

This is my most accurate recollection of the most pertinent time line events that occurred the evening of the helicopter accident in 312SA. July 7, 2018

I (Nick Logan) was covering pilot shortage at the Kankakee Superior Base (KIKK)

Superior Crew: Amanda Fagan (Medic) & Jaime Chappetto (Nurse)

All times are from my Kneeboard notes:

Sunset: 20:26 Local

Official Night and Night Vision Goggle Logging Time : 21:26 Local

Accepted Flight: 2006 Local

Time of Take Off first leg: 2016 local

Fuel on Board: 333 KG in the main fuel tank
plus 84KG between the 2 reserve tanks

First Leg Landing: 2040 local

First Leg Highest obstacle: 1217 Feet MSL

Time of Take Off 2nd leg: 2109 Local

Fuel Remaining: 227 KG in the main tank

2nd leg Highest Obstacle: 1190 Feet MSL

NVG's were preflighted, mounted on the helmet ready for use.
They were in the upright stowed position during this leg of flight.

My Pre-flight estimation of flight time was 12-13 minutes for the leg between Hobart Hospital and Christ Hospital Chicago.

After lifting off the Hobart Hospital Helipad, I climbed to approximately 1700' MSL and contacted Superior Flight Following with my flight plan. I then contacted KGYG (Gary International Airport) to request transition through their airspace.

After being granted permission to transition, I started listening to KMDW (Chicago Midway's) Weather ATIS.

About 5 miles West of KGYG I requested frequency change to KMDW.

Shortly after contacting KMDW requesting entry into their airspace, I noticed a warning on the left Engine 1 side warning panel. The warning was "Twist Grip"
There was also a secondary indication on the warning panel. I do not recall what this indication was.

I believe I had about 5 minute flight time remaining to the hospital at this point.

A grabbed each twist grip individually gently to verify if I could feel they were in or out of position.

I could not notice any significant changes to the throttle position.

I then Pulled out the Emergency Checklist Book.

I tried to locate these cautions quickly.

At this point I decided I did not have enough time to trouble shoot the emergency procedure before landing at the hospital. I would not land at the hospital with a warning light.

I informed the crew we would be returning to KGYG and they would need to contact Superior Flight following to arrange an ambulance to meet them at KGYG. I also tried to hand them the Emergency Checklist book at this time. I could use some assistance to meet the emergency procedure.

I then informed KMDW that I needed to return KGYG. They granted my return. I then turned to head back east to KGYG.

At this point I believe I successfully handed the crew the emergency checklist book.

As I turned back to return to KGYG I noticed the number 2 engine indication was no longer matched with the number 1 engine. It was lower and oscillating.

I knew that this was going take a little more time to decipher exactly what was going on. I wanted to verify exactly what was going on with the emergency checklist.

Within approximately 1 minute of my turn back to KGYG, I heard the low rotor RPM horn.

I lowered the collective to maintain rotor speed. I looked for a place to land and saw a dark spot off to my left.

I was heading east back to KGYG and the dark spot was off to my left (North of my position)

To me, a dark spot gave me the best opportunity to do a full autorotation with a flare to cushion the landing at the bottom...Without damage to persons or property on the ground or within the aircraft.

At this point there was no more trouble shooting and deciphering. I was doing my best to fly the aircraft.

As I started a turn left to the dark spot, I felt the tail oscillate to the right and back and I remembering hearing and increase and decrease in engine speed.

At about 200 feet AGL (Best guess in altitude)- I did not feel I was going to make it to the dark spot. I felt I was going to land on a house. I slowed back to gain distance and

adjusted the collective to maintain rotor RPM within range.

I then dove the aircraft forward to gain back the airspeed I had lost and adjusted the collective to maintain rotor RPM.

At this point I felt I was going to make my spot, and I remember making a few small turns to make this happen.

I initiated a flare, to cushion the landing.

I sat in the seat for a moment trying to collect my thoughts. I heard the Nurse's voice, and I heard the medic's voice. I felt we were all somewhat OK at this point. My feet were almost touching the ground and my right boot was in my lap.

I then heard the medic mention we were on fire. I immediately released my seat belt and started looking for a fire extinguisher. I looked up the hill and saw someone helping our nurse up the hill.

I was unable to find the fire extinguisher. I told the medic we had to get the patient out as the helicopter. Engine 2 was on fire. The medic informed me that she felt she had a broken arm.

We could not get the patient out of the rear clam shell doors due to damage. I unbuckled the patient's waist seat belt, and the medic cut her shoulder harnesses. We both grabbed the patient by the arms and dragged her out of the pilot side sliding door. We dragged her about 40 feet by her hands and legs. My concern was a bigger fire or an explosion.

We asked a pedestrian and a police officer to continue to pull the patient away from the helicopter.

Emergency crews were starting to show up. The medic took charge of the medical aspects and requested they take the patient first.

I was yelling for the fire crew to get a hose on the engine fire. We became patients at this point, and let the crews handle the accident scene.

Please let me know if i can clarify anything further.