

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Office of Aviation Safety
Washington, D.C. 20594

May 13, 2022

**Attachment 4 – FAA Interview Summary and Written Statement
From Boyfriend of the PIC**

OPERATIONAL FACTORS

CEN22FA096

RECORD OF ☐ VISIT ☐ CONFERENCE OR ☒ TELEPHONE CALL		TIME 8:25 AM	DATE 01/11/2022
NAME (S) OF PERSON (S) CONTACTED OR IN CONFERENCE AND LOCATION		ROUTING	
		SYMBOL	INITIALS
Joel Rich		CE03	JSR
Robert Prenger		CE03	RJP
SUBJECT [REDACTED] - Boyfriend of Amanda Youngblood.			
DIGEST			
[REDACTED] stated that he had spoke to Amanda Youngblood on January 8, 2022 directly			
before she departed KSUS via text message. He stated that she had concerns about this			
flight in particular due to the weather and her and the other pilots' (George King) skill			
set. She stated that he did not do a lot of IFR flights and was not very confident in his			
IFR abilities. [REDACTED] also noted that Amanda had told him that both her and George			
King were both hired by Air Net II, LLC. in October of 2021 and that the both of them had			
mainly done VFR flying.			
CONCLUSION, ACTION TAKEN, OR REQUIRED			
After speaking with [REDACTED] about the conversation that took place between Amanda			
Youngblood and himself, it is believed that having 2 low time Air Net II, LLC pilots that			
were not very comfortable flying IMC may have been a contributing factor to the accident			
that took place on January 8, 2022.			
DATE 01/11/2022	TITLE Inspector In Charge (IIC)	SIGNATURE  Digitally signed by Joel S Rich Date: 2022.01.12 07:16:42 -06'00'	

This statement covers concerns that Amanda Youngblood expressed to [REDACTED] on January 8, 2022 about her flight from Spirit of St. Louis airport (SUS) in Missouri to Centennial airport (APA) in Colorado . It will also cover statements that she made about the company AirNet II since she had started working for them in October of 2021.

On January 8, 2022 around 6 pm EST I spoke to Amanda on the phone about the flight she was about to depart on. She was concerned about the weather conditions she would encounter on the route. She knew that the flight would be IFR during the entire route and she would encounter icing conditions along the way. She said that she was not 100 percent confident in the PIC's ability to make a go/no-go decision because he had commented to her that his IFR and icing conditions experience was limited. She said that the other PICs she had flown with she had more confidence in because they had more time in these types of conditions. She was worried that the flight was dangerous and that the risk was high. She did not think that the PIC and her had enough experience to make the go/no-go decision in these conditions and felt the company would not back a no-go decision. She said that she wasn't sure she would make it out of this. She knew the company policy is we are going and felt she was required to make the trip.

A few days prior to the flight she had said the company planes were maintained but not well maintained. She said that she had already had a heater go out and an engine overheat on a flight. She also said that another Baron had recently had a dual vacuum pump failure. She was also scheduled in the plane that had the dual vacuum pump failure but said they had to switch planes prior to leaving Rickenbacker airport in Ohio (LCK). She was starting to be concerned about the conditions of the planes she was flying.

During her initial training at AirNet II she said she was told "this is what the regs say but we are going." During one of her training flights in the Baron she had to land in a 35-40 knot crosswind and sometimes would be faced with low-level windshear on these training flights. On previous flights she would be looking at the weather and she would comment that even if the weather was bad the company's mentality was "you're going".