



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Joshua Lindberg
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: 12/24/17

Person Contacted: Don Pease, Metro Aviation helicopter pilot (witness)

NTSB Accident Number: CEN18FA061

Narrative: In a telephone conversation with Mr. Pease, he stated the following:

- He saw the accident airplane as it taxied on the ramp and took a video on his phone
- The video was provided to the IIC
- The fog was heavy and the visibility was 600-800ft RVR
- He did not believe that the pilot was actually going to takeoff in the fog
- About 12 mins later the airplane departed
- He heard a “pop” and then about 3 seconds later heard the impact and explosion
- The “pop” was similar to an engine backfire
- His location was about ¼ mile from the impact
- He and another employee drove to the accident site and the airplane was on fire
- There was another explosion from within the wreckage after they arrived on scene
- Roger and Tommy from the FBO were already on scene

End of conversation.



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Date: 12/24/17

Person Contacted: Tommy Martin, FBO Ops Manager (witness)

NTSB Accident Number: CEN18FA061

Narrative: In a telephone conversation with Mr. Martin, he stated the following:

- About 0630 he an FBO line service employee, Roger, were asked to tow the airplane from the pilot's hangar to the ramp. The pilot requested the tow because he did not want to taxi next to the other hangars because of the heavy fog
- The 5 occupants had already boarded inside the hangar
- After the tow, the pilot started the engines and taxied very slowly to the runway
- They heard the engine run-up completed and then the airplane departed
- He took a video with his phone of the takeoff – the plane was not visible due to fog but the engine sound was very clear. He heard two "chirps" similar to the wheels bouncing on the runway
- The video was given to the Polk Co. Sheriff's Office and deleted from his phone

End of conversation.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

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Date: 12/24/17

Person Contacted: Roger Cheshire, FBO line service (witness)

NTSB Accident Number: CEN18FA061

Narrative: In a telephone conversation with Mr. Cheshire, he stated the following:

- He has interacted with this pilot many times before
- The pilot seemed very normal, not unusual at all
- He towed the airplane from the pilot's hangar to the Alpha1 taxiway
- After they towed the airplane from the hangar, the pilot made a very slow taxi to the runway
- He listened to the engine run-up which took a long time to complete
- During the takeoff the engines were producing normal sounds similar to full power
- Before the sound of the impact he heard the engines sound as if they were accelerating or revving-up
- Then he heard the explosion, which couldn't be seen because of the dense fog
- They drove to the accident site and couldn't see the wreckage until less than ~200 yards away
- There was another explosion from the wreckage about 5 mins after they arrived

End of conversation.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

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Central Region

Date: January 5, 2018

Person Contacted: Harry Stenger, Aero Fabrication [REDACTED]

NTSB Accident Number: CEN18FA061

Narrative: In a telephone conversation with Mr. Stenger, he stated the following:

- Mr. Stenger maintained the accident airplane and also flew it regularly
- The airplane was kept in a hangar next to his business on the field at Bartow Airport (BOW) and he maintained the hangar as well
- The pilot flew the airplane on Friday before the accident (12/22/17) and after the flight Mr. Stenger adjusted the right seat to be more aft for the pilot's tall son-in-law who would be in the seat for the accident flight. The rear seats were moved more forward a little bit to counter the CG shift from the right seat being moved aft.
- He had recently installed a new RAM Aircraft turbo on one of the engines
- The airplane's Bendix autopilot had auto trim. When the autopilot was engaged on the ground, the auto trim would go to a full nose down trim position
- This would happen because the autopilot's gyro was not level on the ground and the gyro would assume the pitch attitude was too high.
- This Bendix autopilot has been known to have this issue for a long time
- Part of the preflight checks for the autopilot are to confirm that the autopilot is not engaged and that the pitch trim has not moved to an unexpected position
- Mr. Stenger warned the pilot of this trim issue but the pilot didn't understand the issue as well as Mr. Stenger did
- In the past Mr. Stenger reviewed the preflight autopilot checks with the pilot so that he better understood why he should be aware of the pitch trim moving when the autopilot was engaged on the ground. He cautioned him to ensure the autopilot was not engaged on the ground

- The pilot didn't really talk about the autopilot trim being an issue and he knew about the nose down trim issue
- Mr. Stenger made sure the airplane was always mechanically in "tip-top shape" because he also flew in the airplane and didn't want there to be any problems
- He stated the pilot always flew with his feet flat on the floor and not on the rudder pedals
- The pilot was never dangerous in the airplane and never flew recklessly
- John's personal assistant at the law firm can help the investigation with personal related matters
- The pilot's brother would be retrieving the car left in the hangar.

End of conversation.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Joshua Lindberg
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Central Region

Date: January 10, 2018

Person Contacted: Harry Stenger, Aero Fabrication [REDACTED]

NTSB Accident Number: CEN18FA061

Narrative: In another telephone conversation with Mr. Stenger, he stated the following:

- He's been maintaining the pilot's airplanes since the 1980's
- He would sometimes fly with the pilot but since he never took the Cessna 340 initial training, he could not fly it alone
- He doesn't think the pilot went to SimCom or Flight Safety in recent years so it's doubtful that he had insurance on the airplane. If he had insurance then he wouldn't have been going to SimCom or Flight Safety for recurrent training requirements
- Pilot bought the airplane in 2009 when the Hobbs was 1,234.1
- The weight and balance was recalculated on 8/1/13. The empty weight was 4,453.3 lbs, CG 151.22 in, moment 67,3421.5
- Pilot logbooks were kept on the back shelf of the airplane and the pilot filled out his log entries after each flight
- According to his copy of the airplane flight logs that he copied periodically, the Hobbs in Nov. 2017 was 1,607.5
- The pilot flew one ~30 min flight on Friday 12/22/17 after that last Hobbs time so the Hobbs should have been about 1,608.0
- The oil filter was not changed like the 2 most recent oil log entries stated. It was an error in the logbook. He thought the oil and oil filter were changed but his son confirmed today that they were not changed. The log entries are wrong and the date on the accident oil filter must be correct. Since the annual inspection was due in January 2018, they were going to actually change the oil and oil filter at that time.

- The airplane had club style seating. Pilot and co-pilot, 2nd row was aft facing, 3rd row was forward facing
- He does not have any photos of the airplane, inside or outside
- Right before the airplane was purchased by the pilot, AirTrek had a right main gear collapse and propeller strike
- The engines were sent to RAM for prop strike inspection
- He thinks the left engine had the lower time
- He never personally removed either engine so there's no reason they should've been swapped
- Days before the accident flight he moved the copilot seat aft to fit the pilot's son-in-law who was very tall. The 2nd row seat behind the co-pilot seat was moved aft to fit the copilot seat. The 3rd row seats were moved slightly forward to make up for the CG change in the seats being moved around for the copilot seat
- There was also a shelf with seatbelts behind the 3rd row seats. That was likely left over from the air ambulance configuration prior to the pilot purchasing the airplane

End of conversation.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

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Date: March 23, 2018

Person Contacted: Eglis Vinson, John Shannon's (pilot) employee

NTSB Accident Number: CEN18FA061

Narrative: In a telephone conversation with Ms. Vinson, she stated the following:

- She worked for John at his law office for 16 years
- A couple days before the accident John flew the airplane to make sure everything was working properly and that it was ready for the flight to Key West. He always flew the airplane like this in preparation for a flight with passengers
- He had a brown leather book that he always took with him to fly, probably his logbook
- His daughter and son-in-law were coming down to visit and he wanted to take everyone down to Key West for breakfast and then back home in time for Christmas dinner
- This type of flight was a regular occurrence for John and nothing seemed unordinary
- John had flown in instrument conditions many times before
- Everyone described John as a good pilot who was diligent about his pilot duties and was always doing things by the rules. Eglis never flew with him
- Daughter Tori was about 95-100 lbs and Olivia was about 300 lbs

End of conversation.



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

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Date: March 27, 2018

Person Contacted: Craig Glandorf, accident pilot's former CFI

NTSB Accident Number: CEN18FA061

Narrative: In a telephone conversation with Mr. Glandorf, he stated the following:

- He is a current Part 121 airline pilot
- He was John Shannon's CFI in 2002 in the Tampa Bay area
- John had a private pilot license and was training for an instrument rating
- John was a corporate lawyer for the FBO that Craig was instructing for
- John failed his first instrument rating check ride. After the failure he went back to Craig and said he would complete the training exactly as Craig instructed
- Craig and John attended the same church in Lakeland, FL
- In passing, John mentioned an engine failure that he experienced while flying from Tallahassee to Bartow. One of the engines failed over Ocala, but he continued the flight to Bartow with one good engine because the logistics of diverting would have been too difficult
- Craig made plans to fly with John in the accident airplane multiple times, but the plans always fell through for various reasons
- In early 2017 he and John were going to fly John's airplane to Jacksonville. On the morning of the flight, about 5am, Craig checked the weather and it was very low ceilings and visibility. Something like ¼ mile visibility and 100 ft ceilings with dense fog.
- Craig told him they couldn't complete the flight because of the weather and John responded with something to the effect of "legally we can fly because we're Part 91"
- Craig had not talked to John since the canceled flight in early 2017
- John's risk assessment was vastly different than his given their background and experience

End of conversation.