



NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

October 27, 2016

Attachment 10 – Aviation Safety Reporting System Reported Wrong Airport Landing Events for RAP


OPERATIONAL FACTORS

DCA16IA200

Search Request No. 7161

***Air Carrier Wrong Airport
Approach/Landing Related
Incidents***

March 3, 2014



Aviation Safety Reporting System
P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field, CA | 94035-0189





TH: 262-7

MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data

SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded when evaluating these data of the following points.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Information contained in reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the perspective of the specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified and the identity of the individual who submitted the report is permanently eliminated. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reporters; including names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. After a report has been de-identified, any verification of information submitted to ASRS would be limited.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS current contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.

A handwritten signature in black ink, which appears to read "Linda J. Connell", is written over a solid black rectangular redaction box.

Linda J. Connell, Director
NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System

CAVEAT REGARDING USE OF ASRS DATA

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, mechanics, flight attendants, dispatchers or other participants in the aviation system are equally aware of the ASRS or may be equally willing to report. Thus, the data can reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS information. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more aware of the ASRS program and more inclined to report should an NMAC occur. Any type of subjective, voluntary reporting will have these limitations related to quantitative statistical analysis.

One thing that can be known from ASRS data is that the number of reports received concerning specific event types represents the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 2010 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 2010. With these statistical limitations in mind, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS data is the **qualitative information** contained in **report narratives**. The pilots, controllers, and others who report tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail – explaining what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

Time / Day

Date : 199301

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RAP

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : RCA

State Reference : SD

Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 5

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 50

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : RAP

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Airspace.Class D : RCA

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Engineer

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 10000

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 200

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2400

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 232363

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial

Qualification.Flight Crew : Private

Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 3500

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 220

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 2500
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 232434

Person : 3

Reference : 3
Reporter Organization : Military
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Other
Detector.Automation : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

ON A DAYLIGHT VFR DSCNT INTO RAPID CITY, SD, REGIONAL ARPT (COPLT FLYING) MY FLT (ACR MLG ACFT) WAS GIVEN A VISUAL APCH CLRNC BY ELLSWORTH AFB APCH CTL. THE AREA WAS BLANKETED WITH SNOW. WE HAD 'RANCH NDB' THE LOM FOR RWY 32 AND THE ILS FOR RWY 32 TUNED AND IDENTED. WE WERE ANGLING FROM THE E TO FINAL. AT A POINT APPROX 5 MI FROM THE RWY, WE REALIZED WE WERE LINING UP FOR RWY 31 AT ELLSWORTH. AT THAT SAME TIME, RAP TWR ADVISED US OF THE SAME. I TOLD TWR WE WERE MAKING A L TURN BACK TOWARDS RAP. (WE LEVELED AT 1100 FT AGL.) WE WERE REISSUED A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 32 AND WE LANDED. I FEEL THE LESSON FOR ME IS TO BE MORE CONSERVATIVE ON VISUAL APCHS WHEN GND/FLT CONDITIONS ARE LESS THAN PERFECT. THIS PARTICULARLY SO WHEN 2 ARPTS ARE IN CLOSE PROX WITH THE RWYS ALIGNED. ALSO, MY COPLT DID NOT HAVE THE FIELD IN SIGHT WHEN I FELT I DID. I WAS PREMATURE IN CALLING 'FIELD IN SIGHT' WITHOUT HIS HAVING IT AS WELL. WE EVEN DISCUSSED ELLSWORTH BEING JUST N OF RAP AND WITH A SIMILAR RWY ALIGNMENT, BUT STILL LINED UP ON IT. THE SNOW COVERED GND CONDITIONS CAUSED ME TO SEE ELLSWORTH FIRST AND I BECAME LOCKED ONTO IT.

Synopsis

FLC OF ACR MLG ACFT INADVERTENTLY LINED UP WITH THE WRONG ARPT DURING A VISUAL APCH.

Time / Day

Date : 199007

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RAP

State Reference : SD

Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 11

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : RCA

Aircraft Operator : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Medium Large Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Descent

Flight Phase : Descent

Flight Phase : Landing

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Route In Use : Vectors

Airspace.Class E : RCA

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 14000

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 200

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 10500

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 150539

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Reporter Organization : Air Carrier

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Instructor

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 6200

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 225

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 360

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 150953

Person : 3

Reference : 3
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Excursion From Assigned Altitude
Anomaly.Deviation - Altitude : Crossing Restriction Not Met
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Published Material / Policy
Anomaly.Inflight Event / Encounter : Weather / Turbulence
Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Result.Flight Crew : Executed Go Around / Missed Approach

Assessments

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

WHILE ON DSNT TO RAP, WE WERE GIVEN THE WX AT THE ARPT BY ELLSWORTH APCH CTL. THE WINDS INDICATED AN APCH TO RWY 14. WE HAD ANTICIPATED A STRAIGHT-IN APCH TO RWY 32 DUE TO AN EARLIER SEQUENCE RPT. ELLSWORTH APCH GAVE US A VECTOR HDG AND REQUESTED THAT WE RPT THE ARPT IN SIGHT FOR A VIS TO RWY 14. WHEN WE BROKE OUT OF THE OVCST, I COULD SEE A RAIN SHOWER JUST N OF THE ARPT. I TOLD HIM THAT I DID NOT WANT TO MAKE A VIS APCH. THE CTLR TOLD US TO MAINTAIN 6000' AND GAVE US VECTORS FOR A VOR APCH TO RWY 14. WE WENT INTO HVY RAIN AND CLOUD AND WE COULD NO LONGER SEE THE ARPT. WE HAD NOT BEEN CLRED FOR THE INTERCEPT NOR CLRED FOR THE APCH. THE CTLR WAS TALKING TO ANOTHER ACFT. WE WERE NOT ABLE TO CONTACT HIM BEFORE PASSING THROUGH THE APCH COURSE. AT THE F/O'S QUESTIONING, WE WERE GIVEN A HDG TO INTERCEPT THE APCH COURSE, TOLD TO MAINTAIN 6000' UNTIL INTERCEPTING, AND CLRED FOR THE APCH. WE INTERCEPTED THE APCH COURSE, AND STARTED OUR DSNT. I WAS IN THE PROCESS OF DETERMINING FROM THE DME AT THE VOR WHETHER THE APCH WAS GOING TO WORK. AS WE BEGAN TO EXIT THE HVY RAIN AND CLOUD, THE F/O POINTED OUT THE RWY OFF OUR NOSE. I COULD SEE THE RWY AND THE VASI WHICH INDICATED THAT WE WERE SOMEWHAT HIGH AS I HAD SUSPECTED THAT WE WOULD BE. WE CONTINUED TOWARD THE RWY WITH REFERENCE TO THE VASI. AS WE CAME FURTHER OUT OF THE SHOWER AND CLOUD, THINGS BEGAN TO LOOK RIGHT. THE VOR COURSE HAD MOVED OFF CTR, THE ADF NEEDLE WHICH I HAD TUNED TO THE NDB FOR RWY 32 WAS NO LONGER POINTING CORRECTLY AND, AS THE VISIBILITY IMPROVED, I COULD SEE THAT THE RWY WAS WIDER AND LONGER THAN AT REGIONAL. ALSO, THERE WERE VASI'S ON BOTH SIDES OF THE RWY. WE WERE APCHING ELLSWORTH. I CALLED FOR AND EXECUTED A MISSED APCH. WE REQUESTED RADAR VECTORS ACK TO THE VOR APCH COURSE, FLEW THE APCH AND LANDED AT REGIONAL. I CALLED REGIONAL TWR ON THE TELEPHONE AND DISCUSSED WHAT HAD HAPPENED. HE TOLD ME THAT THE APCH HAD BEEN COORDINATED WITH ELLSWORTH AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO CONFLICTS AND NO PROBS. IN PASSING, HE SAID THAT IT IS A RELATIVELY COMMON OCCURRENCE WHEN THE VOR APCH TO RWY 14 IS UTILIZED. THIS WAS THE SECOND TO LAST LEG OF SIX DAYS OF FLYING WHICH

INCLUDED 18 TKOFS AND LNDGS, SEVERAL INSTRUMENT APCHS, HOLDINGS, GATE HOLDS, TSTM DIVERSIONS, A FEW MINOR MECHANICAL PROBS, AND A FAA SAFETY INSPECTOR ON THE JUMPSEAT. ALL OF THESE THINGS ARE JUST PART OF THE JOB AND TO BE EXPECTED, BUT EVENTFULLY THEY DO CAUSE FATIGUE.


Synopsis

ACR MLG WRONG ARPT ALPCH.

Search Request No. 7159

***General Aviation Wrong Airport
Approach/Landing Related
Incidents***

January 30, 2014



Aviation Safety Reporting System
P.O. Box 189 | Moffett Field, CA | 94035-0189





TH: 262-7

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Time / Day

Date : 201308
Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RAP.Airport
State Reference : SD
Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 6
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

Environment

Flight Conditions : Mixed
Weather Elements / Visibility : Rain
Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 6
Light : Daylight
Ceiling.Single Value : 5200

Aircraft

Reference : X
ATC / Advisory.TRACON : RCA
Aircraft Operator : Personal
Make Model Name : Bonanza 33
Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91
Flight Plan : IFR
Mission : Personal
Flight Phase : Final Approach
Route In Use : Vectors
Route In Use : Direct
Route In Use : Visual Approach
Airspace.Class D : RAP

Person

Reference : 1
Location Of Person.Aircraft : X
Location In Aircraft : Flight Deck
Reporter Organization : Personal
Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot
Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument
Qualification.Flight Crew : Private
Qualification.Flight Crew : Glider
Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 800
Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 22
Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 550
ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 1107965
Human Factors : Situational Awareness

Human Factors : Human-Machine Interface
Human Factors : Communication Breakdown
Human Factors : Confusion

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Automation : Aircraft Terrain Warning
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 2500
Miss Distance.Vertical : 500
Were Passengers Involved In Event : N
When Detected : In-flight
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Airport
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I was on an IFR flight to RAP. Minneapolis Center handed me off to Ellsworth Approach on our approach to RAP. RAP was VFR, but I was in the broken cloud base at 5,400 FT MSL, so the field was not in sight. Approach Control gave me vectors to the VOR 14 approach to RAP, holding me in the clouds at 5,400 FT MSL, their radar minimum. While making the vectored left turn onto the final approach course, I broke out of the clouds several miles north of the approach end of Runway 13 at nearby Ellsworth Air Force Base, which is aligned along the same course as Runway 14 at RAP.

I informed Ellsworth approach that I had the "field in sight," even though it was the wrong field. Approach quickly cleared me for the visual and handed me over to the RAP Tower. Having never seen the field at RAP, I flew a visual approach toward Ellsworth AFB Runway 13 before the terrain warning alerted me that I was too low for an approach to Runway 14 at RAP. During this time I contacted RAP Tower and waited for clearance to land. Tower recognized that I was over the wrong field and alerted me, directing me to the approach end of Runway 14 at RAP (1 o'clock and 2 miles.) The Tower also advised me of traffic, a Bellanca on a 2 mile final to Runway 14 RAP.

Several seconds later I found myself on final to Runway 14 at RAP, one-half mile behind and 500 FT above the Bellanca. The horizontal distance was closing rapidly as my speed was about 80 KTS and the Bellanca's was considerably less than that. It was clear that there was insufficient space for me to land behind the Bellanca. I called Tower and informed them that I was making a turn to the right, off the final approach course and that I would make a 360 degree turn to allow the Bellanca to land. I could have also climbed and gone around, but I did not know what traffic was on downwind and did not know if the Bellanca was going to perform a full stop or touch-and-go. Tower allowed the 360 degree turn, or at least did not object or ask me to go around. The Bellanca cleared the runway and I landed uneventfully.

The situation arose because I was vectored out of the clouds close enough to the

approach end of Ellsworth AFB to mistake it for my destination at RAP. This is a frequent problem, apparently, because a warning appears in the airport information, and I had read it. I even commented to others that I did not want to make the mistake of landing at Ellsworth! The problem was compounded by my searching for the airport as I broke out of the clouds. Once seeing Ellsworth AFB, and being aligned on the runway, I kept my eyes out of the plane, on a visual approach.

I had 3 devices that knew where to go, including my autopilot, which was engaged and flying the intercept to the Runway 14 final course, my certified GPS, which had the approach loaded, and my iPad, with geo-referenced approach plates. All the avionics and the iPad knew where to go, but I was looking out of the plane, not at the avionics. Fortunately I did not land at the air force base. I realize that despite my knowing Ellsworth was there and having equipment telling me otherwise, it is really hard to ignore that big, long runway ahead when breaking out of the clouds on an instrument approach.

It did seem as if Tower and Approach were not talking to each other, as it appeared that Tower did not know I was on the Runway 14 approach, and did not reply to my first two radio calls after Approach Control passed me off. When Tower did talk to me, they correctly verified my location and called out the traffic in front of me. As soon as I saw the traffic, the Bellanca, I diverted. Another contributing problem was that approach told other planes to beware of Ellsworth AFB on their approach, but I do not recall approach giving me such a warning. This would have been especially useful while being vectored onto the final approach course for the VOR 14 approach to RAP, since the vectors brought me directly onto a final course for Runway 13 at Ellsworth.

Synopsis

A BE-33 pilot flying IFR to RAP declared the runway in sight after breaking out of the clouds. A low altitude alert from the RAP ILS made him realize he was making a visual approach to a similarly aligned runway at RCA some seven miles closer than RAP.

Time / Day

Date : 200305

Local Time Of Day : 1201-1800

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RCA.Airport

State Reference : CA

Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 0

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

Reference : X

ATC / Advisory.Tower : RCA.Tower

Aircraft Operator : Personal

Make Model Name : Cessna 210 Centurion / Turbo Centurion 210C, 210D

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 1

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Personal

Flight Phase : Landing

Component

Aircraft Component : DME

Aircraft Reference : X

Problem : Malfunctioning

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Location Of Person.Aircraft : X

Reporter Organization : Personal

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument

Qualification.Flight Crew : Multiengine

Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 1950

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 85

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1100

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 583011

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Location Of Person.Facility : RCA.Tower

Reporter Organization : Military
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local

Events

Anomaly.Aircraft Equipment Problem : Less Severe
Anomaly.Airspace Violation : All Types
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Landing Without Clearance
Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Result.General : None Reported / Taken
Result.General : Maintenance Action

Assessments

Contributing Factors / Situations : Human Factors
Contributing Factors / Situations : Weather
Contributing Factors / Situations : Aircraft
Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I MADE AN UNAUTH LNDG AT RCA, RWY 13, INSTEAD OF MY INTENDED LNDG AT RAP. IN SUMMARY, I WAS ON AN IFR FLT FROM FUNY TO FRAP TO VIEW THE MOUNT RUSHMORE AND CRAZY HORSE MONUMENTS, WHEN ON FINAL APCH TO RAP, I EXPERIENCED A SANDEL/DIRECTIONAL GYRO MALFUNCTION, WHICH CAUSED ME TO BELIEVE THAT I WAS INBOUND ON THE VOR RWY 14 APCH TO FRAP. BOTH ARPTS ARE QUITE CLOSE TO EACH OTHER (APPROX 6.2 MI APART, AND THE RWYS ARE ROUGHLY ALIGNED (RRAP IS RWY 14, AND KRCA IS RWY 13)). I WAS CLRED FOR THE RAP RWY 14 VOR APCH, GIVEN A RADAR VECTOR FOR AN INTERCEPT COURSE TO TRACK THE COURSE INBOUND, AND CLRNC TO DSND, AND THEN FOR THE APCH, ONCE THE COURSE WAS INTERCEPTED, I INTERCEPTED THE RADIAL (THE DIRECTIONAL GYRO AND OBS NEEDLE SEEMED PROPERLY ALIGNED), BUT MY DME IN THE SANDEL BECAME INOP, AND WHEN I SAW THE RWY IN FRONT OF ME (LINED UP WITH MY DIRECTIONAL GYRO AND OBS), I WRONGLY BELIEVED I WAS LNDG AT RAP. I CHANGED FREQ TO THE TWR, IDENTED MYSELF AND I WAS CLRED TO LAND ON RWY 14. THERE WAS A VERY STRONG XWIND, SO I WAS CRABBED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE R, AND I WAS NOSE HIGH, SO I DID NOT SEE ANY INDICATION THAT I WAS LNDG OVER A PORTION OF A CLOSED RWY. I BELIEVE THE SANDEL PIN CONNECTORS MUST BE FULLY SEATED TO THE PANEL CONNECTORS OR THIS PROB MAY RECUR WITH OTHERS. ALSO, GIVEN HOW CLOSE THESE ARPTS ARE, I BELIEVE THAT ATC SHOULD MONITOR PLTS IN THIS AREA TO ENSURE THAT THEY ARE NOT ON APCH TO THE WRONG ARPT. I THINK IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA FOR ELSWORTH APCH TO MONITOR THE RAP TWR FREQ TO INSURE THAT PLTS DO NOT MISTAKE THESE 2 ARPTS. AS I ALSO MENTIONED TO YOU YESTERDAY, OVER THE PAST 2 YRS I HAVE HAD A NUMBER OF INTERMITTENT PROBS WITH MY SANDEL THAT HAS REQUIRED VARIOUS REPAIRS. THIS PROB FIRST OCCURRED ABOUT 2 YRS AGO (AND MY MECH RESEATED THE SANDEL), AND THEN ABOUT 12-14 MONTHS AGO, THE PROB RECURRED TWICE, AND SANDEL AUTH REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT (FREE OF CHARGE) THE MOUNTING BRACKET FOR THE SANDEL.

Synopsis

A SIGHT SEEING FLT TO MOUNT RUSHMORE FOLLOWED BY A VOR APCH TO RAP
ENDS IN A LNDG TO RCA. A RECURRING NAV EQUIP PROB CONTRIBUTES TO THE
EVENT.

Time / Day

Date : 199207

Local Time Of Day : 0601-1200

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RAP

State Reference : SD

Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 4

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1000

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 12

Light : Daylight

Aircraft

ATC / Advisory.Tower : RAP

Aircraft Operator : Corporate

Make Model Name : Light Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission : Passenger

Flight Phase : Initial Approach

Route In Use : Visual Approach

Route In Use.Other

Airspace.Class D : RAP

Airspace.Class D : RCA

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Reporter Organization.Other

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Qualification.Flight Crew : Flight Engineer

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 6100

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 120

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 600

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 215251

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Reporter Organization.Other

Function.Flight Crew : First Officer

Qualification.Flight Crew : Commercial

Qualification.Flight Crew : Instrument

Person : 3

Reference : 3
Reporter Organization : Government
Function.Air Traffic Control : Local
Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance
Anomaly.Other
Anomaly.Other
Detector.Person : Flight Crew
Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control
Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance
Result.Air Traffic Control : Issued New Clearance

Assessments

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

WE WERE CLRED FOR A VISUAL APCH TO THE RAPID CITY ARPT WHILE 15 MI OUT. (APCH INDICATED THE ARPT WAS AT 12 O'CLOCK AND 15 MI. WE OBSERVED AN ARPT AT APPROX THE 11:30 POS AND 15 MI; BELIEVING THIS TO BE RAPID CITY WE ACCEPTED THE CLRNC). THE RWY PATTERN AND ORIENTATION AT BOTH ARPTS ARE SIMILAR; IN ADDITION THERE WERE NO NAVAIDS TO HELP WITH NAV. THE ONLY VOR WHICH WAS OF USE WAS LOCATED 90 DEGS TO OUR FLT PATH AND SEVERAL MI FROM THE ARPT. (BOTH ARPTS ARE INTERSECTED BY THE SAME RADIAL FROM THIS VOR). WHILE ON BASE LEG OF APCH NOTICED THE RWY APPEARED TO BE 'LARGER' THAN I WAS EXPECTING (BY THIS I MEAN IT APPEARED LONGER AND WIDER THAN ANTICIPATED). TURNING FINAL I ASKED THE TWR IF THEY HAD US IN SIGHT. THEY RESPONDED 'NEGATIVE.' AS WE WERE ON FINAL AND CLOSE TO THE ARPT THIS SEEMED TO CONFIRM THE PROBLEM. I BEGAN THE MISSED APCH/GAR. A FEW SECONDS LATER, THE TWR CALLED US IN SIGHT AND INDICATED WE WERE 5 MI N. THE CTLR THEN ADDED 'THAT WAS NOT THE RAPID CITY ARPT.' WE THEN SPOTTED THE RAPID CITY ARPT AND LANDED. CONTRIBUTING FACTORS: 1) EBOUND DIRECTION OF FLT HAD US LOOKING INTO THE SUN, WHICH WAS CLOSE TO THE HORIZON. 2) BOTH PLTS WERE TIRED - - WE LEFT THE HOTEL EARLY AND DID NOT GET MUCH SLEEP. 3) I FAILED TO CONSIDER HOW CLOSE THE OTHER ARPT WAS TO OUR DEST, A SMALL CHANGE IN HDG WAS ALL IT TOOK TO 'CHANGE' OUR DEST. LACKING A VOR OR OTHER NAVAID ON THE FIELD I SHOULD HAVE WAITED UNTIL WE WERE CLOSE ENOUGH TO THE ARPT THAT THERE COULD BE NO DOUBT BEFORE ACCEPTING THE VISUAL.

Synopsis

A CPR LTT MADE AN APCH TO THE WRONG ARPT. THEY DID NOT LAND.

Time / Day

Date : 199009

Local Time Of Day : 1801-2400

Place

Locale Reference.Airport : RAP

State Reference : ND

Relative Position.Distance.Nautical Miles : 15

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2500

Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC

Weather Elements / Visibility.Visibility : 20

Light : Dusk

Aircraft

ATC / Advisory.TRACON : RAP

Aircraft Operator : FBO

Make Model Name : Small Transport, Low Wing, 2 Turbojet Eng

Crew Size.Number Of Crew : 2

Flight Plan : IFR

Mission.Other

Flight Phase : Descent

Flight Phase : Descent

Route In Use : Vectors

Route In Use : Direct

Airspace.Class D : RCA

Airspace.Class E : RAP

Person : 1

Reference : 1

Reporter Organization.Other

Function.Flight Crew : Pilot Flying

Function.Flight Crew : Captain

Qualification.Flight Crew : Air Transport Pilot (ATP)

Experience.Flight Crew.Total : 2400

Experience.Flight Crew.Last 90 Days : 100

Experience.Flight Crew.Type : 1400

ASRS Report Number.Accession Number : 158305

Person : 2

Reference : 2

Reporter Organization : Government

Function.Air Traffic Control : Approach

Qualification.Air Traffic Control : Fully Certified

Events

Anomaly.Deviation - Track / Heading : All Types

Anomaly.Deviation - Procedural : Clearance

Anomaly.Other

Detector.Person : Air Traffic Control

Result.Flight Crew : Returned To Clearance

Assessments

Primary Problem : Human Factors

Narrative: 1

I WAS DSNDING FOR LNDG IN RAPID CITY. THE CTLR ASKED IF I HAD THE ARPT IN SIGHT. I SAID NO. HE TOLD ME TO CONTINUE, THEN HE ASKED AGAIN. THIS TIME I SAW WHAT I THOUGHT WAS AN ARPT. I SAID I HAD THE ARPT AT 11 O'CLOCK AND 10 MI. HE SAID THE ARPT WAS 10:30 AND 15 MI, SO THERE WAS THE FIRST CONFUSION. I SAW THE MIL ARPT, NOT RAPID CITY. HE TOLD ME TO STAY WITH HIM, AND HE VECTORED ME TO THE APCH END OF THE ARPT AND CLRED ME FOR THE APCH. WELL I HAD SEEN THE ARPT ALL ALONG, SO I STARTED TO DSND FOR THE RWY AND I WAS TOLD TO GO MISSED, AND THAT I WAS ON FINAL FOR THE MIL ARPT. BOTH ARPTS HAD APPROX THE SAME RWYS. THEY WERE ABOUT 6 MI APART.

Synopsis

GA SMA WRONG ARPT APCH UNAUTH PENETRATION OF RCA ATA.