

National Transportation Safety Board

Office of Aviation Safety

Washington, DC 20594



ANC25MA018

AIRWORTHINESS FACTUAL REPORT

December 2, 2025

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A. ACCIDENT

Location: Nome, Alaska
Date: February 6, 2025
Time: 1520 Alaska standard time
Aircraft: Textron Aviation 208B, N321BA

B. PARTICIPANTS

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¹ Present for post-recovery wreckage examination.

² Present for initial on-scene examination.

³ Present for follow-up airplane examination.

⁴ Present for fuel system components examination.

⁵ Present for TKS system components examination.

⁶ Present for LAAWS indicator switch examination.

Party Coordinator	Ernest Hall ^{1,3,4,5,6} Sr. Air Safety Investigator Textron Aviation Wichita, Kansas
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C. ACCIDENT SUMMARY

On February 6, 2025, about 1520 Alaska standard time, a Textron Aviation (Cessna) 208B airplane, N321BA, operated as Bering Air Flight 445, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Nome, Alaska. The pilot and nine passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 *Code of Federal Regulations (CFR)* Part 135 scheduled commuter flight.

D. EXAMINATION DETAILS

Search and rescue personnel located the wreckage on a large floating icepack on Norton Sound on February 7th. The icepack was subject to tidal ocean currents and moved 5 to 10 miles per day.

An on-scene wreckage examination was conducted on February 7th and 8th by the NTSB. The wreckage was recovered to a Bering Air hangar at Nome Airport on February 8th. A wreckage examination was conducted from February 9th through February 12th by the NTSB with technical support from the FAA and Textron Aviation.

A follow-up airplane examination was conducted at Alaska Claims Services facility in Wasilla, Alaska, on May 8th. The examination was conducted by the NTSB with technical support from Bering Air and Textron Aviation.

An examination of the fuel system components was conducted at Parker Aerospace – Fluid Systems Division facilities in Elyria, Ohio, on June 12, 2025. The components were received in the sealed box and opened in the presence of the NTSB. The examination was conducted under direct oversight of the NTSB investigator-in-charge with the assistance of Parker Aerospace and Textron Aviation.

An examination and functional test of the Low Airspeed Awareness Warning System (LAAWS) indicator switch were conducted at Textron Aviation facilities in Wichita, Kansas on June 16, 2025. The component was received in a sealed box and opened in the presence of the NTSB. The examination was conducted under direct oversight of the NTSB investigator-in-charge and with the assistance of the Federal Aviation Administration and Textron Aviation.

An examination of the recovered TKS system components was conducted at CAV Systems facilities in New Century, Kansas on June 17, 2025. The components were received in the sealed box and opened in the presence of the NTSB. The examination was conducted by the NTSB with technical support from CAV Systems and Textron Aviation.

E. AIRPLANE INFORMATION

The airplane was issued a normal category standard airworthiness certificate on December 3, 2020. At the time of manufacture, the airplane was equipped with a cargo pod installed under the fuselage, and a TKS ice protection system. Bering Air, Inc. purchased the airplane on December 29, 2020. Subsequent to delivery, the airplane was retrofitted with the AeroAcoustics Aircraft Systems Aircraft Payload Extender III (APEIII) System in accordance with STC SA01213SE.

Maximum takeoff weight for the basic airplane was 8,807 lbs. With the APEIII retrofit, the maximum gross takeoff weight increased to 9,062 lbs. However, for flight into known icing conditions, the APEIII flight manual supplement stated, "Refer to Cessna Approved AFM or Supplement."

Weight and balance data (dated January 4, 2023) revealed that in the 11-seat configuration – two flight crew seats and nine passenger seats – the airplane empty weight was 5,388.2 lbs. The moment and empty weight center of gravity were 1,011,960 in-lbs. and 187.8 inches, respectively.

The airplane was maintained under a continuous airworthiness maintenance program. According to the airplane maintenance records, the most recent phase inspections were completed as follows:

- 1,600-hour inspection – December 8, 2023 (3,197.5 hrs TTAF⁴);
- 800-hour inspection – August 29, 2024 (3,979.0 hrs TTAF);
- 400-hour inspection – August 29, 2024 (3,979.0 hrs TTAF);
- 200-hour inspection – November 12, 2024 (4,188.4 hrs TTAF);
- 100-hour inspection – January 7, 2025 (4,291.3 hrs TTAF);
- 12-month inspection – January 7, 2025 (4,291.3 hrs TTAF)
- 24-month inspection – November 22, 2024 (4,193.1 hrs TTAF)
- 48-month inspection – Due March 2025⁵
- Pitot static / Altimeter / Transponder – November 22, 2024 (4,193.1 hrs TTAF).

A review of maintenance discrepancies since the 100-hour/12-month inspections on January 7th, included a missing static wick and an improperly safety wired battery. According to the records, both of those discrepancies had been addressed before the accident flight. The records did not include any unresolved discrepancies.

The operator provided documentation related to issues regarding the cockpit power control quadrant on 208B airplanes. With respect to the accident airplane, shortly after delivery, the quadrant assembly was replaced after the friction lock became jammed and would not move. The discrepancy logs for the airplane from January 2023 to present did not include any entries related to the engine control levers or the friction lock.

A review of the FAA airworthiness directive (AD) log for the accident airframe indicated that the applicable ADs had been complied with as required.

At the time of the post-recovery examination, the recording hour (Hobbs) meter indicated 4,333.7 hours.

F. EXAMINATION SUMMARY

1.0 Accident Site⁶

The airplane came to rest upright on the icepack. The propeller assembly separated from the engine and was located adjacent to the wreckage. The engine cowlings were dislocated and fragmented. The engine remained secured to the mount;

⁴ Total time airframe.

⁵ The 48-month inspection became due in December 2024 since the airplane was issued an airworthiness certificate as a new aircraft in December 2020. However, the grace period permitted under the maintenance program extended until the end of March 2025.

⁶ Directions related to accident site placement and component damage or deformation are with respect to an intact airframe unless otherwise noted.

however, both the engine assembly and the mount were damaged consistent with impact forces.

Contents of the belly pod including pieces of the TKS tank were found 30-40 feet from the tail section of the airplane, northwest of the main wreckage along with the nose gear and one main wheel. The other main wheel was located about 150 feet to the west-southwest of the main wreckage.

Limited ice accumulation was observed on the leading-edge surfaces aft of the TKS porous membranes. Significant ice accumulation was observed on the base of the beacon/strobe light and above the TKS protected area at the top of the vertical stabilizer.



Figure 1 - Vertical Stabilizer at Accident Site

2.0 Airframe Examination⁷

Textron Aviation 208B (s/n 208B5613)

2.1 Fuselage

The fuselage exhibited upward crushing along the entire length. The cargo pod installed along the lower fuselage was destroyed. The upper portion of the fuselage was partially separated above the cabin windows consistent with impact.⁸ The fuselage aft of the rear passenger cargo door remained attached.

⁷ Directions related to accident site placement and component damage/deformation are with respect to an intact airframe unless otherwise noted.

⁸ The upper fuselage was completely removed during recovery.

The pilot and co-pilot doors were separated at the time of the post-recovery examination. Both were damaged and present with the wreckage. The upper portion of the left side cargo door was separated and damaged. The lower portion of the cargo door remained attached to the fuselage and was deformed.

The cockpit flight controls were dislocated upward through the instrument panel, and both control wheels were separated. The instrument panel was damaged. The "below icing min speed" annunciator light appeared intact and was removed for examination. The anti-ice sub-panel of the lower left pilot's electrical panel was displaced and damaged. The pitot/static, stall heat, and wing light switches were in the off position at the time of the exam. The fluid control (TKS) switch for primary pump was in the high position, the max flow switch was in the neutral position, and the backup pump switch was in the off position at the time of the exam. The max flow switch was spring-loaded to the neutral position by design.

The cockpit power (throttle) quadrant was displaced upward and to the right into the instrument panel. The flap position lever was in the up position. The aileron trim indicator needle corresponded to a full right deflection. The elevator trim indicator needle was positioned just above the takeoff range.

Both main landing gears were found twisted and bent aft with the wheels separated. The nose landing gear exhibited impact damage and was found partially attached and the wheel was separated.



Figure 2 - Fuselage during post-recovery examination (Textron photo)



Figure 3 - Fuselage during post-recovery examination (Textron photo)

The pilot controlled left fuel selector valve located in the upper fuselage was found in the ON position. The right fuel selector valve was found near the OFF position. The fuel ecology tank/filter assembly that is located on the left, forward side firewall was impact damaged. The tank was disassembled, and the filter and bowl were found clean with no debris present.

All seat belt buckles were observed cut for recovery. All seats remained attached to the seat tracks and were cut for recovery. The pilot's seat was removed during the flight control examination and the right aft most passenger seat was not removed. There was significant upward impact damage to the lower fuselage and occupant space.

The recovered cargo was weighed. All items were wet from recovery and weighed a total of about 798 pounds.⁹

2.2 Empennage

The empennage was partially separated from the aft fuselage consistent with impact forces.¹⁰ Both horizontal stabilizers remained attached to the empennage. Both elevators and trim tabs remained attached to their attachment points. The vertical stabilizer remained intact, and the rudder remained attached to the vertical stabilizer. The upper portion of the rudder was bent over to the left side of the

⁹ The operator accident flight manifest noted 709 lbs. for the baggage / freight weight.

¹⁰ Photos taken at the accident site indicated that the empennage was partially separated consistent with impact forces. It was cut at the accident site to facilitate recovery.

vertical stabilizer. All vortex generators remained attached to both horizontal stabilizers. The right elevator exhibited diagonal buckling about 20 inches inboard from the outboard hinge. The right elevator near the counterweight horn was bent downward. The left outboard trailing edge of the left elevator was impact damaged.

The right elevator torque tube attachment rivets were sheared at the attachment flange. Metallurgical examination of the rivet fracture surfaces revealed features consistent with overstress separation. The left elevator torque tube remained attached to the flange.

All flight control and autopilot servo cables remained attached to their respective control surfaces. The cables were cut at the aft fuselage consistent with recovery efforts. One exception was the left rudder autopilot servo cable which was separated and frayed consistent with overload. The rudder control cables were continuous from the aft fuselage recovery cuts to aft rudder bellcrank which remained attached to the rudder torque tube. Both elevator trim the actuator extensions measured about 1-5/8 inches, which corresponded to about 10° trim tab trailing edge down.

The elevator aft bellcrank up arm was separated consistent with overload; the down arm was intact. The elevator push-pull tube remained attached to the elevator push rod arm assembly.



Figure 4 - Empennage during post-recovery examination (NTSB photo)



Figure 5 - Empennage during post-recovery examination (NTSB photo)



Figure 6 - Empennage during post-recovery examination (NTSB photo)

2.3 Left Wing

The left wing forward attachment point appeared intact; however, it was cut during recovery. The aft wing attachment point was intact; however, a portion of the fuselage was separated and remained attached to the aft wing attachment point. The wing was removed for recovery. The flap remained attached to the hinges and had impact damage. The flap asymmetry cable was found continuous from the control surface to the aft inboard bellcrank. The spoiler remained attached to the hinges. The

wing tip remained attached to the wing. The aileron remained attached to its attachment points.

The leading edge had upward and aft impact damage. The aileron was impact damaged. All vortex generators remained attached. The aileron trim tab remained attached to the aileron. The pitot tube remained attached and was impact damaged. An STC stall fence was installed outboard of the landing light.

The flap interconnect (long tube) rod assembly between the right inboard forward flap bellcrank and the left inboard forward flap bellcrank was separated. Metallurgical examination of the rivet fracture surfaces revealed features consistent with overstress separation.

The aileron cables were found cut near the fuselage attachment point consistent with recovery. The cables were continuous through the bellcrank and the push-pull tube continuous to the aileron. The push-pull tube remained attached to the spoiler and was continuous to the bellcrank.

The fuel filler cap was securely installed. The seal appeared to be pliable with no notable damage. The connecting tube to the forward and aft fuel valves remained intact. The valves were found in the full forward position, which corresponds with the open position. There was hydraulic deformation at the inboard fuel tank wall and outboard about 2.5 feet on the lower wing skin.



Figure 7 - Left wing (top) during post-recovery examination (NTSB photo)



Figure 8 - Left wing (bottom) during post-recovery examination (NTSB photo)

The strut remained attached to the wing and fuselage. The strut exhibited impact damage and was cut for recovery.

The stall warning vane was tested with a multimeter and found operational. The stall warning vane and mounting plate were removed. When electrical power was applied, both appeared to heat up normally.

The left-wing pitot tube was removed from the wing. When electrical power was applied, it appeared to heat up normally.

2.4 Right Wing

The right wing remained partially attached to the fuselage, it was removed during recovery. The flap remained attached to its hinges. The flap asymmetry cable was found continuous from the control surface to the aft inboard bellcrank. The spoiler was separated approximately 3' from the inboard spoiler attachment hinge. The spoiler remained attached to its hinges. The wing tip remained attached to the wing.

There was a 4.5' semicircular impact damage upward and aft of the leading edge outboard of the landing light. The leading edge was impact damaged upward and aft from the landing light inboard. All vortex generators remained attached. The aileron was impact damaged and remained attached to its attachment points. The aileron trim tab remained attached to the aileron. The aileron trim position was measured from the actuator to the center bolt and was found at about 2 inches, which

was about 5° trim tab trailing edge up. The pitot tube was impact damaged but remained attached. An STC stall fence was installed outboard of the landing light.

The flap connecting rod assembly bellcrank “interconnect” was cut for recovery. The flap jack screw was measured, and the flap extension was found at about 6.5 inches, which corresponded to the fully retracted (up) position.

The aileron cables were found cut near the fuselage attachment point consistent with recovery. The cables were continuous to the bellcrank. The aileron bellcrank was separated at the push-pull tube connection. The push-pull tube was continuous from there to the aileron. The push-pull tube remained attached to the spoiler and was continuous to the bellcrank.

The fuel filler cap was securely installed. The seal appeared to be pliable with no notable damage. The connecting tube to the forward and aft fuel valve was impact separated near the aft valve. The forward fuel valve was found in the aft position which corresponds to the closed position and the aft valve was found in the forward position, which corresponds to the open position. The fuel tank exhibited hydraulic deformation the entire length of the fuel tank on the lower side of the wing skin.

The wing strut remained attached to the fuselage and was cut during the recovery. The strut was partially separated at the attachment fitting near the wing.

The right-wing pitot tube was removed from the wing. When electrical power was applied, it appeared to heat up normally.



Figure 9 - Right wing (top) during post-recovery examination (NTSB photo)



Figure 10 - Right wing (bottom) during post-recovery examination (Textron photo)

2.5 Flight Controls

The aileron cockpit control cables were continuous to a cable separation underneath the pilot's seat which was consistent an overstress separation. The aileron autopilot control servo cable was also separated near the cockpit consistent with overload. The right-side aileron interconnect control cable was found separated in the control column, consistent with overload. The left aileron control cable was separated near the top of the fuselage along the cabin sidewall consistent with overload. The right aileron control cable was separated at the frame near the bottom of the fuselage, consistent with overload. The aileron control cables leading from the aileron quadrant assemblies, located in the upper cabin fuselage, outwards were separated near the fuselage for both the left and right ailerons consistent with overload. From the upper cabin fuselage aileron quadrant assemblies to each wing aileron bellcrank, the aileron cables were separated at the wing root, consistent with recovery cuts.

The elevator push rod from the control column to the forward bellcrank was impact separated but remained attached to the bellcrank. From the forward cockpit bellcrank the control cables were continuous to the aft fuselage where recovery cuts were made. The elevator trim cable was found separated near the cockpit and was consistent with overload.

The rudder controls were continuous from the rudder pedal torque tubes to the aft fuselage where recovery cuts were made.

2.6 Cockpit Power Quadrant

The cockpit power quadrant was damaged and dislocated to the right consistent with impact forces. The flap handle and flap position indicator remained attached to the rod. The rod was engaged with the friction knob and the engine control lever shaft. The engine control levers – power, condition, emergency power, propeller, flap – remained in place on the mating shaft. The friction knob, spring, and spacers were in place. The right-side panel of the quadrant was deformed consistent with impact. Each control engine control lever moved freely through the full range of motion. Adjustment of the friction knob between full tight and full loose and control levers were retained at full and moved freely at low consistent with normal operation.

The control lever rod ends remained attached to the levers. The control cables were separated near the rod end fittings consistent with overstress. The control cables were cut to facilitate removal of the quadrant assembly.

The pitch trim chain was continuous. It remained engaged with the sprockets on both the manual pitch trim wheel and the electric pitch trim motor. The chain was cut to facilitate removal of the trim motor for further examination.

The fuel-oil firewall shutoff valve appeared to be intact. The valve appeared to be about three-quarters closed.¹¹ The valve, as positioned, freely flowed air from inlet to outlet. The shut off control knob on the aft face of the quadrant was intact. The cable had been cut to facilitate removal of the assembly.



Figure 11 – Cockpit instrument panel during follow-up examination (NTSB photo)

¹¹ The position of the valve was consistent with cable tension applied when the quadrant was dislocated during the impact sequence.




Figure 12 - Power quadrant during follow-up examination (NTSB photo)



Figure 13 - Power quadrant during follow-up examination (NTSB photo)

2.7 Fuel Boost Pump

The electric backup fuel pump was securely installed within the fuel reservoir (header) tank. However, the tank was deformed consistent with impact forces. The pump was removed for further examination and testing.



Figure 14 - Fuel boost pump (NTSB photo)

The fuel boost pump appeared intact and undamaged. It was placed on the test bench, submerged in test fluid, and 28-volts electrical power was applied. At a flow rate of 872 pounds per hour (pph), the pump provided a pressure of 17.47 psi and drew 4.2 amps. The test specification required a minimum pressure of 7.0 psi and a maximum electrical current draw of 6.5 amps. With the flow rate reduced to 0 pph, the pump outlet pressure was 18.9 psi at 3.9 amps. The maximum pressure allowable per the test specification was 20.0 psi.



Figure 15 - Test bench readings at 872 pph test point (NTSB photo)




Figure 16 - Fuel boost pump connected to test bench (NTSB photo)

The pump performed in accordance with the manufacturer's test standard. No anomalies were observed. The pump was not disassembled.



Figure 17 - Test bench readings at 0 pph test point (NTSB photo)

2.8 Float Switch, Fuel System

The float switch was pump was securely installed within the fuel reservoir (header) tank. It was removed for further examination and testing.



Figure 18 - Float switch in open position during testing (NTSB photo)



Figure 19 - Float switch in closed position during testing (NTSB photo)

The float switch appeared intact and undamaged. The float was free to move within the housing as the orientation was changed. Electrical continuity of the switch was confirmed using a multimeter. With the assembly held in a vertical orientation, the switch was open. When the assembly housing was rotated upside-down, the switch moved to the closed position. An identical result was observed when the housing was submerged in the test fluid. No anomalies were observed. The switch was not disassembled.

2.9 Check Valve, Fuel System

The check valve was securely installed within the fuel reservoir (header) tank and appeared to be undamaged. It was removed for further examination and testing.

The valve inlet and outlet were unobstructed. The valve was functionally tested by attempting to flow air through the component in both directions. The air flowed freely from the inlet to the outlet but was blocked in the opposite direction. No anomalies were observed.

2.10 TKS System

The TKS reservoir was destroyed during the impact sequence. The TKS filter was found attached to a separated portion of the fluid reservoir. When removed and examined it did not appear to have substantial contamination or solidified TKS fluid.

The left and right horizontal pressure switches for the TKS system appeared intact and were removed from the empennage for examination. The TKS pumps exhibited impact damage and retained for examination.

The TKS system was tested with pressurized air and TKS fluid through its distribution lines to its panels. Pressurized air was blown from approximately the reservoir port to the left-wing distribution line and was clear of blockages to the impact separation located about halfway up the left fuselage side wall to the left wing.

The right-wing distribution line was impact separated and was able to be tested from about halfway up the right fuselage side wall to the center of the fuselage floor and no obstructions were found.

Both left and right wing main TKS distribution lines located in the upper fuselage were pressure tested, and no obstructions were found. Both lines were impact separated near the wing root and fuselage.

Pressurized air was blown from the tail proportionating unit located near the aft fuselage forward to an impact separation that was about 4 feet forward of the aft cargo exit door and no obstructions were noted.

When testing the vertical stabilizer and both horizontal stabilizers through the separated TKS lines in the empennage, all portions of the panels distributed TKS fluid through the entire length of the leading-edge panels. No TKS fluid was introduced into the system before pressurizing the lines consistent with residual fluid remaining in the system.

The left wing was tested through the main distribution line near the wing root and TKS fluid was distributed through the entire length of the leading edge panels.

The right wing was tested through the main distribution line near the wing root and through the TKS divider near the pitot tube. TKS fluid was distributed through the leading-edge panels except for the outboard 3 feet which did not initially distribute TKS fluid. An air leak was subsequently observed from the upper edge of the TKS panel about 1 foot 6 inches from the outboard edge of the TKS panel. The panel exhibited a dent consistent with impact near the location of the leak. The outboard 4-foot section of that TKS panel was removed and tested. The panel distributed TKS fluid normally at that time.

The left strut was tested and TKS fluid was distributed through the entirety of the panel besides the about a 2-foot and 10-inch section of the panel of the lower strut that was cut during recovery. The lower 2-foot and 10-inch section of the TKS panel was unable to be tested.

The right strut TKS panel was tested and TKS fluid was distributed throughout the entirety of the panel.




Figure 20 - TKS system components recovered during post-recovery examination (NTSB photo)

2.11 TKS Components

The TKS tank was fragmented and deformed. Several of the attached components were dislocated or separated consistent with impact forces.

Pump (no.1)¹² motor was separated from the pump housing and damaged. The pump housing was separated from the tank. It was retained by a segment of tubing. The input drive coupling and spider coupling were intact, and the drive shaft was free to rotate. The cam shaft was in contact with and actuated the pistons as expected when the drive shaft was rotated using hand pressure. Both pistons were disassembled. Each exhibited free movement and the springs were intact. The pump housing was free of debris or sediment. All surfaces appeared to be wetted with TKS fluid. The check valve corresponding to the no. 1 pump was disassembled. The spring and plunger were intact and appeared to be operational.

Pump (no.2) motor was separated from the pump housing and damaged. The pump housing was separated from the tank. The input drive coupling and spider

¹² The TKS pump assemblies were arbitrarily designated as no.1 and no. 2 for identification purposes during the examination.

coupling were intact, and the drive shaft was free to rotate. The cam shaft was in contact with and actuated the pistons as expected when the drive shaft was rotated using hand pressure. Both pistons were disassembled. Each exhibited free movement and the springs were intact. The pump housing was free of debris or sediment. All surfaces appeared to be wetted with TKS fluid. The check valve corresponding to the no. 2 pump was disassembled. The spring and plunger were intact and appeared to be operational.

The windshield pump assembly was separated from the tank. The housing exhibited minor impact damage. The pump motor did not rotate when electrical power was applied. However, the motor housing did seem to get warm. The pump was disassembled. The motor drive shaft would not rotate under hand pressure. The housing cavity was free of debris or sediment. It was wetted with TKS fluid. The pump gear module was intact. It was disassembled, and the gears were intact and rotated freely.

The left and right low-pressure switches appeared to be intact. The inlet and outlet were clean and unobstructed. The switches were disassembled. The microswitches provided electrical continuity as expected when the switch plungers were operated manually.

The high-pressure switch housing exhibited damage consistent with impact. The inlet and outlet were clean and unobstructed. The valve was disassembled. The microswitch was damaged. However, it provided electrical continuity as expected when the switch plunger was operated manually.

The windshield solenoid valve assembly remained secured to the tank fragment at the mounting strap. The housing was deformed consistent with impact. The inlet and outlet appeared clean and unobstructed. The shuttle (plunger) appeared to be intact. The magnet was damaged consistent with impact.

The timer box was damaged consistent with impact forces. One side of the housing was missing, and the circuit boards were damaged. According to the manufacturer, the timer box did not contain any non-volatile memory or data logging.

2.12 Low Airspeed Awareness (LAA) System Indicator Switch

The LAA system indicator switch appeared intact and undamaged. Electrical power was supplied to the switch. The LED illuminated both white and amber as the corresponding leads were connected to the 28-volt power supply. Electrical continuity of the switch function was confirmed using a multimeter. No anomalies were observed with respect to the lighted switch assembly.




Figure 21 - Indicator switch on test bench with white LED powered (NTSB photo)




Figure 22 -Indicator switch on test bench with amber LED powered (NTSB photo)




Figure 23 - Indicator switch on test bench in open (undepressed) position (NTSB photo)




Figure 24 - Indicator switch on test bench in closed (depressed position) (NTSB photo)

3.0 Engine Examination

Refer to the separate powerplant specialist's report regarding the engine examination.

4.0 Propeller Examination

Refer to the separate powerplant specialist's report regarding the propeller examination.

----- end of summary -----