the cockpit and set up for the flight. And sometime during that process, they'll stop loading the airplane, bring the weight and balance to you, check that, and when that's complete, start up and depart.

Q. Do you do the weight and balance or is that given to you?

A. No, that's given to us. It's done on a computer.

Q. Does the weight and balance give you performance numbers, as well, like V speeds, EPR settings, things like that?

A. It used to, but not, not at the moment.

Q. Okay. Why is that? Do you know?

A. I'm not 100 percent sure.

Q. Okay. So that means you have to calculate your V speeds and your EPR, then?

A. Yes. Yeah.

Q. Okay. I'm a new-hire with you. I'm first day on the job. Walk me through how to calculate my EPR speed or my EPR settings?

A. Well, the EPR setting comes out of the performance manual, and there's columns that have the temperature and weight, and you read across, and that gives you your EPR setting. Then, for the go-around EPR and performance mixed (ph.) climb EPR, you go to the QRH in the back--

there's a performance section in there -- and get the numbers out of there based on the temperature of the ATIS.

Q. All righty. Do you guys always to the normal charted EPR or do you do, like, a reduced-thruster, de-rated?

A. Normally, we do a reduced-thrust takeoff.

Q. Okay. Is there anything different than what you just told me that you have to do to get the reduced?

A. Well, to calculate it, we use the assumed temperature method. We get the --

Q. Okay. All righty. So you get your paperwork. You get your V speeds. Again, just for a moment, let's say I'm sitting there in the right seat beside you. You're teaching me this. It's my first day on the job.

A. Yeah.

Q. What do you expect an FO to be doing at that point, once you get all the performance numbers? Is there anything that the FO has to do at that point?

A. Well, then, then, yeah, then his job is to -- at some time in this whole procedure, he gets the ATIS, and then when we're both there listening, gets the clearance, copies of the clearance now, and then run the checklist.

Q. All right.

A. And then whoever is the pilot flying gives the briefing, takeoff briefing.

Q. So you're coming out to Honolulu here. It's the first night, first leg. We're departing eight right? What would you expect me, as your brand-new FO to give you a pilot briefing of how (indiscernible) plane?

A. Say again?

Q. What would you expect me as the FO, if I was the pilot flying, what kind of briefing would you expect me to give you?

A. Well, the standard briefing, the, the procedures that we're going to use, if we lose an engine, what our plan is for returning.

Q. Is there any special procedures if you lose an engine?

A. Yeah, there's special procedures. You'd have to brief that. That's in the briefing.

Q. And do you recall what those are by chance?

A. Typically, off eight right, it's climb straight ahead to 400 feet or 1.3 DME and start a right turn, 15-degree bank, to intercept -- to a heading of 220 to intercept the -- I think it's the 171 radial out to Alana (ph.) to hold, level off at 800 feet, speed up, clean up, and then run the, run the appropriate checklists, and then plan our return either to full right or one of the eights, depending on the nature of the problem.

Q. Where would I find that information? Is it on the Jepp charts? Do you guys use Jepp charts or --

A. No. We -- NOS.

Q. NOS?

A. Yeah.

Q. Is it in those charts, or is it somewhere else that I would see that --

A. No, that's in our performance manual that -- at the start, the special procedures.

Q. Okay. All righty. Okay. That kind of helps me be that little fly on your shoulder. So thank you.

A. Okay.

Q. So let's kind of go back to the takeoff. You know, you've already briefed it. You've taxied out. You get in lineup and wait. Who sets the takeoff power once you're cleared for takeoff? Is it the pilot flying or you as the captain?

A. No. The pilot flying sets the takeoff power, and then he approximates the thrust of a position the EPR setting. He's watching outside, and then he calls set takeoff thrust. And then the

other pilot will fine-tune it, bring it up, set it there, and then the captain has his hands on the thrust levers end.

Q. Okay. So the pilot flying bring it up -- let's say I was your pilot flying. I bring it up. What are you looking at as the pilot monitoring it? Do you just sit there and just reach up and grab the -- and fine-tune the EPR, or do you scan the gauges? Help me understand what you would do.

A. No. Scanning all the gauges -- we do -- during the thrust levers up initially to approximately 1.4 EPR to make sure that both come up equally and that they're producing thrust, and then once you get to 1.4 EPR, then the pilot flying will push them up towards the takeoff EPR, call set takeoff thrust, and then if I'm the pilot monitoring, then I'm pushing them up, watching the gauges to make sure they're all, you know, where they're supposed to be. Yeah. And then that should be set. The takeoff thrust should be set by the time you get to 60 knots.

Q. Okay. So you're the pilot monitoring on some flights, obviously, I assume. I mean, I shouldn't say obviously. I assume you're a pilot monitoring some flights?

A. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

Q. Okay. When you are scanning the engines or the gauges, have you ever seen an engine EGT getting hot or in the yellow band or high?

A. Yeah, occasionally, they go into the yellow band.

Q. Since you used the term "occasionally," it's just the nosey nature of me, but define occasionally. Are you talking once a week, once --

A. Yeah, it depends which airplane you're flying and which engines are on it. You know, we have the Dash 9's, the Dash 15's, and Dash 17's, so the, the smaller engines I think are more prone to it than the larger engines.

Q. Okay. Do you remember -- did you fly the accident airplane 810?

A. Yeah, yeah, I've flown that one.

Q. Do you remember what kind of engines it has on it?

A. I believe -- I'm not 100 percent sure, no.

Q. Okay. No worries. When you flew that aircraft, did you ever notice the EGTs getting high or in the yellow that you can recall?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Okay. How often, though, would you -- kind of give me a ballpark categorization, if you will. How often would you get in the yellow band on a departure?

A. Oh, 20 percent of the time.

Q. Did you ever get in the red?

A. No.

Q. Okay. When you got in the yellow band, did you have to -- was there anything required of you? Do you have to write it up if it's in the yellow band or --

A. Not required, no. We can, we can operate in the yellow band.

Q. Okay. Can you recall when you get a warning in the yellow band, is it on a normal takeoff or is it on a reduced thrust takeoff?

A. Reduced thrust.

Q. Okay. All righty. Have you ever had, like, mechanical issues like fuel leaks, hydraulic leaks, anything like that in any of your airplanes?

A. Yes.

Q. What have you had, fuel, hydraulic, what? Help me understand.

A. Had a B system hydraulic failure, had small fuel leaks, lost oil in an engine.

Q. Lost oil in an engine?

A. Yeah.

Q. Was that in flight?

A. Yeah.

Q. So did you have to -- what did you do?

A. We leveled off, declared an emergency, turned around and went back, ran the appropriate checklist, and landed, shut the engine down as per checklist and --

Q. What checklist would you run?

A. It would be the loss of oil quantity checklist, which leads you in then to shut the engine down, which leads into the single-engine approach and landing checklist.

Q. All righty. Have you had any other engine issues --

A. Yes, yeah.

Q. Like what? Help me understand kind of what you --

A. I've had precautionary engine shutdowns, you know, like the engine oil. It's, it's -- the checklist calls for shutting the engine down. I had another one where we had an engine overheat light come on and ran that checklist. And while we were running that, we got a start valve open light come on, and that checklist says to shut the engine down.

But the engine overheat light, when it came on, the checklist for that has you bring the power back to extinguish the light and then operate at that setting. And we, we found that the engine wasn't producing any thrust anymore even though the thrust level was moved up. And so we declared an emergency, ran the appropriate checklist, come back and landed.

And when maintenance got the cowls off and looked at it, it was an eighth-stage bleed air clamp, I believe it was, separated or broke. And the actual eighth-stage bleed air duct was about two inches away from the, from the engine. And I guess the thrust was being bled off.

And then the reason that the start valve open light came on, they said, was because the, the bleed air that was going inside the cowl, which was hot enough it blistered the paint on the outside of the cowl, it probably melted something or shorted something and caused the start valve open light to come on. But they confirmed that the start valve was closed. It never opened.

Q. Was that here in Honolulu or --

A. Yeah, Honolulu.

Q. It was here?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Have you ever had, like, a compressor stall, or anything like that with the engine?
A. I don't recall, no.
Q. All righty. So when you came back after that loss of oil or the -- I'm sorry -- the engine overheat --
A. Yeah.
Q. When you came back after that and you landed, taxied to the ramp, I assume --
A. Yeah.
Q. Did that require a maintenance item or did you just have maintenance come out and take a look at it, and they took care of everything?
A. Oh, no, that was a maintenance writeup, and the airplane was, was done for the day, yeah, till they fixed it.
Q. Okay. Yeah. So if the airplane was done for the day, were you done for the day, as well, or did they swap you out? Help me understand what --
A. That I don't recall. It was about three years ago, and I don't recall.
Q. All right. You knew that was going to be my next question was how long ago, so thank you.
A. Yeah. Okay.
Q. All righty. We've learned a new term here during this investigation, F writeups and I writeups into maintenance logs.
A. Oh, okay.
Q. Do you know what those are?
A. Yeah.
Q. Help me understand what those are --

A. They're flight crew writeups and informational writeups.

Q. Okay. What are you calling -- in your opinion, what would be an information writeup?

A. It's, it's something that typically maintenance requests. You observe a system and, like, pressurization, see what it's doing, and even though the system is working, they, they, you know, want some information about what's going on with it, yeah, rates of climb, stuff like that.

Q. So it's information for maintenance, then? They request --

A. Yeah, maintenance and for other crews that get on the airplane. They can read that and see that, okay, the pressurization is, you know, not acting like it should, but it still works.

Q. Okay. Do you look at informational writeups when you're flipping through the logbook?

A. Oh, yeah, yeah.

Q. What kind of closeout -- you know, crews write up in one box, and then I assume maintenance writes up in the other box, the -- you know, the --

A. Usually they, they write something up that they've noted it, and stuff like that, but it's, it's not a, you know, an F writeup, so there doesn't need to be a corrective action, so to speak.

Q. All righty. Were you by chance flying the night of the event?

A. No, I was off.

Q. You were off. What's a normal schedule for you?

A. It varies. Show up at midnight and fly till 5 or 6 in the morning, or show up at 1:30, show up at 3:30, or if there's daytime flying, show up at 9:30, 10:00 in the morning, and -- it, it varies.

Q. Okay. How many days on are you or weeks on versus how many off?

A. I'm typically out here for about 16, 17 days, and then I get anywhere from 9 to 12 days off in a row. But I purposely like to fly six days straight and have my one in seven, fly another six days straight, one in seven, and then fly whatever else I have to, and then all the rest my off days ahead of my scheduled off, my hard week off so that I can go back to the mainland. Whereas local guys, they'd rather fly two or three days, have a day off, two or three days, have a day off, that

kind of schedule. So --

Q. Do you get to pick your schedule? Like, do you get to bid for a schedule or is it --

A. No, it's, it's, it's -- I guess -- assigned is the right word, but, but you can, you can state your preferences and then they try and figure it out to, to get your preferences.

Q. Okay. Have you ever been required to fly on your days off?

A. Not required, but asked, asked to.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Have you ever done that?

A. Yes. Yeah. Pay is good.

Q. Okay. What happens if you decide to -- you know, they call you to -- fly on your day off and you say no. Is there --

A. Well, if it's on your hard week off, nothing. They can ask you, and for me, I'm on the mainland, so unless they want to, you know, have me fly out here, and you know, they got to be thinking two or three days ahead, so that doesn't usually work. But if, if you're here on island, and you know, for some reason, you have two days off in a row, we're obligated to fly for the company for 16 days every month. That's a 13-month year. So yeah, then, then, then you fly, but it counts towards your 16 days. So then you're going to get another day off or get extra pay for flying an extra day.

Q. All righty. Did you know either of the accident pilots?

A. Yes, yeah.

Q. Let's talk about the accident captain.

A. Yeah.

Q. Henry.

A. Henry, yeah.

Q. Okay. Did you do any of his OE or -- that you can recall?

A. I don't recall, no.

Q. What can you recall about Henry? You knew him, so --

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. Help me understand --

A. Flying with Henry, he was -- I'd say he's very methodical, by the book, and thinks things out before he acts. He doesn't react, you know, just without thinking about it.

Q. Okay. Is that a good trait or is that a -- you know, like, if somebody came to you (indiscernible) and they did that, is that a good trait or that a trait that you try and --

A. No, that's good, yeah, yeah.

Q. Okay. All righty.

A. I mean, he's not, not thinking -- he's not hesitant and taking forever to make a decision, but he definitely considers everything before he makes that decision.

Q. All right. From what you can see, how did Henry get along with other pilots?

A. Good as far as I know. I got on well with him, and --

Q. Did you ever hear anybody not wanting to fly with him?

A. I had heard that. That's all.

Q. Okay. All right. No problem. Was it very many?

A. No.

Q. Okay. How about from what you could recall, how was his interaction with management, or do you have any idea?

A. I have no idea.

Q. And that's okay. How about the first officer?

A. Yeah, Greg.

Q. Yeah.

A. Yeah.
Q. Did you fly with him?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Did you do his OE?
A. Yes. Yeah. Some of it. Not all of it.
Q. Okay. So you don't do all their OE; you just do parts of it?
A. No, at that time, there was, there was another check airman. He did some of it, I believe, at that time. He's left. He went to FedEx.
Q. Have you flown with him since OE?
A. Yes. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Can you recall the most recent time you flew with him?
A. No.
Q. All righty. What's your general impression of the -- of Greg?
A. Very observant, by the book, knows his stuff, and great to get along with. Good pilot, and he enjoys flying, yeah. He was, he was a Regional jet pilot, I believe, or Brasilia, I think it was, and then he got into law and became a lawyer, and has a law practice, and I think he just flies for the fun of it. It's not his livelihood. So -- but he really enjoys it, yeah. And he's, he's, he's keen to learn, too, you know? He's --
Q. I'm sorry. Say that again?
A. He's keen to learn.
Q. Keen to learn.
A. He's very receptive to suggestions, you know?
Q. Okay. Do you know what it takes to upgrade here? Is it a seniority-based thing? Is it an hour thing?
A. It's, it's an hour requirement, and then being, you know, approved. It's not seniority. It's

not that your number comes up, you upgrade. It's not automatic. Like, big airlines, your number comes up, you upgrade. No. Here, it's, it's -- yeah, the time you've been here, recommendations, and, and, you know, the flight times to, to, to meet the regulatory requirements.

Q. Okay. Recommendations from --

A. Other captains, me, check airman, Wallace, the chief pilot.

Q. Okay. Have you given recommendations for --

A. Yes.

Q. Did you give recommendations for either of these two --

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Which one?

A. For Greg.

Q. For Greg?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Let's talk about the work environment here. I know it's pilots always -- there's always a tendency to complain maybe is a nice way of putting it.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you kind of have that same thing here with pilots? Do you hear pilots complaining about management or airplanes or schedules or pay, or whatever?

A. Yeah.

Q. All of that?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. It's an airline.

Q. Okay. All righty. Can you give me just kind of a general what do you hear, or do you have complaints?

A. Well, I hear about, you know, scheduling and, and that -- I just take it all with a grain of salt. I mean, it's, it's the way it is. And it's not going to change, you know? It's the nature of cargo. You show up at, let's say, 11:30 at night for a 12:15 a.m. departure, and then two hours later, you're still sitting there because the cargo hasn't arrived. Well, you know, you get -- particularly new guys. They've never done cargo before. "Well, why don't we show up later?" You know, it's like, "Well, that's not cargo, you know? That's the way it is."

And the same, too, at the end of the day, the schedule may show you're doing, for example, a Honolulu, Maui and back to Honolulu, and then a Honolulu, Hilo, and back to Honolulu. And the new guys think, okay, once they get back from Hilo, they're done, they can go home, but in the meantime, you know, airplane is broken down or they've got extra cargo, and you get back, and it's like, "Hey, you guys, can you do another Maui trip, you know, a Maui return?"

So, you know, and it's -- that's, that's the nature of cargo, and particularly a small operation like ours, where, you know, they don't have a lot of reserve crews that they can call out and cover that. So if you're legal to do it, they expect you to do it. And usually our duty days are fairly short, so -- and the flight times are not that great either, you know? It's short flights to, to the islands. So, so, legally, yeah, you can do it.

And some guys have an issue, too, with -- and it's a personally thing, you know, managing their rest time and, you know, maybe saying that they're tired at 6 in the morning because they've been on duty for six hours because they didn't get adequate rest before they showed up. But you know, that's, that's their problem, basically. I mean, they know when they've got to show up, and they know how long they can legally be on duty. So, yeah, there's no fixed schedule and such.

And you can show up, too, expecting to do a Maui flight, and when you get there, you know, you're going to Hilo or doing -- we call it triangle, you know, Hilo, Kona, and back. And the new guys, some of them, you know, they, they, they can't grasp that. They come from, you know, Regional Airlines, or other airlines, where you fly this trip at this time to there, to there, to

there, and when you're there, you're done. And cargo here is not like that. So --

Q. Okay. You talked about guys being tired at 6 in the morning?

A. Yeah.

Q. Can they call in fatigued?

A. Yes. Yeah.

Q. Have you seen guys do that?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever had to do that?

A. No.

Q. Okay. If they call in fatigued, do you know what happens? Is there anything?

A. No, I don't, no.

Q. Okay. And that's okay. I appreciate that. I know you've been talking to me for a while, and I want to give my other colleagues a chance, but before we do, do you need the restroom or a break, or anything --

A. No, I'm good.

Q. You're good?

A. Yup.

MR. ETCHER: All righty. Dr. Bramble? Would you have any questions, sir?

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Yeah. You mentioned that you filed a safety report, and it was addressed to your satisfaction?

A. Yes. Yeah.

Q. Can you tell us what that was about?

A. It was about control on the ramp, wing walkers and lead marshals. The ground stuff, they have a high turnover, I guess, and the, the -- they're constantly training them, and I think

sometimes they're -- they fill dual, dual roles. They're also loaders. And sometimes they don't have the appropriate wing walkers in place. On one occasion, it created a problem in that we were the outermost airplane, and they were loading the airplane next to us.

And for reasons unknown to me, they had a wing walker on the outboard side, but not on the inboard side. And they were bringing carts with the, the cargo cans in. And the lead marshal who was signaling us to, to taxi out, and I just stopped and got on the radio and told him we needed wing walkers on the, you know, side that they were loading the cargo. And that was corrected very quickly.

Q. How did they correct it?

A. They provided wing walkers on both sides.

Q. So it was corrected on the spot?

A. No. Well, eventually, that night, yeah, but after that, then they, they made sure that there was always wing walkers on both sides. Yeah, that night, we took a delay for that, waiting for them to correct it, but they, they fixed it after that.

Q. Which managers were involved in fixing that problem?

A. I don't recall. I submitted the safety report to the safety office, and I don't recall.

Q. Did you hear back from anyone in the safety office?

A. Not directly, but in the safety reports they issue, it was listed there with the corrective action.

Q. Where did you see that?

A. In the summary of safety reports. It was in the newsletter that's sent out.

Q. When was that that this event occurred?

A. I don't recall. I don't recall.

Q. Do you know what year it was?

A. No.

Q. Do you think it was before 2021?

A. Possibly, yeah, with in the last year or so.

Q. Okay. Just based on your experience with the airplanes -- well, based on your experience with the airplanes with the Dash 9 engines, 810 in particular if you can remember that specific, but generally, the smaller engines, is 2.01 a relatively high EPR setting for a reduced thrust takeoff?

A. Yeah.

Q. Would you expect an airplane to be somewhat heavy if, if that was required?

A. Possibly.

Q. What would you characterize as a relatively heavy takeoff weight coming out of Honolulu?

A. Anything above the 105,000 pounds total takeoff weight.

Q. All right. Some of the pilots we spoke with described compressor stalls as something that happened several times for them. More often on the ground than in flight. You never heard a pop or anything that could have been a compressor stall?

A. Not that I recall, no.

Q. Okay. Were you on duty the night of the accident?

A. No.

Q. Are you aware of anything unusual about the condition of 810 in the weeks before the accident?

A. No.

Q. Was there a recent history of any recurring maintenance issues across the fleet in the months before the accident that you were aware of?

A. I don't recall.

Q. You mentioned those engine incidents where you had to shut down the engine. Did you ever have -- would you classify those as engine failures or --

A. No. Because they're just -- not failures. They're just -- what's the term -- precautionary

shutdowns. The checklist calls for you to shut the engine down as you progress through the checklists.

Q. Did you ever experience an engine failure incident?

A. No.

Q. Do the amount of maintenance issues that you experienced at TransAir seem different than any other operators you've worked at?

A. No. Most of the companies I've worked for, I've flown (indiscernible) the airplanes' maintenance issues are, are there.

Q. Are there any maintenance issues in the 737s in the last year that maintenance seemed to have a difficult time diagnosing or repairing?

A. Not that I recall, no.

Q. Did you ever find a maintenance issue and wanted to write it up and have maintenance tell you why don't you wait until you get back to write it up?

A. No.

Q. Did you say no?

A. No, yeah.

Q. Sorry. I'm going to need you to just say it audibly for the recording.

A. Yeah. No, no.

Q. Okay. All right. Did you ever perform rejected takeoff at TransAir?

A. Say the question again?

Q. Did you ever have to perform a rejected takeoff?

A. Oh, yes, yeah.

Q. What was the cause of that?

A. I think one was a takeoff config warning. And I don't recall if there was others.

Q. How many do you think there were?

A. That's probably the only one I recall.

Q. Oh, I see. So you said you don't recall if there are others?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. How about pressurization issues? Are you aware of any recurring issues of counter-pressurization?

A. Yes, some airplanes had issues.

Q. Did you ever take a flight and have a problem with that to the point where it was -- I don't know -- bothering your ears, or anything?

A. No. I'm one of the few that the pressurization issues never bother me. It's -- I usually find out by looking at the FO and then looking at the gauge to see the cabin is climbing rather rapidly.

Q. Okay. Before the accident, do you know who was responsible for managing safety at Rhoades Aviation?

A. The safety manager, I think, was Orlando Debrum, I think his name is, and he has assistants that help him.

Q. Do you know who those assistants are?

A. No. One is guy from -- he's got a Russian name, but I can't say it. I can't pronounce it.

Q. It is Valari or Valeri?

A. Yeah, yeah, that's him, Valeri, Valeri.

Q. How do you interact with him?

A. Not much. I've seen him a couple of times.

Q. And did you ever interact with Miguel Ramirez?

A. I think I've seen him a couple times, but not really. Most of those people tend to work during the daytime, and we're flying at nighttime, so we don't see them.

Q. Okay. How often did you get a safety newsletter from the company? You mentioned that there was a summary of safety reports that included yours on occasion.

A. Yeah. Periodically. Once every three to six months.

Q. How many total do you think you got in the years that you've been with TransAir?

A. Oh, I think it's a relatively new thing. I think it's only been going for a year and a half or so, so I'd say four.

Q. Did you find the content informative?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. What was your impression of the company's safety management efforts overall?

A. Good.

Q. Okay. Have you noticed any changes?

A. Changes?

Q. In the management's approach to managing safety over your three-year tenure, four-year tenure?

A. Yes. Yeah.

Q. What were the changes?

A. They have more people involved in the safety office and better reporting procedures.

Q. And how would you describe the organization safety culture at Rhoades Aviation?

A. Good.

Q. Do you feel like it was an open culture in terms of reporting safety information?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you feel like management was quick to act on information they obtained, safety information they obtained?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you feel supported by management and able to make safety-related decisions as a pilot without fear of repercussions?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you feel pressure from company management to do things that you felt were unsafe?
A. No.
Q. Before the accident, did you have any safety-related concerns about the company?
A. No.
Q. How was the relationship between the pilots and the maintenance staff?
A. In my experience, good.
Q. Did the mechanics ever argue with you about writing up maintenance items?
A. Not argue, but we've discussed items, particularly the verbiage of it and interpretation of the MEL.
Q. And when you wrote things up, did it seem like maintenance effectively addressed the issue?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you ever heard of a flight crew saying they were afraid of being fired for writing up a maintenance at Rhoades Aviation for the accident?
A. No.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. That's it for me. Thanks.

Clarence?

MR. KANAE: Okay. Thank you, Bill.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Ed, appreciate your time again for coming in today. During your OE observations or evaluations on new hires, what is the OE flight hour requirement? How many hours do these airmen need to actually perform before --
A. Yeah, a minimum of 25, but it's, it's not a hard number. It's till they're competent.
Q. Okay. Have you ever had to extend that or request an extension passed 25 hours for OE?
A. Yes. Yeah.

Q. How many times and what were the reasons?

A. I don't recall how many times, but typically, the, the main reason is guys are not familiar with the Hawaii airspace system, knowing the routes, and you know, flying the shorter legs. It's a little, you know, go, go, go. There's, there's no time, you know, relaxing on four or five-hour legs. It takes them a while to get up to speed with that.

And then, particularly, with new hires that come in that one hasn't flown a jet before, things happen a lot faster, they've got to stay ahead of it, and particularly ones that haven't flown, you know, older airplanes like these, where there's not a lot of automation, they've got to be, you know, ahead of the game the whole time. That typically extends the OE past 25 hours.

Q. Okay. Have you ever had the chief pilot come to you and say, "You know what? It's taking too long. We either need to fire this -- let this person go or your discretion, keep them on"?

A. No, not specifically. I update the chief pilot after, after every OE flight via a training form to note my observations, and then he reviews those. And sometimes we've had discussions about, you know, progress a particular person is making and, and what areas, you know, that seem to be the areas that they need to, you know, more work on more so when we had two check airmen, because we wouldn't always fly with the same student. We'd cross over. If I was on my week off, the other guy wasn't just sitting around waiting for me to get back. He'd flight with the other check airman. So that kind of stuff. But no, not -- he hasn't specifically asked me, you know, if he should continue with this guy or let him go, so --

Q. I imagine that all of the check airmen try to conduct their evaluations in a standardized manner?

A. Yeah. Yes.

Q. How was that conducted? Do you all have a checklist, or how do you determine being standardized --

A. Well, no, we just use standard procedures as what's in the manual and then report back on a

training IOE form.

Q. Okay. You have an IOE form?

A. Yeah. Yes. Yeah.

Q. Oh, okay. All right. Great. During your tenure or your, your employment there, has any of the crewmembers approached you and said, "Hey, Ed, I got this issue about this airplane. Can you help me out? And what do you think?"

A. About the airplane?

Q. On an airplane, on a particular aircraft.

A. Yeah.

Q. "We keep writing this writeup, but we get reoccurring." Have you experienced reoccurring writeups?

A. Yes, yes, I have.

Q. And have you discussed that with the chief pilot or director of maintenance?

A. Yeah, with mechanics, and, and the director of maintenance. And my conclusion is that they're old airplanes, and sometimes they have a hard time getting the parts. They'd have a deferred item, and then it would get extended while they're trying to get the appropriate parts. Now, whether that's a factor, I don't know.

Q. Sure. Are you familiar with the MEL process also?

A. Yes.

Q. And have you experienced whereby the MELs may come to an expiration timeframe?

A. Say that again?

Q. The MEL.

A. Yeah.

Q. There's certain procedures on the equipment list whereby there is a timeframe where that part needs to be replaced.

A. Right.
Q. If it's not, then they can't MEL that aircraft.
A. Right. Yeah. Then, then the airplane is down, yeah.
Q. The aircraft is down? Have you experienced that before?
A. Yes. Yup.
Q. Okay. Any particular tail number you recall?
A. No, don't recall.
Q. Okay. Let's see. Have you failed any of the pilots you've actually examined?
A. Well, I don't examine them. I just train them. It's, it's up to Wallace and David, I guess, to, to fail them and terminate them. I just provide my input as to what they're doing. And I've had a few that they have done, I guess you call it, evaluation flights to see what their progress is, and obviously, they've asked for my input as to, you know, how they're progressing. But I haven't made that decision, and such, no.
Q. Okay. I just have one more question.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Has the principal operations inspector, has he jump-seated on any of your flights, watching you perform an employee --
A. Yes. Yeah.
Q. Were there any comments on your behalf of your performance, do you recall?
A. Not that I recall, no.
Q. Were all positive pretty much?
A. Yes, yes, yeah.
Q. Thank you, Ed. That's all I have.
A. Okay.
MR. ETCHER: Rich?

MR. LEE: All right. Thank you.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Just a couple things. You mentioned earlier about your takeoffs are normally at reduced thrust, assumed temperature method?

A. Yes.

Q. And you mentioned about 20 percent of those are in the yellow band. So in your opinion, do you feel like those aircraft would be able to do a full-rated takeoff and without a (indiscernible).

A. Yes. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So you felt like it wasn't far enough into the yellow band that if you did the full-rated takeoff it would go further in (indiscernible)?

A. No.

Q. Okay. You mentioned you had a couple precautionary engine shutdowns. And you talked about the engine out departure or out to Alana. Did you ever go out to Alana and hold to run the checklist for your precautionary shutdowns or --

A. No. Typically, we request delaying vectors so that we can run the checklist and then, then plan our return. And they usually give us vectors.

Q. What were your thoughts of not going to Alana? I mean, doing vectors versus going out to Alana?

A. Well, it's, it's a lot easier, and you can accomplish the checklist a lot faster. ATC is just giving you a heading to, you know, fly an extended downwind, or whatever, rather than to have to go out, plan an entry into a hold, because we don't have that magic button that you just put and it goes into a hold. We have to calculate it out and then fly the holding pattern.

So if you're on a vector flying straight and level for, for that time, you can run the checklists a lot quicker, particularly when you're doing IOE, because if you go into a hold, then obviously if it's the FO that's the pilot flying, you've got to monitor him entering the hold, and if

he's a glass cockpit guy that's used to just push the hold button, we don't have that. He's got to draw it out, think it out, calculate it. That takes time away from being able to run the checklist.

Q. Sure. All right. Do you guys ever fly dual-captain flights?

A. Occasionally, yeah.

Q. And have you ever done a dual-captain flight with Captain Henry?

A. Captain Henry? I don't recall. I don't think so.

Q. Okay. Getting back to what Clarence was talking about standardization. And do you know if within the company, is there a standardization, something to keep the crewmembers standardized to the -- to procedures in addition to just going to your reoccurring? Is there some other jump-seat program or something like that that keeps all the pilots standardized?

A. No, not that I'm aware of, no. Typically, they have new-hires do a couple of legs on the jump-seat before they start doing -- sometimes before simulator training, sometimes after simulator training, before they do IOE.

Q. Okay. You mentioned you did a rejected takeoff for a config warning. What was the outcome of that, was the configuration issue? Was it --

A. It was a flap issue.

Q. It was a flap?

A. Flaps, yeah.

Q. Oh, so were they not in position or was there -- air problem --

A. They weren't in, they weren't in the correct position.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. And it -- as soon as we pushed the power levels up --

Q. Sure.

A. -- it came on, so we just took -- I don't know if you're familiar with Honolulu, but Romeo Charlie off, identified the problem, saw what was wrong, reset it, and then tried it again, and then

it was fine.

Q. All right. Thank you. That's all I have.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Thanks, Rich.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. You doing okay?

A. Yeah.

Q. Round two is usually a lot quicker.

A. Okay.

Q. But if you need a break, please, take one if you want one.

A. Yeah, I'll just get a bit of water here, and I'll be fine.

Q. Sure. You all good?

A. We're good, yes.

Q. All right. I just have a few questions, and like I said, we'll just go around one last time for everybody to do follow-up questions.

A. Okay.

Q. I failed to ask when I was asking about your history. Have you ever been a line check airman at any other company?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Why did you become a line check airman here?

A. I was asked to be line check airman. Initially, I declined. I didn't think I was senior enough. But they said it wasn't based on seniority. And I guess no one else applied for the position, so they asked me to do it, and I agreed.

Q. Okay. During your guy's line check airman meetings, which -- forgive me -- I think you said every six to nine months --

A. Yeah, it's not regularly scheduled, but yeah.

Q. Who would all be in on those meetings?
A. Typically, David, Director of Operations, Wallace, the chief pilot, and then me, check airman, previously, there's another check airman, Brian Bell (ph.), but he left, and he's at FedEx now, so it's just me.
Q. Okay. Would they ever have anybody from maintenance come in or anybody from the safety department come in and talk to you about trends they're seeing?
A. Not at the check airmen meetings, no, no. They have pilot meetings from time to time, where, yeah, maintenance people, director of maintenance or one of the chief inspectors will come in and, and talk to us.
Q. And that was during the pilot meetings that they would have chief --
A. Yeah, pilot meetings, yeah.
Q. Would somebody from safety come in during those meetings, too?
A. They have, yeah.
Q. Okay. Can you give me kind of an idea of maybe when the most recent pilot meeting was?
A. Probably about a month ago.
Q. A month ago?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. How about prior to the accident?
A. Prior to the accident, maybe four or five months prior.
Q. Okay. All righty. When safety would come in -- excuse me -- on those pilot meetings, what kind of information did they provide to pilots?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Okay. That's okay. "I don't recall" works. All righty. Could you recall what maintenance would bring up?
A. Just general trends on, on the status of the airplanes, recurring problems that they're having

with systems on all of the airplanes or some of the airplanes.

Q. During those meetings, was it, I guess, an interactive meetings, where you guys could ask questions or describe what you guys were seeing or was it all kind of a lecture?

A. Oh, no, both ways, yeah, interactive, yeah, yeah.

Q. All righty. I think Clarence maybe had asked you earlier about anybody on OE that you had -- like, were, you know, said they're not up to par?

A. Yeah.

Q. And I'm not really exactly sure what you said, so my apologies. So could you explain that to me? Have you ever had people on OE that were not meeting the standard?

A. Well, on IOE, you know, you're training to the standard. Whether they reached that, that depends on how long and how long the company is prepared to keep flying them. I mean, they, they all slowly make progress, but yeah, I've had one person that was very slow. But yeah, I reported back what I had seen, and I believe they did an evaluation flight and kept him on. And eventually, he got through.

Q. Okay.

A. But there was no pressure on me to sign him off because, you know, he's got 25 hours, or whatever. It's like, you know, and typically, when Brian was a check airman, too, when he was training someone, and they were, in his opinion, ready to be signed off, that person would fly with me or Wallace just to verify, you know, consistency, and then get signed off. And the same if I trained someone and they were near completion, and they would fly with Brian or Wallace, and they would sign them off.

Q. As there ever been a time, in your experience, that you said somebody was good to go and they flew with the other line check airman or the chief pilot, and they came back and said no, they're not?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Has there been a time where other line check airman would do the same thing, and you flew with him, and you said, no, there's a little work here?

A. No, no.

Q. I know 25 hours is the minimum.

A. Yeah.

Q. But what have you seen kind of an average? Is it -- you know, help me understand. Is it, like, 50 hours? Is it 100 hours that you see average?

A. No. I'd say the average is about 40 hours. I don't recall anybody doing it in 25 hours.

Q. All righty. Clarence, I believe, asked if you'd' had interaction with the POI?

A. Um-hum.

Q. Was that the current POI or the previous POI?

A. Both.

Q. Both?

A. Yeah.

Q. How was your interaction with both of them? Was it, you know, professional, good?

A. Yeah, good, professional, yeah, yeah.

Q. Okay. Don't mean to put words in your mouth. I was just trying to --

A. No, that fits it, yeah.

Q. Have you ever had an emergency doing IOE?

A. Yes.

Q. What kind of emergency?

A. We lost B system hydraulics coming out of Kona.

Q. How did your OE candidate, how did they handle that?

A. Good. He was pilot flying, and he was comfortable to keep flying, so I let him keep flying. I ran the checklist, and we came back in and landed back at Kona.

Q. Okay.

A. Got stuck on the runway because no nosewheel steering, and I think we shut the airport down for about 40 minutes, but they got us towed off, but no, he did a good job, yeah. He was near the end of his IOE.

Q. All right. Was --

A. I always, I always ask them, too. I say, "Are you comfortable to keep flying or do you want to run the checklist?" And he was flying, you know, adequately, you know? I had no issues with it. So he was comfortable. He said he was. So I let him keep flying.

Q. All right. You said he was towards the end of his IOE?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you ever had an emergency declared when somebody was fairly new in their IOE that you can recall?

A. No, I don't recall. I don't think so, no.

Q. Okay. All righty. Have you ever been asked by the company to modify or change paperwork after the fact?

A. No.

Q. Okay. I think Bill might have asked what would you consider a heavy weight of an airplane?

A. I would say over 105,000 pound takeoff.

Q. So can you kind of think of what is -- I know it's probably very hard to quantify, but what's an average weight from Honolulu to Maui?

A. Probably around 90,000, 93,000 pounds.

Q. All righty. And coming out of Honolulu, I understand there's -- you can use a couple different flap settings?

A. Yeah.

Q. What flap settings can you use?

A. Two or five.

Q. What do you normally use?

A. I normally use two.

Q. Why? Help me understand your -- what makes you come with that?

A. We have a long runway. We typically take off on eight right, so a few extra knots of speed is not that critical, and it's less wear and tear on the flight mechanisms.

Q. And I think you said that you had a rejected takeoff because of a flap setting?

A. Yeah.

Q. Was it not selected or was it selected, but it wasn't indicating properly?

A. It wasn't selected correctly, yeah.

Q. Was that during an OE or was that just a regular normal line flight?

A. I don't recall.

Q. In your guys' line check airmen meetings or any time, are you aware if the company monitors, like, fuel burn, like, oh, you know, these flights or this pilot burns more fuel than this pilot?

A. No.

Q. You don't know --

A. No.

Q. No, they don't, or you're not aware?

A. I don't believe they do.

Q. Okay.

A. I've never been contacted by the company to explain fuel burns. I don't believe they do.

Q. Okay. All righty. If an FO was out during his preflight, and he came up and said, "There's a puddle of fluid around the landing gear," or something, what would you do?

A. Go out and take a look at it, see what it is, and call maintenance.

Q. Okay. Would you write it up before you called maintenance or would you just call them?

A. First, I'd call them, and then, you know, once they're out there, then I'd write it up. Obviously, to make sure -- because I've had this happen before, too, that people are not familiar with the airplane, there's fluid under the belly, you go out there, and it's water coming out of the AC system. So, obviously, you don't write that up. That's normal. But yeah, like I said, if it's under the landing gear or the engine, yeah, yeah.

Q. Have you ever had an event like that?

A. Yes. Yeah, yeah.

Q. Okay. The fluid, if it wasn't the AC, did you always write it up or --

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. Okay. One of the crews we've interviewed had said they had a hydraulic leak in Hilo, I think he said.

A. Okay.

Q. He thought it might have been with you, but I'm not sure. But do you remember a hydraulic leak in an outstation?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. How do they fix those kind of leaks at outstations?

A. The one I'm thinking of happened in Maui, and they sent a mechanic out with fluid and appropriate lines. I sent pictures of where the leak appeared to be coming from. And so we sat on the ground and waited until they came and fixed it.

Q. Okay. They didn't have you go out and count the drops, or anything? They just --

A. Oh, sometimes they do, but this one, there was a big puddle. It was obvious that there was something major leaking.

Q. And by big puddle, you showed about a foot?

A. Yeah, about a foot or more --

Q. Foot and a half?

A. Yeah.

Q. Diameter?

A. Yeah.

Q. All righty. How are you guys compensated for your time? Are you paid on a salary? Is it an hourly rate? Is it trip day?

A. It's a combination of it. We owe the company 16 days a month, and each day, it's, it's a daily rate. However, if we go over 10 hours of duty, we can ask for a -- I guess that's a standard rate, too, a set fee for going over that.

Also, if we do -- they call it a split shift, where we do a nighttime flight and then do a daytime flight, too, we get a little extra compensation for that. And then if we work an off-day, particularly if it's a hard day -- we call it red days -- then we get the extra-day pay for that, too.

Q. Have you ever heard of a pilot coming in, whether it's you or anybody else, coming in to do their shift, and the airplane they're given is what they consider not airworthy, and they refuse the airplane? They don't fly at all?

A. Yeah.

Q. Has that ever happened?

A. Yes. Yeah.

Q. Do you know -- has it happened to you? Maybe I would ask that first.

A. I don't recall, but probably.

Q. Okay. But it has happened?

A. Yeah.

Q. So do you know, does -- would a crew get paid for that day because they showed up?

A. Yeah, yeah. That's a paid day, yeah.

Q. Okay. So if they refused to take a flight or they cancel a flight --

A. Yeah.

Q. Or however -- I realize they may not cancel a flight, but if they elect not to do a flight, they still get compensated for their time?

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. Okay. All righty. I think you've answered all my questions. Let me go around and see if my other colleagues have other questions.

A. Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Dr. Bramble?

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. I just have one. I wanted to show you a picture that the first officer on the accident --

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Indiscernible) show him?

DR. BRAMBLE: Yeah. It's the same picture he had before.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. It's just a picture of some fluid leaking.

A. Yeah.

Q. Actually, I should let you describe it. What do you see --

A. Yeah. There's this fluid, looks like fluid on the ground and also on the tire on the side (indiscernible) on the top of it, so, yeah.

Q. Okay. And you said fluid on the side of the tire and also on the top of it --

A. Yeah, it looks like it's dripping onto the top here, and there's, there's some fluid there, as well, yeah.

Q. Okay. What would you make of that, and how would you -- how do you think you'd approach that if you saw that during a preflight inspection?

A. That would be a call to maintenance, let them look at it, see what's going on there.

Q. Okay. And let's say they came out, and they looked at it, and they checked the landing gear actually, the reservoir --

A. Yeah.

Q. And it looked like it had an appropriate level of fluid in it, and they said it looked like the fluid was dry and there was no active leak. Would you want to write that up or would you consider that --

A. No, if there was no leak and there was -- everything was okay, there was an explanation for it, you know, for that, that it's dry, I wouldn't write it up, no.

Q. Okay. What would you make of that, though? I mean, it seemed like there was a leak, and if they don't know where it came from --

A. Yeah. Well, on the old airplanes, too, you get little leaks every now and then under the engines, just drops of stuff.

Q. Okay. That's all I have. Thanks.

DR. BRAMBLE: Clarence?

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. I just have one more, Ed. During a flight with specifically the POI, Mark Butin, on board, after the flight, just during the debriefing, had he made any recommendations to maybe revise any of the procedures that he noticed during your flight?

A. Not that I recall, no.

Q. Thank you. That's all I have. Thank you very much.

A. Um-hum.

MR. ETCHER: Rich?

MR. LEE: Nothing else. Thanks.

MR. RINSMA: Okay.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. All right. Well, you've survived all of our questions. So let me ask you, do you have any questions for us for right now?

A. Yeah, what's the status on the wreckage? Are they going to pull it up or is it going to stay on the ocean floor?

Q. That's an interesting question, and you know, right now, they already have --

DR. BRAMBLE: Are we (indiscernible)?

MR. ETCHER: Almost.

DR. BRAMBLE: Do we want to --

MR. ETCHER: We can take that off the record.

DR. BRAMBLE: We want to answer his questions on the record or --

MR. ETCHER: We'll -- I'll answer that one real quick.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. There's -- they have a boat coming from the West Coast. It's just not here yet.

A. Okay.

Q. So the intent is.

A. Okay.

Q. All right.

A. All right.

Q. Is that clear?

A. Yup. Yup.

Q. Okay. Let me ask you something, though, real quick. Is there anything you can think of that we didn't ask that you think we should?

A. No.

Q. If you were a king for the day, is there anything that you could say, "Oh, man, I wish we

could change this or that," you know, kind of a safety change or any changes you see as being (indiscernible)?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Well, with that in mind, I guess we can call this interview concluded at 9:29 Honolulu time. And we appreciate you coming in to educate us.

A. Okay. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 9:29 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Eddie Rinsma
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 28, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Danielle S. VanRiper
Transcriber

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
	*	

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Interview of: TRACY REASONER, Vice President of Operations

TransAir Executive Airlines of Hawaii

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday,
September 29, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing Commercial Airplanes

CLARENCE KANAE, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

WILLIAM KATT, Attorney
Wilson, Elser, Moskowits, Edlman & Dicker LLP

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INTERVIEW

(8:03 a.m.)

MR. ETCHER: It's September 29th at 8:03 Honolulu Time. This is the interview with Mr. Reasoner. Good morning.

MR. REASONER: Good morning.

MR. ETCHER: My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an Operational Factors Investigator with the NTSB. Dr. Bramble and I are leading the operational human performance group for the event involving Rhoades 810.

NTSB is an independent federal agency charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting transportation safety. The NTSB is not part of the Department of Transportation or the FAA. It has no regulatory or enforcement powers.

I'd like to go around the room, have everybody introduce themselves to you, and also for the recording, and we'll start with Dr. Bramble.

DR. BRAMBLE: I'm Bill Bramble. I'm Human Performance Investigator with NTSB.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, Safety Pilot with Boeing company.

MR. KANAE: Clarence Kanae, FAA Aviation Safety Inspector, Operations based in here in Honolulu.

MR. ETCHER: Mr. Reasoner, that's everybody in here that's going to be asking you questions today. Is there any of us that you wish not to be present?

MR. REASONER: No.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Today we're going to be using a digital recorder. After the interview, we will send that recording out for the transcription, and the party members will have a chance to review that, and we'll correct any typographical errors that may occur but we will not change any of the words -- anything you have said.

The purpose of the investigation to determine the probable cause and to prevent

reoccurrence. Our role is not to assign fault. We're here simply for you to share your insights and knowledge of the, the company to help us understand, and the ultimate goal is to prevent future accidents. Having said that, however, we cannot offer any guarantees of confidentiality or immunity, and the transcription of this interview will actually become part of a public docket as we near the end of the investigation process.

Each of the group members will have a chance to ask questions. We'll ask questions one at a time, and everyone has been instructed not to interrupt the person who is asking questions at the time. There'll be an opportunity for each group member to ask follow-ups questions as well. We'll go around for two rounds, but usually the second round's a lot quicker.

Please answer all the questions to the best of your recollection. If you don't understand a question, please feel free to ask for clarification. If you don't recall something, it's okay to say I don't recall or I don't know. And importantly, if you mis-state something or you feel like you did, please feel free to correct it. It's perfectly fine with us.

You are entitled to have one representative of your choosing. Is there someone that you would like to be your representative here?

MR. REASONER: Oh, Bill's fine.

MR. ETCHER: Mr. Katt, would you be so kind for the recording?

MR. KATT: William Katt, law firm of Wilson Elser.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Does anyone have any questions?

MR. REASONER: I do not.

MR. ETCHER: Everybody ready then? All right. We shall start.

INTERVIEW OF TRACY REASONER

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Mr. Reasoner, would you like me to call you Mr. Reasoner? Tracy? What (indiscernible)?

A. Tracy, that's fine.

Q. Would you please state your, state your full name and spell the last for us.

A. Tracy Lee Reasoner, R-e-a-s-o-n-e-r.

Q. How old are you?

A. I'm 56.

Q. All right. I should say how young are you.

A. Yeah.

Q. What's your current job title?

A. Vice President of Operations.

Q. And can you kind of help me understand what a Vice President of Operations does -- is?

A. I work with all of our managers and day-to-day operations.

Q. Okay. And when did you start with Rhoades Aviation?

A. Okay. Rhoades Aviation, when we purchased them in 2003 -- no, 2000 -- what was it? 2000 -- I'm not quite sure when we started with Rhoades because I started with the company in 2003, and TransAir purchased Rhoades in the middle of it.

Q. So you started with TransAir, the company, and then --

A. Yes, and then we acquired Rhoades Aviation.

Q. Okay. Thank you for that clarification. So as Vice President, where are you typically working? Are -- do you work here in Honolulu? We understand you don't necessarily live on this island.

A. Right. I live on Maui, and I commute back and forth.

Q. Is that a daily commute or --

A. It can be, it just depends on how operations are. I also travel to the outer islands. You know, we have our stations in Kona, Hilo, and Kauai, so I'll travel there to see the day-to-day operations and work with their managers.

Q. Okay. Are you a pilot at all?

A. I have my private pilot's license, yes.

Q. All right, excellent. Just, kind of, a ballpark; how many hours you do you have as a private pilot then?

A. Maybe 300.

Q. Okay. Nice. So I know we've heard from a lot interviews the, the structure of management at Rhoades Aviation, but you know, it's everybody looking up. Can you, kind of -- because you kind of seem to be towards the top of that management pier. Can you kind of explain to us the structure that you see from your vantage point?

A. Well --

Q. From a pilot all the way up to CEO.

A. Okay. Well, would you like me to top to bottom or bottom to top?

Q. Which is easiest for you?

A. Okay. Well, you know, like any airline, we start out with our loaders; we have basic loaders that do things, load airplanes. And then we have leads and supervisors, and then we have managers that manage each individual department.

And from the manager's point of view, it goes up to -- if we're, if we're on the pilot side it goes, you know, pilot, captain, FO captain, then our chief pilot, Wallace, and then our Director of Operations. And the Director of Operations reports to me, and I report to both Teimour Riahi, the CEO, and I work with his -- our CFO, Marjan Azimi, and our controller, Claudia Men (ph.).

And then, on the maintenance side, we have our mechanics, and they had leads and supervisors. And we have our Assistant Director of Maintenance, Mike Johnson, and we have our Director of Maintenance, Mike Kimble, and Mike Kimble reports to me. And then we have our Chief Inspector, which now is Ron Lenhart, and he reports to me.

And then we have our parts department, and the parts department reports to Mike Kimble. We also have our GSE department; our GSE department reports to our operations -- our daytime

Operations Manager in Honolulu. And then we have a night Operations Manager -- we have two managers in Honolulu; one at night, and one during the day. That's basically it.

Q. Okay.

A. We have the HR department.

Q. Okay. Perfect. That's why I always want to ask because you filled in some areas that were good for me, so I appreciate that. From your viewpoint, how would you classify staffing in, in the area of maintenance and in piloting? Are you guys -- do you feel like you're accurately staffed?

A. To clarify, do you mean now or prior to?

Q. The day of the accident.

A. We were fully staffed on the pilot side, I believe. Maintenance side, we're always looking for A&P mechanics, and you know, we're always -- you know, Hawaii is a place where either you like to live here, or you don't live -- like to live here; there's no in between. So you know, we have the standard turnover of any industry in Hawaii.

We were probably 80 percent staffed on our loader side, and our maintenance side, I'm not sure a percentage, but we were able to -- you know, we usually had two mechanics at night, and then a full staff during the day.

Q. Okay. And is that typically what you run is two mechanics at night?

A. Yeah, two to three.

Q. Okay.

A. It -- during -- we usually beef up during peak season. Peak season is usually from October 31st to January 13th, and then we'll have -- hire to normal operations.

Q. Okay. When is the majority of your flights conducted? Is it day operations, night operations, kind of the same -- and, and for reference, let's talk about the day of the accident.

A. Well, it's about -- let's see, the day of the accident was a Thursday night, I believe, and Thursday night's a -- usually a heavy night. It wasn't anything out of the normal of business. I

mean, it was a normal -- it wasn't a peak season, so when it wasn't more than normal, it was pretty normal. Yeah.

Q. But would you say more of your flights are done at night versus day?

A. Well, yeah. I mean, we have, we have two to three flights during the day, and we have up to six flights at night.

Q. Okay. Excellent. So I know you're -- how long have you been the Vice President at Rhoades?

A. So that would be probably 2004 -- no, 5. 2005 I think I got promoted. I started out as just the Station Manager in Maui in 2003, and then I assisted Teimour in getting our first Shorts passenger operation up to stuff. I, I wrote some of the manuals, and I trained all the flight attendants.

And we were able to start a passenger operation with the Shorts, and then after I did that -- you know, Teimour's one of those guys if you show him you could do stuff, he will promote you. So he, he saw that I had a lot of potential, and he promoted me to Vice President.

At that time, we called it Cargo Vice President -- I don't -- Passenger and Cargo Operations, but it was just -- basically he's like, okay, you're the second in command. We'll give you this title, and we'll go from there. And then it, kind of, changed; when we got mail contract, I became the Vice President of Mail Operations to show that we, we -- you know, when -- that I was in charge of the mail operation as well.

And then, later on he just said, yeah, just drop everything and make you just Vice President of Operations. I don't care.

Q. So I know you said you -- you've been at TransAir/Rhoades since 2000 and --

A. Three.

Q. Three?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. Prior to that, what had you done? Kind of give us a cliff's notes version of everything prior to that, if you could?

A. Okay. I joined the Marine Corps out of high school. I was a Crew Chief on CH-46 helicopters and an avionics electrician. I got out of the Marine Corps. I went to Embry-Riddle. My degree is in professional aeronautics with a concentration in aviation safety.

From there I worked for an insurance adjusting firm investigating airplane accidents. I did that for close to eight years, nine years with various -- I worked for several independent adjustors company and then I worked for a law firm, Perth and Dubois (ph.), and I was their Aviation Investigator for -- they had the contract for McDonnell Douglas Helicopters, so I basically worked with them handling all the accidents that happened with McDonnell Douglas Helicopters.

After that, I went to AIG, and was a Senior Claims Representative at AIG stationed in Scottsdale. And so, I did a lot of claims in Alaska, the northwest, and the mid -- the Rocky Mountain Area.

And then, in 2003, I just decided to leave that business, and I moved to Maui. And I moved to Maui in May of 2003, and I had a mutual friend that Teimour knew, who was also an adjuster in Honolulu; his name was Perry Brown. Perry and I were very good friends because I used to assign him claims here in Hawaii, and he introduced me to Teimour. And he needed a manager in Maui, and I just filled the bill.

Q. Excellent. All right.

MR. LEE: I didn't know you did all that.

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I know all those guys. Bob Kern?

MR. REASONER: Yeah, I know Bob Kern very well. I worked for him.

MR. LEE: (Indiscernible).

MR. REASONER: My office was right next to his.

MR. LEE: Oh, wow. Sorry.

MR. ETCHER: All right.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. And thank you for that cliff's notes version. That kind of helped me understand all your background; that helps. We'll, kind of, get in just a little bit here to -- kind of, everything that goes on at Rhoades. We kind of talked about that.

We understand that at Rhoades, employees have the opportunity to submit reports of concerns, whether safety reports or reports that they come talk to people about. Different -- we've heard different versions. In your -- from your viewpoint, how does that system work? And by how's it work, you know, if an employee fills out a form, kind of walk me through the steps that, that you know of.

A. Okay. So we have an SMS system, and in our SMS system, we have several ways to submit a safety report. You can do it online via our website, you can do it -- we have boxes at every station; just a box in a form, and they can just fill out a form.

And when they do it online, they have a choice to whether they put their or not put their name; so it can be anonymous, or they can specifically put their name and say you -- because we ask if you'd like to give more -- do you want to contact -- contact me if you want to know more clarification on whatever happened, happened, and they can put their name. It's a choice.

Of course, you know, any, any safety system is -- comes down to, to two things: communication and listening. And that's what's very prevalent at TransAir is because people are -- you know, Teimour has an open office. Anybody can go into his office and tell them.

Of course, all my managers, I say, you can come to me with anything, and my policy is if you don't tell me, I can't help you. But if you tell me I can help you on whatever it is, anything. Whether it be, you know, hey, we need this equipment, or you know, hey, I need more help here, or hey, we have, you know, something unsafe going on here.

You know, it's just a matter of, you know -- it's open for anyone to come to me. I mean, I,

I pride myself in -- I'll go out to every station myself, and I'll throw boxes; I'll help stack a plane; I'll help push a can. I don't operate any of the equipment, but I'll push cans all day long. And just say, how's it going guys? What's going on? How are you? I'll check to see if, you know, if, you know --

We, we have certain, you know -- we require everyone to wear boots. You know, I want to make sure everyone -- here in Hawaii, you'd be surprised. When I first -- I remember, first time I ever came to Hawaii in 2003, you'd see people at the airport with flip flops on right -- driving forklifts. I kid you not. No matter what company it was, you'd see it. And, and we always make sure everyone has safety shoes; we reimburse them for having, you know, that kind of thing.

Yeah, so it's, it's a matter that starts at the, at the foundation of just the, the day-to-day managers having a relationship with their workers, and then that builds the culture.

Q. Okay. So you said you have a -- or you said Teimour has an open door policy. And you did -- I think you said you did, too.

A. I do, too.

Q. But I think you also you, you want your managers to come talk to you, right?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Do you want any employee to come talk to you? That's what I'm --

A. Absolutely.

Q. If they have an issue?

A. Absolutely, that's why I go out and push cans.

Q. Okay.

A. So I can talk to them, and say --

Q. How --

A. How's it going?

Q. How often does that happen, does somebody come into you and say, hey, I've got a

concern.

A. It happens. I don't know how often. I, I don't keep track of how often, but I -- I'm -- I, I do have people who will come to me and go, hey, could I talk to you in private? And I'll get any kind of thing from hey, I don't like working with so-and-so, to hey, is there any way I could change my schedule, to hey -- I mean, that's -- I mean, I deal with everything.

Q. Okay. All right. Have you ever had somebody come to you with a safety concern?

A. Safety concern? Yes. One time, we had an incident where the, the GPU was connected to the plane and it was connected to the tug. And the person who was driving the tug just got on it and drove away with it still connected to the plane, and of course, it damaged the, the pins.

So I know that can happen, so what we did was we created -- we did it two-fold. We created a buddy program, in the sense of, hey, if you're going to drive something, get somebody with you. If the tug has another seat, make sure they ride with you, and then, they can make sure to hook up -- you know, do all that kind of -- we also -- I found these -- I, I don't recall -- I just remembered seeing these in my career, these bags you could put on, on a tow hitch that says, check for connection, you know.

It was a yellow thing, so we bought, like, I don't know -- we bought a bunch of them, and we put them around all the -- so any time the, the brakes would be locked, and the, and the tongue of the equipment would be up; we'd put that bag on there to like a -- so if they see the bag -- oh, I've got to make sure it's unplugged before I hook it up, and it worked pretty well.

Q. All right. I know -- well, I don't know personally, but I've heard that if you're running a cargo operation, it can be financially challenging sometimes. Is that a good way to say it? Or is it pretty easy to make money in, in cargo, and money's not an issue?

A. Okay. So I can tell you for a fact the -- we've never laid off anybody my entire time here ever. We've never had any financial issues ever. Before I got here, Teimour would always put aside money -- I remember talking to the Controller at that time; I said, hey, I said, you know,

we've got an engine overhaul coming up on one of our PT6s, you know. And I know from the insurance side of it, you know, PT -- so I would see bills all the time with overhauls and how expensive they are.

So I'd say, yeah, how is Teimour going to do this? And she said, oh, he's a stickler for -- he's got it down to per hour cost; for every hour he flies an airplane, he puts money aside in a separate account for his overhauls, so we never have an issue with overhauls. I was like, oh, well that's smart. And then I come to find out, as I got more and more into it, he's that way with everything. His, you know -- our CFO, she -- stickler on numbers and accounting and handles everything very, very well.

Q. So since it sounds like he's got a pretty good financial grasp on things --

A. Yes.

Q. Has there ever been a time that you -- you've went to the CEO and needed money for, for something to -- either a safety item or equipment or anything, and, and he goes wait, hold on, that's, that's a lot of money. No, we can't do that; or anything along that lines?

A. No. In fact, I said, hey, Teimour, we've got a -- a FedEx contract in Maui is, is different -- it's a different operation than any of the other islands, where FedEx is based at every airport except Maui. In Maui they're not based at the airport, so you have to use a slave pilot system. FedEx truck pulls up, the wheels pop up of their truck (verbatim), and you lower -- you have to pick up a can that could be three to four thousand pounds and roll it into their trucks.

And then, they take two cans each to their facility, and they push them out onto their roller floor. I said, you know, Teimour, I said, our forklift's getting old, and I want to do a proposal. And here are three estimates of three different styles of forklifts. There was one for $90,000, one for $100,000, and one for $110. And I said I recommend the Toyota. Of course, the Toyota's the most expensive. He goes, okay, get two, and I bought two brand new forklifts at $110K each, without a blink of an eye. With no -- he just said, he just said, did you do the research? Is that the

best one? I said it is. No problem.

That's the one thing -- if it's equipment -- I'm, I'm big on giving everyone the tools that they need to do it correctly. And that, of course, means safely. And I'm, I'm a keep it simple kind of guy, and he's, he's never balked at that ever, ever.

Q. So it sounds like you and, and Teimour interact quite regularly then?

A. Yes, absolutely.

Q. How often?

A. Every day.

Q. Every day? Okay.

A. Every day. Every morning I would get up, I would analyze the night's operation, and I would send him a text of anything that happened. And if there was anything that -- like, let's say if there was any delays, any -- anything, it could be anything. It could be a pilot not showing up on time, it could be our, our -- being shorthanded to people calling in sick. It could be, you know, hey, it was an easy night. You know, no issues. And I give him a full report every morning. Because all the managers are calling me, and they tell me what happened during the night. And then I'll -- and then I relay everything to him.

Q. Okay. Now sending a text is great, keeps everything moving. Do you guys have meetings, whether it's --

A. Yes.

Q. -- just you and Teimour, or you and your upper management --

A. Okay. Well, pretty much every Tuesday, Friday I will -- I fly to Honolulu, and I would first -- it, it would depend -- either we'd have a morning meeting with all of our managers, and then afterwards I'll just be in his office meeting with him about anything. But every Tuesday, Friday we had a meeting with all the managers.

Q. Okay. And by all the managers, you're talking -- help me understand -- when you --

A. Okay. So it was -- so we have two certificates: a 135 certificate, a 121 certificate. So we'd have the Director of Maintenance for both sides, Director of Operations for both sides, Chief Pilot for both sides, our SMS guys, et cetera. Every -- all the -- it was probably, you know, eight, nine of us.

Q. Okay.

A. But on both sides the house, so we'd go through what's happening on the 135 side? Okay. What's happening on the 121 side? And then we'd make decisions.

Q. Okay. And you said that was every Tuesday and Friday?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Were, were minutes of those meetings every kept or does anybody keep minutes of those?

A. Okay. So minutes were keep -- kept when he was not there, and I would keep the minutes. I would write the minutes down, and I would type them up and send them to him. And then -- but we did have a sign in sheet. We'd do a sign in sheet for everybody, but we'd -- no real minutes unless he was not there, and then I would do the minutes. Because I would run the meetings when he wasn't there; if he was traveling or if he was on vacation, I would -- I'll run the meeting, and I'd just take the minutes. We used to have somebody come in and take the minutes but I didn't -- I just said it's faster for me to do it. Because they would be asking what, you know, certain acronyms were or what have you, and I know exactly -- so I could just do it faster. And then, I'd send it to him.

Q. And just for clarification, him being?

A. Teimour.

Q. Okay. I just wanted to make sure --

A. Yep.

Q. -- we knew who the "him" was. Okay, so how often was he not there that you had to take

minutes?

A. Maybe -- he would go away for, you know, a week vacation or two-week vacation maybe once or twice a year, maybe. Last year, nobody took a vacation so last year no one went away.

Q. All right. Do you, do you in -- and by you, I mean you and all the upper management and whatnot, do you guys have any meetings involving safety-specific items?

A. Yeah, of course. Well, our SMS -- our Director of Safety, Orlando, he's, he's at all the meetings, and we always have -- we created a, a spreadsheet of our SMS system. And they would put that up on the board during either the, either the first part of the meeting or the second -- there was no rhyme or reason.

When I ran the meetings, I did it at the end of the, end of the meeting. We'd go through everything, and then, at the end, I'd put up -- they'd put up the SMS of all the stuff. And then, we'd go through and go -- is it yellow, is it green, is it red. You know, we'd, we'd color code everything, and then, we assign process owners to everything.

When Teimour would -- ran the meetings, sometimes he'd do it first thing, like, first of the -- either at the very first of the meeting or at the very end. Either or. I usually did it at the end. But that was pretty much every Tuesday, Friday, and that's outside of the actual required safety meetings that they would do at the end of our CASS meetings.

So we'd have a monthly CASS meeting, and then at the end they'd always have a safety meeting after that. That was -- minutes were kept and all that kind of stuff. And Orlando was in charge of that.

Q. So -- and I just want to make sure I have it in my head correct. You had a Tuesday, Friday meeting, and it was -- was that internal, or was that an -- was an FAA people there, too?

(Verbatim)

A. No, it was always internal.

Q. Okay. And that was, kind of, a meeting to discuss the status of both the 121 and 135 stuff?

A. Right. And then at the very end or at the very beginning they'd go through all the SMS items.

Q. Okay. And then, you have a CASS meeting.

A. CASS meeting that was handled by the maintenance department.

Q. Okay.

A. And the FAA does attend that. And there are minutes kept, and at the end of that, they would have a safety meeting.

Q. Now how often was the CASS meeting?

A. Once a month.

Q. Once a month? Okay. And so, that -- then there would be a safety meeting attached to that?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And the FAA attended that as well?

A. Sometimes. I usually attended those by phone.

Q. Okay.

A. So I wasn't actually present during those meetings. Sometimes I was, but not always, because those were usually on Thursday.

Q. Okay. And you said the Director of Safety was the one that --

A. Yes.

Q. -- kept the minutes? He, he set up the, the meetings, and he kept the minutes of the meeting?

A. That's my understanding, yes.

Q. Okay. Perfect. Who would all attend that -- you know, you, you say you have a CASS meeting, and then you have a safety meeting attached to it. Do you remember, kind of, who would

attend?

A. With all the require -- all the 119s would be there, at the CASS meeting, and then, there's other maintenance people. You know, parts people were there. But when I attended, and I thought usually all the -- our CMT team would be there, all the 119s would be there, and then there were some -- I don't know their titles, but they're in maintenance; maintenance people who, kind of, ran that meeting. I just know his name, Richie (ph.).

Q. Okay. And during that -- those CASS or safety meetings, did you guys look at any trends?

A. Of course.

Q. Okay. What kind of trends would you look at?

A. We'd look at everything from engine to cycles to landings to -- everything that would be tracked, pretty much, they had spreadsheets for it.

Q. Okay.

A. Parts that were changed.

Q. Okay. All right. Did you guys analyze those trends during those meeting or was --

A. Yep, they would -- yep, they would.

Q. You would, or they -- or --

A. They would. I wouldn't analyze anything.

Q. Okay.

A. They would.

Q. And who is the "they"?

A. It would be our Director of Maintenance, our Chief Pilot, our Director of Operations, and our Chief Inspector.

Q. Got it.

A. And then Teimour was also in the -- all those meetings, and Teimour would ask lots of questions about specific items and would expect answers. Hey, I see this is going on, what's going

on with this? Mike, what's up this? You know, hey what, you know -- we'd see -- a, a lot of times, you know, write ups would be vague from the pilots; it could be vague.

And he would, he would talk to Wallace or David -- hey, how can they fix it if they don't know what's -- you didn't put what engine, if it's the right or the left, you know. You said fuel pump. Which one, number one or number two? That kind of thing. You know, it's just a matter of streamlining -- it's a chance just to improve. You know? It's all about improvement.

Q. So the example you just gave of, you know, which engine, which fuel pump; who did he task with getting that word out to, to fix that problem?

A. Oh, Chief Pilot.

Q. Okay.

A. Wallace.

Q. Can you recall what the Chief Pilot did to rectify that situation?

A. Oh, well you know, Wallace is really, Wallace is really good when it comes to communicating with the pilots, you know. He -- he's, he's no nonsense. He just -- hey, guys. This has happened -- they'd have meetings, you know. Sometimes they'd bring all the pilots in and have meetings and talked to them then, or sometimes it's a little difficult because some are sleeping and some are -- you know, the day shift guys or the night shift guys. So he would make a point to talk to them individually or put out a memo or that kind of thing. David, David was very good at writing memos.

Q. David?

A. Seest, our Director of Operations.

Q. Director of Operations? Okay. All right. Well, since you brought up the Director of Operations, how long has he been the Director of Operations?

A. So, so -- okay. So in 2008, we were in an economic downturn, and we actually wanted to have -- we wanted to -- we contacted the DOT and the FAA and wanted to start our 121 operation.

However, they said no. They don't have the people because it's 2008, remember. Budget cuts. Everybody's, like, working, you know -- the government is shut down in some sections -- some states.

So we wanted to grow and expand because that's -- that was basically Teimour's model. It was, it was basically started out with 402s, you know, going to Shorts and then upgrade to the Boeings. We'd already sourced a Boeing that we were going to purchase, but we weren't going to buy it unless we could get a 121 certificate, of course. And then, we found that there was a 121 certificate for sale, and that was Rhoades. And they were based in Indiana, so we kind of thought outside the box and said, well, the FAA won't let us do it, we'll just buy one. And we did.

So our certificate was based out of Indianapolis for quite some time; a couple years I think, maybe longer. And we worked out of there, and David and Victor both came; they were employees of Rhoades. There were several others, but they've -- you know, like, the original Director of Operations from Rhoades passed away. A lot of people didn't want to leave Indiana because we were moving the operation to Honolulu, and they didn't want to live in Hawaii because they were -- they liked Indiana.

So -- but Victor and David came, and David was -- we -- we've heard -- we have -- they had one airplane on the certificate; it was a Convair. So we brought the Convair here, and David was our Chief Pilot for the Convair. And then when we added the Boeings to the certificate, and we finally got the manuals all approved out of Indiana, the -- we promoted him to the Director of Operations.

Q. So how satisfied are you with the job the Director of Operations does?

A. David does a good job.

Q. And "does a good job"; help me understand how you're classifying that as "good job". You know, kind of -- help me understand what, what you determine that to be.

A. He meets all the criteria. He does everything I -- if we ask him to do something or if he has

input to change something, he does a good job in, in going above and beyond of what's -- the baseline is required. He's not average. Average is, like, doing a -- requirements. He goes above and beyond.

Q. Okay. Since we're talking about some of your, your upper management, how's the Director of Maintenance? How does

he --

A. Oh, Mike Kimble?

Q. How long as he been the Director of Maintenance for (indiscernible)?

A. About -- I'm not sure on how long he's been the Director of Maintenance, how many years. Maybe six? I am not sure.

Q. And that -- that's okay. I don't recall or I don't know, that's, that's okay.

A. Okay.

Q. I'm good with that. How do you think he's doing as a Director of Maintenance?

A. He's, he's good. He's a former Marine, so he used to work on OV-10s. So we have that commonality of both being in the Marine Corp, and then maintenance. So we know -- and we were in the Marine Corps at pretty much the same time. I was stationed in Conniway (ph.) Bay, and he was stationed, I think, in Okinawa in San Diego. So he knew Okinawa like I knew Okinawa, and -- yeah, we got along -- we get along splendid.

Q. Okay. How about your Director of Safety? How long --

A. Oh, Orlando? Orlando's a long time, long time guy. He was with TransAir when -- back in the day when, when I started, so he was, he was one of our -- he was maintenance. He was one of our best mechanics on the Shorts, and then he transitioned to the Boeing. And then, he, you know -- he -- when, when the Director of Safety position came open, he applied, and we welcomed him on.

Q. When that Director of Safety position became open, how many applications did you have

for that? Do you -- can you recall?

A. I don't know how many. I know maybe two or three.

Q. Okay. And you said he's a great mechanic on the Shorts --

A. Great.

Q. -- and, and all that. How is he as a Director of Safety? How would you -- how has he done that job, in your opinion?

A. I think he's done a good job.

Q. Okay. What do you expect the Director of Safety to do? Help me kind of understand. I know you say he does a good job, but what is your expectations of him to do?

A. Well, you know, he, he handles everything that's required under the 119 position as the Director of Safety, and I think he

-- he really -- what's really good is if he doesn't know -- or how or what to do on something -- like, he's not a computer guy when it comes to newsletters. Like, I couldn't build the newsletter, but he said, hey, we got to do this newsletter. Can I get some help? Absolutely. Get a tech guy over here and do a newsletter, you know? He's very good about communication, which is very important I think, in a Director of Safety.

Q. So as a Director of Safety, how many employees does he have that he oversees, or does he have anybody that he oversees?

A. At the time, he had two, two auditors; and now it's still two. But we'd like to -- I mean, we have positions open right now for auditors, so we'd like to bring on more people.

Q. Excellent. From your -- let's move on a little bit now from your management structure to your interactions with the FAA.

A. Okay.

Q. So kind of help me, from your perception or your, your perspective, how is that interaction between Rhoades or TransAir and the current CMT?

A. Well, I was at the very first meeting with the current CMT that we have now. Previously, the -- Stan and John were our previous CMTs. I had a very good relationship because they would, they would fly out to Maui and see me there, and I'd hang out with them and chat with them, and I had a great relationship with those guys. So I knew them very well.

I was at the first meeting with the current CMT, and I was -- I did not know this, but at the time, our, our training -- we have a manager -- a training manager who we have brought on. I, I walked in to his office, and he's a former -- I'd hired him. He's a former Navy guy, and he said, hey, Trace, I, I just, I just looked up the LinkedIn account of our, our current CMT guys. Dude, you have way more experience than these guys.

I said, really? I said what do they do? And he explained Mark's background. And I said, okay, well, you know, he's with the FAA, so he, you know -- we'll work with him. And we go -- I remember going to the very first meeting, and it was three gentlemen. And, and Mark talks a lot, and he's a big talker. I mean, literally, you can't, like, get a word in edgewise sometimes when he would come to our office and talk.

It was like he was holding court, in a sense, and he, he said, you guys -- he, he kind of called out. He said, I just came from one of the major airlines, and their SMS is not very good. I want to make your SMS program the best SMS program in Hawaii. That is my goal for you guys. I'm really big on SMS.

That's -- it's like he didn't talk anything outside of SMS; that's all he talked about was SMS. Okay? And we all left the meeting -- we were (indiscernible). You know, we talked to Orlando. Orlando, do you feel comfortable? Is he -- you know. Oh, yeah, yeah -- Orlando -- Orlando's so easy going. He said, I can work with anybody. I said, okay, well.

And that was pretty much my only interaction with them until recently. I, I really didn't have much interaction -- I never saw them there. I don't think I ever saw them on the outer islands that I know of. I know he flew a couple times to -- I know Mark flew a couple times to Hilo.

Maybe once to Maui, but maybe I wasn't there. But I, I never really saw him out and about. You know what I'm saying? And, and maybe because of -- it was the pandemic, you know? It might have been restricted from there; I didn't see him last year, hardly at all.

Q. Okay. I just want to clarify, by "never seeing them", are you talking the entire CMT, or are you talking a -- the -- a specific inspector?

A. I, I never saw -- okay. So when I come to Honolulu, I, I usually go over to hangar one, which is our main base. And our maintenance for the 121 is hangar two, we call it, so I only go to hangar two for -- if I have to have a meeting specifically over there.

Normally go either -- whoever's over there will come to our -- because we have a better conference room on our hangar one side. So they would come over, so I wouldn't really go over to hangar two. So if they were over there I would -- I wouldn't have seen them.

Q. But I just want to make sure, you're talking about the entire CMT?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Not just a particular --

A. Yeah, the entire (indiscernible).

Q. All righty. We've been told the DFA likes to send -- has been sending you guys lots of letters, communications --

A. Since January, holy Toledo.

Q. Okay. (Indiscernible) -- I, I -- talk to me about that --

A. I've never seen as many letters in my life since January. Since January, I don't know how many -- 40 some odd? I don't know. I, I lost count. And, and what's so interesting is I could tell they're cutting and pasting because I catch -- some of the letters, I'll catch repeated cut and pastes.

You know how you -- when you cut and paste and sometimes you don't really thoroughly read it, or -- oh, I already put, put that there? I see it a couple times in, in their letters, where

they're cutting and pasting, and then, they, they repeat the same thing twice in a paragraph. Oh, wait a minute, that doesn't sound right.

And -- I don't know. They seem to -- they have a very different approach than the previous CMT team. The previous CMT team was more hands-on, seems like to me. They were out on the ramp, they were out talking to us, hey. I, I know Mike Kimble, our Director of Maintenance, and our former Chief Inspector, Scott Mayural, they were, like, holy smokes, man. These guys, they're so different than the other -- it was a very different technique, you could say, on how they managed.

Yeah, they're -- I don't know. What more do you want me to say? But --

Q. No, no. And, and that's okay. Let me, let me, kind of, process that for just a little bit. So we know they sent you letters, and, like, to quote you, "Holy Toledo", right? But they would request a response from you, or was it just more --

A. Oh. Okay. So a couple examples --

MR. LEE: Tracy, make sure you let him finish his question before you answer so you know what the question is.

MR. REASONER: Okay.

MR. LEE: You're jumping on his answer a little bit -- or his question.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So I'm going to repeat that. So you get lots of letters, and were they just informational letters, or did they want a response from Rhoades or TransAir?

A. They'd want a response sometimes, and this is what -- they would -- they were notorious -- they'd send a letter on a Friday after hours at 5:00 and expect a response in seven days. I remember one time it specifically was our -- was -- it was during the election day of the inauguration because that was right around Martin Luther King Day. And they, they sent us a letter on Friday and asked a seven-day return. And it was on a Friday, and there was a holiday on

Monday and Tuesday.

So I mean, really, there was only three days to reply. There was Wednesday, Thursday, and then it was due on Friday, which I personally think is unreasonable. And we asked for an extension, hey, can we, can we get our exception? No. No extension.

And, and that wasn't the first time they denied an extension. I, I asked for an extension one time. They were -- we were trying to take the burden off our Director of Operations for so many -- being in charge of so many manuals. I said, oh, let's make the Vice President of Operations the ADM manual -- in charge of the ADM manual.

And he said, hey, we've had these -- it's been back and forth a couple times, and I said, great, can you, can you give me, can you give me 15 days? No, you get 10. Okay. So then I get -- I said, okay, and then, of course, in 10 days we give them back the manual. And he said, oh, this isn't good enough. I said, well, asked for 15. Did my best. What would you like me to change?

Q. So they sent the manual back to you saying it's not acceptable?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. Okay. What did they say wasn't acceptable?

A. It was -- they never would. So my only experience with manuals was when I helped write a flight attendant manual for TransAir, and the person in charge of flight attendants, the name escapes me right now, but -- he's a really hardcore guy. But he's super fair, and I don't mind that at all.

You can be as hardcore as you want as long as you're fair, and he would, he would come to -- I would send him a manual, and he would come back and say, hey, there's some typos here. Can you take a look at that, and you need to fix this word. Or hey, can you change how this -- he would give me specifics of what to do. I'd do it, no problem.

They're not that way. They're pretty vague, and in general, like, we don't like this font you're using, or we don't like this style that you're using. Okay. But we, we need you to define

this better. Okay. Is there a FAA requiring that? I mean, if there is, we'll do it, but can you give us some direction? No -- there's no -- never a direction in that sense.

Like, I was honestly used to them coming and, you know, they'll give you specifics of this needs work done, but it wasn't like that, no.

Q. Okay. So since -- you know, knowing your history here and everything, you were here when they had the 2015 cargo focus team inspection?

A. Yes.

Q. How'd that go? That you can recall.

A. 2015?

Q. Yeah --

A. Very well.

Q. About six years ago.

A. I believe it was very, very well.

Q. Okay. Did they give you any suggested changes or --

A. Yes

Q. -- required changes or anything like that?

A. Yes.

Q. All right, can you give me an example of some of their required changes?

A. A lot of it had to do with loading procedures, you know. How we -- okay -- how we tagged our containers, our U.L.D.s, so that they -- you know, like, we'd double check. Okay. This, you know -- spot one, two, three, and four. Okay. Let's make it a little bit -- the numbers a little bigger, let's make them -- you know, because we have the -- we have these pouches that they go in. When we print those out, put them in, make them a little bigger. You know, make sure there's no mix-up of order, that kind of thing. They were just doing -- I think it was more preventable. You know, hey, you might want to look at this because we've seen this in the past.

Q. And let's fast forward a little bit to the last year. I know last year was, kind of, a unique year.

A. Right.

Q. But you guys had a couple inspections last year, right?

A. Yes.

Q. Another cargo VOCUS team and CHEP inspection?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. How'd those go?

A. They were, pretty much -- since it was under COVID restrictions, they couldn't come out; they did it all virtual. So it was more manual oriented on our manuals and less focus on actual ramp.

Q. Did that at -- did that add challenges for you guys?

A. I believe so, yes.

Q. What was some of their requirements or suggestions to change? Or did they have any?

A. They never -- normally, you get a -- you know, we had an introduction with them via Zoom, and then, usually, we have a closure with a -- an ending. We never really had that, that I know of, and they never gave us the feedback. I believe they gave it directly to the CMT.

Q. So did the CMT provide you with that feedback then?

A. In some of their letters, yes.

Q. Was some of that feedback similar to what happened in the cargo focus team in 2015?

A. No.

Q. They were totally different, some different.

A. Totally different, totally different.

Q. Okay. All right. We were looking through, as part of our investigation, we were looking at -- through some of the FAA letters of investigations, and we noticed that the accident airplane,

810, had several engine shut downs, failures. Just engine failures in the previous three years.

It showed five, but did you guys look at that anality of it? I know you said you do analysis, and you guys talk about safety in engines and equipment and everything. When you guys looked at that, did that give you any red flags or were any concerns that you guys discussed in your internal meetings or with the FAA?

A. I don't know.

Q. Okay. You don't remember that conversation --

A. I, I don't remember them discussing that with -- the interaction between the FAA and our people, I never recalled any of that.

Q. Okay. So how about internally? Did (indiscernible) --

A. Internally?

Q. -- discuss it and look at -- wow, we've had a lot of engine shut downs, engine failures, on this aircraft. Did you guys look at that as part of your analysis?

A. I believe so, yes.

Q. Can you recall, kind of --

A. I don't know anything specifically about that.

Q. Okay. One last set of questions, then I'm going to let Bill take over because he -- I'm sure he's got a lot of really good questions to ask as well.

We were noticing on the -- and maybe something you're not aware of or maybe you are, we noticed on the weight balance load manifest form that you give to the crews, there used to be an, an -- a power setting -- an EPR setting and a V-speeds. And we've been told by crews that now they can't use those; they have to go in and manually calculate that themselves. Do you know the rationale behind that?

A. I don't.

Q. And that's, that's okay if you don't. That's, that's understandable. And the last question,

then I'll pass it onto Bill; a little bit ago, you had mentioned you had a training manager.

A. Yes.

Q. Had or have?

A. Have.

Q. Have? Current?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. What is he a manager -- what, what training does he oversee? Does he train -- grounds crew training?

A. Oh, no. Not -- and, and not -- no, nothing, like, (indiscernible). It's a -- nothing with aircrew or grounds crew training. Like, hazmat training, loading -- load manual training, security training; that kind of stuff.

Q. Okay. All right but nothing with the flight crews?

A. Nothing with the flight crew. Nothing at all.

Q. Maintenance?

A. Nothing with maintenance.

Q. Okay.

MR. ETCHER: All right. You've answered a lot of my questions. My brain's got to kind of roll that around for a little bit. Do you need a break or anything for a moment?

MR. REASONER: No, I'm good.

MR. ETCHER: Are you sure?

MR. REASONER: Um-hmm.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Dr. Bramble?

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Yeah, Tracy, thanks for the information so far. I have a few things just to kind of plug some holes that, you know, we don't know about. And then I have a few things that came up in other interviews, and we wanted to circle back with you guys and get

your comments on.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. On the contracts for U.S. Post Office and FedEx, do you manage those contracts?

A. Yes.

Q. The last time we spoke with Teimour he said that mail made up about 55 percent of the company's volume, and FedEx made 40 to 45 percent. Does that seem about right?

A. That's correct.

Q. Okay. Does that apply to Rhoades and TransAir, or just Rhoades? Is it similar for --

A. Yes --

Q. -- each --

A. -- similar.

Q. Okay. How long have the mail and the FedEx been, sort of, the bulk of the cargo?

A. FedEx since 2005. Mail since 2003; we've always done mail.

Q. Has the operation -- has the Rhoades operation mostly -- like, since you guys brought it on, has it mostly been mail and FedEx, or did you used to carry other kinds of things?

A. It's -- we carry -- you know, those are the bulk of our business, and then, we also carry just general freight. And, and the Boeings were brought on just as a -- because of our growth.

Q. Okay. Yeah, I'm just trying to get a sense if there was -- there's been a change in the nature of the operation whether

it's --

A. Nope.

Q. -- mostly been mail and --

A. It's, pretty much, been the same. Just a matter of growth.

Q. All right. And then, how often do you get those contracts, or how often do you have to bid on those contracts?

A. The Postal contract is usually six years. Wait a minute, no. Eight years. And then, the FedEx contract was open-ended, but now, they said for, for -- they had a change in policy, and they just do annual contracts. But every contract we have is a 30-day -- they can give you 30 days' notice and move their business. I've never seen it done, but of course, that's what the contacts say.

Q. When, when do you guys come up on the next bid for the Postal Service and FedEx contracts?

A. Well, FedEx is every year, and that just renewed in May. And the mail contract started in -- the, the latest one started in 2000 -- October of 2019. Eight years -- so eight years from there.

Q. Okay. All right. And are you involved in fleet management in terms of, sort of, acquiring new airplanes?

A. No, as in fleet management -- you know, I don't look at any of the logbooks or anything like that to buy. I don't -- anything like that, no.

Q. Are you involved in, sort of, long-term planning about --

A. Expansion, you know, like, upgrading our airplanes, we discuss it. It's an open discussion. I usually don't say much.

Q. Is that more, sort of Teimour's responsibility?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. All right. And seems like the 737 200s have been giving the company a lot of recurring maintenance issues over the last year, and I know 810 was going to be at the end of its useful life probably around the end of 2021. I was wondering what was the company's plan, sort of, for replacing those airplanes with newer airplanes?

A. Our -- we started moving into the 400. We, we purchased a 400. It's at AEI right now getting a door, and we're looking for another 400.

Q. Do you know, sort of, what the game plan is for when you have all the 200s replaced?

A. Eventually, as they phase out, we'll phase in 400s.

Q. Has there been any discussion for accelerating that timeframe?

A. The market's very tight right now with Amazon buying a lot of planes, so if -- the thing with this -- it's, it's a matter of if a good plane comes up, we'll probably buy it earlier than later. Just a matter of if we can find the right -- because we've got -- I know Teimour has a person out there looking.

Q. Okay. Did -- were you aware that Rhoades' maintenance department didn't have any technicians with borescope inspection qualifications on staff in the months before the accident?

A. No.

Q. Was this issue -- I guess, this issue was never raised in, in connection with the recurring compressor stalls the airplanes were experiencing in early 2021?

A. I know Mike brought in an expert.

Q. And outside specialist?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. Do you know if the company plans to train someone in that area going forward? Has that been a point of discussion?

A. We have not discussed it.

Q. All right. The current PMI on your CMT told us that one of the problems he identified in early 2021 involved serious shortcomings of the company's CASS program. Are you aware of any of these shortcomings?

A. Think what he's referring to is we were looking, you know, we were looking for a CASS manager. Position we just filled.

Q. Okay. He, he mentioned that in absence of that, the processes for tracking chronic maintenance writeups; is that something that they had ever discussed with you guys, the CMT?

A. I don't recall.

Q. All right. Last week, we interviewed the former Chief Inspector, Scott Mayural, who

resigned from that position May 21st, 2021, and he stated that his biggest challenge was not having the people he felt he should have to handle the responsibilities and duties effectively. He told us he didn't have the resources to effective CASS audits and that he needed a CASS manager and another inspector.

He said he had brought this up in executive meetings and got permission to run ads to hire more people, but the company didn't get any qualified applicants. Were you aware this was a challenge for him?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you take any specific actions to help address this problem?

A. Yeah, I -- we -- what we did is we, you know, we ran -- any time we're looking for a position, we'll use maybe one source specifically, and then, we'll just broaden that source. I mean, we went to -- as far as, you know, posting ads on Craigslist. I mean, I mean, we were -- you know, all the professional ones we used; we used LinkedIn, and then -- I mean, we would just expand our net.

Q. How long was that job search going on?

A. I don't recall.

Q. Did you feel Mr. Mayural was qualified for the job of Chief Inspector?

A. I don't -- I believe he -- yes, he was qualified; yes. I just know he had some health issues.

Q. Okay. What kind of background did he have?

A. He had worked with the FAA prior. I know this only because he had a conflict with one of our CMT members, I guess, from his FAA history.

Q. What was the nature of that conflict?

A. He -- I guess, beat him up for -- beat him out of a job because I guess they bid on jobs, and he, he got a job over this gentleman. He had a little bit of animosity, yeah.

Q. Which CMT member was that?

A. I don't know. I think it was -- I don't know.

Q. All right. How did you recruit your current Chief Inspector?

A. Ran -- we ran an ad, and he came -- he was a former Director of Maintenance of Aloha, and he, he knows Teimour from way back. And I think he just, kind of, came over to us. It was kind of, like -- he just, kind of, came at the right time. We were, like -- and we -- it was, it was a very easy hire on the spot for me

Q. What kind of qualifications were you looking for, for Chief Inspector?

A. Well, you know, we base all of our qualifications, since it's a 119 position, on the FAA's direction, and we had to actually acquire a waiver for him only because he didn't have the inspection experience that's required by the FAA. But since he had, you know, 30 some odd years of experience in maintenance, they waived it easily.

Q. Okay. What personnel does he have supporting him?

A. He has three or four people under him now.

Q. What do they do?

A. I don't know specifically. I, I wasn't involved in hiring his people. I let my managers hire their own people.

Q. Do you know, kind of, generally what functions his staff performs?

A. I do not.

Q. Just skimming over some questions we've already covered with, with Mr. Etcher. Okay. We understand that the Rhoades hired auditors to support the Director of Safety.

A. Yes.

Q. I think their names were Valeri --

A. And Miguel.

Q. Pilipenko and Miguel Ramirez; is that right?

A. I hired them both.

Q. Okay. And what was, what was their intended role?

A. Miguel was the Maintenance Auditor, and Valeri was the Operations Auditor.

Q. Okay. And what did, what did those jobs entail.

A. Oh, they conduct audits that are directed in our SMS program.

Q. And how would you describe their performance during the first half of 2021, say?

A. Neither one of them had experience as an auditor, so it was a matter of working with Orlando to learn the job.

Q. So the early 2021 was, sort of, a, a process of them gaining experience to learn how to do that?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. Did they regular attend the company's twice weekly meetings?

A. Only Valeri. He's the one that handled the PowerPoint, that's why.

Q. Okay. And how come Mr. Ramirez didn't attend?

A. I left it up to Orlando to invite whoever he saw fit, and Orlando invited Valeri.

Q. Okay. Did, did Valeri make his own presentations, or was he kind of facilitating (indiscernible) --

A. He's just facilitating. Orlando handled the presentations. He was more like the tech guy that hooked up the stuff and had it all there and input it. He would input the stuff into the spreadsheet.

Q. Okay. And he got that stuff from other managers, or from the different managers of the departments or?

A. He would get it from Orlando.

Q. Oh, I see. So he presented the SMS spreadsheets?

A. Yes, yes.

Q. I see. Okay. One of the other things that came up in our interviews with the -- your current

PMI asserted that the DOM had refused to let the Maintenance Auditor audit his department. Is that accurate?

A. No, not that I recall.

Q. All right, and so, Mr. Ramirez told us that he presented a color-coded spreadsheet of poor maintenance documentation involving compressor stalls and some other issues at a mid-April 2021 meeting. I believe it was one of the two weekly meetings that are attended by you and other Rhoades managers, and he said that there was a problem with the writeups, and it needed to be addressed. Do you recall that presentation?

A. I don't -- I, I recall parts of it. I just remember, you know, we -- we've all -- when we have a meeting, and Miguel sometimes would attend; not always. I think maybe once or twice he attended, so it must have been one of those. I don't --

Q. Do you remember the content of the presentation?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So he told us that it involved repairs being signed off using wrong references, writeups missing detailed information about what's done, events of inadequate troubleshooting; none of that sounds familiar?

A. Not specifically. I know when Miguel started, he -- he'd never been an auditor before, and, and it took him a while to get used to doing the job. It might have been during one of those times where he was learning.

Q. Okay. Do you remember any, kind of, discussion following his presentation at the meeting?

A. No.

Q. Do you remember him getting into a, a heated discussion with the Director of Maintenance at that meeting?

A. I can't recall of any heated discussion at any of our meetings.

Q. Okay. All right. Do you, do you know if after that meeting any managers followed up with Mr. Ramirez about the shortcomings that he had described?

A. I'm sure Orlando probably would have, you know, went over everything with him, and at that point, you know, Ron, our Director of -- our Chief Inspector likely would have met with him.

Q. Okay. This was mid, mid-April, so this would have been before Ron, I think.

A. Okay. I'm just, I'm just saying that our group -- our Chief Inspector would -- if there was an issue, our Chief Inspector and Orlando would have met with, with Miguel.

Q. Okay. All right, so Mr. Ramirez told us that after that meeting, his access to maintenance records for future audits was changed so that he had to request all maintenance records from the Director of Safety, who would, in turn, request them from the Director of Maintenance. Do you know if this is true?

A. I don't believe that's true.

Q. Okay. All right, so Mr. Ramirez told us that he subsequently completed an audit on maintenance operations described in a report dated May 6th, 2021. Did you ever see his report on the findings of this audit?

A. No.

Q. Do you know about any of the findings?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So our understanding was that the report, from Mr. Ramirez -- is the report stated that maintenance personnel weren't understanding part give -- how part five was applicable; that maintenance manuals had yet to be revised and approved; that there was no structured maintenance training program; no QA or QC department to provide oversight inspection; repairs were signed off using wrong references; maintenance signed off -- sign offs were impossible to read; AGA references were general instead of saying specific chapter sections and pages; committing repeated maintenance items on the same aircraft; poor communication between maintenance operations and

other departments; and management aware of systemic issues with no solution implemented and safety performance and assurance not considered a primary job, though this was maintenance management who sought them down. Rather, the emphasis was getting aircraft back in service.

Mr. Ramirez told us that he attended a meeting with you and other managers a day or two after the accident in which someone asked him if he could tone down the findings of this report because it looked bad for the company. Is this accurate?

A. I don't recall.

Q. You don't recall that conversation?

A. No.

Q. Okay. All right. Getting back to the FAA, so during their initial visit -- our initial visit, sorry. We heard from some of the management team about some of the preoccupation with formatting issues in the manuals and all that sort of thing, and, you know, the two main letters and work order generated by that. Did you, did you feel like any of the issues the FAA was raising in the letters were legitimate in terms of the issues they were identifying, or was it -- did it seem just, like, a paperwork exercise?

A. In my opinion, it seemed more like a paperwork exercise.

Q. Okay. So we reviewed the letters of investigation -- the five letters of investigation that had been issued, and they were -- some of the issues that were included were that the company had potential hazards in its safety performance and monitoring system; that in August 2020 the company said it would communicate changes to the Minimum Equipment List and any other processes in a quarterly safety newsletter and would conduct audits -- and conduct audits on flight police paperwork to confirm adherence to MEL policies and procedures for 90 days following approval of the MEL revision, but this hadn't happened by December of 2020.

On February 3rd, 2021, a letter from the FAA said they were missing inspection task cards and inconsistencies between aircraft inspection program and maintenance review board review.

The same day, the FAA said there were potential hazards in the company's training and qualification of station personnel in respect to handling of hazmat. The same day, the FAA said there were some scheduled inspections identified below from the 2011 maintenance review board report may not have been accomplished within the required intervals, including a couple specific inspections.

And then, there was some issues with the safety program saying safety risk management processes to conduct system analysis and hazard identification were routinely not accomplished or ineffective. Safety assurance performance monitoring and measurement were ineffective in identifying hazards and currently the cause of the January regulatory non-compliance. Safety promotion did not ensure estimate's competencies for individuals identified by 14 CFR 5.223 were maintained through recurrent training, meaning no train -- not adequate training for the Director of Safety.

Or that safety communication was a conflict, and then, there was some stuff about manuals for weight and balance and runway analysis identified on February 19th that weren't submitted by May 14. And some additional issues with the general operating manual and, and some -- so this stuff was prior to the accident.

Did any -- so did any of those issues seem like they were valid issues, or did you feel like they were off-base with the stuff that they were complaining about?

A. Well, we were in the process of updating all of our manuals and because manuals need to be updated from time to time. We did identify that -- a couple things.

With the hazmat, we used to have a third party do our hazmat training, and when we brought on our Training Manager, we brought it all in-house. And in doing so, we discovered a lot of the records at our third-party hazard -- hazmat trainer didn't have a lot of those even though he had done the training, so there was a bit of a lapse there in the record-keeping; we identified that, and we are in the process, and we fixed it.

With the, the MEL situation, that was -- the MEL was approved by our former CMT, and we were abiding by the rules there. They came in, they didn't like it; the new CMT team didn't like it. They asked us to change it, so we did.

The task cards, I think, were taken care of by our Director of Maintenance. When they were identified, we fixed it.

So it was an on-going process of improving the manuals, and with the SMS, we were in the process of changing over our SMS system from our C manual to a VOCUS online system that is very good. And you know, quite expensive, and we purchased it to improve our SMS.

Q. When did you purchase the new online program?

A. February, but you know, we purchased it, and then, we gave a presentation to our CMT team, and then, we were in the process of changing over when the incident happened. And when the water lining happened, they -- we were in phase three, I believe, of change-over. They basically stopped it until we updated our AIP and our GMO.

Q. So presumably some of the shortcomings identified by the new CMT existed before they were assigned to Rhoades if they were legitimate. Why do you think the previous CMT didn't flag these issues?

A. I think you'd have to ask them.

Q. Were the -- was the previous cargo focus team inspection -- in the 2020 cargo focus team inspection, do you recall if they had similar findings, and is that maybe why the CMT was more aggressive in your opinion?

A. I don't know.

Q. Okay. So the letter of investigation about the Rhoades SMS in 2021 raised questions for us because the SMS -- the FAA has an involvement in supporting Rhoades' initial implementation of the SMS and meet the requirements in part five. How well do you think the FAA supported Rhoades' initial implementation of SMS?

A. I don't know.

Q. Do you recall that time -- that process during that time period?

A. I do not.

Q. Okay. All right. I think that's all I have for right now.

A. Okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: Thanks, Tracy.

MR. ETCHER: All right, Clarence?

MR. LEE: How about if we take a break --

(Crosstalk)

MR. ETCHER: Taking a break at 26 past, and we'll get back on the record when we come back.

(Off the record)

(On the record)

MR. ETCHER: All right, we're back on the record

MR. REASONER: Before we go on, can I just -- I think the meeting you're talking about -- I was just thinking about that, with -- some of the meetings I'm not there. I -- I'll be on the phone, so a lot of times I'm listening in on the phone on some of the meetings that we have on Tuesday and Fridays. Or even if we have an -- sometimes we can't make a Tuesday meeting, we'll do it Wednesday or Monday. Sometimes I'll -- I won't be there, and I will call in for those meetings.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

MR. REASONER: So the meeting you're referring to with Miguel, I don't recall -- frankly, I wasn't in the room. I was probably on the phone.

DR. BRAMBLE: Um-hmm.

MR. REASONER: And if I hear people on the phone -- everybody, you know, everybody

talks a little bit louder than normal because David is hard of hearing. David wears hearing, hearing aids. So we normally talk especially (indiscernible). We're usually doing it from one of our conference (indiscernible), and everybody has to talk into the -- so I can actually even hear it. So that probably would have -- probably when that happened.

So when you said was there any raised voices or anything like that, I didn't notice anything out of the normal because I was probably on the phone.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right. I think that that's actually -- it's actually consistent with what somebody else said. I may have misstated. I think somebody else said that they thought you were probably on the phone and not there in person. All right, you're good?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Yeah.

MR. REASONER: I'm trying --

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Tracy, you mentioned earlier that the previous CMT and the current CMT are like day and night, pretty much, and have you all expressed that concern to the Office Manager at Honolulu CMO, Certificate Management Office? Have you all set down with the, with the entire team of people and also the manager of the office, you know, and explain you all's point of view.

A. Yes.

Q. What was the outcome?

A. So Tiffany was -- Tiffany Chitwood.

Q. (Indiscernible).

A. Tiffany Chitwood, yes. Teimour and I had a meeting with Tiffany in the middle of this process, before the water landing, about our manuals and our manual updates, and we said, hey, you know, we know we need to improve our manuals. That's an on-going process with any airline, of improving the manuals. We're having a hard time with the current CMT team, but we want to work with them.

Tiffany and Teimour agreed to do a spreadsheet of what -- basically, itemizing what manuals are high priority, and then, due dates for when we would submit them. And then, the -- and then, she said that she would make sure that we get a timely turnaround, and that was the process that was going through from, I would say, April or May.

Because, see, we were getting -- just to, just to give you an idea -- the CMT team would not send -- they would send David a letter, Mike a letter, Orlando a letter, and wouldn't CC anybody. So I didn't know about it; Teimour didn't know about it. So I created -- I said, hey, we created a, a group e-mail that had all of our e-mail addresses in it. So we said, hey, use [redacted] Just send it to that e-mail, and then everybody will get a copy of it.

Even now, they forget to do that. So you know, we -- people are getting letters, and we, we don't know. And we were kind of

-- we even told Tiffany, hey, we've created this e-mail. Can you get your team to use this e-mail so that way -- Teimour knows when a letter comes in, I know when a letter comes in. And we can, you know, poke and prod people -- hey, you respond to that letter yet?

A. So that was a process.

Q. Thank you. Has Tiffany gotten back to your staff regarding the process that both Tiffany and Teimour agreed upon?

A. Yes.

Q. For tracking --

A. Yes. We were all on board with it.

Q. Has the CMT also been aware of the communication --

A. Yes.

Q. -- with team management?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Has there been a change in the CMT's attitude towards, towards the company -- after the accident?

A. It's gotten worse.

Q. Sorry?

A. It's gotten worse.

Q. Oh, it's gotten worse?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. I've never in my life been in a -- and it was in the last CASS meeting that we had. We're in the last CASS meeting, and I flew over for it. We go through the whole CASS, and there's no questions. We, you know -- of course, we ask, hey, do you have any -- they go around. Do you have any questions? Do you have a -- as we go through each airplane.

No questions about the whole thing, and then, since then we have brought in a specialist to work on the manuals. And they, you know, SAF, and we submitted manuals through quality resources. I mean, they handle the manuals for Hawaiian Airlines, so they're really good at writing manuals.

We did it with them. We submitted our manuals, and at the end of the CASS meeting, Teimour just said -- he asked -- he said, have you -- how are you coming on the manuals? And Mark was -- as soon as I got the ADM manual, I started reading it, I've been working on it, and I'll get some feedback to you.

Rayza (ph.), Ray, stood up, took off his mask, and started yelling at us. I mean, I'd never seen this -- I was, like, whoa. It was the first time I've ever seen this guy talk in a, you know, meeting, and he's yelling at us. I don't know what you expect us to do. I, I went before Congressional Order since then. And we're like, Congressional Order? What the -- what -- we didn't know what that meant. What do you mean?

Well, you've -- somebody here has told their Congressman that you guys are on the radar. And I can't hold back the gates. Like, he was the one -- I don't know what he meant by that, but I can't, I can't hold -- I'm holding the gate, and now it's going to be wide open. Everybody's eyes are on you, and it's all your fault basically.

And he was, kind of -- I've never seen that, kind of, interaction between -- heck. I mean, it's -- between anybody in this sense. I was very surprised at that. I was, I was pretty taken aback by that, and I think what, later on, we found out is since we have a postal contract -- of course, you know, the mail has been suffering considerably in, in the state, and FedEx is, you know, horrible turnaround times now.

And of course, as soon as the mail -- I mean, as soon as the mail started getting delayed because we're running our Shorts operation instead of the Boeings, I was talking to D.C. And I'm telling you, the Postmaster knew. So I'm not surprised that Congress didn't know because the Postmaster was right there next to him.

And I think they had to answer some questions as a result of that, and, and Ray comes across as a very nice man. But I think he's, he's waiting to retire. I mean, he even said that; hey, listen I've got two more years before I'm retiring. And it's like he didn't want to work and now he's having to work. That's just my opinion. That's how it came across, especially when you stand, take your mask off, and start yelling.

So it's gotten worse in the sense that I can tell you it's just -- it's been very confrontational. But -- and then, they said, okay, we received your manuals. They look pretty well, however we want to do -- you know, Mark said, we want to do a -- we want to have another meeting with you guys, and we want to talk about your SMS.

Okay. Great. So Mark -- I -- we kind of expected Mark to, kind of, run the show in the meeting, and he turned it over to Ace. And Ace said, okay. This is a SMS tabletop, and he just starts putting our, our Chief Inspector on the spot. How many days were you trained? Ha da da

(ph.) -- we're, we're just like, whoa, whoa, whoa. We, we thought this was a meeting to talk about things, not a tabletop.

I even called Mark afterwards. I said, Mark, I said, what are you doing? I said, that was really -- I mean, he talked to us very disrespectfully, in a sense. I mean, I know he's a former chief in the Navy, but we're not a captive audience in the sense of we're in the military anymore so what was that all about? And he said, oh, I'm really sorry. You know, Mark -- Mark's, kind of, standoffish is a sense. He's like, oh, I'm really sorry. It wasn't a tabletop. We do tend to mix up those words a lot. So I don't know about you, but I'd never mix up the word tabletop and discussion.

But that's, kind of, what we've been up against since.

Q. I see. All right. Well thank you for your, you know, your information and for coming in today. That's all I have.

A. Okay.

Q. Appreciate it. Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Rich?

MR. LEE: Probably just a couple things.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Does the company have any engagements in the industry outside of your operations? Do you go to the industry meetings? Do you get influence from other companies? Are there any -- do you do any of that, and what type?

A. We've attended NBAA. Do you know what that is?

Q. No.

A. Oh, National Business Aviation Association.

Q. Okay.

A. It -- they -- big conference. In fact, it's, like, in a couple weeks. It's either in Vegas or in

Florida. They do Orlando, I believe -- Orlando and Vegas. They do it every other year. We go to those industry meetings.

I have a lot of contacts in the industry, as well as Mike Kimble and I know Wallace and David. And we always, I mean -- all my friends are in -- they're on the mainland, but they're all in aviation. So we're always chatting and going to different meetings, and I know we -- the previous Director of Safety we sent to Oklahoma City to a SMS course. And then, I know we were going to schedule Orlando to do the same, as well as some of our new auditors; we've got a couple new auditors that we want to send.

Q. Okay --

A. But yeah, we're always in the midst of, you know -- that kind -- I'm really pro, pro associations and --

Q. Do you have a Chief of Flight Safety in the company?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever had a fully implemented SMS process approved by the FAA?

A. So our current SMS was approved in January 2021, I believe.

Q. Do you know when the requirement was?

A. It was, it was in process. I know they backdated -- I think the FAA -- I think Mark made a mistake, and he had to backdate the stamp of the -- we found some errors in the way they stamped the manuals, and we caught that when we were doing -- when -- actually, we didn't catch it; quality resources, kind of, caught that. Hey, this manual was in process. They've stamped it wrong. They re-stamped it.

It -- but yeah, we -- once it's -- the process started, we were required, we started on that road, and we've had two Directors of Safety since.

Q. Okay. So --

A. Or prior.

Q. When, when was your fully implemented SMS?

A. I don't know the exact date. --

Q. You don't -- I mean, was it 2020?

A. I, I -- again, I don't know the date, but I know it was, it was in line with what we were required.

Q. What, what are the expectations of the FAA from your standpoint? Are you -- it seemed like before you said you had a, a good rapport with the gentlemen you were writing your -- the flight attendant manuals --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- that there was more of sitting next to you, and he would give you a lot of guidance on the right of discipline.

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that what your expectations are now, is for them to --

A. No, no. Back, you know, back, back then, we were a very small -- you know, when I first came to the company in 2003, we were 75 people total, and probably 19 of those were pilots. And then, we've grown since then to or about 300 staff.

So you know, as we've grown throughout the years, we have more and more expertise in-house, so we don't need that, kind of, I would say, hand holding. In the beginning, you, kind of, held our hand and guided us through the process to where -- you know, the last CMT team that was with us, they were, they were just more hands-on.

I mean, they would just come to you and say, hey, I've got a problem, rather than writing you a 20-page letter. And this is what you need to do; this is what I want to see from you. You know, this is what our expectations are. They were, they were very up front, you know, and direct. Where this team doesn't seem as direct, in a sense.

They -- they'll, kind of -- for example, our -- when they pulled our D89 and -- a couple

weeks after the water landing, our, our inspector -- our Chief Inspector was on the phone with the FAA saying, hey, I just submitted the -- a new AIP. Can you -- you know, this what -- I went through it. I've done this, this, and this, you know. How's it look to you?

Yeah, I'm going through it. It looks pretty good. Not -- and then, literally that -- oh, you didn't write me a letter. You didn't write me a letter, so I'm pulling it. But he was on the phone with him literally two days prior saying, hey, I just submitted the manual. How's it looking?

Now, if that was me -- if I was the FAA, and it was looking bad, I would say, dude, it's bad. You've got to get me a letter; otherwise I'm going to have no choice. Not at all. It was, sort of, like, yeah, it looks okay, and then stab you (ph.). To me, I don't know, that doesn't seem right. That's a -- that -- that's not how I do things.

Q. All right. That's, that's all I have. Thanks.

A. Okay.

MR. ETCHER: I just have, like, one or two questions, and then if you're okay, we'll go around real quick. I know we're getting close to the end.

By MR. ETCHER:

Q. You mentioned the spreadsheet that you and the Office Manager of the FAA -- you guys agreed to that --

A. Yes.

Q. -- manual spreadsheet. Who's in possession of that? Is it --

A. Teimour.

Q. Teimour is?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. Okay. We learned, talking about some of the current crews and previous crews, that -- and they couldn't give us days, but you guys, now, require pilots to sign a training contract?

A. We've always required that.

Q. In -- you always have?

A. Um-hmm.

Q. Okay. There -- because they made it sound like it was recent --

A. Oh, no. It was always been required.

Q. Okay. Just -- and can you -- why do they do that?

A. Okay. So we started it back in the Shorts operation when we, when we ran just Shorts, and it was about -- we would -- it was, kind of a choice in the sense that, hey, ground school, and the simulator's going to cost about $30,000. We don't want you to come here, get your, your certificate, get type-rated, and then leave us. Because we, we actually had that happen in -- even in the, in the Boeing, where they would come sign a contract, we have one gentleman come in who was quite interesting.

He, he came on board -- I never met the guy -- came on board, we coached him through -- Wallace coached him through ground school, he went to his IOE checks, wasn't doing well, and coached him through it, in a sense, you know, to where he was confident as an FO, and then he leaves. And then, we find out later on that he wanted actually to fly in Asia with another Asia airline, had it all lined up and needed a type-rating -- current type-rating in 121. So the, the -- you know, when we get talented pilots in, we want to keep them, and we want to, basically, secure them for at least two years because we're spending a lot of money on them.

Q. All right. The last question I have is, we've been hearing from crews and, and different people that there's been a lot of compressor stalls and -- and I shouldn't say a lot, I'm sorry. There have been some compressor stalls in these engines, high EGTs, temperatures -- were those discussions ever brought in up in your twice weekly meetings that you can recall?

A. No, they would be brought up during CASS meetings.

Q. Okay. So they were only brought up in a CASS meeting.

A. If you're looking for analysis, that's when they're brought up. Let's say, if it happened and it delayed an airplane or delayed something, and we are talking about a delay -- hey, the plane was delayed. Why was it delayed? Oh, it was maintenance. Why was it maintenance? Oh, it was this. Oh, it was a -- you know -- they brought the plane back for auxiliary compressor stall if they did -- I don't know. Then, it would be discussed in that meeting.

Q. So do you, do you remember how these were brought up in the CASS meeting and what was discussed and looked at?

A. It's -- you know, when you get our CASS, basically, pamphlet, it has everything in there, and that's how they -- it was, it was a line item, and they would go over it in the line item in the CASS meeting.

Q. Okay. All right.

MR. ETCHER: I think that's all I have right -- for, for now. I appreciate it. Dr. Bramble, do you have any others?

DR. BRAMBLE: Just a couple.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. So in the meeting where the PMI, Ray, yelled at everybody --

A. Yeah.

Q. When was that?

A. That was August.

Q. 2020?

A. Oh, 2021. Just last month.

Q. Oh. Okay. Okay.

DR. BRAMBLE: That's it for me. Thanks.

MR. ETCHER: Clarence?

MR. KANAE: No, I don't have any. Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Rich?

MR. LEE: Nothing else.

MR. ETCHER: Well, thank you again for coming over here. I know you live in Maui, so you had to come a little bit further than others maybe, so I appreciate that.

MR. REASONER: No problem.

MR. ETCHER: Is there anything you can think of -- I mean, I know we're still in this investigative process trying to figure things out. Is there anything you can think of that -- and you, you helped us a lot today, gave us a lot of answers, but maybe we didn't ask a question that might help us that you can think of off the, you know, (indiscernible).

MR. REASONER: Nope, I can't think of anything.

MR. ETCHER: No, no?

MR. REASONER: No.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Well, if that's the case, then we can call this meeting concluded at 9:51 local time.

(Whereupon, at 9:51 a.m. the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Tracy Reasoner
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 29, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Kali Haney
Transcriber

REINTERVIEWED TRANSAIR PERSONNELL

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

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NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII, ON JULY 2, 2021	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
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Interview of: WALLACE HORIBATA, Chief Pilot

TransAir Executive Airlines of Hawaii

Honolulu, Hawaii

Tuesday,
September 28, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing Commercial Airplanes

CLARENCE KANAE, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

WILLIAM KATT, Attorney
Wilson, Elser, Moskowits, Edlman & Dicker LLP

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INTERVIEW

(1:00 p.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. Today is September 28th, 2021, and it is 1:00 p.m. and we are conducting a second interview -- a follow-up interview with Wallace Horibata. My name is William Bramble, I am a human performance investigator with NTSB. I'm assisting the maintenance -- I'm sorry, I'm assistance the Operations and Human Performance Working Group, which I'm leading with Mr. Shawn Etcher for Investigation Number DCA involving Rhoades Aviation Flight 810.

The NTSB is an independent federal agency determining -- charged with determining the probable cause of transportation accidents and promoting safety. We've already introduced our method of interview in a previous interview. I'd now like to have the members of the Operation and Human Performance Group who are present introduce themselves for the transcriptionist.

MR. ETCHER: Hi, good afternoon. My name is Shawn Etcher with the Operational Factors Group for the NTSB.

MR. KANAE: Clarence Kanae with the FAA operations here at Honolulu Certificate Management Office.

MR. LEE: Rich Lee, safety pilot for Boeing Company.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Is there anyone that you wish to not be present in this interview?

MR. HORIBATA: No.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. We'll be using the recorder again and afterwards we'll send that out for transcription and review for errors. And again, the interview is not a confidential interview, it will be part of the public docket for the accident investigation. You're entitled to have a representative at any NTSB interview. Is there someone here you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. HORIBATA: Yes, Bill Katt.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay, would you introduce yourself?

MR. KATT: Yeah, William Katt from Wilson Elser.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay, thank you.

INTERVIEW OF WALLACE HORIBATA

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. Now, onto the questions. Okay, so these questions are a little -- might be a little bit disjointed. Basically, we wanted to make sure that we had a chance to follow up with you on any miscellaneous things that came up, you know, over the last week or so. So, I'd like to start off by asking in the months before the accident, how would you describe the clarity of communications between yourself, maintenance, the Operations Department, and other departments?

A. Good.

Q. I guess primarily between yourself and maintenance?

A. Good. Yeah, we were good before with each other. I talk to the director of maintenance quite often, so yes, I -- good.

Q. And when you had questions for them, were they able to provide you with detailed, clear answers?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And safety meetings -- so you guys had safety meetings, my last understanding from our last visit was you had them twice a week, but then there was also a monthly CASS meeting that was -- accompanied a safety meeting. Did I have that right?

A. That's correct. So, we have two internal meetings that we all meet that heads up each department. We meet twice a month -- twice a week, excuse me, and then we have a CASS meeting that we meet with the FAA and that's every month -- once a month, excuse me.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And then is there a safety meeting before or after the CASS meeting typically?

A. Well, every -- you know, we meet twice a week internally -- our company people so we know what's going on and then the FAA, we meet with them and then if anything comes up after that, we usually catch it on the next meeting we have for that following week.

Q. Okay. So, the FAA just attended the CASS meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. They wouldn't be there for one of those internal safety meetings?

A. No, because it's just our company people there.

Q. And then at some point Orlando brought on some additional SMS auditors, is that right?

A. I know we hired a lady. I don't really know -- she's supposed to be helping with the SMS now. So, I did meet her, Gail, I don't really know her background of what she did. But I did meet her the other day.

Q. Was that after the accident?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. All right.

A. That was after the accident.

Q. But before the accident, it's our understanding that there were two SMS auditors, I think one was named Valeri and the other one was named Ramirez?

A. Oh, Valeri is still with us. Yeah, he's still with us.

Q. Okay. And was there also a Ramirez?

A. Oh, what was his first name?

Q. Miguel?

A. Miguel, yes, they're both still with us. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. And so, it's our understanding that Valeri was the ops auditor and Miguel Ramirez was the maintenance auditor?

A. Maintenance side, yes.

Q. So, on the ops side, like with Valeri for example, how did he interface with the Operations Department?

A. Any questions, he comes up to David and if it's dealing with pilot related things or specific airplane related things like procedures and stuff, then he'll come to me. If David -- if it's something like that, David would just refer him to me and then I will go over stuff that he needs.

Q. Oh, okay. So, David was -- David Seest was sort of his primary management contact?

A. Yeah, he went to David first, yeah, and then if David felt that I should answer the questions, what he needed, then I would get called.

Q. Okay.

A. Because he just came to us just recently about a simulator part thing. So -- yeah.

Q. Okay. And then he was -- I mean, as an auditor, did he make presentations about audits or anything?

A. Yeah, he did.

Q. And then where did he present that?

A. On our weekly internal meeting with lots of people.

Q. Okay. What kinds of things would he present?

A. Any items, things that happen in our company. Yeah, I think the last time I talked to you guys we had that one about that that person walked under the K loader. So, he brings stuff like that up if it's closed, if it's opened. Any safety related things, he brings it up to us.

Q. Oh, okay. So, he did more than audits, he was also tracking reports?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, he was.
Q. I see. And how about the maintenance?
A. Miguel?
Q. Yeah.
A. Miguel brought up all -- anything dealing with maintenance kind of stuff with us.
Q. Okay. Did he attend the weekly safety meetings?
A. Sometimes, if he had stuff to talk to us about. Valeri was more there more than -- I mean, Valeri came almost every meeting. But Miguel was just -- if he had things for us, he'll come, but he wasn't there every meeting.
Q. Okay. Was Valeri there every meeting?
A. Yes, he was.
Q. Okay. Do you know why the ops person was there all the time but the maintenance person wasn't there?
A. Like I said, if he had things to -- that he had to discuss with us, he would come. If not -- I don't really know what his work schedule is either, so I don't know if those days he was on work or what it was. But, you know, I don't know.
Q. Okay. Do you remember a presentation in, like, perhaps April of 2021 where Miguel Ramirez might have presented a spreadsheet of maintenance writeups and things that, you know, related to compressor stalls, or pressurization, or other issues where he had concerns about the way the maintenance items were being written up in terms of clarity and appropriateness of details?
A. Somewhat, I do.
Q. Okay. And what happened -- do you remember the content of what he was telling people or anything about what he had to say?
A. I think he just brought up to our attention -- I know one thing that he was telling that the

pilots need to be more detailed on writing those things up. That was one thing and I guess some of those things was repeated writeups, so he wanted to bring that to our attention in the meeting.

Q. Okay. And what was the reaction in the meeting to that?

A. Well, they all looked at me and said I need to inform my pilots to be more detailed when they write up things. And the pressurization, you know, we -- at that point in time in our time, it was just -- pressurization was really bad.

DR. BRAMBLE: You okay, Bill?

MR. KATT: Yeah, I'm fine.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right.

MR. KATT: If I get up and walk out, just keep going.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Did the director of maintenance -- I mean, did he get into with him at all about the maintenance stuff?

A. What -- I'm sorry, say that again?

Q. Did the director of maintenance -- did he get into an argument with Miguel Ramirez about the -- his presentation of the logbook stuff?

A. Not an argument. I don't think an argument, but they exchanged words.

Q. Okay. And what was the DOM's objection to that?

A. You know, for the compressor stalls, I don't know the whole detail. But maintenance was talking to me about it that they wanted me to investigate more about my pilots setting the power levers, that they're pushing it too fast and maybe that could cause compressor stalls. But I disagree with that totally because we had it on our takeoff roll and we had it in the air. I have never had one But that was a -- and I guess that was kind of a debate between those two guys. And the pressurization, well that was non-debatable because everyone knew we were having

problems with the pressurization.

Q. Okay.

A. But the compressor stall was an issue because it was happening and I guess they were trying to figure it out and that was one of the reasons they think it might've been doing that.

Q. So, you think the director of maintenance had words with the auditor because he didn't think the pilots needed to change how they're using the power levers?

A. That and I think just the way maybe Miguel was presenting what he thought. I mean, Miguel is pretty experienced also, you know, he's been around, so it's not like he doesn't know either. So, yeah, I think it was just a little bit of disagreement on both sides.

Q. Okay. Did Miguel present anything -- did he suggest that the mechanics were maybe not signing off the logbooks in the clearest way?

A. No, I don't think that. No.

Q. Okay. Or that they were, you know, mistakenly citing the wrong ATA codes or things like that?

A. No. I haven't gotten anything about that, so, no.

Q. Yeah, I was asking if you recall that being discussed?

A. No, well that wasn't one of the things I recalled that was bringing up between the two. (Verbatim)

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And you don't recall Ramirez saying anything about having problems with the way that maintenance was signing off the maintenance records?

A. No. Not that portion, no.

Q. Okay. All right, did you ever -- did you attend the meeting with Miguel Ramirez and other company managers the day after the accident?

A. Yeah, we had meetings.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, we did.

Q. And was there a discussion of a maintenance operations audit report that Ramirez may have written in May?

A. Oh, I don't recall that.

Q. And do you recall anybody asking Ramirez to change the content of any report that he may have written in the past on that particular day or at any time? Do you remember management asking Ramirez to change any of his audit reports?

A. No. I mean, they come in, they give their reports, it's either open or it's still closed and they talk about how we can maybe close out whatever is, you know, that they have open. It's the same with Valeri, he has things that come in that's opened and closed and we talk about it -- we discuss it as a group.

Q. Okay.

A. So, unless something went on when I wasn't there, but, I mean, there's a whole bunch of us in there.

Q. Okay. All right, onto Captain Okai. You mentioned -- or someone mentioned that the captain -- before the accident flight, the captain had previously declared an emergency and performed an emergency landing. Do you remember that happening?

A. I do.

Q. Okay. Can you tell us -- we've heard a couple different descriptions of what the reason for the emergency landing was, but can you tell us what you know about it?

A. When he declared an emergency was with Nick Yuda. They took off -- I don't really know the details about altitude and stuff, but they were close to the airport. They had a compressor stall and I think Nick was flying and I guess they wanted to get the checklist done, but Nick said, you

know, let's just get the plane back, the runway's right here, and I guess Henry agreed with it from what I got, and they landed the aircraft.

Q. Okay. Are there any others where he declared an emergency and landed that you know of?

A. There's another incident, he didn't declare emergency.

Q. That he did not?

A. No, that was the second one he had.

Q. Okay. What happened there?

A. You know, I apologize, I don't know why. I know he shut down the engine and -- because I was taxiing my aircraft on the reef runway when I heard that he was returning. And Tower asked him if he wants to declare emergency and he said negative and he landed on the reef runway without declaring an emergency.

Q. Okay. What was your take on his decision making in those two cases, both the compressor stall case and the engine shutdown case? Did you think his decision making was good in those instances?

A. For the compressor stall, you know, it's really not -- I mean, it's a big deal, excuse me, but it's really just bring back the thrust lever and see if it, you know, stops it. And if it gets to the stop then we need to shut it down if it still compressing stalled, but I don't really think it was -- and Nick, when I talked to Nick, he said they were, like, right there at the airport. I mean, it was just a pattern that they came right back in. I think for the second incident, he wasn't that close to the airport, but still within reason and then he decided to come back after they shut the engine down. And what I got from him, I don't think they did all the checklists on that one.

Q. Who was he flying with on that second one where he shut down the engine?

A. I'm sorry?

Q. Who was he flying with on the second one where he shutdown the engine and you think he didn't do all the checklists?

A. Who he blamed, is that what you're asking?

Q. No, who was he flying with? Who was his first officer?

A. Oh, God, man, I'm so sorry. I don't know.

Q. Do you know when that was approximately?

A. No, but I can find all that out for you guys.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, I want to say -- I want to definitely say it was Gina Moore. I'm pretty sure it was her, the lady -- the one lady that we have.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right, and did you talk to him about that incident afterwards in terms of his decision making or use of procedures?

A. I did.

Q. What'd you say to him?

A. Well, I told him first thing -- I don't -- and I apologize for not knowing why he shut down that engine. It wasn't like there was a fire or something like that. But he did shut the engine down and I told him that's fine, if you can't do the checklist and you can turn back, you know, just make sure -- try to do as much as you can. But I would have at least declared an emergency, you know, and just let them know because Tower asked him twice if you're declaring an emergency with single engine and he said negative. So, that's what I talked to him about, you know. It's one of our things in our book that says land at the next suitable airport, so you want to get priority to land.

Q. Okay. And did you happen to reinforce that he should complete more of the checklist?

A. If he has time.

Q. Okay.

A. But every situation dictates, you know, how much you're going to do, right?

Q. Yeah. Is -- what did you think of that situation? Do you think that he should have done more of the checklist in that situation?

A. No, I think he handled that -- but I just feel maybe, you know, with declaring emergency, with the firetrucks there, at least they could -- if there was an injury later, they could scan the engine before he started taxiing back to parking just to take a look before he starts taxiing again. Just to have a look, you never know what's leaking or anything, he's going to track that all the way back to parking.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, so that's all. I mean, really, I think he handle the situation -- I mean, I don't think it really was a big deal and he did what he did and he came right back in.

Q. Okay. So, you know how the rumor mill works sometimes, messages get garbled as it sort of gets passed from person to person. But let me just ask you this, did you reprimand him -- did you ever reprimand him for landing immediately in an emergency rather than continuing to fly and completing all the checklists first?

A. No, never. I talked to him about the incident, but no, we didn't reprimand him.

Q. Which one are you thinking of specifically?

A. I'm sorry?

Q. Which incident are you thinking of specifically?

A. Oh, the second one about not declaring an emergency.

Q. Yeah.

A. And it was more a safety issue on the ground, you know. I just thought at least to get everything checked before you taxi back, you know, you don't know what went on back there.

Q. All right. And then the first one, where he -- they were in the pattern and they landed right away?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did you feel that was an appropriate decision?

A. Yeah, I did.

Q. Okay. And did you tell him that?

A. I'm sorry?

Q. Did you tell him that?

A. Yeah. Well, they called me right away as soon as they landed to let me know.

Q. Okay. All right, another issue was -- let's see, I think it was a first officer who had flown with Okai said that he had had a light -- some sort of oil indication light or oil bypass -- or some kind of oil indication light come on while he was on the ramp waiting to taxi out. And then he waited a while and then -- to see if it would go out and then I think maybe wrote up the airplane. And then subsequently, he told the FO that he was told that he should taxi it out to the runway to make -- to see if the light extinguished before he got to the runway. And then he said that he did that the next time that happened and then brought the airplane back and that he was apparently called on the carpet by the chief pilot, namely you, as a result of that second incident. Does any of this ring a bell? Is this accurate or is this just --

A. No, it happens. I guess maintenance purchased these oil filters that are much thick. So, the oil got to get, you know, warmed up to get thinner and then it flows through it. So, we get that oil filter bypass light on and we're instructed -- maintenance did send us a bulletin saying that, you know, wait about three to five minutes and the light should go out. If the light doesn't go out, shut the engine down and maintenance will check it.

So, for us, you know, we're all about moving cargo. So, once we're loaded, we wanted the pilots to taxi the plane with the light on, go to the reef runway, that should be about three to five minutes. If the light didn't go out, then bring the plane back. It was a simple instruction that we told them and everybody -- the part is, if you're waiting on the ramp, all our people don't know what's going on, right. I mean, they're not communicating, they're wondering why the plane is

running, they're sitting there for five minutes.

So, I don't think I told Henry about that. He was doing -- he wasn't moving at first a couple times and I told him that he should move the plane and taxi to the runway. If the light went out, he can't take off. If the light didn't go out, then just bring the plane back. I think that's what I told him because if he went to the runway and the light didn't go out and he came back, I mean, I wouldn't have yelled. I mean, that's what he's supposed to have done. That's what was instructed to do.

Q. Okay. So, he -- so, as far as you can recall, he never taxied out there, the light was still on, he brought it back, and then you yelled at him because he, you know, brought it back with the light still on. Is that what happened?

A. No, because like I said, Mike Kimble wrote us, the pilots, some kind of bulletin, instructing us on what to do about that.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And when was that approximately when that bulletin came out?

A. Oh, I don't know. I got to look that up, it was a while ago.

Q. Was that in 2021, you think?

A. No, it was before that.

Q. Oh.

A. Yeah, it wasn't in 2021.

Q. Okay.

A. Because I think they used all those filters now, so we don't have that light come on anymore.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean, not that I've seen it.

Q. Okay. And the issue with Henry sitting on the ramp for five minutes, that was also before 2021, you think, about the same time as the memo?

A. It was before the memo came out. We were getting that and I did talk to Mike about it. You know, he explained to me and I said it would be better if maintenance sent something to my pilots or send it to me and then I'll let them know what to do. It's just that we -- for us, if we -- you know, we want to get the plane out of there. I mean, like I said, they don't -- people don't know what's going on, so with the plane just sitting there, it's not -- it's loud and noisy and -- you know.

Q. Yeah. All right, another rumor so to speak is that you may have lectured Henry on using more fuel than the other pilots. That somehow the company was keeping track of which pilots were more fuel and that Henry was burning more fuel than the other pilots. Is there anything to that or is that just --

A. Yeah, there was. He was taking extra and I did question him, I wanted to know why he was taking extra. We calculate more than enough fuel for each pilot to do a roundtrip flight and his reasoning was that he just wanted to take extra fuel. Well, each of those fuels have to be documented and we have to explain why we're doing that. So, I wanted an explanation on why he wanted that when everybody else is just taking just standard fuel.

Q. Oh, okay, so he wanted more fuel loaded aboard the airplane. But did he also burn more or did he just want more?

A. No, he didn't burn more. I don't think he burned more.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean, yeah -- no.

Q. Okay.

A. You know, Henry -- as you know, you guys' been -- Henry's one of our pilots and we had a couple others that just things happen to him. You know, it's just some guys nothing happened to

him and I guess he just wanted that extra fuel just in case. I don't know. That's kind of what I got from him when I was talking to him. He said you never know. Yeah, it's just not putting extra fuel, we -- I had to find out why he wanted to put extra fuel on.

Q. Did you said it was okay for him to do that after you talked to him?

A. No. Yeah, I told him no, you need to justify why you need to especially if the weather is VFR, you know, it's not -- and like you guys know, at nighttime, we don't have flow control, we don't have traffic problems. So, there was no need to take extra fuel.

Q. Okay. Did you ever hear Henry referred to as Oil Can Henry?

A. I'm sorry?

Q. Did you ever hear maintenance refer to Henry or pilots refer to Henry Okai as Oil Can Henry?

A. Yeah.

Q. Why did they call him that?

A. Because Henry didn't really understand -- he had some bad things about oil quantity. He just didn't really grasp at what we were trying to explain to him. You know, we have a certain amount of quantity that we can start the aircraft, we have a certain amount that we need to takeoff, and I guess he just had a hard time understanding that, and he rubbed some mechanics the wrong way. That's what I heard. I've never -- mechanics have never told me that slur of that.

Q. Okay. So, I think -- I can't remember if we were told last time, but we did hear this time that Henry has been reduced to first officer since the accident. Is that correct?

A. Well, Henry -- we asked Henry to come back. Henry cannot come back yet until he gets off of workman's comp and yes, because we were not going to bring him in as a captain until we find out the investigation report. After we get the investigation, we'll go and decide what we're going to do for that. But as of right now, as the chief pilot, I feel he shouldn't be a captain right now until we find out what went wrong.

Q. Okay.

A. But he's not back with us -- not now.

Q. Okay. All right, in terms of compressor stalls, what kind of guidance did you give to the pilots on, you know, how they should handle writeups with compressor stalls? Like, should they always write it up, should they write it up as an F item, or an I item?

A. No, that's -- well, compressor stalls, there's not -- it's writeup. If they get it, it's writeup. We didn't really get guidance on it, we talked about it, made sure they knew the procedure if they did get that. But like I said, we had it on the ground and we had it in the air, it wasn't just on the ground that we got it, we got it during flights, also. And, you know, in the emergency book, you follow procedure, if it goes away, you continue on. So, it's not like we have to come back to the airport. But they were talked about it because it was happening, so we wanted to at least let everybody know to make sure they all knew about it.

Q. So, if you didn't have to come back to the airport if you had a compressor stall, why did you feel that Henry's decision to return to the airport with Nick was appropriate?

A. I can't answer that question. Maybe the compressor stall didn't stop. If you do the procedure, if it stops, you can continue on. If it doesn't stop, the next procedure would be to shut the engine down.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. Yes, because it's not working.

Q. All right, so that could've been the case if it didn't do it.

A. Yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. All right, great. Thanks so much.

All right, Shawn, do you have any questions??

MR. ETCHER: I just -- I have just a few. So, thank you, maestro. You rule out a lot of mine already, so I guess we're thinking alike, which I don't know if that's good for Bill to think

like me.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. I just want to go back to the compressor stalls and the writeups. You said a compressor stall is a writeup?

A. Yes.

Q. What kind, is it an F or an I?

A. So, if we have a compressor stall and it's airborne right, we have it in the air, we do our procedures, it's operating normally now. I would think it's an I item. It's an information item that when -- I expect my pilots, when they land, to call maintenance up, let them know what's going on and have them decide together if they should bring it back or not. Now, for like, say, Henry and them, say they took off, they did the procedure, compressor stall didn't stop. That's definitely a write up. On the ground, if they set power, they're taking off, they're rolling on the runway, pop. That's a writeup because they couldn't get rid of it.

Q. And that would be an F writeup if they couldn't get rid of it?

A. Well, yeah, flight crew -- yes, F. I'm sorry, yes, F for flight crew. Yes, it wouldn't be an I.

Q. Okay. And then and I -- I just want to make sure my little brain has it all figured out, and I would be if they got airborne, they had a compressor stall, but they followed the checklist, it went away, and they continued?

A. Yes.

Q. That's just an I?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. Did the crews have guidance that told them that?

A. The checklist says that clearly.

Q. Well, the checklist talks about reducing and all that, right.

A. Yes.

Q. But did they have guidance on how to write it up, you know, if you have a compressor stall and it clears, it's an I. If you have a compressor stall that doesn't clear, it's an F writeup, or is that just something that was assumed?

A. No, like, to be honest, most of the time with something like that, they usually call me or David up. But I can't recall that we made a specific email or something to them telling them all that because we usually get called by them when they're on the ground already. After they call maintenance, they call dispatch, and they usually will call me or David up.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Is there any specific guidance you guys have produced to help crews know what kind of writeup a writeup could be, if it's an I or an F?

A. Yeah, we did. I mean, since all this happened and we got our interviews. Even my training in the sim has changed a little bit, I'm doing things a little bit different now, and we did talk to them, and we did have two meetings with the director of maintenance and Pat. Pat is our engine guy, he's been working for Boeing, it worked for Pratt and Whitney, then we hired him. We had two meetings with just the pilots, not management, and they met with all our pilots.

In fact, we had three meetings that they met with him just to answer questions -- they can just answer anything freely because none of us are there and it helped. They liked it, so we want to do that, you know, try to do it once a month especially when the planes start flying again, you know. We just decided that it's better that management is not in there because pilots are not going to talk freely if we're all in there. So, yes, we have done some things different.

Q. You piqued my interest when you said in the sim you now do things a little different. What do you do different now?

A. So, we talk about ditching a lot, you know, and I really -- didn't really harp on that, but I do now. The importance of MCT, which -- setting MCT, single engine work, a lot more emphasis on

that, and also focusing basically to know where you are when you takeoff. Make sure -- if you understand a pattern, make sure you can see the runway, you know, you don't want to go to a point where you can't see it or it's too far; SA is very important. And working as a team, you know, if one guy is doing checklists, the other guy should be handing the radio and make sure he's flying and everything. So, I'm a lot more focused on that training now when we go up to sim.

Q. As part of the training before the accident, did you sit down with your crew to help them? And forgive me, let me re-ask this question. Before the accident, you -- some of your new hires would be -- would you call them pilots with not a lot of 121 jet experience?

A. Uh huh.

Q. Did you guys talked to them about declaring emergencies, and when it would be appropriate, or what would be appropriate to think about when declaring?

A. So, ground school they will touch that. But then when they come to simulator, yes, we do because at one point our company, it was -- our pilots was having a little bit of difficult on when to declare an emergency. It wasn't that we were stopping them from

-- saying declare, but we wanted to clear it up on when or what we thought would be a good reason you declare an emergency. So, yes -- so, from now -- I mean, we do talk about it a lot.

Q. Has that -- in your opinion, or maybe crews have told you, has that changed their thinking on when to declare, or do you see much difference?

A. Yeah, I think it does, hopefully. I mean, you know I do ask them and sometimes I don't know if they're going to tell me the truth or not. They all tell me yes, they understand, and, you know -- so -- yeah.

Q. Okay. All right, you do a lot of OE or IOE?

A. Uh huh, yeah, I do -- but yeah, I do.

Q. Okay. A lot in your own term. Do you do some, would that be under your term?

A. Some, yeah. Sim is mostly me, yes.

Q. Okay. When you do OE -- whether in the sim -- a check ride on the sim or actually OE on flight line, did you -- and if we asking this before, I apologize, but did you interact with the POI's doing that? Do you see them on your jump seats or in the sim?

A. So, for POI, he'll come out once a year to line check the check airmen, so that'd be me and Ed. Simulator, he has to come out once a year, which he just did, to check sim instructors out, so that's one. And any captains that we are upgrading, when we feel they're ready, they do an observation flight with the FAA and it's not a pass or fail, it's just an observation. So, if the FAA feels he's good, he knows all the procedures, he flies good, then he signs him off. But if he doesn't, then it's not a fail, we'll just pick another day, you know, he'll have more time. But that's the only time I really see our POI unless he calls specifically something about a pilot or about sim training.

Q. Okay. So, when the -- and is this the new POI or the former POI that you --

A. Oh, both. They both have to do -- they both do the same thing because we all need the same thing.

Q. Okay.

A. Yep, so both of them.

Q. All right, just wanted to make sure.

A. Yeah.

Q. Have you ever had them come out and it wasn't a pass -- and I'm not saying pass, the observation -- did they give you any critiques during the observations?

A. Yeah, they did.

Q. Kind of help me understand --

A. Mostly Mark -- our new POI, Mark Butin, he's really -- he's a little bit more critical, you know, so there were some things that he critiqued about and there was things he critiqued about me. There's a procedure that we did that we're supposed to do with our (indiscernible) and I

wasn't doing it the right way, so he -- I mean, he did, he just mentioned it to me. Of course, when it comes up during sim, he mentions to me things also. (Verbatim) I mean, I want that, so I -- you know, it makes me better, I'm teaching.

But I think one pilot, he was coming in, he was going to be a captain and I was in his right seat and I kept on tell him, you look high to me. We're really big on stabilized approaches in the last thousand feet and I told him, if you don't get down, you're going to -- you're not going to be stable and he kept on saying I'm correcting, and I guess just at that brief moment, he kind of pushed the plane down. Not in a dangerous situation, but then he brought it up and Mark commented about that and he did it -- he thought he should've gone around and he said I thought you should say it. But I said he was there for one or two seconds; I was just about to say I'm going around. But I think that was another reason -- that was another thing he commented on.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Excellent. When Bill was asking you a question about writeups and I want to say it was the maintenance auditor that was saying he wished you guys had more detailed writeups?

A. Yeah, they all say that. Even when the FAA comes in and looks at them. It's more pilots, they don't write enough detailed information, so it's hard for maintenance to decided how to figure out what's going on. This has been an ongoing battle with me. I've been trying to tell them to write more detail. But sometimes we don't want to jeopardize safety, especially stuff that we're rolling on the runway, I don't want them focusing on when they're not supposed to be looking because they're trying to figure out, you know -- so, I said, you know, just when you look, just look -- pick numbers like 5:00, 6:00 position. It's easier to remember than a specific number and then when you're safe, you can kind of figure it out after that. But it's just that some pilots just don't write up enough. It's just been going on now.

Q. We had through some of our interviews that there for a while you guys were having a

pressurization issue?

A. Uh huh.

Q. So, help me understand, in your mind, what would be a good, detailed writeup for the pressurization issue?

A. Well, they want to know first duct pressure -- right, what the duct pressures are left and right, they want to know altitude. Second thing, the pressurization was when we were flying -- you know, like, when we descend, we always descend with the thrust levers closed. So, when we start it down, the pressurization used to go climb like 3,000 feet per minute. So, then we had to bump the power up to get more air flowing and that would bring the pressurization rate a little -- well, so it's not during our ears.

After a while, that wasn't working and then sometimes -- so, just imagine that you're flying, the cabin is climbing, then all of a sudden when we get down low, now what's it going to do? It's going to dump. So, then it just dumps 3,000 feet per minute the opposite way and that -- I mean, it happens to me numerous times yeah, it's sore on your ears. So, they want to know that, they want to know your thrust setting, you know, if you're climbing, if you're descending, all those things gives them more information instead of just writing up we're at level, we're descending, and the cabin's climbing 3,000 feet. That's not really detailed information, right? So, that's what we were kind of trying to explain to our crews when they did writeups. I mean, you're up high, it's not a safety issue if you kind of detail more, right? It's not like you're rolling on the runway and something like that.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. But that was the pressurization was. It wasn't we was losing pressurization; it was just the rate. It was really bad at one point.

Q. Okay. Did you explain that -- how did you explain that to the crews or were you able to explain that?

A. No, because I -- so, we get -- when the logbook comes in, whenever Mike Kimble comes to work, he'll go through all of them and the writeups. And then if he looks at some and he just feels they need to get more writeups, then he'll call me, you know, this crew had this problem, I don't really -- you know, can you call them to get more information because they're not really supposed to bother our crews, right, because they're in crew rest. But I got to know because we want to get this thing fixed for the night. So, they know if I'm calling them, if they're up, to answer because I won't bother them because I know they're in crew rest. So -- and it's usually, maybe -- it's not that long after they leave us anyhow because Mike usually comes to work by 7:00, 7:3- already. So yeah, then I find out and then he'll write it in there, I guess. I don't know what he did, but he'll have the information.

Q. All right. But did you put out any documentation to the crews?

A. Yeah, we did write -- and Mike, like, those meetings that they just had with maintenance, Mike -- I told him to write that, we need good writeups, we do. He talked about compressor stalls, he talked about engine temperatures. I mean, they went to -- and the pilots have equal opportunity to just ask whatever they wanted to ask to the maintenance people.

Q. We kind of heard though some of these interviews that maybe the pilot versus maintenance interaction might be -- I don't want to say strained, but definitely not buddy buddy, how's that? Were you aware of that?

A. Yeah, I was because, like, me and Mike, we have a good rapport. If he has -- if he gets complaints on my pilots, he'll call me and vice versa, if my pilots complain to me, I want to know, you know, and same thing. I do, I get that and it's just some they like and some they don't like. Yeah.

Q. In your opinion, was it more of a power struggle, a personality conflict kind of? How would you generalize it?

A. There's some maintenance people, they're just -- I think the way they talk, you know, and

I'm sure my pilots do the same. I don't think it's just maintenance. I mean, I do tell my pilots to make sure you respect them, you talk to them the same way you want to be respected back. If you talk like that then expect to get an answer like that. So, I do tell maintenance, when I'm out there, too, you know, if you have a problem, just call me and I'll make sure I straighten out my pilots, you know.

Q. Okay. Since you do some IOE or some OE and you also do sim training, do you teach pilots how to advance the thrust levers in?

A. Uh huh.

Q. How do you teach them?

A. So, most of our guys have flown automation planes, Embraers, classics that have auto throttles. So, the easiest way I can tell them to is, you know, we want to advance it slowly to 1.4 EPR, engine stable. The speed you want to think about is how you used to see your thrust levers move when you hit the (indiscernible) auto throttle to bring it up. That's about what the speed is. And I also check them when they're in simulator and I have never seen anybody just jam it -- I mean, the only time I see that is maybe when we get wind shear, but of course you want to get that thrust lever up. So, that's why when Mike brought that up, me and him, we had words. I did, I felt kind of offended that he was insinuating one of my pilots was doing that and I disagree with that because I've never seen that in sim or when I do line checks. Never. So, yeah, I mean, that's kind of how I teach them.

Q. Okay. Did you send out a friendly reminder to anybody or anything?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. But we talked about it, of course.

Q. All right. We learned that they have a maintenance auditor and an ops auditor in the Safety Group. Do you work -- do you interact with the ops auditor more than the maintenance or do you

kind of interact with both of them?

A. No, it's more the ops.

Q. More ops?

A. Yeah, because he has more questions on training procedures. For maintenance side, hardly -- in fact, never. I mean, I know him, we're friends, but not really.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. He might have a question just -- but he just has a question.

Q. Has any of his questions that he's brought up, have you ever disagreed with some of his results of what he's looked at?

A. No, I think he knows -- he pretty much knows.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. I think with Bill, you had mentioned you guys have your twice-weekly meetings and they bring up stuff that's not closed at the next meeting -- if something wasn't closed out, they bring it up?

A. Yeah.

Q. Is there a timeframe on how soon these safety audits or --

A. Yeah, there is -- on the matrix, there is.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, there is.

Q. And that's what it's based on is that matrix?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. So, when there's things that is open and we're getting close to the deadline, yeah, we need to decide, you know, if it's flight ops side, or maintenance side, or whatever -- loading side. You

know, they have to come up with how they're going to fix this problem so we can close it. So, yeah, it shows on that matrix.

Q. Anytime a crew declares an emergency or has a return back to an airport, do you ever debrief them at all?

A. Debrief them?

Q. Yeah, like, you know, if they have an emergency, you debrief to learn from it. If they return back, you debrief them both?

A. Yeah. Well, I mean, I talk to them, yes.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, we do because anything that comes back like that, you know, the FAA will call or they want information already. So, maintenance will get involved, of course our POI, and then sometimes David, if he can't answer, he'll tell Mark to call me. Especially if I talk to the pilots, he'd rather me talk instead of me telling him what they said and then he talks to Mark, so I'll do it. But if they can't get ahold of me or whatever and they talk to David, then he'll usually explain to Mark.

Q. And you've been in the airline industry long enough too, you know that pilots talk, pilots might exaggerate, they might now. But we've kind of had a few times where people said that crews have been cursed out or yelled at by various people. Have you observed that, have you done that? Just kind of help us understand if that's --

A. Well, you know, you got to be more specific about yelled at. I mean, yeah, I will especially if they come to simulator and they're not prepared. That's their job, that's what we're paying them for and I do write -- a week-and-a-half before they come, give them all the -- whatever they need and make sure they know that they got to study. This is either a check or this is training, so I expect my pilots to come up prepared. It's just like any job that I've been in, I mean, I would get my butt chewed out, too, if I wasn't prepared. I'm sure you would, too, right?

So, yeah, I do.

Let me see, that's one big thing, pilots that don't call, or, like, they call in sick and the next day I got to go chasing them to see if they're going to call -- I mean call well. To me, that's not my job, you know, because I have to find a pilot because they need to sleep if they're going to fly. So, yeah, I mean, I do talk about that or if pilots come in and they don't let us know they're here. That happened twice and they were sleeping in the lounge because they came early, we couldn't find them, flight went out late, and that's all clearly in our manuals, which they're probably not reading.

Q. Okay. And just so I have it for the record as well, if a crew declared an emergency -- let's take Henry's event where he did not declare an emergency and I think you said you were taxiing out, right?

A. I was taxiing, yeah, going to the runway, yes.

Q. Okay, so you were going to the runway, he didn't declare, did you have to verbally reprimand him or written reprimand him for that?

A. No, there was no verbal reprimand and there was nothing written up. I did tell David Seest about it, of course. I did question him, yeah, we talked -- we had a good talk. I mean, I made him wait for me until I come back, I did my flight. I wanted to know the reason why he didn't declare and then like Bill, I explained to him the reason why I thought he should've declared an emergency, just to make sure everything was okay.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So, did you yell at him for that? I just want to make sure just to --

A. No -- you know, no. Actually, me and Henry, out of all the pilots, me and him was good friends. Yeah.

Q. All right. I know I used the phrase reprimand just a minute ago and forgive me, when I say

the word reprimand, what does that mean to you? Does that mean -- kind of help me, what does a reprimand mean to you?

A. A reprimand means to -- well, it can be different ways, right. We can reprimand him that we take him off the line without pay. We can reprimand him by our counseling statement, that we counseled him and that can go into his file. Or it could just be a reprimand that I just discussed with him because in our counseling statement, we do have a section that says a person was brought in, was talked to, nothing else was, you know, done after that and that's what I did with Henry.

Q. Have you ever -- I don't like to use the word threaten, that just sounds so negative. But have you ever held their job over their head if you will?

A. No, never. We need them more than they need us, I think.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, so no.

Q. All right. And one last question and then you might be done with me for a little while. Normal thrust takeoffs --

A. No --

Q. A normal thrust takeoff, not a reduced.

A. Yeah, okay.

Q. Is there a requirement on how often those need to be done?

A. Well, so there's only -- well, for us, there's only two takeoffs, right, reduced thrust or max thrust. So, those are the only two settings that we do. So, we've talked about this, a max takeoff, we wanted to do it once a week. Besides that, it's always reduced thrust takeoff for us. Like, that thing I talked to about you earlier -- last time that it just varies on the flap setting that we use for takeoff. The Dash 9 engines, we're using -- most of us were using flaps two because that would give us a lower EPR setting, which, you know, of course, lower EPR setting, lower temperature. With the Dash 15 and Dash 17 engines, bigger engines, so we use flaps five for that. But what I

see when I give line checks, the pilots was just -- they were using flaps two most of the time which is nothing wrong -- I mean, there's nothing wrong with that. But -- yeah.

Q. But is there a -- do crews have to document -- like, if I go to an airplane and I open it up and I see -- do I have to look at how long enough the last max takeoff --

A. Oh, yeah. We have on our maintenance log, there's a -- what do you call it? There's a check box for max takeoff, yes.

Q. And how often does that box have to be checked to make that aircraft, you know, legal -- airworthy -- I'm not sure what the right word here is.

A. Well, like I said, we wanted -- it is supposed to be done every week, so the captains was required just like the VOT to check those things, right. I mean, that's their job, so -- yeah, to make sure the VOT was complied with, make sure make takeoff was complied with.

Q. So, it's every seven calendar days or is -- it's not X number of flight hours?

A. No, it was not flight hours, it was calendar days.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: That's all I got, thank you so much.

Clarence?

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Wallace, do you need a break?

A. No, I'm good, thank you.

Q. Okay, great. I just have a couple questions. As a check airman -- the FAA basically expects a check airman to be standardized in how they actually conduct themselves in performing a check ride or a check. Could you explain the rules and procedure for an engine out of Honolulu on eight right? is there a standardized procedure?

A. Yes. So, according to our books, there are -- the runway analysis manual on taking off on

runway eight right, it's either when you lose an engine it's 1.3 DME or 500 feet. Whichever comes first, you make the turn to a heading of 220, no more than 15-degree bank turn, and intercept Honolulu radio 171 to Alana. Now, that's what we're supposed to do. But if the crews can let them know early, declare an emergency instead of turning so far right to the 220 -- you know, declare emergency, let them know what's going to happen, return to the field or, like, the 140 heading, that's okay, too, as long as they let them know. But initially, that's in our books, they're supposed to do that.

Q. Has that procedure been talked about with ATC?

A. Sorry, I don't -- yeah, I don't know.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. But I believe no because our crew is just supposed to let them know that we're going that way. And I get where you're coming from because when I heard what was going on, the controller was a little bit mixed up where 810 was going because 809 was coming that way. Yeah, I kind of got that also when I was listening to them talking.

Q. And you do actually simulate that in the simulator in Miami, right?

A. Yeah. If they don't get a heading, they're supposed to follow that procedure in our manual, yes. They can't just go to 140 heading, they need to follow our procedure unless they get instructed and let them know -- declare emergency and let them know that they want a different heading.

Q. Okay, thank you.

A. Uh huh.

Q. And then my last question, earlier Dr. Bramble was talking about Captain Okai having an emergency and you mentioned that the first officer was Ms. Moore -- Gina Moore.

A. Yeah, I think so.

Q. Yeah, but then in that same remark you said used to work.

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. What do you mean by used to work?

A. Gina Moore is no longer with us. She decided she was going to leave us so she got hired at Kalitta.

Q. Oh.

A. So, she's no longer with us.

Q. Okay, I was just wondering.

A. Yeah, she's no longer with us.

Q. As you know, we interviewed her on our last --

A. Yeah.

Q. On our first interview session.

A. Uh huh.

MR. KANAE: That's all I have. Thank you very much.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, Rich?

MR. LEE: Thanks.

BY MR. LEE:

Q. Just a couple things. We've spoke to a lot of your pilots and they mention that you're away a lot training in Miami?

A. Uh huh.

Q. What is your typical schedule as far as how much are you away in Miami?

A. Quite a bit. More -- I would think more than I'm here.

Q. So, what, like monthly, is it?

A. I very well -- end of November to beginning of January I'm here because that's our busiest month, so I need to be here. And then usually January -- usually maybe I'm away about two weeks, two-and-a-half weeks, come back for about two weeks, two-and-a-half weeks. That's

usually my cycle.

Q. Okay. And I think you mentioned the last time, maybe, you have another sim instructor evaluator (indiscernible)?

A. Bob Lander, yeah.

Q. Yeah. Do you ever check him to make sure he's doing the standards of your company?

A. Of course, yes, I do.

Q. All right.

A. And he just -- yeah, and the FAA also, right, he has to abide by that, too, so yes.

Q. Okay. The compressor stalls in flight, you mentioned that you run the QRH procedures and as long as you reduce the thrust back to a range where it's not continuing, the guidance in the books allows them to continue. But if they continue into the outstation, what happens then? Do they write it up and then maintenance has to fly out there to fix it or -- and so that's the case?

A. Yeah, they do.

Q. Okay.

A. Because in our books -- and I do talk about this, you know, we -- unless it's something urgent that they need to return to the field, something like fire or whatever, everything is good in the aircraft, we want them to continue.

Q. There's been a lot of discussion about pilot's writeup and things, pilots don't write a lot of detail. I mean, there can always be a maintenance person there asking the pilots about what they saw or whatever at that time instead of, you know, the next morning or whatever. It seems like a lot of the pilots that we talked to, they get frustrated because they writeup the same thing over and over and it doesn't get fixed. So, my question to you is that how much more detail is expected for a pilot to put in the book to get it fixed if they keep writing it up?

A. You know, it was a problem. But this new FAA team, they're kind of monitoring and I'm not blaming any FAA that was before these guys came, but this new FAA team, they monitor

repeat writeups. So, the other FAA team, the maintenance side, and our POI, they really did it. So, things have changed -- I mean, things change, but there's only so much -- and I tell the pilots, you know, there's only so much we can do, if something's wrong, just write it up -- just keep writing it up.

Q. All right. There's a lot of discussion -- you talk to the pilots about the compressor stalls, and what to do, and writing it up, but you mentioned right off the bat that you've never had one. So, maintenance was -- had discussions with you about, you know, on the ground, what are the pilots doing and we've spoken to some pilots that, like you, haven't had any -- they told us they haven't had any, but then other that have had multiple things.

A. Right.

Q. So, can -- I mean, what's your judgement -- what do you think -- what's the reasoning behind that? I'm assuming you fly alone a lot and some of the other pilots don't fly a lot --

A. Well, you know, that was something, of course, brought up through us people to management, so I did jump on their planes just to ride along and just to observe. But I mean, I couldn't find any reason -- and of course, when I flew it then nothing happened. I mean, I don't know. And I did observe, you know, thrusts, how they set it, if they're bringing it back too fast, bringing it forward and I have never said anything to any pilot that he was too forceful or slamming it back, so I don't know.

But yes, I think after the director of maintenance kind of mentioned that, I wanted to go myself especially those -- the pilots that did have it to just make sure they were doing everything that they were supposed to be doing. And those pilots that had those incidents, I talked to them personally, I mean, they called. We didn't do it as a group, but like I said, we had those meetings. But this was after that incident that they did ask about compressor stalls, they did ask the maintenance people about all that.

Q. Okay. So, my last thing here is we -- all of us have asked you about the max thrust takeoff

requirement. Now, is that a maintenance requirement or an ops requirement?

A. I would think it would be a maintenance issue, but it was there when I -- before I even got here.

Q. You said it's in the forms as a requirement and the captain's supposed to look at and see okay, it's due, and then perform max takeoff?

A. Yes, that's correct.

MR. LEE: All right, thank you. That's all.

MR. HORIBATA: Yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, we're going to do one more round. It will be much shorter probably, but do you want to take a bathroom break?

MR. HORIBATA: No, I don't have to go to the bathroom. No, I'm good.

DR. BRAMBLE: Do you need water?

MR. HORIBATA: No.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. So, just to make sure we have the record clear on this question that Rich asked you about. He asked if a crew had a compressor stall and it stopped happening and then they flew to the outstation, would maintenance have to come fix it and you said yes. Would that also be the case if it -- they got the compressor stall to stop happening when they reduced thrust and they only wrote it up as an I item? Or only if they wrote it up as a -- I mean, any time they ever have a compressor stall, maintenance has to look at it?

A. No. So, let me -- yeah, let me rephrase that. So, if you take off, you do the procedure, everything's fine with the engine. So, they continue and say they land in Maui, right?

Q. Right.

A. So, they'll call maintenance up and let them know we got this, maintenance will instruct them whatever they feel he needs to do before they take off, or they might just tell him, you know,

you haven't gotten them the rest of the flight, it should be okay. So, if those weren't, then they would probably just take off the airplane again.

Q. Okay. If they -- if maintenance was satisfied with whatever they told them, they wouldn't have to come out there?

A. Now, another scenario could be when they were landing, if they get the compressor stalls again during landing, yeah, I probably should -- the captain would probably write it up this time and have somebody come and check it. But, you know, they did the procedure and nothing encountered again the whole flight.

Q. Then they wouldn't have to come out?

A. No, they wouldn't have to come out.

Q. All right. And then off the max thrust takeoff requirement, if a pilot told us if they hadn't done a max thrust takeoff in the 737's for eight months before the accident, does that seem plausible? I mean, is it possible they could be telling us the truth?

A. Yeah. I mean, if they said it, yeah.

Q. How would you know if they weren't doing it -- if they weren't doing the max thrust takeoffs?

A. Well, we got to look at our -- the maintenance logbook, right. Like I said, it's an item that is checked and the captains are supposed to check to make sure that it was done within the seven days. So, if it's not, then usually I tell them that I would need to know and they should do one that day to bring it back, you know, that way we're doing it.

Q. Okay. Who audits those logbooks with respect to those max takeoffs?

A. I think maintenance does that.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. So, if somebody wasn't doing them when they were supposed to, would they

contact -- I mean --

A. No.

Q. Would they contact you?

A. No, they -- so, say a captain goes in there, he checks the book and it's like say -- just an example, say 14 days no max takeoff.

Q. Uh huh.

A. So, I don't know if will call me on that, but he's supposed to do it, you know, to get it back again. But I never got called by anybody about that.

Q. Okay. All right, so you remember the meeting I asked you about where Ramirez presented the spreadsheet about the maintenance logbook writeups?

A. Uh huh.

Q. What kind of a meeting was that? Was it a CASS meeting or a safety meeting?

A. No, it was just an internal meeting. It wasn't a CASS meeting.

Q. Okay. Was it a safety meeting, one of the biweekly meetings?

A. No, just a biweekly meeting that we all meet together.

Q. Okay. But --

A. Basically, that meeting that we had was just for us to talk about the planes, maintenance status on all the planes, any incidents that happened. It was just so that we all know what went on because, like, especially on the weekend, you know, management is not there. So, Tuesday we have our first meeting and we just talk about what happened on the weekend basically, things that are out of country for checks and things like that in Taiwan, when it's coming back.

Q. Okay.

A. Things like that. I mean, it's just a meeting to get updated.

Q. Yeah. But it wasn't the twice a week safety meeting?

A. No, it was.

Q. Oh, it was?

A. Well, it's really not a safety meeting. I mean, I don't know. If I said safety, it's really not, it's just a meeting that we have that all of us got together, each section, and we just talked about it -- what things that went on. But the safety side did come in, Orlando was there, I mean, he did his talk with us also just like me and David for the flight ops side, we were there. The 135 side is there also -- they're there, too. So, it's just everybody that's in the company, the head people just come in, we just talk story.

Q. Okay. I'm still a little bit confused about whether it counted as one of the twice a week safety meetings because I know you had -- twice a week you had safety meetings. We were told that part of the safety --

A. I guess it's a regular -- well, safety was involved because they did talk to us. But yeah, I guess it was an internal safety meeting. Like I said, Valeri and them, they said -- they came in there, they talked, Orlando came, he talked about the safety issues. But then everybody else did their talking also, maintenance, flight ops, even the 135 people were there also.

Q. Okay.

A. So, it was just each section talked about whatever they had to and that was done twice a week.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you remember in that particular meeting, was Teimour there?

A. Yeah, he was there.

Q. And how about the vice president, Tracy?

A. No, I don't think Tracy was there at that time. He was on speaker, I think.

Q. On speaker?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And how about the director of maintenance -- well, I guess he must've been?
A. Oh, no, he was there -- Mike was there, yeah.
Q. And David, you said -- David Seest?
A. Yeah.
Q. And you were there?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. All right, was the FAA there?
A. No, FAA was not there.
Q. All right. David Hoshour, he's no longer with the company?
A. No.
Q. What kind of a professional relationship did you have with him? Was it difficult?
A. Yeah, it was. He's a good stick and rudder, but he doesn't like to follow the rules. He doesn't like to follow procedures and stuff. I had problems with him.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. All right. And did he leave of his own accord or was he --
A. Yeah, he left on his own accord. He resigned, yeah.
Q. Okay. Was he -- did you feel like he was trying to sort of do more than his job description or get -- sort of go beyond his responsibilities?
A. No. I mean, I never thought he stepped over bounds, he just was a talker. He loved to talk to all the women, so the problem was sometimes he runs late and I had to talk to him about that because, you know, our planes was loaded, he wasn't there, and he was observed talking to people. So, yeah, but stepping over? No, I never got that from him. I think he would want to, to be honest.
Q. Okay. Did you consider him to be a good captain?

A. This is put -- I'll just put it this way, he's a captain that I know would bring down my plane safely. He just -- he was lazy, you know, we -- I had him do a check with Mark Butin and he did excellent, he did everything by the book, even Mark was surprised with that. But everything else, he just never took it seriously, you know, and I have a problem with that.

Q. Did you guys get into it sometimes, like yelling or arguing?

A. No, never. We would never. Me and him -- I mean, you know, he respected me and I respected him, but I did have talks with him, of course.

Q. Okay. All right, one thing that Henry said -- Henry Okai said in his original interview with us was he described sort of an informal personal procedure that he did when taxiing to the runway.

He said along the way -- and this is not company procedure, this is my procedure, I will bring the power up and check all the engine instruments, basically everything to make sure I look at the instruments. Make sure there are no red flags anywhere and then I'll come over and look at the hydraulics, make sure we have pressure, we have quantity. Make sure the two systems are good, within the green, and then I'll check my flight instruments. Then I'll check the other pilot, make sure I set that side up right, the courses and all that for the navigation. I'll come down, look at the frequencies, make sure we're all good. I'll look overhead, make sure there are no initiators, and then I will check the bleeding edge devices, make sure there's nothing sticking out. He said this is me; this is not company procedure. I don't know if they want me to do this, maybe I'll get in trouble for saying this. Would you have any objection to him -- his employing this personal procedure and would you call it an additional procedure or more of a technique?

A. Well, that's a lot of things to be doing while you're taxiing. I just want to make sure -- and I didn't know all that and then, you know, to check engine instruments, that's why when we're cleared for takeoff, we bring our EPR's to 1.4, to make sure everything's in the green, everything is good and if it is, we set it for takeoff. It's just -- you know, maybe that's the way he did things at the other company. I don't know. I haven't -- that was one thing I never got -- any FO's called

me about that thing. I think you guys knew the only thing was about that flight control check thing, right? That was a big thing between those two people. But I -- she -- even she never called me or anything about what he was doing about all these things.

Q. Okay. Was Henry generally compliant with standard operating procedures?

A. Yeah, he was.

Q. Okay. Were you aware of any other sort of idiosyncrasies about the way he did things other than the wanting his -- or I guess you said you weren't aware of that?

A. Yeah.

Q. Were you aware of any other than what I just described?

A. Well, except for the flight controls. I was aware of that because those two -- you know, it escalated to they -- you know --

Q. But on the flight control checks, I think you told us last time it wasn't really -- what he was doing wasn't contracted procedures, it was --

A. Well, in our book it doesn't say that. But he wanted it that way, I guess, like he wanted to do all those other things and I did talk to Gina about it, you know, and if he wants to do it at the end of the runway where he's safely stopped and he wants to do a final check, that's nothing wrong. But I think it was to the point that they were just at each other already and it just -- I don't know, that's what I got. But yeah, I mean, after listening to all those things that you just said he does, I mean, I wouldn't -- he probably would've done that too and I think you did mention that he checked everything, right? So, yeah -- which I don't think nothing's wrong as long as he's doing -- it's safety and doing what he's supposed to be doing instead of doing all that.

Q. Okay. On the -- you mentioned that there had been increased emphasis in the training about when to declare an emergency, but it wasn't clear in the discussion about whether that had -- that change had occurred before or after the accident. I assume it was after the accident?

A. No, it was before the accident. We was talking about it before. Henry had another incident

and it was skeptical on -- it got involved because another airline was in front of him and he decided he wanted to declare an emergency and I don't know how this airline found out what it was. But they vectored him off, they let Henry land and they brought him back around. I guess the pilots complained to their POI and their POI called our POI and it got -- it just -- we had to explain the reasons why.

Q. What was the reason for his declaring an emergency?

A. Fuel quantity gauge, it went to zero.

Q. Okay. When was that?

A. That was either late of 2020 or beginning of -- it's more 2021, I think. Yeah, 2021.

Q. Okay, likely 2021?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Why did he declare an emergency in that circumstance?

A. He just -- I don't know why. I had a good talk with him, you know, he just felt that he needed to get on the ground and he wasn't that far away from -- and he was going into Kona that day.

Q. Was he flying along and all of a sudden, the fuel quantity just went to zero or how did that -- what happened?

A. He said when he was flying that they went from Honolulu to Hilo, Hilo to Kona and he was supposed to come home. When flied to Hilo, the gauge bounced, then it was normal. He said he landed, the gauge was fine, he took off, coming to Kona it bounced, he said, and then it dropped to zero.

Q. Okay. How long was that before he landed?

A. You mean after that?

Q. Yeah, after the gauge went to zero?

A. I know he told ATC he wanted priority landing and they said well, you're number two

unless you're declaring emergency because Aloha was coming in in front of them, and then I guess whatever he thought, he decided he was going to declare an emergency. So, they vectored Aloha off and Henry went into land.

Q. All right. Did you think that was an inappropriate decision?

A. I did, yes.

Q. Okay. Why?

A. There's other -- there's secondary things you can check to see if the fuel quantity gauge -- I mean, the fuel is zero and I asked him on all those things he should've checked and the FO did too and he just thought he needed to put the plane on the ground. I mean, that's basically what I got from him when I talked to him.

Q. Okay. What else can he check to cross reference?

A. Fuel flow, I mean that's one thing. We use fuel for cooling for oil temperature that would right and also, the biggest thing, I think he had, like, over 5,000 pounds in that tank. If you lose 5,000 pounds, you'll plane will yaw, I guarantee that, and I asked him well, was it stable, did you get any yawing? No, everything was fine.

Q. Was it the indication for a wing tank?

A. Yeah, it was the wing tank. I think it was the number two tank, yeah.

Q. Okay. And did you yell at him about that?

A. No, I didn't yell, but I was pretty firm about it. I mean, to me, he should've checked all those other things. I mean, he didn't need to declare the emergency, everything was fine. The engine wasn't -- the engine was fine and I think the FO -- I talked to the FO and the FO tried to tell him that too. He just thought he needed to get the plane on the ground.

Q. Okay. Was that before Henry had the other instance where he lost the engine and didn't declare the emergency?

A. Yeah, that was one of the -- I don't know if that was before that first -- so, I think -- let me

see, so the one he didn't declare, that was before the incident. I don't know --

Q. Before --

A. Yeah, the one he didn't declare the emergency, he shut down the engine.

Q. It was before the one where he (indiscernible).

A. That was before --

MR. KATT: Wait a minute, just let him finish the rest of what he's saying, then you can answer, so you get it clear.

MR. HORIBATA: Oh, sorry. Okay.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. So, the -- what you're saying -- tell me if I'm correct, but -- so, he had the incident where he declared an emergency because of the fuel gauge. Was that after the one where he lost an engine and landed without declaring an emergency, or was that before?

A. Before.

Q. Okay. The fuel gauge was before the landing without declaring, okay. All right, so when you talked to him about the landing without declaring an emergency, did you guys discuss the previous incident or any landing that he did declare an emergency inappropriately?

A. Yeah. I think we discussed about declaring an emergency exactly, yeah.

Q. Okay. But did it come up? Did you say well, I know I told you not to declare one for the fuel gauge, but you should've for the engine out?

A. Well, it's not that I told him he shouldn't, I told him he you should've used other means to determine if you did have a fuel leak or not any fuel in the tank. I mean there was other means that you could've checked to make sure that was what or it was just a gauge problem. So, that's what I kind of explained to him.

Q. I'm just wondering if that previous incident came up at all during the conversation after the second one?

A. It came up because of what -- it came up because he brought it up about declaring an emergency, which he was, I guess, a little bit unclear about when to declare an emergency.

Q. He brought it up after the second one with the engine?

A. Yeah, we talked about it.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So, do you think based on those conversations, he should've had a pretty clear idea about whether to declare an emergency or not in the accident plane?

A. I think he did declare an emergency in the accident flight, did he?

Q. I haven't reviewed the tape.

A. I think he did do it.

Q. But the question I have in my head is do you think he had a clear idea about where he should have?

A. I think definitely. I mean, of the circumstance, yeah, I think so.

Q. Okay.

A. And I'm pretty sure he did declare.

Q. Okay. One other thing I wanted to clarify, so you mentioned that there were managers or not in the monthly meetings with Pat, the engine guy, and the director of maintenance that are happening now since the accident?

A. Say that again? I'm sorry.

Q. So, since the accident, I think you said you guys are having meetings where the pilots come in and meet with the engine guy and the director of maintenance?

A. No, we just -- yeah, we did that, yes.

Q. Once a month?

A. No. We had three meetings already, but we want to do that -- we want to start doing that

monthly, you know, so at least pilots can ask questions related to the airplane.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean, we're just trying to do things to make them feel more comfortable, so they can ask questions to the source.

Q. And so, when you said -- I know you said the managers wouldn't be present, but the director of maintenance is a manager, so I just wanted to double check, would he be the only manager present?

A. And Pat. Pat is our -- I don't really -- I apologize -- what his title is. But I just know he has a lot of background, and he worked for Pratt and Whitney, he worked for Boeing, so he knows these engines. He worked for CFM, I mean, he knows all the engines, so that was another thing.

Q. Okay. What's Pat's last name?

A. Give me one moment, I have it.

Q. All right.

A. Hold on. I turned it off.

Q. Oh. You can tell us afterwards.

A. Okay, yeah.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. So, that's it for me for round two. I appreciate it.

Shawn, do you have anything additional?

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. I just have one question and it's because I'm not a hundred percent sure on these safety meetings. I know you have the two meetings a week and then you have a CASS meeting once a month, correct?

A. Yes, once a month.

Q. Do you have any safety meetings with the FAA, the POI, the PMI?

A. Oh, yeah, of course. Orlando's there, yeah.

Q. How often are those?

A. Well, he's there at the CASS meeting and he's there at the weekly meetings. He's there every meeting we have.

Q. Okay, and that's great. But with the FAA, do you have safety meetings with the FAA besides the CASS?

A. I don't really know. I mean, maybe Mark would come to Orlando to talk about safety issues, but I'm not there. But when we're at the safety meeting -- I mean CASS meeting, everybody's present and Orlando does talk about all the safety things that on, yes, with the FAA present. Now, I know he meets with Mark also, so I don't know how often they meet on that day.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. That might help in my brain and hopefully I can keep it there. So, that's all I have, thanks.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, Clarence?

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. I just have two questions.

A. Yeah, go ahead.

Q. The first one is, back in 2017, do recall an inspection -- or actually a -- I guess you could call it an FAA inspection on the company from, specifically, the Cargo Focus Team?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the outcome of that inspection? Was it positive, negative?

A. Well, I have -- I mean, it'd have to be okay, they granted -- I mean, they let us continue. I know we had some things that we need to fix -- I mean on the flight ops side. They jump seated numerous times with us.

Q. Do you recall what those were? Sorry.

A. No. One was briefing, this inspector, even if it was VFR, he thought we should brief the whole ILS approach if we're using it because you never know if you're going to need it. I mean, of course we got that changed when Mark came because me and David gave our spiel that we don't really think that's warranted if it's VFR. But that was one thing. I'm trying to think --

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Wallace Horibata
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 28, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Carolyn Hanna
Transcriber

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:	*	
	*	
TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH	*	
NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII,	*	Accident No.: DCA21FA174
ON JULY 2, 2021	*	
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Interview of: TEIMOUR RIAHI, CEO

TransAir Executive Airlines of Hawaii

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday,
September 29, 2021

APPEARANCES:

DR. WILLIAM BRAMBLE, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

RICH LEE, Safety Pilot
Boeing Commercial Airplanes

CLARENCE KANAE, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

WILLIAM KATT, Attorney
Wilson, Elser, Moskowits, Edlman & Dicker LLP

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INTERVIEW

(10:03 a.m.)

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, so today is September 29th and it is 10:03 a.m. My name is William Bramble, I'm a human performance investigator with NTSB and Shawn Etcher and I are leading the Operations and Human Performance group for Accident Investigation Number DCA21FA174 in Rhoades Aviation Flight 810. This is a follow up interview with Mr. Teimour Riahi.

I've already read to you about the NTSB's role and our function and so forth. But just for the purpose of the transcriptionist, could we please have Mr. Etcher and the other group members present identify themselves?

MR. ETCHER: Good morning, sir, my name is Shawn Etcher with the NTSB. I'm the Operational Factors group chairman.

MR. RIAHI: Good morning.

MR. KANAE: Good morning, Teimour. Clarence Kanae with the FAA Aviation's Safety Inspector Operations.

MR. RIAHI: Good morning, sir.

MR. LEE: Hello, Rich Lee, safety pilot for the Boeing Company.

MR. RIAHI: Good morning, sir.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay, is there anyone here that you object to being present?

MR. RIAHI: No.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay, and again, today we're going use this digital recorder and send the recordings out for transcription and each party member will an opportunity to review the transcription for typos. Again, the purpose of the investigation is to determine probably cause and prevent recurrence. You're entitled to have a representative at any NTSB interview. Is there someone here you'd like to have as your representative?

MR. RIAHI: Yes.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay, and that is?

MR. RIAHI: That's Mr. Bill Katt.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay, Mr. Katt, can you introduce yourself?

MR. KATT: Yeah. William Katt with the law firm Wilson Elser.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay, great. Thanks, questions? Okay.

INTERVIEW OF TEIMOUR RIAHI

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. All right. So, Teimour, we have some questions to help us fill in gaps where, you know, we've gotten different pieces of the puzzle that don't have the connecting piece and so forth. And then we also have -- I have a number of things where things came up in interviews with people and we want to make sure that we get your side of the story in terms of things that were asserted about things that transpired or what not.

A. More than happy to help.

Q. Yeah. Sorry, some of these may be difficult questions. But we want to make sure that you have a chance to respond to things that other people might have said. All right, there are also a few of these that I think Mr. Reasoner's already answered, so I may have some pauses while I eliminated questions. All right, so it seemed like the 737's have been generating a fair number of recurring maintenance issues over the last year, and 810 was going to be sort of timing out in terms of cycles by the end of 2021. Have you or other managers been sort of having discussions about moving up the timeframe for replacing the 200's with newer airplanes that might be more reliable prior to the accident?

A. Yes, very good question. We actually initiated the discussion back in 2019 in planning of upgrading our fleet in the future. So, the discussions really start from early 2019 and we decided -- we realized that 810 was the first aircraft that needed to be retired and there would be other

aircrafts, you know, depending, of course, how the cycle would turn out, would be the next candidates for the retirement.

But the plan was that, you know, as soon as we are able to secure other aircrafts -- other newer aircrafts, you know, we would actually do early retirement on some of the fleets which are very close to the retirement date. We chose the 737 -- Boeing 737 400 and in 2021 we purchased a Boeing 737 400 and that was essentially to replace aircraft N810TA.

Q. Okay.

A. And the efforts are still ongoing to secure a second Boeing 737 400 and we have our agents -- you know, a few agents looking in the marketplace for acquiring of the second Boeing 737 400. So, essentially, we figured every two years we would be able to replace one Boeing 737 200 with a 400 and that plan still is ongoing.

Q. Okay. How long has that been the plan?

A. Since 2019 when we first initiated that plan. In 2021 we were able to secure the first Boeing 737 400. The market is extremely tight for these aircrafts right now because of the high demand for this particular type of airplanes. We're very happy that we secured the first one. The first one was purchased in, I believe, February of 2021 and we signed a contract with a company called AEI, Aeronautical Engineers Incorporated, out in Miami for the conversion of this aircraft from passenger to a freighter. And the aircraft was inducted in July of this year into the process and the process is ongoing. This aircraft is scheduled to be completed by early December 2021.

Q. Okay. And then the plan going forward is to still replace one airplane approximately every two years?

A. Yes, absolutely. Yeah, we kind of put the plan together which I figured approximately every two years would be a comfortable timeframe. Not to exceed two years to start replacing the fleet for the renewal of the fleet. You figure in two years, you know, every aircraft has -- of course we have to find it, we have to do the maintenance on it. Most of these aircrafts we would want to

have a fresh seat check and we have to brief documents of course. There's always aircrafts -- you know, come from other countries that would be subject to other U.S. laws and they have to upgrade it to a certain level of compliance with the FARs.

So, we figured, you know, all the processes and of course the process of conversion, mostly they are freighters -- I mean they are non-freighter aircraft that have to be turned into freighters. So, it would take some time, so we figured about maybe at least eight or nine months, you know, to get inducted, getting in line with certain companies, and of course everything else. So -- and then of course work with the FAA to put the aircraft on the certificate, pilot training, maintenance training, and all of that in place would take approximately two years for us from the beginning to the end. But we are hoping always a lot less than that, but we assigned that time to hopefully be able to complete the project.

Q. Okay.

A. And to be very much in line with this particular aircraft -- this aircraft's going to be ready in December and we would need at least another month or 45 days for a C-check, and the upgrades, and work with the FAA after that which we would expect to at least -- I would say in the neighborhood of about maybe 60 days. So, that two years is -- this very aircraft is a very valuable thing -- that two years, which would be -- we would expect to have this aircraft on the certificate in first quarter or the beginning of second quarter of 2022.

Q. Okay.

A. Which will be exactly -- approximately less than one-and-a-half years.

Q. Okay. Onto another topic, were you aware that Rhoades Maintenance Department did not have any technicians with a borescope inspection qualification on staff in the months before the accident?

A. I was not.

Q. Was -- and was the issue of borescoping the engines ever raised in conjunction with the

recurrent compressor stalls so many airplanes were experiencing early 2021?

A. You know, I don't recall that, that's a maintenance question. But if I'm not mistaken, anything that we did not have in house we always made provisions to have it contracted to be done.

Q. Okay. The current PMI for Rhoades told us that one of the problems he identified in early 2021 included serious shortcomings in the company's CASS program. Were you aware of any shortcomings in that area?

A. I believe that we always did the CASS the way that we interpreted from our manual and we were having regular CASS meetings. I mean, we had those CASS meetings forever and the FAA was always in attendance in the CASS meetings and we were not made aware of any discrepancies that the FAA brought to our attention.

Q. Okay.

A. May I add something else in the previous question about the borescope?

Q. Uh huh.

A. Now, I do remember that -- I mean, of course every maintenance procedure goes in accordance with the published manuals of the -- whether it's the engine or airframe, airframe manufacturer, engine manufacturer, avionics, avionics manufacturer, they have their own manuals. I do know that, you know, we strictly follow the manuals of the manufacturer and I'm not aware of any of our FAA approved manuals that requires regular borescoping of the engines. In my knowledge, I believe -- and again, I'm not a maintenance, I'm more operations -- more familiar with operations. But as far as the maintenance is concerned, I believe borescopes becomes due when it's decided that there is a particular problem with a certain mechanical issue with an engine that would require a borescope.

Q. Okay, thank you for that. Can you recall the PMI -- your current PMI communicating anything about absence of adequate processes for tracking chronic maintenance writeups?

A. Can you repeat that? Adequate tracking of maintenance issues?

Q. Chronic maintenance writeups. Did he ever say the company is lacking adequate processes to track chronic maintenance issues?

A. No, because we were actually working with the chronic maintenance issues ourselves. That was part of our CASS meetings -- the monthly CASS meetings. I mean, tracking -- we were tracking -- that was part of a tracking system that we had, you know, our CASS meetings.

Q. Okay. Last week we interviewed --

A. I'm sorry, may I add something else too?

Q. Okay.

A. Again, these -- you know, I mean, any maintenance writeup is a maintenance writeup, it becomes more significant when it's repeated, you know, in a certain number of days, or months, or weeks and that is an attention catcher. (Verbatim) And I personally have always asked questions about the chronic writeups, it's a big topic of discussions that comes. In these meetings we have the chief pilot, we have the director of operations, I always attend myself because I'm interested, you know? And the director of maintenance of course and all the top people in the company gather together once a month for the CASS meetings and the subject of chronic writeups definitely was open and we were discussing it. So, we were tracking it, we knew about the quote, unquote chronic writeups.

Q. Thanks. So, last week we interviewed former Rhoades chief inspector, Scott Mayural, who resigned from his position in May 21st, 2021. I understand that he does something else for the company now?

A. Yes.

Q. But he stated that his biggest challenge was not having the people that he felt should have to handle their responsibilities and duties effectively. He told us that he did not have the resources to do effective CASS audits and that he needed a CASS manager and another inspector. And he

said he had brought this up in executive meetings, got permission to run ads to hire more people, but that the company didn't get any qualified applicants.

And so, I was wondering you were aware that this was a challenge for him in early 2021?

A. This was actually discussed and we -- as soon as I knew about it, you know, I asked him to definitely hire people that he wants, all the qualified people. He did interview a few people and he did not like them and that was it. So, the search was ongoing until not very recently -- you know, soon after that, we hired a CASS manager that's currently with us right now.

Q. When did the CASS -- the new CASS manager start?

A. He started about -- close to about maybe -- actually, you know, a few days before the accident. That was the end of June, a few days -- last few days of June 2021. And Mr. Scott Mayural was under a lot of stress, which -- he became sick and as a result he resigned his position because he felt a lot of pressure from the CMT team.

Q. Okay.

A. In fact, he had to be hospitalized, you know, with some issues.

Q. Okay. Did you feel that he was qualified for the job of chief inspector -- like well qualified for it? We received some comments in interviews from the FAA inspectors and maybe he -- maybe they felt he wasn't qualified for that job.

A. I totally disagree. If you look at his resume, he was indeed an FAA inspector in his previous life and to us, and to the person that was responsible for hiring him, Mike Kimble, when he discussed it with me, we looked through the resume, to us he was well qualified to do that. I think the FAA's decision was very subjective.

Q. Okay.

A. And he was under attack, to be honest with you, by the FAA team, continuously being demanded that he's not qualified. But, you know, eventually when he resigned his position, we decided to -- we did not (indiscernible), we decided to look for someone else.

Q. Okay. And what qualifications were you looking for when you hired the new chief inspector?

A. Well, the new chief inspector came with many years of maintenance experience and for many years he worked for the same company. He used to work for Aloha Airlines as a mechanic at the beginning and then he became the aircraft maintenance and stayed with them for many years. When the company was sold to a company called Aloha Air Cargo, he maintained his position until very recently. So, that was another at least -- I would say at least 12, 13 years, you know, with the subsequent company and then we hired him. In fact, I tried to hire him once before and it didn't work because he said that he was happy with the job he was doing over there. But, you know, that's about when we first got to know him, very nice gentleman and very qualified.

Q. And what people does he have supporting him now?

A. He has his CASS manager that is just recently hired, Patrick Pogue.

Q. What was that?

A. Patrick Pogue.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. P-o-g-u-e.

Q. Uh huh. Anyone else on his staff?

A. On his staff, I don't know at this time.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't believe so.

Q. All right.

A. I believe we have -- we already have made, you know, the resources available to the Maintenance Department to fortify that department -- the CASS department and the search is ongoing actually. So, that I know, the search is ongoing to fortify a few more people for the Inspection Department and the CASS office.

Q. Okay. The last time we met, we discussed a letter that you sent employees encouraging them to write up maintenance issues without fear of repercussions.

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. That's the letter that we put into people's paycheck because I figured it goes to everybody. Everybody comes to get their paycheck, so, you know, people have access to it. I just wanted to make sure that they read that.

Q. And we did speak to some people who recalled getting that, so that's good that they did seem to receive it.

A. Yes.

Q. Just in terms of the timing of events, my recollection from last time was that the safety report about the captain being reluctant to write up an issue came up in a -- maybe a safety meeting or a CASS meeting. Is that right? Or was it --

A. It may have been discussed, yeah, I remember that. That's what triggered that letter, you know, because a lady pilot was writing it up and we received that and we acted upon it immediately. In fact, before I sent that note out -- do you have a copy of the note by any chance?

Q. No, that's one thing I was going to ask you about?

A. Oh, I'd be happy to give you a note, yeah. I'll send it to you, for sure.

Q. That's great, yeah.

A. But yeah, that's what instigated that letter that I wrote to the company people encouraging everyone and yeah, that letter's available. Oh, here's what I wanted to say. And then before the letter was going -- even out, I immediately contacted Mark Butin, our POI. And I said that -- you know, Mr. Mark Butin, this is something that's happened and we came out of a weekly -- twice weekly safety meeting and he happened to be invited -- we always invite him to attend these meetings and at the end of the meeting, I said look, you know, this is something that came up, by

the way. I just wanted to share the information and I'll show you the anonymous report. And I said look, I'm going to be doing something about this, I'm going to write a letter and I'll give you a copy of it. But I just want you to be aware of this and I want to share that with you and he appreciated it oh, okay, thank you, let me have it and we did send him a copy of it, too.

Q. So, at that meeting -- is that meeting the first time it was sort of formally discussed amongst the managers at that meeting that Mark Butin attended?

A. No, I don't believe so. I think this had happened before and if I remember correctly, it was very much along the same time, but it was one of those meetings that I knew about it and we knew that I was going to do something about that because it was so unbelievable that people thought we were going to fire people. We've never fired anyone about writing anything up on the aircrafts and that's the records there. So, I just don't believe that, you know?

Q. So, at this meeting where Mr. Butin learned about this, at the same meeting you said look, here's the report and then here's what we're going to do about it?

A. After the meeting.

Q. Oh.

A. Yeah, in that meeting I don't believe that that actually came out, so he had no idea about this.

Q. Oh.

A. But after the meeting had ended and we were all saying bye to each other, I grabbed Mr. Butin and I said by the way, you know, I just want to let you know that something like this came up and we just got a hold of it -- I think we had just gotten ahold of the information and I wanted to share that with him. I said look, this has come up, just want you to know about this and we're going to be doing something about this. Yeah.

Q. So, you already had -- you had the plan -- the action plan in mind?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. In mind, yes. It wasn't -- it hadn't materialized, but I said this is what we're going to do, I'm going to write everyone a letter to encourage everyone not -- number one, not to be fearful of writing things up. That's why we have an anonymous reporting system. They can anonymously put it on the website, they can, you know, write on the special forms that we have. There's an anonymous box that -- you know, the blank forms are there and they can wrap it and put it inside the box, you know, the box is locked. So, there's several ways to be able to report anything that you want to report about any subject and put it in the box, and we'll open it up and look at it, and we don't even know who the person was.

Q. Okay, thanks for that. And I apologize for jumping quickly across topics. But I just want to hit all of my things that I have.

A. And I apologize if my explanation is a bit too long. So, you can always stop me.

Q. It's okay.

MR. KATT: I still don't know.

DR. BRAMBLE: You need to provide us with everything you think is important.

MR. RIAHI: Yes.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. That's fine. Okay, so we understand that Rhoades hired auditors to support the director of safety and those included Valeri Pilipenko and Miguel Ramirez, is that correct?

A. That's correct, yeah.

Q. All right.

A. We have further fortified that department by another very qualified person.

Q. You have since then?

A. Yes, we have since then.

Q. Who's the new person?

A. Her name is Gail and she was part of the SMS Department at Hawaiian Airlines for many years.

Q. Okay.

A. And she took an early retirement, because of the COVID, that they were offering and we, you know, invited her to come work with us and she's been very happy working with us.

Q. Okay.

A. She's part of our team.

Q. Were you involved in hiring Valeri and Ramirez -- or Miguel Ramirez?

A. Not directly. I knew about it, but not directly.

Q. All right, and how would you describe their performance during the first half of 2021?

A. Their performance, I think, you know, was very good. They were (indiscernible), they were assigned different projects to audit for the aircraft safety and they were out doing their jobs.

Q. Did they attend the company's twice weekly meetings?

A. Absolutely, yeah. It was a mandatory meeting for everyone from the Safety Department as well as all the top managers -- the directors, top managers, with myself religiously attending every Tuesday and Friday and we invite the FAA team to attend anytime that they want to attend it too. They attended some. It's pretty much every Tuesday and Friday at 10:00 a.m. Everybody has to attend those meetings.

Q. Okay. So, a number of people told us that Valeri would attend those meetings, but that Michael (sic) Ramirez didn't attend those meetings very often. Is that the case?

A. Yeah, that's true, actually. You know, that's true. The director of safety, you know, would decide who to attend -- not decide, it was -- like, everyone was encouraged to attend and be there, mandatory for the top managers. Absolutely for the top managers and as long as we had at least one person were there, Valeri or Mr. Miguel, you know, along with -- of course the aircraft safety was always there, that would suffice.

Q. Okay.

A. But yeah, Mr. Valeri was pretty much always there. Mr. Miguel, you know, he was encouraged to come, but he was not always there.

Q. Okay, and did Valeri and Miguel make presentations at the meetings?

A. Mostly Valeri did.

Q. Okay.

A. He was in charge of -- you know, we developed our own Excel sheet of the issues to discuss so we can -- it was, like, a quick reference and Valeri was in charge of that. He was all up to date as to what the event was, when it happened, what we did about it, what were the mitigations, and the control that we put in place, and when we closed the subject matter.

Q. Okay. All right, I have a few questions about Mr. Ramirez, who I understand is no longer employed with Rhoades. So, he relayed some things to us that were of concern to him. He told us that at a mid-April meeting, he presented a color-coded spread sheet of maintenance writeups that were sort of prompted by the occurrence of some compressor stalls and some other incidents and he presented that at one of these meetings with the top Rhoades managers. Do you recall him making a presentation with that in April?

A. Yes, I do.

Q. And do you recall what kind of issues he identified?

A. I don't recall particular issues. But, you know, the issues, that obviously was maintenance related, mostly generated from the writeups probably or maybe the audits that he did. I don't particularly remember that -- each and every writeup that -- or subject he was discussing at the time.

Q. Okay.

A. But in general -- yeah, that's a good general statement. Yeah, it was the maintenance issues and the writeups and of course that -- I mean, the meetings that we had was really all about

the issues that were coming up. And it was all encouraged, you know, everyone write things up, let's see what it is, put it out in the open, let's everyone discuss it and come up with a resolution. So, I'm sure that there was -- everybody had their own list of things to discuss and I'm pretty sure that Mr. Miguel had his own list and discussed a lot of things.

Q. Okay. So, he communicated to us that some of the issues that he raised in that meeting involved maintenance signoffs using wrong references or too general ATA codes, non-specific sections, missing detailed information about what was actually done to troubleshoot issues. Does any of that sound familiar?

A. Yes, it does.

Q. Okay. What kind of discussion followed that presentation at the meeting?

A. Well, the discussion was very much encouraged and of course we said to him wow, let's see. But the question had to go out to the aircraft maintenance, Mr. Mark Kimble, and his chief inspector, Mr. Mayural -- Scott Mayural and there was a live -- I remember that very well because there was a very lively discussion which I was out there sitting and listening to everyone. I was enjoying it, actually, because that was exactly what the meeting was for, you know. It was a lively discussion, there were discussions about, you know, how he found things to be wrong and the aircraft maintenance and chief inspector had a totally different view of the manual and how it's supposed to be. There was a very lively discussion between them, they did not agree with each other at all and I do remember that.

Q. Okay. Was it fair to call that discussion a bit heated between the director of maintenance and Mr. Ramirez?

A. Yes, but I was enjoying it. I told both of them, I said look, don't take these things at all personal, but I'm glad that you're getting your opinions out and make it heard, you know. That's the only way we can decide how we can solve any and all issues. So, I had to kind of step in and, you know, get both of them and encourage them to be respectful to each other and professionally

respectful to each other. There was no name calling, by the way, it was just a very heated, professional discussion.

Q. All right. What was the nature of that disagreement between them?

A. Exactly what you mentioned, you know, there were some things that he thought -- Mr. Miguel Ramirez, as an auditor, he felt he had to write up and the certain ways was signing off things and executing maintenance. And the Maintenance Department totally disagreed and brought the books and said look, this is what the manual says and that's how we're doing it and that's exactly what they did, these are the FARs. And, you know, they said the -- Mr. Ramirez did not really have line experience much but --

Q. That he didn't have what?

A. Line experience.

Q. Oh, line experience.

A. Line experience. Whereas I knew Scott and Kimble, they had, you know, strong backgrounds in line maintenance, and manual interpretations, and the function of the maintenance and how to write things up, how to, you know, to sign it off. But Mr. Miguel had a different idea -- a different view and it was that discussion between them.

Q. Okay. How was that conflict resolved afterward?

A. Well, to me, actually, the process worked very well. Soon after that, Mr. Miguel, he quit. I had no idea that he quit at all until I was told that, you know, he was offered another job with Mokulele Airlines and he left.

Q. Okay.

A. He was also previously a mechanic that was hired by us and he worked for us shortly and then he quit and some years back he came back and said he wanted to have a job again and that's how we invited him to come work with us. But that time we said okay, you know, we have a position at the Safety Department and we're going to put you in here and he accepted.

Q. Okay. Did you or any of the other managers follow up with Mr. Ramirez after that meeting about the shortcomings that he described? Did you talk to him privately about it at all?

A. I did not talk to him privately. But I believe the director of safety, you know, had discussions with him. But, you know, I encouraged, actually, both the director of maintenance and Mr. Ramirez to definitely talk to each other further about their disagreements and that did happen, actually, a few times. And I believe Mr. Ramirez accepted that, you know, the way he interpreted a certain thing was incorrect.

Q. That the way he --

A. So, I did follow up, you know, with -- you know, the director of maintenance and the chief inspector as to the outcome of that. So, basically, on the meetings that we have on Tuesday and Friday, all the items discussed, those are, like, question mark and we're out of time, it goes to the next session. So, from Tuesday goes to Friday, so we completely follow up with all those items until it's all resolved and the discussion was again on the next session. But Mr. Ramirez was not there on the next session. I asked Mike Kimble, he said I encouraged them to get together again after the meeting -- after the heated discussion to go back and make sure that they're going to resolve this one way or the other and Mr. Kimble did say that they got together and resolved it.

Q. Okay.

A. But it wasn't soon after that occasion that Mr. Ramirez quit his job to the best of my recollection, you know, as to the dates.

Q. When did Mr. Ramirez leave?

A. I don't remember the date. I can get that for you.

Q. Okay. How come Mr. Ramirez didn't attend the next meeting where it was discussed?

A. Well, he did not regularly meet -- attend too many meetings because as long as we had at least -- out of the three people in the Safety Department, you know the director of safety and the two auditors, as long as we had at least two. The aircraft safety was absolutely a must because he

was in touch with everybody else with his people and Valeri was really the record keeper and of course the auditor -- he was the auditor for the operations.

Q. Okay.

A. So --

Q. And with respect to the issues that Mr. Ramirez raised about the maintenance writeups, it sounds like what you're saying is that your impression was that Mr. Ramirez agreed that he was incorrect in flagging those issues and the director of maintenance had the correct interpretations?

A. Yes, that was my interpretation of it after.

Q. Okay. So, Mr. Ramirez told us that after that meeting, his access to maintenance records for future audits of the Maintenance Department was changed so that he had to request them from the director of safety, who would then in turn request them from the director of maintenance to supply anything that was requested. Do you know if that was true?

A. I'm not privy to that information. It's the first I'm hearing it.

Q. Okay.

A. Because I strictly requested that they do get together and they find the issues to resolve it for the company, of course, you know, and put their personal disagreements aside.

Q. Okay, and Mr. Ramirez also told us that he wasn't invited to the CASS meetings. Is that --

A. Oh, no, that's not true. This meeting was mandatory for everybody as long -- for the top managers. The top managers, you know, were definitely big into their own people, they wanted to be in the meeting and Mr. Ramirez was always invited. He attended a lot of the meetings, but not as many as others.

Q. Okay.

A. His office -- I've brought in the director of safety office right next to my office because I want to be more in touch with them on a daily basis. They were at a different hangar and -- but I do remember Mr. Ramirez was always working very well. But he was mostly sitting behind his

computer.

Q. Okay, and the PMI told us that it was his understanding that Mr. Ramirez had kind of been thrown out of the Maintenance Department by Mr. Kimble who didn't want him in there auditing things. Did you hear about anything like that happening out there?

A. No, I didn't hear -- if I've ever heard that I would've put a stop to it, you know, because they were absolutely encouraged to look at that. He was a maintenance auditor, so he had to have access. No, I was not aware of that at all.

Q. All right.

A. I don't believe that would be the case because I would hear it from others and I never heard anything from anyone else.

Q. Okay. Mr. Ramirez told us that he subsequently completed an audit on maintenance operations on May 6th, 2021. Did you ever read this report?

A. On May 2021, I don't remember right now.

Q. Okay. So, this report --

A. I would not particularly read any and all of these reports unless the aircraft safety felt that there was something very import that I needed to know about.

Q. Okay.

A. But since we were having meetings every week -- twice every week, a pretty extensive meeting -- two, three-hour meetings each and every day, I figured if something's very important that I needed to know about -- everything was out in the open, you know, I would know about it.

Q. Okay. So, he told us that the findings in this report were that -- and there's a number of them. Here, I'll read them just to see if it sounds familiar. The maintenance personnel were not understanding that part 5 was applicable to their roles, that the maintenance manuals had yet to be revised and improved, that there was no structured maintenance training program, that there were no -- there was no QA or QC department to provide oversight of inspections, that repairs were

being signed off using wrong references, that maintenance sign offs were impossible to read and contained references that were too general, that there were too many repeated (indiscernible) on the same aircraft, and that there was poor communication between departments, and that management was aware of systemic issues, but no solution was implemented and safety performance and assurance was not considered their primary job -- this is management of the maintenance aspect -- rather the emphasis was on getting the aircraft back in service.

That was kind of the gist of some of the negative findings of his report according to him. Does any of that sound familiar? Does that jog your memory in terms of having seen that?

Q. Well, you know what, that was the subject of the meetings -- the heated meetings that we were having between, you know, Mr. Miguel and Mr. Kimble, the director of maintenance. Yeah, that was the subject -- that was the whole subject. Yeah, that's what he was saying and they disagreed completely with that and again, I encouraged it, but that was the whole meeting. The process worked pretty well, you know, they should talk to each other about this and see what the issues are.

Q. All right. And this is kind of an inflammatory statement, but Mr. Ramirez also told us that he attended a meeting with you and other managers a day or two after the accident in which you asked him if he could tone down the findings in the May -- early May audit, this one we were just talking about, because it looked bad for the company. Is this accurate?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Okay. All right.

A. Well, that -- I do remember, again, within the same meetings that the heated conversation was going on, I was encouraging everyone to be very objective and to make sure that they present their positions and the -- you know, the position and how everything is pretty correctly and not because of personality conflict. Don't allow the personality conflict to influence, you know, your writings and/or your discussions, you know, of what's important.

But you promote your company to a point that, you know, you elevate the company and you protect the company for what it is. If something's not working right, you should, you know, say it, don't be afraid. But don't make accusations that you do not know if it's correct or not. But that was all within the same discussions, you know, I never had a private meeting with Mr. Miguel.

Q. Okay. And --

A. Again, in my role, I intentionally do not have private meetings with any particular management person about a very tricky subject because I want others to be around as well. And so, I would not make -- I would not have -- especially after that discussion, I would not have a private meeting either with Mr. Kimble or Mr. Miguel unless someone else -- at least a few other people would be present.

Q. Mr. Ramirez claimed that this was the day after the accident. So, it was sometime that meeting. This would've been a couple of months later.

A. I don't recall.

Q. Okay.

A. You know, we had a lot of meetings after that accident, of course, naturally, we're all concerned and, you know, I don't recall anything during a meeting with anyone. I met with everybody asking a lot of questions. I would have definitely don't that, yeah, asking a lot of questions. But as to whether, you know, me and Mr. Miguel had a private meeting after the accident, I don't know if it was private because everyone was involved. We all had questions, and definitely all of the meetings was pretty much attended by more than myself alone

Q. But whether it was private or not, you don't recall telling him that he needed --

A. No.

Q Suggesting that he water it down or change it?

A. No. Like I said, you know, in my previous statement, I would always encourage everyone

to be honest about it and then, you know, put their possible personality traits against each other away and be more objective about what's most important about the truth in the company. That's what you have to deflect.

Q. Okay.

A. I encouraged both of them.

Q. And were you aware of mister -- of your new chief inspector working with Ramirez to revise that report?

A. No, I don't remember that.

Q. And I'm not saying it did or didn't happen. I'm just saying --

A. Yes, I was just -- I've not heard of that. Whether they tried to revise the report, I don't know.

Q. Okay. All right, so onto another topic, the FAA letters. You know, we heard from a lot of people about sort of the many letters that the FAA was sending and we kind of got the sense last time that we were here and from some of the more recent interviews that it seemed -- from Rhoades standpoint, it seemed like the FAA was preoccupied with formatting issues in the manuals and sent too many letters and was sort of more caught up in the paperwork rather than addressing issues face to face. Is that fair presentation to what --

A. It's extremely correct, yes.

Q. All right, so --

A. We were inundated by letters after letters after letters, you know, and unreasonable deadlines -- arbitrary deadlines like we receive letters on a Friday night at 5:00 p.m. or, like, 4:59 p.m. It's just typical and I've got records of it, you know, and giving us, like, five days or six days to reply to it or come up with a fix or whatever. And then out of those five days -- it was a Friday night, right, Friday counted, Saturday and Sunday is a holiday and specifically I remember there was a Monday holiday as well, so, the first business day was Tuesday, the fifth day.

You know, we actually wrote a letter, we were going to protest it, that's not -- can you extend it, you know, and the letter response came that why should we extend that, what have you shown us to extend it? But the letter just came, you know, we're trying to address that, but this Friday night we received this, you're counting Friday as one whole day out of these days that you're giving us and it was Saturday, Sunday, and there's a Monday holiday. So, the first day is Tuesday as the business day and that was just one typical example and that pretty much continued. It's amazing that you receive a lot of letters on Friday nights that counts Friday as a day.

Q. So, I think we have a clear understanding of how the letter writing and the deadlines were challenging. Did you think that the FAA had a -- in terms of the substance of the letters, did you feel like the FAA had any legitimate claims in terms of safety issues? And if so, what were those?

A. I don't believe so. Our PMI, Mr. Ray Lesane, he never considered that most of it mostly was brought up by Mr. Butin and he's a great letter writer, you know. I mean, at the beginning the letters we were getting were, like, seven to eight, nine-page letters that would completely confuse us all as to what it is. And part of the discussion I specifically remember, you know, Lesane said well, you know they're unsafe operators, you know, but we have to adhere to what he's writing. That was his comment that we were not an unsafe operator because if you were unsafe, I would shut you down tomorrow.

So, there was a lot of letter writing, long letters, I protested to Mr. Tiffany Chitwood that, I mean, I've never -- in 40 years of operations, I've never had a CMT that would get bombarded with letters from each and every one of them every few days. And it's -- you know, why don't we just have a meeting of the mind, do one subject at a time, and move forward, you know, we can give you a print up of the events that we're working on. But what was the most important thing that you want us to work on, okay this, okay we're going to work on this. It was all manual issues, you know, and manual issues on any airline goes through a lot of changes and the manuals have to be updated. So, it's an ongoing thing with any airline, you know, too many updates. It never

stops, it's an ongoing thing.

But we were just inundated with letters that everything was bad, these manuals are no good, and it was totally untrue. Just yesterday, we received a call from Mr. Lesane and, you know, he said oh, you know what, I'm so sorry that -- he didn't say sorry, he said wow, what a day and hey, I'm going to write you up, I'm going to give you two LOIs, letter of investigation. Oh, wow, two, for what? And then he cited two issues, okay, and we said okay, fine, thank you. Let us know what it is, you know, we can read it, we can respond. He said okay, fine, and then 15 minutes later he comes back, he has another -- other questions and he said oh, you know what, okay, I made a mistake. I understand, yeah, I was wrong, so it's going to be one LOI.

This has been going on ever since, you know, we've had this team. They've never objectively looked to work with the operator. Again, I respect them all, you know, nothing personal against them. But the process -- actually, I may have touched up on this on my first interview as well, the process was like a got you, another one, got you, this is not good, that's not good. So, everybody in the company was very nervous about this CMT team. We've never had a CMT team like this before, we've worked with many before and the process was always, you know, very collaboratively done between us and the relationship would be such that we worked very well with each other.

And what really hurt, was that after the accident, you know, I mean, the FAA announced that we were shut down because of many investigations going on for the past year-and-a-half. In fact, year-and-a-half since the inspection team was assigned to us and everything went on the media, on the news because we were under intense investigation. We never were under any intense investigation. We were under inspection, we had a CHEP inspection that was ongoing and as always, they had things that have to be improved or looked at and we took those very much to heart and we were going to do that.

And so, the fact that they announced that we were shut down because of many inspections

and a lot of fines, you know, this wasn't anything -- I mean, there was no truth about this at all period and that really hurt us a lot. So, you know, this thing created a lot of fear, you know, into everything, into pilots thinking that they're going to get violated for whatever, maintenance, operations. It was just like, you know, as soon as we see them, they say got you, we got this on you, we're going to get you. It was just very unfortunate.

Q. Did they levy hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of fines?

MR. RIAHI: Clarence, I'm so sorry because you're the FAA and I'm being very honest, you know, it's not about you personally, I've worked with you personally before. I've worked with a lot of other inspectors. I've had and I do have a lot of respect for every inspector that works at the FAA. But there are some that need probably more training and I certainly believe that Mark Butin, Ace Acevedo, and Mr. Ray Lesane, they need to be retrained as to how to handle an operator. That's my personal view with all due respect to you and everybody at the FAA.

It's just some people that need more training, you know, have more experience. Mr. Mark Butin, this is the first time ever he's become a POI. I know he was involved at Hawaiian Airlines; I know he was going to shut down Hawaiian Airlines, and I know somehow, they got rid of him, he was assigned to us. Mr. Ace Acevedo came from Navy, you know, I don't know how much civilian experience he has and Mr. Ray Lesane has never been a PMI. This is the first time he's become a PMI.

In my view, somebody has to look at these guys -- and they've been very good about letter writing and citing regulations, but that's all my personal -- just wanted to make sure that you know, you are terrific. You were my inspector at one time before and we had a great relationship and everyone else. It's not about you or anyone else that works at the FSDO, you know, and I think comes from top down, Ms. Chitwood was there, the manager of the FSDO. I remember she was a flight attended, you know, she has no experience with heavy aircraft I don't believe. I don't know, but I don't believe she has type rating on any of the aircraft.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay.

MR. RIAHI: Mr. Butin has never even flown large airplanes.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. Okay, but -- well, actually on that one thing you mentioned about fines, have they levied hundreds of thousands of dollars in fines on you over the last year?

A. Absolutely not.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't know where that information comes from. There was one fine that we had for a drug abatement program and I'd like to explain that, how the fine came. We were fined I believe about 45,000 dollars and it was about a mechanic that we hired. He applied to us, filled out the application and he basically lied on his application. However, he went to a drug test, he passed the drug test, we hired him, and then later in an audit it became apparent that, you know, on a previous time he had been drug positive and he had to go through a program to get him back into the system again. He did go there, he served his time, he never received the letter from his doctor that he tested fine, that he'd finished the course.

And then we hired him -- not then, but, you know, sometime after, when we hired him, we had no idea about that. On the application have you been convicted of any drug offenses, been on drugs he said no and we were cited because they said that we should have really known about that, that he had not completely finished his training. After we found out and we start tracking back, we found out that he had not paid his fee to his doctor and the doctor withheld that certification from him and because of that, we got fined 45,000 dollars. So, there was no hundred thousand dollars. Those 45,000 dollars -- about that much, if you try to explain this to the FAA -- you know, how can we mitigate this? We did everything that the book wants us to do, but we still got zapped by this. And so, that was the fine that we were levied against.

Q. So --

A. And we paid the fine.

Q. Okay, thanks for that. So, we've reviewed the letters of -- we reviewed several letters of investigation that the FAA agreed to provide to us about Rhoades and they span the time period of July 2nd, 2020, to May 26, 2021. And they included some things like the company committing to communicate changes to the minimum equipment list, processes in the quarterly safety newsletter, conduct audits on flight release paperwork to confirm adherence to MEL policies and procedures for 90 days following approval of MEL revision. And then the FAA argued that that had not been accomplished by December 2020, so between August 2020 and December 2020.

There was a letter about alleging missed inspection -- missing inspection task cards and inconsistencies between the AIP program and maintenance review board review. Potential hazards in the company's training and qualification of station personnel with respect to anyone with hazmat. What else, some scheduled inspections identified in the Maintenance Review Board reported that it had not been accomplished at required intervals on aircraft, and some issues with the safety management system. Specifically, that the safety management processes to conduct system analysis and hazard identification were routinely not accomplished or ineffective. The safety assurance performance monitoring and measurement were ineffective at identifying hazards and determining root cause or preventing regulatory non-compliance.

And then safety promotion did not ensure that SMS competencies for individuals identified by 14 CFR 5.23 were maintained through recurrent training or that safety communication was accomplished. That meant that they didn't that the SMS -- the director of safety wasn't receiving required training. There were some delays, I guess, in their receiving revisions to loading, weight and balance, and runway analysis manuals between February 19 when Rhoades said they would submit them and then May 14 when the manuals had not yet been submitted. So, I mean, these are sort of the content, the substantiated issues that they're raising as opposed to the process and the deadlines and so forth. Did you feel any of these issues were valid and needed to be addressed?

A. Some were valid, but most was very subjective. It just was not the way that they wanted to see, you know, and then they cited that we're not doing it, like, you know, not doing the CASS audits, you're not doing any SMS audits. Absolutely not, you know, we're doing it, except that they did not like the way we were doing it. It was very subjective.

Q. Okay.

A. That's what it was. Like, about the MEL, for example -- I mean, there's several things to talk about here, the MEL, we were using an MEL which was approved by us for years we were using it and it was approved by the previous inspection team. And MEL goes through changes, you know, Boeing may have something different, something comes up, you know, they change it, the FAA has it. So, a lot of things could change, the operations, you know, changes and then you have to change the MEL.

In this particular time, the MEL allowed us to -- an approved -- FAA approved MEL allowed us to use certain parameters to MEL a subject. Well, you know, we were violated for that, they were like you could not because your MEL is wrong. I said well, look, right or wrong, this is something that the FAA has approved on and if you want to change it, we can change it, no problem. This was in, I believe, 2021 -- December 2021 (sic) I believe, you know, the subject came up.

MR. KATT: It can't be December 2021 because we haven't gotten there yet.

MR. RIAHI: Oh, I'm sorry. December 2020, thanks for that. December 2020.

MR. KATT: I had to show you I'm listening.

MR. RIAHI: Right, December 2020. So, you know, we said look, this is how it is. I mean, you're citing us for a lot of things that's already approved. We haven't done anything outside of our actual MEL, we can change that. So, okay, well, there's a new change coming in and -- I believe change 61 or 62 -- in the 60's, you know, it's coming up and then okay, change it then. Well, we changed everything, you know, and this MEL -- we still haven't received the MEL

back from the CMT.

There was another issue about one of our airplanes with the landing gear that they disagreed with the way that, you know, the CPCP was being done on one of the gears on one of the aircrafts which had already been signed off, it was done. It was done by the FAA approved repair station and then the -- and the aircraft was actually out of the seat check, you know, at least some time and they cited that this is wrong and you have followed the correct Boeing instructions how to do it. And we kept arguing look, I don't know, maybe you don't understand, you know, we have done that.

They were adamant they we were wrong, you know, Mr. Ace Acevedo -- I mean, the whole team actually, we were working on this together because I remember having a few meetings with them about this, trying to convince them look, this is not how it's done. And again, I was not the person to convince them because I'm operations. But our maintenance team, you know, was trying to explain all the documents and they were adamant that it was not, and we were wrong, and that the aircraft is going to be grounded. The aircraft was grounded close to about -- I think five or seven days before they realized that we were right and they came back.

So, I specifically asked Mr. Acevedo -- I said Mr. Acevedo, now that you know, can you write us a letter saying that you were wrong about your interpretation because you economically damaged us by not allowing us to use our aircraft that was in perfect shape, all the maintenance was done on it. We went through economic hardship; can you just give us a letter and we'll forget about it. Just say hey, you know, sorry, you were right, we were wrong, we misinterpreted. We never received a letter, instead yeah, you know, it's okay, you can use the aircraft now. I said Mr. Acevedo, I mean, there's more to it, why'd you do that?

There's been many occasions of this with the latest one yesterday. Mr. Ray Lesane calls us -- calls up and say okay, we're going to give you two LOIs and everybody's scared, we go oh, my god, what's coming up again, another LOI? And then he calls back ten, 15 minutes later and says

oh, no, it's going to be one LOI because no, I understand because -- I mean, our chief inspector tried to explain, you know, what are you talking about? I mean, this subject -- whatever the subject was actually, you know -- but he was trying to convince him that hey, this is wrong, we've done it this way and that way and it's supposed to be done this way and that way.

And he was adamant again, no, I'm going to send the LOI, he was just very forceful with his voice and then he calls back and says oh, you know what, no, now I understand what you're talk about, okay, yeah, okay, good. I talked to a few other people, yeah, there was -- okay, there's going to be one LOI. So, he even admitted to the fact that he scared the hell out of us with two LOIs about subject matters and we said okay, fine. We never contested anything and said look, Mr. Lesane, just send it to us, we'll look at it, we'll find out what's right or wrong and we'll respond back to you, you know. And, you know, I mean, this process of got you, you know, has just been going on and on with this team.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. So, presumably if some of these shortcomings existed --

A. We were not perfect.

Q. -- they could've been identified by the previous CMT. Why do you think the previous CMT didn't flag these issues?

A. I think the previous CMT -- I mean, look at their background, you know, where they've been, what they've done, what kind of experience they have and then compare that to the other CMT team, you know, apples and apples. And you'll find that the previous CMT had a lot of experience working with larger airplanes and this CMT had a different experience, I believe.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't pass judgement, but, I mean, there have been many occasions in the past year-and-a-half -- many occasions that this CMT has played the judge and the jury, you know, at every step of the way.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right. I have taken up more than half of the interview. So, I'm going to go ahead and pass the baton onto Shawn. Thank you very much.

MR. RIAHI: My pleasure.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you, Bill.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Do you need a break or anything? You doing all right?

A. No, I'm fine.

Q. Okay.

A. Thank you.

Q. You've actually answered a lot of my questions with Bill, so I appreciate it. So, mine shouldn't take too long.

A. All right.

Q. But to follow up on one of the questions Bill had early on about chronic writeups.

A. Right.

Q. You said -- and I just want to make sure in my head I have it right that that comes up during those Tuesday, Friday meetings, right?

A. Right.

Q. So, help me understand what is it -- in your mind or in the company's mind, what is a chronic writeup?

A. A chronic writeup is, you know, a writeup that keeps repeating itself. Like, for example, your screw is loose, okay, we tighten the screw. The next day, again, the same screw is loose again and another five days later, another writeup comes up, screw is loose. So, it's pretty much about the same subject that happens, you know, on a writeup. So, frequent writeups of the same subject.

Q. Okay.

A. That's what I explain as a chronic writeup.

Q. And that's great, I just wanted to make sure we're both talking on the same sheet of music here.

A. Yeah.

Q. So, looking through some of the maintenance logs on the event aircraft, we've seen high EGTs kind of recurrent. Is that a chronic writeup by your guys' definition then?

A. Well, any writeup that's written up several times becomes a chronic writeup, right? But whether that writeup is correct or whether the person writing it up understands the parameters, you know, that's a different question. So, a chronic writeup, EGT -- high EGT, well, EGT is what? I mean, the manufacturer says from here to here is green, and then from here to here is yellow, from yellow to here, a small amount is red, right? A lot of it, I understand, it was not identified that it was in red, okay? Green is good, going into yellow is not a high temperature, right, it's higher than the green, but it's not red. So, you know, again, people writing it up, they have to give more information with other things as well.

Q. Okay.

A. Like the oil temperature is high, okay. So, the oil temperature is high, how is your pressure? Is the pressure high, too? Well, you know, you don't have a problem, the pressure's okay. The temperature high, is the oil pressure real low? Oh, my God, you have a problem. So, the interpretation, you know, I mean, the way that you write up things would give maintenance a lot of the understanding of what the issue is and what they have to look for.

Q. So, it sounds like maybe there wasn't a lot of information in the writeups for you guys to adequately determine what they consider --

A. I have heard that before many times. Some of the writeups that I've seen have suggested that there was nothing wrong. I mean, I remember one writeup was like EGT high or oil pressure high. Never identified which engine was it, you know, was it the right engine or the left engine, at

what altitude? You know, give more information. So, I believe my maintenance was always complaining to pilots look, when you write things up, give us more information so we can detect it better, we can investigate it better. So -- but that's what it was.

Q. Okay.

A. And of course, the pilots, you know, adhere to that to try get the best information.

Q. And we have heard in some of our interviews that pilots would have a tendency to reach out, talk to maintenance and then maybe write it up, maybe maintenance would. You know, there was still some things like that and if they didn't write it up in detail, but they told it to the mechanic in detail -- and I don't -- we never could get that (indiscernible) how detailed that went. But they would've, would that have sufficed to get the mechanics enough information to figure out? Or do they really need to write it in detail?

A. You know, all I can say is this, that we always encourage everyone -- you have a problem, just write it up. Don't be afraid, write it up so it's official and people can definitely look into it. We always discouraged -- I heard about that the one time and I discouraged it. I talk to the director of operation and of course the chief pilot, as far as the director of maintenance as well, tell your mechanic, don't accept that kind of stuff. If they come and approach you well, I think the pressure of the tire is low, well I don't know, write it up. Encourage them to write things up so it becomes official, people can look at it, you know. We always advocated that a hundred percent.

Q. So, how did you encourage that? You know, it's easy to say (indiscernible).

A. Right.

Q. How did you guys put practice to that? How did you encourage pilots to write up details?

A. Okay, yeah, right. Like I said, you know -- again, it came up in our meetings. You know, the Tuesday and Friday meetings are extremely good and we continue doing that because everyone -- I encourage everyone to just bring it out. Anything that you have, issues and it could -- it doesn't have to be aviation, it could be ground equipment, it could be some incorrect process of

something, you know, within the operations, just bring it out. So, that is the area that we would talk about it and we would ask everybody else to -- the chief pilot, and the director of operations, and director of maintenance all work together, discourage that if somebody approaches you with something.

There's also this possibility that I figure -- I think maybe they casually are talking about it, maybe they don't even know if it's correct or not and they want some information about maintenance. But it could be that the maintenance gives them something. But we said hey, look, let's just stop this, you know, if there's some issues that you have, even if you think -- hey, I think when I was flying the aircraft, the aircraft was flying a little bit more a little bit more on the left side than the right side. I couldn't keep it straight. Well, you write it up -- you know, use just I felt -- is it felt? Okay, just put I felt exactly how you want to explain that issue. So, we highly encourage that. I did hear about the fact that sometimes they casually talk to each other and I wanted to put a stop to it immediately.

Q. Okay. We had at least one pilot say that it seemed like there would be a problem with at least one aircraft and then a couple weeks later there would be a similar one with the same problem, but it was with another aircraft. He said it felt like it moved around the fleet. Did you guys look into -- well, first of all, did you guys know that that was happening?

A. What are you referring to?

Q. I want to say it was -- and forgive me, I don't remember, I don't have my notes, but I want to say the pressurization maybe or something.

A. Pressurization, yeah.

Q. But it seemed like to him it was moving around the fleet and were you guys made aware of that at all?

A. Well, you know, there was pressurization issues, that was one of the chronic issues that we always discussed. You know, pressurization was definitely one of the chronic issues that we

discussed, definitely, yeah and it was within different airplanes, that's true. But every time it was written up, I believe it was different. I mean, if it was written up, it was addressed, you know, one way or the other. But we also -- I saw a pattern of the pressurization issues which was actually pointing to one person -- one of the pilots.

And so, you know, when I started inquiring about that, how come it's only one pilot writing this up? If it's a pressurization issue, there should be more than one person writing it. And then we realized there were actually more than this one person, but the majority -- like 85 percent of the writeups of the pressurization was coming back to this one person writing it; one pilot. But again, neither here nor there, a writeup is a writeup. But we wanted to kind of make sure that, you know, the pilot didn't have an ear problem himself also. So, you know, that was also coming up in our conversations, you know, why is it mostly only one pilot writing it up and nobody else writes it up because we're asking other pilots, how come you're not writing it up? If it's an issue, you guys should write it up also.

But there definitely was pressurization issues that was going around that was mostly directed to the pressurization box, you know, that you control the pressurization. But I understand, of course, we have a system that goes on standby -- if the main system fails, it goes on standby. It's a control box, I think.

Q. All right.

A. But from time to time, they may find a door sealed, that could've been the problem. I do remember reading how it was mitigated, those issues -- the writeups.

Q. Okay. Now, help me understand, this twice a week meeting keeps coming up. The Tuesdays and Friday meetings, we've been told that they were an internal meeting only, and we've been told that -- I think with Bill you said that the FAA is always there or were invited.

A. Yes.

Q. Help me understand, which is it? Is it internal only or did you invite the FAA? I seem --

we seem to be getting conflicting information.

A. Okay. I can explain it to exactly which -- so, hopefully, you know, I can answer your question. So, these meetings were strictly all managerial meetings. So, we had the directors of all departments, director of maintenance, director of safety, chief pilot, director of operations, myself, Tracy, my VP of operations, and our operations managers, Bobby Lehman and Bobby Soon (ph.). there were the absolute must that they had to be. At times, they brought in other managers, but in Honolulu, it coincided for training. They come out here for training-- or bring the people for training -- for recurrent trainings for different sorts, if they were -- if they happen to be here on a Tuesday or Friday, we definitely invite them to.

Now, as far as the FAA, we always told the FAA that we are having these meetings on Tuesday and Friday and you are more than welcome to attend the meetings. It was not totally internal at all. The FAA was invited if they wanted to attend, some meetings they attended. I absolutely made sure that they were more than welcome to attend come and attend the meetings. So, it was very transparent. They did attend some but did not attend all.

Q. And then you also had a CASS meeting?

A. Yes.

Q. In my brain I just want to make sure I got it right, you had that once a month?

A. CASS meeting once a month and again, you know, the email goes out to all departments that have to attend as well as the FAA team that these are the times that are advertised that we're going to have the meetings. They'd be very well aware of it and they mostly attend those meetings. They will always mostly attend.

Q. Was there one FAA inspector that attended more than the others or did they all thee attend?

A. No, all together.

Q. Okay.

A. They either come or they're not there. But they're most there, though. There was some

occasions that they're out of town or training or something.

Q. Okay.

A. But I'm pretty sure that they made every effort to make sure that they're going to be at the CASS meetings.

Q. I think with Bill you were talking about on that Tuesday and Friday meeting that your managers are mandatory and then they could invite people from their departments there?

A. Yes.

Q. Like the director of safety could invite his auditors?

A. Yes.

Q. And there was one auditor that seemed to always be there?

A. Yes.

Q. But the other one --

A. Valeri, yes.

Q. Did that seem unique to you, abnormal? Or was it anything that 00

A. No, I was told that Miguel -- I specifically asked that question, actually, you know, but I was told that Miguel -- and I actually asked him myself, too, you know, I said look, why don't you come out and be at the meeting, we have a meeting at 10:00 today. He just wasn't interested to be in the meetings. That was my interpretation. I didn't want to make him do that, I said look, why don't you come in more often to these meetings? I remember seeing him in the meeting -- for the length of time that he was with us, which was no more than a few times, I only saw him at the meeting I think no more than once or twice. Definitely no more than twice, it may have been only once. I did not make him do that because I had the director of safety out there as well as another auditor, Valeri, which these two people -- well, Valeri was interested to be -- he was always there. But Mr. Miguel was not always there.

Q. Okay. Let's talk again about the cargo focus team --

A. I'm sorry, may I say something else too? When I asked Mr. Miguel, he said oh, I'm very happy sitting by my computer, you know. He was very happy to have his own corner and work his own programs.

Q. Okay.

A. When I asked him, I remember, a few times and that was his thing yeah, I'm very happy sitting right here and I'll do my work from here.

Q. All right. I think you've already talked about the cargo focus team a little bit, maybe with Bill, but I just want to make sure in my head I got that right. There was a focus team inspection in 2015?

A. That's right and we came with flying colors.

Q. Okay.

A. Passed with flying colors.

Q. Was there anything that they brought up to you that needed to be correct?

A. You know, to be honest with you, that was 2015, I don't particularly remember any of these points. But the reports are there, I can get to it and -- I cannot answer anything at this time.

Q. Then you had another one last year in 2020?

A. Right.

Q. A CHEP and a cargo focus team at the same time, correct?

A. I believe so, yes.

Q. Okay. And I want to -- did you get that --

A. They were not the same team members, by the way, they were different people.

Q. Okay. Did you get the results from that?

A. We got bits and pieces of it. See, we were not allowed to contact them directly and that's what we wanted to really do. But the CMT gave us just information here, there, you know. We wanted to really kind of talk with him directly more often and we were discouraged to wait until

our CMT contacts us.

Q. All right.

A. And a lot of the questions that they had, you know, on how we operate our operations, they questioned about -- you know, the manuals definitely needed some changes since the last time they were changed which was, you know, quite a while back. We had no issues with that, but we were never doing anything unsafe to the point that they would say this is just so totally wrong. The manual items, the format is what had to be changed, you know, we realized that. The manual content had to be updated because we had not updated and there was -- you know, I mean, if there was anything regulatory about the manuals, we would have definitely done that. But non-regulatory things and the things the CMT wanted us to do was very subjective and we had to explain to the previous team that they, this is how we're doing it. I mean, we show it to them and they would accept it, you know, so that's how it was.

If I mentioned -- by the way, you brought some subject about the hazardous material, that we were not -- we had no idea how to do hazmat. Very wrong statement that was made the CMT team. I remember that one occasion that Mr. Butin came in, he was by one of the airplanes, and we had some materials coming in, delivered to us by FedEx and FedEx had a very good, you know, operation. And we had the paperwork and there was some interpretation of the kilogram versus pound and we had -- our operation manager was trying to explain to Mr. Butin that this is the difference, you know, you don't understand. He said look, I don't understand it, I think it's in violation, you have no idea how it's supposed to be done. He said look, we know that, you know, we've done it for many years, we've never had any issues with that, we've gone through many audits and he was adamant that we were doing it wrong.

And he delayed the flight, we had to go to FedEx to get clarification from them and then, you know, they -- we met with the representative and then they came back with the results and we were correct and Mr. Butin was wrong. But then he admitted, he said oh, you showed it to me,

okay, I understand now. But that delayed our flight for so long, it made us look really bad with FedEx, we got, you know, letters from FedEx because the flight was delayed and all because Mr. Butin did not understand the pound and the kilogram. He thought that the weight and balance and the weight and balance couldn't have been more than correct. So, I just remember that discussion and I just kind of wanted to let you know about that as well.

Q. Okay, well thank you very much.

A. My pleasure, yeah.

Q. The last question I have -- and it's -- you're a 737 pilot, right?

A. Yes.

Q. You fly it?

A. I have the type rating, yes.

Q. All right. When they --

A. Since the last time I added up my hours because you asked me that question, how many hours do you have.

Q. Okay.

A. I thought I had maybe 300, but I have close to maybe 500 or 600 hours.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So -- and those are hours that you have flown? We've been hearing from pilots --

A. I'm not an expert but --

MR. KATT: Teimour?

MR. RIAHI: Can you help me?

MR. KATT: Let him answer -- ask the question.

MR. RIAHI: Okay, sure.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. But you're a pilot -- whether you're an expert on it, you're a pilot, so I want to use your view -- take a view on something, all right?

A. Right.

Q. We've had pilots explain that they've had compressor stalls, some have returned back and landed, some have haven't. If you received a compressor stall on departure, let's say.

A. Right.

Q. You rotate, you're climbing, you get a compressor stall.

A. Right.

Q. And you ran the QRH and it says pull the throttle back, would you -- and the compressor stalls goes away, would you continue or would you return back to that airport? What would you do as a pilot? Help me understand what you would do?

A. Okay. Yeah, it can be subjective, different pilots have different views of this, you know. But if I have a compressor stall and we open QRH, it requires us to bring the power back to see if the compressor stall dissipates. And if it dissipates, you know, it's fine, but it would still be an issue for me. I, personally, would bring the aircraft back. If the compressor stall, of course, is not good, you know, it's really bad, then you definitely have to come back. So, me personally again, is very subjective. Me, personally, even if the compressor stall went away, I would not continue the flight. I would still come back.

Q. Okay.

A. Does that answer the question?

MR. ETCHER: It did. It helped me understand what you were thinking because you have experience in it, so I wanted to get your viewpoint. But I appreciate it.

I think that's all I have, Bill, thank you very much.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay, Clarence?

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Are you okay? Do you need a break now, Teimour?

A. No, I'm fine, Clarence. Thank you.

Q. All right.

A. Thanks for the offer.

Q. I just have a couple questions.

A. Yes.

Q. Your remarks regarding the current CMT versus the previous CMT was, like, very different.

A. Very different.

Q. And have you brought that up to the office manager, Tiffany Chitwood?

A. Thank you very much for that information, yes -- that question. You know, I do remember the meeting I requested from Ms. Chitwood, she was nice enough to arrange the meeting. To date, we have no met personally, right, which I do not appreciate at all. You know, we could sit at a table face to face, there's only so much we can do with a Zoom meeting. Our meetings are only being -- restricted to Zoom and well, she did make herself available on Zoom, invited Mr. Andrew Ayers (ph.), I believe he is her supervisor, to be in the meeting with the CMT team.

And that's when I said, you know, we need to identify exactly what is the issue that we have to be doing. We have to concentrate on one thing at a time, I've been getting bombarded with these long letters, you know, which confuses everybody and the fact that I brought this up to Mr. Butin that look, you know, you're inundating us, all of our staff, you know with these long letters. I've never received these long letters and most of the inspectors, you know -- including yourself, you've written me letters, you know, it's like no more than one page because you don't want to confuse the operator. The letters that receive from this team, every one of them is long and it just makes everyone very confused.

So, I brought it to the attention of Mr. Butin and I said look, doing this, you're taking your

attention so much far away from what's most important, to dispatch this aircraft in a safe manner. You know, you are just inundating us with this, why don't you just discuss this, you know, what are the issues that you have? These are the manuals that we've had in the past, you know, you need updating, we'd be more than happy to update them. One of the sections, section three, section four, subchapter six okay, why don't we just have a quick meeting, face to face? And they did not restrict themselves from coming to our office during the COVID, which we appreciate that, you know. And we basically want less of those long letters and more interaction so everybody understands, they take their own notes, and these are the things that, you know, you have to do.

MR. KATT: Teimour?

MR. RIAHI: Yes?

MR. KATT: His question is did you have a discussion with Tiffany about this?

MR. RIAHI: Yes.

MR. KATT: Okay.

MR. RIAHI: Thank you, yeah. I'm just getting to that, too. So, because of that, you know, nothing happened in the talk with Mr. Butin, so I contacted Ms. Chitwood. She was graceful to allow me the meetings, it was a Zoom meeting, Mr. Ayers was there, and all the inspectors were there too, our CMT team. And they mentioned that -- well, I was very open and communicative about the process and I said look, why don't we just come up -- what is most important to the CMT team, you know, this item, okay, weight and balance, or GOM. We just assign process to this and then we assign priorities and we do it, they accepted, so it was a nice framework that we have to work with.

We were working on that, but then every time we sent something to the CMT team, it just comes back with very condescending comments, we have letters of this. And that was one of my complaints to Ms. Chitwood that, you know, the team is very condescending towards our team and we've done this for a long time. We understand the FAA regulations, we understand flying

airplanes, and to comment is not constructive and it puts everybody on the edge and does not serve a good purpose for establishing a good relationship with your CMT team. So, I did bring it to her attention and I don't believe anything was done. Nothing was done.

MR. KANAE: I'm sorry.

MR. RIAHI: Yeah.

MR. KANAE: Was this --

MR. RIAHI: Nothing was done.

BY MR. KANAE:

Q. Was this before the accident?

A. That was before the accident.

Q. How about after, did you contact her again or anything?

A. After the accident I don't believe I had many contacts with her because I thought she was ineffective. She was the person I could go to control -- to be able to control that. But no, I didn't get any good feedback from her. And then from that point on, I started to -- you know, I sent a few emails to Mr. Ayers, I felt maybe he could help, you know, with that process.

MR. KANAE: That's all I have, Teimour, thank you.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay, Rich?

BY MR. LEE:

Q. I just have probably one thing here. It's back to the maintenance auditor that was in the one meeting and there was a heated discussion with the director of maintenance --

A. Yes, and the chief inspector.

Q. I understand the auditor works for the director of safety?

A. Right.

Q. Was there not a director-to-director communication on fixing that? Or did you direct them -- for the director of maintenance to talk to the auditor and fix that? I would just think that, you

know, it would be similar level to discuss it. Did the director of safety get involved or not?

A. The director of safety did get involved. But again, that particular session was a very heated session. And, you know, there was no, you know, bad name calling, but I tried to cool everyone down and tell them hey, look, just try to stick to the subject and that's exactly -- the director of safety did the same thing basically. But it was mostly -- the communication was between the director of safety -- I'm sorry, director of maintenance and the auditor as well as the chief inspector, Scott Mayural.

MR. LEE: Okay. That's all I have, thanks.

MR. RIAHI: Yeah. He did get involved the same day that I said hey, look, guys, you know, let's just be very objective. He felt -- he kind of reiterated what I was saying to them.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Shawn, do you have any more questions?

MR. ETCHER: No, sir?

DR. BRAMBLE: Clarence?

MR. KANAE: No more, thank you.

DR. BRAMBLE: Rich, you're done I suppose.

BY DR. BRAMBLE:

Q. So, with that being said, Teimour, is there anything that we haven't asked you about that you thought we would or you want to share with us?

A. Anything else I would like to share with you?

Q. Yeah, we just always at the end of every interview like to offer people the opportunity if they were waiting for us to ask them something in particular, but we never did. If they want to share, then they have the opportunity.

A. Oh, I see. Sure. We are very disappointed that we've been shut down currently. We are very disappointed that the wrong information has been, you know, put out to the public that we were grounded because of many years of ongoing investigations. But there was no investigations,

we were in -- under inspection that any other airline does.

We had issues with the manuals that we were addressing with the FAA. They sent us a letter because, like I mentioned, every time that we submit a manual it comes right back and -- you know, for punctuations and formatting issues, which was not, you know, something you send the manual back. You just work with the operators, like, this is area that you have to use -- comma should be not there or table of contents has to be readjusted. And then for that we got our D089 -- and it was about, I think, two days after the accident the D089 was pulled, which essentially stopped us from being able to do maintenance on our aircraft. There were issues with our manuals that we were working -- currently working with the FAA and it would give us 30 days to, you know, apply for -- apply to the executive director to get it back.

Now, the accident had happened and we were totally unaware -- we were so inundated with information of course, you know, the thing that happened and we were working with the NTSB, of course, we missed the deadline. And in fact, we did not miss the deadline because we didn't count the day that we received it. We responded to the letter and of course we went to the executive director, you know, for relief, but we got a call that we cannot fly from this point on and at that point, it was not even the 30 days yet. So, we protested that. In any event, we did not win that.

But ever since that time, we contacted the FAA, okay, what does it take to make this right? And we were given a number of things that had to be changed in both AIP and the GMF (ph.). We hired a professional firm that actually works with Hawaiian Airlines currently to put the 787 on the certificate, a very professional firm. And we had a meeting with the FAA team, introduced them together, and they said okay, this is the stuff that you have to do and then you're going to get the ops specs back.

This was back in July of this year and the team was with us for almost three weeks fixing everything on the -- exactly how they wanted us to fix it on the writeups on the old manuals. And the assumption was that, you know, we're going to get our operations certification back and we'll

start flying again. It was, like, so well explained these are the writeups from the FAA and these are the corrective actions, and this is how we have changed the manual. The manual has been with them since August 11 of this year and we have not sent -- you know, received it back. And the notes that we're receiving is basically that this is still not good, it's not acceptable, you don't know how you do maintenance.

Again, very condescending and our outsourced company that works with Delta Airlines, works with Hawaiian Airlines currently and a few other large airlines, they are just puzzled as to how this CMT is not accepting everything. So, I don't know how to explain that, but I wanted that to be on the record that we still -- we've been hurting very much for not being able to fly. And the CMT, also, when they announced that we're grounded, they said this has nothing to do with the aircraft ditching in the ocean. But we believe it's different.

Q. Okay. Do you have any safety recommendations you'd like to propose? We always offer everyone that opportunity as well.

A. The biggest safety recommendation that I would like to recommend as a business owner and also as someone that's done this for 40 years, is that an experienced, knowledgeable CMT team is exactly what the FAA intended for the operations -- for the operators to keep everything safe. And, you know, a CMT team that makes everyone nervous and has the got you attitude is not going to promote safety.

DR. BRAMBLE: Okay. Teimour, thanks very much for your time.

MR. RIAHI: Pleasure.

DR. BRAMBLE: All right, I'm going to go ahead and stop the recording.

(Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	TRANSAIR FLIGHT 810 CRASH NEAR HONOLULU, HAWAII ON JULY 2, 2021 Interview of Teimour Riahi
ACCIDENT NO.:	DCA21FA174
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii
DATE:	September 29, 2021

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Carolyn Hanna
Transcriber