

Memorandum of Conversation

Date: 16 July 2019

Time: 1600 central daylight time

Conversation Including: Matt Rigsby, Sr. Accident Investigator
FAA Office of Accident Investigation, AVP-100



Conversation Regarding: CEN18LA026, N138WH

Duration of Call: 20 Minutes

Summary & Factual Information from Conversation:

Mr. Rigsby called to provide some clarification on what level of oversight the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had over the selection of a long line used during power line construction flights.

Mr. Rigsby stated that the only lift equipment that the FAA Portland FSDO specifically approved for the helicopter was the hook assembly; the long line and crewmember harnesses were not subject to FAA review/approval for the Part 133 Class B operation. Mr. Rigsby also confirmed that at the time of the accident, while operating under Part 133 Class B, the two linemen were considered crewmembers (not passengers) during the powerline construction flight. Mr. Rigsby noted that the FAA is in the process of updating their guidance to operators to consider all operations that involved human external cargo to be Part 133 Class D instead of being Part 133 Class B. Additionally, the FAA is currently considering requiring operators to utilize a secondary retention device when human external cargo is being utilized under Part 133 Class D.

Mr. Rigsby also confirmed that a pilot selects the length of the long line for a specific mission after he/she considers the required length to position the lineman at the specified workstation and to keep the helicopter above any wires, structures, or obstacles. The pilot chooses the shortest long line available that ensures obstacle clearance, which increases positive control of the cargo/linemen during the flight.

--- End of interview summary ---

I can attest that the above summary and factual information was taken on the above stated day, and is correct to the best of my knowledge:

Signed: _ Andrew Todd Fox (NTSB Air Safety Investigator) _

Dated: _ 16 July 2019 _