



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

May 6, 2021

Attachment 1 - Flight Crew Transcripts

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

DCA20IA014

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of: *

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REPUBLIC AIRLINES FLIGHT 4439 * Accident No.: DCA20IA014

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Interview of: HABIB AHARY

Pilot, Republic Airlines

Via Telephone

Friday,
November 15, 2019

APPEARANCES:

WARREN ABRAMS, Operations Group Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

PATRICK LUSCH, AVP-100 Safety Investigator
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NILSON PERINI, Air Safety Engineer
Embraer

PATRICK HOLYFIELD, Safety Chairman
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT)
(Representing Republic Airline Pilots)

MARC ANDERSON, General Counsel
(On behalf of Mr. Ahary)

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:31 a.m. EST)

DR. SILVA: All right. Habib, thanks again for speaking with us today. I have kind of a background that I'll run through so you know what to expect and who you're talking to, because there's a few of us on the phone.

MR. AHARY: Okay.

DR. SILVA: And we'll start with a (indiscernible). So the NTSB uses a party system. So while we are experts in investigating, we are not experts in everything else, so we rely on the help of the industry. And so the people you'll hear from today are representatives from IBT, Republic, the FAA, and we'll talk more about the FAA's role here also. But we rely essentially on the industry for expertise.

Everyone on this call is part of this investigation, so they are bound by our rules. Any information that we find here is used purely for the investigation. It cannot be used for enforcement action or anything else.

So the purpose of our interview here is safety. We're not here to assign blame, liability, any of that. We really just want to prevent this accident in the future or, sorry, incident. I should be careful about that. You're the expert. You were the one there on the airplane. So we're here to really learn from you. As much detail as you can go into in terms of what you were doing, what you were looking at, what you were thinking, all of

1 that would be helpful for us.

2 So keep in mind, there's no right or wrong answers. If you
3 don't know an answer, "I don't know" is a perfectly good response.
4 If you need clarification, feel free to ask for that. And if you
5 need a break, also, don't hesitate to speak up. And that's,
6 again, for everyone else on the line as well.

7 MR. AHARY: Thank you. What was your name again? Sorry.

8 DR. SILVA: My name? Yeah. So my name is Sathya Silva. I
9 am a human performance investigator with the NTSB. So what we're
10 going to run through -- stand by.

11 KELLY: Sorry to interrupt, guys. This is Kelly with the
12 ROC. I just added Mr. Nilson back to the call.

13 DR. SILVA: Great.

14 MR. PERINI: Okay, (indiscernible).

15 DR. SILVA: Thank you. So we'll run through introductions
16 here so you know who you're talking to. Warren?

17 MR. ABRAMS: Yes, I'm Warren Abrams. I'm the Operational
18 Group Factors Chairman in this -- of this investigation, and thank
19 you for joining us on the line today. Appreciate it.

20 DR. SILVA: Okay.

21 MR. PERINI: Thank you for the opportunity --

22 DR. SILVA: Sorry, Nilson. Go ahead.

23 MR. PERINI: Thank you for the opportunity. Okay.

24 DR. SILVA: So Nilson is with Embraer Air.

25 MR. AHARY: Okay. Hi, Nilson.

1 DR. SILVA: Patrick Lusch.

2 MR. LUSCH: Good morning. I'm Patrick Lusch. I'm an
3 accident investigator with the Office of Accident Investigation
4 and Prevention with the FAA here in Washington, D.C. I want to
5 thank you for taking the time to talk with us this morning.

6 I just want to add a couple of things to my introduction to
7 put you a little bit at ease. I know many times pilots are
8 fearful or nervous about talking to the FAA. I want to let you
9 know that the division I work in specifically can only use
10 information to make safety-related changes going forward from the
11 information we learn in the investigation. That's our sole
12 function. We do not have any type of enforcement capability in
13 the Office of Accident Investigation, and nothing that we learn in
14 the investigation can be shared with our counterparts out there in
15 the field, the inspectors that are at your certificate management
16 team.

17 So I just wanted to give you a little peace of mind that
18 anything you say today, even if it's something you feel you did
19 wrong or did incorrect, we can learn from that. We can use it in
20 the investigation, but we cannot use it in any type of an
21 enforcement proceeding against you or the carrier in the process
22 of this investigation. So I thank you again and look forward to
23 talking to you momentarily.

24 MR. AHARY: Thank you, Patrick.

25 DR. SILVA: Okay. Patrick Holyfield.

1 MR. HOLYFIELD: Hi, Habib. You know who I am, but just for
2 the record, I'm the IBT Safety Chairman, IBT rep, the line captain
3 and instructor/evaluator. Thanks for taking the time to have this
4 call with us.

5 DR. SILVA: All right. Joe.

6 (Mr. Abrams disconnected from conference call and then
7 rejoins.)

8 DR. SILVA: -- you have all the answer, and then I will turn
9 it back over to you at the end if there is anything we missed,
10 anything else you wanted to add, anything along those lines. Do
11 you have any questions before we get started?

12 MR. AHARY: No, I don't believe we (indiscernible). Thank
13 you.

14 DR. SILVA: Okay. Thank you. Did anyone else join the line?
15 I know we've had a couple of dropouts?

16 MR. ABRAMS: Sathya, this is Warren. I dropped off and I
17 rejoined.

18 DR. SILVA: Okay. Perfect.

19 INTERVIEW OF HABIB AHARY

20 BY DR. SILVA:

21 Q. Okay. Habib, can you speak and spell your full name for us?

22 A. My name is Habib Ahary. I was the captain on the Flight
23 4439. H as in hotel-Alpha-Bravo-India-Bravo; Alpha-Hotel-Alpha-
24 Romeo-Yankee is the last name.

25 Q. And how old are you?

1 A. 32.

2 Q. Can you run through a Cliff Notes version of your background
3 in aviation, kind of from when you started flying to how you got
4 to where you are now?

5 A. All right. Sure. So I started flying -- my first flight was
6 back in 2008. I think it was 2008. But -- yeah, I pretty much
7 went to Vaughn College of Aeronautics and Technology. I got a
8 bachelor's degree in aviation and piloting, a minor in air traffic
9 control, and I have my aircraft dispatch license. I was also a
10 CFI, CFII and MEI for 2 years at a flight school in Long Island.
11 I had over 16 sign-offs, 95 percent pass rate. I've been working
12 at Republic Airlines from May of 2015. I upgraded a little bit
13 over a year ago as a captain. I've been a captain on the Embraer
14 175 ever since. And -- yeah, here I am.

15 Q. Okay. Do you know about how many hours you have?

16 A. About 4500 hours total time.

17 Q. What about on the E-75 or 175? Sorry.

18 A. I think a little over 720 pilot in command as a captain, and
19 total, all-in-all, about 3,000.

20 Q. Okay. Do you have any other type ratings?

21 A. No, just the Embraer 175, 170.

22 Q. Are you a check airman with the airlines?

23 A. No. No.

24 Q. Okay. Do you fly outside of work at all?

25 A. No.

1 Q. So I just kind of want to run through the day of the
2 incident, and I want to start from the beginning, from your first
3 couple of flights, up until the accident or the incident flight in
4 as much detail as you can give us. So can you kind of start from
5 your first flight of the day?

6 A. Sure. So we got into Detroit the night before. We got, you
7 know, a good night's rest and we had -- I think there was like a 2
8 p.m. show the next day to work out of Detroit-LaGuardia. It was
9 like a 1500 departure time. We were working American as well.

10 Yeah, everything was normal that morning. I did our
11 preflight inspections and all our required, you know, items
12 checked off. And I'm not sure exactly what message we got, if it
13 was in the climb or en route, but we got something on the EICAS
14 that said SW pitch 1 failure, something like that. And we looked
15 over the QRH. It was just an advisory message. So I wrote it up.
16 And then we landed at LaGuardia, and we had a little bit of sit --
17 not too long of a sit, but I called maintenance, and they quickly
18 came on board to address that write-up. Do you want me to
19 continue or --

20 Q. Yes.

21 A. Okay. Yeah, sure. So, yeah, once they -- they were trying
22 to troubleshoot the item. I'm not sure if it was ran up before or
23 not, but they told me that they were going to replace the pitch
24 trim on my yoke; they would have to drive 20 minutes away and come
25 back. And then once -- I went out to get, like, some food. I

1 came back. I told, you know, the American gate agent to just hold
2 off on boarding. They're like -- you know, not to board, but told
3 them once maintenance is done, we'll board up.

4 The first officer called me while I was out to get food. He
5 said, hey, they're going to start boarding. They're just going to
6 defer it. I said, hold off boarding; I want to come and talk to
7 the maintenance guys. So I go and they said, you know, we were
8 told to defer the pitch trim on the yoke and, you know, they did a
9 proper, you know, adding of that item to the deferred index and
10 the MEL book, and they just pretty much told me use your backup
11 trim; the trim on the yoke is MEL. They put a sticker on it, and
12 left with the EICAS. I think that's what the -- whatever the MEL
13 said, they did, because I rechecked it.

14 And then, you know, off we went. It was first officer's leg
15 as well because the day before I did two legs. So that day we
16 were flying, it was his turn to do two legs. So he did the first
17 two, and I told him I'll do the last. So he flew to Atlanta. No
18 issues whatsoever. From what I can recall, that EICAS message was
19 still on the EICAS, obviously, because it was MEL'd and it was a
20 failed pitch 1.

21 We landed in Atlanta. It was, you know, a quick turn, very
22 light load. We had like 12,000 pounds of fuel and just 6
23 passengers. We upgraded everyone to first class because, I mean,
24 we've got like 12 seats in first. So just, you know, thought that
25 would be a nice gesture. So we did that, and did our -- of

1 course, the MEL that I mentioned earlier, when we checked it,
2 there was nothing for us to do on the MEL as far as something
3 different. Just operation is not applicable, just any down the
4 line problems.

5 So we did, you know, we did our checklist, you know, taxied
6 over to 9 Left, I believe, in Atlanta for takeoff. And I did this
7 in LaGuardia and I also did it in Atlanta, we just take off config
8 1. You know, we just check that just to make sure everything was
9 in line, although the MEL said you didn't have to do that, but
10 just as an extra thing, precaution we did it.

11 So we took off. I mean everything felt normal. On the climb
12 out, the plane was performing really well, like it does when it's
13 light. We were climbing at 3- or 4,000 feet a minute. And I
14 usually fly up for a couple thousand feet, and then request the
15 autopilot, which I did.

16 As soon as the first officer selected the autopilot for me, I
17 don't know if it engaged and a second later it failed, but shortly
18 after that, we get the yellow EICAS message and, you know, it was
19 AP fail on the EICAS. And I believe from, you know, what we can
20 recall, that SW pitch trim on the EICAS went away slightly before
21 that, because he had pointed it out on the climb out. So it had
22 went away.

23 So as soon as the autopilot failed, I knew that something was
24 wrong, and I started to feel the pressure build up on the yoke,
25 and I quickly glanced down at the pitch trim indicator. I don't

1 remember exactly what number it was at, but it was pretty high up
2 there. And then it was spinning pretty quick as well. I told the
3 first officer to declare an emergency; we got to turn back now,
4 without giving any detail. Because it was just like I came into
5 shock and that's the only thing I wanted to do is just obviously
6 fly the plane first, but then return as soon as we can.

7 So he looks at me and goes, for what? And I'm like we got a
8 pitch trim runaway. And I just said help me, because I had the
9 autopilot trim dis button pressed already, and then I told him,
10 press the button, press the button. I mean, I'm not sure if --
11 you know, if during climb that performance that I had felt was
12 great, we were already in the runaway. I'm not sure. But that's
13 what it seems because, you know, the pressure built pretty quick,
14 and as we got higher, it got harder to control the plane.

15 So from -- you know, he declared the emergency. I started to
16 make a quick right turn to downwind, still with the climb rate of
17 3- to 4,000 feet a minute, from what I can recall. And both of
18 our hands fully pushed down on the yoke. You know, I mean, from
19 what I can recall, you know, he had -- he did mention, I'm
20 pressing the button, I'm pressing the button. So we both had our
21 hands on the autopilot trim as best we could.

22 As I started to -- as our speed started to come down, I --
23 from what I can recall, as the speed started to come down, you
24 know, I was fearful of a stalling situation as we got higher and
25 higher. Yeah, as the speed started to climb -- I mean, as the

1 plane started to climb, the speed started to drop obviously, and
2 we couldn't pitch the nose down. The only thing I could see that
3 was helping was my banking, and that's pretty much what I
4 continued to do, just kind of do little steep turns up there to
5 just, you know, kill that vertical component of lift, which kind
6 of helped me -- you know, even though we already did get up to
7 like 14,600, I think it was, or somewhere around there, you know,
8 the only why I think we stopped the plane from getting into a
9 stall situation is by those continuous banks. And then -- yeah,
10 so as we were in the banks, we took turns. You know, I was
11 talking to ATC. It was just a lot of back and forth with me and
12 the first officer. And then I finally transferred control to him
13 just to kind of see what I could do, because we were both fully on
14 the controls trying to keep the nose down.

15 And then the QRC, I had it out eventually in my lap but I
16 wasn't reading it out loud because, you know, we were just trying
17 to control the plane at that point. But I know the QRC says, you
18 know, a System 1 and 2 cutout after our boxed memory item, which
19 is AP trim dis button, press and hold. So in my head I'm
20 thinking, okay, it's -- you know, I want to cut out channel 1
21 because that's the one that's written up. And the first officer,
22 you know, he actually did yell out, you know, System 1, System 1,
23 and I was about to do it. So I just lifted the guarded switch and
24 pressed System 1 and we were able to -- you know, then I -- we
25 were able to regain control. I'm not sure, but I think he was

1 able to trim on his side. We did get the amber dashed lines on
2 the pitch trim indication because we cut out the system. And at
3 that point, we just, you know -- our main concern was getting the
4 plane on the ground safely. And, you know, we did that the best
5 we could and how we were trained to do it. And that's --

6 Q. Okay. Awesome. So I just wanted to follow up on a few
7 things you mentioned. Do you have an idea of when you tried to
8 engage the autopilot or when you requested that?

9 A. I don't remember, to be honest with you. It was after
10 takeoff. I hand-flew the plane for a few thousand feet, and then
11 I asked for the autopilot, and when the first officer engaged the
12 autopilot, it failed.

13 Q. Okay. So you're saying pretty much immediately it failed?

14 A. Yes. Yeah, it failed immediately. Even at that point we --
15 I still didn't realize like -- I was like that's weird. I'm not
16 sure if we tried to reengage it again, or he did try to reengage
17 it again, but when we made the declaring emergency call, you could
18 hear in the background, the caution, the caution was already --
19 you could hear the caution oral warning. So I'm not -- so just
20 right before that is -- you know, a few seconds I would say before
21 that is when I realized we were in the runaway.

22 Q. Okay. And you mentioned when you went back up to the
23 aircraft after they had deferred it, the maintenance guy said to
24 use the backup. What does that mean?

25 A. Well, we have a backup trim below our radio on a low

1 pedestal. So if pilots use a trim to alleviate any nose up or
2 nose down pressures -- I mean it's just second nature for a pilot
3 to use the one on the yoke. I've been doing that since my days in
4 the Cessna 2008. So as I first took off -- yeah, I didn't need to
5 do it because I wasn't flying the leg from LaGuardia to Atlanta.

6 Q. Uh-huh.

7 A. And then on the way back, you know, I got -- I don't remember
8 if I used the backup trim on the climb out but, you know,
9 obviously when I asked for the autopilot, the plane was already in
10 a runaway situation. I'm not sure. I'm not a mechanic.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. I don't really know what caused it.

13 Q. I'm not quizzing you. I just don't know --

14 A. Yeah, yeah.

15 Q. So -- okay. So it sounds like -- what I was trying to
16 gather, it sounds like there is like a control for you to actually
17 enable the backup trim, that you said is under the --

18 A. Yes, there is a -- yep, there's a backup trim right above
19 where the System 1 and 2 cutout guarded switches are, right above
20 that.

21 Q. Got it. Have you ever had to use the backup trim before?

22 A. Never.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. I mean, during our tests in the morning, when we do our
25 originating and receiving checklists, that's the only time we

1 touch that button. That's only when I touch that button.

2 Q. Okay. What about -- has there been any training scenarios
3 where you ever had to use that?

4 A. Yeah, you know, we were trained, you know, with these
5 situations, runaways, you know, we -- you know, we're trained to
6 handle these situations to the best of our abilities, and I can
7 recall myself using it. I mean, you're not told, hey, press that
8 button. You just have to do what you have to do as a pilot to
9 control the runaway.

10 Q. Okay. So can you -- in that training for a trim runaway, can
11 you describe what you went through as far as you can remember?

12 A. I don't -- I mean, it's -- you know, it's -- you know, you
13 get, you get some where it's like after takeoff. I think I had
14 that a couple of years back. And then you get it again -- we get
15 it again en route, but obviously it's more of -- I think it's more
16 of just like, you know -- yeah, you're expecting it. So, and in
17 the sim you're much more calm and you know if you're red screen on
18 a spot training event, then -- you know, it's a training event, so
19 -- it's pretty much a similar situation. You start to feel
20 pressure either nose down or nose up on the yoke, and you do your
21 memory item. You hold on the autopilot trim disconnect button,
22 and that cuts out the trim runaway, and the pilot -- you call for
23 the pilot monitoring -- you call the QRC item and the pilot
24 monitoring pulls it out and they run through the appropriate
25 checklist, QRH. You're pretty much up there troubleshooting while

1 you're holding the pitch trim button in a sim scenario.

2 Q. Okay. So you have to be holding that button the whole time?

3 A. Until you cut out the appropriate system, yes.

4 Q. Okay. Thank you. Got it. Do you remember how long or like
5 an estimate of how long it took for them to decide -- maintenance
6 to decide to defer the item instead of actually getting the part
7 that they were intending?

8 A. Well, I'm not 100 -- I mean, I don't really -- I don't recall
9 too much. All I remember is we called maintenance. You know,
10 they came over quickly. It was like three or four of them. And,
11 you know, they were trying to troubleshoot where the message came
12 from, and they came to the determination that they were going to
13 just change my pitch from on the yoke. We had like two or three
14 American gate agents on the plane obviously back and forth with us
15 trying to board the plane. It was kind of hectic because of that
16 reason, and that's why I can't -- and I just left -- I just
17 totally left the plane and just went up to get food, and then I'd
18 say like 15 minutes later, 15 minutes later, the FO called me and
19 said they were going to defer it.

20 Q. Okay. Do you have any idea if they even got the part before
21 they made that decision or was it --

22 A. I don't know. I don't know.

23 Q. Okay.

24 A. And they did tell me that the part was 20 minutes away,
25 though. They would have to drive to get it. I don't know if they

1 sent someone to get it. I'm not sure, to be honest.

2 Q. Okay. I was just wondering if they mentioned anything.

3 A. No, not that I recall.

4 Q. Got it. Have you flown with the first officer during this
5 incident at any point before?

6 A. No. It was the first time.

7 Q. Okay. How was it flying with him?

8 A. He was a great FO. You know, great. You know, he was a
9 trained pilot, trained by Republic Airlines. You know, I think --
10 I trust any FO or captain that goes through our training
11 department. And, yeah, it was just like any other flight. Just
12 everyone knows what they got to do; flows, callouts, everything
13 went great. And -- yeah.

14 DR. SILVA: Okay. All right. I'm going to pause here. How
15 are you feeling? Do you need a break at all?

16 MR. AHARY: No, I'm okay.

17 DR. SILVA: Okay. So we're going to go around our table.
18 We'll start with Warren. Are you there, Warren?

19 MR. ABRAMS: Yeah, I'm here, Sathya. I hit the wrong button.
20 But naturally that what we all -- takes place. I'm going to defer
21 for just a second. I do have questions but I'm going to pass to
22 Patrick Lusch, if that's all right.

23 MR. LUSCH: Sure.

24 MR. AHARY: Sure. No problem.

25 MR. ABRAMS: All right. Thank you.

1 BY MR. LUSCH:

2 Q. Okay. Just a couple of questions. A lot of it has already
3 been covered, but just to clarify a few things. You mentioned
4 that when the autopilot was engaged, it stayed on. I just want to
5 try and get the sequence of events here. It engaged but then it
6 kicked off and you got the AP fail EICAS message. Is that the
7 order that that happened in?

8 A. Yes, but I don't know 100 percent if the autopilot engaged
9 because it happened so quick. It happened so quick, I don't know
10 if it ever engaged or not.

11 Q. Okay. Very good. When you were in the situation with the
12 runaway identified, do you recall if you attempted to use your
13 control yoke switches?

14 A. Which switches are you referring to?

15 Q. The trip --

16 A. I'm sorry. I don't recall that to be honest with you.

17 Q. That's okay. That's all right.

18 A. But like I said, I've been doing that for my 12 years of
19 flying, so it wouldn't surprise me if I did.

20 Q. Okay. With regard to trying to get the nose down, you
21 mentioned how much pressure you were applying forward on the
22 column, both you and the first officer. Would you characterize
23 that you were both simultaneously exerting quite a bit of effort
24 on the control column forward at the same time?

25 A. I think it was every ounce of power we had, to be honest with

1 you. And the FO that I was flying with, he works out a lot. He's
2 pretty buff. So we were both putting full -- our full power down
3 on the yoke because the plane continued to climb, and I was trying
4 to stop the climb.

5 Q. Do you think you hit the forward stop on the yoke?

6 A. The forward stop on the yoke, I don't know.

7 Q. Do you think you pushed it as far forward as it could go?

8 A. I don't know. Maybe. I mean at one point, we both had our
9 knees on it as well.

10 Q. Okay. Regarding the procedure for the memory item, you
11 mentioned the autopilot trim disconnect. I just, I want to ask a
12 little bit of a pointed question to make sure I got it on here
13 correctly. Do you recall if you pressed it multiple times or if
14 you pressed it and held it?

15 A. I believe that in the beginning phase of this entire
16 incident, I pressed and held it. Because at that point, I was
17 just flying the plane. I don't recall if I let go on and off,
18 because at one point he just kept asking questions, kept asking
19 questions, kept asking questions, and I have to, I have to remove
20 my hand off that button to reply to ATC.

21 Q. That's what I was looking for. Yeah, I was going to ask you
22 that next. They're both located on the same side of the yoke,
23 right?

24 A. Yeah, you've got the autopilot trim and then the button right
25 above that is the PTT, the hot mic. You know, you've got to use

1 that or on top of the glare shield, but I didn't go all the way up
2 there.

3 Q. Okay.

4 A. I just used the one on the yoke to talk to ATC.

5 Q. And then further with that procedure, do you think there's
6 any changes that you would need to see with that procedure or did
7 it -- obviously it didn't initially work the way it was probably
8 supposed to or didn't correct the situation that you were in, but
9 do you think there's any changes that are needed to that memory
10 item in the QRC procedure?

11 A. Like I said, you guys are all the professionals, but if I
12 could change something, I would probably have that System 1 and 2
13 cutout boxed as well.

14 Q. Okay. Got that down here.

15 MR. LUSCH: Let me see. I'm just running through my notes to
16 see what hasn't been asked yet. I think I'm good for the first
17 round of questions, but I may have some follow-up ones here
18 shortly. So I'll go onto Warren next.

19 MR. AHARY: Sure. Thanks.

20 MR. ABRAMS: All right. Warren Abrams.

21 DR. SILVA: Thanks, Patrick.

22 MR. ABRAMS: Thank you. This is Warren.

23 BY MR. ABRAMS:

24 Q. Habib, I want to extend appreciation for you joining us
25 today. Tell me what you were going through emotionally. Did you

1 think this was the end? I mean, was this the end of your flying
2 career? I mean, what were you going through? What was going
3 through your mind at that point in time when you couldn't really
4 control the airplane?

5 A. Well, I mean, for a pilot, you know, that's probably the
6 worst thing to ever happen to you, you know, flying -- you know,
7 having a plane that you've been flying for 4 years, 5 years, a
8 plane you love, a plane you trust, not being able to control it,
9 but that's when, you know, training kicks in. And then I was
10 taught in my very first lessons in -- you know, when I'm doing my
11 private pilot, you know, my instructor was telling me don't -- you
12 know, if you feel like it's the end, you don't ever give up. You
13 know, you just -- you fly this thing to the last second, as best
14 as you could.

15 And, you know, it took us a while to control the plane
16 because we were always taught to aviate, navigate and communicate.
17 So that's the first thing we were doing is just flying the plane.
18 As you can see, like we -- we ignored ATC a bunch of times because
19 we were trying to just control the plane. And then once we got,
20 you know, our -- we got the plane not under control, but we
21 realized that the steep turns -- I realized the steep -- because I
22 was flying it for the first bunch of minutes. You know, once we
23 were in the steep turns, it's okay flying. Now we're not stalling
24 and we're not almost going to stall anymore. You know, we're
25 still up here.

1 You know, in my mind -- a lot of quick things were going
2 through my mind, you know. It's kind of weird the things that go
3 through your mind, but they were just like, you know, things
4 really quick, like, oh this, you know, this is not going to be
5 good for Republic Airlines. This is not going to be good for
6 aviation. This is not -- you know, this is bad. Just like --
7 just a bunch of things: What were you trained to do? What system
8 is not working right? Which system do you got to cut out?

9 Because, you know, the plane's built really, really well.
10 There's a lot of, you know, redundancy. And as long as you know
11 -- you have a bit of knowledge about the systems, which I
12 personally think our company is really good at teaching us, you
13 know, you're able to eliminate those systems to get the plane back
14 under control and, you know, thank God, that's what happened, you
15 know.

16 Q. When you said you were stalling, have you got any idea what
17 your stall -- I realize you don't compute this all the time, but
18 approximately. I mean you know what your stall speed is
19 approximately. Do you have any idea? Can you share that with us?

20 A. Well, I didn't say I was stalling. I just said we were in a
21 stalling situation. I should have worded it right, but at that
22 time and moment, you know, because we had a, you know, green dot
23 which is the speed that we don't tend to fly at; you know, we
24 never fly below green dot.

25 Q. Right.

1 A. And I saw -- we were, we were -- green dot was -- we were
2 flying below green dot, and we didn't get to the stake shaker, but
3 the PLI was up the entire time. You know, stall speed differs.
4 So with the weight of the plane, I guess. And I don't remember
5 100 percent, but 1.3 -- I'm not --

6 Q. Yeah.

7 A. -- yeah, I don't know 100 percent right now.

8 Q. Yeah.

9 A. But, you know, when the PLI is up, you know, at 3,000 feet
10 for the whole time, you know, that's a situation that you want to
11 get yourself out of. And, you know, when you see the red airspeed
12 tape come up -- creep up closely, and as you're -- you know, the
13 plane's pitching up and you're pushing the yoke down, that's also
14 fluctuating. So all you see is red speed tape coming up and down,
15 fluctuating, and the PLI being up, and you're pitched up without
16 being able to pitch down. To me, that's an impending stalling
17 situation and that's pretty much, you know, why I said it on the
18 radio.

19 Shortly after that, we were out of that situation because of,
20 I guess, the steep turns and other inputs in the flight controls,
21 that I really can't remember what exactly we did, but we were out
22 of that situation. We got our speed back up, and that kind of --
23 we were able to breathe a little bit because obviously we don't
24 want to stall the plane over Atlanta or anywhere, but especially
25 that low.

1 Q. Yeah. And the flaps were up at this time?

2 A. I believe so.

3 Q. Yeah. Did you ever consider or think about putting the flaps
4 back out or was that just -- you know, just full forward pressure
5 was the only thing you could think of at that time? What was
6 going through your mind at that point in time?

7 A. Well, I would say, you know, what was going through my head
8 at that time was, you know, controlling the plane. We weren't
9 really thinking about, you know, the flaps -- putting the flaps
10 out. I wasn't thinking about that. I was sitting there fighting
11 with the yoke.

12 MR. ABRAMS: Habib, I'm going to -- that's all I've got at
13 this time. I may have something for round two, but anyway, that's
14 all I have at this time. Thank you very much.

15 MR. AHARY: Thank you.

16 DR. SILVA: All right. Joe?

17 BY MR. AMANN:

18 Q. Hey, Habib. This is Joe Amann.

19 A. Hey, Joe.

20 Q. A lot of the questions you guys have gone over, but so you're
21 saying the flaps were up when --

22 A. I believe so, yes.

23 Q. The flaps were up. Okay. And as far as the QRC, did you --
24 you never did get to run the QRC or --

25 A. Well, no, I had it out. But again I know what the QRC has on

1 it for pitch trim runaway. I'm not saying that, you know, I used
2 it from memory, but when I did hit the button the QRC was out, you
3 know, from what I can recall because that's -- I transferred the
4 controls to the first officer, one, because I needed a break. I
5 wanted the squawk the 78-700; I wanted to talk to ATC. And I
6 wanted to start troubleshooting what was going on and -- you know,
7 in my head, once that happened, once I transferred the control, I
8 already knew that I wanted to cut out System 1 because that was
9 the system that was written up. You know, the QRC had you cut out
10 both, and then takes you to QRH which has you going through two
11 full pages of troubleshooting items, you know, which would have
12 kept us in this situation for another 10 minutes or so.

13 Yeah, we were on the right downwind kind of like doing our
14 steep turns. You know, we had -- at one point, we had the runway
15 in sight but we couldn't like -- it was like really hard because
16 we were pitched up the entire time. But, you know, I had the QRC
17 out, and the first officer did, you know, scream -- not scream,
18 but he called out, System 1, System 1, and I said, yes, yes, yes.
19 And I just lifted the guarded switch without hesitation and just
20 hit it. And then he was able to trim on his side. I even like
21 felt the yoke kind of -- you know, the pressure relieving, being
22 relieved. At that point, you know, our main focus was getting
23 this plane on the ground safely and not delaying -- we got the
24 plane under control, that was our primary objective.

25 Q. Did you try the backup trim at all? The backup trim switch

1 on the pedestal?

2 A. When we were in that situation?

3 Q. Yeah, (indiscernible) --

4 A. Yeah, I -- during the entire ordeal, I do remember, you know,
5 trying to use that switch, because I did hear --

6 Q. Did it work or not?

7 A. Nothing -- not that I could -- you know, not that I
8 recognized. Because I do remember 00

9 Q. Was it working with the FO's side?

10 A. You mean after the cutout or before the cutout?

11 Q. Either/or, I guess before and after. You probably didn't try
12 it afterwards to see if it worked.

13 A. Well, yeah, I tried -- I think I tried it -- I tried it
14 before, just to see if it could help, I think, while I was flying
15 the plane as well, and nothing helped. And then once I cut out
16 System 1, then the FO's yoke trim seemed to work without, you
17 know, the indication. Because once you cut out one system, you
18 get the amber dashes --

19 Q. Right.

20 A. -- on the pitch trim indication and the EICAS. But -- and I
21 was asking him, is it working? Is it working? And I could feel
22 it on the yoke myself. Because, you know, during this entire
23 time, yes, there was a transfer of flight controls, but the
24 transfer of flight controls just meant like, hey, you're on them
25 full; I'll be here to back you up with flight controls. It was

1 kind of like a silent language we were using because, you know, we
2 were -- at times we both needed to be helping each other push the
3 yoke down until we were -- a little relieved on the steep turns,
4 and even during the steep turns, I always had my knee, my left
5 knee on the yoke, just to kind of back him up.

6 MR. AMANN: Okay. That was all the questions I had. Thanks
7 for the nice work you've done.

8 MR. AHARY: Appreciate it. Thank you.

9 DR. SILVA: Patrick Holyfield.

10 BY MR. HOLYFIELD:

11 Q. Hi, Habib. Man, I won't take much of your time. Most of my
12 questions have already been answered. Now the biggest question
13 that I have is referencing the MEL. What's your opinion of --
14 being in the situation that you had and the successful outcome of
15 it, what's your opinion of having the capabilities during the MEL
16 process of allowing a flight to be dispatched with a pilot's trim
17 switch completely deactivated in the MEL and there's no
18 prohibition for said pilot to not fly the aircraft?

19 A. So the question is pretty much, you know, what I think about
20 this -- me not having a pitch trim on the yoke, right?

21 Q. Yeah, and still being able to allow that pilot to fly rather
22 than make it a no dispatch condition or something like that?

23 A. I don't believe any airplane should be taking off with any
24 kind of trim issue, because this particular -- from what I
25 understood, you know, if there's a fail or a fault in the pitch

1 trim on the yoke, there's no way to completely isolate it.
2 There's still wiring being connected. You know, if there's a
3 fault or a short in it, and the plane is dispatched and the pilot,
4 you know, maybe presses the pitch trim on the yoke by mistake or
5 by instinct, because that's what pilots do -- that pitch trim on
6 the yoke is used every single day, every time we fly, even if
7 you're flying a Cessna, from the first day we begin flying. So I
8 personally don't agree with being able to MEL a pitch trim on any
9 pilot's yoke.

10 Q. All right. Thank you for that. Do you believe -- I think
11 you already answered this. Just for my clarification, do you
12 believe that the QRC leaves something to be desired in the fact
13 that the system cutout buttons are not a memory item? Do you
14 believe that the entire QRC portion of pitch trim always should be
15 memory item or boxed?

16 A. I believe that the pitch trim really -- yes. In addition to
17 pressing the autopilot trim dis button, I believe that the box
18 item should also include System 1 and System 2 cutout. Yes. Like
19 I said, I'm not an expert, but I think that'll -- that would have
20 got us a step ahead of -- because if we would have done that, from
21 what I can recall, it probably wouldn't have changed anything
22 until we got to the QRH. But, I mean, using our judgment, we --
23 you know, we just did System 1 to kind of skip that step and
24 control the plane. I mean, it's a combination of system knowledge
25 and having that boxed as well. And then the PIC discretion, I

1 guess, you know, they can determine -- because we know what the
2 QRH -- what's coming on the QRH. It's, you know, reengaging 1,
3 reengaging the other, see what helps, see what changes. So yeah,
4 I mean, if it's boxed, I don't see it being a bad thing.

5 Q. Okay. And I think we all agree on this call, that there is
6 no greater expert to this situation than you on this phone call.
7 We have speculation and simulation, but you have actual real-world
8 experience. So your opinion holds great value, in my opinion, on
9 how to make this better for all of us aviators in the future on
10 that.

11 And the point I bring up with that is the point that you're
12 handling an airplane that is trying to be out of control and
13 remain out of control, all the while attempting to grab a QRC card
14 that's going to direct you to do the System 1 and 2 cutout, but
15 not from your memory, but from reading something on an item at
16 night on a departure that was a runaway situation from basically
17 rotation. So that's the point I make.

18 The last question I have for you is, do you believe that the
19 EET, or extended envelope training, that we received and continue
20 to do at Republic, prepared you well for this very scenario and
21 the exposure that you had in the simulator, or would you change
22 anything? Say, for continuing curriculum candidates running
23 through those recurrent scenarios, would you support the idea of
24 having this scenario built into a curriculum for all of our pilots
25 to expose, greater than what they've already seen in the limited

1 pitch trim runaway scenario that you've experienced in your own
2 training?

3 A. Well, as far as the training that I received at Republic,
4 that we receive at Republic, I think it's without a doubt, you
5 know, it saved our lives because, I mean, you know, we were
6 trained to prepare -- not -- I mean, we're never prepared. We
7 were trained to, you know, kind of be ready for a situation like
8 this if it ever came up. Although it's rare, and no one ever
9 expects it and every time we take off, we're thinking, yeah, it's
10 going like -- I mean, of course, I always recommend, you know,
11 continually doing what we do in the sim.

12 I don't know if it was a spot training or quick look item for
13 the pitch trim runaway, but obviously it's AQP. It's usually non-
14 jeopardy. And, you know, we do brief the pilots before we give
15 them the scenario, but I feel like the pitch trim runaway should
16 be thrown in there randomly, even for the instructors, just kind
17 of like, hey, whenever you feel like you should, you know, give
18 the pilot the pitch trim runaway, just do it without actually
19 having it scripted on when it occurs. That we'll definitely talk
20 about after, you know, once I start to brainstorm even more.

21 But yeah, I mean, it should be a non-jeopardy item, or
22 continue to be a non-jeopardy item and, you know, pilots should
23 continue to do this in the sim. The check airmen and APDs that we
24 have are great. They're the experts because they see these things
25 every year and, you know, that's -- and I'd be willing to help

1 with whatever I can.

2 MR. HOLYFIELD: All right. That's all I have, man. Again,
3 Habib, great job on this and thanks for continuing to be dedicated
4 to fixing this situation for everybody. That's all I have.

5 MR. AHARY: Appreciate it. Thank you, guys.

6 DR. SILVA: Nilson, are you still on the line? Do you have
7 any questions?

8 MR. PERINI: Okay. Yes, I have some questions and answers,
9 the pilot partially answered all my questions, but I would like to
10 clarify some things.

11 BY MR. PERINI:

12 Q. First of all, I'd like to know about (indiscernible) on the
13 MEL. Did you discuss with your first officer about who will be
14 the pilot monitoring or who will be the pilot flying according
15 this supposed failure in the pilot trim switch? Did you discuss
16 and did you realize you should use another trim (indiscernible)
17 because the pilot trim switch was already --

18 A. From what I could understand from that question was --

19 Q. Did you discuss with your first officer about the pitch trim
20 switch in the left side, the pilot side, was not MEL, and did you
21 realize that you should use the (indiscernible) to trim the
22 aircraft?

23 A. Well, the MEL for -- our MEL for this pitch trim switch on
24 yoke, the maintenance procedure says NA, not applicable;
25 operations, NA, not applicable; and dispatch, NA. So it's only a

1 write-up. Yes, we -- you know, obviously at our company or any
2 company, I think we know, we clearly establish before we even push
3 out the gate, before we start our checklist, who's going to be the
4 pilot flying for that flight, who's going to be the pilot
5 monitoring.

6 I did mention to him that my pitch trim is inop. I don't
7 remember me specifically saying I will be using the backup trim,
8 because it's -- you know, that's, I guess, what we had in our
9 minds anyway. Nor does the MEL require for us to specifically
10 talk about that. But, yeah, I mean when we took off, it was so --
11 I mean, I don't know. I don't recall -- if your question is, did
12 I use it? Did I not? Which one did I use? I don't remember.
13 All I remember is the plane was in a runaway situation. The pitch
14 trim was in a runaway situation, and we realized that after we
15 engaged the autopilot.

16 Q. Okay. Thank you. My second question, if you request for
17 your first officer to trim the aircraft in the right side, and if
18 you request -- if you realized that the right side was working
19 properly, in spite of the fact the right side had no work priority
20 in comparison with your yoke (indiscernible)? Did you realize
21 that the co-pilot's was working and your side was not working?

22 A. Well, I mean, I knew that my FO's -- well, I didn't know, but
23 I mean we realized that my pitch trim was MEL'd, so I don't know
24 if it was working or not working or faulted or not -- I mean, I'm
25 not sure what the question is. I mean, I'm not going to fly the

1 plane and tell my FO to trim for me, if that's what you're asking.

2 Q. Okay. The other (indiscernible) about the memory items,
3 (indiscernible) procedure, autopilot (indiscernible) what button
4 should be pressed. When you do this action, you are inhibiting it
5 with three switch: the pilot, co-pilot, and (indiscernible)
6 inhibit when you press and hold the autopilot trim
7 (indiscernible)?

8 And the second (indiscernible) should the (indiscernible)
9 box, the (indiscernible) switch should be (indiscernible). Are
10 you aware about the system functionality, that you should remove
11 both systems because if you have only one system, this system will
12 be running all the three switch? Only one system is sufficient to
13 work. You can work the three instance -- pilot, co-pilot and
14 backup -- will be working if you not disable the (indiscernible)
15 system? Are you aware about this functionality?

16 A. I'm not sure I understand what you said. Are you saying that
17 if we cut out both systems, the trims will still work?

18 Do you guys understand what --

19 Q. Yeah. If you push it in, only the system where
20 (indiscernible) the other system, all the three switches will be
21 working. Are you aware about this? The (indiscernible) box, and
22 the other box (indiscernible) will take over the system, and the
23 situation when you release the autopilot and select
24 (indiscernible), when you release, you are coming back to reduce a
25 situation if you are having a trim runaway and still having trim

1 runway, okay, because one system is sufficient to have the
2 transmitters working.

3 A. Was I aware? Yeah, I'm aware of one channel, I'm aware of
4 one channel because the system is made for redundancy. You have
5 two channels. The cutout for 1 is channel 1; the cutout for 2 is
6 channel 2. Yeah, we don't have -- our memory items do not say
7 cutout System 1 and 2.

8 Q. (Indiscernible) asking you --

9 A. The memory items just --

10 Q. (Indiscernible). Yeah.

11 A. Yeah, I followed our memory item, and, you know, I cut out
12 System 1 instead of both to get the plane under control, because
13 if we cut out 2, like I mentioned, the QRH is going to put us in a
14 2-page dilemma of 20 minutes. And, you know, when you have your
15 knees and your hands both on the yoke and you've got passengers
16 and you're over a populated area, your main priority is to control
17 the plane and get it down on the ground safely. That's -- we did
18 that to the best of our ability.

19 Q. Okay. Thank you.

20 A. When we pushed out -- we pushed out System 1, we got control
21 of the plane, I mean. So that was enough for us at that point to
22 just come in and land the plane. We're on a downwind about to
23 join the final -- you know, when we finally cut out System 1, we
24 regained control of the plane. I'm not sure what else --

25 Q. Okay. Thank you very much.

1 A. Thank you, sir. Thank you.

2 DR. SILVA: All right. Thank you.

3 BY DR. SILVA:

4 Q. Habib, I just have a few follow-ups. How are you doing? Do
5 you need a break?

6 A. No, I'm okay. Thanks.

7 Q. Okay. This should hopefully be a speed round. Have you ever
8 had any other trim runaways in your aviation career?

9 A. On descent, never in a real climb.

10 Q. Okay. Do you remember when your last recurrent was, sim
11 training?

12 A. I don't really remember, to be honest with you. Usually --
13 I'm a May hire, so it's usually around like May, June, July time.

14 Q. Got it. But you said that the last time you saw anything
15 like this in the sim was a few years ago?

16 A. I don't remember. I don't remember, to be honest with you.
17 Every year the curriculum changes. And if we do have extra time
18 in the sim, usually the check airman will ask us, okay, what do
19 you guys want to try? And a lot of pilots actually say, you know,
20 the fun things. I mean, these things is fun in the sim, but it's
21 not fun in a real plane.

22 Q. Right. Okay. And is there a manual trim wheel in the
23 aircraft?

24 A. No. No.

25 Q. Okay. All right. Just curious. And then the last thing, I

1 just wanted to clarify, the use of the backup trim. I thought
2 earlier you said you hadn't used it, but then I heard you say you
3 had used it. I just wanted to clarify.

4 A. I did use it. I did use it. I just don't recall when I used
5 it. Because I heard -- because we did a cutout, I think, after
6 holding it for 3 seconds, and we --

7 Q. Right.

8 A. You know, it starts yelling at you, trim, trim, trim. And I
9 heard that a couple times because I was using that, because, you
10 know, it was just like -- I think it kind of just got stuck in the
11 up position or the down position. I forget what I was doing. But
12 I was trying to work it, but nothing was changing.

13 Q. With the backup trim, is what you were saying?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Got it. Okay.

16 DR. SILVA: Okay. Those are all the follow-ups I had. We'll
17 do one more quick round. Warren.

18 MR. ABRAMS: Yes. I just have -- maybe it's a clarification.
19 What I'm looking at is not a Republic manual, but it's an Embraer
20 Air 170, 175 QRH, and this is more of a statement than anything.
21 In their pitch trim runaway memory items, they have autopilot trim
22 disconnect button, push and hold; Pitch Trim System 1, Pitch Trim
23 System 2, cutout buttons, push in. So in the Embraer Air manual,
24 and like I say, this is not the Republic manual, but as a memory
25 item for the runaway pitch trim, the Embraer Air has you

1 disconnecting System 1 and System 2 as a memory item, bold-faced
2 item, boxed item, however you want to refer to it. But like I
3 say, I'm not -- I'm just pointing this out as a point of reference
4 because there was some discussion on it just a few minutes ago.
5 So there is a slight difference in obviously the manuals or the
6 QRC versus the QRH. That's a comment more than anything. That's
7 all I have.

8 Habib, thank you very much for your time. I'm sure there's
9 more questions in round 2, the speed round, but we thank you for
10 being here today and participating with us.

11 Thank you, Sathya.

12 MR. AHARY: Thank you, guys. Thank you all, as well, for
13 being here as well.

14 DR. SILVA: So we'll just go around and give everyone else
15 here -- Patrick, did you have anything? Patrick Lusch.

16 BY MR. LUSCH:

17 Q. Just one last question. Do you recall once you were on the
18 ground, if you or anyone at the company pulled the circuit
19 breakers for FDR and CVR?

20 A. No, nobody touched the -- I mean, we don't have company
21 maintenance there. I don't know who came on the plane after I
22 left. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. Not a problem. Thank you very much. I have no
24 further questions. Thanks for your time today.

25 A. No problem. Thank you.

1 DR. SILVA: Joe, do you have anything?

2 MR. AMANN: No, I don't have any other questions.

3 Everything's been answered. Thanks for your time.

4 DR. SILVA: Patrick Holyfield?

5 MR. HOLYFIELD: No, ma'am. I don't have anything extra.

6 Thank you.

7 DR. SILVA: Okay. And Nilson, if you have any other
8 questions?

9 MR. PERINI: No, I'm okay. Thank you very much.

10 BY DR. SILVA:

11 Q. So we're going to turn it over to you. Is there anything
12 that we should have asked you that we didn't and that you want to
13 add?

14 A. Not that I can think of.

15 Patrick Holyfield, Marc, anything I missed, that we talked
16 about and I forgot to mention?

17 MR. HOLYFIELD: No, I think we pretty much covered it so far.

18 DR. SILVA: Awesome.

19 MR. ANDERSON: This is Marc Anderson.

20 MR. AHARY: Hey, Marc.

21 MR. ANDERSON: Yeah. Hey, this is Marc Anderson. Can I just
22 make a quick comment? Just from --

23 MR. ABRAMS: Marc, this is Warren Abrams.

24 MR. ANDERSON: -- I think I'm a little bit older than some.

25 MR. ABRAMS: Hold on, Marc. Marc, no, I apologize to you,

1 but as a representative, if you and your client, Habib, need to
2 take a 2 or 3 minute break, but -- we'll be happy to hear from
3 Habib, but we do not hear from you.

4 MR. ANDERSON: No, that's okay, that's okay. It was just a
5 personal comment, honestly unrelated to this particular event.
6 It's not important. That's okay.

7 MR. ABRAMS: Okay. My apologies for interrupting. Thank
8 you.

9 DR. SILVA: If you need to reach out to us later, that's
10 fine, Marc.

11 MR. ANDERSON: Sure. Thanks.

12 DR. SILVA: Feel free to reach to out. Okay.

13 Well, Habib, thank you so much. If you do think of anything
14 else you want to add, you can feel free to go through either
15 Patrick or Joe to reach us. I think you have Warren's information
16 as well. So, we again -- we appreciate your time and honesty and
17 openness. We again --

18 MR. AHARY: Yeah, I mean, I guess I'd like -- yeah, thanks.
19 I appreciate you guys all being here. This is all, to the best of
20 my recollection, of the event, you know, best I can remember.
21 Thank you, guys, all for the hard work.

22 DR. SILVA: We will be working on it. Thanks. All right.
23 Thanks, and have a good weekend, everyone.

24 MR. ABRAMS: Thank you.

25 MR. AHARY: All right. You, too.

1 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you all.
2 MR. AHARY: Yep. Bye-bye.
3 (Whereupon, at 11:36 a.m., the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: REPUBLIC AIRLINES FLIGHT 4439
Interview of Habib Ahary

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20IA014

PLACE: Via Telephone

DATE: November 15, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Kathryn A. Mirfin
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

* * * * *

Investigation of: *

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REPUBLIC AIRLINES FLIGHT 4439 * Accident No.: DCA20IA014

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Interview of: BANEET PABLA
First Officer, Republic Airlines

Via Telephone

Friday,
November 15, 2019

APPEARANCES:

WARREN ABRAMS, Operations Group Chairman
National Transportation Safety Board

SATHYA SILVA, Ph.D., Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

PATRICK LUSCH, AVP-100 Safety Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

JOSEPH AMANN, Line Check Airman/Aircrew Program Designee
Republic Airlines

NILSON PERINI, Air Safety Engineer
Embraer

PATRICK HOLYFIELD, Safety Chairman
International Brotherhood of Teamsters (IBT)
(Representing Republic Airline Pilots)

MARC ANDERSON, General Counsel
(On behalf of Mr. Pabla)

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I N T E R V I E W

(09:11 a.m.)

MR. ABRAMS: All right. For those who are -- Marc and Baneet, I'm -- as I said, I'm Warren Abrams, the operational group chairman at the NTSB for this investigation. And we're here today to figure out or try to determine what took place in the cockpit on Flight 4439 the other day, and try to make sure it doesn't happen again.

Baneet, I want to give you a few kind of rules of engagement and things like that. We're going to go around the virtual table. We're not in the same room; everybody's calling in from different parts of the country. And we're going to --

MR. BANEET: Yep.

MR. ABRAMS: -- and we're going to ask you questions, and we're going to -- I'll ask questions first and then we'll hand it off to another investigator and they'll ask questions, and we'll go around the table, I say virtual table, one at a time asking our questions. If you don't understand a question, if you don't know the answer to the question, just tell us. I mean, "I don't know" is a perfectly acceptable answer. In fact, there are no right or --

MR. BANEET: Okay.

MR. ABRAMS: -- there are no right or wrong answers. It's your story, and we want to hear what you have to say.

As I just said, I'm recording these events today and I will

1 have the recording sent off to be transcribed, and they will be in
2 the hands of the party members that are on the call today with us
3 probably within about 10 days; it could take as long as 2 weeks.

4 So with that, I would like to go around the table, Baneet,
5 and let you know who is with us on the call today.

6 Sathya, if you'll introduce yourself, please?

7 DR. SILVA: All right. Hi, Baneet. My name is Sathya Silva.
8 I am a human performance investigator with the NTSB.

9 MR. ABRAMS: Patrick?

10 MR. BANEET: Hi.

11 MR. ABRAMS: Patrick Lusch?

12 MR. LUSCH: Hi. Good morning. My name is Patrick Lusch.
13 I'm an accident investigator with the Office of Accident
14 Investigation and Prevention in Washington, D.C. at the FAA.

15 Warren, do you want me to go ahead with my quick briefing or
16 do you want to come back to me?

17 MR. ABRAMS: No, you go right ahead. You roll in with it
18 right now, that'd be great.

19 MR. LUSCH: Perfect. All right. So just to let everybody
20 know, my office, AVP-100, is charged with investigating incidents
21 and accidents, and we have no enforcement tools, no enforcement
22 action, and anything that we uncover or we learn in this accident
23 investigation is solely for the purposes of preventing it from
24 recurring in the future. Our policy within our office is that
25 nothing that we gain out of the investigation can be shared with

1 the local certificate management team. In other words, we can't
2 provide any information from interviews or from flight data or
3 anything like that to anybody in the FAA that has the potential to
4 use that information for any type of an enforcement action.

5 So I just want to put your mind at ease that anything you
6 tell us today is solely to go forward with the intent of learning
7 about the event and seeing if there's any changes that we might
8 need to make to any type of a system design, a procedure,
9 training, anything like that to prevent another crew from
10 encountering the same type of situation. And once again, to
11 reiterate, nothing that is brought to my attention today, I have
12 absolutely no ability to bring that back with any type of
13 enforcement action. Thank you.

14 MR. ABRAMS: Thank you, Patrick Lusch.

15 Staying with the Patricks, Patrick Holyfield, please
16 introduce yourself, please.

17 MR. HOLYFIELD: Yes, sir. It's Captain Patrick Holyfield.
18 I'm a line captain, instructor/evaluator. I'm the safety chairman
19 for the Republic pilot group.

20 MR. ABRAMS: Very good. Thank you.

21 MR. HOLYFIELD: And I'm the IBT representative. Yes, sir.

22 MR. ABRAMS: Good.

23 And, Joe, please introduce yourself.

24 MR. AMANN: Hi. I'm Joe Amann. I'm a check airman -- line
25 check airman and an APD for the company, for Republic. I'm here

1 to represent Republic. Thank you.

2 MR. ABRAMS: Very good. Thank you.

3 Nilson, please introduce yourself, please. Nilson, are you
4 there? Nilson, this is Warren Abrams, are you on the call still?

5 Baneet, we had Nilson Perini from Embraer Air on the call,
6 and it appears he has dropped off. But I will let you know that
7 Embraer Air is a party to this investigation and they're
8 interested in the events that happened as well.

9 Marc, will you introduce yourself, please?

10 MR. ANDERSON: Yeah. Marc Anderson. I am a captain at
11 Republic. I'm also general counsel for Teamsters Local 357.

12 MR. ABRAMS: Very good.

13 And, Baneet, you're allowed one representative today to
14 represent you. And have you selected a representative to
15 represent you yet?

16 MR. PABLA: I'm not sure. I think that Marc is going to be
17 with us.

18 MR. ABRAMS: Yes, he is. Is that who you select? Is that
19 who -- are you happy with that selection?

20 MR. PABLA: Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah.

21 MR. ABRAMS: Okay. Very good.

22 MR. PABLA: Yeah, I'm okay with -- I'm good that yeah.

23 MR. ABRAMS: All right. Very good.

24 Well, with that, the introductions have been made and we'll
25 get this proceeding underway.

1 INTERVIEW OF BANEET PABLA

2 BY MR. ABRAMS:

3 Q. Baneet, if you would tell us your name -- tell us your entire
4 name and spell your last name, please.

5 A. Sure. First name is Baneet, and last name Pabla, P-a-b-l-a.

6 Q. And, Baneet, how old are you?

7 A. I'm 30.

8 Q. And without getting into the city and everything else, give
9 us a brief history of how you got to Republic Airlines; when did
10 you start flying, just a brief 2 or 3 minute biography of your
11 flying history to date.12 A. All right. Well, I attended Vaughn College of Aeronautics
13 back in 2008. I was there for just 2 years. I didn't finish it
14 off. Then I started my flight training around 2016 or so in
15 McArthur Airport, ATP flight school, Islip Airport. I was there
16 for zero -- from zero time all the way through my CFIs, and I just
17 trained in the same vicinity. Then I also instructed with them.
18 I was there for my (indiscernible), instructing with them, also in
19 -- at McArthur Airport. And it was like, I'm at 1500 hours, I
20 interviewed with Republic, and I was with them July 24th, hired
21 with them, 2018.

22 Q. Very good.

23 A. That's about it.

24 Q. Good, good history. So -- and tell me about Republic. How
25 many different types of airplanes do they have?

1 A. Just an Embraer Air 170, 175s are the -- that's it.

2 Q. All right. And the day of the accident were you flying a 170
3 or a 175?

4 A. I believe it was the 175.

5 Q. All right. Let's start prior to Atlanta. You guys flew into
6 Atlanta that day. Where did you fly into Atlanta from?

7 A. I flew into Atlanta from LaGuardia.

8 Q. All right, so LaGuardia to Atlanta. And who was flying that
9 leg?

10 A. I was.

11 Q. You were flying. Anything significant? Anything eventful
12 about that leg?

13 A. No. Nothing at all, really.

14 Q. All right.

15 A. Just a normal leg.

16 Q. All right. When you left LaGuardia you had a MEL write-up;
17 is that correct?

18 A. Yes, we did.

19 Q. And do you recall what that write-up was?

20 A. I remember it was for the captain side trim switch, but I
21 don't know exact, I don't know exactly what it was.

22 Q. All right. And during that flight did -- and you were
23 flying, was that MEL item -- did that MEL item impact your flight
24 in any way?

25 A. No.

1 Q. All right. When you're taking off, that's obviously a time
2 of a lot of trim changes; speed is increasing, you're trimming a
3 lot. How was the trim? Did it feel normal to you when you were
4 leaving LaGuardia?

5 A. Yeah. It was operating normally. I usually do hand-fly up
6 to about 10,000 feet, so -- it was perfectly normal.

7 Q. All right. And when you engaged the autopilot was there any
8 rapid trim movements at that point in time? Could you tell if the
9 stabilizer was trimming left -- or I mean up or down at that time?

10 A. Yeah. It was completely normal.

11 Q. All right. So --

12 A. So usually when I ask for the autopilot on and just auto
13 (indiscernible) it was okay.

14 Q. All right. Good. You had it trimmed up just right for the
15 engagement with autopilot. Very good.

16 Conversely, coming into Atlanta, when do you usually --
17 altitude wise, when do you usually turn the autopilot off?

18 A. Usually right before the final approach fix or, you know,
19 glides of interception.

20 Q. All right. So the autopilot is trimming that. I mean you're
21 getting your flaps out, and am I correct in stating the
22 autopilot's trimming the stabilizer until -- at that point in time
23 until you get the autopilot off?

24 A. That's correct.

25 Q. All right. And was there anything noted of significance in

1 the trim when that was happening?

2 A. No. It was completely normal.

3 Q. All right. Once you disconnected the autopilot, there's
4 still some slowing down to do. How about the trim at that point
5 in time?

6 A. It was still working well. It was still definitely normal.

7 Q. Okay. I think we beat that up enough to know that -- I think
8 we beat that up enough to significantly say that the trim was not
9 an issue for you coming down from LaGuardia to Atlanta.

10 A. Right.

11 Q. Did maintenance -- do you recall if maintenance performed any
12 actions on the airplane while you were in Atlanta?

13 A. While we were in Atlanta?

14 Q. You landed in Atlanta.

15 A. In Atlanta --

16 Q. Were there any --

17 A. -- maintenance -- there was no maintenance. No, not in
18 Atlanta. No.

19 Q. Okay. All right. When you guys taxied out, I'm assuming
20 it's the captain's leg -- where are going when you leave Atlanta,
21 by the way?

22 A. We're going back to LaGuardia.

23 Q. Okay, Atlanta-LaGuardia. Is the captain -- is this his leg
24 to fly since you flew down?

25 A. Yeah. Exactly.

1 Q. Did anything significant happen during taxi out?

2 A. No. It was a normal taxi out of here as well.

3 Q. All right. And captain pushes the power up for takeoff, if
4 you would, walk me through the scenario. You push power up for
5 takeoff and it -- please fill me in on what happened in the next
6 10 minutes or so.

7 A. All right. So we do our normal takeoff configuration check.
8 We do a check; everything's okay. He powers up, deact (ph.) the
9 TO/GA set, and switch to auto. You know, we started moving, got
10 our 80 knots, make normal callouts, V1, rotated perfectly fine.
11 I'm looking at our climb rate. It's -- and we got a -- it's
12 moving pretty rapidly, but we only had six passengers on board so
13 we were very light. That's the lightest I've flown an aircraft
14 in. So it seemed -- as far as, I was -- didn't have a lot of
15 people, it seemed normal to have a really good climb rate.

16 And I remember the -- the one number I remember seeing is
17 3900, about 4,000, so a decent rate of climb. And a couple
18 minutes later, I'm not sure what's going on. I'm waiting for the
19 switchover to departure, and the captain says declare emergency.
20 And at that point it still didn't hit me. I was wondering what's
21 going on? Why? What am I declaring emergency for? And then he
22 once again -- I seen he was struggling with controls, and says,
23 declare emergency, we have trim runaway. And that's when I went
24 to ATC, and I was still uncertain, a little uncertain of what was
25 going on. And I told them we had declared emergency.

1 They asked for the nature of emergency. So I was
2 (indiscernible) that, it's trim runaway. And that's when I see
3 the, that's when I see the captain, he's like kind of fighting
4 with the control. And that's when he also tells me, help me --
5 can you help me push down, help me push down? So now we're both
6 trying to keep the nose, trying to keep the nose from rising so
7 much. The speed's not moving rapidly anymore. Trying to push
8 down, trying to push down. And all I hear is the captain say
9 press the button, press the button. Memory items was very --
10 already in my head. Autopilot trim just kind of, hold and --
11 press hold. So I'm pressing it and he -- I guess he's pressing
12 it, too. We're trying to push the nose down. He keeps saying
13 press the button, press the button. I remember at one point I was
14 -- I even asked him, what do you want me to press? Because I was
15 pressing it and it was doing nothing.

16 And, you know, then we're just fighting. He puts us in a
17 little bank. I think that helps the nose from rising so much. We
18 decided then to switch over to me. Maybe we'll source it to my
19 side and maybe it might get better or it might be more
20 controllable. So we decided that. I started to fly. I got --
21 took control of the airplane.

22 We're still in the bank turn because that's, like I say,
23 that's the only thing that's helping us keep that nose down.
24 We're trying to talk to tower. He's -- I see him pulling out the
25 QRC, but we both need to be on the controls. He's pushing down.

1 I have my hands on it. I have my knee on it too, just trying to
2 force it down.

3 I got a little glance at the pitch trim indicator. It was --
4 at that point it was dashed, dashed yellow lines. So there was
5 nothing at all. ATC's trying to give us vectors or just have - us
6 try to descend down to 6,000, and we can't descend basically, so
7 let's keep climbing. And then I see the tip tape coming on up,
8 where -- the captain says we're in a stalling situation. We were
9 pretty close -- we're pretty low speed. I heard we were at 138,
10 the lowest. I don't remember exactly what speed we were, but
11 that's when we kept turning. The bank -- like I said, the bank
12 was helping. We're pushing down, still pushing down.

13 And just in my head, we -- I kind of remembered from training
14 -- well, we did this scenario in training one time, and I -- in
15 the QRC I remember it mentioned System 1 or 2 cutout. And
16 asked -- at that point just yelled it out System 1 cutout,
17 Captain. He was (indiscernible) with the QRC, and we both
18 (indiscernible) we agreed we had System 1, so we thought, you
19 know, since we were in deferred already, it was just the captain's
20 side, we were just, all right, that should be the one, and we hit
21 the system cutout. Just -- not, not right after, but sooner
22 or later the pressure was not as much as before. And like I said,
23 I was still flying, and I just tried to hit the trim switch.
24 There was no numbers there still, but I could see the speed
25 starting to build up again. And I thought, just get the trim down

1 a little bit more and then the nose slowly, slowly started to come
2 back down. By that time we were getting back to the downwind.
3 We're flying up -- we started descending and we decided to just
4 hand-fly all the way down. We just -- we got turned around, got
5 on final. The captain cut his speed, say he loaded the approach
6 up, and we just wanted to get on the ground ASAP before something
7 maybe changes or it would happen again. And that's when we --
8 we're back on the ground. That's pretty much summed up, sums up
9 the whole thing.

10 Q. Interesting. Very good. I appreciate that. Let me ask you
11 a few questions about that. When you said you were about -- I
12 think you said you were at 138 knots. Did you have any flaps out
13 at that time?

14 A. No. We did retract all the flaps. At that point, when I was
15 declaring emergency, captain was telling me just flaps, flaps, you
16 know. So we did put them all away, retracted all of them.

17 Q. All right. You've got a System 2 as well. Did you
18 deactivate System 2 or was it just System 1 you turned off?

19 A. Just System 1. Like I said, we thought it was the captain's
20 side, just the captain -- so we -- system cutout, just kind of
21 like put it together, like, all right, that's for system --
22 captain side is System 1, we'll cut that out; since that was
23 deferred, that was the issue.

24 Q. All right. And this -- I promise you, this is not an FAA
25 oral, so there's no right or wrong answer. Do you have some -- I

1 call them initial action items or bold-faced items when you have a
2 fixed trim runaway?

3 A. Yeah. We do. It's the autopilot trim system button, press
4 and hold. Which they both -- we were both pressing it and that's
5 all that -- did nothing.

6 Q. All right. Are there any other steps to that procedure?

7 A. No. After that, we just called up the QRC, both QRC, and
8 then followed those steps there. That's the memory item.

9 Q. Okay. All right. So let me back up a little bit more and --
10 once you deselect System 1, who is flying at that point in time?

11 A. Oh, we decided that I'm going -- I was going to fly, the
12 first officer's going to fly it the whole time.

13 Q. All right.

14 A. Once we -- you know, because we said his was deferred, so we
15 (indiscernible) we kept to the FO side.

16 Q. Okay. And let's talk about trim again, and we talked about
17 all that trim coming down from LaGuardia to Atlanta. Now getting
18 back into Atlanta, how was the trim -- were you manually trimming,
19 electrically trimming? What was the -- how are you trimming the
20 airplane at that point in time?

21 A. This is after we hit the system cutout you're talking about?

22 Q. Yes. The System 1 cutout, how did you trim --

23 A. Yeah. Okay, so --

24 Q. Go ahead.

25 A. After that, we were just using the switch on the yoke, the FO

1 side. And like I said, there was no indication of what trim
2 setting it was on, but it -- I saw the nose -- the speed starting
3 to build up every time I used it. So the switch was working on my
4 side. The trim was, you know, it was working.

5 Q. Okay. And were there any significant trim issues from that
6 point on until you landed? And I say -- I'm not implying --

7 A. No.

8 Q. -- that you had a trim --

9 A. No.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Yeah, that at point it was a pretty normal for me. Like I
12 say, I couldn't see an indication of what trim setting I was at,
13 but it was enough to just keep my altitude set and the speed where
14 I wanted it.

15 Q. All right. Did you -- was it a normal approach speed or did
16 you have any additives for anything, or was it just a normal
17 approach and landing at that point in time back into Atlanta?

18 A. It was a normal approach and landing.

19 Q. Okay. And do you recall -- I realize the captain is usually
20 in charge of the logbook, but he can delegate it for you to put
21 something in there. Do you recall what kind of write-ups you put
22 in the logbook after you got back to the gate in Atlanta?

23 A. I don't remember at all, no.

24 Q. Okay. Since you had declared an emergency, I was assuming
25 there was something in the logbook, but we'll ask that question on

1 another day at another time.

2 A. Yes.

3 MR. ABRAMS: Baneet, I'm going to pass the microphone, shall
4 we speak, to Dr. Sathya Silva, and she will take her turn in
5 asking you some questions. Before I do that, though, turn it over
6 to her, I want you to know that anytime you need a break, if we
7 need to take a break at any time, just feel free to raise your
8 hand and let us know, because we're happy to take a break. And
9 that goes for everybody at the table as well, if you guys need to
10 take a break, please let us know. So --

11 Anyway, with that, Sylvia -- Sylvia -- Sathya, you've got it.
12 Please go ahead.

13 BY DR. SILVA:

14 Q. All right. I just wanted to run back through your background
15 real quick. And I apologize if you did already answer these
16 already. Can you run through what your certificates and ratings
17 are?

18 A. All of them?

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. Okay. So, like I said, I got my private instrument, private
21 multi, CFI, single, commercial single, commercial multi, and CFII
22 and MEI.

23 Q. And what about type ratings?

24 A. Just the 175 -- 170 and 175.

25 Q. Do you know about how many hours you have?

1 A. Total, I think I'm at about -- I don't know, like 700 here,
2 so about 2300, 2200 -- 2400, more or less.

3 Q. About -- okay, 23, 24. And you said about 700 -- is that
4 type?

5 A. That's the Embraer, yeah. I'd say that's 700, yeah.

6 Q. Okay. And where are you based?

7 A. Based out of LaGuardia.

8 Q. And when you did start at Republic?

9 A. I was a July 24th hire, last year, 2018.

10 Q. July '18. All right. Do you fly outside of work at all?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Keeps you busy enough, huh?

13 A. Yeah, for sure.

14 Q. Okay. I -- again, I'm going to -- you might hear repeat
15 questions, here, but I wanted to just gain some clarity on the
16 flights that you had that day. So can you kind of start me
17 through like from when you woke up, like where you were and what
18 your schedule was like through the --

19 A. Sure.

20 Q. -- through the incident? Yeah.

21 A. Yeah. I know we had a decent late start. We were in
22 Detroit. In Detroit, we were going from Detroit back to
23 LaGuardia, then LaGuardia to Atlanta, Atlanta back to LaGuardia.
24 It was, like I said, a late show, so -- I don't know. I think it
25 was like a 2 p.m. van that we have Detroit to the airport for like

1 a 3:10 flight.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Yeah, so it was a late flight. So essentially we had an easy
4 morning. Got up -- slept enough, got up, had breakfast, had
5 lunch. Then we made our way to the airport.

6 Q. What time do you think you woke up that day?

7 A. I think it was around 9 o'clock; 9, 9:30 p.m. -- a.m.

8 Q. And you said you slept enough. Is that -- do you recall what
9 you --

10 A. Oh, yeah, I did. Yeah, because I usually -- usually I do the
11 assigned a.m. showtimes, so it was pretty nice having a late
12 showtime that day. And I definitely slept in.

13 Q. And what day of your -- I'm blinking.

14 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Actually, I am (indiscernible) drop
15 in. I just added Mr. Nilson back to the call. Sorry.

16 MR. ABRAMS: Thank you.

17 DR. SILVA: Thank you.

18 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: You're welcome.

19 BY DR. SILVA:

20 Q. All right. So out of your trip, what day of the trip was
21 this?

22 A. This was the last -- well, it was a 2-day, so it was the
23 second day.

24 Q. Okay. Where did you come in from the day before?

25 A. Oh, it was a (indiscernible), actually.

1 Q. That's okay. You don't have -- I don't know is a perfectly
2 good answer.

3 A. It's -- yeah, sorry.

4 Q. That's okay. No worries. All right. So you mentioned that
5 there -- that you had a trim runaway scenario in training. Can
6 you describe that a little further, what you remember from that
7 scenario?

8 A. Yeah. It was, it was just a -- it was pretty much just to
9 get us to get, you know, hit the AP, autopilot trim switch up at
10 press and hold, that scenario, and along with do some QRC, QRH
11 procedures. So we kind of -- we didn't really get to like, you
12 know, fly it as much because it's in the sim. But what they want
13 you to do is, you know, hold it enough so we can at least get the
14 QRC, QRH, and just see how it is. That's mainly what it was for.

15 Q. Okay. So you said you didn't get to fly it?

16 A. No, we didn't really fly. I think I was -- as far as I
17 remember, I think I was doing the QRC and QRH and the captain was
18 on the controls. I believe so. This is a while -- this was back
19 when I first started, so over a year ago.

20 Q. Okay. So the point was so that you could get that press and
21 hold. Do you remember if the --

22 A. Yeah, that's (indiscernible) --

23 Q. Yeah, go ahead.

24 A. Like I said, this was just to familiarize us with how we go
25 from, you know, the memory items, the QRC, and then from QRC to

1 QRH, and just follow steps. I think that's what the whole point
2 was. So --

3 Q. Okay. Do you remember when the failure kind of resolved?
4 Did it fix itself after the press and hold of the autopilot trim?

5 A. I don't recall. Because I think we do -- we don't go through
6 the whole thing. We just went, okay, we got the QRC to see what
7 we have to do. Go to QRH, we're going to try this, we're going to
8 try this. Okay, should be good after that. And that was just --
9 I don't remember if we went through the whole thing, but I know we
10 just talked about it and we read what's in the QRH.

11 Q. Okay. Got it. And I'm not familiar with a QRC. What is
12 that?

13 A. It's just a, it's -- we have a memory items there, the bold
14 items there. That's the quick reference, what we look at right
15 away. And then that kind of pushes -- that pushes on to the QRH,
16 where we follow more in-depth procedures of what to do. So QRC
17 kind of like stops the problem from there, and the QRH kind of
18 goes further in detail.

19 Q. Okay. So is it only the memory items that would be in the
20 QRC? Is that right?

21 A. Mainly just -- yeah. There's a couple other things, but
22 mainly, yeah, the bold items, the boxed items.

23 Q. Okay. Okay. I got it. So you mentioned that the captain
24 was starting to pull out the QRC but he didn't get to it; is that
25 correct?

1 A. Yeah. I mean, like I said, he was shuffling through it, but
2 we both needed to be on the controls at most of the part. Like I
3 said, when we had the bank, the airplane was okay, wasn't -- you
4 know, it wasn't running away too much, too bad, you know, too
5 roughly. But when, you know, like he had backed off a little bit
6 and then it gets a little -- the pressure was a little too much
7 for me. Or if I was off of it, then the pressure was a little too
8 much for him. So we both kind of needed to be on it. And like,
9 we -- he was -- you know, when I was flying, he was my eyes and
10 ears. He was looking at the speed when I wasn't. So he was
11 screaming out, hey, watch it, we're going to stall, we're going to
12 stall. You know, so we -- like I said, we both needed to just fly
13 the airplane at that point together.

14 Q. Um-hum. And then have you flown with this captain before?

15 A. No. That was our first trip together.

16 Q. Okay. And so he was on the -- he was with you the day
17 before, too? Is that -- when you got there?

18 A. Yeah, both days. Yep.

19 Q. How was it flying with him?

20 A. It was good. We were all -- you know, he's very laid back.
21 We -- everything was procedurally done, and it was comfortable.
22 We, you know, we were talking and getting our work done at the
23 same time. It was good.

24 Q. Do you feel like he was willing to -- sorry. Do you feel
25 like you could speak with up any issues that you might have had?

1 A. Yeah, for sure.

2 Q. That he was open to that?

3 A. Yeah, for sure. Definitely.

4 Q. And just so -- I'm trying to understand the system a little
5 bit better, too. So from your knowledge, what is the press and
6 hold of the autopilot trim supposed to actually do?

7 A. In depth, I'm not really sure what it does. But I think it
8 just disconnects the trim switch, so (indiscernible) stop that
9 runaway. It supposedly can stop that runaway. I'm not really
10 too, too sure exactly that's what it does.

11 Q. Okay. That's fine. And then the switch --

12 A. Okay.

13 Q. -- from one -- what was the term you used here? You
14 disconnected the System 1 trim, is that what the -- is that what
15 you said?

16 A. We pressed the System 1 cutout button. It's a guarded button
17 on the panel, and that's what we pressed.

18 Q. Okay. Got it. What panel is that on?

19 A. That's our -- the pilot control, pilot side, that's the one
20 in between us, the captain and I.

21 Q. Got it. Is it the captain that actually pressed it?

22 A. Yeah.

23 Q. Okay. And, again, same kind of question: Do you know what
24 that button is supposed to do in comparison of the press and hold?

25 A. I mean, at that point, like just from training and going

1 through it, we thought we would -- we assumed that it's going to
2 cut it out, and so -- because I know we have a priority order for
3 the trims. It's supposed to go from, I think, backup to captain
4 to first officer. So in just our head, I think we thought we were
5 okay if we press this cutout button. I remember seeing during our
6 training, going through QRH. Maybe it might just, you know, stop
7 what's happening and come over to our side where it works.

8 Q. Okay.

9 A. So that was our thought process at that point.

10 Q. Okay. I see. When you say priority order for the trim, what
11 does that mean?

12 A. So there's a -- it kind of follows a priority order. So this
13 maybe happens, and the backup is the first thing kind of the trim
14 will follow, then the captain's trim side will be second after
15 that, and the first officer's trim switch. It just an order of
16 which it kind of follows.

17 Q. Okay. So --

18 A. If anything goes wrong with it.

19 Q. Got it. Is that in the software or is that something like
20 you guys can control in the cockpit?

21 A. No. That's in the -- I believe it's in the software,
22 automatically magic.

23 Q. Okay. Sounds good. Let's see here. Do you recall if there
24 was -- if you were using autothrottles or autothrust?

25 A. Autothrottles were engaged. I don't remember any of us

1 taking them off, no.

2 Q. Okay. Would that have been like the whole time through
3 landing?

4 A. Yeah, the whole time.

5 Q. Okay. Got it. When you came in for the landing, can you
6 kind of walk us through what procedures and aircraft configuration
7 you used?

8 A. Yeah. We did a Flaps 5 landing. Just like -- just normal, a
9 normal landing. About 30, 40 feet, I just take -- idle the --
10 recharge the throttles, and then I just come on down and we just
11 touch down. And used the thrust reversers, thrust goes down, and
12 I hit the brakes as soon as I can after that.

13 Q. Got it. Is a Flaps 5 normal for you guys at Atlanta?

14 A. Yeah.

15 Q. Okay. Have you ever encountered trim runaway in your 2300
16 hours --

17 A. No.

18 Q. -- aside from this? Okay. And do you recall what the
19 weather was doing that day during the incident?

20 A. Yeah. It was clear skies and just calm winds. It wasn't
21 gusty or anything. So --

22 DR. SILVA: Okay. That's all I have for now. Thank you.

23 MR. PABLA: You're welcome.

24 DR. SILVA: All right. Warren, back to you.

25 MR. ABRAMS: All right. Thank you. We doing okay, guys? Do

1 we need to take a break or can we keep on going?

2 MR. PABLA: All right.

3 MR. ABRAMS: So, Baneet, that's kind of directed at you. Do
4 you need a break yet?

5 MR. PABLA: No. I'm all right.

6 MR. ABRAMS: Okay. Patrick Lusch from the FAA, please --
7 you've got the floor.

8 MR. LUSCH: Okay. Thanks, Warren. Good morning again.

9 BY MR. LUSCH:

10 Q. Baneet, many of the questions that I was planning on covering
11 today have been asked, which is great. I just have a couple of
12 follow-on things here.

13 Could you review, just to make sure I heard you correctly,
14 exactly when you and your captain noticed the runaway after
15 takeoff and how quick it was after liftoff?

16 A. So when we took off, I didn't know what was happening. It
17 was all, all the captain. He was flying and he dropped the
18 pressure himself. Like I said, we had normal callouts taking off.
19 I was just waiting for the handoff to departure. And when the
20 captain said, hey, declare emergency, like I said, I still didn't
21 know what was going on. Altitude, I'm not sure. One thing that
22 I -- he did say autopilot on. And I hit the autopilot, and soon
23 after, I think that's when it went -- it started going crazy.
24 That's -- altitude, I think he went to the up -- had an earlier
25 altitude than usual because of the departure, I think it was,

1 follow certain restrictions. So I think he actually was earlier
2 than he would have. So that's 3,000 feet. So that was 2800,
3 that's when it happened, around that, so --

4 Q. Do you remember if there was any anomaly engaging the
5 autopilot? Did it stay on?

6 A. Yeah. I mean, once we hit it, I remember it said engaged,
7 and then that's when he, you know, said that, you know, after a
8 couple seconds later, declare emergency; we have a trim runaway.
9 And then I do remember that -- a little after declare emergency,
10 the autopilot had said autopilot fail. I do remember that.

11 Q. Okay. That was an EICAS message?

12 A. Yeah, it was EICAS message.

13 Q. Okay. Very good. And so at this point had the airplane been
14 cleaned up yet, flaps retracted or were -- you were in the process
15 dealing with the runaway and cleaning up the airplane at the same
16 time?

17 A. Same time, yeah. So we were, you know, trying to clean it up
18 -- we were trying to keep the nose from pitching up too high and
19 declaring an emergency at the same and cleaning up the airplane.
20 So all that was happening together.

21 Q. Do you remember, were you -- were both of you on the controls
22 for an extended period of time simultaneously trying to keep that
23 nose down?

24 A. Yeah, we were.

25 Q. And have -- do you ever remember using that level of force

1 before in your flying with the controls or do you feel like you
2 were at the stop?

3 A. No, I never felt that before. That's the first time for
4 sure. I mean, during training in the sim, I remember like we were
5 -- just a couple weeks ago, I had recurrent training. And that's
6 when I remember our instructor -- I think we were doing -- I think
7 it was stall training, I believe it was that. And he was showing
8 us how much force you could actually use on the aircraft to cover
9 all that. So I did feel a good amount, but this was way more than
10 that for sure.

11 Q. Okay. You mentioned the stall training. Was that your
12 carrier's extended envelope training?

13 A. Yeah. That's exactly what it was. Yeah.

14 Q. Okay. So that was the E training that you guys had. Do you
15 feel like the training you received for that extended envelope
16 training was helpful in this event?

17 A. Yes. I believe so. Like I said, you know, we kind of knew
18 how much force to push down with. We know we had -- doing that
19 training, you know, we then knew how much we could really push
20 down with the aircraft, how, you know, aggressive you can be with
21 it. Just knowing that, I guess in my mind, we were able to just,
22 you know, push the airplane down even further this time.

23 Q. Okay. Once the captain had cut out System number 1, just to
24 clarify and make sure I capture this correctly, do you recall if
25 there was any further stabilizer movement that was not commanded

1 from a yoke switch, or was all subsequent stabilizer movement the
2 result of pilot input?

3 A. I think after that it was all pilot input. Nothing, nothing
4 led just me to say it was trim switch button.

5 Q. I'm sorry?

6 A. Like that's what it was.

7 Q. So your trim switch was working correctly after that point,
8 and did the captain attempt to use his trim switch any further
9 once System 1 was cut out?

10 A. No. He didn't use his controls after that at all.

11 Q. Okay. And then my last question for you, Baneet, was
12 regarding your memory items and your QRH or QRC, excuse me,
13 procedures, did you feel that there was anything in there that
14 needed to be changed or modified?

15 A. I mean, we -- like the memory items from the AP autopilot
16 trim switch button press and hold, like I said, we did that and it
17 didn't do anything. Just knowing that we went through this
18 procedure and even system cutout, I guess helped us. But then, I
19 don't know, if it's going to help us every single time. So it's
20 like a -- I'm not sure what you really could do at that point,
21 kind of a situation. We just knew that, hey, it was just the one
22 that was -- the captain side was deferred, and we just kind of put
23 one and two together, and, you know, we decided System cutout 1
24 was the one that we should press. But --

25 Q. All right.

1 A. -- like I say, like the memory item was just autopilot trim
2 button, press and hold. That's really it.

3 MR. LUSCH: Okay. I have no further questions. Baneet,
4 thank you for your time this morning. Thanks for being so willing
5 to share your experiences with us.

6 And back to you, Warren.

7 MR. ABRAMS: Thank you.

8 Let's see. Joe, it's your turn. You've got the mic, Joe.

9 BY MR. AMANN:

10 Q. Okay. Honestly, most of the questions that I had or I jotted
11 down here while I was listening, have been asked. My one question
12 was, so the QRC was never accomplished? Is that the way I
13 understand this?

14 A. Like I said, we were -- we're flying. He tried, captain did
15 try. I remember him -- I saw him bring it out. The QRH was in
16 his lap. But every time he would look down, at that point we just
17 needed help with the controls. It was every like, every couple
18 seconds that he needed to help me out or vice versa. But --

19 Q. So the --

20 A. Yeah.

21 Q. -- number 2 cutout -- but number 2 cutout was never pushed;
22 is that what you're saying?

23 A. No. It was not at all. After System cutout 1, like I said,
24 the plane was a little more normal, more controllable, so at that
25 point, you know, it's working, why press anything else? That's

1 what -- that was both of us feeling.

2 Q. Okay. Thanks. And did you ever attempt at all to use the
3 backup trim system switches?

4 A. No, I did not.

5 Q. Did you guys ever --

6 A. I wasn't sure if it was --

7 Q. But you did state in the priority -- you do know the priority
8 of it, that it's backup, captain, F0? That's actually the
9 autopilot, that was --

10 A. Yeah.

11 Q. -- flying, the autopilot?

12 A. Yeah.

13 Q. So while you were both pushing the autopilot disconnect
14 buttons, it was still running away on you?

15 A. Yeah. It was -- I mean, we couldn't get the -- the nose was
16 still trying to go up. So I'm not sure how much further it was
17 going to go up, but at that point we just -- we still couldn't get
18 control of the airplane. So we were pressing it and we still had
19 no control of the airplane.

20 Q. So once you got the System 1 cut out, you were able to regain
21 -- you were able trim up your trim switch, correct?

22 A. That's correct.

23 MR. AMANN: Okay. That was all. Like I said, a lot of my
24 questions have been asked already, so that's all I have. Thank
25 you.

1 MR. ABRAMS: All right. Thank you, Joe. Appreciate it.

2 Nilson, I believe you're on the line. I'm sorry that we were
3 having communication difficulties and you did not hear a lot of
4 what Baneet had to say at first. But we'll turn the mic over to
5 you and the floor is yours. So feel free to engage in questions.

6 BY MR. PERINI:

7 Q. Okay. Some questions are already answered. Actually, my
8 first question is, did pilot use the pitch control switch, in
9 spite of the fact that the pilot switch, it was on the MEL. I'm
10 asking if pilot used the trim switch on the left side during some
11 stage of the flight or during the troubleshooting of the failure?

12 A. Well, I'm not sure if the captain used that switch at all
13 throughout the whole flight at that flight. I'm not sure.

14 Q. Okay. The other question from looking through some of the
15 data, I saw that when the co-pilot did the trim for your right
16 side, he was able to establish the normal flight, with
17 (indiscernible) force on the yoke. So it says if you alter and
18 control (indiscernible) the co-pilots wants to trim, in spite of
19 the fact that the co-pilot have no priority to confirm the captain
20 switch, the co-pilot have no priority to (indiscernible) to trim
21 part of the aircraft.

22 A. Yeah, that was after this --

23 Q. Did the co-pilot (indiscernible) --

24 A. -- the system cut out.

25 Q. Another question is because the procedure, the memory item

1 for a trim runaway is that the pilot press the disconnect
2 autopilot from trim. Because when you disconnect with the push
3 button, then all the trim switches, the pilot, co-pilot, and also
4 the backup, will be disabled. With, as a second item, a memory
5 item, push in both systems. I'm asking if you push both system or
6 only one system?

7 A. Only one system, just the System 1.

8 Q. Only one system. And do you know if you -- he had only one
9 system, that all the switch, trim switch remain active? Because
10 when you push in both system, system 1 and 2, all the trim systems
11 will disable. If you push only one, you cannot achieve, will be
12 the backup. And with the backup, you can use the switch, trim
13 switch. You cannot -- in this case, the system will not disengage
14 the trim switch.

15 A. Yeah. So I'm not sure (indiscernible) --

16 Q. (Indiscernible) the system push in --

17 A. Yeah, I wasn't -- I was not aware of that. We just hit
18 System cutout 1, and after that it was just -- we felt -- or I
19 felt it controlled a little more, a little better than we did
20 earlier. And then we used my trim side and, like I said, we got
21 the control back of the airplane at that point.

22 Q. Okay. But the reason we have in this procedure as a memory
23 item, that each trim system work and trim the aircraft, you should
24 push the -- you push (indiscernible) and all the trim, all the
25 trim switch will disabled in this case. If you push only one, the

1 backup remain active, and with the backup, all the trim remain
2 active.

3 A. (Indiscernible).

4 Q. Okay. That's the reason we (indiscernible) multiple memory
5 items. We just (indiscernible) there will be some more questions.
6 That's just for (indiscernible) to answer, if not, I provide
7 (indiscernible).

8 MR. ABRAMS: Nilson, is that all you have?

9 MR. PERINI: Yes. For me, it's okay.

10 MR. ABRAMS: All right.

11 MR. PERINI: Is that -- okay. But we need some familiarity
12 about, in regard to the required (indiscernible), and that we can
13 suggest as far as difference and line them up with
14 (indiscernible). We -- at this point, we are, we are
15 (indiscernible) we can send you after our, our briefing
16 (indiscernible). I think that's all.

17 MR. ABRAMS: Nilson, that's breaking up pretty bad. I'm not
18 sure if everybody heard all that, but we'll -- can I conclude,
19 Nilson, that you're finished with your line of questions?

20 MR. PERINI: Yes. I am (indiscernible), yes.

21 MR. ABRAMS: Okay. Thank you.

22 MR. PERINI: Okay. Thank you.

23 MR. ABRAMS: Everyone, let's -- we'll go from a second round.

24 And, Baneet, second round is just a few follow-up questions.
25 It doesn't go nearly as long as the first round. And let me --

1 I've got just a few questions. For the recording, this is Warren.

2 BY MR. ABRAMS:

3 Q. Baneet, do you recall what kind of pitch angle you had? I
4 mean, what was the highest pitch attitude you attained? Do you
5 recall that?

6 Maybe I'm off the line.

7 MR. LUSCH: I got you loud and clear, Warren.

8 MR. PABLA: Can you hear me?

9 MR. ABRAMS: I can hear you.

10 MR. PERINI: Sorry. Your question's for me? You talk --

11 MR. ABRAMS: No. I had a question for Baneet.

12 MR. PABLA: Hey, Warren?

13 MR. ABRAMS: Yes?

14 MR. PABLA: Yeah, I got it. I'm not sure what happened. I
15 think the most I saw was a 10-degree nose up, but that was just,
16 you know -- because we were just forcing the nose forward and it
17 was trying to go back up -- back up, and we were pushing it. So I
18 think 10 -- about 10 degrees or maybe a little higher, but that's
19 all I can remember at that point.

20 BY MR. ABRAMS:

21 Q. Yeah. We've looked at the data, and I realize this is not a
22 question; this is a statement. But you actually got up to 27
23 degrees nose-up pitch. So --

24 A. Whew.

25 Q. Yeah. Amazing, isn't it?

1 A. Well, yeah.

2 MR. ABRAMS: Baneet, that's all I have. We'll turn it over
3 to Sathya. Do you have any other questions, Sathya, on round two?

4 DR. SILVA: Yeah, just a few follow-ups.

5 BY DR. SILVA:

6 Q. Do you stay on tower frequency the whole time?

7 A. Yes. We were still -- we stayed with tower. They even
8 wanted to stay with us. Yeah, I think they originally asked us do
9 you want to switch over. We didn't respond, and so they -- I
10 guess they kept us with them.

11 Q. Got it. Okay. Do you remember what departure you were
12 flying out of Atlanta?

13 A. The Jac 2. I believe that's the usual one that we fly. I
14 believe that was Jac 2 departure.

15 Q. Let's see. How do you like working for Republic?

16 A. Great. I believe it was the first place, the only -- pretty
17 much the first on my list when I was looking for regionals. So I
18 pretty much got where I wanted. I live at -- on base, so it can't
19 get better than that.

20 Q. What's your favorite thing about working there?

21 A. Well, I'd say that I live on base. They booked me one off in
22 LaGuardia right off the bat in the interview, and the caps on the
23 flying were really good. They help you -- well, absolutely, they
24 help you a lot. They know upgrade time is coming fast, so they've
25 been helpful with that.

1 Q. If let's say you could change anything about the job, what
2 would it be?

3 A. If I -- I'm sorry, what?

4 Q. If you could change anything about the job, what would it be?

5 A. Oh. Honestly, I don't think there really is. It's been
6 pretty much ideal job for me at least. Scheduling has been good
7 with me. The hours have been good. Training's been good. I fly
8 out when I want to. I stay at whatever hotel I need to be,
9 (indiscernible) if I want to. So everything's been pretty good
10 for me, at least.

11 DR. SILVA: Okay. Awesome. That is it for my questions.
12 Thanks for your time.

13 MR. PABLA: You're welcome.

14 DR. SILVA: Warren, back to you.

15 MR. ABRAMS: Thank you, Sathya.

16 Patrick Lusch, follow-ups?

17 BY MR. LUSCH:

18 Q. Just one last thing, Baneet, for you. Is there anything that
19 you want to tell us about this event that no one asked you yet? I
20 probably took Warren's thunder. That's probably one of the last
21 questions he was going to ask. But from the FAA's standpoint, I'd
22 like to know if there's anything that you would like to let me
23 know or any of the investigators that hasn't been asked on our
24 behalf?

25 A. No. I don't think so. I think we've covered pretty

1 everything, of me telling what the story is and what the captain
2 will probably tell you, I think that's pretty much it.

3 MR. LUSCH: Great. Thank you for your time today. I have no
4 further questions.

5 MR. ABRAMS: Patrick Holyfield?

6 MR. HOLYFIELD: Yes, sir.

7 BY MR. HOLYFIELD:

8 Q. Baneet, man, I want to thank you for your professionalism and
9 dedication to contributing not only to the successful outcome of
10 that flight last week, but also your commitment to the process and
11 making sure it's good for everybody moving forward, including all
12 2500 Republic pilots. So just a few follow-up questions, man.

13 From your experience now that you've lived through this
14 actual experience and not in a simulated environment, do you
15 believe that the QRC memory item is sufficient for that scenario
16 or would your experience support a change of it now to include a
17 Republic System 1 and 2 cutout button to be added to the memory
18 item rather just on the QRC itself?

19 A. I mean, so we pressed the autopilot, autopilot trim button,
20 press and hold it -- held it, and it didn't do anything for us.
21 System cutout 1, pressing that, helped us out. But from just
22 talking to everybody, if we put that on there -- like we were
23 discussing that, it was like (indiscernible) because it
24 (indiscernible) that that was.

25 So it's kind of like I'm not sure if we should. I'm not

1 sure. Because just doing it -- just doing a training, and us, you
2 know, putting together, all right, System 1 was captain side or
3 whatever -- or captain side is deferred, so that should be the
4 issue. That's the only thing that really led us to making that
5 decision. So making a memory item of it, I'm not too sure how
6 helpful that would be.

7 Q. How long do you think it took you to get from completing the
8 memory item with the autopilot trim disconnect button, press and
9 hold, to actually executing the System 1 cutout button press?

10 A. I think, I think we were just getting into our third turn.
11 Because I know we made two 360s and we started that longer,
12 further out. And that's -- once we got into that, that's when we
13 got that system cut out, and then we started to join the downwind
14 back into the airport. So we were -- we did an extra two 360s and
15 were into a third one we got it pressed.

16 Q. Got you. And remembering how long you were actually able to
17 physically press and hold that trim disconnect switch because you
18 were doing everything you could do fly the airplane to successful
19 outcome, were you able to press and hold that switch more than,
20 say, 3 or 4 seconds at a time or in the heat of the moment you
21 have no idea of how long you were successfully able to press and
22 hold, keeping in mind that I knew you were pressing the push-to-
23 talk to transmit to ATC, so it was handful. Was it a long time
24 you pressed that button?

25 A. Yeah. Yeah, we held it down for definitely more than 3

1 seconds.

2 Q. Okay.

3 A. Because I know we were silent with -- we didn't speak to ATC
4 for a couple seconds every minute or two, too. So at that point
5 we were kind of like pressing it, pushing down, pressing it,
6 pushing down. The captain was totally pressing it. Like I said,
7 we were going through back and forth. Like we were both pressing
8 it, so -- and we definitely pressed it more than 3 seconds.

9 Q. All right, man. Cool. Final question for you. What's your
10 opinion of living through this situation, like having the ability
11 for an MEL to defer a pilot's trim switch on his or her yoke, but
12 the MEL not prohibiting that same pilot from being the pilot
13 flying on that flight?

14 A. Yeah, that would be --

15 Q. That -- go ahead.

16 A. That was a little interesting, that we had a MEL on it and it
17 was deferred, and we still -- we were still able to use it. So
18 that was -- once we landed and we kind of like, you know, caught
19 out breath, the next morning we -- the captain and I spoke about
20 it. And we found it interesting -- well, we both went back to the
21 MEL, looked at it. And it was interesting that, you know, we
22 still flew with it, still used it; it was just deferred and we
23 still used it. So maybe if -- I mean, an MEL we could have it say
24 maybe not fly it with that side or source it, or not fly at all,
25 maybe, (indiscernible).

1 MR. HOLYFIELD: Thanks for your answers.

2 That's all I have, Warren.

3 MR. ABRAMS: All right. Thank you. All right. Thanks
4 there, Patrick.

5 Joe, your turn.

6 MR. AMANN: No, my -- most of the questions have been gone
7 over. I mean, you guys did a great job.

8 BY MR. AMANN:

9 Q. As far as what I see in my daily operation, the training
10 department, is there anything that you would like to see us do
11 differently in the simulator?

12 A. (Tone) Oops. Hey, it's me.

13 Q. Did you hear my question?

14 A. No, I didn't. I got disconnected and had to rejoin.

15 Q. Oh. Sorry about that. I was just saying that the -- most
16 have the questions that I had asked here, have been reasked. But
17 one thing as far as we're concerned in the simulator with that
18 pitch trim runaway situation, is there anything different that you
19 would like -- that you thought would've helped you in this
20 situation that we could have done in the simulator, or not?

21 A. I mean, I -- from doing the simulator one time, we, you know,
22 we did -- we had a good outcome of it. Maybe we could a sim, you
23 know, like the whole procedure maybe more than once, just to, you
24 know, be familiar with it and recognize it a little sooner.

25 And --

1 Q. Right.

2 A. -- without making, you know, three returns, 360 turns. I
3 mean, if we catch it sooner, definitely just turnaround and land
4 right away.

5 Q. Right. Another question, when -- one other question actually
6 I have. When you guys noticed the trim runaway, were you in the
7 process of retracting the flaps and did you continue to retract
8 the flaps?

9 A. So, I do --

10 Q. Well, do you remember what position they were at, I guess is
11 the question?

12 A. Yeah, Flaps 2. That's what we took off from. And then --

13 Q. You recognized it prior to retracting any flaps or were you
14 in the process of retracting?

15 A. I think it was in the process of it, because I remember what
16 happened was, he said he wanted Flaps 1, Flaps 1, and then at that
17 -- in that little instance is when you get transferred over to
18 departure. So that's what I was waiting for. And then I see the
19 climb rate and then the captain's saying that, and then I'm
20 talking, so I didn't put flaps up. I think he put the flaps up.
21 I remember him calling it and then, but -- and he quickly just put
22 his hand up and called flaps up, and I just like confirmed it.

23 MR. AMANN: Okay. All right. That's all I have. I'll leave
24 it at that. You guys did a nice job. So thanks on behalf of the
25 company.

1 MR. PABLA: Thank you.

2 MR. AMANN: Thank you. That's all I have. Yep.

3 MR. ABRAMS: Thank you, Joe.

4 This is Warren again. Nilson, are you still on the line with
5 us?

6 MR. PERINI: Yes, I'm here.

7 MR. ABRAMS: Do you have any follow-up questions? Nilson --

8 MR. PERINI: No more questions for me.

9 MR. ABRAMS: Okay. No more questions.

10 Well, ladies and gentlemen, I think that will wrap it up. I
11 want to say, Baneet, I thank you as well for your participation
12 today. We thank you immensely. I know we've all gained an
13 insight, a valuable insight of what took place in the cockpit, and
14 we thank you for your professionalism as a pilot and we wish you
15 the best of luck in your career as you progress there at Republic
16 Airlines. But if there is no further comment, I will stop the
17 recordings --

18 (Whereupon, at 10:17 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF: REPUBLIC AIRLINES FLIGHT 4439
Interview of Baneet Pabla

ACCIDENT NO.: DCA20IA014

PLACE: Via Telephone

DATE: November 15, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Kay Maurer
Transcriber



Autumn Weslow
Corrections made 6/30/2020