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Accidents · NTSB CEN12FA290 · Final report

Cessna 401 accident near Chanute, Kansas, May 11, 2012

On May 11, 2012 at about 9:30 pm local time, a Cessna 401, registered N9DM, was substantially damaged in an accident during enroute (cruise) near Chanute, Kansas. It was a personal flight under general aviation rules (Part 91). 4 people were killed and 1 person was seriously injured. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).

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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged

The malfunction of the cabin heater, which resulted in an inflight fire and smoke in the airplane. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of understanding concerning the status of the airplane's heater system following and earlier overheat event and risk of its continued use. Also contributing were the inadequate inspection criteria for the cabin heater.

Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.

What the record shows

Date
May 11, 2012 · about 9:30 pm local time
Place
Chanute, Kansas · map
Type
Accident
Injuries
4 people were killed and 1 person was seriously injured.
Weather
visual conditions (good weather)
Aircraft
Cessna 401 · all 401s on the register
Registration
N9DM · registry record · serial 401-0123
Damage
Substantial damage
Flight
Personal flight · general aviation rules (Part 91)

The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record

While en route to the destination airport, the pilot turned on the cabin heater and, afterward, an unusual smell was detected by the occupants and the ambient air temperature increased. When the pilot turned the heater off, dark smoke entered the cabin and obscured the occupants' vision. The smoke likely interfered with the pilot’s ability to identify a safe landing site. During the subsequent emergency landing attempt to a field, the airplane’s wing contacted the ground and the airplane cartwheeled. Examination of the airplane found several leaks around weld points on the combustion chamber of the heater unit. A review of logbook entries revealed that the heater was documented as inoperative during the most recent annual inspection. Although a work order indicated that maintenance work was completed at a later date, there was no logbook entry that returned the heater to service. There were no entries in the maintenance logbooks that documented any testing of the heater or tracking of the heater's hours of operation. A flight instructor who flew with the pilot previously stated that the pilot used the heater on the accident airplane at least once before the accident flight. The heater’s overheat warning light activated during that flight, and the heater shut down without incident. The flight instructor showed the pilot how to reset the overheat circuit breaker but did not follow up on its status during their instruction. There is no evidence that a mechanic examined the airplane before the accident flight. Regarding the overheat warning light, the airplane flight manual states that the heater “should be thoroughly checked to determine the reason for the malfunction” before the overheat switch is reset. The pilot’s use of the heater on the accident flight suggests that he did not understand its status and risk of its continued use without verifying that it had been thoroughly checked as outlined in the airplane flight manual. A review of applicable airworthiness directives found that, in comparison with similar combustion heater units, there is no calendar time limit that would require periodic inspection of the accident unit. In addition, there is no guidance or instruction to disable the heater such that it could no longer be activated in the airplane if the heater was not airworthy.

The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.

The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English

What happened, in order

  1. Miscellaneous/other during enroute (cruise) defining event
  2. Emergency descent initiated during enroute (cruise)
  3. Fire/smoke (non-impact) during enroute (cruise)
  4. Collision during takeoff/land during landing

The NTSB's findings

  • cause Aircraft › Aircraft systems › Air conditioning system › Heating system › Malfunction
  • factor Personnel issues › Action/decision › Info processing/decision › Understanding/comprehension › Pilot
  • factor Organizational issues › Management › Policy/procedure › Adequacy of policy/proc › FAA/Regulator

Pilot

  • Certificate: commercial pilot
  • Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
  • Flight time: 613 hours in all; 13 in this make and model; 13 in the last 30 days
  • Medical certificate: Class 1 (with waivers/limitations)
  • Seat: left
  • Injury: fatal

The aircraft

  • Airframe total time: 2,455.5 hours
  • Last inspection: annual inspection, January 15, 2012
  • Maximum gross weight: 6,300 lb
  • Seats: 7
  • Landing gear: retractable
  • Engine 1: Teledyne Continental Motors TSIO-520-E (piston); 0 hours total
  • Engine 2: Teledyne Continental Motors TSIO-520-E (piston); 0 hours total
  • Fire on the ground

The flight

  • Departed from: RVS Tulsa OK at 8:45 pm
  • Destination: CBF Council Bluffs IA
  • Flight plan: IFR

Weather at the time

  • Light: daylight
  • Wind: from 180° at 4 knots
  • Visibility: 10 statute miles
  • Sky: broken clouds at 11,000 ft
  • Temperature: 70°F (21°C), dew point 59°F (15°C)
  • Altimeter: 30.06 inHg
  • Observation at 9:52 pm from KCNU, 6 miles away

Injuries

FatalSeriousMinorNone
Flig1
Passengers31

About this page

Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number CEN12FA290.