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Accidents · NTSB CEN17FA127 · Final report

Mcdonnell Douglas Heli CO 369FF accident near Chalmers, Indiana, March 14, 2017

On March 14, 2017 at about 7:46 pm local time, a 1987 Mcdonnell Douglas Heli CO 369FF (helicopter), registered N530KD, was destroyed in an accident during maneuvering (hover) near Chalmers, Indiana. It was an external-load flight under external-load helicopter rules (Part 133). 1 person was killed. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The pilot's failure to ensure that the needle did not entangle with the tower's vertical lattice as he moved the helicopter rearward, which resulted in the helicopter becoming tethered to the tower and a subsequent loss of control.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
March 14, 2017 · about 7:46 pm local time
Place
Chalmers, Indiana · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
1 person was killed.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Mcdonnell Douglas Heli CO 369FF FF, built 1987 · all 369FFs on the register
Registration
N530KD · no longer on the register · serial 0044FF
Damage
Destroyed
Flight
External-load flight · external-load helicopter rules (Part 133)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

As part of a power line construction project, the helicopter was stringing sock line between power line towers. The pilot was in the process of hooking a needle that was attached to a 50-ft long line to the tower structure in order to pull a sock line that was attached to the needle through the center of the tower. The helicopter was equipped with a side pull hook assembly that attached a cargo hook to the left side of the helicopter. The 50-ft long line was attached to the cargo hook, and a grappling hook was attached to the other end of the long line. The grappling hook was connected to the metal needle, which was to be temporarily attached to a horizontal cross-member of the tower. A cell phone video of the accident sequence revealed that the pilot made two unsuccessful attempts to hook the needle to a horizontal cross-member. On the third attempt, the helicopter flew backward until the needle became entangled with the tower's vertical lattice, which tethered the helicopter to the tower via the long line and resulted in the pilot losing control of the helicopter. As the helicopter continued to apply force on the long line, the needle's aft loop impacted the tower and subsequently separated from the needle. When the needle fractured it ended the helicopter's tether to the tower. The helicopter continued backward to a near vertical pitch attitude then rotated about its vertical axis. As the helicopter rotated and descended, the long line became entangled with the main rotor blades, and the main rotor blades impacted the top of the cabin and the tailboom. The tailboom separated about mid span and impacted the ground next to the rest of the helicopter. Examination of the fracture surfaces of the needle showed evidence of ductile overstress separation. There was no evidence of a preexisting fracture or crack in the needle. The fracture of the needle was most likely the result of the needle impacting the tower. The side pull system was certified for a maximum side pull load of 1,900 lbs., which was to be safeguarded by a breakaway swivel and shear pin. The video of the accident sequence revealed that the long line remained attached to the helicopter even after the needle became entangled with and impacted the tower. The breakaway swivel did not appear to separate before the long line became entangled in the helicopter's rotor blades. The breakaway swivel, its shear pin, the two carabiners that hooked to either side of the barrel swivel, and the upper portion of the long line were not found during the investigation. It is likely that the swivel was forcibly disconnected from the side hook when the long line became tightly wrapped around the rotor hub, and then the missing components were ejected from the rotor hub when the long line broke. An examination of these components was not possible; therefore, the investigation could not verify the type of swivel and shear pin that were installed during the accident. A study of the accident video revealed that shortly before the needle became entangled with the tower, the helicopter initiated a rearward movement. As the helicopter flew backward the needle rotated/rolled about its longitudinal axis from a vertical orientation to a more horizontal orientation, which moved the leading edge of the needle laterally toward the tower until it became entangled with the tower. The helicopter continued to move backward and pulled the needle's aft hook into contact with the tower, which tethered the helicopter to the tower via the long line. The long line force applied on the helicopter before the accident sequence started was calculated to be about 875 lbs, which was less than half the rated force of the side pull hook assembly. Therefore, it is unlikely that the long line force applied on the helicopter before the needle contacted the tower contributed to the accident. The force required to fracture the needle's aft loop was calculated to be 73,790 lbs., which is nearly 40 times greater than the load required to shear the breakaway swivel shear pin. Since the breakaway swivel could not be located the investigation was unable to determine why it did not separate as designed during the event when the helicopter was tethered to the tower. In the absence of the breakaway swivel and shear pin, there is no evidence that system did not function as designed and certified relevant to the certification basis of the STC. Based on the evidence, the system should have separated due to tensile loads transmitted to the shear pin at the time the helicopter became tethered then moved away from the tower.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. External load event (Rotorcraft) during maneuvering
  2. External load event (Rotorcraft) during maneuvering (hover) defining event

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Action › Incorrect action performance › Pilot
  • cause Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Expectation/assumption › Pilot
  • cause Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Tower/antenna (incl guy wires) › Contributed to outcome
  • Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Equipment/furnishings › Agricultural/external load sys › Capability exceeded
  • Environmental issues › Physical environment › Object/animal/substance › Tower/antenna (incl guy wires) › Response/compensation

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: instructor: helicopter; instrument: helicopter; rotorcraft: helicopter
  • Flight time: 12.8 in the last 90 days; 8.3 in the last 30 days; 14,975 as pilot in command
  • Medical certificate: Class 2 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 6,336.8 hours
  • Last inspection: continuous airworthiness programme, February 28, 2017
  • Maximum gross weight: 3,100 lb
  • Seats: 4
  • Landing gear: fixed
  • Engine: Rolls Royce M250-C30M (turboshaft); 17,263 hours total
  • Operator: Rogers Helicopters, Inc.

The flight

  • Departed from: MCX Monticello IN
  • Destination: MCX Monticello IN
  • Flight plan: none

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 350° at 12 knots, gusting 19
  • Visibility: 7 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 3,500 ft
  • Temperature: 27°F (-3°C), dew point 16°F (-9°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.25 inHg
  • Observation at 7:35 pm from KMCX, 5 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flight crew1

Documents from the investigation the NTSB's docket: the evidence folder behind the report

The docket, the folder of records gathered during an investigation (maintenance records, photographs, witness statements, examinations), has not been read from the NTSB for this case yet; the list appears here once it has. Open the docket at the NTSB.

Other NTSB records under N530KD the same tail number, which may have belonged to a different aircraft at the time

2012-09-30CEN12LA667 · accident near Decorah, IA · substantial damage · no injuries

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The documents and photographs are the NTSB's docket, the folder of records gathered during the investigation, shown as the NTSB released them (the NTSB redacts some personal details first) and listed under the NTSB's own titles. This site's own text never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number CEN17FA127.