



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

Jim Silliman
Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: November 1, 2016
Person Contacted: Mr. Thad Miller, Pilot
NTSB Accident Number: CEN17LA029

Narrative:

The pilot reported that the flight was being operated under Part 91 flight regulations. He stated that he was provided a trip sheet for the flight on Saturday, October 29th. The original trip sheet indicated that there would be 9 males with their golf clubs. The pilot called Mr. Honaker and asked about the trip because there were only 8 seats on the airplane. He was told that it was a mistake and there were going to be 8 females on the flight with their bags going to Brunswick, GA.

The pilot reported that he departed with the airplane over its maximum gross takeoff weight by around 900 lbs. He determined the gross weight by using 150 lbs for each passenger and the total baggage weight of 300 lbs. He said there was about 2,300 lbs of fuel onboard. The 130 gallon main tanks were topped off or nearly topped off, and both 57-gallon aux tanks were full. The maximum gross takeoff weight is 10,600 lbs. He estimated that his actual takeoff weight was 11,500 lbs.

The pilot stated that when he was doing his flight planning, he determined that he could make it to Brunswick, GA if the airplane was topped off with fuel. If not, then he would need to stop en route for fuel. The next day the main tanks were topped off with 211 gallons of fuel. He stated that he never flew with 8 passengers onboard before. The most passengers he had flown with was 4 passengers and a copilot. Oftentimes, he only had 1 passenger onboard. He stated he felt self-imposed pressure to complete the flight since there were 8 passengers onboard.

He stated that he thought he had enough runway (5,500 ft), but the airplane never got off the ground. He said the decision speed was around 100 kts for V1. Rotation speed was around 105 – 110 kts. He stated the airplane's speed stayed below 100 kts. About 1/2 down the runway, the airplane's speed was about 80 kts but the airplane didn't accelerate. He tried to lift off the airplane but the stall warning vane sounded. The airplane was already near the end of the runway

when the pilot attempted to abort the takeoff, but the airplane went off the end of the runway. The pilot stated that he didn't get "on" the brakes or put the propellers into reverse pitch. The pilot veered the airplane to the right to avoid an instrument lighting system (ILS) box. The left wing hit the ILS box, and the left main gear and nose gear collapsed. Both propellers had ground strikes. The airplane skidded back to the left before stopping. Once the airplane stopped, the pilot opened the door and assisted the passengers to evacuate the airplane. No one was injured during the accident.

The pilot stated that he was hired by Honaker Aviation on July 14, 2016. He went to Atlanta (PDK), GA on July 15, 2016, for recurrent training. At Honaker, he flew the Beech F-90, B-100, and the Citation I. His flight time was:

Total flight time: 13,141 hours
Flight time since working for Honaker Aviation: 117.2
Beech 100 hours: 77.1
Beech F-90: 33.9
Citation I: 6.2

Other King Air Time:
Beech 99: 570
King Air 200: 214.5
King Air 300: 170

The pilot had about 7,900 flight hours in Metroliners, with much of that being single-pilot time. He also had flown DC-3s, CH-47s, and Convair 470s.

The pilot stated that the airplane was operating normally before the accident. The engines and flight controls operated normally during the pre-takeoff checks. The elevator pitch trim was set in the "green" range. He stated that a warning horn would have sounded during takeoff roll if the trim was not set right.

He stated that the B-100 is a single-pilot airplane. Typically, he flew it single-pilot, but sometimes the owners asked that it be crewed with a copilot. His copilot on the accident flight was Mr. Carlton Watson. Mr. Watson also flies the Beechjet. He had flown with him 1 time before. It was on a short 3-leg trip to Franklin, NC and then to Lexington, KY before returning to JVV. He stated that the copilot "followed his lead." He thought the copilot made an airspeed callout when the airplane reached 80 kts. The copilot did not call for an aborted takeoff.

The pilot stated that Mr. Reggie Caillouett provided CRM training at Honaker Aviation.

The pilot stated that he did not know why he didn't abort the takeoff.



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Date: November 10, 2016
Person Contacted: Mr. Carlton Watson, Copilot
NTSB Accident Number: CEN17LA029

Narrative:

Mr. Watson stated that he was hired by Honaker Aviation in March 2016 as a Beechjet 400A copilot. He went to CAE in Dallas in March for training and received 1 week of ground school and 1 week of simulator training in the Beechjet 400. He currently flies as the copilot on N188HA and has logged approximately 200 flight hours since being hired. As a copilot on the Beechjet, he is flying Part 135 for Jet Access Aviation, which is another business associated with Honaker Aviation. He is not the flying pilot on the Beechjet when there are passengers onboard; he performs the duties of the non-flying pilot. On occasion, he is the flying pilot on an empty leg when there are no passengers onboard. He stated that he received training in crew resource management (CRM) at CAE and that it is also covered in the Jet Access Aviation GOM.

He was the copilot on the King Air 100 only two times, including the accident flight. He had about 3 hours of total flight time in a King Air 100. He described his duties on the King Air 100 as a "safety" pilot. He said the safety copilot acts as the emergency backup to the pilot. He did not receive any pilot training in the King Air 100 and did not have any airplane specific systems knowledge of the airplane. As the safety copilot, he read out the checklist items and the pilot responded and made the appropriate switch changes.

He stated that he did not know what was the maximum gross takeoff weight of the airplane and that the pilot did not inform him that the airplane was over the maximum gross takeoff weight. He did not know the power settings for the takeoff such as maximum takeoff torque, maximum engine temperatures, and maximum propeller rpm. Prior to takeoff, the pilot did not conduct a takeoff brief and the copilot was unaware what the V1 and Vr airspeeds were. There was no discussion about a rejected takeoff.

He stated that the pilot taxied the airplane onto the runway and applied the brakes while increasing the throttle to what he assumed was maximum power, much like a short field takeoff.

The pilot released the brakes and the airplane accelerated down the runway. He stated that the airplane didn't seem to be accelerating as fast as he thought it should. When the airplane was about 1/2 down the runway, the airspeed was 80 kts and he checked both airspeed indicators to see if they were in agreement and he called out 80 kts. He stated that the airspeed hung at 80 kts for a long time and by the time it was near 100 kts, the airplane was approaching the last part of the runway. He stated, "We got to go" and the pilot rotated the nose up but the stall warning horn sounded. He said that he warned the pilot that they needed to stop and the pilot pulled back on the throttle, but it was too late to stay on the runway. He placed his feet on the pedals to brace for impact. The airplane veered to the right and the left wing struck the ILS antennae. The left main landing gear and nose gear collapsed and the airplane veered back to the left before coming to a stop. The engines were still operating. He shut off the fuel to both engines and switched off the Master Battery Bus bar while the pilot was getting the cabin door open for the passengers.

He stated that the plan was to fly to Brunswick, Georgia, and leave the airplane there. He and the pilot were going to rent a car and drive back to Jeffersonville, Indiana. He said the drive back would take about 8 – 10 hours. He said that he arrived at the airport for the flight around 11:30 am and would be returning around 12 hours later. He stated that driving back from Georgia "was not a big deal."



RECORD OF CONVERSATION

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Air Safety Investigator
Central Region

Date: November 3, 2016
Person Contacted: Mr. Shawn Honaker
NTSB Accident Number: CEN17LA029

Narrative:

Mr. Honaker stated that the airplane at gross weight should have been able to get airborne by 2,000 ft and that left 3,500 ft of runway left to do an aborted takeoff. He stated that the maximum engine torque is 1628 lbs of thrust. During takeoff, you set approximately 1,550 lbs and that provides a safety margin for engine temperatures and torque, but provides good takeoff power. He stated that the pilot wasn't sure what torque setting he had used during the accident flight.

Mr. Honaker also stated that the maximum propeller rpm is 2,200 rpm. The propeller rpm could be at red line (2,200 rpm) and the engine torque could be at 80% to 100%.

He stated that the pilot wasn't sure what engine torque setting he used during takeoff. The pilot was very aware that the airplane was heavy due to the 8 passengers and bags, and was perhaps distracted by that instead of ensuring that the proper engine torque was set.

At maximum gross weight for takeoff, the V1 airspeed is 100 kts. It would be about 104 kts with the airplane being 600 lbs over max gross takeoff weight.



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Date: November 15, 2016
Person Contacted: Mr. Shawn Honaker
NTSB Accident Number: CEN17LA029

Narrative:

Mr. Honaker stated that the flight was originally scheduled for a Lear 45 but that airplane needed to have its windshield repaired so the decision was made to take the passengers in the Beech 100 to Georgia. Although the Lear 45 was on the Part 135 certificate for Jet Access, it was going to be a Part 91 flight since the owner of the Lear 45 was flying the passengers, which included his mother, for free. He was also a part owner of the Beech 100 so that flight also was a Part 91 flight.

Mr. Honaker stated that the owner wanted to have a safety copilot on board the airplane in case the pilot experienced a medical emergency. If the pilot became incapacitated, the safety pilot could then land the airplane safely. Mr. Honaker was aware that the copilot was not trained in the Beech 100, and that the copilot did not know the engine settings and airspeeds for takeoff. For instance, the copilot did not know the maximum gross takeoff weight of the airplane, the engine torque, engine temperatures, propeller rpm, or the V1 airspeed for takeoff. The safety copilot was not expected to use good CRM because as a Part 91 in a single-piloted airplane, the pilot was expected to make the command decisions.

Jet Access is a "sister" company of Honaker Aviation. It's has a Part 135 certificate. The Beech 100 was not on the Part 135 certificate. Jet Access has a designated chief pilot, director of operations, director of safety, and a director of maintenance. They might be available to provide guidance to the pilot, but he is not required to answer to them since they are not part of the chain of command for a Part 91 flight. The pilot's weight and balance and aircraft performance calculations for takeoff would not be reviewed by anyone at Honaker aviation since he is the PIC.