



RE: Airplane crash 3August2012

Samuel Anaya o Raymond Plessinger

08/06/2012 04:39 PM

Mr. Plessinger,

This is the best recount of the events that led to the 3AUGUST2012 crash.

This was to be my second cross-country solo; my first was the day prior. I put together my flight plan early in the morning and called weather service 30 minutes prior to my flight.

I reviewed my flight plan with Jr. Lynch (CFI) and he endorsed my book prior to taking off. He warned me regarding cross winds at this airport which I acknowledged. I asked which runway I should take off from because of the cross wind

and he advised me that was up to me. I told him that since it appeared equivocal, I would take RW36 with 989BT because I was flying to the F17 (Center TX) which was to the NW. My pre-flight of the aircraft was uneventful. I performed all my checks and then prepared to leave.

JR advised me that he would probably not be at the airport and to leave the PAA Flight Bag in the plane.

I took off from 36 at about 15:30 without incident and contacted Deridder Radio to activate my flight plan. I spoke with Fort Polk Center and Fort Worth Center in route to F17 for flight following.

I landed without incident at F17 and immediately took off to return to L39 (Leesville). Polk Center was contacted for flight following until I saw Leesville airport in sight. At which point I contacted ATIS at Fort Polk and had instructions November. I was considering landing on RW18 based on my instructions but remembered that it was a crosswind at L39. As I approached L39 the windsock appeared to be a crosswind at about 5 KTS which I felt comfortable addressing. I entered a left downwind for RW36 at 1300FT, turned base and final without incident. I made calls throughout all my turns to 122.8. On final, my glideslope looked

perfect and I was trimmed for 70KTS. At that time, I had full flaps in, full mixture, and had the fuel shut off valve in. Autopilot was off and I had checked my landing checklist twice.

However, I did not appear to descend as expected, was moving faster than the ASI, and it looked like I was quickly going to be pass the 1000 FT mark. I was confused and checked my flaps and my airspeed again. I was still about 70KTS. At this point I made the decision to do a go around and put full power in. I was just about to drop my flaps to 20 degrees when it did not feel like I was making any lift and the engine did not feel like it typically did in prior go arounds. I looked ahead and noticed there were trees about 700FT and the end of the runway 36 and was unsure whether I would be able to clear them. I wondered if my engine was not working correctly and knew I had to make a quick decision. I could continue with the go around and risk stalling on top of the trees while trying to avoid them or abort the go-around and probably damage the aircraft. About three seconds into the go-around attempt, I aborted it. I pulled the throttle all out and did not bring up the flaps. I did my best to bleed off as much airspeed but knew I was probably not going to have enough runway to stop completely. I porpoised a couple of time before I was firm on the runway but I didn't have enough runway left before I hit the field. I was confident that I was going to stop when I noticed the ditch ahead of me. At that point, my plane dipped nose first and flipped over. I was startled and aside from my right hand and knee, I was not seriously injured. I unbuckled my seatbelt and turned off the master. I was unable to reach for the key and was afraid the plane my blow. I struggled getting the door open but eventually managed to get out safely. I walked about 100m after I contacted Kate Chastain (CFI) regarding the crash. I then contacted 1-800-WX-BRIEF. I believe this was at 1645.

I noticed the wind sock as I was walking away it appeared to be a 10KT wind directly from the south.

These are the events as best as I can remember them.

Regards,

Samuel Anaya, M.D.

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