



The National Transportation Safety Board

Office of Aviation Safety
Central Region
Memorandum for the Record
Summary of ATC
Communications and Radar
Track
CEN19FA084
Goshen Indiana
February 21 2019

Provided by the FAA to the NTSB:

An SRT was conducted and the event was color-coded "Green" with no AJI follow-up required. These were the main findings of the SRT:

- Traffic volume was light with low complexity. The GSH Airport weather was wind 270 at 9 knots, visibility 9 miles and the sky was clear. There was no depicted precipitation on the radar display and the ATM reported that there were no SIGMETs, AIRMETs, or other weather products valid at the time of the accident. The ATM briefed there were three positions open in the TRACON; the Radar North, Radar South (S) and a stand-alone CIC. The CIC was monitoring the operation and providing general supervision.
- N4922K established communication with the S controller four miles east of the GSH VOR traveling westbound. N4922K was VFR at 2,600 feet and requested a practice RNAV Runway 9 Approach circle to Runway 27. N4922K advised they were planning to conduct additional practice approaches following the RNAV Runway 9 Approach. The S controller radar identified N4922K and cleared the aircraft for the RNAV Runway 9 Approach circle to Runway 27 two miles west of the GSH VOR.
- The ATM reported that the S controller did not ask N4922K if they were in receipt of the current weather and NOTAMs at the GSH Airport. The ATM stated that controllers will ask IFR aircraft if they are in receipt of current weather and NOTAMs; however, the ATM reported that controllers generally do not ask VFR aircraft to verify that they have the current weather and NOTAM information.
- The S controller instructed N4922K to report the procedure turn inbound. N4922K reported inbound, advised the S controller that they would be a full stop landing with a short delay on the ground, and then would be requesting an additional practice approach to the GSH Airport. The S controller told N4922K to remain on their same beacon code so they could be re-identified after departing. The S controller terminated radar service for N4922K and approved a change to advisory frequency.
- The ATM stated that the S controller did not observe any anomalies with the flight and that N4922K's descent appeared normal. The ATM reported that the facility lost radar contact with N4922K after services were terminated at a point where they would normally expect to lose radar contact. The ATM stated that the facility received a call from the Central Regional Operations Center approximately eight minutes after services were terminated and were advised of the accident involving N4922K.



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