

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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CRASH LANDING OF A CESSNA 525A
N525KT AT THE MGC AIRPORT
IN MICHIGAN CITY, INDIANA,
ON DECEMBER 27, 2017

Accident No.: CEN18LA062

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Interview of: CALVIN PETHAN, Pilot/Vice President Operations
Integrated Flight Resources, Inc.

Tuesday,
February 20, 2018

APPEARANCES:

MITCHELL GALLO, Aviation Accident Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

JAMES LOBASH, Aviation Safety Inspector
Federal Aviation Administration

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. GALLO: This is an interview with Calvin Pethan. My name is Mitchell Gallo from the National Transportation Safety Board, and with me is James Lobash from the Federal Aviation Administration.

Calvin, do I have permission to record this conversation?

MR. PETHAN: Yes.

MR. GALLO: Okay.

INTERVIEW OF CALVIN PETHAN

BY MR. GALLO:

Q. All right. Like I mentioned previously, why don't you just go back when you got assigned the flight and give us the story about what went on, what you were feeling, what you were thinking, just all the events that happened?

A. Sure. Well, it's -- like any other flight, you see it coming up on the calendar a couple days ahead of time and start looking at the different things that you need to for preparation. And so, as per my statement here, on December 26th, the day before, at about noon, the co-pilot texted me and asked if anyone made arrangements for someone to be at that airport in the morning.

Our passenger was going to be earlier, but we had an early flight in the morning. So sometimes those airports aren't open that early in the morning, so we were just checking to see if anyone had made arrangements for that yet. And I just replied that no one had and that he should take it upon himself to call

1 the FBO and see if they have someone there that early.

2 And then a few hours later, he sent me a text message saying
3 that he spoke with the manager and that they gave us a code so the
4 passenger could get through the gate because they really didn't
5 want to have anyone there in the morning; it was just too early.
6 And so that way our passenger could walk through the gate and --
7 without anyone being present. So we just elected then that we'd
8 go through there without getting fueled. We could do that, no
9 problem, so --

10 He also indicated that the manager told him that the runway
11 looks good and any snowdrifts are below the taxi lights. And the
12 reason we asked that is the CJ wings are relatively low, and so
13 sometimes these smaller airports, they don't plow the snow away
14 from the taxiways as much, and so we were just making sure that
15 our wings would clear any snow. And so he had the conversation
16 with them, asked them how everything was looking, and the manager
17 said that no, the runway looks good, the snowdrifts are below taxi
18 lights. And then, via text, we agreed to meet at 5:45 on the 27th
19 and depart at about 6:15. So that gives us enough time to get our
20 fuel and look at everything in the morning and head over to
21 Michigan City.

22 So I don't know when -- at some point prior to the 27th,
23 flight plans were put into the system to do proper fuel planning.
24 Chris did the flight plans. He just inputs them in our account.
25 And then he usually sends me the fuel planning via a spreadsheet

1 and says, this is what I'm going to take here, this is what we
2 should take here. And I check it all over and make sure that I
3 agree with everything, and everything looked good. So at some
4 point on the 27th he put in the flight plans. And that was -- so
5 the 26th, I was in the office in the afternoon, so I was just
6 watching weather and everything, and there wasn't anything crazy
7 forecasted to be in Michigan City the next day, so --

8 I left the office at about 6 o'clock on the 26th. And
9 throughout the evening, I continued to monitor weather and phone
10 apps like AeroWeather and the Flightplan.com app, and just
11 watching the radar and things like that. And I didn't see
12 anything that caused any concern, and so, to my recollection, I
13 went to sleep around 8:30 because it was an early morning, so I
14 thought I'd get some sleep.

15 In the morning, I woke up about 4:45. As I always do in the
16 morning, I quick refreshed my weather app and made sure everything
17 was good. And noting that it was VFR conditions over at Michigan
18 City, and so thinking great, VFR, and went on with the rest of my
19 morning routine, shower and dress and all that.

20 Arrived at the airport. Chris and I discussed how much fuel
21 we were going to take, so any updates to what he had sent me the
22 day before, just making sure that we're still on the same page,
23 that we're going to take the fuel out of DuPage to get all the way
24 to our end goal, Wilmington, for the morning.

25 And then -- let's see. We discussed whether we should take

1 off with a VFR and IFR flight plan. Because when I looked at the
2 weather, VFR, and still then VFR, but it was -- the visibility was
3 coming down a little bit, so we decided IFR was just the safer way
4 to go, so we decided to go with that. So we took off with 2,850
5 pounds of fuel to make it all the way to Wilmington after our stop
6 in Michigan City.

7 The rest of the preflight duties were accomplished. We did
8 the coffee, the ice, the papers, and got in the airplane to leave.
9 That's when we -- we got in the airplane, and that's when we
10 clicked the file button on Flightplan.com. I think you'd be
11 familiar with that, so --

12 Q. Yeah.

13 A. We got in the airplane, and we said, okay, for sure, we'd
14 just go IFR and make this all easier, safer.

15 So I was obviously the PIC. I was -- I'm type rated in the
16 airplane, and then Chris was acting as the co-pilot, and he's
17 pilot flying. We've been kind of bringing him up to more
18 responsibility, and so he was the pilot flying.

19 We departed DuPage as normal. I didn't write it down here,
20 but the weather in DuPage was CAVU, as my one owner likes to call
21 it, clear, visibility unrestricted. About halfway to Michigan
22 City, we noticed some IMC conditions below us. There was, like, a
23 layer of broken overcast.

24 And we began our descent. We elected to use anti-ice motors
25 based on just the fact that it was cold and there was visible

1 moisture, as you're supposed to. Listened to the current weather
2 conditions. We elected -- because it had gone down significantly
3 since we looked at it, we elected it to do the approach to 20, the
4 RNAV 2-0 approach. And everything was still -- everything was
5 well above minimums. We could still make it in no problem.

6 So we descended via the profile. Broke out of the clouds
7 with adequate time to see the runway lights. We continued our
8 descent towards the runway. I noticed some tower lights on the
9 north end of the field, which are -- we didn't want to hit them,
10 so just pointed that out. And then we noticed that the PAPI was
11 lit up, but it was NOTAM'd out of service, and I do believe once
12 you get the voice recording that you'll hear us say don't use it
13 because it was NOTAM'd out.

14 So at -- let's see. At one point during the descent, I
15 recall advising Chris to make sure he put the runway in the
16 prescribed landing area, not to make it a floating soft touchdown,
17 as it is a short runway. And that is pretty typical of me and
18 anytime we're going into a 4,000-foot runway. And then I did note
19 that there appeared to be a dusting of snow on the runway, so I
20 thought it would be more important than normal to do that.

21 So he did so, to my recollection, within the first 1,000 feet
22 of the runway. And I think that's been confirmed as well, to my
23 understanding. So once he touched down within that 1,000 feet and
24 on speed, immediately deployed the ground flaps to begin slowing
25 down. When he attempted to brake heavily, there appeared to be no

1 effectiveness. And it was just -- it was like ice skating. It
2 just wasn't doing anything. And so he said something like the
3 brakes aren't working or just something to that regard that he had
4 little effectiveness, little or no effectiveness. And so I
5 attempted the brakes on my side as well in case it was a system
6 thing or whatever. Just as an added note.

7 But then I also noted that the airplane was not slowing at a
8 rate that I was familiar and comfortable with. And so I have in
9 here, approximately two-thirds down the runway, I knew that we
10 were destined to go off the end. It was -- the speed that we had
11 two-thirds down the runway and our rate of deceleration, we were
12 going off the end.

13 So looking at the airspeed -- I quickly glanced at the
14 airspeed indicator and noticed that we had not yet lost half of
15 our speed, but we were already more than halfway down the runway.
16 And so I elected that even -- so we were for sure going to go off
17 the end of the runway, in my opinion, and so I thought if we can
18 make it off the end of the runway in the air, that'd be better
19 than going off the end of the runway on the ground.

20 So I elected to make the call to go, go, go. And I assisted
21 in powering up the airplane to power up the engines to initiate an
22 aborted landing. And as the aircraft sped up, for a moment it
23 appeared we may make it off the ground, as the nose did lift off
24 the ground. And I think that was evident with the tire tracks.
25 But there was not adequate amount of runway remaining to lift off.

1 At some point -- and I can't remember details as they
2 occurred; it just -- it's all a blur to me. But we did bring the
3 power back to idle and went through the fence, the guardrail, and
4 you guys kind of know the rest of the story. We secured the
5 airplane, verified that we were both not injured, and probably a
6 few hundred bad words on the voice recorder, and then elected to
7 stay in the airplane as the airplane didn't appear to have -- to
8 be doing anything after we secured it, knowing that we're in the
9 middle of a field somewhere and it's warm in there. So we kind of
10 stayed with it just to -- survival training, I guess.

11 And then I noticed that responders had come, been coming up
12 to us, so we got out then and notified the proper channels. And
13 exited the aircraft through the main cabin doors, no emergency
14 exit. But the main cabin door was open, or we opened it. And so
15 after that, I mean, it's all the after effects and all the
16 aftermath. So I don't think that needs to be in too much detail.
17 So --

18 MR. GALLO: Jim, do you have any questions?

19 MR. LOBASH: I've got just a couple.

20 BY MR. LOBASH:

21 Q. In mission planning -- just, this is more looking at it from
22 a company perspective and procedure wise. Part 91, what type of
23 release authority do you need for a Part 91?

24 A. If the trip is on the calendar and it has a trip number with
25 it, that's --

1 Q. That's good enough. So the day of, you don't have to check
2 with anybody, like a 135, where you get a formal release or
3 anything like that?

4 A. No. It's just -- if it's there and it's got the trip number,
5 it's a good-to-go.

6 Q. Okay. How about as far as going in your airfield without
7 weather forecast capability? Because that looked to be -- when I
8 looked at the forecast, there's a break in the forecast between
9 where Gary was and where South Bend was. Depending on if you were
10 needing the plus or minus an hour, depending on what you look at,
11 you could say, yes, you need an alternate; no, you don't. So I
12 was just wondering what the thought process was there?

13 A. There really -- I mean, it used to be an area forecast,
14 right?

15 Q. Right.

16 A. And those are --

17 Q. Those are gone.

18 A. -- gone out the window.

19 Q. Yeah.

20 A. So that's I don't think really established as to what needs
21 to be looked at as the -- you could say the closest, you could say
22 the one with the best weather to make it best suit you. It
23 really --

24 Q. Exactly. Yeah, there's nothing that says one way or the
25 other.

1 A. Right.

2 Q. So I was just wondering what your thought process was that
3 day?

4 A. And to us it was we're looking at the weather there, at --
5 you know, the current at Michigan City, and we're looking at the
6 fact that we're standing at DuPage, which is 20 minutes away --

7 Q. Clear blue sky. Yeah.

8 A. -- and it's clear blue sky. So we had enough fuel to get
9 anywhere in the country we wanted to go.

10 Q. Pretty much, yeah.

11 A. And so it, you know, it's just a -- we're thinking the
12 weather's great here if we have to come back, so --

13 Q. Yeah. Okay. Last question I have is as far as training
14 goes, simulator -- when you do simulator rides, have you ever done
15 or do you ever talk about going over rejected landings once you've
16 touched down?

17 A. No.

18 Q. That's what I thought. I was thinking that's --

19 A. And I've thought about this a hundred times since obviously.
20 And that is something that is so broad, because you could -- you
21 know, clearly I'm speculating here, but you could practice it one
22 way, it's never going to turn out the same. The different
23 conditions are going to make everything completely different.

24 Q. Right.

25 A. So it just -- no. It's not something that you practice.

1 It's -- you practice --

2 Q. Right. And that's what I -- based on what I saw.

3 A. Once you get on the ground, everyone assumes you're done.

4 You're stopped and you're off the runway, so --

5 Q. Right. Yeah. And that's kind of what I saw, too, when I
6 looked at everything. Because one of the things we saw was the
7 flaps were still in ground flap. That may have hurt significantly
8 your ability to get back airborne.

9 A. Sure.

10 Q. So one fact is, if you've never practiced before and never
11 thought through it or anything else like that --

12 A. Right, right.

13 Q. -- you know, in the heat battle where you were --

14 A. Right.

15 Q. -- you essentially become a test pilot and, you know --

16 MR. GALLO: There's no checklist for it, is there?

17 MR. PETHAN: Yeah. There's no checklist.

18 BY MR. LOBASH:

19 Q. There's no -- there is no checklist.

20 A. Right.

21 Q. Exactly.

22 A. There's no checklist. There's no thought to it because --

23 Q. Right. Because --

24 A. -- because nobody wants to take the responsibility of saying,
25 yeah, you're going to make it, or no, you're not.

1 Q. Yeah, and everything -- from what I could tell just looking
2 through -- you know, some airplanes are go airplanes, some are
3 stop. It seems like once this airplane's on the ground, it's a
4 stopped airplane and, you know, trying to get it back airborne is
5 really difficult.

6 A. Sure. I mean, it's -- that's up for speculation, because you
7 could -- I mean, given different conditions, this could've been a
8 completely different story.

9 Q. Exactly. Exactly.

10 A. I mean, it's just -- that's speculation. So I, I don't know.
11 I thought with the performance that I've seen out of that airplane
12 for taking off, that I should be able to get back off the ground.

13 Q. How often have you gone into short runways, below 5,000 feet?

14 A. This airplane goes into Lansing, IGQ, often.

15 Q. And that's right at 5,000 or 4,800, whatever it is.

16 A. 4,000.

17 Q. It is at 4,000?

18 A. 4,000.

19 Q. Okay.

20 A. Flat. So plenty.

21 Q. Okay. Yeah. Because I saw that in your -- when I went back
22 in time and duty I saw that.

23 A. Yeah, yeah. Like I said, this airplane goes into Lansing.
24 This company is based right at the Lansing airport.

25 Q. Right.

1 A. So I personally have gone into Lansing quite a bit. And
2 under different situations and different weather as well, and so
3 I've had the experience on this runway -- this size runway.

4 Q. And you have a decent idea of what the --

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. -- landing considerations are --

7 A. Right, right.

8 Q. -- and landing performance and everything else for that?

9 A. Um-hum.

10 Q. Okay.

11 A. Yeah.

12 MR. GALLO: Okay. I need to collect my thoughts since Jim
13 went first.

14 MR. PETHAN: Oh, boy.

15 BY MR. GALLO:

16 Q. So there's an interesting concept I was thinking about for
17 the past couple weeks, and -- you know, sometimes people say,
18 well, don't get involved in an accident. But an interesting
19 thought question is maybe it's better to be involved in -- to be
20 an accident to reduce loss of life. From a structural damage
21 point of view. Because you can define an accident as damage to
22 the airplane or injury to a person.

23 So -- and Jim kind of talked about, you know, about sim
24 training and, you know, you're done once you land, but you don't
25 keep going. And I mentioned this before when we were talking

1 about an accident in Cresco, Iowa, where the crew aborted landing
2 and tried to go around, but they just didn't have the runway. And
3 there may be maneuvers where you just take the hit to reduce the
4 more severe occurrence.

5 So looking back at this, and what you know now, do you think
6 it would have been better just to go off the runway without the
7 additional energy? And this is something I've talked about in
8 test pilot autoflight (indiscernible) also. So you get into
9 something like this and you no longer have control authority, or
10 you have a weather emergency and you want to put it down in --
11 airplane down in a field. Well, it would be an accident, but
12 you're not going to lose control.

13 A. Right.

14 Q. You'll have some control but not complete control. But so
15 going back in this case, do you think -- I mean, just keep trying
16 to stop and -- rather than adding energy to it?

17 A. I think retroactively we can look back at any accident and
18 say, I could have done something differently. But I don't think,
19 I don't think I'd do this any differently than I did. I think the
20 decision saying that we may make it off the ground -- I don't
21 think, had I not been through this accident, that I would make
22 this decision any differently any other day. Do you understand
23 what I mean?

24 Q. Sure. Right.

25 A. I'm saying you can go back now and say, would it have been

1 better to continue stopping? Well, obviously, because we crashed.
2 But if we go through this same situation again, I'm not going to
3 say that I'll make the decision any differently, because I don't
4 know what all the parameters are. I don't know exactly how far we
5 went down the runway. I don't know exactly the speeds. I don't
6 know those kinds of things.

7 Q. So going back to simulator -- in your sim training for this
8 airplane or any type ratings that you have, do they ever do any
9 training on contaminated runways in your sim training?

10 A. Um-hum. Yeah.

11 Q. And where did you go for sim training at?

12 A. CAE.

13 Q. And in your outside -- outside of your flying here, do you
14 ever read or study any kind of aviation materials?

15 A. Um-hum.

16 Q. And can you kind of describe what those are?

17 A. I mean, I get emails quite often about -- like Aviation
18 Business emails where they'll have a little excerpt from an
19 accident investigation or anything like that. There's nothing in
20 particular. I don't read one thing more than another. But just
21 even in the office we have magazines, Aviation Business
22 International or AV Week or just a bunch of just maybe pilot
23 magazines. I have a Sporty subscription. So just reading some
24 articles on that kind of stuff.

25 Q. Okay. I have kind of a question that's come up in other

1 accidents I just want to assess your knowledge in. So far in my
2 other accidents nobody's gotten the answer right. And from what I
3 recall, some crews that I had landed on a snow-covered runway, and
4 it was slick and they went off, and they would say -- this was in
5 a non-towered airport. And they would say, well, there was no
6 NOTAM. So are non-towered airports required to have -- to NOTAM
7 those snow conditions?

8 A. I don't believe so.

9 Q. Do you know how -- and I'll give you the answer from what I
10 think, from what I remember. Do you know how to determine whether
11 an airport is required to put those NOTAMs out?

12 A. No.

13 Q. It's kind of a circular path here at -- and so I looked into
14 that, and you have to look into the airport facility directory.
15 And if they're a certified -- yeah, ARF index, they need an ARF
16 index. If they have an ARF index in there, then they have a
17 certified snow removal plan, and also then I think they have to
18 issue local NOTAMs. So --

19 A. Does it have anything to do with whether they're a 139
20 airport versus a non-139?

21 Q. Going in the ARF index, from what I remember it -- going into
22 the AFDI, I had to -- it was something related to the ARF index.
23 So that was another question I had.

24 Are you familiar with Flight Safety Foundation articles?
25 Have you ever seen those?

1 A. No.

2 Q. Okay. I pulled those up, and I'll share them with you.
3 There are two there -- there are actually two there that I found
4 quite detailed and interesting. I mean, they had one for CFIT.
5 They had one for contaminated runways. They had one for
6 stabilized approaches. And I've used those in the past, and so I
7 was just -- it's something I found interesting, and I'll share it
8 with you or the company to look at.

9 How many times have you been to -- flown into the Michigan
10 City Airport prior to the accident?

11 A. This would be my first.

12 Q. Okay. And I don't know if you mentioned, maybe I don't
13 recall, but can you go through the configuration of the airplane
14 coming down for the approach into Michigan City and then on the
15 runway?

16 A. Sure. I mean, the -- like, the --

17 Q. The spoilers and the flaps and --

18 A. -- flap positions and all that kind of stuff? Flaps are full
19 for landing and landing gear's down. Speed brakes were not out.
20 That's after touchdown. Upon touchdown, the ground flaps -- or
21 the flaps were selected to ground flaps, which automatically
22 deploys speed brakes. And that would be the only configuration
23 change.

24 Q. Okay. And then looking at the 135 training manual, there's a
25 whole list of ground training material. And one of them was CTS

1 training, and it has different modules.

2 A. Sure.

3 Q. Do you think that training, that CTS training program, is it
4 too generic; is it too specific? What are your thoughts about --
5 and then also let me add to that, is it something that you kind of
6 just go through just to get it done and -- so I'm throwing all
7 these questions out there -- or do you think it would be better
8 learning if you were in, like, a lecture environment where
9 somebody goes through everything, and you're kind of led through
10 it with quizzes rather than kind of a self-study, get-through-it
11 type thing?

12 So those are kind of all these questions I'm thinking about,
13 so maybe you could talk about that a little bit?

14 MR. LOBASH: Do you understand --

15 MR. PETHAN: I get it. I just don't see how this --

16 MR. LOBASH: Has anything to do with --

17 MR. PETHAN: Has anything to do with what we're talking
18 about.

19 MR. LOBASH: What kind of training is that?

20 MR. PETHAN: The computerized training systems, or it's a --
21 whatever. You log in and you do just computerized modular
22 training. And it takes you through some tutorials and then
23 through some exams, or I think they're called lessons or something
24 like that, where you do some multiple choice answers first, and
25 then at the end, you take an exam based on the whole module.

1 MR. LOBASH: How often do you have to do those?

2 MR. PETHAN: Recurrently once a year. And so I guess the
3 question is whether it's adequate training or whether it's --

4 BY MR. GALLO:

5 Q. Do you think it's not -- if it's too generic, is it too
6 detailed? How much time? Because I've never seen it, and so --
7 and based on your experience, you're walking into this --

8 A. Sure.

9 Q. -- module, is it something you've seen before and there's
10 nothing new there, or --

11 A. No. Every year I do it, there's something more I learn on
12 it. They seem to change things around, change what their focus is
13 in each category and things like that.

14 For me it's better to learn that way than to sit in a
15 lecture. I get very bored in lectures. And so for me, having
16 animation and having these things that you watch through -- and
17 it's a computer, so we all love to stare at computers. So, I
18 mean, for me, it's adequate training.

19 There's some places where I think that it's more specific to
20 a different operation than what we do, but there's some places
21 where it's more vague. It's a very wide variety. I don't think
22 we can really speculate what -- I don't know. I just -- they
23 have, you know, winter operations training, which I'm sure would
24 be beneficial to this, and some things where they'll start talking
25 about -- like, for instance, I looked at the winter operations

1 training just to familiarize myself with it again. And they'll
2 talk about Canadian brake value assessments, and that doesn't
3 really mean anything here, so that -- do I really need to know
4 that?

5 But there's definitely pertinent information that they give.
6 They give definitions for contaminated runways on ICAO and FAA and
7 Europe and -- so it's a broad spectrum, I'd say.

8 Q. Yeah, I -- and the reason I ask, I've never seen it. It
9 seems like the brunt of training was listed CTS, aside from, you
10 know, the av manual and other things. Is it lengthy to complete?

11 A. Um-hum. Quite lengthy.

12 MR. LOBASH: Use words. Don't --

13 MR. PETHAN: Oh, sorry. Yeah. Sorry. Can't nod my head? I
14 can't see that?

15 Yeah, it's lengthy. In fact, I think our training manual, to
16 my knowledge, requires a certain amount of hours to complete these
17 subjects, but it's well over those amount of hours. You know, if
18 the training manual says you can use 8 hours of CTS for this
19 particular day of training, these things take hours and hours and
20 hours and hours. I mean, if it says 8 hours, I bet it's 16 hours
21 to go through that actual module. So it takes a very long time.
22 And it does get a little annoying, but that's part of the
23 training.

24 BY MR. GALLO:

25 Q. And do you do that at the IFR office, or can you do that at

1 home or --

2 A. Anywhere, yeah.

3 Q. So you just log in?

4 A. It's just a log in to a website, yeah.

5 Q. Okay. All right. That's all I -- that's the only question I
6 had about that. And then for the accident flight, how did you run
7 the performance numbers for landing distances?

8 A. From the book.

9 Q. Okay. Did you calculate it or did Chris?

10 A. We both looked it over.

11 Q. Okay.

12 A. Yeah.

13 MR. GALLO: I think that's all the questions I have. Do you
14 have any?

15 MR. LOBASH: I don't have anything else.

16 MR. GALLO: Do you have -- one more question. Do you have
17 anything else you want to tell us or that we missed or you want to
18 comment on?

19 MR. PETHAN: Not that I can think of that's pertinent, no. I
20 think you guys have the information you need.

21 MR. GALLO: Yeah.

22 MR. LOBASH: Right.

23 MR. GALLO: Well, that concludes it. Thank you very much.

24 MR. PETHAN: Great. Thanks. I'll get Chris in.

25 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: CRASH LANDING OF A CESSNA 525A
 N525KT AT THE MGC AIRPORT
 IN MICHIGAN CITY, INDIANA,
 ON DECEMBER 27, 2017
 Interview of Calvin Pethan

ACCIDENT NO.: CEN18LA062

PLACE:

DATE: February 20, 2018

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Kay Maurer
Transcriber