ANC23FA008

OPERATIONAL FACTORS/HUMAN PERFORMANCE

Attachment 2

Hawaii Life Flight Personnel Interview Transcripts

November 11, 2023

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*
	*
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022	* Accident No.: ANC23FA008

Interview of: EDWARD CAVANAUGH, CHECK AIRMAN, Pilot/Check Airman

Hawaii Life Flight

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday
February 15, 2023

APPEARANCES:

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. ETCHER: Good afternoon. My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an operational factors investigator with the NTSB. All that means is I look at everything that interacts with the pilot kind of forward of the cockpit door, if you will, and everything that interacts with it. So just a little bit here, I'll go around and have everybody introduce themselves, kind of tell you what their job role is as well. But I want to let you know that our role here is not to, you know -- punitive or anything. We just want to learn. The ultimate goal is to learn everything we can, kind of come up with a probable cause to help prevent this from happening again to anybody.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Right.

MR. ETCHER: And so that's the ultimate goal. So we want to make sure you kind of understand that. We might ask some tough questions and they might not be tough, but you know, we just want to make sure we have that full, nice picture so we can clearly figure out what happened and see if there's a fix to it.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: All right? But as I said, I'm going to go around the room. I'll let everybody introduce themselves, and we'll start with Sabrina.

DR. WOODS: Hi.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Hi.

DR. WOODS: Dr. Sabrina Woods. I'm also from the National

Transportation Safety Board. I'm human performance. So essentially what I'm investigating is kind of like, you know, all the things that make it so a person can perform in their job. So the things that benefit that and you know, some of the things that detract from that. And so that's kind of my function here for this investigation to this accident.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you.

MR. GARRISON: Dylan Garrison, with FAA. I was assigned by the FAA to be the Inspector-In-Charge for the accident investigation. I want you to know that I'm here in a safety role. I'm here as a information-gathering role. I know that most of the time as pilots, it wasn't too long ago that I was back in industry. And I know most of the time when we see the FAA, you know, it's like it's more of an enforcement or check ride that we interact with them. But I want you to know this is not a check ride in any way. This is not about enforcement in any way. I'm not here in that role in that capacity. That's not my intention. My intention here is to gather information regarding the accident and safety. So I don't want you to feel like I'm searching for the right answer when I have questions, or anyone here is searching for the right answer. We just want to know your perspective, what you know, what information you have. This isn't a test. If you tell me the wrong equipment that's onboard or something, we don't care, you know? Like I said, that's not what matters to us. This is strictly information-gathering roles.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MS. HILL: Millicent Hill, the NTSB Investigator-In-Charge.

MR. ETCHER: So that's everybody that will be asking you questions today.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Typically, we'll do two rounds. I'll usually start, ask a lot then Sabrina asks the really smart questions. And then we -- everybody else has good questions. And then we do a second round just for follow up. Second round is always quicker than the first.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So just so you have that in mind. As you can see, I am using a recorder. We're going to record this interview and have it transcribed. That transcript itself will become part of our public docket when this event closes out.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Is that okay if we record and transcribe?

MR. CAVANAUGH: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you. Also, when you're interviewed by the NTSB, you're -- you can have a representative with you if you wish. I see you came in here alone. Do you wish to have a representative at all?

MR. CAVANAUGH: No, I'm okay.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Well, and if you need to go talk to somebody, it's okay. Just let us know. You can -- we'll pause

and you can phone a friend or whatever you got to do.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: All right? Before we get started though, there's always a couple rules I like to lay out. One, this isn't a check ride. We're just strictly having a conversation. I want to learn. We all want to learn. So you know, don't think of any of this as a check ride. But if there's a question I ask or anybody asks that you don't quite understand? It's okay. Ask for clarification.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: We don't think anything of that because sometimes what I think in my brain doesn't always come out my mouth the same way. And so it's good to ask for clarification. Because if you give me an answer that I don't understand, I'm also going to ask for a little clarification because I want to make sure I have a good picture of it.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: If you need a break at all, just say so. We'll hit pause, take a break. It's not a problem at all. And the most important role, I always say, is if you -- if I ask a question and you just don't know the answer? I don't know is just as fine as anything else.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: We like facts, of course. But we also know people have opinions, and that's okay. I want the opinions too.

Sometimes I'll even ask opinionated questions, you know, what's your opinion? But just make sure you tell us if it's an opinion. Just I'll assume it's all facts, but if you tell me it's an opinion then that helps me remember that you're on that. Okay, that's an opinion.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: And that's very helpful as well. So don't hold back. Just let us know.

MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: All right? Are you ready to get started?

MR. CAVANAUGH: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Everybody else ready? Okay.

INTERVIEW OF EDWARD CAVANAUGH

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. I always say I ask the toughest questions first.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. So, can you state and spell your last name?

A. Last name's Cavanaugh, spelled Charlie-alpha-Victor-alpha-November alpha-uniform-golf-hotel.

Q. And your full -- your first name is?

A. Edward.

Q. Do you like to go by Ed, Edward?

A. Ed.

Q. Captain, sir?

A. Usually Ed.

Q. All right, okay.
A. That's fine.
Q. What is your job title?
A. I'm a line pilot/check airman for Hawaii Life Flight.
Q. Okay. How long have you been with Hawaii Life Flight?
A. Since July of 2015, I've been with Hawaii Life Flight.
Q. Okay, all righty. And how long have you been a check airman?
A. 22 months --
Q. Okay.
A. -- 21 months.
Q. All right. I assume you have a Check Airman letter?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Not on me, but yeah.
Q. Right, right.
A. I do have one.
Q. Just always want to make sure you actually have one, so all righty. So you said you're a line pilot/check airman. So that means you do both roles?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Fly the line and then I have a base, Molokai.
Q. Your base is in Molokai?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, perfect.

A. And then I'll pick up a check ride here and there.
Q. All right, excellent. We'll get into that here in just a little bit on the difference between the roles, if you will. What kind if Airman's certificates and type ratings do you have?
A. I have a Gold Seal CFI, Double I (ph.), MEI. And then I have a ATP with a Metroliner and a 757, 767 type. And then I also have an airframe mechanic license, and ground instructor.
Q. Okay, excellent. Now I said I always start with the toughest questions first. And well, that may not be completely true. This is probably one of the, the toughest questions. A ballpark -- can you give me your total flight hours?
A. I'd say between 12,000 and 13,000.
Q. Okay. Now this is always the toughest, it seems like. How many flight hours do you have in the King Air?
A. Say I'd been flying it about 15 years, maybe average 300 a year. So it's be what, 300? About -- God, it seemed like more than 450 or -- no, wait a minute. No, trouble with math right now. But anyway, roughly 300 hours a year for 15 years. I can do the math real quick.
Q. So about 4,500 give or take?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. I would say there.
Q. All right, perfect. All right. See, I told you. These were the toughest, now they get easier so it's all right. Can you just

give us kind of a nice quick Cliff's Notes version of your aviation history?

A. I think I got my CFI in like '94. And then I flight instructed for about 1,200 hours. Took about four years back then to get up that high. Then I went to freight, flying Navajos, Cessna 404s. Went to Great Lakes Airlines for about a year and then I went back to the freight, flying the metroliners. I had a letter for instructor in the Navajo, and then I stayed there for a while. And then I ended up in Gallup, New Mexico, flying 414s, and then they got a 425. Then I went to another company, flying the Beech 200, King Air, the A-100 and the E-90 King Airs. And then AMRG was purchased -- had purchased the company that I work for, for about eight years, in the 200 and the 90 and 100. And then I came out here for -- I was here probably, I think about four years and went and flew the 757 for Asia Pacific Airlines for about a year. And then I decided that I'd rather be home. I had just gotten married and my wife didn't really appreciate me being gone, yeah, all the time. So I came back to Hawaii Life Flight.

Q. Okay. And you said AMRG bought your company. Was that Guardian? Is that who AMRG is, or is that somebody else?

A. I think at the time it was a guy name Joe Hunt (ph.). And he ended up buying the company that I worked for called AeroCare (ph.). And then it went through some changes and we ended up as a GMR company.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, I just wanted to make, you know.
A. Yeah.
Q. I know that's aviation for you. Everybody's moving title holders and all that.
A. I think we've been under the Guardian Flight Certificate since 2017. And I can't remember if that was Joe Hunt or whether GMR did that, but.
Q. And that was Hawaii Life Flight's under that since 2017?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. And I think you know, have some bases in the mainland.
Q. Okay.
A. And they kind of just all rolled them into the -- the I guess, Air Medical Resource Group.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And then GMR I think bought AMRG.
Q. Okay, perfect. All rightly. So I know you said earlier that you are involved with training. You're a check airman. Kind of help me understand, in a training role. Do you do just line checks or simulator tests?
A. I do the 135, 293s and the 297s, 299s. I don't do too much instructing. However, if somebody does have difficulty and they need to be retrained on the check ride, then I'm authorized to do that. But that's -- that's about my limit or that's about what

they ask me to do.
Q. Okay.
A. As far as instructing goes.
Q. About how many check rides do you have to give a month?
A. Well, I think I've done about 30 total over 22 months. So just over one.
Q. Okay.
A. Sometimes I'll do like three in a month and then not do one for a little.
Q. Okay.
A. Little bit.
Q. And do you do that on top of your normal line flying duties or do they pull you off line to do these?
A. A lot of times it's days off.
Q. Okay.
A. I pick up days off, do the check ride on a day off or.
Q. Okay, all right. So you've been doing check rides for 22 months. You kind of -- I assume you have a pretty good idea of some challenges some pilots might have, or you see a trend maybe. Do you see any trends on the check rides that you've done -- difficulties pilots are having or things they're doing well?
A. I think -- and this would be my opinion.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. That the company is really into standard operating procedures and checklist usage. So I've noticed, even over the 22 months I

been doing it, people are, you know, starting to talk when they're single pilot flying, you know. They'll be like okay, I need to cross the FIX at 140 or whatever. And so I think that's been a big improvement from when I started, yeah.

Q. Okay. Any other things that are a great improvement? Or that you're seeing pilots coming through like oh, they're -- I've done five of these or 10 of these in a row and eight of them have kept doing this wrong or something. Have you seen anything like that?

A. No. I think the -- the one thing that I've seen is people will -- they'll do the takeoff. And it's just a technique thing. They might select like an assigned heading rather than runway heading --

Q. Mm-hm.

A. -- for the flight director which I think, you know, it'd be kind of, you know. If you have an engine failure or what, you don't already want it in the turn, you know what I mean?

Q. Mm-hm, okay. All right.

A. And that would also be my opinion. And it's just I've seen a few people do it.

Q. What's the company policy on that?

A. It's to align with the runway.

Q. Runway's centerline?

A. Yeah.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. The heading indicator so that the flight director is, you know, initial climb --
Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- is straight ahead in case there's an engine failure or what have you.
Q. All right. So from my own, check airman's always -- I know it's always a tough thing to ask but I always have to. Have you given anybody an UNSAT --
A. No.
Q. No UNSATs at all?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. Done about probably 50 percent where I'll retrain on something.
Q. Okay.
A. But no, nothing UNSAT.
Q. Give me an idea of some of the things you've had to retrain on.
A. Well, seems like some instrument procedures sometimes. Occasionally the stall series. They may not recover how the company wants them to recover on it.
Q. Okay.
A. And occasional steep turn.
Q. All right. Now, how many times can you retrain and retest?
A. Well, you can get two. But if you accept the retraining and

then you mess it up again, you -- you'd be done with that.
Q. Okay.
A. But normally it's two and then you get the UNSAT. There are some things that will get you an UNSAT. Like if you pull an engine on somebody, they select the wrong engine, forget to put the gear down or maybe you have to take control of the airplane from the applicant. Then that would be an automatic --
Q. Okay.
A. -- ending of the check ride.
Q. So, and I just I think I asked. I think you answered but it's a long day, I guess. You've not had any UNSATs.
A. No. No UNSATs.
Q. Can you incomplete a check ride?
A. You can discontinue.
Q. Okay, have you done that?
A. No.
Q. Okay. So did you know the accident pilot, Brian?
A. Not personally.
Q. Okay.
A. I did fly with him. I gave him a couple of check rides.
Q. All right.
A. Three check rides.
Q. Well let's -- let's talk about those then.
A. Okay.
Q. When was the last one you gave him, do you recall?

A. Would have been July --
Q. July.
A. -- of 2022.
Q. Okay. And I know that's -- I'd do math but that's probably going to be bad for my brain. But it's been a few months ago, how's that?
A. Yeah.
Q. Anything come to mind from that check ride, good or bad?
A. I think he had made improvement over his recurrent check ride. He started talking a lot more as far as, you know, the SOPs go.
Q. Okay, was that the problem he had on his previous check ride, or was there other issues? You said he made improvement.
A. Yeah, I think the -- I have a copy of the 8410s. His first check ride was clean. He didn't have any retrains. And then on his second check ride he had an ILS that was unsatisfactory. He had a -- grab my glasses. And that would have been February 3rd of 2022. It was a recurrent check ride, 3.1 hours. He had a UNSAT on holding and a UNSAT on the ILS approach. And he retrained and rechecked, satisfactory.
Q. Okay. Well, did you have any idea why you UNSAT those?
A. For the ILS and the ATP. What he did was we're on vectors for the ILS. And VCAP (ph.), the GPS selected as, as NAV source until he rolled out on the localizer and he overshot it slightly. We were being vectored. So the -- I got him for the -- let's see

where it's at here -- "select, tune and identify and confirm the operational status of the navigational equipment to be used." He wasn't that far out of the -- the marker.

Q. Okay, so you retrained and retest. So when you retrained does that mean you do another ILS, or does that mean you just talk about it and you go try it again?

A. It depends on the applicant.

Q. Okay.

A. Usually tell them what, you know hey, you know. We're gonna have to do that over.

Q. Okay.

A. and then you know, if it's something like that, you can -- sometimes they elect to just try it again.

Q. Okay.

A. And then you retrain or talk about it.

Q. All right. And I know it's been a long time ago that you probably don't remember. Did you have to do another ILS?

A. Yes.

Q. As the retrain or just as the recheck?

A. It was the recheck.

Q. Okay.

A. He did -- he continued the first ILS even though he had been UNSAT.

Q. Okay.

A. And I told him that it as UNSAT and we'd have to do it again.

But he did do the ILS.
Q. Okay, and what happened on the hold thing I think you said was the UNSAT?
A. On the hold, if I remember correctly. He had briefed a teardrop entry. And then he did kind of a weird and just a strange entry. And I was, you know, since he had briefed a teardrop entry and then he kind of did like a half parallel, half teardrop type thing.
Q. Okay.
A. And the FARs I think say you can pretty much enter a hold any way you want. But there's, in the ATP, it says you do the appropriate entry.
Q. Okay. So when he did these -- the hold, for instance. Was he hand flying, do you know? Do you remember, was he autopilot? What do you -- do you remember what he was doing?
A. I believe -- I think it would have been in autopilot.
Q. Okay.
A. For sure, it's autopilot.
Q. All right. Do you ever have people try and do that all -- do the check rides all hand flown?
A. Not very often.
Q. All right. So you have?
A. No.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. No. I mean, people will hand fly certain portions. But as a

general rule, I think they like you know, the autopilot, you know, just a little better.

Q. Okay. How do you like the autopilot?

A. I like it.

Q. Does it work well for you? Is it cumbersome, easy to use?

A. It's not as nice as the Boeing. But it is, I mean, it's better than a Cessna.

Q. Okay.

A. Or at least the single Cessnas. It's got several vertical, horizontal modes, and it seems to -- seems to be all right.

Q. Do you see pilots having issues with the autopilot at all?

A. Not so much.

Q. Okay.

A. No.

Q. All right. So he did the whole -- he did the ILS. Was there any other things he didn't do so well?

A. No, that was about it I think.

Q. Okay.

A. That I can remember.

Q. Okay. And now, this was -- and I don't -- forgive me. Was it like last July, or did you say like last July or did you say like --

A. Oh, this --

Q. -- a couple times ago?

A. -- this was in February.

Q. Okay.
A. For the recurrent. Last July he did -- let me see here. That's kind of weird. He had a missed approach unsatisfactory.
Q. What made that unsatisfactory?
A. We were -- had some traffic over in Lanai and we had to discontinue the approach. And so I gave him an alternate instructions for a missed approach.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And it -- I've -- I have it written down that it took him longer than average to get the airplane cleaned up.
Q. Okay, what's that mean? I'm just trying to visualize what longer than average, cleaned up.
A. It's sometimes people might forget the flaps or there's a -- two different, there's a go around, which is full flaps. And because of the C-90A, when you do a go around with full flaps you pitch and then when you hit 100 knots you retract all the flaps. And then when you get a positive rate you put the gear up. And on the missed, just a missed approach, then it's you know, the -- missed approach you do gear up, positive rate, gear up. And then when you're all stabilized you hit the flaps up, so.
Q. Okay. Okay, thank you. I just wanted to make sure I understood what that meant, so I appreciate that. Since you been doing check airman duties for the last 22 months, give or take. Do you feel when people -- candidates come to you -- that they are well prepared, well trained, ready to go? Any troubles you've

ever had? I mean, I know some people maybe mess up something here and there and get retrained. But are they well prepared for the check rides or are they sort of okay?

A. I believe they're well trained.

Q. All right. Not had any big issues between?

A. No.

Q. Okay. If on your check ride you see something like, we'll take Brian. You know, entered the hold incorrectly and you did another one. Let's say they entered the hold incorrectly. Do you communicate that to -- not pilots' names, but to anybody here to get maybe emphasize that on training a little bit?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you see a trend?

A. If I saw a trend I would, yes.

Q. Okay. How would you go about doing that?

A. I would contact my chief pilot or assistant chief pilot and the director of training.

Q. Is director of training, is he here or is he in Utah?

A. South Jordan, Utah.

Q. South Jordan? Okay.

A. Randy Ostman.

Q. Okay, all righty. Have you ever had to do that?

A. Have I --

Q. Not called -- notice a trend and bring it to their attention?

A. Just the runway heading.

Q. Okay, and was it because of what Brian did, or was it you saw a trend developing?
A. Well, I saw a few people doing it. And I know it's technique.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. You know, some people just do it. And I was always trained at flight safety and we always did runway heading. Because you could always remember the heading, you know. You're getting vectored or whatever.
Q. Right.
A. The initial heading. And --
Q. Okay.
A. -- so that was kind of one of my little pet peeves is when people didn't -- didn't set it to the runway heading.
Q. All right. I remember a little bit ago you said something that the July training for Brian was about 3.1 hours.
A. Yes.
Q. Is that -- help me understand. 3.1 hours seems like a lot, but then maybe it's not. So help me understand. Is that a lot more than normal? Is that about average? Is that Chuck Yeager (ph.) or awesome?
A. It's I think the average would run, depending on traffic. Because Lanai gets real busy.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And so sometimes you have to discontinue approaches and -- or

a controller may not give you, you know, they'll put you in a hold for a while. And so I think the average is probably 2.1, 2.2 I think probably. And then if you have retrains then that adds time as well.

Q. Can you give me an estimate about how many times you have retrains on a check ride?

A. About 50 percent of the time.

Q. About 50.

A. Yeah, that's what it seems.

Q. Okay. And are they typically procedural errors or are they, I don't want to say pilot issues. But you know, they're not having -- they're not able to control the airplane or there's an issue with their piloting skills?

A. Most of the time it's just a procedural, I guess. Maybe they didn't do something according to the SOPs.

Q. Do you happen to know what the bustbusted rate is here or is there one?

A. I think it's actually been steadily climbing, at least for initial new hires.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. I think last I heard it was about 50 percent that they're bustbusted in and out of the initial ground schools.

Q. Is that up in Utah or?

A. Yeah. South Jordan, Utah.

Q. Do you know why? I mean, I know ground schools or initials,

I mean, I get that. But is there -- are they seeing a reason why that's going up?

A. My opinion would be maybe the -- finding somebody who can fly a six pack is probably getting harder.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. And people that actually want to do single pilot, it's probably, you know. When somebody can just go to the regionals with $1,500 now, a lot of guys want to get that airline job. So that's -- it's better to do that than -- than to go fly Medevac. So I think maybe the quality of the applicant has probably declined because of that.

Q. Okay.

A. That's just my opinion.

Q. And that's -- that's okay. Thank you for making sure --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- you're clarifying it's your opinion. But no, I appreciate that honesty. Is there any discussion on what they need to do to improve that bust rate? Is that -- is it -- maybe I should ask. Is that bust rate a concern to you all in the training department, that it's going up?

A. We don't -- we don't really deal with the initial here.

Q. Okay.

A. They do that in South Jordan. But it is a concern, I believe, because eventually you're gonna run out of people, you know.

Q. Mm-hm.
A. If you can't find anybody that can qualify then eventually you'll have a hard time in the future to keep it going.
Q. Okay. How about here in Hawaii Life Flight? Which bust rate? Do you guys talk about that here at all, or do you even have one?
A. I'm not sure. I don't think it's that high. There are people that bust. They had somebody was maybe a two-year employee, perhaps a little more. And I think Kaleo, the assistant chief pilot, sent him to Utah. And then he had -- I think he had issues there.
Q. Okay, all right. If you're doing a check ride and you see a pilot that might need a little bit more -- maybe that's not happened to you -- a little bit more time. Is there a time restraint on how many hours you can have the airplane up? I mean, I know there's fuel. But do they say three hours, that's all you get and the check ride's over? Or does --
A. No. But if somebody's having that much difficulty then it's probably better they go back to training.
Q. Okay.
A. They don't say anything about the times or how long you -- it's our discretion --
Q. Okay.
A. -- on whether we do the retrain, recheck. It's our discretion.

Q. Oh, okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. All right.
A. We just need to notify the -- usually we'll call the boss and kind of discuss the retrains, yeah.
Q. Okay. Do you as check airmen, instructors, training department here in Hawaii. Do you guys meet together as a collective group to discuss any trends you see?
A. Yes.
Q. How often?
A. It used to be once a month we would have a meeting, training. But we all communicate between each other.
Q. Okay. Sorry, you said it used to be once a month. What is it now?
A. I think they actually switched the pilot meetings to once a week.
Q. Okay.
A. And then I've been waiting on my medical, so I haven't really been too involved on the -- had a little difficulty with my medical so I'm waiting on the people in Oklahoma City to get it.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. So I haven't been. But that's -- that's what it was prior to me going out on leave.
Q. Okay. Are those meetings done here in Honolulu, are they virtual?

A. Like a Teams?
Q. Yeah.
A. Teams meeting. Usually it's company wide.
Q. Oh, so it's not just Hawaii bases. It's -- is it just Hawaii that's company wide, or are you talking Utah?
A. Whole company.
Q. Oh.
A. Everybody. Yeah, we all get together.
Q. Okay. So you could hear what other branches of Guardian are seeing in their training and things like that? You guys kind of communicate like that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, all right. Any idea how long those meetings are -- they 10 minutes?
A. Usually an hour, hour and a half.
Q. Okay, excellent. So we'll kind of switch gears just a little. I know there's a simulator downstairs that's not working anymore, is what we were told. But before you -- were you here before they had the simulator?
A. I was here before they had the simulator.
Q. Okay. Do you see that simulator being a big benefit or is it you're not really sure yet?
A. I think it was a benefit. The plan was to get everybody to go through that every year instead of going to South Jordan. And then I think the GPS broke on it or -- the company, after they

built it, shortly after it was built, the company I guess went broke or something. So the support on it has -- yeah.

Q. That adds a new challenge.

A. Yeah. Yeah, so I think it's hard getting software or hardware issues worked with it.

Q. Okay. So were pilots required to go through that simulator before it broke or was it just kind of they can if they want?

A. They were required, if I remember correctly, yeah.

Q. But you felt like in your opinion, you felt like it was of benefit?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. On your check rides I know there's always a list of things you have to do. Do you have to do unusual attitudes?

A. Yes.

Q. How do those usually turn out? You know --

A. Usually --

Q. -- how do people handle it? I mean, it's not something we practice every day, right?

A. Usually pretty good.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. Do you do check rides at day or night?

A. Day.

Q. Day.
A. Yeah, they've all been in the daytime.
Q. Is that a company requirement or is that just that's the best time to do it for you and --
A. That's just the way the schedule worked out on it.
Q. Okay.
A. I think the visual maneuvers would be harder at night, like steep turns and --
Q. Okay.
A. -- stuff like that.
Q. And when you do -- when you do unusual attitudes or steep turns or any of the maneuvers. Do you do them over land or do you do them over water?
A. Usually over water.
Q. Okay, does that add a new challenge for the applicant or is it pretty easy? You don't see any issues with them handling that --
A. No.
Q. -- over water.
A. No.
Q. Okay. All righty. If you let's say tomorrow, you and I went out for a check ride and I did something that was odd, whatever, you pick it. I failed to pull out a checklist or anything. But I'm the third one that you've seen. Is there a means for you besides these pilot meetings once a week? Is there a means for

you to get that elevated up that man, we got to do something with this?

A. Yeah, I could talk to the chief pilot, assistant chief pilot or the director of training.

Q. Okay. And you say chief pilot. Does Hawaii have a chief pilot?

A. Yes, they have an assistant chief pilot.

Q. And assistant chief, okay.

A. Yeah, named Kaleo.

Q. Right.

A. And then Andy Munion is our system chief pilot for all the regions except for I think Alaska maybe.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. But he's not -- the chief pilot, the assistant chief pilot's not here, is he? He's --

A. No.

Q. -- not based in Hawaii? He's somewhere --

A. I think he's in like North Dakota or something.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Is he -- do you ever have to get a hold of him for anything or does your assistant chief pretty much deal with anything you need here?

A. The assistant chief takes care of like local issues.

Q. Okay.
A. And then, but it's always pretty easy to get hold of the chief pilot or the director of operations or the director of training actually. They're all pretty easy to get a hold of.
Q. Okay.
A. And then they have a pilot manager on call that, like I said, doesn't really have much to do with check rides, but it's another resource for you.
Q. Okay. And what's a pilot manager on call? What is that?
A. They'll discuss like let's say, you know, you're not liking the weather or you have a fatigue call, or any kind of operational issue. You call, discuss it with the manager and then they will give you approval to either do or you know, if you feel comfortable to continue, then they'll determine whether it's -- the risk factor is good or whether it's better just to, you know. If you have a question, yeah, they're there to help figure it out for you.
Q. And that's for more of a line pilot than a training pilot? Is --
A. Yeah, that's more of a --
Q. -- okay.
A. -- I'm not sure why I brought that up.
Q. Oh no, I -- it's okay. I'm glad you did.
A. Yeah.
Q. It's just I want to make sure I knew where they fell in the

whole position here.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, perfect. How do you like flying the King Air?
A. I like it.
Q. And don't compare it to your Boeing or anything. You're just --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- as an airplane.
A. I think it's a good airplane.
Q. Handles well?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Have you ever had any I don't want to say issues with the airplane -- whatever, autopilot disconnecting or electrical issues or anything like that? Is -- have you ever had any issues?
A. In the whole time or just here in this company?
Q. How about just here in this company.
A. Yeah, just some minor issues, maybe fuel gauges. We did have the EFIS system went blank one day taking off out of Honolulu. Inverter failure.
Q. Okay, all right. Have you ever had the autopilot kick off on you in flight?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you know why it did that?

A. I'm not really sure.
Q. Okay.
A. Sometimes it just got a little buggy or something and then --
Q. Was that like in cruise, descent?
A. Probably would have been in cruise yeah, would be the most --
Q. All right.
A. -- most likely place.
Q. And just for the record, how did you know it disconnected on you?
A. There's an audible alarm.
Q. Okay.
A. And then the flight director will disappear.
Q. Okay.
A. So it's there should be an audible alarm. The C-90A, if I remember correctly. Well yeah, I can't say for sure on the C-90A. I haven't flown one in a really long time. But the C-90B has an audible alarm, and then the flight director, Delta Wings, will disappear. And then your scoreboard will, you know, the FDE (ph.) and autopilot and all the things on your scoreboard will disappear.
Q. Okay, and just for the record. The scoreboard you're -- I assume is the annunciator panel?
A. Yeah, the annunciator. On the EFIS-84 you'll have the indicators that are actually on the -- attitude (ph.) indicator.
Q. Mm-hm, okay. Excellent. And the GPS, how does that work?

Is it pretty easy in the airplane? Is it kind of a -- takes a little bit to get used to it?

A. Well --

Q. How does it work to you or how do you see pilots using it? Is it easy enough?

A. -- I think so.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, in my opinion it's easy enough.

Q. Okay.

A. Pretty straightforward. You have to study but you know, you have to -- it's not -- it's intuitive but it's not, you know, that intuitive to where you can just jump in and -- and fly away but.

Q. Need a little basic knowledge and then it's --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- okay.

A. And then there's a lot of features on it. It's like an FMS, a lot. I think it's pretty similar in a lot of ways to the FMS.

Q. Okay. Do you typically -- we're going to put your training hat on here because it's kind of what I'm looking at for a little while anyway. Do you see pilots on check rides having any issues, especially new hires, having any issues learning the GPS? Pretty easy for them?

A. I haven't.

Q. You haven't.

A. No.

Q. Do you do initials or is that all done in Utah?
A. I don't really do any. I'm always the, like a recurrent or a 297 --
Q. Okay.
A. -- instrument proficiency check, so I haven't really flown with any initial new hires. Most of the people I fly with have been here for more than a year or two.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. If I worked here but I worked at -- let's say I worked out of Utah. And then I said, you know, I really like the warm weather in Hawaii. I'm going to move there. I get a base here. Would I fly with you when I first come in to get the, you know. Would you give me a line check here to make sure I kind of know how it works? Or is there any IOE?
A. There's IOE. They won't just set you loose here.
Q. Okay.
A. They'll set you up and have you fly some of the routes. And I guess if you needed a check ride they would probably give you a check ride. But they usually do IOE with you.
Q. Okay. Do you do IOE at all?
A. No. The base I'm at, we really don't have much movement at all.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. So I haven't -- they can't get anybody to apply over there

actually. But so, I haven't -- I did IOE with a guy probably two years ago, and that was before I was doing the check airman. I'd just ride with them and kind of show them around. It's pretty dark here, and so it, you know, it's different from the mainland for sure.

Q. Yeah, I heard a new term this week -- dark, dark.

A. Oh yeah.

Q. And what does that mean to you? I mean you're like, oh yeah. Like that's -- that's something.

A. It's darker here than I think -- yeah. You fly over Arizona and it's pretty dark but there's ground lighting here and there?

Q. Mm-hm.

A. But here, there -- sometimes you look and just there's no horizon. It's just black, you know, from the -- and it -- yeah, it's dark.

Q. Okay.

A. It's probably darker than most places, I would think.

Q. Oh wow, okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you notice like at night? If it's cloudy does that make it worse or if it's crystal clear is it -- does it matter?

A. Unless there's a moon, it doesn't really matter.

Q. Okay.

A. It's -- we got so much low cloud layers here that a lot of times on the climb out and the descent you're in the clouds

anyway. So it -- it's --
Q. Okay, excellent. I have one last question for now, while my mind kind of smushes all this together, before I hand it off. But you said something that kind of perked my interest. Why is your base having such a hard time getting people to come?
A. Such a remote base. It's -- and the -- they say it's a friendly island, but it's not the -- it's just it's really remote. We got like two gas stations, no stop lights, it's very native. And it's -- they don't like people. I mean, and they don't like people visiting. They don't like people moving there and it's kind of uncomfortable, you know? And if somebody's used to Starbuck's or whatever --
Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- and, you know, it's -- there's nothing there. It -- except for beautiful beaches, you know. Besides that, there's not a -- not a whole lot there.
Q. Okay, all right then. I can see that, so I appreciate that.
A. Yeah.
Q. I'm going to turn it over to Sabrina. But do you need a break before?
A. No.
Q. Okay, you're doing all right?
A. Yeah.
Q. All righty. Here's Sabrina.
BY DR. WOODS:

Q. In your own words can you tell me what you think about when you think of safety culture?
A. In my own words?
Q. Yeah.
A. The promotion of safety and guidelines. For instance, the establishing SOPs and following those.
Q. Yeah. Does communication and feedback have a role in your safety culture?
A. Yes.
Q. Tell me a little bit more about that please.
A. We have a Baldwin Safety System. And you're -- you can file an anonymous or not anonymous Baldwin report if you have a concern. And then it'd be taken up with the safety committee, and they try to find a resolution to the -- whatever you might have turned in on it.
Q. So that's how you do things here at Hawaii Life Flight?
A. Yes, they have Baldwins.
Q. Mm-hm. So I guess overall, what is your impression of? Because it sounds like you've been couple other -- doing a few things in your very, very short career. I guess, how would you rate the safety culture overall here then?
A. I think it's -- I think it's pretty good.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. I think it's on-tier with some 121 operators.
Q. Okay. How do you feel about that particular feedback system?

Is it effective? Could it use work?
A. I think it's effective.
Q. Mm-hm, have you used it before?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And about how long was the turnaround time until you felt that there was resolution?
A. Probably I'd say usually it's within a couple days.
Q. Okay.
A. If you had a serious safety issue you can always go to the director of operations or the chief pilot, or the assistant chief pilot and just say, no, that's not gonna work.
Q. Okay, and I -- so your -- you feel comfortable personally doing that.
A. Yes, I do.
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah.
Q. But I guess, so you're pretty high up on the food chain here. What about just your standard line pilot in one of the out bases away from Honolulu? Do you think that they would feel comfortable? Is this the kind of environment where they could just walk up to Kaleo and be like hey, I got this issue?
A. I think so.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So would -- to chat a little bit about the accident

pilot, Brian.
A. Yes.
Q. And what you've done as far as his check rides. Do you -- first of all, did you I guess, did you know him outside of the workplace at all?
A. No.
Q. Okay. I just wanted to make sure. I didn't think so, but I wanted to be sure. In your opinion, what was his personality like?
A. He seemed I guess maybe -- he seemed like a happy person.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And, but I really didn't know him beyond --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- you know, the check rides. So it's kind of different, yeah.
Q. Yeah.
A. Because you might not get the true, you know. They're usually, you know, kind of nervous.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And so I -- what I know from him he seemed to be a happy person.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. Yeah, and that's probably all I can really say about him on that.
Q. Did he seem nervous with you?

A. One time, when I -- I started quizzing him.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And that seemed to make him a little bit nervous, but he calmed down.
Q. Do you remember what the subject was that you were quizzing him?
A. Electrical system.
Q. Okay, like diagramming it or --
A. I'm sorry?
Q. Do you mean like having him diagram it?
A. No.
Q. Or what do you mean by electrical system?
A. He -- we have to do an electrical system check.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And you have to go up to the center panel and you go through the voltages for the different busses. And he seemed to be doing it real fast, so I told him he needed to slow down.
Q. Okay.
A. He seemed to know what he was looking for. But it just to me, it seemed kind of fast.
Q. Was he receptive to your instruction?
A. I believe so.
Q. Yeah. Did he -- did he display like an interest in learning more?
A. I think so.

Q. Or in how you do things maybe?
A. Yeah, I think so.
Q. Okay. During your time with him. I always -- I kind of jokingly call it the cockpit confessional. So people chat and sometimes you talk about things other than what you're just doing. I know you had a very specific task to do, so this might not have occurred with you. But did he ever chat with you about how he thought things were going here at Hawaii Life Flight for him?
A. No.
Q. Mm-mm?
A. No.
Q. Did he ever talk about what he enjoyed about the job?
A. I think he liked having the two weeks off. And I -- I can't really remember --
Q. Okay.
A. -- anything like that. I don't -- I'm not sure he did though.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Conversely, did he ever talk about anything that he was frustrated with with the job?
A. Not to me.
Q. Okay, how about frustrated with his own performance?
A. No.
Q. Okay. And then lastly, did he talk about anything in regards

to like the nature of the mission here and what it is you have to do in the flying environment that you guys were working in?
A. Not that I can remember.
Q. Okay, no problem. In all, in your perception, what's the working relationship like between the pilots and the crews here?
A. They seem to be pretty good in my experience.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. I've always gotten along with most everybody I work with.
Q. Yeah.
A. They seem to -- I mean, I've heard rumors of different people that don't get along. But I say generally I would think that everybody's pretty professional and task oriented.
Q. Do you happen to know what happens if people just cannot get along?
A. Usually they end up something happens. They'll get terminated or counseled by HR.
Q. Mm-hm, have you seen that happen then before?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And so is there a -- I mean, we don't just go from I had a disagreement to termination, right?
A. No.
Q. Are there -- I'm assuming there's steps in between?
A. Yes.

Q. Do you know what they are?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. No, I'm not -- I'm not into the -- I don't have any knowledge of their counseling or --
Q. Well no, I meant like who? Who's involved in that -- in those steps?
A. Oh, that would probably be the chief pilot or assistant chief pilot and the director of the medical program, Mark Leggett.
Q. Okay.
A. It would probably be something with those guys.
Q. Okay. So kind of the same thing on the training and quality control side. If things just aren't -- and I know you've said that particularly out at the Utah facility, you know, 50 percent make it through the program. But once they're here and they're kind of established, if there is that lack of proficiency or a failure to perform, in your opinion, is that process solid? I mean, are you just -- knowing that the pipeline might be slowing down, it might be being squeezed a bit. In your opinion, have you seen anything in regards to we should -- need to keep working with this person to get them through because we can't afford to lose any more people?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. In fact they had an employee that was actually employee of

the year that they fired not -- a couple of years ago for lack of proficiency. And I think it was probably pretty tough --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- for Kaleo, you know?
Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- to have to let him go. But I think they sent him to Utah and they determined that he wasn't quite up to task.
Q. Yeah. Who ultimately makes that decision here? Is it -- do you know? Is it joint between like Kaleo and higher? Or is it just like the Utah facility that has all the power? Do you know?
A. I think it's a combination.
Q. Okay.
A. I don't think they can -- I don't know if they can. But maybe they don't act independently on something like that.
Q. Mm-hm, yeah.
A. That it'll be a collaboration --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- between you know, say Kaleo and South Jordan and HR and -- I would think.
Q. And just the reason I ask is because obviously, this is a very unique operating environment and so there's always kind of that wonder, like do they really know what we're going through out here, there in South Jordan? Like, it's a different environment there than here. So I'm just wondering how often do you all here get to inform that kind of process as to who you're working with?

A. (No audible response.)
Q. I think that's it. I think that's all I have for now. Thank you.
MR. ETCHER: Dylan?
BY MR. GARRISON:
Q. I was curious, who were you flying 414s for in Gallup?
A. Gallup Med Flight.
Q. Yeah?
A. Yeah.
Q. Nice. I think they're the reasons I ended up flying 414s, and the owners I flew knew them and they convinced him the 414 was the best when they wanted to start their charter service. So, I started in a 135 with the 414s, so.
A. Nice.
Q. Yeah, it's great. It's funny though.
A. It's a good bird.
Q. Yeah, it is. It's a good airplane. It's nice compared to the 421. You don't have to worry about all that gear -- what gears, yeah.
A. Gets so --
Q. Yeah. I was just curious about that.
A. Yeah.
Q. That's fun. Small world. You did a check airman observation 21 months ago?
A. Yes.

Q. Who did that observation?
A. Mr. Hahns (ph.).
Q. Okay. He came in to do that, huh?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. And then I took a check ride with him maybe seven months ago or eight months ago for a recurrent. And I think Kaleo was getting his check airman renewed.
Q. Oh, okay. Do you guys ever just do check airman observations -- well I guess that's a -- 24 months, you got to have that from the FAA, huh?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. I wanted to talk about you mentioned it's common on check rides for you to have to provide retraining?
A. Yes.
Q. And you said about 50 percent of the time.
A. Yes.
Q. And you said maybe this is in areas like on you know, you're doing 297 rides or whatever, so you're having to retrain some instrument thing or departure or something. How is that retraining documented?
A. It's through the 8410.
Q. Mm-hm. What do you do with the 8410?
A. We'll mark UNSAT.
Q. Uh-huh.

A. And then if they retrain successfully, do a little u and an s.
Q. Okay.
A. And then it's documented on the 8410 itself and then it's also entered into their training records.
Q. Okay.
A. For the --
Q. It sounded like to me earlier you were differentiating between retraining and UNSAT. Is it -- is that a difference in your mind?
A. Well, it's on the paperwork it says UNSAT for a particular area.
Q. Okay.
A. And then there's the general whole check ride UNSAT.
Q. Okay.
A. So --
Q. So when you say UNSAT you mean the entire check ride was -- like, your documenting the check ride is unsatisfactory, not just in particular areas? Is that --
A. That's -- yeah, that would be how it would --
Q. Okay.
A. -- is.
Q. So they can have an UNSAT in a particular area. You provide retraining. They get a SAT, so therefore the check ride is a satisfactory. That's what.

A. Yes.
Q. Oh, okay. That makes sense. Talk -- going back to the dark. You said you know, it's different than the mainland. It's not the same.
A. Yes.
Q. It's darker out here. Are there areas in Hawaii that are more that way than others?
A. I would think. To me, Molokai is real dark.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. Between Maui and the Big Island can get pretty dark. And then when you're heading toward Honolulu, yeah, you can usually see there the glow of light or you can see the actual city itself.
Q. Okay. Have you done a lot of night flying around here?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, and have you become disoriented at all?
A. I get a vertigo on occasion.
Q. Okay.
A. But never -- I just continued to rely on the instruments and.
Q. Okay.
A. But every once in a while I'll get vertigo, but.
Q. Okay. You had mentioned earlier that someone -- that if someone was to have relational problems they'd eventually be let go if it escalated to that point. What about, I think you had mentioned that there's someone was let go for performance as well.
A. Yes.

Q. Like, is that pilot like, not performing sufficiently? Is that what you're talking about?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. He was not proficient. And they trained him and then ended up sending him back to Utah, and then Utah determined yeah, he wasn't -- he wasn't cutting it.
Q. And this was the employee of the year that you're referring to?
A. He was at one time.
Q. Okay. Like how -- what span of time are we talking about between employee --
A. Probably over a year.
Q. -- over a year.
A. It's probably, you know, the first year maybe he won, if I can remember correctly. And then after maybe between the second and the third year perhaps. Just guessing on that, but.
Q. What -- the employee-of-the-year award. What things might he be considered for that? Like, what performance did he do that would make him?
A. I think it's like ability to get along with people.
Q. Okay.
A. And willingness to be a team member and stuff like that.
Q. Okay.
A. I'm not even sure we've had one since then.

Q. Okay.
A. But I would think it was that kind of thing.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Yeah, that's all I'm looking for is your understanding. And then so you said you think that was hard on Kaleo because it was like, there's this guy who's a really good team player but like, we just can't get him up to performance level.
A. Right.
Q. What kind of -- do you know what kind of performance level we're talking about? Like, what was happening that he couldn't demonstrate?
A. I'm not really sure, to be honest.
Q. Okay, he was just failing check rides, is that?
A. Yeah, he was failing check rides and then having difficulty in training as well.
Q. Okay.
A. So like, I think -- and this is all just speculation on my part.
Q. Sure.
A. He was a long-time VFR guy.
Q. Okay.
A. And I think maybe his -- and I don't know for sure. But maybe his IFR wasn't quite up to standard. But I have no idea actually in real life.

Q. Okay, that's just your understanding of it.
A. Yeah.
Q. That's all I have for right now.
BY MS. HILL:
Q. How often do flights cancel due to maintenance?
A. It depends. It goes in spurts, it seems.
Q. And more often since the accident?
A. Oh yes, I think so.
Q. Why do you think that is?
A. I think I haven't been flying here so I -- I'm not really sure. But I have heard that the planes are down quite often. And that -- that's all I really know. I'm not sure what they're getting written up over or anything like that.
Q. Thanks.
MR. ETCHER: You good? That was round one.
MR. CAVANAUGH: Okay.
MR. ETCHER: Round two is always quicker, but do you need a break or anything? We've been going a little over an hour, so.
MR. CAVANAUGH: No.
MR. ETCHER: You're good?
MR. CAVANAUGH: Yes.
MR. ETCHER: Okay.
BY MR. ETCHER:
Q. Just to dovetail this a little bit here on Millicent. I just said -- and you said it a few times. I just want to get it clear

in my mind. You said you haven't flown in a while. How long was the last -- when was the last time you actually operated a flight?
A. November.
Q. November?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So back in November, I know that's many months ago. So try and help me go back there. Did you ever -- how often would you have written up a plane for mechanical reasons? Or did it -- did you have to write them up very often?
A. On occasion. I'm not real certain on a number though.
Q. Okay.
A. Like an average number of -- sometimes it was a lot of things. And then you would go a little while and then you'd have another issue with the airplane.
Q. Okay, okay. So living where you live, being as remote as it is. If you have a maintenance issue, do they have a mechanic out there for you, or do they have to send somebody out or?
A. They'll fly a mechanic out.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So when you have a mechanical issue is that -- I don't want to say take a long time to resolve. But does it take a little bit of time?
A. It can.
Q. Okay. And when that happens are you just downed, right?

A. Yeah, you just wait until the --
Q. Okay.
A. -- the mechanic comes and they get a ferry permit if it needs more extensive work and it can be ferried.
Q. Okay.
A. Or they fly a mechanic in.
Q. Okay. Did you say you were an A and P?
A. A.
Q. A.
A. Just the airframe, yes.
Q. Okay. Do you ever -- do they ever ask you to do any of the work?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. No. I don't know why. But I've worked for several 135 operations and they never let you do both.
Q. Right.
A. That -- you can do one or the other and, you know.
Q. Okay.
A. And I'm okay with that, yeah.
Q. Absolutely. I don't blame you, so.
A. Yeah.
Q. I just I wasn't sure because like you said, you kind of live in a --
A. Yeah.

Q. -- more remote area so I wasn't sure if that was a benefit to you and them or not.
A. No, yeah.
Q. So thank you for indulging me in that odd question. Doing check rides that you do, line checks. What do you call them, line checks or check rides?
A. Check rides.
Q. Okay. Do you ever -- does the FAA ever come out and fly along with you on them?
A. They haven't for me.
Q. No? Have you ever -- this sounds like a weird question. I know we have seen them. But have they -- have you ever seen the FAA come and sit on a ride? I know you said not for you, but like for your assistant chief. I assume he does check rides as well.
A. Yes.
Q. So has -- have you ever seen them come out?
A. No.
Q. No.
A. Not that I can remember. Because I mean, kind of removed with the -- we don't see a whole lot going on --
Q. Okay.
A. -- in the other bases.
Q. When was the last time you saw the FAA?
A. Would have been I think on my last recurrent check ride is when it was an observed check ride for the ACP.

Q. Mm-hm.
A. And that would have been the last time I saw them personally.
Q. Okay. And is that check ride done here in Honolulu or do they come out to you?
A. Usually it'll start in Honolulu and you go down to Lanai or Kona or wherever --
Q. Okay.
A. -- might have the best -- the best place to practice that day.
Q. Okay.
A. You know, traffic and such.
Q. This is probably going to sound like a weird question from a pilot asking another pilot. But does it concern you you don't see the FAA very often?
A. I don't, I mean, I don't see them on Molokai. I have nothing against the FAA. So it doesn't concern me. But it wouldn't bother me either if they came in more often, yeah.
Q. Okay, all right. The procedures here at Hawaii Life Flight.
A. Yes.
Q. Are they the same procedures that Guardian has? Or do you guys have Hawaii Life Flight specific procedures?
A. We have an SOP for the company, Guardian Flight. There is -- due to the C-90A, there is that difference in the SOP on the go around.
Q. Okay.

A. And that that would be the only special thing, I guess, that we had here. Because they don't have any C-90As on the mainland. But they're retiring those airplanes, or they have retired them and so they -- they're going to change the SOP when they're gone to have one straight line SOP.

Q. Okay.

A. Throughout the system. They also have Pilatus (ph.), and we don't have the SOP for the Pilatus (ph.).

Q. Okay.

A. I would assume they have an SOP for the Pilatus, but.

Q. Right, okay. So if you opened up your books, do they say Guardian or do they say Hawaii Life Flight?

A. They say Guardian.

Q. Okay.

A. Guardian Flight.

Q. All right. It -- are there any procedures or SOPs they have that -- well, just to be honest, just don't work in what you guys do here? Do you have -- have you ran into any -- run into any of those?

A. No.

Q. No, okay. Now I know we've all just come through that little joy known as a pandemic.

A. Right.

Q. How did that affect your training and your check rides and -- or did it?

A. Well, the proficiency kind of suffered, I think, because there was nobody flying. And so I think maybe proficiency wise it hurt some people and.
Q. Okay. Did that increase your workload later when it comes to check rides, because they weren't as proficient?
A. No.
Q. No, okay. Did -- was that a discussion with your training group that you have, about the proficiency?
A. I do remember them discussing it but I'm not -- I can't recall the exact. But I do remember there was a discussion about the -- the fact that we weren't flying. Now on the mainland they were -- they were getting beat up pretty good and they were flying all the time. But out here, we had lockdowns and --
Q. Mm-hm.
A. -- sometimes there weren't any. We got one major trauma center here and so they weren't accepting patients and they weren't really -- unless somebody was ready to die or something. I don't think they would move them. If they just had COVID I think they just kept them at home or something.
Q. Okay.
A. But it did seem like it slowed down quite a lot.
Q. So I'm going to assume by that that you didn't fly that much either during that time.
A. No.
Q. Okay.

A. I don't believe so.
Q. So with all those lockdowns, how did you get to do check rides with other pilots of other bases? Could you get there easily or were they kind of sequestering you to your island?
A. You know, I can't remember exactly. But I -- I'm not even sure I was a check airman during the pandemic.
Q. Okay.
A. But I can't remember that exactly.
Q. Okay.
A. Because you couldn't -- you couldn't even do like inter-island travel. So it was -- it was really hard to get around.
Q. I'll bet.
A. Yeah, especially on Molokai. Yeah, I had an exemption from the Governor for work, and they still they quarantined me. And I showed the State the letter from the Governor and they still quarantined me. They didn't -- I wasn't allowed to, you know, venture out.
Q. Wow.
A. At the time.
Q. Wow, okay. It does sound like a bit more challenging out here, so.
A. Yeah, they were pretty -- they were pretty hardcore.
Q. Yeah.
A. But we, I guess we suffered compared to most places, it was controlled better here, I guess, for the COVID anyway. I don't

know if it did the economy much good, but.
Q. I think that didn't do anybody's economy that good.
A. No, right.
Q. So, all right -- CRM. Do you see that on check rides? Do -- how does that look to you on check rides I mean -- rephrase that.
A. CRM?
Q. Mm-hm.
A. You're allowed, you know, you can -- you could talk to the med crew and have them help you out if you need the help. We got intercoms now and so you could communicate with the med crew. Dispatch can help you out if you need it. And it's a lot of times other airplanes are on the frequency, other company airplanes are on the frequency.
Q. Mm-hm, okay.
A. So you can -- you can utilize that --
Q. Okay, so do you see people using that?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do they show you how they use that on a check ride or is that even something that you really need to worry about on a check ride?
A. You can ask, you know, what if this happens. A scenario-based question.
Q. Mm-hm.

A. And see, you know, what they might utilize if they needed to.
Q. Okay.
A. But --
Q. All right. As far as when you're giving a check ride. Is it all just in the flight or is it -- is there an oral portion?
A. There's in oral.
Q. How long does that usually take?
A. Hour and a half, two hours.
Q. And how do -- typically what do you see pilots doing -- okay on it? Some work areas they need to work on?
A. Normally they're -- yeah, they're pretty good on it.
Q. Good, okay. I think this is my last question, because you've helped me fill in a lot, especially in your special role as a check airman. I'm sorry. I have two now, sorry. Do you view training records of pilots before you go give a check ride?
A. Yes.
Q. Like, if you knew I was coming to the check ride from you, would you pull up my training records and look them over?
A. Yes.
Q. Would there be -- what would you look for?
A. I'd look at your 8410s. Because we -- on a flight duty tracker, that there's a database that we can go in there, see all your competency tests. We can see your training records. And if an instructor's noted anything on your say SIM session or we'll look at the 8410 and see if you've had issues previously.

Something that you can kind of look for in a peephole, to make sure they're not gonna -- make sure they've learned from the problem, you know.

Q. Okay. So if you saw a lot of UNSATs on topics on the Sim or something, would you pay more attention to that? Would that give you concern? Just kind of help me understand what --

A. Yes.

Q. -- you know. If you saw one UNSAT would that give you a lot of concern or?

A. It definitely give me concern.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So if you looked at my records. If we were gonna go flying, you looked at my records and you saw man, he has in the last five SIM sessions he had -- I'll just pick a number -- 15 UNSATs, I don't know. Would that seem like, oh that, that's a bit abnormal?

A. Yeah, it would. It would definitely get my interest.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, and I'd probably, you know, look for problems that you've had previously. Make sure you're not just continue to have the same problem, you know, every -- every check ride.

Q. Okay. Did you happen to look at Brian's?

A. Yes.

Q. Anything there stand out to you?

A. I know he had some problems in the SIM with Stu.

Q. Okay.
A. And, yeah.
Q. Did those manifest themselves at all in your flights?
A. Not on our flight.
Q. Okay.
A. And I -- I kind of looked at it pretty close for the --
Q. Okay.
A. -- looked for some of the things that Stu said.
Q. All right. All right, last question, I promise this time. I know you do check rides.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you give line checks to any of the pilots?
A. No.
Q. Do you guys do line checks here, maybe I should ask that way.
A. I think it's part of the 293, 299 -- 297, 299 ride.
Q. Okay.
A. And the recurrent part of the recurrent check ride.
Q. Okay.
A. A line check.
Q. Okay.
A. But there's no -- like you might have it in an airline where the line check airman just shows up and fly, you know. There's --
Q. The surprise.
A. -- yeah. There's -- we don't. We don't have that.
Q. Okay.

A. That I'm aware of.
Q. Okay.
A. I haven't seen it.
Q. Perfect. I promised you it was my last one, so I --
A. Okay.
Q. -- I'll keep to that -- hey now. I'll keep to that promise. But Sabrina might have a bunch, so I'll just pre-warn you. No. Sabrina?
DR. WOODS: You've been great. No, I appreciate it. No, I don't have anything else. Thank you.
MR. CAVANAUGH: Thank you.
DR. WOODS: Yeah.
MR. ETCHER: All right. Dylan?
BY MR. GARRISON:
Q. All right. So as a line pilot, you're flying the line back before November, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So when they call and give you a flight, call you for a flight. Say hey, we got a flight for you. Leave out of Molokai, got to such and such a place. Let's just say, Kauai, pick someone up. Do they always give you a destination of where you're taking the patient?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Is there ever a time when they don't give you the destination? If there's a like hey, just go now. Go get there.

We'll let you know later where you're gonna end up?
A. I've never had that.
Q. You've never had that.
A. No.
Q. Okay. When you -- when your interactions with Brian on the -- any training, any checking. Did he ever demonstrate any difficulty with the Garmin unit or the autopilot or EFISs or anything?
A. I didn't see any.
Q. So would you describe the problems that you did run into as just like the procedures and some approach stuff? Like, what is -- what would you describe the problems?
A. A little bit of procedural error, and a little drift from the SOP.
Q. Okay.
A. As far as well, they have the SOP. They -- and they want an airplane flown a certain way. I actually think it's a really good thing because then you're ahead -- ahead of the airplane. Because you're okay, you know.
Q. Right.
A. I'm five miles from the -- yeah, so.
Q. Let's see. You mentioned that you looked back when you did Brian's checking. You looked back and saw that he had some problems with Stu in the simulator.
A. Yes.

Q. Were there any other problems in his past that you're aware of on any training or checking?
A. I think it had initially he had some extra SIM time. But I don't recall exactly. I know that he had the problem with Stu and I k now he had some earlier issue with the -- Utah. I think he had some extra SIM time needed, but.
Q. What does that mean? Does that mean that he got like an UNSAT on a check ride and needed extra SIM time or like needed extra SIM time before a check ride?
A. I would imagine it was extra SIM time before the check ride.
Q. Okay, but something in his record indicated that to you.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. But I think if he would have failed the check ride out of training, they probably would have just terminated him. So I think he probably had the problem before a check ride.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Tell me about how Hawaii Life Flight conducts partial panel training.
A. The -- usually with the EFIS, there's a composite mode and you can put both displays on one or the other. And then if you got scenario based, you know. If you lost your whole EFIS panel, what would you do? And they have the right side instruments and then the Sirius through fore-flight and the virtual -- I don't

know what they call it. But it's -- I forgot what they called it for some reason, but it's simulated terrain mapping and it's got like an ADI on it, airspeed indicator and an altimeter.

Q. It's on the iPad?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. I'm struggling to recall the name of it now too. No.

A. Yeah, it's like virtual --

Q. I know what you're talking about.

A. -- yeah. It's oh, I can't remember.

Q. Yeah, I just --

A. Synthetic vision.

Q. Thank you, yeah. Synthetic vision.

A. Synthetic vision.

Q. Yep, okay. So there's synthetic vision on the iPad.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And that's part of partial panel training?

A. Yes.

Q. To use that synthetic vision on the iPad?

A. Yeah, it's not part of the training but it's there.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. If you need it.

Q. Okay.

A. The partial training is more blackout the EFIS, look at the right side. And then the synthetic vision is unapproved but it might help you.

Q. Okay, so they're required to fly off the right-hand side instruments. Are they shooting approaches off the right-hand side?
A. No.
Q. No.
A. Right.
Q. It would just be like here, do this partial panel. Okay, recover.
A. Right.
Q. And here's your EFISs back and, okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Are you required to do partial panel checks on check rides?
A. As far as on approaches or?
Q. I don't know. You tell me. I'm curious. I'm generally -- I do not recall, so you can inform me. I don't remember.
A. Yeah, we'll simulate the EFIS failures in the composite mode of the EFIS.
Q. Okay, and do they have to fly approaches partial panel?
A. No.
Q. On approach -- or on a check ride?
A. No.
Q. No, okay.
A. Uh-uh.
Q. Okay, so it's just a partial panel, demonstrate, recover.
A. Yeah, what are you gonna do if this happens type.

Q. Okay. Is there any company policy for setting up the right-hand instruments in case you need them?
A. I can't recall.
Q. Okay.
A. I usually turn up the lights.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And make sure I have a good view of them.
Q. If you were -- if a pilot was shooting an approach and had that failure where they lose both EFISs, something caused that to fail. Autopilot's no longer engaged. What are their options at that point, shooting an approach?
A. Well at that point, they would need to regain control if they lost control of the aircraft. Personally, I would get on the right side of the airplane and let the -- let the controllers know I needed help and yeah, just go from there.
Q. Okay. So let's just imagine that we're shooting a ILS approach with Garmin, right or on autopilot. All of a sudden, two EFISs go black, autopilot kicks off. Where are we looking next?
A. You would have the copilot side HSI. You'd preset that for the ILS.
Q. Okay, and is there -- is that typical to preset that before you do the approach on the copilot side?
A. It's something that I do.
Q. Okay.
A. I can't recall if it's in the training manual though.

Q. Is it company policy or anything?
A. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay.
A. I'm not sure.
Q. You know, it's interesting to me that there's EFISs on the left-hand side and then gyros on the right-hand side. Is that remarkable to you at all?
A. Well, I don't know if it's remarkable, but I don't think it's the way they do it these days, you know. More of an old school thing. I flew the Beech 1900 for a while and we had the little peanut gyro.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. There was this big King Air and we had the third gyroscopic indicator in case of a failure in that. Apparently the company has -- is installing the Garmin 275 standby indicators in the airplanes now, which I think is a positive thing.
Q. Yeah, reduce the redundancy.
A. Yeah, and then they're converting to the Garmin 600 with the flat panels, and those also have the standby attitude indicators.
Q. After an accident like this, are you the type of person, type of pilot that likes to just push it out of your existence and just go on with your job? Or are you the type of person who's like -- tries to come up with an explanation so that you can move forward in the job that you need to do?
A. I don't know. Learn from it, if you can. If they find the

cause. And then I don't know about blowing it off or -- is that what you were asking or?

Q. I just --

A. I --

Q. -- you know, some -- there's, I feel like in these discussions there's the type of people who are like, I'm just waiting until the accident investigation comes out. I'm not even going to think about it. I'm just going to keep doing my job. But they there -- and they don't want to think about it, right?

A. Right.

Q. But then there's other people who are saying like, well I want to know what happened. I want to -- I want to give my best guess of what happened so that I can know that it's not going to happen to me. And so I feel like those are like kind of the two routes that people kind of lean. Do you identify more with one of those than the other?

A. The second, I want to know what happened --

Q. Okay.

A. -- so that it doesn't, you know.

Q. Is there a story you're telling yourself with this of like why it won't happen to you or why you feel safe to go out and fly again?

A. You know, I don't know what happened.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. But there's little like triggers that I have that I try to

keep an eye on. Like you know for me, having the right side instruments, make sure they're well lit and I don't know. That's the way I've been for a long time. Of course, I haven't flown since the accident, but that was what it was prior to that, so yeah.

Q. And you think those right-hand instruments, lighting those up, you feel like in your opinion, is that related at all to this? Is -- in the story you tell yourself?

A. I think it could be a possibility.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. I don't know what happened or -- I've tried to stay out of the rumor mill.

Q. Sure.

A. And so, and that's kind of -- I think it's a possibility.

Q. Yeah, I'm just curious. And you know, I like to ask this question because you know, there's people -- you and others that we're talking to. Like you guys have way more experience with these airplanes. You have way -- this operation, you will understand it in a way that we can never come, come in and do an investigation and understand it. You guys, you know, so sometimes there's just that, you know, something along those lines of like -- like I learned today that there was an auto -- there was a type of autopilot here that -- in heading mode it's -- it can fly off the GPS, so it can navigate off the GPS, you know? I was like, I've never heard of that before. I would have never known that,

you know. So it's little things like that like, that help going along those -- those lines, I guess. There's a -- there's one contract here where they use two pilots.

A. Yes.

Q. Are you familiar with that?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Do you ever do the check rides for the SICs?

A. No.

Q. Are you aware if they're doing 135 check rides for the SICs?

A. I believe so.

Q. Okay.

A. I think -- I'm not even sure how often but I know they do them.

Q. Okay.

A. I'd never been asked to do one.

Q. Okay. Do you know if any pilots that fly that same -- any captains, PICs that fly that same contract. If they're ever required to do their check rides with an SIC as they'll be operating, or would it always be single pilot there because they're doing their check rides?

A. I don't know.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't know because I -- I'm not a -- occasionally I get called to be a SIC on one of the flights.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. Or maybe even a PIC at time, one time at one point. But I'm kind of removed. We don't get a lot of that.
Q. Okay.
A. It is Molokai, yeah.
Q. So when you're called over to be an SIC, is there SIC training that you received?
A. No.
Q. No, it's just like because you're a captain we assume you can fly in the right-hand seat.
A. Yes.
Q. Just go be -- fulfill the contract.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Two pilots.
Q. Okay. Have you read in the, like an initial NTSB report or anywhere else on the transmissions -- the last transmissions, radio transmissions that were sent by Brian?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. One of the last things that he says. So he's -- he's flying, right? He's on vectors. He's being vectored and then he's cleared, direct, for an initial approach FIX.
A. Yes.
Q. And then it seems that he was not tracking towards that FIX as instructed. And so ATC queries him again and says, confirm your directive at initial approach FIX. And he comes back and

says something along the lines of, One-Three-Golf-Zulu is off navigation. He ends the transmission. Puts the -- push the talkback on and says, we're gonna give this a try. And that's one of his last transmissions. Would you have any idea of why he might say off navigation, like I'm off navigation, what that could possibly mean?

A. I think the only two -- you couldn't get to TAMMI with a VOR. So I think the only two things is they didn't have a NAV display or perhaps their GPS was not working. Maybe had filed or --

Q. Okay, GPS not working or failed. NAV display? What do you mean?

A. That -- the HSI.

Q. Oh.

A. If it's not displaying the GPS signal.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. That's helpful. Thank you so much. That's all I have.

BY MS. HILL:

Q. Have you ever filed a Baldwin report?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you feel like you got a satisfactory resolution from it?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you think it's an effective system?

A. I do.

Q. What about their risk assessment forms?
A. They just changed that.
Q. For better or for worse?
A. I haven't used the new one much. And I haven't had the chance to use it. I think it's a little more in-depth than the other one. Yeah, the other one took into account the weather and I think the new one -- I'm not really sure about the new one. But the -- sorry, I -- I'm not sure about the new risk assessment.
Q. Okay. No, I'm good.
MR. ETCHER: Well, you made it through. I want to thank you first of all for coming in. You've helped me. I can speak for me but I'm sure as a team you've helped us all understand a lot more, just what you do, what's required, what you see and that helps us a ton. So thank you for taking the time to come down here and talk with us. But we've asked you tons of questions. But I'm always so afraid that there's one question that man, you have in your brain that's man, if they had just asked something about this it might help shed some light. Do you have any of those in your mind that would help us that we didn't ask?
A. I can't really think of anything, to be honest.
Q. Okay.
A. I know that you probably -- I don't know what information you have on the accident, as far as any theories you might have developed. I'm sure you probably can't disclose that to me. So I might just kind of wonder, you know, what you guys -- and I know

you can't answer, so.
Q. Well you know, I'll tell you like I tell most people. A lot of times when we're doing these interviews and stuff, we all try and keep it -- I don't want to -- I don't want to use the word clinical. We don't try to come up with decisions at this point --
A. Right.
Q. -- or theories, if we can help it because that's going to skew things.
A. Right.
Q. We just want to know basic and factual information, if you will. Kind of go in with a clear mind. So I mean, we're like you. We want to know but we want to look at everything --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- from a clear, unbiased viewpoint.
A. Right.
Q. So that's why we try not to come in with too many theories going.
A. Yeah.
Q. I mean, sometimes there's things that pop up. It's like oh, let's ask about this. And that's why we interview people. Helps us understand.
A. Do you know if they were able to get the photos and the CVR? Was that readable or?
Q. It is in our lab, that I do know. So I don't know a whole lot of details off of that. But I do know it's in our lab. But

because it was in the water for so long, there's a whole process our lab has to go through.

A. Right.

Q. They don't go through that process and -- may not have good data ever, so I'm not sure how long that all takes. But I do know they have got it at the lab.

A. I think maybe that would be the only questions that I had would be -- yeah.

Q. And hopefully as this investigation goes on we can start putting that all together. And then of course, when the final comes out that all, you know, that will come out, all of that will come out as well. So hopefully that will add a lot of closure and clear up a lot of, you know. I don't want to say confusions, but questions you all have.

A. Right.

Q. All right?

A. Okay.

Q. Anything else?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Well, then I will call this interview concluded. It's 17:09 local. And again, thank you so much.

A. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 5:09 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022 Interview of Edward Cavanaugh
ACCIDENT NO.:	ANC23FA008
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Suzanne Ventura
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*
	*
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL	*
ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII	* Accident No.: ANC23FA008
ON DECEMBER 15, 2022	*
	*

Interview of: JOHN HARVEY, Pilot

Hawaii Life Flight

Maui, Hawaii

Tuesday
February 14, 2023

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SABRINA WOODS, Ph. D, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MILLICENT HILL, Investigator-In-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

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Federal Aviation Administration

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I N T E R V I E W

(8:12 a.m.)

MR. ETCHER: Good morning. Again, my name is Shawn Etcher. I'm with the NTSB. I'm what they call an Operational Factors Investigator, which all that means is I kind of look at everything that -- pilot related, interact with the pilot, kind of everything forward with the cockpit door, if you will. So I'm hoping you'll be able to educate me a little bit on the procedures here and the aircraft and everything because I know you've got experience with it.

MR. HARVEY: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: So I appreciate you coming in. Like I said, we're just here to learn. And typically as we do investigations, we invite parties. In this case we have the FAA with us. They're here to help us. They're subject matter experts as well, just to help us make sure we look at everything and we don't overlook something because we want to learn and figure this out.

MR. HARVEY: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Now, we're also going to be recording this interview. Is that okay with you if we record the interview and have it transcribed?

MR. HARVEY: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: And then just so you're aware, that transcript will become part of the public docket later on when this case closes, but then it's an accurate representation. It's a verbatim

transcript of what you said. So once we get the transcript back, we as a group will go over it to make sure there's no typos in there. We don't change anything you say. And then they'll certify it to make sure it's correct because it's easier for them -- it's easier for us to make sure all the acronyms or anything you said isn't misspelled, names misspelled and things. Then they'll certify it.

MR. HARVEY: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Just so you know, we will not change anything you said. As per the regulations, you are entitled to have a representative here with you. Do you wish not to have one?

MR. HARVEY: I wish not to have one.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. That was kind of a bad, poor choice question, wasn't it? I need coffee obviously. Just a few ground rules for you. During this interview process, if there's a question you don't understand, just ask. This isn't a check ride, nothing like that because you -- I guarantee you if you give me an answer that I don't quite understand, I'm going to ask. So it's a two way street here.

MR. HARVEY: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: If you need a break, just say so. We'll push pause, take breaks, whatever you need. All righty?

MR. HARVEY: Sure.

MR. ETCHER: All right. So does anyone else have any questions before we get started? All righty.

INTERVIEW OF JOHN HARVEY

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. I always start with the really tough questions first.

A. Okay.

Q. Can you please give us your full name and spell your last?

A. John Robert Harvey, H-a-r-v-e-y.

Q. And how old are you?

A. I am 57.

Q. What is your job title?

A. Pilot for Hawaii Life Flight.

Q. Okay. And pilot in the King Air?

A. King Air.

Q. Okay.

A. C90, yes.

Q. All righty. How long have you worked at Hawaii Life Flight?

A. Coming up on three and a half years.

Q. Okay.

A. Just coming up on -- almost four.

Q. Almost four?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Congratulations. That's a long time to -- anymore it seems like.

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. What kind of airman certificates and ratings do you currently hold?

A. I have an ATP. I have a CFI, CFI-I, MEI, an A and P.
Q. All righty.
A. IA, I had an IA, no more.
Q. You had, but not current?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Have you ever been a check airman or a flight instructor?
A. No.
Q. Here at Hawaii Flight, I know you have a CFI, so I want to make sure it's --
A. No, not at Hawaii Flight, no.
Q. Okay. Just kind of ballparking. This is where the really tough questions are. Your total time. Do you have an idea how much total time you have?
A. A little over 20,000 hours.
Q. Wow. That's impressive. How many do you have in the King Air? A ballpark?
A. King Air, I would say I have about 2,000.
Q. Okay. And just for our understanding, the King Air is single pilot ops for you guys or is it --
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Have you ever been involved in an accident or an incident before?
A. No.
Q. All right. With that many hours, that's a great feat. So

well done. Can you kind of give me a nice CliffsNotes version, if you will, of your aviation history? Kind of just so we get to know you as your pilot experience.

A. Okay. I joined the Air Force out of high school. I was a mechanic, helicopter mechanic. And I went to Amarillo and I got A and P. And I worked as a mechanic for about ten years and I -- then I got my pilot's license when I was 30 years old and I've been flying since then.

Q. Okay. Excellent. Kind of get a little bit into the structure here, if you will, of Hawaii Life Flight. Where are you based?

A. Here in Maui.

Q. Here in Maui. Is that where the headquarters is for Hawaii Life Flight?

A. No, it's -- well, it's in Honolulu.

Q. Honolulu?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So how do you -- how does that work within Hawaii Life Flight? If you have an issue out here in Maui, but the headquarters is in Honolulu, how does -- how do you guys communicate with headquarters or do you often?

A. Yeah, well, every day. Yeah, we have, you know, ops. You know, a dispatcher and we just call them if we have any problems. All will call maintenance and -- or I call Assistant Chief Pilot Kaleo or I'd call PMOC, which is the pilot manager on call. It's

either him or somebody on the mainland.
Q. Okay. How would you categorize staffing with Hawaii Life Flight?
A. How do you mean?
Q. Do you feel like they have enough staff to operate what they're doing? Do you guys feel overworked or -- I know most Government people say we're overworked and underpaid. But, you know, for you guys, you --
A. We've been --
Q. Do you have to work a lot of days off?
A. I think we have enough. I mean, we're short pilots on some of the bases and I think we have enough maintenance people now. I think we have enough people around.
Q. Okay. I'm curious, you said you have enough maintenance people?
A. Well, they brought a bunch in from the mainland because they've been working on the aircraft by the --
Q. Okay. When did they do that? Do you remember?
A. Probably, I guess, the end of December maybe. I don't know. That's -- they do that in, you know, in Honolulu. And I haven't been there that much.
Q. So in Maui, you don't have a mechanic based here in Maui?
A. I don't have a mechanic, no.
Q. So --
A. There's a contract guy.

Q. Okay.
A. It's occasionally they can call and do some things. Sometimes he's here.
Q. Okay. So kind of walk me through that, if you will. If you have a mechanical issue, how do you deal with that? Being out here, if you come out into the airplane here in Maui and you have a mechanical issue, how do you guys deal with getting that fixed or addressed?
A. I usually call dispatch and they'll have -- call maintenance. And I'll either call -- they'll have me call maintenance or they'll do that. And I usually talk to a mechanic that's in Honolulu. And then we talk what the problem is. And they say they write it up or, you know, they may defer it or they might have to ferry it back to Honolulu. But a lot of times they'll fly a mechanic out here to fix the problem.
Q. Okay.
A. It might take a little while though.
Q. I'm sorry, say that again?
A. It might take a little while for them to get one out, but.
Q. Okay. So forgive me, but I don't want to assume anything. Kind of walk me through a day in the life, if you will, of working here at Hawaii Life Flight.
A. Okay.
Q. Or is there any kind of typical?
A. There's a typical day. Some days are very busy. Some days

there's -- nothing happens.
Q. Okay. So how long do you normally -- how long are your shifts?
A. They're 12 hours.
Q. And what is -- do they usually start and stop?
A. We do a week on, a week of days, a week of nights. Start 5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. and the night starts at 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m.
Q. Okay. And during that 12 hours, kind of walk me through that you're on. What happens? Is -- do you just come in and sleep in the crew bunks or are you going the whole time?
A. No. No, usually I'm at home.
Q. Sorry about that.
A. Yeah, it's all right.
Q. My computer.
A. Yeah, I'm usually home in the -- if I work a dayshift in the morning I'll get up about 5:00 and I'll call dispatch and I'll just check in and I'll see. They'll tell me what aircraft I have, what medical crew I have. If there's a fly -- if they had any flights last night or not. And then I'll come in in the morning and I'll preflight the airplane and do the -- transcribe the logbook if they had a flight in the last 24 hours. And then I go and do other things. I go home or do, you know, until I get a flight.
Q. Oh, so you don't have to stay at a --

A. No.
Q. -- here at the airport?
A. No. No.
Q. Okay.
A. I have to -- should be within 20 minutes, 20 to 30 minutes of the airplane.
Q. Okay. So do they call you when there's a flight that comes up, I assume?
A. Well, it used to be, before this happened, I just got texts and I just would respond to the texts saying okay or, you know, if I'm not -- what was I going to say? But now I guess they call you and I check the weather to where we're going and accept the flights. And then I talk to the medical crew to say it's okay.
Q. Do they have any guidelines for you? If once you get notified that you have a flight and something comes up, I assume it is all -- just comes up. Nothing's prescheduled, right?
A. No, nothing's prescheduled.
Q. Something comes up. Do they have a timeline, like, from the time we notify you, you need to have the airplane in the air by X amount of time?
A. No.
Q. No.
A. No.
Q. Okay. Does the medic crew stay at the airport all day or do they go do whatever --

A. No, they either live here in Maui, if they're going to stay at their house or they stay at the crew house, which is in Wailuku.
Q. Okay.
A. About 20 minutes away.
Q. Okay. So kind of dig in just a little bit. Let's say you get assigned. They call you and say hey, we need you to fly from point A to point B.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Yeah, you pick whatever airport you want. Walk me through from what you do. What's expected or if there's something you do maybe a little different. Kind of walk me through what to do until the plane gets airborne.
A. Okay. Well, if I get a flight, I usually check to weather to see what the weather is at the destination. And I know what it is here. I kind of look, it's good here. And then I drive to the airport, pre-flight the aircrafts, file flight plans, do the -- start the flight duty track, the flight duty log on the website. And file -- you know, and check NOTAMs and all that stuff.
Q. Okay.
A. And then wait for the crew.
Q. Okay. You said you file a flight plan or you have a dispatch that does that?
A. I file a flight plan.
Q. You file it?

A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Is it usually IFR, VFR, company VFR?
A. Oh, we always file IFR flight plans.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you have to do any kind of an assessment of you, of the route, of the airport before you take off? Like a risk assessment or --
A. Yeah, they have a risk assessment, yeah.
Q. So how do you -- what kind of questions does that ask you?
A. So they got a new one out. And it'll ask you the weather, the mechanical problems with the aircraft, how you're feeling.
Q. Okay.
A. How many flights you've done.
Q. So you do the risk assessment form. Is it paper based, computer based?
A. It's all computer.
Q. It's all computer? Does that go anywhere, do you know?
A. I don't know.
Q. I --
A. I just don't know.
Q. I don't either. That's why I figured I'd ask.
A. Yeah.
Q. So it's okay if you don't know.
A. Yeah.

Q. I don't know is always a great answer if you don't. Okay. Let's say you come in, pre-flight the airplane and something's wrong with it or you have a problem with the day or, you know you have some kind of a concern.
A. Okay.
Q. How do you communicate that to -- I believe you said you have an assistant chief pilot out here or a chief pilot?
A. Assistant chief pilot, yes.
Q. How do you communicate that to your chain of command of your concerns?
A. I just give him a call.
Q. Is it only verbally or do they have a process you can write up, document it?
A. Well, I guess that's probably what the problem is.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. I know everything's --
A. You're talking about maybe -- or something wrong? What are you asking exactly?
Q. You're right. That's a -- thank you for the clarification.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So if you find something wrong with the airplane --
A. Well, yeah, yeah.
Q. You already walked that through.
A. Yeah, I'll write it up on the log book.

Q. But let's say you're -- you were supposed to fly from here to another airport and you noticed there's a NOTAM for that airport and the runway might be too short. So you got a concern about it. Whatever. I have no idea.

A. Yeah.

Q. How would you address that? How would you get the powers that be to know?

A. I would tell just the runway's too short, we can't go.

Q. And it's okay?

A. Yeah.

Q. There's no push?

A. Yeah.

Q. There's no --

A. Yeah, that's pretty much it.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. What if you had an issue with another crew member, you know, one of your other crew, you flew with him a week ago and you guys kind of got in a spat, I don't know.

A. Okay.

Q. What do you do? Is there -- and you have a concern about working with them again. Is there anything you can do?

A. I don't know. I've never had that problem.

Q. Okay.

A. So I'm not sure.

Q. Well, that's good then.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. All righty. Do they ever give you any problems for not taking a flight?
A. No.
Q Any -- I don't want problems. That's a bad word.
A. Yeah.
Q. My apologies. Do they ever -- you know, try and push you to take a flight?
A. No.
Q. Okay. If you say no, it's no?
A. Yeah.
Q. Can your other crew say no to a flight?
A. Yes.
Q. Have they?
A. [No audible response].
Q. That you're aware of.
A. Medical crew, I have not -- no, they've never said no to a flight.
Q. Okay. Have you?
A. Yes, oh yeah, for weather.
Q. Oh, for weather?
A. Yeah.
Q. I mean, that's -- any other reasonings that you would say no?
A. No.

Q. No. Okay. If I asked you to kind of -- I had to say classify your work environment, but that's the best words I have. You know, your communication with upper management, with other workers and everything. Is it a friendly environment? Is it more hostile? Is there --

A. It's friendly.

Q. It is?

A. Yeah.

Q. All the way above you and with those that work with you?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. No problem.

Q. All righty. Let's start kind of getting into the event just a little bit if you will.

A. Okay.

Q. Have you ever -- I assume, and again, forgive me for assuming, but you've probably done that flight that the accident flight occurred on?

A. Many, many times.

Q. Okay. Any concerns on that route flight or going to to that area? Has there been anything that you --

A. The only concern I would say -- so if you fly that route, when you get to ONOHI you sometimes lose radio, ATC. It's a little scratchy. But then you pick it back up as soon as you turn south.

Q. Okay.
A. And they know that. It happens all the time. It's like a little dead zone there.
Q. Okay.
A. Waimea Airport itself can have bad weather a lot. And there's just, you know, RNAV approach usually we do. That's about it.
Q. Okay. When you're flying, what's your technique of flying? Do you hand fly a lot? Do you autopilot? Does it have an autopilot? Maybe I should --
A. It has an autopilot, yeah. Yes. Yes, it has to. We can fly single pilot with an autopilot. I am -- I had fly sometimes to a couple thousand feet and then the autopilot on. Sometimes I'll turn it on right, you know, 500 feet, 600, you know, after takeoff. It depends on how I'm feeling or what's happening or how busy I am.
Q. Okay.
A. Sometimes I have the autopilot fly the approach down to, you know, 500 feet or so. A lot of times -- sometimes I'll hand fly it. But there are cruise that are -- you know, 99 percent of the time, I have, you know, autopilot's flying.
Q. Okay. When would it not? When is that one percent of the time that it would not fly in cruise?
A. If it's -- the one percent, sometimes it doesn't -- over-shoots the turn on an airway or something and I'll have to take

over and turn a little bit. That's about it.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. All right.
A. I don't want to, you know, way overshoot. And it does that, you know. It won't -- capture our turn quick enough.
Q. Okay. All right. When you had fly it, has there ever been any issues you'd had engaging the autopilot after hand flying it or is it pretty -- is it a pretty easy working autopilot in your words?
A. It's pretty -- easy to work it.
Q. Okay.
A. Had no issues.
Q. All right. Have you ever had any issues with the airplane, that -- the accident airplane? Do you ever recall? I know -- I believe you might have been one that flew it more recently.
A. That particular airplane -- yeah, we fly so many different airplanes, we've got, you know, nine. I think nine out here now. Well, actually, we're down to seven. So it's hard to remember which airplane was which because they're all about the same. I don't remember anything in particular in that aircraft that I've had big issues with, no.
Q. Okay. Do -- have you ever had any -- we'll use big issues. We'll use your words. Have you ever had any big issues with any of the airplanes that -- and if so, maybe not airplanes

specifically, but kind of what comes to mind of some of your big issues?

A. I have not, no. I've not really had any huge issues, no. I mean, I've had minor things that have been written up. I've not taken an aircraft because of problems, you know, during pre-flights or during flights, you know. Leaking brakes or dead battery. A few of those. But no, I've not really had any major issues up there really.

Q. Okay. Okay. And forgive me, I'm hoping you can kind of educate me more than even than you have already. What kind of audible alerts does the airplane provide you? Like autopilot, does it have an audible alert for the autopilot?

A. Yeah, it has it. It's a, you know, it's a noise when it comes -- when it disengages.

Q. Is it like a buzz, a --

A. Like a -- yeah. Well, I don't know what you call, like chirp.

Q. Okay.

A. Okay. Something. Yeah.

Q. Kind of a chirp?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. How about altitude alerts, does it have --

A. It has an altitude alert to 1,000 prior and it goes up 300 feet prior and in descending or climbing to the altitude, the preset altitude, yeah.

Q. Okay. If you leave an -- if you capture your altitude and then you leave your altitude inadvertently, like you're hand flying or whatever and you descend, does it alert when you go outside of a certain tolerance?
A. Yeah, I think about 300 feet as well.
Q. Okay.
A. I'm not 100 percent sure.
Q. Yeah.
A. If it was.
Q. I appreciate it.
A. Yeah.
Q. Because I'm not 100 percent sure every -- your plane's a little different.
A. Yeah.
Q. So I always like to know what you got here. Has it ever -- does it have any noises that it makes when it captures a navigation route or anything like that?
A. Uh-uh.
Q. Okay. All righty. For a moment let's talk about the medic crew. When they're -- when you're flying with them, where do they normally sit or do they sit in the front with you?
A. No, they normally sit in the back. They have different seat configurations on different aircrafts, so it depends. And they usually -- their seats on the right side facing backwards. There's one there and one maybe farther in the back on the --

there's either a bench seat or another seat in the back.
Q. Okay. Do they ever lay out on the gurney? Just --
A. Yeah.
Q. Does that happen often in flight, takeoff, landing?
A. No, no. In flight, you know, I think they'll go back, you know. Especially late at night or (indiscernible) or something.
Q. How long is that flight from here to there? How long is that typically? Is it, like, 20, 30 minutes?
A. About 30 minutes.
Q. Okay.
A. It depends how you do the approach or not.
Q. Okay.
A. Shave off about five, six minutes if you, you know, just do a visual.
Q. Right.
A. And --
Q. Okay. For a moment let's talk VFR then since you brought up visual. I had something come into my brain. That area from the time you leave the south of the island here, there's, you know, the water space.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. I'm going to call it south. Sorry, I'm directionally challenged today. There's water, obviously, between the islands. Is that challenging to -- hand fly, you know, dark night? If it's at night, for instance, moonless, clear?

A. I guess it could be, yeah.
Q. Okay. Have you ever felt any issues? You know, has it given you any moments where you're like, wait, what's going on. Okay. I --
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. There is two intersections. There's ONOHI and there's another one right next to it. And if you don't put it in the FMS correctly, you'll fly the different -- the wrong one. So you got to check that. But they're pretty much preprogramed, the routes are. And if you use those. Some people don't use them. They just put them all in themselves. Just making sure that's not in there.
Q. So let's talk a little bit about that.
A. ONOHI and BARBY (ph.) is the two, two intersections right next to each other.
Q. Okay. So what does it do if it's put it in incorrectly or it reads it wrong or whatever you said? I apologize.
A. I think it will fly ONOHI to BARBY and then turn around and go back to ONOHI if you did that. If you had two ONOHI's in there.
Q. Oh, okay. So has it got an extra ONOHI?
A. Depends how you put it in the FMS, it could.
Q. Oh, okay. And that's the company route or is that people who preprogramed, you know, manually program?

A. Some may preprogram I think, but it might happen.
Q. Okay. Yeah, I'm sorry, I said preprogramed. People that manually program?
A. They're -- I think one of the aircrafts one time had -- a company or somebody had put it in there and it had both and you had to delete one of those for it to work right.
Q. Okay.
A. And I think that was fixed -- years ago.
Q. Okay.
A. I do remember that. That was one of the things I thought about that's happened, but.
Q. Okay.
A. But I don't think that's where it happened. I think it was south of that really.
Q. Right. No, it's just something I --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- wanted to get a little clearer in my mind, so I appreciate that. Let's talk a little bit again about the airplane. Did you know it has a video recording device?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Do they use that to -- do you know what they use that for?
A. I figure they just point it at the engine instruments and, yeah, I don't know. They'll check it. I don't know what they do.
Q. Okay.
A. Honestly. Yeah, I don't know what they do with it.

Q. No. No, worries. I wasn't sure. Some companies might use that to send out information to crews. Like, hey, we're noticing people doing something.

A. Yeah.

Q. Try and do that. Nothing that you're aware of. Okay. Do you know how often they pull the data out?

A. It --

Q. I know, you're not the mechanic, right. So --

A. I have no idea.

Q Okay. Perfect. How would you classify training? When you came on and even your recurrent training here, was it adequate? Is it just --

A. I think it's adequate, yeah.

Q. It gives you the information you need?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Helps you understand. Do they teach you anything knew during recurrent?

A. Yeah.

Q. Can you give me, like, just an example maybe?

A. Geez.

Q. Yeah, I know. It's always -- you know, when you say that I always ask for examples, so my apologies.

A. Well, I don't know. I can't think of it. Yeah, some obscure, this happens, this will happen, on and on and on. I can't remember anything specific right now, no.

Q. Okay.
A. But I do remember, like, oh, okay, you know. I'm going to -- you know, I think I had recurring. It was online last July. There was something there I remember that was -- I never heard before, but I don't remember what it was.
Q. That was last July.
A. Yeah.
Q. so we'll give you a by on that one. Yeah. Do you ever get any training in engine failures?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. In the airplane or they do it in a simulator or, I'm sorry, a --
A. Well, they have a simulator here in -- in Honolulu. And the last time we did it here in Honolulu.
Q. Okay.
A. We do quite a few (indiscernible). Yeah. And we practice then -- we do the check rides twice a year, you know, every six months and we do engine failures, single engine failures in the aircraft.
Q. And they do it in the aircraft?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay. How about unusual attitudes or spatial --
A. We do those.
Q. -- disorientation training?
A. Yeah. Uh-huh.

Q. How do they do that?
A. Well, in the aircraft they'll just put you in and, you know, do the attitude and then recover it.
Q. Okay. Is that easy enough to do? Is it -- has it given you challenges? Do they do it daytime or nighttime?
A. Daytime.
Q. Daytime. VFR or IFR?
A. VFR.
Q. Okay. Kind of walk me through if you're in an unusual attitude, what's your procedures or what do you do to get out of an unusual?
A. Well, I just set course. You're descending. We do some throttle, level wings, pull up. If you're in a high -- you know, nose high, you add power, push your nose down, level wings.
Q. All right. All right. Let's talk a little bit if we can about Brian.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You were based with him. How long were you at the same base with him?
A. About three years.
Q. Oh, so --
A. Since he started here, yeah.
Q. Okay. Do you guys interact at all outside of work?
A. A little bit.
Q. Okay. What was he like as a pilot? I mean, I assume you

never flew with him or did you ever fly with him?
A. I don't think I ever flew with him, no.
Q. Was there ever any complaints that you've heard from other crews?
A. No.
Q. Okay. What did he -- did he have a normal habit he did when he worked? Did he just come in, do his job, go home, rest? Come --
A. He was opposite shift than me, so I'm not sure what he did when he was working.
Q. Okay. You guys always worked opposite or --
A. No, when he first started he wasn't and they swapped us around about two years ago and we were opposite shifts.
Q. Okay. Was there a reason you got swapped?
A. There was another pilot that came on and they wanted to work the pilot in I guess.
Q. Okay. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Could somebody refuse to fly? You know, like -- do you guys have a -- I don't know. Maybe you guys don't have anything, but like a no fly list? Like certain crews will not fly with each other?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. There might be some people that do that. I don't know.

Q. Oh, nothing you've heard? Okay. And you said he lived here in Maui?
A. Yeah.
Q. So he'd go home? He didn't go to the crew house or whatever?
A. Yeah, he lived in Wailuku.
Q. Okay. Outside of work, did you -- I know you said you guys hung out some together.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Maybe not a lot. Was he more of an outdoorsy person?
A. Yeah, very outdoorsy, yeah.
Q. Okay. All righty. I got one more question and then I'll pass it off to Sabrina because you've got to be tired of looking at me.
A. I'm fine.
Q. And she asks really --
A. I am a little bit --
Q. -- nice questions, so.
A. Oh, I just got back from Vietnam and I'm, like, the complete opposite, huge jetlag right now.
Q. Oh, I can imagine. I know the feeling, so.
A. Yeah.
Q. Has Brian ever been written up by anybody that you're aware of?
A. No.
MR. ETCHER: No. Okay. Like I said, I was going to ask that

one question and then I'm going to pass it off to Sabrina because --

DR. WOODS: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: -- she probably has really smart questions.

DR. WOODS: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Unless you need a break?

MR. HARVEY: I'm fine.

MR. ETCHER: You're fine? Okay. Sabrina?

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. Hi, John. So I'm Sabrina Woods. I'm the Human Performance Investigator on this accident.

A. Yeah.

Q. And so my job is kind of determining those relationships. So like man/man interface, which is just how people get along with other people. Man/machine interfaces, which is, like, I've got this aircraft, it's doing this thing. That am I going. And then man environment. And by environment we mean, like, your operating environment, your -- the company that you work for, the policies that are in place and things like that.

So some of the questions I have, I want to follow up on a couple of questions that Shawn has asked. But to continue this vein, since you're already thinking about just kind of interactions. We've kind of got a high level understanding of how well you knew Brian. But can you describe in your own words, like, what was his personality like?

A. Oh, he was very happy. Yeah, active. Extremely friendly. Everybody liked him as far as I knew. I didn't know anybody that didn't like him.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Yeah, we got along really well.
Q. Okay. So I guess what was your first impression? Is that the same as him as a person?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What are your first impressions of him as a pilot?
A. I don't really know. I never flew with him.
Q. Okay.
A. To be honest. I mean, I think he flew helicopters and airplanes. I figured he's a pretty good pilot if he can do, you know, both of those.
Q. Uh-huh. Did he ever, like, complain to you about, like, the difference in flying between helicopters and fixed wing or anything like that?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. No.
Q. Did he ever complain to you about just the nature of the business that is, like, being on call, your 12 hour shifts, one week/one off, that sort of thing?
A. No. No, he didn't. Yeah, I think he really liked it, the schedule.

Q. Uh-huh. What about the operating environment? And I actually do mean environment in that sense and, like, just kind of operating here among the islands? Did he ever express any concerns or --

A. No, he liked Hawaii. I mean, he lived in Kauai for a long time and yeah, he -- I mean, he liked Hawaii, so he came back out here.

Q. Came back out here. Do you know where he was before?

A. I think it was Florida.

Q. Okay. Doing something similar or do you know?

A. I think he was a pilot in Florida. I'm not sure exactly what he did in Florida.

Q. Okay. And as far as, you know, personality friendly, sociable, that sort. And presumably got along okay with -- everyone?

A. Yeah, everybody loved him. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And so when you guys are paired with your crews, is it always the same crews in and out or is there -- kind of like, how, you know, in the part 121 world, crews will match up. They may never see that guy again for another year.

A. Yeah, sure. Yeah, we have the Maui based crews and we usually fly with them. And we switch around. There's people that come in. There's float, medical people too come in and go out. We've got a few -- a bunch of new ones in right now, I mean, from the mainland just to help out. But --

Q. So are they, like, seasonal? Do they rotate in and then rotate back out?
A. A lot of -- yeah, they'll come in and leave and go. I mean, we do rotate through medical crew.
Q. Okay.
A. But we have a lot of the same ones that have been here for a while.
Q. Okay. You talked a little bit earlier about kind of like your go/no go process, essentially like your risk assessment process.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. How involved do those crews, and by this I mean the medical crews. How involved are they in that risk assessment process?
A. They're not.
Q. At all?
A. Not really.
Q. So they don't get a say?
A. Do they do their own risk assessment.
Q. Oh, okay. Is it on the same platform that you do?
A. I don't even know whether it's totally different than ours.
Q. Okay.
A. So yeah.
Q. Well, that's okay. We'll --
A. And I'm not sure what they use. They have their own everything, all their --

Q. So I guess what happens if there's a disconnect in those two mutual risk assessments? Like, what if the medical crew is, like, no, we're not into this, but your assessment is fine?
A. Yeah, they -- I mean, they -- that can happen. I've heard that happening where they decided they can't go for some reason, they don't feel safe.
Q. So how do you seek resolution?
A. In what way? If they don't feel safe, we don't go. That's the resolution I think.
Q. Okay. That's what I was like, it's perfect.
A. Yeah.
Q. No, that's --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- exactly what I was looking for.
A. Yeah.
Q. Like, if something is, you know, is a no go in this instance, you know, what happens next. And then I guess who do you -- then who do you notify when that happens?
A. I would go ahead and notify dispatch first and then I'd probably call the PMOC.
Q. Okay.
A. Flight manager on call.
Q. Okay. So going back to kind of that, again, that no/no go list for maintenance. You had talked about you -- there's not really any maintainers here. They're all in Honolulu.

A. Uh-huh.
Q. Maybe they'll fly somebody out, but wouldn't that take a long time? Do you just -- I guess what do you do with the aircraft then at that point?
A. It just sits in here. It stays here.
Q. Okay. And you just move to another aircraft?
A. No. No, usually they'll fly -- if it's -- if the aircraft is broken here, they'll send another island, another crew, another aircraft --
Q. Oh, I see.
A. -- over here to pick the patient up or who knew -- whatever the mission is, they'll send somebody else.
Q. Okay.
A. And then we'll just wait for them. You know, then they'll fly somebody out on one of our crafts or they'll put them on commercial airlines and fly them out here.
Q. How many aircrafts are actually here in Maui?
A. One.
Q. Oh, okay. Okay.
A. And none right now.
Q. And then total, you said there were nine.
A. There were nine.
Q. We know what happened to one of them. What's -- where's the others?
A. The two of the A models are -- they don't fly them anymore.

They took them offline.
Q. Do you know why?
A. Really old. They sold them, I think. The -- we had a meeting yesterday and they said they just sold them.
Q. Yeah. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So also back to the flight risk assessment. You said something interesting. You said, well, the new way is.
A. Yeah.
Q. Which leads me to believe there's an old way.
A. The old one was just a very simple -- actually, I thought it was way better because it was basically simple, you know, number system that, you know, have -- that you did and just gave a number. You know, now it's this long thing.
Q. When did it change?
A. About three or four months ago.
Q. Okay. So three, four months ago, so approximately, like, November timeframe or --
A. I think so, yeah. Beginning of November maybe.
Q. Okay. And was that previous numbering process, was that also automated online or --
A. No. No.
Q. -- was it a paper?
A. It was just on paper. Or yeah, it was online. You know, you could find it online or on there, so it was the GOM.

Q. And then where was it kept if it's on paper? Who does it go to?
A. It was just given -- so you would put that number on your flight duty tracker, which is the website. You would put that number in there. And you would tell dispatch -- so when we got a flight in, before we left we'd tell dispatch, you know, that -- we'd give them, like, our flight plan, our -- routing and our, you know, all the information and that number. We'd give them that number. We still do that. We just give them the number.
Q. Okay.
A. Risk is four or whatever, we'd tell them.
Q. And I get if you don't know the answer to this, but is there archival process? How long do you keep these flight information on file? How long does the company keep it?
A. I'm not sure. It's -- I think I can go back to when I started and it's still there.
Q. Okay.
A. I think.
Q. So you can go back and look up old missions --
A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- and go like, oh, that's what I did?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay. So this is your own words. This is -- I'm not looking for the company answer. This is, like, the world according to John.

A. Okay.
Q. Describe for me what you would consider -- well, describe for me safety culture in your own words.
A. Safety culture? Here at Hawaii Life Flight or just --
Q. World according to John.
A. According to John.
Q. What's safety culture, specific to aviation though?
A. Yeah. Wow, that's a tough one. I'm not really that great at doing something, describing things like this because it's kind of an abstract thing, you know. I think safety culture is just how -- people being safe, I guess. You know, feeling what's safe to do and what's not and making their own decisions about what to do in certain situations.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And in that decision making process, I guess, what if somebody has a different opinion? In your perfect safety culture, then what would happen?
A. Then a different opinion than who?
Q. The -- so you said people making safe decisions.
A. Yeah.
Q. so let's say you have made a safe decision that -- I'm looking out there. The weather, I'm not feeling the weather.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. I don't think it's safe to fly. But you have an

organization, right, that you work for and obviously that organization is in the interest of doing business and maybe they're of the opinion that you should fly. In your world, in your safety culture, what happens next?

A. We don't fly. I don't fly. Yeah. No, they don't push. They push us to fly.

Q. Yeah.

A. No.

Q. Okay. So that is actually the next question is.

A. Yeah.

Q. I wanted you to have a good idea of what you think it should be first and then now --

A. Yeah, I mean --

Q. -- explain to me, like, Hawaii Life Flight, what's their safety culture like?

A. I think it's pretty good. I mean, they're very safe and they -- yeah, they don't push us to do flights. And then we tell them, you know, hey, the weather looks bad. Even if it's above minimums for the approach or something, at some airports, like Waimea, because even -- Waimea is one of those places that if it's just -- you know, if it's above mins, but still is probably not -- you probably still won't be able to get in because of the way the, you know, the approach is and the visibility. And so like I said, if it looks even remotely bad, I'll say no, I'm not going to go because it's not -- some pilots will go. You know, they're more

-- I think the pilots based in Waimea, yeah, they go there a lot and they feel more comfortable going there.

Q. Yeah. It -- does Hawaii Life Flight provide any sort of policy on that for you or do they leave it up to the pilot discretion?

A. No, it's the pilot.

Q. Okay. So a little bit of empowerment there.

A. Yeah.

Q. So what's the thing that you like the most about the company?

A. The company itself or job?

Q. Uh-huh. The job, sorry.

A. I just like being at home and not having to commute to places. Being on call and then being able to stay at home while I'm working.

Q. Uh-huh. And if there's something that you're frustrated about or the thing you like the least about the job, what would that be?

A. The least about the job? I suppose working the nightshift. If we get a call at 2:00 in the morning, I don't really like that that much. But I still do it.

Q. Yeah.

A. It's the late night flights I don't like the most.

Q. Yeah.

A. Anything past --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- like, 1:00 I don't care for.
Q. So now let's go with the actual company. So that was the job. So now we're pivoting back to the company. What's the thing that you like most about the company?
A. The people.
Q. Okay.
A. I like working there. They're very nice. I get along with them. The management's good, yeah.
Q. So again, frustrated, like the least about the company?
A. I just don't -- I don't know. The -- yeah, I don't really -- I can't think of anything, honestly.
Q. That's fine. That's okay.
A. No.
Q. Sometimes there's always --
A. Like this --
Q. -- like that one little thing that gets us.
A. Yeah.
Q. That we're like, man, this place would be perfect if only XYZ happened. There's nothing like that?
A. I can't think of anything.
Q. Okay. Okay. No problem.
A. Sorry.
Q. No, you're fine. No, again, this is kind of the world according to you.
A. Yeah.

Q. And it helps us because, you know, we don't work here.
A. Yeah.
Q. So it's good to help inform us about what's going on. Can you give me a high level, like, understanding about, like, quality, pilot quality control in this instance? Do you have quality control checks? Do you have feedback checks, feedback forms from stakeholders or customers? Or is there anything like that in your process?
A. From?
Q. So quality control, which is performance.
A. Yeah.
Q. So I guess give me a high level of what that entails on a yearly basis?
A. Quality control for?
Q. Pilot performance.
A. Pilot performance?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Oh, we get eval every year.
Q. Okay.
A. It tells, you know -- they go through a list of things and say you're doing this fine and you're doing this fine and that's about it. It's usually on the phone.
Q. It's usually on the phone. Okay.
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. So I guess if there's something that isn't fine, how does

that get rectified?
A. I guess they'd tell you.
Q. You -- I guess you -- let's backtrack.
A. Okay.
Q. That's a perfectly good segue actually.
A. Yeah.
Q. Has that ever happened to you?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Has that ever happened to anybody else you know of?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. That -- yeah, nobody tells me what's happened.
Q. Okay.
A. It's a very -- it's very isolated here. I mean, we -- I don't work with any other pilots usually. I don't really -- you know, I mean, I talk to them or text them on the phone.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. I don't really see them that much.
Q. So you do get an opportunity for, like, those watercooler chats about, like, hey, this is what's going on?
A. Yeah, but that doesn't really happen much.
Q. Is there a lot of pathways for communication, like, from Honolulu to you or even from --
A. Well, just most --
Q. -- Guardian to you?

A. Yeah, a lot of emails. We get a lot of emails.
Q. Okay. And that's your primary form then --
A. Yes.
Q. -- I guess of communications?
A. Yes.
Q. It's emails. Okay. Do you ever -- do you ever have, like, safety down days or a day just dedicated to talking about safety issues across the parent company?
A. Not since I've been here, no.
Q. Okay. So to double back then, after this accident occurred, was there any sort of safety down day?
A. Well, yeah, they shut everything down.
Q. Okay.
A. A while.
Q. And what kind of conversations happened then?
A. They just asked how we were doing, how are we feeling.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. If we were okay mentally.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And what -- by they, who do you mean exactly?
A. Management, chief pilots. Yeah.
Q. Good. That's good that they're checking in.
A. Yeah.
Q. And when did you, I guess, start back up business after the

accident occurred? Do you know?
A. They started Honolulu -- because I've been on vacation the last two and a half weeks, so I haven't really worked. Before that, I was the -- two weeks before that I was working. We had a plane. I was very busy and we had a plane. So maybe a month ago we started up here in Maui.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. I think it started a little bit earlier in Honolulu. Some of the bases still aren't even flying.
Q. Okay.
A. I like (indiscernible) and KauaiKauai are not flying yet.
Q. Is that for -- is that directly related to this accident or just because of staffing and/or, like, aircraft availability issues?
A. Both, I think. Mostly aircraft. There's only three aircraft right now.
Q. Oh, okay. And so going back to, again, like, performance. Do you -- is there any sort of customer feedback process?
A. From the patients?
Q. Well, from -- I mean, you're not contracted by the patient though, right? You're usually contracted by a facility?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. A medical facility --
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. -- of some sort?

A. Yeah.
Q. So yeah.
A. The hospitals. Yes.
Q. Yes.
A. The medical crew does more of that. I don't really deal with any of that.
Q. Okay.
A. So no.
Q. No, that's great. And so that's something that we know that we --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- we can ask them.
A. Yeah, they deal with all that.
Q. Okay.
A. And dispatch does the -- all the coordination with all the -- I never talk to hospitals. I never even --
Q. Yeah, you're just --
A. I never go inside of them. I just drop the crews off.
Q. You're told where to fly.
A. Yeah.
Q. And you fly there.
A. Yeah.
Q. Understood. Thank you. So going back to safety culture. And I feel, this is, like, Sabrina's view of things.
A. Okay.

Q. That an important part of safety culture, some of the things you've talked about, which is, like, hey, if I don't feel comfortable, I can say no and that's respected, which great. But also if there's something that you see that, hey, this really needs to be fixed or maybe this process needs to be looked into, we call that the feedback loop, the feedback channel. What is your process for feedback? So if you have an issue, where does that go and how?

A. Well, I mean, you could fill out a Baldwin Report, like a safety report online about a problem.

Q. Okay.

A. You could do that. Or I can call and talk to Assistant Chief Kaleo.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. And I usually tell them, hey, there's a problem with this and he takes care of it usually.

Q. Okay.

A. The problem is.

Q. So that's great. That's what my next question is.

A. Yeah. Yeah.

Q. Does it usually get taken care of?

A. Yeah.

Q. Or do you feel like --

A. Usually, yeah.

Q. -- your shooting emails into the ether?

A. Yeah, most of the things get fixed, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Excellent.
A. They do.
Q. So you're pretty comfortable that, like, if I have an issue, it's going to get taken care of?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. All right. I think that's it for me for this round.
A. Okay.
DR. WOODS: So we --
MR. ETCHER: Thanks Sabrina.
DR. WOODS: Yeah.
MR. ETCHER: And my apologies, I said I was going to have everybody introduce themselves to you when we started. I totally failed. I need coffee. So I'll have then introduce as they -
MR. HARVEY: Okay. Sure.
MR. ETCHER: -- as they start asking questions.
MR. HARVEY: That's fine.
MR. ETCHER: And I meant to tell you also we usually go two rounds just because somebody will ask a question and then they'll maybe -
MR. HARVEY: Okay.
MR. ETCHER: The second round is super quick. So - but, Millicent?

BY MS. HILL:

Q. Millicent Hill. I'm the Investigator in Charge. You mentioned the PMOC, the pilot manager on call.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Is that a special duty? Is that something that everyone rotates or how does that work?

A. I guess they rotate, yeah. They have in Utah, I mean, you know. Or it was just the mainland, but now Kaleo or Assistant Chief, he's taken over most of those responsibilities for Hawaii.

Q. Okay. So the PMOC is usually Kaleo?

A. No, yeah.

Q. Okay. Before, who was it?

A. Andy Munion. Yeah, there's a chief pilot or an assistant pilot, any of the managers in Utah.

Q. Okay. Okay. And how much interaction with you have with them on a normal – your two week rotation?

A. Probably none.

Q. Only if there's an issue.

A. If there's an issue, yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Pretty much the only time I really call them is if I went over 14 hours duty time to fly back here, which happened a lot. Probably at least once or twice every couple weeks.

MS. HILL: That's all I have.

MR. ETCHER: That's it, Millicent?

MS. HILL: I think so.
MR. ETCHER: You're good?
MS. HILL: Yeah.
MR. ETCHER: All right.
MR. HARVEY: Okay.
MR. ETCHER: Do you need a break?
MR. HARVEY: No, I'm fine.
MR. ETCHER: You're good. Dylan, would you be so kind?
MR. GARRISON: Yes.
BY MR. GARRISON:
Q. Dylan Garrison with the FAA.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And I'm the Inspector in Charge of the FAA for this accident investigation. All right. I wanted to ask about the autopilot. Do you – what type of autopilot is in the airplane? Do you recall?
A. Golly. The brand?
Q. Whatever you recall.
A. Oh, Jesus. My brain on this one. Shit. I want to say Garmin.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And is it all the same with, with all the airplanes that you're flying in Maui?
A. Yeah.

Q. All the King Airs?
A. They're all the same.
Q. Okay. And we talked about how often you would fly with the autopilot. You said 99 percent of the time you're flying with it inflight. And you had mentioned, you know, sometimes it would overshoot or whatever and you'd have to fly it. And how often would you say that that was a problem?
A. Not much. Usually just on an approach as they – you know, when you switch to, like, you're flying to localizer approach. It would overshoot that and you might have to bring it back in. But it was usually pretty good. Sometimes it would overfly.
Q. And then you would hand fly it the rest of the time or you're reengaging the autopilot after you picked up --
A. Sometimes I hand fly it the rest of the time. Sometimes I would reengage the autopilot. Depends on what's going on or how I felt.
Q. So you're a highly experienced pilot at 20,000 hours, you were talking about. So as far as your autopilot, I'm sure you've flown with a lot of different flights.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. How does this one compare to others that you've flown?
A. It's okay. I mean, it's a little disconnected occasionally. Yeah. You got to watch it. It'll overshoot to courses.
Q. Yeah.
A. You know, it something you can't just look -- you know, you

have to keep an eye on it. It's not that great.
Q. Right. What reasons would a pilot be flying without an autopilot at --
A. The only reason I would think in flight is just -- proficiency, just to hand fly it for, you know, just to get more hand flying in. That's the only reason I can think of.
Q. Okay. And is that something that you and Brian ever talked about, was the proficiency hand flying, anything like that?
A. Uh-uh.
Q. Okay. I know -- I think we had discussed at one point he was asking you about the NDB needles or something shortly before the accident. Do you recall that?
A. He asked me?
Q. Yeah, you had mentioned a conversation about the --
A. No, that wasn't me. That -- he talked to Matt about that and Matt just told me. So this is thirdhand. I mean, that's what Matt said. The other pilot. One of the pilots here in Maui. He had told me that Brian had asked him about that. But I didn't talk to Brian about it.
Q. Okay.
A. So I have no idea what he said.
Q. Okay. All right. So you and Brian were, you said, most often opposite shifts.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So there's one airplane in Maui. The last person to fly it

usually before you fly it, if you guys are opposite shifts, would be Brian.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. No, he -- okay. So I worked days and he's nights. So when I was on nights it was CJ. So I only worked one week opposite him.
Q. Okay. One week opposite.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Which was when he was on nights and I was on days.
Q. Okay. So those times that you were opposite to him and he flew the airplane last, can you recall a time that he wrote something up?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. I mean, a specific time?
Q. Sure.
A. I mean, he's written lights -- I mean, he -- a lot of the lights. He writes lights up inside the cockpit quite a few times because they always are always burned out. So some of the things. I think he did write the autopilot up once. He told me about it. Yeah.
Q. So the writing the lights up, is that -- did that ground the

airplane?
A. I think it did, yeah.
Q. Okay. It was a required item?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So it grounded the airplane. Was there any other instances you can think of where Brian grounded the airplane writing up a discrepancy?
A. He -- the autopilot, I think he --
Q. The autopilot?
A. Grounded that, yeah. And the mechanic came out and changed it out.
Q. Okay. Mechanic came from?
A. Honolulu.
Q. Honolulu. Okay. So those are the only two things you can recall?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Maybe lights and autopilot?
A. Yeah. That's all I can recall.
Q. Okay. You had mentioned that your currently -- Hawaii Life Flight is currently short on pilots.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. How are they providing coverage being short?
A. They're not.
Q. Okay.
A. Just off -- yeah.

Q. So how is that affecting the operation?
A. The bases that are flying aren't really busy right now. It's just the three. There's three bases flying right now.
Q. And what does that mean as far as you as a pilot? What does being busy mean?
A. Well, I mean, it's pretty much you fly the entire shift.
Q. Okay.
A. But that's how they -- I guess the last -- when they -- I was -- I've been out on vacation, but I -- we had the meeting yesterday. And Matt was saying he was flying every night, you know, all night long.
Q. Okay. And so how does having more pilots help with that because that --
A. Oh, we had less flights per shift, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. I'm sorry. Sorry. I'm on call, so I have to have the phone.
Q. Are you okay? Do you need to take that?
A. No, no.
Q. All right.
A. It's all right. Spam.
Q. Sorry, help me understand here. Okay. Because I understood one pilot's working days 12 hours, one -- one pilot is working nights 12 hours.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And so as long as you have those pilots in place, it's -- I

don't -- I'm not understanding how you're more or less busy because you're short on pilots?

A. Well, so what I'm saying is normally all the flights are -- you know, we have a Maui flight. We do the flight, night flights and then the Kauai has a Kauai flight. They do the Kauai flight. Now, if we have flights we don't have to fly to Kauai to pick up a patient. Or if big island, there's nobody there, we -- so we are flying a lot of the flights around the whole island.

Q. I understand.

A. Instead of just doing our flights.

Q. Right.

A. Just on Maui.

Q. So the ones typically assigned to Maui, you're also getting ones typically assigned to other islands --

A. Yes.

Q. -- that aren't currently flying or are short on pilots. Okay. Are there requests to work on off days?

A. Not since this has happened, no.

Q. But before the accident?

A. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, we did. We'd pick up overtime, yeah.

Q. Okay. Overtime. So how does that work?

A. So there's open shifts, Kaleo will just ask if we wanted to pick it up or not and say yes or no.

Q. And you'd get additional compensation for that?

A. Yeah.

Q Well, what type of compensation? Is it significant?
A. Yeah, it's actually double time I think.
Q. Oh, double time?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So you get paid double for working on one of your days off?
A. Uh-huh. Yeah.
Q. And what's -- so can you work your entire time off?
A. Well, yeah, pretty much.
Q. And then --
A. If you wanted to.
Q. So let's say --
A. As long as we get the, you know, the days off required, then yeah.
Q. You're required days off?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Are you talking about the required days in a quarter?
A. Uh-huh. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So let's say there's a highly motivated pilot who's just, I don't know, trying to pay off debt, save up for a vacation or a wedding or something like that.
A. Right.
Q. But they could just work their entire --
A. Yeah, but there hasn't been that much open time. It's generally a couple days here and there and that's it.
Q. Oh, okay. So like right now, you're -- you said they're

short on pilots, but for you, even if you wanted to do that, you would only be able to work a couple days here and there?
A. He hasn't asked me. I know there's some open time coming up, but they might -- they may not even fill that because they don't have any airplanes right now, so they might not ask us to do that. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay. You had mentioned -- we were talking about mechanical problems earlier. You had mentioned, like, coming in, maybe you would find something. I just thought of this question too. You know, when you were -- working opposite of Brian, did you ever come in and find something inoperative that wasn't written up?
A. No, he usually told me if there was any problems and I didn't really -- I don't think I've -- I think one time I came in and I found a leak. I wasn't sure if it was him opposite me though. But yeah, I found a break leaking and I wrote that up. But that might have happened after I was off shift.
Q. You said Brian always talked to you about problems.
A. Yeah, he would text me.
Q. Of the --
A. Or call me.
Q. Okay. Did he ever text or call and let you know of a problem and then not document it and say, hey, you can write it up if you want to. I just wanted to let you know this was a problem.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So he knew of a problem. He didn't document it,

but --
A. Well, he might say, you know, the autopilot disconnected the one time and, you know, or a couple times and I just reconnected it and just be aware of that.
Q. Okay.
A. There's nothing to write up because it's all working. If it reengages, it's not an op, so you can't really make -- you can tell. And when I go back to Honolulu, I might say, hey, you know, this disengaged a couple times to the mechanic. It's not an op. It actually does work.
Q. Okay. What is the threshold? What is the requirement for writing something up?
A. Threshold?
Q. Yeah, what's the requirement? What's the threshold for writing something up?
A. If it's broken, write it up. I don't know. Is this -- you're talking about, like, a -- what do you mean?
Q. So you had mentioned that if the autopilot disconnected in flight, that you don't have to write that up. So at what point would you have to write it up?
A. Oh, it's -- yeah, I mean, there's no set amount that I know of. But if it happens more than a couple times, I would write it up, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. If it happens once, no, I'm not writing it up.

Q. Okay. So you're not aware of --
A. So that's pretty typical of these autopilots for that to happen.
Q. Okay. So you're not aware of any, like, requirement for mechanical irregularities, whether they're intermittent or permanent, of needing to be written up? So it has to be -- like, the autopilot would have to fail for it to be written up or operate consistently?
A. Yeah.
Q. Is that what you're saying?
A. Disconnect consistently, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. They are trying to -- and they would -- it seems like they're actually trying to change that and want us to write up every single thing now. They didn't before. So it's --
Q. Okay. What does that mean, write up every single thing?
A. Every little thing. I mean, like, a lightbulb out. Anything that's wrong with the aircraft, write it up there (indiscernible) no, so.
Q. Okay. And before it was --
A. Yeah, if it's a minor thing, no. You know, minor little thing that wasn't affecting flights, you know, was not a nuisance or anything, you know. Yeah, no, you didn't write it up.
Q. And let -- and I just want to be clear, I'm saying -- we're saying before --

A. The accident, yes.
Q. Okay. But we're talking about before the accident and then this was a change that came about after the accident of, like, hey -- and where do you see that change coming from?
A. Management, chief pilots. Uh-huh.
Q. And do you know who specifically?
A. Kaleo. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Yeah, that's what I wanted to know.
A. Yeah.
Q. Because, you know, with the connection with Guardian.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. When we're saying chief pilot, sometimes it's, like, are we referring to Kaleo, are we referring --
A. Yeah, Kaleo.
Q. Okay. So Kaleo since the accident is, like, no, we're writing everything up now.
A. Yes.
Q. I don't care. Before it was a light and we can keep flying. We've got a mission. But now --
A. Yep.
Q Okay.
A. Yeah, that is a change, yes.
Q. Okay. That -- I think we kind of mentioned this twice now, but I just wanted to go back to it. You mentioned back in November that they changed the way that -- possibly November you

said, they changed the way you got notified of a flight where before it might have been a text message?
A. No, this has happened just after the accident.
Q. Okay.
A. We started up.
Q. This is the accident?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. After the accident. So now they call us and ask if we can accept the flight. Before we just got a text of the flight and I just text back okay. And then I would check the weather if it's in -- and I would say, hey, this weather's bad. We can't do the flight. I'll call them up. What are you going to do? If -- everything was good, I'd just -- I would just do the flight and the work, yeah.
Q. Why was that change made?
A. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay.
A. But they did.
Q. Was there any explanation that was offered or no?
A. They just wanted to make sure everything, you know, I guess, make sure everybody's comfortable with taking the flight.
Q. And why do you think it was changed?
A. I would say so less chance of a flight being taken or flown that was -- that should not have been. Shouldn't be taken

basically, yeah.
Q. Okay. How does that accomplish? How does a phone call help accomplish that, that a flight's not taken that shouldn't be?
A. Well, you actually talk to dispatcher and they ask us if we can take the flight. Before they didn't ask us. They'd just text the flight.
Q. Right. So before that -- so that communication's still going on. But now with the phone call, there's more of a discussion?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that what --
A. Yes.
Q. Is that what you're saying?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay. What other changes have taken place since the accident that you can recall?
A. Yeah, so the biggest things are definitely the ride ups. The -- yeah, the way that everything is dispatched, the call. We supposed to call back. You call the medics and say -- ask them if they're okay to take the flight and I tell them, hey, the weather's good and everything's fine. Is it -- you know, are you fine with the flight or are you all -- it's a little, you know. Yeah, we're going to Hilo and it's raining over there. You know, it's kind of -- say are you okay with that or not, I would ask, I would say that. So that's difference.
And honestly, I haven't really flown that much since it's

happened. I've had a few busy days. And it's done. Yeah. We have a lot less aircraft because we're working on them. And yeah.
Q. They're working on them? Tell me more about that.
A. For what I'm not -- yeah, so there -- right now there's quite a few aircraft in phase. They have the new glass cockpits.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. They're 6,000 is what they call them. And they're putting new autopilots in those aircraft so they downed those. I have not flown any of those aircrafts. Yeah, so I'm not sure. I don't know. I mean, yeah. Again, it's an explanation. You know, there's -- it just -- I guess right now there's only three aircrafts flying.
Q. Okay.
A. We have seven aircrafts, so four of them are not flying.
Q. So out of those three aircrafts that are flying, are any of those glass cockpit?
A. No, not that I know of.
Q. Okay.
A. I can really look it up right now if you want.
Q. But there's no airplanes in Maui --
A. Right.
Q. -- that have been glass cockpit?
A. I think. No, no. We have not. I have not flown any. They have only been Honolulu and now Hilo and start flying them. I did training online for it, but I've not flown one yet, so.

Q. You trained what?
A. They had online training on a new --
Q. Oh.
A. -- the new system and I did it, like, a year ago. But I've not flown it yet, no.
Q. What was the training?
A. It was a PowerPoint kind of thing online.
Q. For the new equipment? Is it Garmin, is that what it is or?
A. Yeah, so.
Q. Is it G1000? I don't know what it is?
A. 6,000.
Q. 6,000?
A. 6,000. You know, I honestly don't know any -- hardly anything about it.
Q. Oh, really?
A. I watched the video a year ago and I have not looked -- I have not used it. I have never -- I haven't seen it, so I don't know. But that wasn't the -- you know, the aircrafts didn't have it, so.
Q. We kind of talked around this, but I just want to make sure we get rid of all assumptions here. Could -- would you explain to us how the shifts work? I know you guys are on for two weeks and you switch in the middle.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Would you explain, like, how that works exactly and, like,

how the transitions from days to nights works and --
A. So, yeah. So it's Wednesdays. We switch on Wednesdays. So if I -- like, I'm two weeks on, two weeks off. So my two weeks start Wednesday. I would work the day shift, 5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for seven days. And then the next Wednesday I'd work the night starting at 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. the next seven days. So the Tuesday day it would be a day shift and I'd have -- so I'd get off at 5:00 in the morning and I'd have until 5:00 Wednesday to -- so I have -- you know, that's, what, 48 hours off.
Q. So that Tuesday you get off at 5:00 in the morning?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Not 5:00 at night? Because your shift is from 5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.?
A. So yeah, so yeah. So it's 5:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. for four days. I get off on Tuesday at 5:00 p.m. And I'd start the Wednesday at 5:00 -- yeah, 5:00 p.m.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, afternoon.
Q. So you have 24 hours?
A. Twenty-four hours, yeah. Twenty-four hours, yeah.
Q. Okay. So you get all day --
A. All day Wednesday.
Q. To transition?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So 24 hours to transition, okay.

A. It's still a little tough, though. I mean, the -- yeah, if I work that first Wednesday and I -- work late at night, yeah, it just -- you get tired.
Q. Right.
A. Just from working day shifts.
Q. I can imagine too, especially, like, I feel like I'm getting older and I switch time zones from, you know, you're talking about coming back from Vietnam and stuff. I switch time zones, it's like, man, my body's just not adapting as well anymore, you know. So I can imagine doing this job for a while that, like, you might -- that day is kind of dreaded, you know, of having to, like, make that switch. Do you feel that at all?
A. Oh, yeah. I mean, so I try to, you know, sleep. And I'll go to bed early that night, if I can. If I'm not working. I mean, if I'm not -- I don't have a flight, I mean. So I get some sleep in case I get called out at 1:00 or 2:00 in the morning.
Q. All right.
A. Get some sleep.
Q. And how do you feel about that? Like, when you go in -- okay. Let's -- so you make the transition. You go in at your 5:00 p.m. shift. You try to get sleep and hope to -- you're hoping that no one calls out for a shifts and maybe you can sleep through the whole night, right?
A. Uh-huh. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And so when you do get that call, how do you wake

yourself up? How do you get there? Because you're kind of on nights, right?

A. Right.

Q. So how do you get there to make sure that you're alert and safe to fly?

A. Well, I jump out of bed and off. I live about 25 minutes from the airport, so I pretty much just jump in the car and go.

Q. Okay.

A. I generally deal with that.

Q. Do you drink coffee or anything?

A. I don't drink coffee, no.

Q. I got to imagine that at some -- you know, like, everyone has good days and everyone has bad days, you know.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And some days you're going to feel better and you're going to be really alert and, like, and some days you're going to be questioning of, like, man, should I be doing this.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Like, I'm exhausted. How do you handle those days?

A. Yeah. Well, I'm just exhausted. You know, I just keep going. I don't know.

Q. Just push through.

A. Push through. And I didn't -- and so now they're way more accepting of calling in fatigue. Before this accident, I think I did it once.

Q. Okay.
A. And now -- since then I did it once or twice since this happened.
Q. Okay.
A. Because we were working the entire night.
Q. Okay.
A. And then usually that -- about 2:00 or 3:00 in the -- what happens at Honolulu, it's 2:30 in the morning. They'll say, we've got another flight for you. I'm like, no. I'm done. I'm not going to be able to do that.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, I just told them that. Just fly back to Honolulu. Head back to Maui and I'm done.
Q. So before the accident you mentioned that you did it one time?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Tell me about that.
A. Well, I just told dispatch, you know, I'm too tired to take this flight. And then they said, well, you call PMOC. And I called Kaleo and said, hey, I'm too tired to take this flight. He said okay. And then he said don't forget to fill out a Baldwin Report. And I said okay. And the next day I got to fill out this long report thing online. Yeah, got (indiscernible). You know, all the flights -- you know, it asks a bunch of questions about what flights you've done and why you were tired and all that

stuff.
Q. What's the report called?
A. It's a Baldwin Safety Report. And it's a fatigue report, I guess.
Q. Okay. And you said it's a long report?
A. It's pretty long, yeah.
Q. How long does it take to fill out?
A. Like 25, 20 minutes, 20 minutes total.
Q. That would feel, like --
A. Nothing to you, probably.
Q. Oh, well, yeah. As far as paperwork, yeah.
A. Yeah.
Q. That's true. But I could imagine that that's not something you want to deal with, right?
A. No. I do it the next day.
Q. You just do it the next day? All right. And that was -- that's something that felt acceptable in that situation for you?
A. Yeah.
Q. Like, oh, no big deal.
A. I feel like I was justified in --
Q. Just fill it out tomorrow.
A. Yeah. Pretty much everything I've called out I felt like I was justified because it was, you know, we were really busy and it was late at night.
Q. And then when you submit that report, who does that go to?

Does that to Kaleo or --
A. It goes to, you know, the managers, Kaleo and the chief pilots.
Q. And then have you ever heard anything back on those?
A. (No audible response.)
Q. Okay. So you think they just document them or something or --
A. (No audible response.)
Q. Okay. Tell me -- the night of the accident, do you know what the mission was that was --
A. They were to fly. They had the -- he had the medical crew. They were to fly to Waimea to pick up a patient and I think they were going to take him to Honolulu.
Q. Okay. And do we know anything about the patient or --
A. I don't know anything about the patient. We don't really. The pilots don't even know anything about the patient, except for the medics. And we're not supposed to.
Q. Okay. Tell me about that. Why aren't you supposed to?
A. Because it might affect your decision to make the flight. If it's a really serious patient and the weather's bad, they can say, you know, you'll push it to take the flight. So they don't tell us.
Q. Okay. I can see that going the other way too though, right? Like, if you don't know, then you might always assume.
A. Yeah, well, you know --

Q. That it's --
A. -- most of them aren't critical. Some -- you know, 20 percent of the flights are critical I think.
Q. Yeah, you know, I'm more familiar with air ambulance flights on the mainland and I know, like, when they're requesting a King Air on the mainland it's, like, it's not critical at all. Like, if it's critical, they're getting you in a helicopter and they're going to go hospital to hospital.
A. Right.
Q. You know.
A. No, they're all stabilized. All patients are stabilized.
Q. Okay. But I know, you know, like after this accident, you know, the governor is calling in the National Guard.
A. Uh-huh. Yeah.
Q. And they were, you know, because it became, like, really mission critical.
A. Right.
Q. Like, it really highlighted how critical this service is, right, that's accomplished here and, like, it also highlighted the fact that oh, Hawaii Life Flight is the only one doing it here, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Because there was Air Methods here before, I think.
A. Yeah, like I said, yeah.
Q. But they're no longer flying. It's just Hawaii Life Flight.

A. Yeah.
Q. So, I mean, does that -- do you feel like that adds any pressure? Like --
A. Yes and no. You know I talked to, you know, medics and we have -- we have some nurses that have been here a long time and we have a nurse that's been here a couple, like, 30 years. So, you know, if they're stable enough to go on an airplane, they're stable enough to stay at the hospital too, you know. So it --
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Us flying somebody is not going to save their life, most cases. It doesn't -- you know. It doesn't have to go. But usually -- you know, the problem is that the problem here can't do a lot of things that the hospital in Honolulu can, so that's why we fly them patients, specialty things, you know.
Q. Do you know how Brian felt on this at all? Have you guys ever -- did you guys ever talk about that, about the mission or anything like that?
A. Not really, no.
Q. Okay. Were you aware that he had another job as a helicopter pilot?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Okay. What do you know about that?
A. Oh, I just know he flew a -- he just did a few days a month.
Q. Okay.
A. And I --

Q. And what type of work was it?
A. It was tour helicopter. Like, I don't remember the company. Yeah, I can't recall.
Q. Were you ever aware of a time when he flew an air tour during the day on a time when he was assigned to work that night, the nightshift?
A. I don't know. No. I'm not sure.
Q. You're not aware of any?
A. No.
Q. No. Okay. I was going to ask, as far as a patient being mission critical, how does that work in Hawaii? Like, if someone is really critical, like, I know that the big island doesn't have as good as hospital, as good as medical service as Oahu.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So let's say that someone is very mission critical. You said, oh, well, they're going to be stabilized if they're going on a King Air.
A. Right.
Q. What are the other options for them, do you know?
A. Yeah, that's a medical -- I don't know.
Q. No, as far as, like, how -- what -- is there a helicopter they can take? Is there jets they can take or --
A. Well, we have one helicopter in Kona and we have one helicopter here.
Q. Okay. And when -- why would they send the helicopter as

opposed to the King Air?
A. The helicopter can land at the airport in Kona to pick the patient up and take him directly. So it saves a little time.
Q. The King Air can land at the --
A. No, no.
Q. -- airport?
A. The helicopter can land at the hospital in Hona.
Q. Oh, the hospital.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. The Kona hospital is about a 50 minute drive from the airport.
Q. So if they were more critical, they would send a helicopter as opposed to the King Air?
A. If they can't go in the helicopter, they will take -- in the helicopter, the helicopter can't take a lot of patients depending on the weight and you have to have a patient. So they won't take a lot of the patients. They won't take, you know, pregnancies and psych patients and anybody over 230 pounds or something.
Q. Okay.
A. Depending on the -- yeah.
Q. Do you know --
A. There's a lot of restrictions for the helicopter.
Q. Okay. Do you know why they sent the King Air that night instead of the helicopter?

A. They usually -- yeah, we usually go on a -- the helicopter doesn't --
Q. Why is that?
A. It's just for Kona.
Q. Okay.
A. It says Kona Hospital on the side of it, so I figured it's just for Kona.
Q. I think we talked enough about this, but the risk assessment. It seems to me that the way that that is working, correct me if I'm wrong, is you fill it out and you get a number.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. The whole purpose is to get that number.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. The whole purpose of filling out that form is to get that number. And then that number is going on the -- you said flight and duty log or --
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay. It's going on the flight and duty log. Put that number in there, right? And --
A. And we also tell it to the dispatch verbally when we get a flight.
Q. Okay. And then dispatch is recording that as well. And then what is -- I mean, how often have you -- what are the ranges of the risk assessment, I guess? Do you know?
A. Well, the old one was one to 17. And 17 you got -- you know,

the only time I ever had that was when we were 14 hours it's at 17 and you just had to get -- permission from PMI to fly it. Now, it's like one to five and I've never gotten more -- anything other than a one. So I've never had it -- I'd never had an issue where it's anywhere near where it says I shouldn't fly, the way it's written out. So it's --

Q. How useful do you feel that that form is in actually assessing risk?

A. It's terrible.

Q. Okay.

A. It's the worst thing I've ever seen. It's very difficult and it takes a long time to fill out and it's -- yeah.

Q. You don't feel that it's helpful in actually making a decision?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. It doesn't do anything like that.

Q. Okay. Yeah, that's interesting, the, the ranges you're talking about. You said, you know --

A. I thought -- yeah.

Q. You can get a 17, but you can still get permission to fly.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Or you -- but --

A. The old one's one to -- that's the old system. And the new one is just one to five and it's always a one, so.

Q. So it's -- you feel that's unhelpful? Yeah.
A. It's not helpful at all.
Q. Okay.
A. It's terrible.
Q. Okay. You had mentioned that you've cancelled flights before after getting requests, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. And the reason you gave was weather.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is there any other reasons?
A. No.
Q. You've cancelled a flight? Okay. So tell me about that process. When you cancelled the flight due to weather, how does that happen? Who do you talk to? How do those conversations go?
A. I just tell -- I just call dispatch and say, you know, it's below mins at this -- whatever airport we're going to. We can't go. And they'll say, we'll check the weather and call me back in a half hour, you know. Okay. I'll check it in a half hour and call you back.
Q. Okay.
A. And I'll tell them, you know, it's -- predicted, it's the forecast is going to be bad all night or the forecast will be bad for the next three hours, but I will -- and I'll just call them back every hour. I'll check about every 15 minutes or a half hour and I'll call them back. It's still bad or, okay, now it's good.

We can go now.
Q. And when you're talking about bad and good, what's your threshold there? What's the difference? Like --
A. Well, they use green, yellow and red. You know, red you can't go. Yellow is, like, marginal and green is, you know, it's everything's good to go whatever, you know. My personal?
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, it's just yellow. So it's -- it depends on the airport. And if it's, you know, minimums are -- it's above minimums for approach and they're like, no or yes. It depends on the, you know, airport basically. But here in Hawaii, pretty -- weather's good, you know. We very rarely have something that's that bad.
Q. Like, it's either bad or it's good? It's not like the -- you're saying that it's not hard --
A. It could be -- yeah, it never had -- it's not really bad. You know, it's usually well above, you know, the mins for the approach or yellow. So I think the only time I -- so I go to Waimea where it's below mins, they said, well, they said no, I can't go because of the weather as far as approach. And I think one other time we had thunderstorms and wanted to postpone, but here at the airport.
Q. Okay. So really it sounds like to me what you're saying is that the threshold is minimum.
A. Uh-huh.

Q. So if you can attempt to approach there, to you that's an indication of, like, let's -- we can go?
A. Yeah.
Q. I have no reason to cancel.
A. Right.
Q. Have you ever heard of any pilots using a different threshold, like, you know, maybe they have their own personal minimums --
A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- of what they feel comfortable with?
A. Sure.
Q. What would those be? Like, what are --
A. I've known pilots that say they won't fly at night at Waimea.
Q. Oh, really?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that before the accident as well?
A. Yeah.
Q. Interesting. What was the reasons for that?
A. They just didn't like flying there I guess. I don't know. They don't fly there as much and they didn't -- they don't like the airport.
Q. But they're willing to fly at night other places, just not to Waimea?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Can you -- I don't -- I'm not understanding why.

A. I don't know why either. So, yeah, I just heard this.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. Now, this was not this company. This was at the company Life Safe, the company I worked for before.
Q. Okay.
A. Doing the same job.
Q. Okay. And they were flying King Airs as well?
A. Uh-huh. 290s, yeah.
Q. Okay. But it's just specifically that route?
A. Uh-huh. Or that pilot. The airport, yeah.
Q. Okay. And did it have to do with the airport or the route, do you know?
A. The airport.
Q. Oh, the airport?
A. Yeah.
Q. What --
A. It's nasty. It's hard to see. The approach isn't straight on, you know. It's a circle approach. When the weather's there, it's -- it just really just fills in. It's just not, you know.
Q. Right. Yeah. Air ambulance guys, they're -- they get the worst of it flying in at night in the most remote airports, huh?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay. So when you cancel, who do you call to cancel, sorry?
A. Dispatch.
Q. Dispatch. And then is that the end of it or is there more

follow up after that?
A. That's pretty much it, yeah.
Q. Okay. And what if they disagree? What if --
A. They don't disagree.
Q. Okay. What if it's like we were talking about. A pilot calls as has different minimums, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So they're saying, well, I'm not going to go because of weather. And they're saying -- they look at weather and they say the weather is above minimums. You can get in there.
A. They don't look at weather.
Q. They don't? Dispatch doesn't look at weather? Okay. And what about when you call the PMOC, when you call the manager? Do you ever have those conversations?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Are they ever calling after a cancelled flight? Like, or how would that conversation go if they, you know, if someone cancels a flight?
A. Oh, yeah, I will say I cancelled a flight because, you know, below minimum bad weather and go and they ask me what the weather was. And I say -- and I tell them and they say okay, pretty much.
Q. And that's for you, right? Because your threshold is minimum, so, like, that's just pretty clear because that's a legal requirement, right?
A. Right.

Q. Like, as a 135, you're not even allowed to attempt it unless it's above minimum?
A. Well, it is actually because -- it is. If I say Waimea and I see a particular airport. If I see the visibility is less than, like -- it's still above minimums, but visibility is less than, like, four miles I'll say no because that's just -- once it gets below that, you can't see the airport. You can't see the airport.
Q. Okay.
A. Even if it's above minimums, you can't see the airport on the approach and you just go around. And I've gone around there a few times because of that. Even though it's above minimums, didn't see anything. That's just the way it is.
Q. Okay.
A. Just the rain, the way the rain is in the airport.
Q. And I know when I've been in those same positions, you know, flying and cancelling, you know, it -- when it's marginal. You know, when it's not clear, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Like, there's a thunderstorm over there. No one's going out there. But, like, there's always different pilots at a company, right? There's some pilots who will go with anything.
A. Uh-huh. Right.
Q. And there's some pilots who won't go with anything.
A. Right.
Q. Right. Like, oh, I see a cloud, I'm not going or whatnot.

A. Yeah.
Q. But there are other ones who are like, oh, what's a little thunderstorm, you know?
A. Well, that's like the helicopters. They won't go if it's cloudy.
Q. Right. But there's those different thresholds of pilots. And so what I want to know is how are those handled at Hawaii Life Flight? Like, you know, because from a business standpoint, right, you got to find that happy medium of, like, safety and accomplishing the mission because we can't just -- the most safe flight is the flight that never happens, right.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Like, that's the -- that's the zero risk flight.
A. Right.
Q. If there's going to be a flight, there's going to be risk involved. So we have to assume a certain amount of risk and mitigate that as much as possible. And so that would hopefully be the goal of any company, right, is to balance that. So -- and you're always going to have pilots on one side or the other.
A. Sure.
Q. Or on both sides, right. Ones that are willing to take way too much risk that the company -- it's not in the best interest of anyone. And ones that are not. So how is that handled at Hawaii Life Flight to get that balance?
A. I'm not sure what they do. I do remember -- so just recently

the last time there was a big thunderstorm the south of here and we had a flight. We had three med patients out of Maui. And that was, like -- yeah, I told them I'd like to wait a little bit to go back to (indiscernible) because, you know, that was a really bad day. But I think none are -- somebody else actually went before I did. And I was waiting a little bit. And I waited for the weather to move out of the way and then I went. It was just like 30 minutes, so -- because I was in Honolulu at the time. So someone actually did go, went on right -- yeah.

Q. Who, who worked --

A. He did fine.

Q. -- for Hawaii Life Flight?

A. Yeah.

Q. Did --

A. Yeah.

Q. And was there any communication between you two on that?

A. Between us? Between me and the other pilot, no.

Q. Okay. Any other pilots? Like, I know sometimes, like, peers will -- you know, when I was a life pilot and I was -- you know, we would, what, you're not going in that or you're going in.

A. Yeah, but we don't -- honest, you know, we don't really talk to each other that much because we don't see each other that much.

Q. Okay.

A. Only really (indiscernible) there at the same time. But it's rare for us to even be there at the same time.

Q. Did you feel like there was anyone you could call besides management to talk to to help with the decision?
A. No.
Q. No. You didn't -- did you feel a need for that at all?
A. No. I've been flying out here for 15 years and real comfortable flying in Hawaii and condition of the area and weather.
Q. Yeah, it seems like you would be a great resource for someone who did feel unsure. Is that -- was that ever done? Did anyone ever call you and say, hey, man, here's what I'm seeing. What do you think?
A. No.
Q. Nothing like that?
A. Uh-uh.
Q. No new pilots, anything coming in?
A. Uh-uh.
Q. Okay. So on this flight to Waimea, they were asked to go up to 13,000 feet. And the ATC controller said, hey, are you able to do 13,000 feet, if I -- recall correctly.
A. Yeah.
Q. Is that normal to go up that high on that flight?
A. Well, I --
Q. With that route?
A. I could probably see what they did. I usually do it at 9,000.

Q. Okay.
A. I usually always fly at 9,000 unless there's some weird weather or something you want to get above.
Q. Okay. And if ATC came back on -- you're flying that route and ATC says, hey, can you do 13,000, what would be your response?
A. Yeah, I could.
Q. Yeah.
A. 10,000 is really --
Q. Is there any hesitation with that at all?
A. No, I could easily do 13,000.
Q. Okay. Were you aware -- because I know you flew this plane.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Were you aware of the -- did you look through the maintenance discrepancy sheet before you flew the airplane?
A. Yeah, I looked back a little bit, yeah.
Q. Yeah. Were there any open items, any discrepancies?
A. Not that I saw, no.
Q. Everything was signed off?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Did you happen to notice what items were written up?
A. If -- I don't know. It's been months.
Q. Right.
A. I can't really think of specific ones, no.
Q. Okay. Were you aware that there were multiple items written up for the pressurization system?

A. I think so. Now that you mentioned it, yeah. That -- I mean, that happens a lot in this aircraft, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, it does.
Q. It happens a lot?
A. Yeah, a lot of pressurization problems in the King Air.
Q. Okay. Tell me about that.
A. I haven't really had any issues, but I've heard that they -- it fluctuates a lot. You know, and the cabin will climb rapidly or descend rapidly depending on -- if you start descending it will, like, jump up quite a bit. I think this -- I think it was this aircraft that did that. Did it for a while and then they finally fixed the problem.

But you start to descend and the -- cabin would climb 2,000 feet a minute for a few seconds, you know, the cabin altitude and then come back down. So you -- a lot of the King Airs got -- yeah. What I have done is you got to slowly reduced the power because if you just bring it back quick it's going to spike.
Q. Right.
A. Because it uses all the, you know, lead air if it spikes.
Q. Yeah.
A. And it may -- and maintenance, I was talking to maintenance about it and they said the problem is the dirty outflow valve and they clean them and it fixes the problem usually. And it seals the door, a lot of times it will leak. I've had that issue.

Q. Why would an airplane have -- why would these King Airs that you were flying, why would they have a problem maintaining max differential?
A. Leaks because the door, leaks in the door, leaks around the windows.
Q. Okay. Is that a common problem?
A. I think so, yeah.
Q. And what --
A. It's --
Q. And what --
A. Usually it's a door seal I think, the little rubber seal, the inflatable seal around the door not sealing or not sealing properly.
Q Okay. And so when you're not getting max differential, how far off are we? Do you know what the max is?
A. It's 5.2, yeah. It's all --
Q. 5.2?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, so 5.0 is the max, so 5.2, yeah, 5.1. I never -- I mean, it usually gets up to that, right up to there. I haven't seen a two hit. I haven't seen -- I think 4.5 maybe was the higher, you know, the lowest non -- less than max I've ever seen.
Q. Right. Okay. And remembering that information, I mean, is that something that you're considering if you accept to fly up to

13,000?
A. No. I mean, it'll -- no.
Q. Okay. In the flight, is pressurization part of climb checks or cruise checks or --
A. Oh, yeah. You check the pressurization, always check it. Yeah, look at it, make sure there's pressurization. I mean, if it's not pressurizing you certainly know because your ears are popping like crazy.
Q. I guess I should ask a more -- the checklist that is used, you know, we talked about the risk assessment. You're like, that thing is not useful at all.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. What about the checklist, how useful do you feel that that is?
A. Yeah, pretty useful, I mean.
Q. Okay.
A. All right. You know, I look at it and I try to do everything, you know. I mean, it's pretty useful --
Q. Because I know in single pilot operations, sometimes that checklist just gets, you know, it never gets pulled out or whatever.
A. Yeah.
Q. But you feel like that that might be different here at Hawaii Life Flight?
A. We look at them, yeah.

Q. You look at it. Okay. So you use it on a regular basis?
A. Uh-huh. Oh, yeah.
Q. Cruise and all.
A. Especially out in Kona Island.
Q. In regard to maintenance, how do you -- what are your thoughts on not having a mechanic based in Maui and --
A. Oh, it would be nice to have one here, but I know it's -- it's not practical. We don't have a hanger or any place for them to store anything. So it's really not practical.
Q. And how do you feel that that impacts the operation?
A. I think it impacts -- because a minor thing will fly you back to Honolulu. Not now, but before, yeah. If it's a minor thing, we'd fly it back and get it fixed there.
Q. Okay. And as far as the -- making the go/no go decision, is -- for all the, you know, all of you pilots here in Maui were having to make that decision, do you feel that that -- not having a mechanic here has an impact on that at all?
A. Yeah.
Q. In what way?
A. Well, yeah, if you can't get anything -- if you can't get something fixed, you have to decide if it's worth taking the plane, feel comfortable taking the plane with the write ups or what's wrong with it or -- I mean, yeah. Since, you know, fly back to Honolulu so you can get it fixed. So yeah, it does make -- come into the decision making process. Is it safe to fly,

yeah, probably safe to fly. Might as well fly back and get it fixed there.
Q. Okay. And when you say fly back, like, as an example, like this flight that was going to Waimea, it was ending in Honolulu.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is that what you mean by fly back or do you mean fly straight -- like after the mission -- the mission's ending in Honolulu anyways, so why don't we just get it fixed then?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Or do you mean, like, go straight to Honolulu?
A. No, I mean, year, after a mission we'd fly to Honolulu and get it fixed, yeah.
Q. After the mission. Okay. The Appareo, are you familiar? How familiar are you with that system?
A. The what?
Q. Okay. The camera that's in --
A. Oh.
Q. -- in the airplane.
A. I didn't know it was called that.
Q. Yeah. I didn't either until this.
A. Yeah.
Q. I had never heard of it.
A. I don't know anything about it.
Q. Yeah.
A. I think.

Q. I didn't know much.
A. They have never said anything about it and I don't know anything about it.
Q. So all you really knew that there's a camera there?
A. That's all I know.
Q. Okay. So there was no pre-flight checks?
A. No.
Q. No one ever --
A. Just watch your head, that's all, I mean.
Q. Okay.
A. I always hit my head on the thing.
Q. Okay. What about the cockpit voice recorder? Were -- was there anything that you're supposed to check on that or anything that you're --
A. Oh, you're supposed to test, but it's not on the checklist. You don't really do anything with it, no.
Q. Okay. So you don't -- pilots don't really do anything. Okay. And then as far as has the Appareo the camera, ever came -- come into any discussions, any training, anything with you?
A. (No audible response.)
Q. So they've never, like, hey, this happened, that happened. We have it on film. We can talk about it here or anything?
A. No.
Q. Nothing, okay.
A. No.

Q. All right. What about in training, do you guys -- I know you have a simulator there in Honolulu.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. But as far as training in the airplane, how often are you guys training in the actual airplane?
A. Training?
Q. Sure.
A. No training, no.
Q. You don't train in the airplane?
A. No.
Q. Okay. And then do you -- what about check rides, how often are you doing check rides?
A. Six months.
Q. Every six months? And do you do check rides in the simulator?
A. No.
Q. Why not? That semes like that would save money?
A. That's just -- no, it's a ground thing. It's not a full. It's just ground based. It's a training device. It's -- I don't need to do check rides in it.
Q. Okay. So you're not -- it's not legal to do check rides in there? Okay. Is it legal to do training in it?
A. I -- we do it, so I guess it is.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.
A. I don't think it's working, though, right now.
Q. Oh, really?
A. Yeah. They bought it from some company and right after they bought it, the company went out of business. It's got all kinds of problems.
Q. Okay.
A. Like, I've only used it once here in Honolulu.
Q. Okay. But that's what -- okay. So you've only used the one in Honolulu once. So where is your training accomplished then?
A. (No audible response.)
Q. How often are you accomplishing training?
A. Well, when I got hired, I did the sim in, you know, Utah. And then we do the online training and we do the once a year on classroom for two days. That's it.
Q. Okay. Do you have any -- recurrent flight training on a yearly basis?
A. No.
Q. So you're never going back to Salt Lake for additional recurring training?
A. I haven't been tested since I got hired, no.
Q. You haven't been there since you -- so any flight training that you accomplish is accomplished in Honolulu in the simulator?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So you're just doing a check ride every six months and

you're not doing any training?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. What about your recurrent training?
A. The recurring, yeah, the -- so we do --
Q. It's all online?
A Every month we do, you know, do we have these, you know, one system. And everyone's, like, just general, you know, just general seat, you know, just general knowledge.
Q. Okay.
A. Every month we do one of those. It's, like, 15 minutes each. And then, yeah, once a year we -- the pilots based in the mainland go to Utah and they sit in the classroom, but we just do it online from here. Not here, at home.
Q. Okay. So all of your required recurrent training is done virtually?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And there is no flight training involved?
A. No.
Q. You only are doing six month checks?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. When you did this initial flight training then, was there any training done on partial panel?
A. No.
Q. No? Did they ever -- what about in reference to -- so one thing that's unique about this airplane is you have the EFIS, the

two EFIS on the lefthand side and you have steam gauges on the righthand side.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Kind of an interesting setup.

A. Right.

Q. Right. Like, you kind of have some glass instruments over here and you have old steam gauges on the righthand side. Did they ever provide any training in reference to those?

A. Uh-uh.

Q. No. Okay. And then what do you know about, like, handling emergencies related to -- or I should say no emergencies, I should say failures, dealing with failures with that instrumentation? What do you know about?

A. This composite mode, if one of them fails you go into composite mode and -- you know, all the information on one of the screens.

Q. Okay. So in composite mode, what --

A. So if one of the actual screen fails, you can put all the information on the other screen.

Q. Right.

A. That's pretty much it.

Q. Because those are cathode-ray tubes.

A. Cathode-ray tubes. The old TVs.

Q. So old TVs basically.

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. And so if one of those screens fail, then you can flip a switch, composite and it'll put all the information on the --
A. Right.
Q. -- other screen.
A. Yeah.
Q. So it's a more cluttered screen?
A. Right.
Q. But all the information is there?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. What about if both of those fail?
A. I guess I would look over here, but I've never actually done it.
Q. And --
A. I think they're going to start doing that.
Q. Okay.
A. Trying to -- yeah, they've talked about it.
Q. Tell me about that.
A. Oh, it was last meeting they're saying they're doing -- starting to do that in Utah in the simulator. And I guess they're sending our pilot up -- our pilots to train down in Utah starting now.
Q. Has something changed with the training because --
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Like, since the accident? Like --
A. Well, I haven't had any training since the accident, so I

don't know.
Q. Okay. Are you scheduled for any training?
A. No.
Q. Okay. And do you -- have they talked about sending you to this flight training where they're going to --
A. Matt's going. I know that. He's going to Utah for the training because that's -- he'd due to recurring training, but I'm not due until July, so.
Q. Okay. So for his recurrent training, they are going to send him to Utah?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is he going to fly in an actual airplane or simulator there? Do you --
A. He's going to do a simulator as far as I know.
Q. Okay.
A. They'll do --
Q. And they're going to do a partial panel training?
A. That -- they brought that up yesterday, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. I don't know if you're going to talk to him today, Matt or CJ. I mean, interview -- are you going to interview them today or --
MR. ETCHER: One of them we will.
MR. HARVEY: Yeah.
MR. ETCHER: I'm not sure which one yet.

MS. HILL: We're going to.

MR. HARVEY: Yeah.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. What about the DPU? Are you familiar with the DPU?

A. The -- yeah, it's -- yeah. I mean, I -- it's from training. I don't know any -- I don't know how it works or anything, but yeah.

Q. Just from training?

A. Yeah.

Q. What do you mean from training?

A. Well, I just know it does all the stuff.

Q. Okay.

A. It puts all the information together and then it's applied. But yeah, provides the displays. That's all I know really. I don't know, you know, much about it.

Q. Okay. And if it was to fail, can you tell me what happens?

A. I guess you don't get any information if the screens fail. You have to pretty much fly partial panel from there and look at the right side.

Q. Okay.

A. And fly the aircraft.

Q. And can you -- what about your -- is it connected to the autopilot at all?

A. Yeah, the autopilot would not work.

Q. Okay. And can you reengage the autopilot in any way?

A. No.
Q. Using the instruments --
A. No.
Q. -- on the righthand side?
A. No, that only works off the last (indiscernible). Yeah, but you would hand flying it, looking at the right side. Can I get --
MR. ETCHER: Continue.
MR. GARRISON: Okay. Earlier you had mentioned --
MR. HARVEY: Oh, that's CJ.
MR. ETCHER: Yeah.
MR. HARVEY: He's got a tie on.
MR. ETCHER: I know. I was like --
MS. HILL: All dressed.
MR. HARVEY: I think he's from Utah. He's a good guy.
MS. HILL: Okay.
BY MR. GARRISON:
Q. Earlier you had mentioned pilots programing the FMS incorrectly.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. What are you referring to when you say the FMS?
A. Well, not the FMS. I should have said the FMS. I should have said the GPS.
Q. The GPS?
A. Yeah, I -- that's reverting back to my airline days, yeah. There's no FMS. There's just GPS. And there's -- there's routes

in there that are preprogramed in there.
Q. Okay.
A. And in other words, you'll stick in the routes and it won't be the exact routes that you actually want. You'll have to look at it, so.
Q. Who preprograms those routes?
A. It's in there. I don't know who put them in there.
Q. Okay.
A. And they're all different in all their aircrafts, so.
Q. Okay. So --
A. Some of them had them all. Some of them had part of them. It's just I think whoever -- the pilots who put them in there just ordered them from previously flights and they have been there forever. They all change.
Q. So you're referring to the Garmin unit?
A. Yeah, Garmin Unit.
Q. All right.
A. And some of the pilots, they always put their own route in anyway. I don't use those.
Q. How many Garmin units are there?
A. Just one.
Q. Just one. Well, what do you use for navigation if that fails?
A. NPRs.
Q. All right. So you would -- all right. So on this flight

from Maui to Waimea. So let's say you get around hear Hana and they start putting you on headings or something.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And then they tell you fly direct Linsey (ph.) for the initial approach fix.

A. Yeah.

Q. So at that point your Garmin fails. What -- how are you going to navigate from Linsey from that point?

A. Well, I wouldn't be able to. You just -- you put that localizer in, edge of the localizer and (indiscernible). You know, yeah, you'd have to go needles and set the course.

Q. Okay. So what -- could you get -- to Linsey?

A. I'm not -- Linsey, I don't think I've ever been direct to Linsey.

Q. Okay.

A. But yeah, you can -- I could --

Q. Could you get to the initial approach fix?

A. You cannot go direct. You know, you cannot navigate directly to the approach fix, no. You could intercept the course.

Q. You said you'd never been to -- Linsey's not ringing a bell for you?

A. No, I mean, I know the intersection, but we don't ever direct that intersect enough, sorry.

Q. All right. What's typical as far as, like, getting set up for the approach coming in?

A. Decky (ph.) or what's the intersection, the other one out there? Oh, so, yeah, for Waimea. I think to Kona. For Waimea, yeah, Linsey, yeah. Okay. Yeah, you wouldn't be able to do that. It's on nav approach anyway, you can do it.

Q. Oh, it's on nav approach?

A. Yeah, you can do it.

Q. So what would you do to get into Waimea then if that's --

A. I wouldn't go.

Q. Okay.

A. I wouldn't go.

Q. All right. So you'd get around --

A. If I FMS fails, I'm not going to Waimea. I'm -- you know.

Q. And you mean the --

A. I'd go to Kona.

Q. You mean the Garmin?

A. Yeah, the Garmin. Sorry, if the Garmin failed, yeah, I wouldn't go.

Q. And so let's say that this is the scenario. You're south of Hana. You're headed towards Waimea and that Garmin unit fails. What do you do at that point then?

A. Oh, the (indiscernible). I would tell the ATC I'm going to Kona.

Q. Oh, you're going to Kona?

A. Yeah, because Kona's always -- 99 percent of the time is VFR, so I might as well go to Kona.

Q. Okay. And then how would you get in there?
A. I would just fly the ILS.
Q. ILS?
A. Uh-huh. 170 is right there.
Q. Okay. And could you navigate to the initial approach fix?
A. I could intercept it.
Q. Okay.
A. Pretty much right there, yeah. It goes right through.
Q. So would you -- if they said, okay, fly to the initial approach fix, would you just say no?
A. I'd say no, I'm unable. I can intercept the localizer. Just give me a heading.
Q. Okay. So you're requesting vectors and flying on?
A. I would request vectors. Yeah.
Q. Okay. One thing that has come up -- well, I'll just ask this question. You worked opposite of Brian for one week at a time.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. When you were on days and he was on nights, did you ever see him around? Did he come around? Was he around the airport? So he's assigned a nightshift --
A. I didn't -- I never saw him at the airport, no.
Q. You never saw him at the airport? Did you ever see him around? I mean, your most -- often you're at home, right? But I'm saying, like, maybe you get called out for a flight. Did you ever see him around the airport?

A. No.
Q. Okay. Were you -- I know that in our previous conversation you and I discussed that sometimes he would get cranky. You had mentioned that. Is this something that you and I talked about?
A. No, I don't --
Q. Am I mixing my conversations?
A. I don't know. I don't think it -- I don't think I've ever seen Brian cranky.
Q. Okay. I may be mixing my conversations.
A. Oh, so one of our medics says that he didn't like -- he told me that he didn't like flying it -- you know, he didn't like -- late nights, he did not like to fly the late nights. He didn't like that and he would get cranky. He told me that. I've never personally seen Brian anything but happy.
Q. Okay.
A. So I've never seen him cranky. But Seth working at -- with him at night says that, yeah, late at night he would get cranky or -- not cranky, but that he didn't like flying at night, late at night. You know, like that, so.
Q. Okay. I apologize.
A. Yeah.
Q. I'm mixing my conversations up.
A. Oh, no, no. No, I've actually -- yeah, maybe I said that. I don't remember having said that. I've said -- yeah. But I've had, yeah, medics say that he does get -- late at night, he

doesn't like flying late at night.
Q. Okay.
A. He would not be happy with that. I wouldn't say cranky, but he would not be happy flying late at night.
Q. Okay. Medics --
A. Most people don't love them either.
Q. Right.
A. I don't like flying late at night either.
Q. Would medics say that about you?
A. No.
Q. Why would they say it about him and not about you?
A. I don't know. Because they said that he could -- he didn't like flying at night and he don't care. I'm like, well, I do. And so I don't verbalize. I don't say, you know -- I just say, you know, let's go. I mean, I don't -- I'm not -- I think he might have said that he was -- you know, he didn't like flying at night and I never said that, so.
Q. Okay. So he said I don't like flying at night and I don't care. Is that what you said?
A. No, no, no. What I'm saying is I don't talk that much about how I'm feeling and maybe he did.
Q. Oh, okay. All right. So among -- have you talked to many people in the -- and I'm not necessarily concerned about management as much, but just, like, your peers, other pilots, other medics and stuff. What are the conversations like after the

accident? What have you guys been discussing?
A. Oh, we -- you know, I talked to Matt a little bit about it and he's -- we try to theorize, you know, what happened and -- but we -- I don't -- we haven't really got anything that's conclusive or thought of anything at the moment, no. Basically we don't -- the basic conversation is we have -- nobody knows what -- we have no clue what happened.
Q. Uh-huh. I imagine that that would be tough to, like, have to go back to flying and not --
A. Yeah, it is.
Q. -- with those questions and answers.
A. Yeah, we don't. We'd like to know.
Q. Yeah, how have you guys handled that? Like --
A. Well, I mean, it doesn't bother me as much as some other people because I'm -- have been doing this so long and I don't feel like there's a problem. I don't know. I'm not sure what happened there, what happened with it, but I feel pretty safe. And --
Q. So why do you and other pilots feel like, since we don't know what happened, why do you feel safe? Why do you feel like it won't happen to you?
A. Oh, I don't know. I think it's just naïve, I don't know. I'm not sure. There's maybe some really weird string of circumstances, you know. One of the millions things that happen. Like winning the lottery, you know, and have -- I don't -- just

something bad, you know, all the things came together to happen. That's what happened. So the chance of it happening again, you k now, we all (indiscernible). This is all -- I mean, I can't remember anything that's ever happened before, so the chances of it happening again are pretty rare, pretty small.

Q. Okay. But if -- so you don't feel like it -- as far as a problem -- I guess what is the story that you're telling yourself of what did happen and why it won't happen to you?

A. I think -- I mean, I'm -- I mean, my best guess, and a total guess, is he got distracted and started messing with something and maybe the autopilot did fail and gets disoriented because it's a pitch black night and that's what happened. That's my best guess.

Q. Okay.

A. But, I mean, I have no idea.

Q. Okay. That would make sense why you --

A. Yeah.

Q. So in your mind you're telling yourself, well, you know, like, I just need to stay diligent and not get distracted?

A. Yeah.

Q. And even if something fails, like, focus on what I need to focus on. Okay. That makes sense. I had heard that when you call dispatch, that it -- is that recorded conversations?

A. I think so.

Q. Okay. Have you ever experienced receiving any coded messages on the recorded line of, like, any type?

A. Uh-uh.
Q. I guess it's not ringing any --
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. Coded messages? What do you mean?
Q. That's all I need to know.
A. I have no idea what you're talking about now.
Q. Okay. That someone may be hesitant to say what they're really wanting to say because they're on a recorded line.
A. Oh, oh, no. No, I tell what I say, you know. I tell -- no, I don't think about that when I'm talking to him.
Q. Okay. And do you feel that that comes in the other direction, that they feel -- they tell you how they feel even though they're on a recorded line?
A. Yeah, I don't think they're -- I don't think there's much shelter there, no.
Q. Okay. Have you ever received a phone call after getting off the recorded line to have a similar conversation that you just had on the recorded line?
A. No.
Q. Okay. We were -- you were talking earlier about safety culture.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. In regard to -- I want to talk to you about safety culture in regards to check rides. How many unsatisfactory check rides have

you had?
A. No.
Q. Ever?
A. Never.
Q. Okay. So you've never had to be retrained on anything?
A. Uh-uh.
Q. Okay. And then what would be -- I just want to know your opinion. What would be an appropriate course of action if someone does get an unsat? Let's say you go in on your next check ride and you fail an approach. What is --
A. Training, do some training approach and approach a few times and then we check on it.
Q. Okay. So then -- now, tell me about the safety culture. How do you think that's going to be handled if you go in for your next check ride and you get an unsat on that? You receive retraining, you test again, you get a satisfactory.
A. Yeah.
Q. How do you think that's going to be handled?
A. I'm not sure how it would happen. I don't know how they do it here. I would assume that you just do the retraining, take the check ride. If you pass, then you just continue.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, nothing --
Q. Okay.
A. -- would be different.

Q. All right. And then let's say you go in six months later and you get an unsat again, something else that's related.
A. Probably looking for a different job because I wouldn't even feel safe anymore.
Q. You wouldn't feel safe if --
A. No, if I was that bad, you know.
Q. -- if you started --
A. Yeah, failing.
Q. -- getting unsat?
A. I probably wouldn't work anymore.
Q. Okay. How do you feel that management would view you if you were getting unsat after unsat?
A. Probably not -- yeah, probably a little hesitant. I don't know they --
Q. Have you ever heard of anything like that happening at the company?
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you give me an example?
A. Yeah, well, a female pilot that we had here, she failed a check ride and she went back to Utah and did retraining. And I have no idea what happened with her, but she ended up quitting and not working here anymore.
Q. Okay.
A. But I don't know any of the details. They didn't tell me anything, so I don't know.

Q. So she got an unsatisfactory on some item on her --
A. Uh-huh.
Q. -- check ride and then went back to Utah for retraining?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And -- okay. Because I know when you fly with the check airman that's normally what you guys do for --
A. Yeah.
Q. Is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you ever fly with the FAA for a check ride?
A. Not here, no.
Q. No? It's always with the check airman?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. When you get an -- let's see. When you're flying with the check airman, I know that you don't even have to end the flight, right? You may not be familiar with this.
A. Yeah.
Q. You haven't experienced --
A. Well, I mean, I've not -- like, some things I haven't done, you know, I haven't failed a check ride, but, you know, like -- whoa, I want to do that. Let's do that one again, you know, something like a stall or something that didn't set correctly. I put the props first instead of the gear or whatever. And I just -- and we just do it again. So (indiscernible) and I do it correctly and we just continue. I mean, I've had that one before,

yeah.

Q. Okay. So you say do it again, but that's not documented? Or is that documented is the question I should ask?

A. I don't document it. Maybe the check airman documents it somewhere, but --

Q. Does the check airman document it?

A. I don't know.

Q. Okay. And does he document it on your records to show that you --

A. No, I don't think so.

Q. Okay. So when that's happened in the past, it's just, like, do that again. Okay. Good.

A. Yeah.

Q. Now you're satisfactory, let's move on?

A. Yeah, yes.

Q. But there's no documentation of the retraining that --

A. No.

Q. -- took place or anything like that?

A. Not that I know of, no.

Q. Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Hey, Dylan?

MR. GARRISON: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Before you start your next round, he's been going for about two hours now. Would you like a break, a potty break or anything like that?

MR. HARVEY: No, I'm good.

MR. ETCHER: And I know your phone honked a few times. I just want to make sure because I think you said you're on call. I just want to make sure it's nothing you need to take.

MR. HARVEY: Oh, let me check. I mean, I don't have a meeting.

MR. GARRISON: Yeah, we can -- let's talk a break.

MR. ETCHER: How about let's take a five minute break? Would that be all right?

MR. HARVEY: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: And I don't know how long you've got left to go yet.

MR. GARRISON: I have a few more questions.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. And then you've got a few more and it shouldn't take long after, but I know you've been going two hours. We might want to stretch and deal with whatever you need and we'll --

MR. HARVEY: I have nothing. I'm okay.

MR. ETCHER: And somebody else might need to use the --

MS. HILL: Restroom.

MR. ETCHER: -- scholars room.

(Off the record.)

(On the record.)

MR. ETCHER: Back on the record at 10:11 Hawaii time.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. Okay. We had mentioned the safety stand down after the accident.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. When you got back to normal operations, how did that process work?
A. Well, we got a plane, we start flying again. There's no special process.
Q. There's no special process?
A. No.
Q. You had mentioned that people called and checked on you though, right?
A. Yeah, people did, yeah.
Q. Okay. And who was it that called to have those conversations to see how you guys were doing?
A. I think Andy Munion called me and Clare (ph.) called me. That's pretty much it.
Q. So the Chief Pilot of Guardian Andy Munion?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And then the Chief Pilot for Hawaii Life Flight?
A. Yeah.
Q. Kaleo. Okay. So beyond that, them checking in with you, there was nothing? It was just, like, are you ready to fly and then back to normal operations?
A. Oh, we had some questions. They emailed some questionnaire and then I filled that out. So asked if we're ready to fly again.

So I figured.
Q. And then everything was normal -- with your first shift?
A. Yeah.
Q. Everything was just like it was before?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You had mentioned earlier that flying over your 14 hour duty day happened a lot.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Tell me about that.
A. Well, it happens, you get back to Honolulu and the crew goes to the hospital. By the time they get back, we just got to part 91 back to Maui and it'll be over a 14 hour duty time. Which does make -- you know, you don't actually work 14 hours. So we started at --
Q. Oh, right.
A. -- 5:00 p.m. and maybe it's 3:00 in the -- you know, 4:00 in the morning.
Q. Right.
A. And we won't get back here until 6:00.
Q. Right. And then how does that work in relation to your next shift?
A. So you have to have ten hours. So once you land, it's been 30 minutes from the, you know, fill out paperwork and -- post-flight the aircraft, put the tie down on its. So I give it take you 30 minutes. So if we land at 6:00, so we're off duty at 6:30.

So ten hours from then we come back on duty.
Q. Okay.
A. At 4:30.
MR. GARRISON: Okay. That's all the questions I had for now.
MR. ETCHER: Oh, okay.
BY MR. ETCHER:
Q. I only have a few more. I told you, second round's always a whole lot quicker.
A. Okay.
Q. You've really given me a lot of education today. I only hope I can retain just a little bit. So I'm glad I'm -- you're allowing us to record it. It helps me to come back and revisit it. Do you have a base safety officer or someone in the Hawaii Life Flight thing that is in charge of safety?
A. Not that I know of, no.
Q. No. Okay. No worries. How many times have you cancelled a flight, you yourself decided nope, not doing this flight?
A. Maybe two, three.
Q. Out of the last year or out of your career here?
A. Career, for the last four years.
Q. Okay. When you do that -- this is always an odd question to ask, but there's no easy way to ask it. Do you get -- do they deduct your pay for it?
A. No. No. No. It -- we're paid by duty time. Nothing to do with flights.

Q. Okay. So how -- if you're paid by duty time, when you work on your days off, how do they do double time? Just pays you twice your duty?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Oh, okay. All righty. You said -- forgive me. It might have been when Sabrina had asked. Something about flying and you said you don't like to fly at 400 --
A. Well, nobody does.
Q. Huh?
A. Well, you -- say the question. I'm sorry.
Q. It's okay. You said you don't like to fly at, like, after 1:00 in the morning.
A. No.
Q. Is it just -- help me understand. Is there something -- is it just tired or is it --
A. It's tired I believe, yeah.
Q. Okay. I wasn't if you were, like, oh, there's something bad that happens.
A. Oh, no, it's actually nice flying. It's usually very quiet, you know. You know, no issues getting in and out of any airports.
Q. Okay.
A. That's actually the easiest time to fly.
Q. Okay. Do you ever have any issues with air traffic control? I mean, I know you said the one -- you know, sometimes there's spot where you might miss them.

A. Oh.
Q. The radio prompts.
A. The radio, yeah. No, actually when --
Q. They're usually helpful when --
A. Oh, they're very helpful, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. Never had any issues with them.
Q. All right. And the last question or series, if you will, if you had something, like autopilot kicked off and you reengage, you know, you were able to engage it, no big deal. Is there any way you can write that up to tell the crew, hey, this -- you know, like, some airlines will call it an I write up, an informational write up where it doesn't require mechanical signatures. Just your communication to the next crew.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Do you have any means to do that?
A. We just text.
Q. Just text? Okay. I wasn't sure if there was some --
A. Or call.
Q. -- official documentation.
A. Some will call, some will text.
Q. Okay.
A. There's no official way, no.
Q. Again, that's all I have. Thank you --
A. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: -- so much for your help. I'll let Sabrina ask what she has.

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. A couple last questions for me.

A. Okay.

Q. One is kind of out to the blue. I should have asked earlier, sorry. Talking about you said that somethings the crews might, like, lay out in the back if it's late and they're tired and that sort of thing. I guess, does Hawaii Life Flight have a general policy when it comes to restraints and if so, what is that?

A. Well, they should have their seatbelt on, but they -- yeah. I mean, they do what they want basically. I mean, I look back. Yeah, yeah, they should. They're pretty good about keeping their seatbelt on.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't know if they're laying in the gurney if they actually put their seatbelt on or not.

Q. Should, but is there an actual policy in place?

A. No, I don't think there is.

Q. Okay. What about for the pilots?

A. Yeah, I always wear it. I -- yeah, I always wear my both control and -- my shoulder harness and my seatbelt.

Q. Okay.

A. I don't think -- I think we're all required to have had the harness on during takeoff, landing, taxi, but I always -- I never

take it off. I always wear it the whole time.
Q. And is that, again, in a policy written somewhere?
A. I'm sure, yeah. I'm (indiscernible) somewhere, yeah.
Q. Okay. When you're making your flight risk assessment decisions, can you tell me how you handle -- so there's, like, IMT conditions regarding convective weather, essentially. Because you talked a lot about weather and you talked a little bit about (indiscernible) in particular weather.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. But where do you equate, like, moonless night in that flight risk assessment? Do you put it -- I guess, we -- do you put it on par with convective weather or is it --
A. No, I don't.
Q. It's a totally different animal --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- that you take into consideration?
A. Just I am -- yeah, I -- just don't -- I don't consider it really that much at all.
Q. Okay. What about other pilots? Do you know?
A. Not that I know of, no.
Q. Okay. Has there ever been a conversation about, like, it is darker than dark out there?
A. Well, it's interesting because I never really thought about that much until this -- so I flew with an assistant chief pilot from the mainland our first time out here. And he was saying,

yeah, I flew at night. I couldn't believe how dark it was. And I was like, okay, yeah. I didn't really -- I've never really noticed. But yeah, it does get really dark out here, yeah.

Q. Yeah, do you feel like it's something that maybe people have to get used to?

A. Maybe he does.

Q. And then going back to kind of your setup, your 14 hour duty day, some of the time it extends into. Does the company have a -- like an FRMS, a fatigue risk management system or a fatigue risk management program in place that you're aware of?

A. No.

Q. No, it doesn't or no, you're not aware of it?

A. I'm not aware of.

Q. Okay.

A. Management -- yeah, they had the -- you -- a form you could fill out and -- but I don't think there's an actual program.

Q. Do -- so has Hawaii Life Flight established any policies or procedures on how to manage, like, your duty day and fatigue? In other words, how do you know what the requirements are for you outside of, like, FAA regulations, but has Hawaii Life Flight put any policies in place --

A. No.

Q. -- regarding fatigue?

A. It used to be that if you did call it fatigue, we would have to go tell dispatch here, yeah, I'm fatigued. I can't fly

anymore. And then you would have to call the PMOC and tell him you're tired or you can't fly anymore or Kaleo. But now you don't have to do that. You don't have to call the PMOC or Kaleo. You just tell dispatch. They just changed that.

Q. When did the -- and that was back in November when your --

A. Like, two weeks ago.

Q. Oh, okay. Oh, okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And but again, is that written down anywhere? So if I'm a new guy coming in off the street and I want to get hired --

A. No, I don't think they've put anything anywhere. That was all just emails.

Q. So again, if I'm a new guy off the street and I'm -- I've just been hired, how do I learn all these things? Where do I go for information?

A. You learn from other pilots and, yeah, but you learn in training. We all go through all the procedures and policies. But when you get out here, you just kind of learn from other pilots and you learn as you go. It's kind of on the job.

Q. So would you say information is more, like, tribal knowledge passed from one person to another person?

A. A lot of it is, yeah.

Q. Okay. So nothing -- there's no, like, online system to where I can access all things Hawaii Life Flight and I can click and I can read?

A. Yeah, so there -- they're all over the place. It's -- and I had problems finding anything. I mean, there's, like, stuff, you know, here, there. And I'm trying to find specific things. I'm like, it's hard to find specific things.

Q. Okay.

A. It seems better to bring it up, you know, but still, there's some.

Q. Okay.

A. It's hard to find stuff.

Q. Okay. So one more time going back to kind of the fatigue system in place. And we talked about calling it fatigue, what the process is for that and then the duty restriction of the ten hours in between. But is there -- is all the rest of it, I guess, up to the pilot themselves to make the determination --

A. Pretty much.

Q. -- on a day to day?

A. Yes, yes.

DR. WOODS: Okay. Okay. All right. That is all I have. Thank you very much again, from my end of things. Millicent?

BY MS. HILL:

Q. Did Brian ever fly outside of Hawaii Life Flight and the helicopter air tours? Did he fly personally, like, as a Cessna or on the side --

A. Not that I know of.

Q. -- just for pleasure?

A. No.
Q. Do any flight instruction?
A. I don't think so.
Q. Or anything?
A. I don't think so. But he might of. I don't know.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. I don't think so.
Q. Outside of Kaleo, do you have any regular contact with any Hawaii Life Flight or Guardian management or --
A. No.
Q. Just everything goes through Kaleo?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. How is crew rest monitored. Since everyone's kind of at home, is it just an honor system or --
A. Pretty much.
Q. We -- you talked about some of the policy changes that have come since the accident. Are there any opportunities for more that you think could enhance safety or improve the operation that haven't been made yet?
A. Well, they're trying to put a lead pilot in the space or entertaining for that, so that might help.
Q. Or reverting back to the old risk assessment point maybe?
A. Well, I thought that was better.
Q. Yeah.
A. It made more sense to me, but -- because this is ridiculous.

That thing is so long and ridiculous. And every time I try to do it, you're doing it and I just get all these errors. It's just -- it's horrible. I don't even know how many people actually still do it anymore. They never -- they did training and they mentioned it once and I haven't heard anything about it.

Q. Okay. Okay.

A. My personal opinion is it's a terrible -- it's horrible. It's a complete waste of time. It's always my last thing. I -- and I have -- there's so many things I have to do before a flight. That's the last thing I do because it's -- I think it's not that -- personally, everything else is more important than that because it just takes so much time and it's a waste of time.

Q. Okay.

A. So yeah, and they just keep adding more and more paperwork for us to do, spending more and more time doing paperwork and actually less flight time actually looking at the aircraft. When I get to the plane, I spend 90 percent of my time doing paperwork and ten percent of the time actually pre-flight, looking at the aircraft. I see (indiscernible) spending more time. Yeah, it's a lot of stuff we have to do.

Q. And roughly how many pilots is Kaleo overseeing, do you know?

A. I have to look it up. Well, it's basically -- well, there's one, two. Five day, so maybe 24 maybe. I mean, I'm not sure exactly. Three space has got probably four pilots, we have three here. Some have three. And in Honolulu they have ten maybe or

eight.

MS. HILL: Okay. And that's all I have.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. You mentioned you flew with the assistant chief pilot when he came out here?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. When was this?

A. It was January, first week of January I think it was.

Q. So after the accident?

A. Yeah. Yeah. They came out and we did, like, the familiarization flight. They flew with us. And I flew the route from here to Waimea and back.

Q. What's a familiarization flight?

A. That's what they called it. I don't know. Yeah, I just flew. He sat in the right seat and we flew the flight.

Q. But was it -- so was it familiarization for him? Is that what was going on?

A No, it was for me, I guess. Yeah, I thought it was a weird name, but okay. Refamiliarization, where you get in the cockpit flight. I don't know.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. It's something they said we should do to --

Q. Was this one of your first flights after --

A. It was the first flight after, yeah.

Q. Oh. So this was the first flight?

A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. It wasn't a revenue flight. It wasn't a -- it was just flying with him. We took off and went to Waimea. We landed there, took off again and flew back to Maui.
Q. So after the safety stand down?
A. Yeah.
Q. This is part of how they were spooling back up?
A. We were putting it back up, yeah.
Q. Okay. So this --
A. I'm sorry. Yeah. Yeah. So that's part of it, yeah.
Q. Okay. So they sent out?
A. Yeah.
Q Okay. And on those flights, you just flew a normal flight? Did --
A. Yeah, anything normal.
Q. Any training that was accomplished?
A. No, just everything normal, everything.
Q. And did they ask you if there was anything, like, hey, do you want to receive training on anything?
A. No.
Q. No. They're interviewing for a lead pilot at each base right now.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. What is the role of a lead pilot? How will that help?

A. As far as I know, as I have been told, that they just -- there's a list of it. I don't -- I mean, I'm not sure exactly what they're wanting to do. But just keep -- just make sure that everything is -- all the paperwork and stuff is taken care of, as far as I know, and make sure -- I'm not sure what their job is going to be.

Q. Okay.

A. I didn't apply.

Q. Does --

A. I don't. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Do you know how it is intended to impact safety culture at all?

A. I don't know. TJ might know more about it, but -- he did, I'm sure.

Q. You mentioned the risk assessment, the old one was better?

A. Well, it was less comprehensive, but it was basic. It was much simplified and it made more sense and it worked better and it was quicker. Yeah, you could do it within an easy amount of time.

Q. And you mentioned that the new one you don't find useful at all?

A. No.

Q. Did you find that --

A. It doesn't help me at all, personally.

Q. Did you find the old one useful?

A. Yeah, it was kind of. Yeah, it was helpful.

Q. Okay. In making a decision?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. I mean, if I didn't have a number, I'm, like, okay. That makes sense. Yeah, it made more sense.
Q. Okay.
A. But they seem to think this new one is way better, so. I might be the only person that has an opinion, this opinion, but I'm not sure.
Q. All right. I mean, is there anything that you feel that we should know or anything that you wanted to talk about?
A. I just -- you know, does anybody have any ideas what happened? Do we know? I mean, you don't have to tell me, but on this -- do you guys have an idea?
DR. WOODS: We are still analyzing the recorders and things that were sent to the lab. So we don't have much info on that yet. And this is the beginning of our interviews here.
MR. HARVEY: Okay.
DR. WOODS: We're still collecting more, so yeah.
MR. HARVEY: Okay.
MR. GARRISON: That's all I have.
MR. ETCHER: Well, you took my last question I always ask. So, you know, you rained on my parade. So I guess, unless you've got nothing else you want to add to it, you know.
MR. HARVEY: I can't think of anything, no.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. No, perfect. Well, you do have my contact information there.

MR. HARVEY: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: If you do think go something.

MR. HARVEY: Sure.

MR. ETCHER: Please reach out and hesitate -- don't hesitate because it's those little things, believe it or not, that help us figure this out a whole lot easier and more accurately. But we will call this interview concluded at 10:29 Hawaii time.

(Whereupon, at 10:29 a.m., the interview was concluded.)


CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022 Interview of John Harvey
ACCIDENT NO.:	ANC23FA008
PLACE:	Maui, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Kelly Anne Treado Vance
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022	Accident No.: ANC23FA008

Interview of: LANDON HONEYCHURCH, Instructor

Hawaii Life Flight

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday
February 15, 2023

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SABRINA WOODS, Ph. D, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MILLICENT HILL, Investigator-In-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

DYLAN GARRISON, Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

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I N T E R V I E W

(1:05 p.m.)

MR. ETCHER: All right. Well, good afternoon. My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an Operational Factors Investigator with the NTSB. All that means is I'm -- I look at everything forward of the cockpit door and how it interacts with the pilot and how the pilot interacts with it and things like that.

We brought you in here because you're in that training department and, you know, all that. So we kind of want to get that aspect as well. And we're asking for your subject matter expertise as it relates to Hawaii Life Flight and help us kind of fill in some blanks in my head and kind of help me get a better understanding of how it all works.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Normally when we do investigations, there's usually parties to our investigation. They're subject matter experts, if they will. And on this one right now, we have the FAA is our subject matter expert as well. So on -- in a little bit he'll introduce himself to you also. But right now we're just here to learn everything we can that you can help us with because that's the only way we're going to really kind of start understanding all the pieces at place.

And so you being here to help us is always a huge help, so we thank you for that. But I'll go around the room. Sabrina?

DR. WOODS: Hi, I'm Dr. Sabrina Woods. I'm the Human

Performance Investigator from the NTSB that's been assigned to this case. And so my job essentially is to just kind of figure out the human performance aspect of how you do your jobs here at Hawaii Life Flight and kind of everything that goes into that.

And so that's kind of interactions, like working with one another. That's -- that man/machine interface, which is, like, how you work well with the aircraft and then also the environment, meaning, like, your, you know, your policies, your SOPs, the things that are in place -- to help you essentially perform your job.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

MR. GARRISON: I'm Dylan Garrison. I'm with the FAA. I've been assigned to this accident investigation as Inspector in Charge with the FAA. I do want to let you know that my role here is safety. I'm in a safety role. I'm here to gather information in regards to the accident. I am not here in an enforcement capacity. I am not here in anything to do an enforcement investigation. That's not my role today.

It's to gather information to learn more about what happened, what could have happened. Information surrounding that. So in this -- as opposed to maybe past interactions that you've had with the FAA, this isn't a check ride or anything like that. Like, this is about gathering information. So I don't want you to feel like when I ask questions or anyone asks questions, that you have to have the right answer.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. GARRISON: You don't have to have a right answer. We're not testing your knowledge. That's not the intention. It's just to know what's your perspective, what's your ideas, that's your thoughts. We're trying to build a bigger picture of events leading up to the accident and what occurred.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MS. HILL: I'm Millicent Hill, the Investigator in Charge.

MR. ETCHER: So that's everybody that'll be asking you questions. And just so you kind of understand how this will work is go around. I'll start with a lot of questions.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: And then we go around to each individual person. There's usually two rounds. Second round is almost always so much quicker than the first. Just -- so keep that in mind. As you can see here today, I have a recorder going. We're going to record and have this interview transcribed, just like we do with all of them.

But we just want to make sure that you're okay that we do record and transcribe, knowing that the transcription is what's going to be in the public docket later on and not the recording. Are you okay with us recording and transcribing?

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Thank you. Also I want to make sure you're aware that you are entitled to have a representative of

your choice, if you wish. It's not required. Just you may have one. I didn't see you bring one in, so I just want to make sure you're okay not having a representative?

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Yes, I'm okay.

MR. ETCHER: All righty. Well, and if you do need to reach out to somebody about anything, just say so. We'll let you go call a friend.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Or dial a friend or whatever that phrase was on that one show. Just a few ground rules before we start, if you don't mind. During your interview, if you don't understand a question, go ahead and ask for clarification. It's not a check ride. As Dylan said, it's -- there's no right answer or wrong answer. But if you don't understand something, just ask because if you give me an answer that I don't quite understand, I'm probably going to ask some more just to make sure I have an understand.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So it's kind of a two way street that way. If you need a break, any time, just say so. We'll try and ask, but sometimes we get kind of -- as you give us all this information, we're learning from you and we kind of lose track of time as well. So if you need a break, just say so.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: And the last and the most important rule is if I ask a question, if you don't know the answer, I don't know words just as good as anything else. So we like as much facts as you can get. But if you have an opinion, just let us know that it's your opinion.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Just so we can kind of keep that clear. Is that all right?

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: All righty. Is everybody ready?

INTERVIEW OF LANDON HONEYCHURCH

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So I always say I start with the toughest questions first. Just get the worst ones out of the way. So if you could state your full name and spell your last for us?

A. My name is Landon Honeychurch. My last name is H-o-n-e-y-c-h-u-r-c-h.

Q. Excellent. And what is your job title?

A. I'm a PIC here with Hawaii Life Flight and I'm also a Pilot Instructor.

Q. Okay. And when did you get hired on at Hawaii Life Flight?

A. September of 2016.

Q. Okay. So what is an instructor here? What is -- kind of give me a nutshell?

A. My role as instructor here is to do mostly scheduled training. So for your 293, 297, 299 check rides proficiency checks, stuff like that. In Honolulu at least we have two instructors here minimum for unscheduled training events. So if someone fails a check ride or things like IOE or, you know, initial operating experience for new hires, things like that, we will facilitate the training.

Q. Okay. So are you, are you one of those instructors that helps facilitates those training for unsat rides or are you, like, a line check airman style?

A. Oh, I'll help with the training for failed check rides.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So you are not a line check airman, correct? Or are you?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. I am not.

Q. All righty. What kind of airman certificates and ratings do you currently hold?

A. I have an airplane multiengine ATP. That's the highest level I guess of -- certification I have.

Q. Okay. DO you have any CFI ratings or anything?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Excellent. Now, this I always say is one of the toughest questions. Just a ballpark, what's your total time?

A. Ballpark, about -- somewhere between 3,000 and 3,500 hours.
Q. Okay. I said that was one of the toughest. This is going to be the toughest. About how much of that is in the King Air?
A. I would say most.
Q. Most of it?
A. Most of it.
Q. Okay. And you just --
A. I don't know the ballpark.
Q. Okay. And that's okay. I don't know works, remember.
A. Okay.
Q. I told you, those were the toughest. Now they get easier.
A. Okay.
Q. So just for the record, when was your last check ride with Hawaii Life Flight?
A. Yesterday.
Q. Yesterday. And it was successful, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. All righty. Can you kind of give us just a broad CliffsNotes version of your aviation career, how you got here?
A. Sure. Yeah. I got most of my ratings through Galvin Aviation and I got my commercial multiengine at George's Aviation. And then I worked there flying charters and cargo in a Chieftain. And then I became an SIC here in the King Air and concurrently I became a PIC at Royal Pacific Air, flying another Navajo. And then I became a PIC here in 2018. And then the following year I

became an instructor.
Q. Okay. Excellent. In your viewpoint as a pilot or even as an instructor, whichever, how would you classify or categorize -- staffing here? Are you guys --
A. In what sense?
Q. Do you feel like from a pilot's perspective, for instance, do you feel like you're adequately staffed? Like, you know, you don't have to work a lot of extra overtime or do you have to work a ton extra more than normal?
A. I think for the most part, yeah, we're adequately staffed.
Q. Okay. For the most part, what -- I'm curious, what does that mean?
A. Well, just historically, everyone was working a 66 percent scheduled. So whether that was 20 days and ten days on or 14 days on, seven days off. That was historically the schedule that we were working. It wasn't until recent years, I don't know off the top of my head, that we started doing a 50 percent scheduled for 14 days on, 14 days off and, you know, so on and so forth.
Q. Okay. And is that ten on, 20 off or --
A. Oh, currently it's in increments of seven. So it'll either be 14 on/14 off, 14 on/seven days off or seven on/seven off.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And is that throughout the whole Hawaii Life Flight?
A. That's throughout Guardian I believe. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Great. What schedule do you typically work?
A. I work a 14 days on, seven day off schedule.
Q. All right. Are most people content with 14 and seven or is that just --
A. At the bases that are 14/seven, yes.
Q. Also not all the bases are?
A. Not all the bases are.
Q. Okay. All right. And are you based where?
A. In Honolulu.
Q. You're right here at Honolulu?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Excellent. I know you said you were one of the instructors here.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Do you guys have regular instructor meetings to get together and kind of talk about --
A. Yes, we do.
Q. I don't want to challenges you're seeing, but issues you're seeing maybe in the sim?
A. Could you clarify that question?
Q. Let me start with the first part of the question.
A. Okay.
Q. Do you as instructors have meetings here to just sit down and discuss whatever?
A. We have training department meetings.

Q. Okay.
A. On the first -- or the Thursday of the first week of each month.
Q. Okay. And is that a mandatory you have to attend as an instructor or is it if you --
A. It's optional if you're on -- if you're scheduled to be on, like if you're on day shift, then yes, you have to attend it. Let's say if I'm an instructor and I'm on nights, then it would, you know, if it's my rest time I won't attend the --
Q. Okay.
A. -- the meeting. So yeah, that's okay.
Q. And what if you're on a day off, do you have to come in for them?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. You don't have to. It's not required.
Q. Okay. All righty. And you say they're -- forgive me. Don't ever let me put words in your mouth, but I think you said there was two instructors here?
A. Yes, myself and Stu.
Q. Okay.
A. Nishimura.
Q. All righty. And typically do you guys -- are you able to attend those meetings?
A. Yes.

Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So during those meetings, did you guys get together and discuss maybe concerns or issues you were seeing pilots coming into training --
A. Yes.
Q. -- doing? Can you give me kind of an idea of what kind of the stuff you guys see pilots?
A. I guess recurring habits that are forming or drift, you know, so to speak. Things that we would like to incorporate, status on certain documentation. Like, if we have a new SOP or a new item of, you know maneuver or approach profiles, we will -- we brief on the status of that, if it's approved or not or if it's, you know, getting approved. Things like that.
Q. Okay.
A. And typically also in Honolulu, they purposes staggered our -- Stu and I's schedule so that -- to increase coverage.
Q. All right.
A. Basically. So if one of us is -- you won't have two instructors off or two instructors on nights.
Q. Okay.
A. So one of us will be on days. One of us will be on nights or off.
Q. Okay. All righty. How often do you do training here? You give training, I'm sorry, not you actually partaking, but you

giving some training?
A. Oh, yeah. I've been giving training for pilots about -- on average about two to three times a month.
Q. Okay. Now, kind of looking over -- let's look over broad terms. Pilots that come in, do you see -- I know you talk about drift and things like that with pilots. Do you still see that happening the same kind of issues over and over again or do they change year to year?
A. Oh, it's different with every pilot. It's not -- I can't give a blanket statement for all pilots, but it's just dependent on each pilot, yeah.
Q. Okay. Now, do you do all the training in the sim? Do you do it in the plane?
A. Both.
Q. Both. Okay. When is the last time you gave sim instruction or sim training?
A. I would have to refer to my records for that.
Q. Okay.
A. I don't know off the stop of my head.
Q. Okay. Ballpark been a while?
A. I would --
Q. Just ballpark.
A. Ballpark maybe four months.
Q. Okay. Okay. Have you given flight training during that time?

A. Fight training, I would -- I can't give an answer to.
Q. Okay.
A. I can't ballpark it, yeah.
Q. All righty. When you have given flight training, whenever that's been, is it daytime or nighttime?
A. It just depends, both.
Q. Oh.
A. Yeah.
Q. So you've done both?
A. I've done both.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. Is there a reason it depends? Is it just scheduling conflicts? Is it, oh, we want people to do nighttime just so we can check that? Just kind of help me understand.
A. No, it's just whatever we both feel comfortable with. It could be part of the schedule. It could just be less traffic. You know, sometimes if it's too much traffic during the day, it's, you know, harder to successfully conduct training then.
Q. Okay.
A. Than if it's at night.
Q. Okay. Do you normally do it right here around Honolulu or do you go elsewhere?
A. Elsewhere.
Q. Okay. All righty. Do you guys have an ASAP Program or --

A. Yes.
Q. How does -- have you used that?
A. I have not used it.
Q. Do you know how it --
A. Not yet.
Q. -- works?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. I know how it works, yeah.
Q. Have you heard any feedback? Have they asked for feedback or have you heard any pilots say anything about it?
A. I -- no, I haven't heard too much feedback of it. I -- yeah, I think it only -- we only started talking about it within about a year and a half ago I want to say, ballpark.
Q. Okay. All righty. So it hasn't been here that long?
A. Not that I'm aware of, no.
Q. Okay.
A. Not longer than a year and a half.
Q Okay. Perfect. So let's kind of get into the training word, if you will for a little bit. Put on your training hat. How do you feel -- do you feel you have adequate resources to conduct training here?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And kind of give me an idea of how long training is. If somebody's coming in for training recurrent or whatever

training you could come up with?
A. Oh, yeah, recurrent, if they're a new hire, I say it will take a number of days. More than one. I don't know how much it can take. For recurring training for existing pilots in the company, it should take no longer than about a day.
Q. Okay.
A. You know. Yeah. That's about it.
Q. So a pilot comes in for his training in -- and I just want to clarify what a day is. Because you guys seem to work 12 hour shifts?
A. Yes. Yes. And I'm specifically talking about the flight training portion.
Q. Right.
A. So whether it's actual in aircraft training or simulator, not including ground instruction.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So that day, is that -- are you talking about a full 12 hours of sim and flight training or are you talking it's just, you know, so many hours?
A. It depends. It's -- we have a syllabus, an AATD form that we have. And however long it takes us to get through each item, that's just how long it takes. So there's no set time where if we run out of time, like, oh, that's it for the day.
Q. Okay.

A. You know, we have to attack each item --
Q. Okay.
A. -- to a level of proficiency.
Q. Okay. So I always like to have examples so my brain can kind of picture it, if you will. So let's say I was coming in to you for my training. Is it sim and flight or is it just sim or flight?
A. No.
Q. Help me understand.
A. It's typically just sim.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So I come in to do sim training. Kind of walk me through what you're -- I'm sure you've got a long list of things you got to have -- you try and accomplish.
A. Yeah.
Q. Kind of give me an idea, is there certain topics that you guys zero in on? Is there everything is dealt with?
A. Well, for the sim, typically my lesson plan, I guess, for the sim would be to start on the ground. So we'll do all the ground check and abnormal starts and procedures on the ground. Whether they do well or not, anything that they miss on the ground, I like to think that they'll pay for it later in the air, you know, during foreseeable failures that may come up if they miss something. And then of course we will refer back to what they

missed on each check and specifically in each startup check, what system they're checking.

Q. Okay. Yeah. Okay. So let's say I get in there and we're going through this list of items, whatever it is. And I do something poorly. I don't know how you guys -- how do you guys classify them? Is it just -- or do you even classify them as proficient, non-proficient?

A. Oh, yeah, there's -- for the simulator there is a grading scale for the Form 120 and 110 for in-aircraft because that's, you know, in-aircraft and required. It's just satisfactory or unsat.

Q. Okay.

A. But for the sim, yeah, there still be a grading rubric. Typically, I'll try to get them proficient in each category. If I can't do that, then I will have to create another lesson, another day of training, if you will.

Q. Okay. So you can't get me proficient in a category today. I'm just using me an example --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- because, you know, I haven't flown a King Air, so we'll use that as my excuse.

A. Okay.

Q. But you can't get my proficient in a category and you have to request more.

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that -- help me understand. Is that a challenge for you

to get more time for me or is that -- will they look at me and go, whoa, do we really want him flying?
A. Oh, no, not at all. If I see anything in the sim that, you know, isn't proficient or even questionable, I'll just say, hey, this guy is not ready for a check ride. We need to come in for another sim session.
Q. Okay.
A. And they'll say, okay. Yeah, let me know when he's ready.
Q. Okay. All right. So when you go do flight training, if we go up -- do you do that after the sim typically?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So you did my sim. You got me proficient and we go up in flight training. And maybe the same thing rears its ugly head.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Whatever I was not proficient at and you got me to, but I'm still not to what you would call a level of proficiency. What do you do?
A. I -- well, I've never been in that situation. Typically, the reason why I do sim before is so that I can form a level of comfort where I trust the pilot flying in the aircraft. I don't want to take into an aircraft with someone I've never seen perform when I have the ability to see them perform in a simulator.
Q. Okay.

A. So that's why I do the sim before --
Q. All righty.
A. -- flight training.
Q. So and forgive me, I think you say this -- the aircraft is sat or unsat?
A. Yes.
Q. Is that how you create that?
A. Yes, the training for the aircraft portion of training flight is sat or unsat.
Q. Have you ever had to give an unsat?
A. Not that I can remember. I may have.
Q. Okay.
A. For certain things, but nothing that wasn't addressed before a check ride.
Q. Okay. All right. So we go up. We fly. Do you pull my engine and give me a single engine failure on departure or anything or you just do that in a sim only?
A. Oh, no, I've done that in the aircraft as well.
Q. Okay. Do you go up and do unusual attitudes or any kind of air work?
A. Yes.
Q. How do that -- how do those look to you from the pilots that you've done? Everybody able to handle those pretty well? Do they kind of give some challenges? Because I admit, I don't go out and try to fly at an unusual attitude.

A. Uh-huh.
Q. You know, so it's not one -- something I should be proficient in, but --
A. Yeah.
Q. I got to maintain proficiency.
A. Some better than others. It could be reaction time. It could be controlling pitch before roll. It could be certain things like that.
Q. Okay.
A. But if there's anything questionable, then it has to be addressed before moving on to the next portion. But yes, we do unusual attitudes with every training flight especially.
Q. Okay.
A. And then we do it in a sim as well.
Q. So -- and I think you said that some of the flight training is done in a day and some is done at night?
A. Yes.
Q. So you do unusual attitudes at night as well?
A. In the past, yes.
Q. Okay. In the past. Does that not happen now?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. Well, I haven't done training since the accident.
Q. Well, prior to the accident. Let's just pretend right now that the day of the accident everything stops. But before the

accident, did you do them at night?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. How did -- did you see any difference between how pilots reacted during the day and the -- versus the night for unusual attitudes?
A. Not really.
Q. Okay. I have to ask, did you do them over the water or did you go -- is there another spot over land or wherever that you go do flight training?
A. No, over the water.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And the reason I ask is I heard a new term this week that I've never heard before, dark dark.
A. Dark dark?
Q. I guess it gets really dark out of the water at night. And have -- has that given any troubles that you've noticed?
A. Yeah, on a clear dark night, typically what I've noticed is that when conditions are dark and clear, it's actually almost worse than it being dark and IFR because certain places -- like taking off out of Maui in a bank, the boats with their lights on in the water blend in very well with the stars. So then it feels like you're in space and then you lose reference, so then your head goes down.
Q. Okay. Yeah. Okay. That makes sense. So we go out and do

flight training. And I was proficient in the sim, but there was something you had questions on about my abilities maybe in the airplane or whatever. What do you do? If you have to give me an unsat, what's the policies required? I know you haven't -- you may have given one, but --

A. Oh, well, I mean, yeah, the procedure would be that if anything in -- especially in a training flight is unsat, it will be addressed to the higher ups. So it would be Kaleo and Andy Munion and they'll decide where to go from there.

Q. Okay.

A. Whether you need to address more training, whether to address this pilot privately out of -- I don't know.

Q. Okay.

A. But yeah.

Q. All right. Have you ever heard of them asking a pilot to maybe go seek employment elsewhere?

A. Yeah.

Q. Oh, that's happened?

A. Yeah.

Q. Just a ballpark range, in the last couple years? How long ago has that ever happened?

A. Last I heard of it was about 2019 I want to say.

Q. Okay. Yeah. Okay.

A. It was a few.

Q. All right. So since you're in training and I know we just

came out of that little joy called pandemic. And I call it a joy in air quotes of course.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. How challenging was that to do training? I mean I understand here in Hawaii you --

A. Oh, not difficult at all, especially during COVID. It was -- you could do right close traffic in Honolulu because there was no --

Q. Okay.

A. All the Hawaiian Airlines planes were parked on the -- but yeah, it was actually probably the best timeframe to do training just based on availability and low traffic.

Q. Okay. You had no problems getting people in from out bases or anything like that?

A. Uh-uh.

Q. It was pretty --

A. No. Well, I mean, during the pandemic at least, it was -- sim was optional. So you could waive sim.

Q. Okay.

A. And, you know, the people would take check rides without doing any training if they opted out of it. The retraining would be obviously mandatory retraining if they, you know, unsat a check ride. But yeah.

Q. Okay. You said the retraining was not optional. They had a -- if they unsat something, they had to come in and do --

A. Yeah.
Q. -- a sim and everything? How often did that happen during the pandemic?
A. I don't know. I don't know during the pandemic.
Q. Okay.
A. Specific timeframe.
Q. Are there very many unsats even nowadays in the last --
A. Not --
Q. -- take the last year?
A. Not typically.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you -- how many times have you had to be in the sim to help somebody get through it in the last year?
A. I would say no more than three times.
Q. Okay.
A. A year.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. All righty. And --
A. That's just my experience.
Q. Right.
A. I have no idea about any other instructor.
Q. Okay. Yeah, and that makes sense. I'm sorry. I should have said in your experience.

A. Yeah.
Q. So my apologies. Thank you for that clarification. Did you ever do any of the accident pilot's training?
A. Any of the?
Q. Brian's training, did you do it?
A. Yes.
Q. When was your most recent interaction for his training?
A. February 17th, I believe, of 2021.
Q. Of 2021?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you recall how that went?
A. Yeah, he had failed his check ride. He got an unsat. I received an email from Kaleo, who did the check ride who unsat him. And then we discussed the items that he was lacking, I guess. And when I met with Brian, we -- you know, during the ground brief, we briefed each item. You know, we were going to -- how we're going to form the lesson plan, what we'll be practicing. And all that is required for him to retake his check ride would just be, you know, ground briefing instruction, plus at least an hour of flight training.

But yeah, after briefing with Kaleo and after briefing with Brian, I felt it best to put him in a sim. And then we ended up spending about five hours, I believe, in the sim before we did his flight training. And then the flight training became more of a demonstration of the proficiency for all those items.

Q. Okay. Can you recall what the -- what made you think going to the sim would be better?
A. You know, talking to him on the ground, just asking him questions about the -- our company's SOP and approach profiles. A lot of it was general. No real specific answers. So a good example, I guess, would be in our SOPs for our approach profiles, it would be three to five miles from final approach fix you would be slowing down to 140 knots with your flaps in approach setting mode. And if you're on a non-precision approach, it's one below glide slope and you would perform any checklist, have gear down, lights on, props fully forward, fully configured for landing. So that would be the answer that I was looking for. And he would give I guess loose answers. Like, oh, I'll start slowing down three to five miles. And then it's like, oh, and then once I come up on final approach fix, gear props and all the rest. And it's like, okay. Well, what are the other components, you know.

So I just figured, well, you know, it can't hurt. It can't hurt putting him in the sim and seeing, you know, more training. And then, you know, it'll get to a point where both he and I would both feel comfortable getting into the plane and continuing the lesson.

Q. Okay. And five hours in the sim, I mean, in my mind I think, wow, that's a lot of time.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. But did you need all five hours or, I mean, was -- did it

take -- how do I say it. Did it take that long for you to feel comfortable with his proficiency and following the challenges he had?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Yes.

Q. Do you remember what -- I mean, I know you quoted the SOP on approaches and speeds. Was there other issues that you can recall?

A. Yeah. The missed approach I wanted to really emphasize on with his training. I think it happened twice where if I asked him on the ground, he would give the correct answer. And then performing a missed approach in the airplane, he would forget to bring the gear up or the flaps up in the wrong order. And in a missed approach, you know, typically you're closer to the ground and you want to move away from the ground. If your gear is down creating drag and you're in full flaps creating more drag, it's not really an -- helping you get away from the ground.

Q. Okay.

A. So it was items like that on the SOP profiles that I wanted to emphasize as his training and get to a point where he was very proficient.

Q. Okay. Is there any other examples? I mean, these all seem to be, like, approaches and, you know, things that deal with the approaches. Are there any other issues that you can think of?

A. No, that was just the ones that stick out to me.
Q. Okay. All right. That's perfect. Thank you. All right. So help me understand. I don't fly the airplane. So your guy's procedure.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. One dot below you start configuring. Is this hand flown or autopilot?
A. Oh, either.
Q. Or does it matter? Either?
A. Yeah.
Q. What's the -- does the company require one or the other?
A. What do you mean?
Q. does the company require the pilots to fly an approach, hand flying it for proficiency --
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. -- or do they require them to --
A. Oh, yeah. It's an item of our check ride that we have to have at least one single engine hand flown approach.
Q. Okay. Is there any --
A. More or less.
Q. -- SOPs that require even a line pilot when they're out there flying to do an approach with the autopilot coupled? Or is it just pilot's discretion to hand fly it or autopilot?
A. Sorry, what do you mean by that? Like, by --
Q. Well, the --

A. -- for training or, like, for operation on the line?
Q. Well, for training.
A. Okay.
Q. Do you have to see them to an autopilot approach? I know you said they had to do a hand flown single engine.
A. Uh-huh. Yeah.
Q. Do they have to do a hand flown two engine operating?
A. Well, for this case, for Brian's retraining, my primary goal for the flight training portion was to do the things that he failed on the check ride, those items first. Everything else can be addressed in the sim.
Q. Okay.
A. But yeah, for the flight training portion, I just wanted to emphasize the items that he had failed.
Q. Okay. Now take off your instructor hat for a minute and put on that line pilot hat. Is there a policy within Hawaii Life Flight that if you do an approach, it has to be on the autopilot or it has to be hand flown or is it your discretion, line captain? Your choice of --
A. I mean, there's no rule saying you have to do it.
Q. Okay.
A. Is that what you're saying?
Q. Yeah.
A. Okay. Well, then yeah, yeah. There's no rule saying you have to do one or the other.

Q. Okay. See, I should have just kind of put paraphrases down and let you put the question together.
A. Oh.
Q. You hit it perfect on the head. So all right. Thank you. It -- the airplanes are equipped with a video recorder, correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you even notice it?
A. Yeah, it doesn't -- I don't mind it.
Q Okay.
A. Yeah, I mean.
Q. Do they ever use those video recordings to kind of look at how people are flying things or doing things?
A. That I don't know. I know that there's SD cards in it. I don't -- I have no idea who has access to them.
Q. Okay.
A. How often they check it. I don't know.
Q. So they don't -- and I know you don't know what other people maybe do, but nobody comes to you and says, hey, we downloaded all these video cards and we're seeing pilots coming in, you know, a dot low and still doing 180 knots consistently.
A. Oh, no.
Q. They don't come and say, hey, instructors, let's start working on these areas because we're seeing that in the video?
A. Oh, no.
Q. No?

A. No.
Q. Okay. Do they ever -- does anybody ever come to you guys and say, hey, we're seeing issues occurring, however. And as instructors, can you guys address that a little bit? Help pilots address --
A. Does who say that to?
Q. Any upper management. I don't know. Your --
A. Well, I mean, we'll see that with check airmen.
Q. Okay.
A. Like, check airmen, even if someone passes their check ride, you know, they'll say hey, you know, this guy -- like, you know, stalls. We need to beat up stalls. Like, some of them, like, it's like, you know, they're getting confused with which staff configuration or be like, oh, hey, guys, run-ups. The past three check rides I've done, the run-ups are, you know, whatever. So it'll be mainly from the check airmen on their, you know, conducting their check rides. They'll bring us the information to touch up on.
Q. Okay. Have they brought anything to your attention in the last year?
A. The run ups.
Q. The run ups?
A. Yeah.
Q. is that it? And were --
A. That's the one that comes to mind, yeah, that people have,

you know -- whether it's, you know, not doing the run-ups or whether it's doing run-ups and then not doing them correctly or not knowing which system they're testing.

Q. Okay.

A. I think a lot of it comes down to, I don't know, wrote memory. Yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. Okay. I might have to mull that over in my head a little bit, but we'll --

A. Okay.

Q. I think you've got it, so I appreciate that. If I want to just come into the sim to fly, to -- I -- for whatever reason. I've got a check ride coming up in three months. When -- before that was mandatory, I understand it's mandatory now.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Is that correct?

A. Yeah.

Q. Sim is mandatory training now?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. It's mandatory training.

Q. But can I just say, hey, I just don't feel proficient enough to do --

A. Oh, absolutely.

Q. -- an instrument approach.

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that not a -- is that challenging to arrange or is that --
A. No, not at all. Yeah, and in fact, Brian actually has -- I have several text messages from Brian asking, hey, you know, I see you're on day hanger. Can I come in and do a sim, quick sim session. I'm in Honolulu.
Q. Okay.
A. Or like I have scheduled maintenance. And I'll be like, yeah, come on in.
Q. All right. What's some of the things that he would ask to be proficient or to work on?
A. Just practicing approaches or dealing with, you know, single engine stuff maybe sometimes.
Q. Okay.
A. yeah.
Q. All right.
A. Or actually even airports that he's unfamiliar with. He's like, I've never been to Upolu before. Put me in Upolu or something.
Q. Okay.
A. Stuff like that.
Q. All right. But if you're working day shift, that's pretty easy, assuming you don't get called out or whatever. But I assume that's pretty easy to arrange to just go into the sim?
A. Yeah, well, nightshift too. But in the problem -- my personal opinion, not fact, but my personal opinion is that if I'm

on nights and they're on nights, I typically don't want them coming into the sim because I don't want them to get fatigued flying approaches and then having to go fly back home. Because then that's a whole another element of, you know, risk involved. So I just like --

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. But that's your thing, right? There's no prohibition?

A. Yeah, there's no rule against it. And, you know, it's just my person opinion on the topic of doing that --

Q. Okay.

A. -- at nighttime.

Q. Perfect. In just kind of big round numbers, how many trainings, how many instructing, training sessions, whatever you want to call it, have you done? How many different pilots in the last year or two years, your choice?

A. I think I -- well, I've -- other than the people hired within the last three months or so, like for pilots, I've done everyone's training at least once.

Q. In the last year or two?

A. In the last year or two.

Q. Okay.

A. For a sim.

Q. Have you hired very many?

A. Oh, no.

Q. No, okay. Well, you mentioned that. I just wanted to make sure you guys weren't hiring, like, 20 of them or something.
A. Oh, no, no. Nothing like that.
Q. Okay.
A. Just I think a couple that I've maybe missed or just didn't get around to.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. All righty. Just going through my list here real quick. Do you just -- do you teach any ground school?
A. Not typically, no.
Q. No. Okay. Now, are you still doing training here or is that all getting shipped up to Utah?
A. For the meantime, yes, all being shipped up to Utah.
Q. Why for the -- what's the meantime with? What's that?
A. Oh, just because our simulator at the moment is inops. So.
Q. Okay. Do you know what's wrong with it?
A. Oh, well, the Garmin, the GPS isn't working in it.
Q. Okay.
A. So yeah.
Q. Are they going to fix it, do you know?
A. I have --
Q. Are they trying?
A. I have no idea.
Q. Okay. So in the meantime, if you have somebody that wants to

come in and go do some flight training and you say you always like to put them in the sim, how do you deal with that?

A. Oh, I just --

Q. Do you just go out there?

A. I can't tell them. Or I can't offer their training anymore because I don't have the sim. So it would have to be in the aircraft, but then that needs approval from PMOC.

Q. Okay. Does that -- has that happened?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. Not recently, no.

Q. Okay. Not recently, but so it has happened? People have gotten --

A. Oh, no, not --

Q. Okay.

A. Not at all.

Q. I just wanted -- okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. I just wanted to make sure when you said not recently.

A. No.

Q. I just wanted to clarify that. When you're doing some of your training, whether it's in flight or in the sim, do you have -- do you ever have Mr. FAA come over or Ms. FAA come over and go for a ride with you?

A. No.

Q. Never have?
A. No.
Q. Okay. All righty. I think you're getting through most of my questions. So I'm going to -- I know you've got to be tired of looking at me and talking with me.
A. Oh, no.
Q. So I'm going to pass it off to Sabrina.
A. Okay.
Q. Unless you need a break. Do you need a break?
A. No, I'm fine.
MR. ETCHER: Okay. Sabrina?
DR. WOODS: Thanks, Shawn.
BY DR. WOODS:
Q. So I want to go back to Brian. I know you said you've trained, you've had some instances having to retrain. There was a -- you said a failed check ride or an unsatisfactory check ride?
A. Yes, an unsat check ride.
Q. That might have precipitated some of this. I guess compared to some of the other pilots that you've engaged with on the training platform, would you consider Brian's performance, like, average, above average or below average?
A. Honestly for that -- prior to the sim, below average.
Q. And was that the only opportunity you had to work with him since then? I know you said he was texting you and saying, hey, can I come in.

A. Yeah.
Q. Since that check ride, you got him back square. Since then, how many times have you had approximately to work with him.
A. I don't know off the top of my head.
Q. Okay. But there have been a few?
A. There have been a few, yeah.
Q. And how about that performance as compared to others?
A. Oh, yeah, nothing concerning for those impromptu I guess sim rides. Yeah.
Q. So for that time post-unsat check ride, did -- everything that you had concern about, did you -- do you feel like you got him back on track and that there wasn't anything left unresolved?
A. Oh, yeah. Absolutely.
Q. Okay. Out of curiosity, what was his personality like?
A. Oh, personality, real fun guy.
Q. Yeah?
A. Really easy to get along with. Pleasure to fly with. Yeah. Really laid back kind of guy. Doesn't get upset about anything. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So in his -- in general, his mood was pretty upbeat or --
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And then it sounds like receiving instruction from you, did

he take that well?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. I think so.
Q. Did it seem like that there was, like, it -- again, it sounds like it, but I want to confirm, especially if he's texting you to say, hey, can I get a little more time. Does it seem like he was eager and interested and had a good attitude about continued training and learning?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Okay. In the time that you interacted with him -- first of all, have you flown with him outside of a training environment?
A. No.
Q. Okay. So only for training purposes?
A. Yeah.
Q. Did you ever have conversations about the job in general and the mission here at Hawaii Life Flight?
A. What do you mean by that? Like --
Q. Did you ever just chit chat about --
A. Just --
Q. -- like, hey, man, this job, you know, working days, working nights. I never know when I'm going to get called out.
A. Oh, just general about the --
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Oh, yeah, yeah. We talked a lot about that.

Q. Did he ever express, like, what his favorite thing about working here was?
A. Yeah, well, he -- I can't remember. I think it was Southern Air he worked for and he flew for the airlines.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. But yeah, he really liked the quality of life over here with the schedule because he could be on call at home.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. So it was like unless you're getting called in to work, you could do whatever you want. So he really likes that. And then, you know, especially during COVID, he was like, oh, man, you can't pay me enough to go back to the airlines.
Q. Yeah.
A. I'm like, okay.
Q. What about the opposite? Did he ever express, like, man, I wish this got better here? I mean, if this one thing were --
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. -- fixed, it'd be perfect.
A. His main complaint was flying 7 Alpha Mike. It was one of our planes, November.
Q. Oh, I've heard of the Alpha Mikes.
A. And I first had (indiscernible). Yeah, Alpha Mikes.
Q. Why do you think that is he complained about those aircraft?
A. It has almost no automation. It's -- I mean, it's an old autopilot, but all the -- there's some little different -- well,

it's kind of hard to explain. Does anyone fly a King here? Have you flown -- okay. So like in most King Airs when you select altitude you want to climb or descent to, it'll arm it.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So it gets it, you know, ready to level off there. And then that one doesn't -- and then there's only one CDI needle to navigate with. You can't have two. And then the buttons are in different places, so he hated that plane. But yeah.

Q. But those aircraft were being essentially decommissioned out of your inventory, correct?

A. Oh, yeah. It sold already.

Q. Okay.

A. So it's not online anymore.

Q. Got you.

A. So I -- yeah.

Q. Any other concerns about the job itself outside of just the equipment and anything about kind of the non-tangibles, like does -- the duty schedule or --

A. Well, it doesn't really pertain to --

Q. -- interpersonal relationships?

A. It doesn't really pertain to flying.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. But he would complain about, like, medical schedule and allocation kind of. Like, oh, if I have, you know, like if Hilo has the plane and, you know, the pilot and the med crew, how come

I have to go to a Hilo flight or -- something like that. Like, if it was just that the pieces were there, like, oh, why do -- why are they calling me and not that person. It was just small stuff like that. But yeah. I don't know if that makes sense.

Q. Uh-huh. It does. So I guess that's a good question then. You might have more insight because you're stationed here in Honolulu.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. But I guess how well versed are some of the -- island pilots on how dispatch dispatches, in your opinion?

A. I would say fairly well. Everyone has -- I mean, right now there's so many policy changes, I have no idea. But typically before it was always -- the primary concern was ETA.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So it's who can get there the quickest. So, I mean, and that's why it would be things that we would -- it wouldn't make sense to us, but it was the primary goal was ETA.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. So I'm going to bank that for a moment because I'm going to come back to that question. But before I do, so you said some of the things he enjoyed, some of the things that, you know, maybe a little bit of frustration with the mission. Did you know him well enough to know what he did in his off time? Like, what did he love so much about kind of the I don't have to work. I'm going to

go do this other thing, like?
A. Oh, well, I know he liked to travel. He would talk to me about traveling.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. And then he flew helicopters and yeah, stuff like that. Just kind of -- I think motorcycles too I think.
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah. He was an energetic guy.
Q. Does Hawaii Life Flight have any sort of, like, policy about flying elsewhere outside of this organization in place?
A. Yeah.
Q. Moonlighting, essentially.
A. Moonlighting, well, yeah. So we have flight and duty tracker which tracks all of our duty and rest time.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. And for any commercial flying, you have to log it in that same website, so the same tracker. Yeah. In fact, I had to do that too when I flew concurrently here at another 135 as well.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. I would have to put both flight times into flight and duty tracker.
Q. And what do you suppose the reason for that is?
A. Oh, to keep track of your rest. Yeah.
Q. But who is looking into that to keep track of your rests?
A. To keep track? Well --

Q. Is there any sort of oversight besides you obviously acknowledging what duty you performed --
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. -- and what rest you need?
A. The chief pilots, yeah.
Q. They are keeping track for both flying entities, for you and, like -- in your instance, for you flying here and the other part 135 operation?
A. Well, to make sure that there's no violations of going over your mandatory rests or --
Q. Okay.
A. -- free time.
Q. So in this instance, that would be Kaleo then is --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- looking into that sort of thing or is that higher in, like, Guardian?
A. I think it's higher in Guardian.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So circling back to the -- I mean, I'm going to be upfront. There's -- a lot of people have said kind of, like, how it is now, which always leads me to believe that it used to be different.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And you even yourself alluded to, like, policy changes,

things have changed.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So some of the changes that you've seen are -- is this -- did these happen before the accident or are they mostly post-accident?
A. Which changes, sorry?
Q. Well, you just said, like, you were talking about policy changes.
A. Oh, for dispatch?
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah, that was after, post-crash.
Q. That was -- okay. And that's what I thought, but I wanted to confirm. And then for the training, the recurrent training mandate, is it fair to say that?
A. Oh, no. Well, the mandate for sim training happened before the crash.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. Or actually sim training I should say.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Not in aircraft flight training.
Q. Yeah.
A. But yeah, we were bringing in people from outer islands to come to Honolulu to be in the sim before the crash until it broke. Yeah.
Q. Was there ever any, like, interpersonal issues that you ever saw Brian had to deal with with other members of -- or employees

of Hawaiian Life Flight?
A. What do you mean?
Q. Did he ever have a beef with somebody?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Or did anybody ever have a beef with him?
A. Oh, yeah, there was another pilot, Gwen (ph.). But they -- she left.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. But yeah, that was, like, years ago. It was 2021 actually I would say, about the same time.
Q. But since then, anything?
A. No. No, not that I'm aware of. I don't know.
Q. If there is ever an issue, like, let's say you maybe don't get along with someone, is there -- what's the policy here for dealing with that sort of thing? Or is it just, like, hey, there's only a few of us. You all better get along.
A. Oh, well, there's several ways actually. It's like -- depending on, you know, if it's a beef with, you know, a coworkers or, like, your boss or something.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. You can do the Baldwin Reports, which is, like, a -- it's a reporting system that goes to the top of management in the mainland in Utah. And then if it's like a coworker or something, you'll take it to your supervisor. So that would be Kaleo.
Q. Uh-huh.

A. And then he will run it up the chain and then they'll determine the best course of action. And then if it has to go to HR, then it'll go to HR. Yeah.
Q. Have you ever -- I guess, does that happen very often? Have you ever seen that happen?
A. Not typically, no.
Q. Okay.
A. I think most of it will stop with Kaleo.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And what are the tools in his toolbox to fix that sort of thing?
A. Well, I think he'll bring it to HR and then he'll talk to us or, you know, talk to -- counsel whoever's having these issues and then try to mitigate it through just talking it out and having discussions privately.
Q. So you've been here for a little bit. In your opinion, how well do you think that the Baldwin System works? This is an opinion based question, so.
A. An opinion based question?
Q. Yeah.
A. I'm not -- I haven't used it.
Q. You have never used it?
A. Well, I use it for my risk assessment, but I don't -- I've never made a Baldwin Report about anything.

Q. Is it that you've never seen or been involved in something to which you wanted to make a Baldwin Report or that you just didn't feel that that process was sufficient for your needs?
A. Well, I think any problem I've encountered I don't -- I didn't think of the Baldwin System as the right resource to be used.
Q. What's a better resource?
A. Just either talking to a supervisor or the chief pilot.
Q. Is that because of your comfort level or because of your, like, the timing in which you wanted to get things done?
A. I think comfort level.
Q. So you're just comfortable going with -- to your supervisor?
A. yeah.
Q. Do you know if others use it or talk about using it? Have you ever heard about others talking about using the report system?
A. Yeah, I've heard about other people using it.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you know if, like, changes were made based on what was said?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay.
A. I don't know.
Q. And going back to your interactions with Brian, I know that sometimes, you know, it -- especially in coworkers, I call it

cockpit confessional. Sometimes there's conversations that go on.
A. Yeah.
Q. And just like, hey, these are how things going on because that's part of human -- interactions in life. Did he ever express to you concerns about flying, specifically flying and then second, specifically flying the King Air?
A. No, the only concerns I've ever heard from Brian was about 7 Alpha Mike, particular that King Air, that aircraft.
Q. And -- but nothing about operationally flying?
A. No.
Q. Because you guys fly all times of the day, kind of at the whim of somebody out there.
A. No.
Q. Flying environment such as, like, over -- at night, over water, IFR, anything like that?
A. No.
DR. WOODS: Okay. All right. I think that's all I have for now. Thank you.
BY MR. GARRISON:
Q. Are you -- excuse me. Are you regularly flying the line here?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And that's why you're -- you've been doing since the accident, correct? Like, as far as -- sorry, I should have said. You haven't been doing any training since the accident, is that

what I --
A. Yeah. No, no pilot training.
Q. Okay. And that's mainly just due to the sim you said? Is that correct?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Are you still flying for Royal Pacific?
A. No.
Q. Are you flying for anyone else?
A. No, just Hawaii Life Flight.
Q. This is it. Okay. What do you know about the cap team?
A. I don't know. I mean, I know them. What do you mean?
Q. Do you fly on the CAP team?
A. Yeah, I fly the CAP team, yes.
Q. Okay. And what's different about that as opposed to the other?
A. Well, a bunch of things. Well, for starters, yeah, they don't -- we have more time to prepare as they come in. It's about a 30 minute call out. We can be on call at home. We don't have to be in the hanger rooms for that. They're not company employees. So each leg, to my understanding, is a part 135 leg. So it's kind of, you know, more stringent to adhere to your duty time requirements and flight time requirements. And now recently they don't need to wear the headsets in the plane.
Q. When you say they, who?
A. The CAP team.

Q. Okay.
A. The CAP team doesn't need to wear the headsets.
Q. Okay. When I refer to the CAP team -- or when you refer to the cap team, who are you referring to, I guess?
A. Oh, the Kapiolani transport team.
Q. Okay. So that wouldn't involve pilots. It's just the medical staff, is that what you're saying?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. So when you -- I'm just trying to clarify terms, that's all.
A. Okay.
Q. There's no, like -- I'm -- I don't know answers.
A. Okay. Yes.
Q. I'm really trying to gain information.
A. So --
Q. People have brought up CAP team. I'm trying to get --
A. Okay. Yeah.
Q. Yeah, I'm not testing you on anything. Yeah.
A. Yeah, so the CAP team is just for Kapiolani Hospital. It's a team of nurses and respiratory therapists and sometimes they'll bring, like, a neonatal surgeon or whatever. But they're just the medical team. And then as pilots here in Honolulu, some days you are assigned to hanger, which -- it's just you, single pilot, flying a plane and then there's a nurse and a medic.

Q. Okay.
A. Or two nurses in Honolulu who are all -- that's the crew. And then if you are on a cap shift as a Honolulu pilot, then you get to be on call from home. You are paired with another pilot, whether that's SIC or sometimes you'll have to be paired up with the hanger pilot. And then you can be on call at home and then make your way in when there's a CAP flight.
Q. Okay.
A. And then meet with the CAP team.
Q. Okay. So they fly two crew?
A. Yeah.
Q. Why is that one flown with two pilots?
A. Just a contract agreement.
Q. Okay. Why would the contract require two pilots?
A. I have no idea.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. What about other contracts, why don't they require two pilots?
A. I'm sorry? Which one? What do you mean?
Q. I'm just trying to get an idea of, like, why there's one, like, designated, like, this one flies with two pilots and all the rest fly single pilot. Like, I'm just trying to understand, like --
A. Well, it's a --

Q. What made that --
A. -- certificate issue. I mean, it's like not an issue, but our certificate is for single pilot operations in the King Air. And then we just offered two pilot because the hospital wants two pilots. But I think on -- I mean, I've been here for seven years. The crash happened about two months ago. But ever since I've been here from seven years before the crash, in my experience, we've always had two pilots. And I think primarily it's because of loading. It's because there's what's called NICU flights.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. And there's a 300 pound isolate that they put the babies in. So depending who the CAP team members are, they may not be able to carry it.
Q. How is --
A. So then there's two pilots, one up top, one outside to help slide this 300 machines into the --
Q. Oh, okay. Just -- okay. When -- before the accident, when the simulator was working and did you say pilots were required to come in or simulator training?
A. Before the accident, a little bit before. About six -- I don't know when, off the top of my head, it was actually made.
Q. Okay.
A. but I've been told that from like September, around there, September of 2022, everyone had to come into the sim for sim sessions for recurrent.

Q. Why was that change made in September of 2022? Like, why was it different --
A. I have no idea --
Q. -- before that?
A. -- why.
Q. Why wasn't it required before September?
A. I don't know why.
Q. Okay. And then when pilots did come over -- before that they could come in voluntarily?
A. Yeah.
Q. You were talking about, like, they could -- like, Brian texted you and just said, hey --
A. Oh, they could still come in voluntarily after September.
Q. Okay.
A. It was just that for the recurrent, they had to come in. Before that, they didn't -- they could waive it. Like, there were certain pilots that have never been in the sim. But ever since we had the sim, anyone -- it was open to anyone at any time.
Q. Okay.
A. If they wanted to.
Q. Could you get -- like, if a pilot was based in Maui, could they get paid to come over and sit in the sim for a day, do sim training for a day?
A. Oh, no, not unless it was -- unless it was required training or their recurrent and it was optional. Then they could do that.

Q. Okay. So before September, before --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- it wasn't required, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. So during that time, no one was required to come in. So no one was getting paid to do simulator training at that point?
A. No, they would only get paid if they opted to do it for recurrent.
Q. For recurrent? Okay.
A. For recurrent.
Q. I understand.
A. Yeah, so if they --
Q. If they wanted extra?
A. Yeah, if they wanted extra it's like, no.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Understood. That makes sense.
A. Yeah.
Q. But when it -- but if it was, like, hey, your recurrent is coming up.
A. Yeah.
Q. Simulator is open if you want it and they said, yeah, I want that. And then they would get paid to fly over and come --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- do the simulator?

A. The company would pay for their ticket and pay them their time coming over here on --
Q. Okay.
A. Whether it's a day off or on the schedule.
Q. That makes sense.
A. Yeah.
Q. Yeah, that makes sense. In your extensive experience in the simulator, what were common problems that pilots would have that you would see that you guys had to address?
A. The typical items. So common items I would see is rushing through startup system checks. So, like, bus transfer and those kind of tests.
Q. Yeah.
A. They would just click right through the volt meters. After starting the first engine, they wouldn't do the current limiter check on the second engine. They wouldn't start their timer for starting engines. So then it was kind of like, you know, how do you know when the cycle's complete, you know. Certain -- a lot of it was done in the ground. But then that's what kind of -- the broader picture turned into by not doing these steps on the ground, it creates problems or questions when you're flying. Like, how do you know what you're losing and what's working and what's not.
Q. Okay.
A. That was the typical things that I would see.

Q. Okay. Anything in -- like, in flight?
A. For flights, little bit of, I guess, rust or drift in procedures for things like missed approached, urgent maneuvers. But then it's like, you know, how often do you do those.
Q. Yeah.
A. You know.
Q. Yeah, that makes sense if you're just -- if you're not doing it and you --
A. Yeah, and then of course that's the purpose of the training, is that, you know, in Hawaii when it's beautiful weather 99 percent of the year, how often are you going to go miss.
Q. Right.
A. But that's why we have the training and, you know, the day that you do have, you've -- should be current and proficient in it.
Q. Right. That makes sense. Were you -- has the King Air always had the Garmin unit?
A. Which one?
Q. Since you've been with Hawaii Life Flight, has it always had --
A. It's always had a Garmin unit. When I first came here, it was a 430.
Q. Okay.
A. And then it turned into the 650. And then it was -- now we have certain planes with the G600 suite.

Q. 600?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Sorry, before the G600, it's -- it was what?
A. Well, the 625 I guess.
Q. 625?
A. Yeah, the 625. The -- just the small screen portion.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So that's what was in Golf Zulu?
A. In Golf Zulu, yes.
Q. Was the 625?
A. I believe it was a 625, yeah.
Q. Okay. Were you around when they installed the 625 for --
A. Yes.
Q. Were you doing training?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So did you -- when pilots were learning that, what -- that was a new system for them to learn that setup.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. The 625.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Were there any common problems associated with that?
A. The 625, not to my knowledge, no.
Q. Okay.
A. I mean, people would get annoyed with the settings, but that

was --
Q. Oh, sure.
A. You know with Track Up or North Up.
Q. North Up, sure, I got it.
A. And then people are like, you know, who flew this plane last.
Q. Right.
A. But it was just setting and -- yeah.
Q. Okay. But as far as, like, setting it up for an approach, all that kind of stuff?
A. Oh, yeah. Yeah.
Q. That was --
A. They were all very proficient with that.
Q. Okay. So a lot of --
A. Oh, actually, yeah. The problem was -- well, yeah. The problem is that they were being very reliant on the GPS.
Q. Oh.
A. That's why now a lot of our training, ironically in Utah, in the mainland, is doing approaches with no GPS.
Q. Oh, great.
A. Because everyone is so proficient in it, that they kind of formed this reliance on it.
Q. Oh, interesting. That makes sense. So they're doing, like, the OR approaches and such?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do they have NDB approaches out here or is it just --

A. No. Well, like, in Hilo, the alternate miss is NDB.
Q. Okay.
A. But no, typically they don't do NDB approaches out here.
Q. Okay. So just VOR GPS?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Okay. And ILS.
A. And ILS, yeah.
Q. Tell me about how you did partial panel training.
A. Partial panel, I mainly did it in the sim. A lot of times I would have to pause and explain to them the different characteristics of what they're seeing and if they're properly addressing each partial panel. So in the sim at least, if I would fail two screens, we would go through a process of elimination to see what it could be.

So if you lose two screens and it's completely black and you lose your autopilot and your autopilot alert system comes on, you know that it's most likely going to be your avionics bus. So in order to get it back, you would look at your panel and then pull your avionics master circuit breaker and everything would come back on.

If you lose two screens and you're magenta lights come on, you know you have to reset your gens. And then if you have a DPU failure and you lose both screens, you didn't have to guess because it would say in all red DPU fail. So typically --
Q. It does that in simulator, right? It says DPU fail?

A. Yeah.
Q. Does it do that in the plane too?
A. No, in the plane that's what we -- that we brief in the sim. And then I don't show it in the plane specifically because it's kind of, like, you know, risky to do it, especially in Hawaii where everything's very congested. Yeah, we brief it and I show them pictures of what DPU failures could look like. Where, like, the -- it looks like it's -- what's the word? Like fractal almost.
Q. Okay.
A. They're going to -- like a broken computer screen where, like, some images are distorted, some aren't. Maybe it'll go black. Maybe it's really faded. So I was like, that's what it could be.
Q. So it sounds like you've experienced a DPU failure in an airplane before?
A. Well, no, I've never experienced a DPU failure.
Q. Oh, you haven't?
A. No.
Q. How do you know it's, like, fractal, fractal?
A. Oh, just research.
Q. Okay. You just --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- look into it?
A. Yeah. Just research and it's happened to some pilots in the

mainland that we've kind of shared information through these training meetings and, like, whoa. Send that to me.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know, I'll brief these to the guys.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And you said you don't do that failure in the airplane because it's too risky?

A. Well, I -- just typically it doesn't make sense to do it in Honolulu. I'll simulate it and then, like, fail their autopilot and then turn the dimness down on their screens.

Q. Okay.

A. So it'll simulate, like, a DPU fail and they'll still have to do the corrective action.

Q. Okay. And then, like, what would be an exactly of a corrective action in that situation flying around Honolulu?

A. Well, depending what phase the flight you are, but level flight. Just be straight and level, no turn and then scan your instruments. Yeah, I mean, it's happened to me on an operational check flight out of here where I failed my EHSI went out. Where I'm -- I took off out of Honolulu on an OCF. I mean, that's -- and that's the purpose of it, is to do a trial run. But our -- my departure heading out of here is 130.

And then, you know, everything was good on the ground when I lined up on the runway and as soon as I rotate, it started

spinning. And then when you look at, okay, I'm on a heading of 120. Why I am going to land when I should be going offshore.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So my corrective action is wings level, see where the error is spinning towards and no, that's not it. You can refer to several things. You can look at your GPS track. You can look at the copilot side and see if that part's failing. You can refer to your status router and look at your iPad. There's a lot of ways that you can do --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- to identify what has failed. And that's how I got out of the heading and then I talked to tower, turned around, immediately came back and landed.

Q. Could you use --

A. But I --

Q. -- your ADI too?

A. I'm sorry, what?

Q. Your ADI, the --

A. You could. I mean, you know, I -- at the time, my instincts were just to look over to the copilot side, look at GPS and then just land.

Q. Or divert to?

A. And even -- I was -- yeah, I was VFR.

Q. That's helpful.

A. Yeah.

Q. You know.
A. Well, it was VFR at night, so it was kind of, like --
Q. Oh, okay.
A. -- whoa.
Q. It was night.
A. Yeah.
Q. Yeah. Okay. What was that failure with the HSI spinning? What caused that?
A. It was a DG failure.
Q. Oh.
A. Yeah, so the GG was inop. But that's what we were testing.
Q. And that's the only thing that it took out, the DG only took out -- didn't do anything with your attitude indicator?
A. Uh-uh.
Q. The attitude indicator was fine?
A. Yeah, the attitude indicator was fine. I mean, I only knew it because it was going out and then it would kind of lag or it would stop spinning while I was in a turn. I was like --
Q. Oh, interesting.
A. -- what.
Q. That's a new one I've heard.
A. So it was, like -- I think it was, like, a connection issue.
Q. Oh, interesting. I haven't heard of that one before.
A. Yeah.
Q. There's some weird ones you can run into, huh?

A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So partial panel training. We were talking about with that DPU failure, get the double black EFIS.
A. Uh-huh. Or single and then they would go to composite, but yeah, so.
Q. All right.
A. Partial panel like that.
Q. Okay. So double black let's say?
A. Yeah, double black.
Q. And the autopilot's out. So now we're needing to shoot an approach. Tell me the corrective action there?
A. For shooting an approach?
Q. Like, how --
A. Well, it --
Q. how a pilot's going to handle this from that point, yeah.
A. Well, it depends what the failure is.
Q. So it's a DPU failure. And --
A. So if it's a -- yeah, if it's a DPU failure and then you're autopilot's out, in terms of shooting an approach, I mean, first of all, you would declare an emergency and then try to get the easiest thing possible and try to get vectors or have ATC guidance to take you to the closest suitable airport and hopefully you break out. If not, then yeah, you're going to have to fly off of the copilot's side if you can't get it back up.
Q. Okay. Is there -- so you're going to have to fly off the

copilot's side, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is there any company policy for setting up those instruments on the right-hand side?
A. For the right-hand side? Yeah, there is. It's a part of our sim training.
Q. Okay. Tell me about that.
A. Our sim training, well, you know how I said if we -- if they miss something on the ground, they'll pay for it in the air?
Q. Right.
A. A lot of times we will -- a portion is when I give the pilot whatever the altimeter setting is. If they don't set it on the right side when they take off in training, we will give them a static port blockage in the sim.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. So as they're climbing or descending, they're altimeter is not going to be reading the same as their copilot altimeter. And once -- by that -- most cases for the people that miss it, when they look they don't know which one is right. And even if they do know which one is right and they're like, okay, the copilot one's more accurate than this one, they don't remember what the altimeter setting was.
Q. Yeah.
A. So that's the -- that's how we attack it in training.
Q. Yeah.

A. Ios making sure that everything is set on both sides.
Q. Yeah. Okay. So there's company policy to check it on the ground.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. What about, like, when you set up for an approach, setting up for an RNAV approach, let's say.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Which would probably be a typical one, right, that a pilot might set up for. Is there any company policy, like, once you get the approach loaded and set up to change the CDI needle on the right-hand side at all to set it to final approach course or anything?
A. I don't know if there's necessarily a rule. Like, a rule saying, like, if you don't do it, you'll get in trouble. But it's part of our training curriculum.
Q. It's part of the training curriculum?
A. Yeah. For -- it's part of the training curriculum that we have in the sim that -- for any ground based nav, it'll be set. So it's not like -- if, like, you're doing a GPS, yes.
Q. You're not going to set --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- final approach course or anything?
A. You're not going to -- set final approach course because if you lose -- like, even if you have GPS, you can, like, refer to your screen like in an emergency scenario. But your CDI on the

copilot side can't be so -- you know, it's not going to be linked to your GPS.

Q. Yeah, and the 625 has a course needle, is that right?

A. Yeah, yeah, on the display for the Garmin.

Q. Once your --

A. But I'm saying the CDI needle on the copilot side --

Q. Right.

A. -- won't be linked to it.

Q. Yeah.

A. Yeah.

Q. I understand what you're saying. I was just, like --

A. Yeah, like if you --

Q. I was realizing out loud.

A. -- press the home button and you go to the, you know, the DV -- the CDI needle on the screen, then yeah, that's how you would do it.

Q. Yeah, if you're flying in the RNAV approach, it's loaded. You're flying it.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Your CDI needle is there on the home screen, right?

A. Yeah. I mean, it's -- yeah.

Q. Is that the screen that's -- is there a company policy to have that CDI needle up?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So is it possible that it wouldn't be up? The --

maybe the moving map might be there instead?
A. It is possible, yes.
Q. Okay. So in that situation, let's say it's a moving map. We didn't transfer it over to the CDI. We're flying an approach, IMC conditions into Waimea, right.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And we're going to shoot it down to minimums.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. And somewhere in that descent, the CDU fails.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Even if both goes black, autopilot --
A. Yeah, you're going around.
Q. -- has kicked off. And so tell me what the pilot references at that point and gets out of that situation?
A. You would reference the Garmin and get out of it and call ATC.
Q. Okay. And he's got the Garmin set up on moving map.
A. On moving map? Then you would have to press the home button, hold it, go back to the CDI needle and then you'll get your full display of active where you point, where you're going, distance, all of that.
Q. Okay.
A. In your Garmin screen. But then immediately you would have to break off from the approach and go miss. You can't fly a published part of the approach if you lose your primary display

unit.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. That makes sense. Do you ever encourage people to hand fly on their normal -- like, when they come in for training, it's, like, oh, man. You're a big rusty. Maybe you should hand fly once in a while, like, instead of just having the autopilot on all the time?
A. What do you mean? Like, do I encourage? Like, do I discourage in any way or do I --
Q. No.
A. -- encourage them to --
Q. I'm wondering if, like, you -- like as the training, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You're doing training. We just heard this at companies before. You know, like, you come in for training and they're, like, oh, you've -- you know, you come in for your six month check or whatever.
A. Yeah.
Q. And they're like, oh, you've done nothing by autopilot flying.
A. Yeah.
Q. And now I'm failing your autopilot.
A. Oh, I see.
Q. You can't fly the airplane.

A. Yeah. No, I --
Q. Like, maybe --
A. I -- what I tell them before we do flight training is I just want to see if you're safe. So if you're doing a lot -- typically what I see is on a missed approach on a non-pression approach, you know when you level off an MDA and you're approaching the missed approached point. What I typically see is, in terms of hand flying, autopilot flying, is when people have the approach sequence in the Garmin and then they're leveled off at MDA. And then they're like, okay. And then they -- they'll hit go around. They'll add full power and then they're busy looking down here at the autopilot.
Q. Yeah.
A. And if the autopilot -- if they can't get the autopilot to do what they want, it's like, screw it. Fly the airplane. It's -- that's a problem for another day.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. So in that term, that's in terms of autopilot versus hand flying. I encourage them to hand fly if the autopilot is not being helpful to them.
Q. Uh-huh. Okay.
A. Does that make sense?
Q. Yeah, that makes a lot of sense. We were talking earlier about you were asked to -- after Brian received an unsatisfactory on a check ride, you were asked to do some retraining with him.

A. Yes.
Q. Did he receive a sim training session before his check ride on that one, do you know?
A. I can't remember. Because it -- because he did come in for multiple sim sessions. But if it was an elective one, I don't -- I can't remember. I'd have to look at -- I'd have to look it up.
Q. Well, I mean, elective or required, whatever. Like, do you know if he came in before that --
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. -- unsat to do the sim training?
A. I mean, yeah, he's -- yeah, he's come in before to do sim training before the --
Q. Right, right. I mean, my understanding, correct me if I'm wrong, I may be misunderstanding something here. But when they're coming up on their check ride, that's when they're -- you know, they can be paid to come over and do sim training, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Do you know if he elected to do that sim training before that?
A. Oh, I can't remember.
Q. That's -- okay.
A. I can't remember. Yeah.
Q. Okay. You mentioned you were required to do an hour of sim time.
A. No, no, flight training.

Q. Flight training?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. You were required --
A. Because the sim is always optional.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. You're required to do an hour of flight training after an unsat?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Where does that requirement come from, do you know?
A. Oh, just from my -- what my supervisor told me.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, it's --
Q. So Kaleo?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. Just said hey, we got to do a minimum of an hour.
A. Of at least an hour and then, you know, ground instruction to ground -- no, I mean, to -- as long as it takes on the ground --
Q. Okay.
A. -- to identify every item.
Q. And then you said you did five hours with him in the sim?
A. Yeah.
Q. Which was -- you said that was beyond -- that's beyond what's required, but I -- that was just me personally wanting to do that with him.

A. Was that what you planned as, like, oh, this may take -- this will probably take, like, five hours or was this surprising to you once you entered the sim session that it took that long?
A. Oh, no, that was kind of planned five hours.
Q. Okay.
A. Like after -- yeah, after, you know, this -- the day or two before the -- having him come here. Just looking at the things that he unsated.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. I felt that it was, like, this is probably going to be at least five hours.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. So if anything else -- yeah.
Q. Thank you for that carination. Thanks. You mentioned on that flight training -- when you did do the flight training, I don't -- did you mention how long that took? I don't know.
A. A little over an hour.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So it was right about --
A. For the flight, yeah.
Q. -- what you expected. But you -- one of the comments you said is that it became a performance demonstration?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Like, can you tell me more about that?

A. Yeah, so I used the five hours in the sim to get him to not just the point where oh, he finally did it right, you know. It was like, you're going to do it right and then you're going to do it right again and again and again. And then to the point where I'm going to start failing stuff on you and you're still going to do it right. So you're going to do a missed approach and then it's like, after the first time you do it, good. That's great.

And then we're going to do it seven more times and then I'm going to start failing engines on you. And then you're going to start losing screens. And then only after you do that, now we can go in the plane because I know you can handle more than just what's required.

Q. That makes sense. You had mentioned earlier talking about sometimes upper management, Kaleo up, someone will come down and say, hey, we're emphasizing this in training now.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. I realize that you're not doing training right now, but are you aware of any training emphasis of -- since the accident?

A. Training emphasis? Not particularly. We have monthly, like, lessons and exams, but there at random. So, like, last month's one was icing. I mean, I guess you could say it's --

DR. WOODS: Happen often here?

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Yeah, not here, but it's like, you know, I wouldn't say it was, you know -- it's just kind of at random. But yeah.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. Okay.

A. Well, and the 275I. that was the latest one.

Q. 275 what?

A. The 275I, the Garmin backup.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. It's like a redundancy, but they've had it in the Garmin planes and then it's installed in, like, all of our aircraft now.

Q. Okay. Is this with the new glass cockpit, is that what you're referring to, the 275I?

A. Yeah. Well, no, no. It's not the whole glass cockpit.

Q. Right.

A. Because that was always the vision was, you know, one by one they're going to put the whole thing in there. But then the other part was the 275I. So the last I heard in the meetings was that the reason -- the hold up for the budget, because the budget was approved since, like, 2021 or something, is mainly a supply chain issue.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. It's finding Garmin autopilots. Like, they can't find them because there's -- they're not producing them. But we're moving forward and getting the 275I. It's not an -- it's just a separate, it's own battery, it's own instrumentation. I think it has its own air data computer and AHRS. So it has attitude, yeah.

Q. So it would typically be used as, like, a standby attitude as a --
A. Yeah.
Q. But it could be used as more?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. That's how they --
A. That's a good way of putting it.
Q. -- they're kind of designed. And they kind of fit in the standard --
A. Yeah, dial. Yeah.
Q. -- yeah, avionics panel circle.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. So, like, you're not having to really adapt your panel. That's --
A. Yeah.
Q. I think I'm aware of the one -- instrument you're referencing. I wanted to talk about you mentioned this one case where training Brian might have been below average of what you would expect of a pilot.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Are there other instances where you're aware of Brian not training to satisfactory standards?
A. Not in my experience. Not that I've seen.
Q. Training or checking?
A. I don't know.

Q. So your only --
A. That was the only time I've ever had to train him.
Q. So you're only aware of one training session and one check ride that he needed extra work?
A. Yeah, mine. Yeah, the one --
Q. For --
A. Like, that's how I did his training is he failed that check ride.
Q. Okay. So you're not aware of any other conviction there?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Okay. Does that ever come up where you get a pilot coming in and it's like, oh, man, this guy again on the six month check? Like, this guy is -- we always got to work harder on him to get him up to standard. Is that a thing or do you guys talk about that?
A. No, usually never here long enough if that's the case.
Q. Oh, really?
A. Yeah.
Q. What happens with someone like that?
A. I mean, typically they're going to be put through remedial training.
Q. Wow.
A. And then somewhere along the line, they'll just leave.
Q. Okay.
A. Because they don't want their -- you know what I mean? It's

like people don't -- people would rather quit than get their PRD kind of wrecked.

Q. Oh, yeah.

A. So if you get fired, then it ruins your chances of getting another job because your pilot records are going to be showing with these failures. So it's like, once you get the letter saying, like, hey, you got to go to remedial training, it's kind of the writing on the wall where people are, like, you know what, I think I'm good. I'm just going to leave.

Q. What is remedial training?

A. Oh, that's in Utah. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And it's just, like, a course you go to for a week or something?

A. I've never been a part of remedial training. I've never even conducted it. So I --

Q. Do you know anyone who's gone to it?

A. I mean, I know one pilot that went through it, but he's no longer with us in the company.

Q. Was that his choice or the company's choice?

A. A little bit of both.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. That makes sense.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Let's see. Seven Alpha Mike.

A. Yes.
Q. When was the last time it was online, do you know?
A. Not off the top of my head. I'd have to look that one up too.
Q. Was it -- do you know if it was months ago or years ago?
A. I would say it's maybe, like, six. I think I flew it within, like, the last seven or eight months I would say. Summertime, sometimes I flew it.
Q. Summertime. Okay. So it wasn't online in December?
A. No, no.
Q. Okay. Do you know which airplane was online and -- because --
A. Actually, I don't know if seven Alpha Mike was online. I don't think it was though.
Q. Okay.
A. But I don't know for sure.
Q. Okay. Can you recall at all, 13 Golf Zulu had just gone over to Maui, yeah? Are you aware of that?
A. I don't know about that.
Q. Okay.
A. The planes allocated --
Q. I won't ask further on that then.
A. Oh, okay.
MR. GARRISON: I understand that was a long time ago. So no worries. That's all I have for now.

BY MS. HILL:

Q. You mentioned the Track Up, North --

A. Yeah.

Q. Is there -- what's your preference?

A. I prefer Track Up on my avionics and I prefer North UP on my iPad.

Q. All right.

A. If that makes sense.

Q. Is there any company SOP for those preferences?

A. No.

Q. How do most pilots configure?

A. I think most is Track Up.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. So you made it through round one. I told it it's the longer one. But we've been going about an hour and a half. Do you need a break?

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Oh, yeah, I'll just use the bathroom, if that's okay?

MR. ETCHER: Absolutely. We'll take a break at 26 past.

(Off the record.)

(On the record.)

MR. ETCHER: And back on the record at 32 past the hour.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So thank you so much so far for everything you've given us. It's been very helpful. We'll do a second round. It's a lot quicker. I just have a few questions and then we'll go around.

A. Okay.
Q. You've helped fill in a lot of blanks so far. For a moment, I mean, since you're in training, let's talk about the autopilot.
A. Okay.
Q. From your experience as an instructor, have pilots been able to understand how to use it easily or has it been a challenge? And I know it's irrelevant, but just general terms.
A. Well, for general terms for the whole fleet of Hawaii, it's been pretty easy for them to understand. They've only had to understand the same autopilot and only the Alpha Mike models being the different variation in terms of autopilot. Like, I was talking about the altimeter setting or altitude setting and arming and stuff like that. But yeah -- for the general portion of it, it's been pretty easy.
Q. Okay. Have you ever had any issues, you as a line pilot --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- flying with the autopilot?
A. Well, for me as a Honolulu pilot, we've had to learn four different variations of autopilot. So for Honolulu, we have to learn how to fly to Alpha Mike, so don't capture altitude unless you select it. The normal Bravo models that do. The G600, so it has a Garmin autopilot. And then Victor Foxtrot, which is one of our planes that has a G600 avionics, but it has an old Collins autopilot. So --
Q. How much of a challenge is that to learn? I mean, are they

-- they're not that similar. But are they similar enough?
A. The -- well, Victor Foxtrot, that one is being -- it -- that one has only been an issue in Honolulu because it hasn't really gone anywhere else.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. You know, only pilots that are trained on the G600. Last I've heard, I think they've already actually switched to autopilot. So now it's just two autopilot -- or two aircraft that have G600, also have the Garmin autopilot. So that's where we're at now. But typically we -- the only problem I've heard of with that one airplane was one pilot had a really difficult time learning it because of how it was set up in terms of the annunciator panel.

So if you were on nav, there was what's called a GPSS button, which would navigate based on GPS. So GPSS meant GPS steering. In the Collins autopilot, there's either nav or there's heading. So the only way to activate that GPSS mode would be in heading mode. So that was a problem for only one pilot because it was confusing, right. I mean, rightfully so. It's like, am I in heading mode or am I in nav mode. Because I'm in heading mode and my heading is 270, but here we are turning towards Japan.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. So that was, like, one instance. But then that pilot's no longer here either. But yeah, that was the only problem I've ever heard. Other than that, everyone else picked it up pretty quickly

and actually preferred that plane.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. Have you ever had the autopilot disconnect on you? You're just -- you're in route, you're descending, climbing, whatever?

A. Yeah.

Q. What would cause it to disconnect?

A. Well, in 8 Alpha Mike, and that plane has been out of commission for over an year. But in 8 Alpha Mike, it would -- it could be anything. It could be a gust of wind, you know. I mean, it would just kick off. But yeah, it was like a -- I think one of it was actually flap settings. Where if you would put down your approach flaps, certain times it would disengage and kick off. So but then you would kind of, you know, be ready for it.

And then the way our procedures for the Alpha Mikes especially we had a checklist for the A model aircraft specifically. It was thousand to go and then select check. That was the actual verbal callout. So that within 1,000 of, you know, leveling at your altitude, you would be -- all your attention would be focusing if it's going to capture that altitude that you select.

Q. So how about in the non-Alpha Mikes? Was there any any -- did you ever have any -- anybody -- did you have any autopilot issues or did anybody have autopilot disconnecting that you can

recall?
A. Not disconnecting in flight, no.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Troubles connecting?
A. MEL, but not, like --
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, if that makes sense.
Q. Yeah. All right. How often have you -- do you hand fly?
A. Like, in a measurement of time or frequency or --
Q. Yeah, I mean, do you tell yourself, oh, every so many flights I'm going to hand fly or every so often I'm going to -- you know, what's kind of -- or maybe you're just, like, oh --
A. Every time I get a new plane, I'll hand fly for at least the first 20 minutes.
Q. Okay.
A. Just because I don't -- and not that I don't trust, but I don't -- I want to verify that the trim settings is how I fly. Because then you can't detect that on the autopilot, right?
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Yeah.
Q. So is there -- does the autopilot -- so help me understand that a little bit. The trim settings, does the autopilot --
A. Everything other than elevator.
Q. Oh, okay.

A. So like if you receive a plane from someone and you take off, maybe the rutters are cranked all the way right or maybe the aileron is cranked all the way left or something, depending how they fly. But then I'll take off. I'll hand fly until everything feels right and there's -- I relieve all pressure and then I'll set the autopilot. And then that's my baseline for straight and level flight.

Q. Okay. Okay. That I understand. Thanks for the clarification.

A. Oh.

Q. Have you ever heard of any electrical issues in -- I get it. The alpha mics were the --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- the ones nobody liked, obviously.

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. But how about the, like, Golf Zulu or anything like that? Did they have any electrical issues?

A. Not that I'm aware of specifically with Golf Zulu. I've heard of, like, EFIS failures. I mean, that's in a recurring thing in some of our shift briefs, is that people say, like, oh, this one, it's not necessarily inoperative, but it'll be, like, hey, this one takes -- like, this one took five minutes to spool up or something like that. That's like, oh, that's weird. You know, and then they had -- the flight director will pop up and then have all the icons and stuff.

Q. Uh-huh.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. You fly, so correct me if I'm wrong. Have you written airplanes up mechanically?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Can you give me an idea of -- is it --
A. I just wrote one up yesterday.
Q. Oh, really?
A. Yeah.
Q. On your check ride of all things?
A. Oh, yeah. Yeah.
Q. All right. What'd you write it up for?
A. Copilot push to talk button, I wrote it up. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Does maintenance fix these pretty easily? Do they MEL them quicker?
A. No, I mean, some of them, even the ones that are MEL, in most cases, I mean, depending what it is, they -- they'll just fix it immediately.
Q. Okay. One question I meant to ask when we were talking earlier, you're both a line pilot and an instructor.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. But how do they mesh those schedules? If you -- if somebody wants to check ride, you got to retrain them. How do they mesh that with your line flying?
A. Well, I mean, primarily we do their training during the day.

So if someone fails their training and, say, I'm on days, they're just going to pull me off the schedule the following day and then I'll just be doing training. Because if -- like, let's say Stu is on nights, they're not going to tell him, hey, I know you flew all night. Starting tomorrow, you're going to train someone. So then that's how they would do it. It's whoever day on days or whoever's off will do the training. If you're on nights, it'll just not be you.

Q. Okay.

A. It'll be the other instructor.

Q. So if they pull you off days, do they have a backup pilot? Somebody that's standing by on reserve or whatever you guys would call it to cover your shift?

A. Well, to open the bid out to anyone who wants it and typically it's -- I mean, I've never heard of it not being covered.

Q. Okay.

A. To be honest.

Q. Okay. All right. Earlier with somebody you said there's been lots of policy changes. I don't remember -- I just wrote here lots of policy changes.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Do you -- can you recall how long ago you're talking here with lots of -- I mean, when I hear lots I think tons, but --

A. About a month ago.

Q. Okay.
A. Is when majority of them happened.
Q. Okay. And were they bit policy procedure changes or were they just --
A. Yeah, yeah. So prior, the procedure would just be that dispatch would text us our flight information. So a release number, destination, patient weight and then who our crew was and then the tail number of the aircraft. And then it was up to us, the pilots, to, you know, check, make sure the weather was good, check NOTAMs, check the plane out that it's all air worthy, do all that stuff and along with our risk assessment.

Now, they'll just tell us, like, oh, you have a flight. Can you check the weather here. And then you say, yeah. And then they'll give you phone numbers to call and that's your crew. So then I have to brief the crew and then say, are you guys feeling okay.

So then it kind of puts that on the pilot's perspective. And I think my concern with that is like, I'm not a psychiatrist. You know what I mean. How would I know? I -- you know what I mean? I mean, it's like, if you're talking about wellness and fit to fly, how do I know if somebody based on questioning someone if they're really okay to fly, you know.

And then another policy change is it's the intercom in the aircraft. I never did that before. And now I think that is -- yeah, it's a big change.

Q. Intercom for?
A. For medic crews. So while the pilots are -- you know, they're plugged in. The medic crews are -- also have headsets and they're plugged in in the back too.
Q. That wasn't the case before?
A. No.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So how would they -- how would a med crew communicate with you? Would they just tap you on the shoulder or would they --
A. Well, no. I mean, only up until maybe -- I don't want to say two or three weeks ago. We even got clarification on whether or not we could use the isolation button because that was the thing where it was, like, you guys all have to be plugged in and have -- and increase communication with the crew. And then I think the medic crews felt really good with that so they know what's going on.

But then the pilots are like, we have to navigate. We have to aviate, fly the plane. We have to do all the taxiing and communications with clearance, ground, tower, departure, approach and center and now on top of that we have to hear all these things, like this chatter for things that don't pertain to us. So, like, typically it would be kind of hard to get your clearance and then talk to clearance and everything while you're -- hearing the med crews, like, hey, can you pass me that apple cord. And

this is for my iPad. You know, grab that med bag. And, you know, you're like what the heck, you know. Yeah. So.

Q. Okay.

A. That was some of the ones that pop out at me.

Q. So can you use the isolation button?

A. Yeah.

Q. All right.

A. Yeah, you can use the isolation, as long as it's brief. But then it turns into, like, well during the brief, are they okay with it. How does that make the nurses feel. Are they safe to take the flight now if they, you know, are being controlled when they can and can't talk.

Q. Okay.

A. yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. So that's been a concern of mine I guess.

Q. All right. Do you have anybody here at -- out in Hawaii that's a -- I don't know what you want to call it, a safety officer, a safety person?

A. Oh, well, in terms of safety, I would refer to Michael Koenes (ph.). He's our director of safety. But he, like, comes down here and he's the guy in charge of the Baldwin System and, yeah, he's shooting us all these emails and he's a part of all the safety meetings. But yeah.

Q. But do you have anybody here in Hawaii that's a safety

person?
A. No, not that I'm aware of.
Q. Okay.
A. I think he just takes care of it, I guess.
Q. Okay. All right. You said earlier that it's beautiful here 99 percent of the time.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. How do you keep current?
A. What do you mean how do I keep current?
Q. You got to -- I assume you have to maintain currency, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. I mean, night takeoffs and landings and all that?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. That's probably not hard for you guys.
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. But instrument approaches.
A. Yeah.
Q. How do you guys keep current?
A. Well, for Honolulu it's pretty simple. We do a lot of Waimea and Molokai flights.
Q. Okay.
A. And Waimea, the weather will change six times by the time you get there.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.

Q. So it's not too hard for you guys to know. I'll take -- for this base here, for you anyway.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, well, I mean, that's for the -- the real portion of it. But then in the sim, that's where we get most of our training from.
Q. Okay. All right.
A. Yeah.
Q. Sorry, I meant to ask this earlier when we were talking about the autopilot. The disconnect, or you disconnect it or anything, does it give you any alert?
A. Oh, yeah.
Q. Any --
A. There's a loud tone.
Q. Okay. Is that --
A. It will tell you, followed by, like, two or three lights. It'll tell you that your autopilot failed or disconnect and then you'll get your red annunciator light, followed by the tone and then your pedestal will be blinking. It's pretty hard to miss.
Q. Okay. Does that tone sound like any other tone that you would get?
A. No.
Q. No.
A. It's a very loud solid tone.

Q. It's pretty clear?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. All right.
A. It just goes do-do. It's -- so it's a very specific type. Not like -- you can't confuse it with stall horn or anything like that.
Q. Okay. Perfect. That's what I wanted to make sure.
A. Okay. Yeah.
Q. That there's no confusion, so. Okay. Typically, do you know what the bust rate would be of people not satisfactorily completing a checkrid I know you've done a few retraining events after check rides. But do guys keep track of -- as instructors, any failure rates or bust rates?
A. I -- not off the top of my head I don't. I know the ones that I've deal with.
Q. Okay.
A. But I don't know about any others.
Q. That's not -- those numbers aren't necessarily discussed in your every first Thursday of every month instructors?
A. No, I mean, I get the emails. I just haven't --
Q. All right.
A. I don't know the rate off the top of my head because I haven't counted them.
Q. Oh.
A. But, I mean, I've -- I get the emails every time there is an

unsat because just we need to be briefed on them.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. But in terms of who does what, I can't --
Q. Right.
A. -- keep track of it.
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you give me an estimate in the last year how many of those emails you've gotten?
A. Last year, no more than five.
Q. Oh.
A. Yeah. Probably way less than five.
Q. Okay. Okay. And I know what -- Dylan and you were talking about, you know, this pilot's not here anymore. That pilot's not here anymore. What kind of turnover rate do you see? Do you have a lot of people leaving and new hires coming in?
A. Very -- actually, fairly low turnover.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
MR. ETCHER: All right. I believe that is all my questions and you've helped me fill in a lot of blanks, so I appreciate it. Sabrina?
BY DR. WOODS:
Q. Yeah, I have a couple more. So in general, how would you describe the working relationship between the pilots and the

crews?
A. Pretty good. Pretty good up -- I mean, after the crash, it brought up a lot of, you know, I guess questions. But before the crash, I would say very good.
Q. Questions? Who's questioning?
A. Med crews. Med crews and pilots
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah, pretty much that.
Q. Any idea exactly what those questions are?
A. Like, two pilots. Like, they'll want either two pilots or they'll say, like, they want to know what's going on in the front.
Q. Yeah. So what is the company trying to do to help answer and/or sway some of those concerns?
A. Well, I think things like making policies like intercom.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. But I think mainly the best thing that the company did was get the pilot's input. Because I think most pilots, including myself, feel that for this particular operation, it's better being single pilot. It's actually safer being single pilot, if you can believe that much.
Q. Why is that?
A. Because if you have the best pilot in the world in the right seat, Everything's on the left. That's just how the thing is designed. The firewall shutoff valve is on the left seat. The gear handle is in the left seat. All your fuel control stuff is

in the left seat. It -- unless they're going to reach over your lap to flip switches in your electrical system, they can't really do much.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. And even the autopilot instruments, it's all off of the left seat.

Q. So I do a lot of investigations into what I call unintended consequences and so -- and you see that. You see sometimes after significant incidents such as this that here will be a lot of change, a little bit of kerfuffle and -- but sometimes that brings up additional issues that people don't realize. You talked a little bit about, like, the headsets and the chatter. So this is kind of a two parter. And first is are your crews aware of, like, sterile cockpit procedures?

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. They're well aware of sterile cockpit. The problem is is that even though they respect the sterile cockpit, if they have a patient back there, they have every right to be talking to each other because they need communication if you're working on a critical patient. Just like I have every right to be talking to clearance, ground and anything in tower for navigating flight. So if both parties just were isolated or separated, then I feel like that would be better for both departments.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. and I can focus on what I'm doing and they can have all the communication with each other dealing with the patient in the back.

Q. So that's actually a perfect segway. Is you've experienced this for a little while. You're maybe picking up on some things that you feel might not be working as intended for this change. What do you intend to do about it?

A. Well, I need to give it more time too.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. I mean, it's so new we're -- like I said, you know, I only recently got clarification on just the use of the isolation in the briefing. And if it's only been three weeks, it's, like, you know how much are you going to learn really. So I think it -- with time, as questions come up, I hope to get them addressed. But you don't know until you know I guess.

Q. True. Do you feel that there is a good system in place for that kind of feedback?

A. Yeah, yeah. I think that at least the leadership that I've been dealing with, they've been -- it may not be the answers you want, but you'll get answers and they've been very responsive.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And we talked a little bit earlier about that. Your preference is probably to go to someone such as Kaleo, whereas there is another option of the Baldwin Report, correct?

A. Yeah.
Q. Would that be an appropriate venue to -- for other pilots maybe who are off island -- off this island who are not as comfortable going directly to Kaleo? Would that be a good venue for them to also express their concerns?
A. I mean, they can.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. I mean, I don't -- I can't speak for them.
Q. Yeah.
A. I don't know.
Q. I'm just saying that you kind of have a rare opportunity because you're here and maybe you interact and -- physically see these people more often.
A. Well, I mean, I don't know. They have, they have their base meetings.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. And now that's -- actually not even just recently. It's been happening since COVID ended that it's all in person. So that's who they can, you know, bring it up to Kaleo or --
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, what have you.
Q. In your own words, how would you define the safety culture here at Hawaiian Life Flight?
A. I would say it's -- I mean, I feel comfortable with it. So speaking for myself, I would say it's a good safety culture here.

Q. What makes for a good safety culture?
A. Being heard.
Q. Okay. And I think the only other -- questions I have is for the autopilot disconnect, I know Shawn was asking about about, like, the sound, the, what I would call, an oral warning that it makes.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. That is something that can be exhibited in the sim, correct?
A. I mean, I don't know how since it's broken, but yeah, it would be -- it could be in the sim.
Q. I thought it was the GPS that was --
A. No, I don't know because it's broken.
Q. Okay.
A. It's just generally broken. That's why we can't use it.
Q. Okay.
A. Because I -- my explanation to mainland was that, like, hey, I can't use just a GPS. Can I do other stuff in this sim. And they said either you can do it all or you can't do it. So now that it's broken, I have no idea what work has been done on it right now.
Q. Okay. Prior to that though, was that something that could be heard in the sim?
A. Yeah, it could be heard in the sim.
Q. Okay. Okay. But if you were not allowed to -- I have to word my next questions, which is could we get a demonstration.

A. Well --
Q. But maybe I'll talk more to -- with somebody else about that and see if it's possible.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Because I haven't been in the sim for two --
Q. Yeah.
A. I don't want to give an answer and then it's --
Q. Oh, no, I hear you.
A. -- I don't even know, so.
Q. I understand. Okay. Thank you. That's all I have.
A. Okay.
MR. ETCHER: Dylan?
BY MR. GARRISON:
Q. Tell me more about -- you said there was a Collins to autopilot that when in heading mode, you can put it on to navigate using the GPS.
A. Yeah.
Q. Tell me more about that. I've never heard of that before.
A. Yeah, so in the Collins autopilot, the annunciator panel isn't -- it's a separate panel, not a part of this system.
Q. Okay.
A. So the EFIS system is, like, those tubes, those screen TVs. Well, for the -- Collins autopilot in Victor Foxtrot, it would just be a strip bar, not a part of the screen, just its own

lights. And when you would hit it, it would be the same lights as you would see on the pedestal. So you would be in heading mode in the pedestal, heading mode in the panel above the EFIS.

And then if you press GPSS, there would be two icons. One in the pilot's side and one in the copilot's side. Pilot's side would say GPSS with an icon with a big X over heading to let you know that you're not in heading mode.

Q. Okay.

A. And then on the copilot's side, it would just have an X over heading. So that was your only indication saying, like, okay, I don't have heading, right.

Q. But you were in heading?

A. And -- yeah, but so that was the problem with this one pilot was that the autopilot's saying we're navigating on heading mode and the screen is saying we're not indicating that -- or not navigating on heading mode.

Q. Yeah, I could see how that'd be confusing.

A. Yeah. So that was for Victor Foxtrot at least. But, I mean --

Q. That was the only airplane that had that in your -- in this fleet?

A. Yeah, and that's why it got -- you know, after dealing with it and flying it for so long, you know. I mean, everyone kind of preferred that plane because it was, like, you know, the best for Garmin and navigating.

Q. Okay.
A. And everything was all nice and new. But that one mode was the biggest issue.
Q. was there any oddities like that with Golf Zulu?
A. No, not with Golf Zulu. Not that I can remember.
Q. Okay. So that is a more typical autopilot? Is that how you would describe it? Like --
A. Oh, yeah. Very typical autopilot with Golf Zulu.
Q. Heading mode is heading mode, nav mode is nav mode?
A. Yeah.
Q. And then when you are --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- in nav mode and you want to navigate -- so nav mode and you want to navigate off the GPS, is there anything you have to switch?
A. No.
Q. Or, like, when you go from flying in route on a GPS, navigating using the GPS and you want to switch to an approach. Then you want to fly an ILS. How do you switch from nav mode into flying that ILS approach?
A. Oh, just like any King Air. You would go to your preselect knob and then it would switch down to the next window. You would select VOR or localizer if you want to do ILS and then you would just hit the transfer switch and then that’s how you would get into ILS mode.

Q. Transfer switch on the --
A. On the preselect knob. You know how, like, you'll hit -- you'll switch over to preselect and you then you can select whether you want VOR or localized or GPS.
Q. Okay.
A. And once you have the one you want, you would select it and then transfer so that it would transfer to the active mode.
Q. Okay. So if I'm switching -- if I was flying on -- using GPS navigation. I'm clear to direct an initial approach fix for a GPS approach. How would I want to switch my autopilot at that point?
A. If you're -- flying on GPS to do an RNAV approach, like a GPS approach, you wouldn't change anything. You would just stay in GPS.
Q. So I just hit load approach, activate approach, direct initial approach fix?
A. Yeah.
Q. And then that -- I don't have to change anything on the autopilot?
A. You shouldn't have to.
Q. Okay.
A. You could do the whole thing on nav, yeah.
Q. Again, I'm -- this is not a test at all.
A. Yeah, no.
Q. I'm really curious. I'm wanting to make sure I understand it correctly is all.

A. Yeah, if you're doing a GPS approach and you hit direct anywhere and you are on white needles in the King Air, it's like it'll -- it's not like the Garmin where it's magenta.
Q. Okay.
A. So it's on white needles going on GPS and you just hit nav. You can fly to direct to any approach fix and start the approach and fly the whole approach in nav mode.
Q. Okay. What if I'm being vectored around and then I'm cleared direct to initial approach fix, how would I want to change my autopilot?
A. You would just go from heading to nav.
Q. So I'm in heading mode and all I do is load the approach, initial -- I'm heading below the approach via the initial approach fix. It's giving me the pink line to the initial approach fix. I reach down and I just nav?
A. yeah.
Q. And then it should go intercept the course?
A. Well, it would be a white needle, but yeah. As soon as you hit direct to the initial approach fix, you would hit nav and then it would take you there. Even if you were on this heading, you hit nav, it's going to turn you into -- take you directly to where you want to go.
Q. You know, I've just been assuming it, but these have flight directors, right?
A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Just wanted to make sure. Now, you mentioned the autopilot being inoperative earlier. Can you fly these planes with the autopilot inoperative?
A. Yeah. Well, the MEL for -- or to defer yeah. If you have an autopilot inop, you can fly as long as you have a copilot.
Q. Oh, if you have a copilot?
A. Yeah.
Q. So that would only -- I mean, but you guys only fly with a copilot on one contract?
A. On cap flights, yeah. That's why we have the copilots is for the SICs, but if -- like say a pilot -- a plane goes down for maintenance because it loses autopilot, then we can call any pilot. Sometimes we've even called the Molokai pilot to fly over here, land, hop in a plane and then go fly.
Q. Okay. So then you're flying two crew?
A. Yeah, two.
Q. Okay. And do you guys do CRM training? Like, because you mentioned, like, you don't --
A. What -- well, in in-dock, yeah, you have to cover, like, what CRM is and stuff like that. But typically our CRM training is mostly getting familiar with the autopilot.
Q. Right.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Right. But recurrent training or anything, like, do you ever do, like, how you're going to run a two cockpit crew? Does that

change at all, like, who's running the checklist, who's working radios, who's flying the airplane, like how that's done?

A. Oh, no. It's just that if everyone is -- everyone is trained to be single pilot.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So that's basically what it is. It's just a decision of who wants to do it.

Q. And I'm sorry, did you say -- do you ever fly the cap team flights or --

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So in that situation, you're trained for single pilot. So when you go fly, does the SIC get a turn to fly?

A. Yeah, typically.

Q. And the 135, 91, doesn't matter? They can fly either one?

A. Yeah. Well, yeah, if they're checked right. Like, they could fly either one, but we like to -- we prefer them flying the 91 legs. But that's mainly just for exposure purposes.

Q. Sure. So when they're flying, what are you doing in the left seat?

A. Basically kind of being a CFI and instructing them.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. And doing radios if they're the ones flying.

Q. Is there any company procedures or anything that has, like, what each person should be doing or, like, what --

A. No, because it's not required for a certificate.

Q. Right, it's just you just have this one contract where it is required though?
A. Yeah. Well, yeah, it's just an agreement contract with the hospital.
Q. Right.
A. But yeah, so there's no -- like, for all intents and purposes, other than doing a cap flight, we're not required to even have them. So I guess the best way to put it is if Kapiolani decided that they didn't want to have anything to do with this company, then there's no reason to have SICs.
Q. Right. These SICs go get -- they do have their check rides, right?
A. Well, yeah, they'll do two --
Q. Part 135 check rides?
A. Yeah.
Q. Sorry.
A. Well, just 12 month check rides. They don't have the six month check rides.
Q. Okay. They don't have to do --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- 297 ever six months? Okay. Have you either read in the, like, in the initial NTSB report or wherever else about the last radio transmissions for 13GZ?
A. No, no.
Q. Have you heard them?

A. Not really. I mean, we've been trying to look for them, but we can only get so much from live ATC.
Q. Right.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. I mean, it was in the initial --
A. All the hang on or something, yeah.
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah, I read that, but yeah.
Q. Okay. So you're familiar with that?
A. Are you asking if there's anything more or if I've heard anything more than that?
Q. No, I was just asking if you were familiar with that.
A. Oh, okay. No, just making -- okay.
Q. I didn't know if you read --
A. Just making sure.
Q. If you had heard that yet or not.
A. Oh, yeah, no.
Q. Or anything about that.
A. I've read about that, yes.
Q. Okay. One of the last things that Brian says is he is cleared direct Lindsey (ph.) for the initial approach fix into Waimea.
A. Or TAMMI (ph.)?
Q. Did I say Lindsey? I think I've been saying that.
A. Oh, Lind because Lindberg (ph.) is over there I think?

Maybe.

Q. No, I think I'm just mixing up.

A. Oh, TAMMI.

Q. You're right.

A. Okay.

Q. It's TAMMI.

A. TAMMI for Waimea, yeah.

Q. I think I've been saying that wrong. Sorry. TAMMI. But the clear direct TAMMI--

A. Yeah.

Q. -- for the initial approach fix. Thanks for correcting me. And then ATC comes back on and they say, hey, confirm your direct Lindsey because he wasn't --

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Did I say it again? Your TAMMI.

A. Yeah.

Q. Confirm your direct TAMMI because he wasn't trending in that direction.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. And he replied something along the lines of I'm off navigation. Hang on. Off transmission. Back on transmission.

A. Yeah.

Q. We're going to give this a try.

A. Yeah.

Q. And you have way more experience with this operation, with

this airplane, you know, and we -- of course we can't know the -- like, exactly why. But do you have any idea why Brian might say that? Like, what could have possibly been going on that he would say we're off navigation? What does that mean?

A. I've been wondering the same thing myself. Ever since the crash happened, I've been (indiscernible) until, like, 10:00 at night trying to put myself in the same situation, to fail everything to see what could have happened. I have no idea.

Q. Okay. What is the story, like -- I know that you guys shut down. You had a safety stand down after the accident.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. But eventually you guys got back in the airplane and starting flying again.

A. Uh-huh.

Q. What is that story that you're telling yourself of, like, why it's okay for you and why you feel safe to go fly?

A. What do you mean? Like, what am I telling myself or --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- like, what did the company tell us or what do you mean?

Q. What you tell yourself.

A. Well --

Q. Of, like, why this won't happen to you.

A. I don't know how to answer that.

Q. Okay. I'm just trying to get an idea of -- in your head of, like, you know, like it's a risk every time we go to fly, right.

A. Uh-huh.
Q. And when a plane we've flown and people we fly with crash, it's like are -- the questions are, like, why and, like, how do I make sure this doesn't happen to me.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. I mean, you know, and like -- I don't know. And so I was just -- is that just something you just push out of, like, I don't want to think about that? Or is that something, like --
A. Well, because I don't know what caused it.
Q. Right.
A. And it could have been anything. It could have been mechanical. It could have been training. It could have been fatigue. It could have been a health related issue. It could have been any of those things.
Q. Sure.
A. I'm not saying that I'm, like, you know, above all of those things. But I can't see the scenario that I'd be in where I wouldn't have a better understanding of what's going on. And that doesn't come into training or experience. That's just -- I mean, even if it's mechanical. If it's a certain level of like the wind fell off or something let's say, for instance, what can you do. And it's just the risk you have to take. And like you said, right, anytime you get into the plane it's a huge risk to take. So yeah.
Q. All right. One of the things you said earlier was talking

about, like, having to check in with the crews. And you're like, I'm not a psychologist. Like, I don't -- you know, I don't want to make an evaluation. Is that the explanation that's come to you of why that change was made is like, hey, we need you, the pilots, to make sure the med crews are okay to go on these flights?

A. Yeah, I mean, that was the new policy is that we'll contact them and make sure that they're okay to fly. And, I mean, it's always been the motto, but I think they're just pushing it more now for, you know, a broader interpretation of three to go, one to say no because the typical crew is one pilot with two medical crew members. But then it's just -- I don't know. I think it's interesting that it's, like, it's all up on the pilot to make that decision. To be, like, are you okay, you know.

Q. Yeah.

A. Because depending on your attitude, if you're a pilot that's, you know, willing to listen and that's okay. But if you're another pilot that says I'm saying we're going to go. If you're not going to go, then go home. Then you're like, well, where does that put the med crews, you know. So that's kind of why it's -- I don't know, but I don't think it's a foolproof system. But --

Q. Do you feel like this change is helpful?

A. I think that the change is helpful to the med crews.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. Not necessarily the pilots.

Q. Making them feel better, more comfortable?

A. Yeah, feel -- I mean, having anyone ask you how you're feeling is going to be more of a -- I would hope that it's more of a feeling of relief. But then having to ask someone if you're the pilot, that's more of a responsibility, you know. It's on you to determine their answer and if they are ready to fly based on what they say.

Q. How does them being on headsets in the airplane, how does that help? Like, this is a change we made after the accident.

A. Yeah.

Q. So how is this helpful?

A. I don't know. I really don't know.

Q. Do you feel that it's helpful?

A. Because -- I think it's helpful for -- I think it's helpful for problems that could arise inside the aircraft. I don't think it's helpful for situational awareness outside the aircraft. Like, the only situation I see it being helpful is, like, the patient's going crazy back here and is getting violent or something. Then it's like, thanks for telling me, you know. But other than that, it's, like, I don't know.

Q. Sure. So do you -- is that another -- do you feel like that change was made for -- do you feel like that helps with safety?

A. I think it's more of an emotional decision. I think it's to give them a -- give med crews a sense of comfort, I think.

Q. So we've made changes -- we've made a couple changes to make med crews feel more comfortable and to get them more comfortable

with getting back to flying.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. That's --
A. I think so.
Q. You think that's an accurate --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- description of what you said? Okay. So what if a pilot, with this whole headset policy, right?
A. Uh-huh.
Q. I can imagine a pilot being like, no. You know.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. You're not going to be on headsets. I got enough going on up here. I'm not going to listen to you. I'm going to have isolate on or I'm going to have -- like, what would happen in that situation if a pilot decided, like, to go directly against that?
A. I think they would be counseled and then probably run up to HR and then probably be gone.
Q. Okay. So what if that pilot was saying, well, I'm PIC to this aircraft. I feel like this is in the best interest of safety, so I am going to act against this policy. Is that still the situation?
A. Probably. Probably.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.

A. I don't know for sure though.
Q. Yeah.
A. Because I'm just --
Q. Yeah, we're --
A. This is an opinion I want to include.
Q. That's -- okay.
A. Because I'm not the one making the decisions. I was just saying my opinion. That's probably what would happen.
Q. And that's all I'm asking for and that's what I want to know, right?
A. Yeah.
Q. Because you're a life pilot. So what is true doesn't necessarily matter as much as what you as the line pilot are receiving as the message.
A. Yeah.
Q. Right. So if you as the line pilot receiving the message that I don't have the right to go against this policy because we could jeopardize my job, that's why that's relevant.
A. Yeah.
Q. You know?
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. So it is your opinion that matters here.
A. Okay.
Q. I'm not saying that management's saying this.
A. Yeah.

Q. You know.
A. Okay.
Q. Or that that's their motivation. Do you know the reason that med crews are requesting two pilots? Why is that something that they would help if --
A. Well, I think it's the airlines too. Like, I mean, if airlines have two pilots and if they look at the cap team and how they get two pilots and they don't, they only have one pilot. I think that they think that it's safer. And honestly, like, two pilots for, like, the airlines, yeah. That makes sense. It's -- there's way more systems. It's a way more complex aircraft, you know, and there's more procedures involves.

But, like, for a King Air, I don't -- most of the safety issues I've been involved in in this company so far, I would say 90 percent of them have been because of a copilot than just flying by myself. That's just my experience.
Q. Ninety percent of the safety problems you've had are caused -- are because of copilots?
A. While flying, like, safety risks has been because with our copilots, or one in particular that's no longer here anymore, but with one of them, it's like you have -- you are flying the plane, but also being an instructor.
Q. Okay.
A. So the workload is as high as it gets. And then you factor in things like weather, you know, MEL items or whatever. It gets

more complicated. Versus if you're training single pilot and you fly mostly single pilot, then that's where your comfort level is, you know.

Q. Yeah. I understand that.

A. Yeah.

Q. What about flying with two captains, you guys do that sometimes, yeah?

A. Yeah.

Q. You said --

A. But the level -- I guess what -- the proficiency levels there, not with the SICs necessary.

Q. Right. So do you feel like if that was the case then, that if the proficiency level of the SIC was raised, if that would be a safer environment or is still safer to move single pilot in your opinion?

A. I think honestly it would be easier to go single pilot. A lot of crashes happen with two captains too.

Q. Okay. Okay.

A. Yeah. I think that's why the military probably goes single pilot. Because people disagree.

Q. Have there been any changes made since the accident that you would feel -- or that may help prevent an accident in the future, that may help prevent an accident like this in the future?

A. The -- well, it's always been a rule, but they're saying mandatory after every flight, not just different -- is walk

arounds. I really like that. So having the crews do mandatory pre and post-flight walk arounds, that's -- I think that's a big help. Yeah.

Q. Post-flight walk arounds?

A. Uh-huh.

Q. Okay. Anything else?

A. The risk assessment. I like that too. It's not that it -- we didn't have one before. It's just that the one we have now is very, very detailed.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you feel the new one is more useful than the old one?

A. Oh, yeah. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. It wants to know everything.

Q. Okay. So then they need that -- that's more useful than making it go no-go decision?

A. Yeah, especially single pilot, yeah.

Q. So based on your experience, are there any changes that could be made to prevent an accident like this in the future?

A. I don't know. I mean, we -- I don't even know the cause of it. How can I give you the answer for the solution.

MR. GARRISON: Sure. Okay. That's all I have.

BY MS. HILL:

Q. How often do flights cancel because of maintenance issues?

A. In my experience, rarely. Maybe one or two times out of 100. But I mean, I hear a lot of mechanicals happening, I'm just not -- in my personal experience, maybe, like, once, twice.
Q. Has that changed since the accident?
A. To clarify the question, is it for inoperative things found or just --
Q. For any reason, mechanical reason.
A. For mechanical. Yeah, I mean, a lot of them are just in phase. So that's why we, on a good day, will have maybe one or two planes running up now.
Q. Are you -- we heard about a lead pilot program at the bases.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. Is -- can you tell us more about that or is that happening or just in discussion?
A. It's in the very early stages. Yeah, they just -- we just went over it, yeah.
Q. That it's going to happen?
A. Yeah, for the -- it went out for -- to the bases for discussion. And then certain bases have, I think, agreed with it and they've selected someone. Other bases are still undecided. So that's -- it's still in the early phases where I'm not sure exactly how we'll go about that.
Q. If the autopilot failed in route, would a pilot be required to or would it be optional to turn around and go back to base and not be --

A. Oh, it would be required. It would be required. Yeah.

MS. HILL: Okay. That's all I have. Thanks.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Okay. So you made it through all the interview. You did a great job. Thank you. You gave me a lot of information.

A. I hope so.

Q. And I know we asked a ton of questions and you've been great. I know we've went way over time.

A. Oh, no.

Q. But is there anything you can think of, like, oh, man, I wonder if they know about this topic or, man, if they knew a little bit about this it might help maybe shed some light on something. Is there anything like that that --

A. Maybe creating a system other than Baldwin that is for more specific topics, I would say. Instead of, like, a broad, like, this needs to be changed and it's a huge systemic problem. Maybe something more, like, hey, I have just a small, you know, complaint or a question or a concern. I just need a quick answer, you know. Like, it doesn't need to be a three week ordeal or something. You know.

MS. HILL: Like comment box?

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Yeah, or -- yeah, some -- even kind of like a comment box, yeah. But that goes to the right person, I guess you could say. Yeah. Oh, and the isolation button. I hope you can just get that squared away for me. Things annoying.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Well, let me give you my card. So if you think of anything --

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Oh, okay.

MR. ETCHER: Don't hesitate. Reach out. Let me know because every little detail we get helps put the many pieces of the puzzle back together.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So it helps us try and figure out what happened. And like I said, we're here to prevent this from ever occurring again. And, you know, all the little information you give us adds to that, helping us figure out the right reason to prevent.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: All righty. But do you have any -- anything else you want to add at this point?

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Oh, no. Well, actually, do you guys have any questions, like, for, like, certain things that you would want to know that, like -- I don't know? Like, because you guys have questions, like what does the autopilot do this or whatever. I don't know. Like, is there things you want me to go find out?

MR. GARRISON: At this point --

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Because I can't do it in the sim because the sim is, like, being worked out.

MR. GARRISON: Yeah, that's a bummer.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: So I don't know where it is. Like --

MR. ETCHER: For --

MR. GARRISON: It's okay. Kaleo is giving me a demonstration and I can share it with Sabrina too.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay. Never mind.

MR. GARRISON: Yeah, so --

MR. HONEYCHURCH: That was my only thought.

MR. GARRISON: I have it on video, yeah.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: And we also -- we'll be going to Salt Lake City also to interview people there.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So I know they have a sim there as well.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: If we needed to see something, I'm sure we could get that there as well, especially with your guy's --

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: -- not working.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Okay. Cool. Cool.

MR. ETCHER: All righty.

MR. GARRISON: Thank you.

MR. HONEYCHURCH: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Well, I appreciate it. But if there's nothing else, we'll call this interview over at 1523.

(Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022 Interview of Landon Honeychurch
ACCIDENT NO.:	ANC23FA008
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Kelly Anne Treado Vance
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*
	*
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022	* Accident No.: ANC23FA008

Interview of: BROOKANNE JONES, Flight Nurse

Hawaii Life Flight

Maui, Hawaii

Tuesday
February 14, 2023

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SABRINA WOODS, Ph. D, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MILLICENT HILL, Investigator-In-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

DYLAN GARRISON, Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

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I N T E R V I E W

(2:40 p.m.)

MR. ETCHER: Good afternoon. Again my name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an Operational Factors Investigator with the NTSB. All that means is I look at everything kind of forward of the cockpit door and how it all interacts, and people that interact with the pilots and just interface with that, kind of understand the whole job and the whole operation if you will.

Typically when we do an investigation we have parties to the investigation, subject matter experts to help us make sure we look at everything correctly. In this case we have somebody from the FAA here as well. But I'm going to go around the room here, have everybody introduce themselves to you, and kind of give you their position, what their job role is here as well. Start with Sabrina.

DR. WOODS: Hi again. I'm Dr. Sabrina Woods. I'm a Human Performance Investigator with the NTSB. So my job is a little different than Shawn's in that I'm kind of looking at essentially all the human factors involved with how people are able to operate and do their job. And so that's everything from like what I call the man-man relationship, meaning like how people interact with each other, with their co-workers and things like that. Man-machine interface which is how people interact with the aircraft in this instance, and then man-environment which, and by environment I do mean like the company, all the company policies

that are in place, like how you're told how to do your job. So a lot of the questions that I'll be asking will be kind of based in one of those different three arenas. And again, I appreciate it just having subject matter experts such as yourself here. It helps us understand more about all those different things to come together.

MS. HILL: Millicent Hill, I'm the Investigator in Charge.

MR. GARRISON: Dylan Garrison with FAA. I'm the Investigator in Charge with FAA.

MR. ETCHER: All right, so that's everybody that's going to be interviewing you and asking questions.

MS. JONES: Sounds good.

MR. ETCHER: Now you kind of know where we --

MS. JONES: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: We all have little different roles but all still for the same goal is to figure out what happened and ultimately to prevent it from ever happening again. And you're here to kind of help educate us in one part of the whole operation. And so we'd like to have that whole picture so I appreciate you again coming in.

As part of our interviewing process we do record these, have them transcribed. Are you okay with us recording and transcribing?

MS. JONES: I am, yes.

MR. ETCHER: And just for your knowledge, this transcript

will become part of the public record when this case comes to closure. It will just be a part of the whole docket for this case. Per the regulations, you are actually allowed to have one person in here with you as a representative. Do you wish to have anybody? I see you didn't bring anyone, but I just want to make sure.

MS. JONES: No, I'm okay. Thank you though.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Well if you need to call somebody or phone a friend or whatever that's perfectly fine, just let us know.

Just a few little ground rules if you will. During the interview, if you need a break to go to the bathroom, get a drink, call somebody, whatever, just say so. We're happy to take them. If you don't understand a question, it's okay to ask for clarification, because if I don't understand an answer I'm going to ask for clarification, so it's perfectly fine. And most importantly, if you don't know an answer, I don't know works just fine as anything, so don't think you always have to have an answer.

MS. JONES: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: You know, if you have an opinion, just let us know it's an opinion.

MS. JONES: Right, okay.

MR. ETCHER: You know, factual is great but opinions are good too. And we may even ask for opinions every now and then, all

right? So anybody else have any questions? Ready? All right.

INTERVIEW OF BROOKANNE JONES

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So I always ask the hardest questions first. Can you please state your full name and spell the last?

A. Yes. Brookanne Jones, last name J O N E S.

Q. Thank you. And how old are you?

A. 34. I have to think about that now.

Q. You're getting like me. I just quit thinking about it. What is your job title?

A. I am a flight nurse.

Q. For?

A. For Hawaii Life Flight.

Q. Okay. And how long have you been doing that?

A. I onboarded mid-November with this company, so only a couple months.

Q. All right. And how's the first couple months been?

A. A whirlwind given the crash, but overall it's been really, really good. I was with a previous company, Air Methods, which is another huge air medevac company and they had operations here in Hawaii, but they stopped their Hawaii operations which initiated my transition to Hawaii Life Flight. And in comparison to the two companies, I've been much more pleased with my onboarding with Hawaii Life Flight. It's just been a better overall experience, even just from the interview process on.

Q. Okay, how so?
A. I feel a little less like a number, and it's just a little bit more of a personalized experience in employee to management. Their interview process wasn't nearly as intimidating as Air Methods. Sometimes I think in our field it attracts kind of intense people, and sometimes, you know, the Type A personalities, the know-it-all personalities, it clashes. And so even in just the interview process of like giving scenarios and making sure that you know your clinical knowledge and the way that that can be delivered can be a bit intimidating and aggressive, and it wasn't that way at all just even from the get-go with this company. I never felt like I was going to say the wrong thing, or even if I did, I wasn't going to be judged by it. So it was just overall from the start a really good company.
Q. Okay, that's good to hear. Where are you, do you guys have bases?
A. Yes.
Q. So where are you based?
A. I'm based in Maui, here.
Q. You're based right here.
A. Yes.
Q. Have you been based here the whole time?
A. Yes.
Q. Oh wow, okay. With, I know you're kind of relatively new here, but kind of help me understand the structure that you go

with here. Who's in your chain of command? Who do you answer to?
A. Okay. So I -- Seth is my Maui-based manager, and he's the one who I've been primarily precepting with. So being a new employee I'm still on like my 90 days probation if you will where I have to go through what we call third riding which I had completed. That means, you know, a full crew is a nurse and a medic, and so I had to do seven shifts of a third rider, just being the third clinical person in the aircraft to just like get exposed to calls and what their process is. So I had to do seven days of that, four of which I did with Seth, and then he's kind of been my go-to point person because he's the Maui-based manager, and so he's going through all of the clinical skills.

Because at the end of the 90 days I do what's called an IS test and it's just a big exam to make sure that I know all of our protocols, all of our processes, how all of our equipment works. If I don't know a protocol, you know, they'll throw out scenarios just to make sure that I know all of the resources that I have available to me to make sure that if I do get in a sticky situation clinically, where to go to next. So I don't have that scheduled yet because that schedule got thrown off with the crash. So I'm that process right now. So Seth is my first person, and then typically I would go to Mark Leggett.

Q. Okay. And I know Seth is your first manager, he's your preceptor and all that, so I'm sure you're interacting with him quite regularly.

A. Yes.
Q. How often -- have you ever had to go to Mark for anything?
A. No.
Q. No? Okay. You said you looked -- your eyes got really big when I asked that -- is that some kind of bad thing or is that a good?
A. No.
Q. I just want to make sure I understood what was going on. I know you haven't been here super long, but how would you categorize the staffing here? Do you guys, I mean, do you hear, does it sound like its well-staffed? Do you guys have to work a whole lot of time, not enough?
A. I would say that the staffing is a struggle. It kind of always has been just in air medevac. Like I experienced that with the previous company as well. But from my very brief shifts that I've done here, there has been like a lot of moving parts of okay, there's a nurse over here that doesn't have a medic partner. How can we move them around to make sure that we have as many bases open as possible? So it's kind of like always the chess piece moving around. Very rarely is there like every single base fully staffed with an aircraft and pilot and we're good to go.

I've done air medevac for about two years now and I don't think I've ever experienced like a, oh cool, on-shift and everything staffed, awesome.

Q. All right. And here at Hawaii Life Flight are you based just

in the airplane or are you also in the helicopter or do you guys just --

A. Just in the fixed-wing, just in the King Air.

Q. Just in the fixed-wing?

A. Correct.

Q. And is that how it's always going to be or do they cross-train you for both?

A. They've given me the opportunity to cross-train, but that's down the road and that would be with our rotor in Kona. We don't, the helicopter based here in Maui is actually through AMR and it's just for 911 response. So they only do scene calls and get victims or patients to the hospital here, and there's no need for a nurse on those flights. Those are just paramedics and medics.

Q. Okay, all right. So what's the difference then -- this is going to show my ignorance -- what's the difference between a nurse, a medic, and you know, you throw out all these terms, so I hope they're standard.

A. So a nurse, Registered Nurse, I went to nursing school and I have my RN license and Bachelor's Degree in Nursing. A paramedic, I don't know exactly what their education is. It is a, I think a year-long program. I guess technically they're like a step down from nursing. They don't go through as much education or need as much hours or -- I mean they still hold a license, but it's not as thorough as a nurse. And the reason why we're typically paired with a paramedic and a nurse on the aircraft is because nurses

have a lot of like hospital and bedside experience. Minimum in order to be a flight nurse, at least with this company, is five years within a critical care arena of a hospital. So you need to either have five years' experience in an ER and an ICU. And then paramedics, they're on the scene ground-side of things, which makes for a really great team in the air because they're a little bit more used to the moving parts and being in ambulances and potentially having things go wrong and not being in like a completely controlled setting as a hospital and having doctors around. They're used to that type of a work environment, whereas nurses are a little more versed in the equipment and the critical care side of things from a hospital standpoint. So it just makes like a really great medical team for air medevac.

Q. Okay, thank you. That kind of helps because I was like okay, we always just say medic, so I didn't realize there was actually a distinction.

A. Yes. So you can't fly -- minimum credentialing in an aircraft on an air medevac it has to be a paramedic and nurse. It can't be paramedic-paramedic. It can be nurse-nurse, but minimum is paramedic-nurse.

Q. Okay, perfect. I will actually hold that in my brain so I appreciate that. I know you've said here it's entirely different than where you were before, the experience has been better. But overall, do you look at the work environment here as open-armed, friendly to hostile at all? Anything along those lines or just?

A. I haven't, yes. I haven't gotten any of the hostile work environment. It's been very, everyone's been super supportive, helpful, knowledgeable.
Q. Did you ever have the opportunity to fly with Brian during that?
A. I did, I did. So again, I did my seven shifts of third riding, and those are 24-hour shifts, so full seven days of 24 hours. Three of which I did in Waimea on the Big Island, and then four of them were here, and when I was here I was flying with Brian. My last flight with him I believe was two days before the crash.
Q. And I know it's been several weeks ago, but can you kind of -- do you remember anything about that flight, anything about flying with him?
A. Not really. I was just kind of already in a whirlwind of like picking up on like their processes and going through their paperwork and how their charting works, and all of it. But I wasn't really focused on -- I mean I'm not versed in aviation at all anyways, but like particularly given that those were like my training shifts, I really wasn't paying attention to like the pilot-side of things. I was just kind of drowning in my own paperwork.
Q. Okay, yes, I get that, so I figured if I don't ask I'll never know. All right. So you've flown with other pilots here as well I assume?

A. Yes.
Q. How do they all seem to be -- I know you've been in medevac for a while, but how do they feel to you? Do you feel, I don't want to say safe because that's just wrong, but do you feel confident getting on board that, you know, if they've looked at everything critiquely if you will. Not a real word, but critically, how's that? That's probably a better word. Come on, it's been a long day. How does that feel to you? I know you're still getting to know them all as well, and there's nuances with that.
A. Yes, I do. I have always felt safe getting on the aircrafts with these pilots. Again, I don't necessarily understand all the nuances of aviation, so knowing like what that looks like I'm trying to educate myself more on, if that makes any sense. Because I don't even know what to look for to make sure that those processes are happening.
What I can say is that anytime I've ever had a question or not understood anything, whenever I've brought it up with any of the pilots they're extremely knowledgeable, and open, and supportive in like explaining whatever is going on or whatever my question might be.
Q. Okay, all right. Have you ever had the opportunity to sit up front during a flight?
A. Yes.
Q. How was that?

A. I love it. It's so fun. It really helps me understand flying more and like what the pilots are looking at. Air traffic control being able to hear, just hear what they're saying. The more that I do it I'm like, oh I've heard that before. Or like the flight plans, I'm like I know, you know, which flight plan we're going on to get home. So I feel like a really great learning opportunity to get a little bit more experience with what the pilots are dealing with up front when we're not up front with them and we do have a patient. Because obviously we only sit with the pilot when there's a dead-leg.

Q. Okay, all right. I mean when you were up there did the airplane seem like everything was going well? Was it at night -- let me start with that. Was it daytime? Nighttime?

A. Honestly I've done it so many times that I -- I've done night and daytime. I don't know if I did any dead-legs in that aircraft up in the cockpit. I can't recall that.

Q. That was where my next question was going, so thank you for beating me to it. When you're flying at night, how did it look? I mean I'm sure the view's great coming in on the island and everything, but when you get out between islands was it a little abnormally dark feeling to you? Did it seem normal? Was it just, you're still just absorbing everything in?

A. The stars are incredible if it's a clear night, but yes, it is very dark.

Q. Okay. So when you're flying and not sitting up front, where

do you normally sit without a patient or even with a patient? Where would you normally sit in the aircraft?

A. This aircraft is configured a bit differently than my previous King Airs. So I usually, and actually now our, they're like restructuring some of our aircraft, so there's one I think right now, and of course I don't remember the tail number of it, but that has different seating. I usually sit on the bench side when I don't have a patient.

When I do have a patient and if you're the -- we trade off in seats depending on who is charting and who is taking care of the patient. So typically if you're taking care of the patient, you're sitting on the bench seat because then you have access to the bags and everything in the back, and you also have access to the patient to mess around with whatever you need to mess around with. And then if you're the crew member that's charting on the iPad, you're sitting at the head of the bed. Because then you can see from the head of the bed the monitors mounted on the mount and you can just be typing in the vital signs and going through your chart making sure everything is documented. You can just kind of like see a big picture there without having to get up and putz around with anything.

Q. Okay. When you're seated, are you buckled in, are you unbuckled?

A. I'm buckled. If the patient needs anything or if anything needs to be messed around with of course I unbuckle.

Q. Okay. When you unbuckle do you tell the pilots or do you say anything, or do you just unbuckle and go to the patient?
A. Usually I just unbuckle and go to the patient.
Q. Okay. What if it's turbulent? It's Hawaii, maybe it's never turbulent. I say that. Try not to laugh.
A. I usually, I mean usually it is turbulent and I just make sure that I have a pretty good stance and make sure that like wide stance and holding onto something. I'm never just like not holding onto something, whether that be like having a hand on the seat or grabbing the net while I'm grabbing anything from the bags, you know, just being sure that I'm as stable as possible.
Q. Okay. I just have a few more questions and then I'll let Sabrina. She asks the really good questions. But when you're dead-heading, dead-leg, whatever --
A. Dead-leg.
Q. Dead-leg, okay. When you're on one of those, do you guys lay on the gurney at all?
A. Clinicians do, yes.
Q. Okay, I'm sorry. I didn't mean pilots, I meant medical personnel. (Laughing) Let me clarify that.
A. Yes. No, the pilot never lays on the gurney. But yes, clinicians do especially depending on how many flights we've done and if it's in the middle of the night can be naptime for sure.
Q. Okay, all right. Do you guys have to tell the pilots you're doing that at all?

A. I haven't in the past, no.
Q. Okay.
A. Maybe there's a rule about that. I'm unaware of that and I haven't in the past let my pilot know.
MR. ETCHER: I think that's all I have for right now.
MS. JONES: Okay.
MR. ETCHER: I'll let Sabrina ask her really smart questions.
BY DR. WOODS:
Q. So new to the organization, and I understand that, and I appreciate that. Have you gotten a lot of awareness yet on essentially what is your risk assessment process prior to like going for a mission?
A. Sure. So we have what is called a static risk assessment. So that is every time I clock in, our shifts start at 8:00 in the morning and you're supposed to do a static risk assessment that asks pretty generic questions. I don't remember them all. There's a handful of them of like, good sleep; have you worked another job in that past I think 12 hours or 24 hours; how many of those hours have you been working. And it scores you from there so you have a static risk assessment from coming on shift. And then every time we get dispatched on a call, we're supposed to complete another risk assessment because that can tick up the more calls you go on and the more hours you are up physically working with a patient.
Q. So is that in that whole seven-day, 24-hour?

A. Yes, so the scheduling is, our -- mine has been very messed up with the onboarding and orientation, but a typical schedule for fulltime is we have to work 10 shifts a month. That's a fulltime schedule. Depending on what base you work with, that can be three 24-hours on, six off. It can be five on, 10 off, or it can be 10 on, 20 off. You just have to hit that 10 shifts within your month.

So that being said, like when I worked with Brian and was doing my last four third rider shifts, they were four days in a row. It was four 24-hours. And so I did a static at the very beginning of those four days, and then every time we got dispatched you're supposed to do a risk assessment before you accept the call.

Q. Okay so what if it's a particular turbulent week and like out of the two days you've already been locked down on five or six missions? First of all, is that a possible scenario to have happen?

A. That's a lot. I think the most that I've ever done with my previous company, not with this company, was four. Because an average trip depending on where you're getting dispatched to is going to take about four to five hours.

Q. So let's say you've hit that four, but you haven't hit your how ever many days you've been scheduled for, but you're just like tapped out.

A. Done, yes.

Q. Talk me through that process?
A. We are, no questions asked, it's always I think the saying is "Three to go, one to say no." So if one person is not feeling up for the call for whatever reason, fatigue, they're just not in the right headspace, they're feeling sick, whatever reason, no questions asked, we don't have to go. So we don't have to -- that risk assessment is from my understanding just kind of a backup safety assessment, but we can say I'm done at any point in time. No questions asked, no repercussions.
Q. I guess who are you having that conversation with? Is it just the pilot or do you have the conversation with Seth or?
A. Sure, sure. Usually talking with your crew members, talking with your pilot, and then if that's the decision that -- say I come and I say I'm done, I can't do anymore, then we let dispatch know saying we're done and we go down on crew rest for typically eight to 10 hours. And that's an uninterrupted, don't reach out to us, no texts, no calls, nothing. Nothing work-related for eight to 10 hours.
Q. So then does your scheduled time pause for that?
A. No. We're still on the clock, we're still working, that's still part of our shift, but we're on crew rest so that when that crew rest is done, we're rested and ready to go for whatever dispatch call might come through.
Q. Okay. So going back to Brian, when you first met him I guess, what was his personality like?

A. Super friendly, nice, easygoing guy. Yes. I only -- I flew with him a handful of times. I didn't talk to him that much. But from what I could pick up on the very limited interaction, he was just really approachable, nice guy.
Q. Was he the pilot for any of the times that you flew up in the front seat?
A. No.
Q. Okay. So I guess from outside of the workplace, have you ever had any interactions with him?
A. Outside of the workplace, no.
Q. Never hung out or anything like that?
A. No, I'd never met him before.
Q. Okay. And then in those brief conversations were they just about like this is what's going on while we work together, or did you ever have a chance to talk about anything outside of work, like what's going on in your personal lives?
A. I honestly don't know. I'm sure there was some personal life, you know like what's your background, where did you come from, you know, how long have you lived here. Those kind of things. I don't have a specific memory of the conversations that we had.
Q. Let me approach it from a different direction. Do you know what he liked to do for fun?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Do you know his like interpersonal family dynamic?

A. No. I learned of a girlfriend after the accident.
Q. And do you happen to know like how long he had been at Guardian?
A. I didn't know how long he had been at Guardian. I knew that he was a fixed-wing and a rotor pilot. But I didn't know his experience further than that.
Q. Prior to the accident did you know if he was actively flying as a rotorcraft pilot?
A. (No audible response.)
Q. So pivoting back, I know I feel like I'm pendulum swinging, back to kind of like the company dynamic and all, especially what you said, I mean you're actually really great because you have that experience with another company and then now as compared to how Guardian does it. For you, is there a clear path of communication that you've seen like from you up to essentially Guardian itself is located in Salt Lake City. Do you feel like information is disseminated clearly?
A. I'm trying to think because I don’t feel like I've needed to like use that pathway of communication yet, so I'm having a hard time answering that. I guess from just the onboarding process of communication between everyone that I've talked to in the onboarding process, it has been a bit scattered you know of getting emails from this person, and then reach out to this person for this education. So in that sense I guess it's a little bit disorganized. But never to the point where I haven't been able to

like get answers and actually eventually communicate with who I need to be in touch with to get what I need in regards to like scheduling questions, or flights, or reimbursements. Those types of things.

Q. Okay. So I guess in that same vein, have there been any policy changes that have occurred since you've worked for Guardian?

A. Policies since I've worked for Guardian? Since the crash, yes, there has been -- there has been policy changes in how we are dispatched for calls.

Q. Okay. And I guess give me the high level version of what that change was.

A. Sure. Okay, so they are working on taking the pressure out of us getting a call. So prior to, dispatch would send out a text with the patient's weight, age, diagnosis, where they're going from and where they're going to. Just the generic, very down and dirty, what call we're doing, what call we're getting dispatched for.

And they are currently now working on not sending out that text, making sure that there is communication between the pilot and the crew members now prior to knowing anything about the call so that there is no pressure in saying yes to a flight because of the acuity or the criticalness of the patient. They don't want that to be a factor in our decision-making of whether or not we're ready to do the call. That's been the biggest policy change so

far since the crash.
Q. And so how did that information come down then? Like how did you know, hey, we've got a policy change?
A. That came through email and through our medical directors, and all of the meetings we've been having since the crash and conversations. Of course, I can't remember everybody's name because there's been so many people a part of these meetings. But it came from higher-ups from Oahu as well as Salt Lake City, and down in all of our risk management teams of how to mitigate those factors that can increase risk and fatigue.
Q. Okay.
A. Typically through email and through our Teams meetings. That's how we've been like communicating since the accident.
Q. So this is an opinion-based question. In your opinion, why this specific change? In your opinion, why do you think they thought it was warranted?
A. I think, in my opinion, there's a lot of questioning about particularly night flights. Hawaii is a very unique geographic location in air medevac where it's not necessarily always critical patients. Actually a lot of times it's not critical patients, there's just not the resources on the island that the patient is living on.

So for example, Maui has no pediatric psych resources whatsoever. That's all on Oahu. So the 16-year-old suicidal teenager we're shipping over. Are they critical? Are they unsafe

in our hospital? No. But they do still need to get to a different island. The question is and a lot of the frustration that comes from the crew, in my opinion that I've heard, and I have this frustration as well, of depending on what the patient's diagnosis is, why are we flying them at 3:00 a.m.? Do we need to be doing that or can they be waiting until daylight hours? Or is there a different way that we can be transporting these patients and not taking this risk? Like there should be -- there's been a push for like an acuity scale of like does this transport need to be happening right now. And I think that there was a lot of question after the crash of what were they -- who were they going to pick up and why.

Q. Understood.

A. So I think that was a big trigger in that change of like we need to get the diagnosis out of the decision-making of our crews and really focus in on are you guys in a headspace. Regardless of whatever you're going to go transport, are you in a headspace and ready to get on that aircraft.

Q. So prior to a policy change then, where do you see time of night, like O-dark-thirty is what we call it in the military, how much did that factor previously into your risk assessment?

A. Phrase that a little bit differently for me.

Q. So regardless of the status of the patient, did time of night in which you were being requested, dispatched, did that factor into the pre-mission flight risk assessment?

A. Yes in the sense that it is one of the questions on the risk assessment of is this dispatch happening between I believe the start is 1:00 in the morning to 4:00. Has that ever bumped me out of being in the red and saying, no-go, no. I think the risk assessment from my experience more goes back to how am I feeling. And usually at O-dark-thirty I'm checking in with myself a little bit more of like am I good to go. But the numbers have never really reflected I'm not good to go on our physical risk assessment. Does that make any sense?

Q. It does. Okay. So now essentially one of the things that has changed is you are not fully aware or apprised of the patient's status when you're making the decision to go let's say at 3 o'clock in the morning?

A. Correct.

DR. WOODS: Okay, I really need to chew on that for a moment mentally, so I'm going to pass it off.

BY MS. HILL:

Q. How long did you fly for Air Methods?

A. A year and a half.

Q. Was that fixed-wing or rotor?

A. Fixed-wing.

Q. Was there a similar risk assessment before flight?

A. There was. It wasn't as frequent, it wasn't as thorough, and fatiguing out was much more difficult to get approved. I faced a lot more pushback from upper management of why are you timing out

than I had experienced with Hawaii Life Flight. Here, no questions asked, okay, see you when you wake up. But in my previous experience it was a lot more email, a lot more chain of command, a lot more this is the situation can we go down for rest-type of conversation.

MS. HILL: Thanks.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. So you mentioned in Hawaii it's not common to have critical patients. If they were to have a critical patient that needs to be moved, how would they do that?

A. Still with us. I guess to clarify that a little bit better, it's not that we don't have critical patients. It's just that there's a wider variety of patient population that we see due to our limited medical resources in these remote island communities that on the mainland could probably go by ground because they're not critical. But they have to go by air here.

So that's kind of the unique niche with air here is that we are transporting those patients that they need surgery, the surgeon can't do it here on this island, it's scheduled for tomorrow or the next day on the other island and we need to get them over there, so we'll fly them. That kind of thing where typically that could be ground on the mainland.

Q. Okay. So what would be an example of a critical patient?

A. I had a 6-year-old little girl who fell off of a skateboard, cracked her skull, brain bleed, unconscious, intubated, needed to

go to neurosurgery to relieve the pressure on her brain. I mean that was a pretty intense call where you're moving quickly and making, you know, time is critical.

Q. And that's a neurosurgeon, so needed to go to a neurosurgeon in Honolulu --

A. Exactly.

Q. -- because there's none available where they were coming from?

A. Not a pediatric one here on Maui, correct.

Q. Okay. And is it always in a King Air, like so for that patient like is that moving in the King Air?

A. Yes.

Q. So that night, the night of the accident when they were going to pick up the patient in Waimea, do you know who that was or what the status was? Have you learned any of that information since?

A. No, none of that's been released.

Q. Okay, none of that's been released and that's not something that's known?

A. Not typically. I'm not exactly sure. That might be under just like patient privacy act where you don't need to -- if you're not involved in the patient care, I don't think they're going to release that to us.

Q. Do you know if it was critical or not?

A. I don't.

Q. Okay. So I hear that what you're saying is they're not

wanting to release this information of who the patient is so that that doesn't put pressure on, right?

A. Yes.

Q. But could that allow room for the opposite to be true? Like could it be possible to assume, like if you don't know, couldn't it be possible to assume that every patient is this 6-year-old with a brain bleed?

A. Sure.

Q. Is that something that's being experienced?

A. I can't speak to whether or not it's being experienced. I can speak to my own personal feelings on that of I don't necessarily agree that knowing or not knowing is a pressure in my decision to take the flight or not. And I can see on the flipside that you are wondering what you might be saying no to.

I also think for me personally, more of the pressure comes from -- this might sound terrible but I'm a little bit in the medical field for a long time so I had a little, not necessarily what the patient's situation is, but if I say no, I have other coworkers and crews that are then going to have to be dispatched because I can't take it. And that's where my pressure comes from.

Q. How interesting. Okay. No, that's really helpful information especially to someone who's not in the medical field at all. You know, because for me, it’s like no experience in whatever, I'm just being a father, whatever, a 6-year-old, oh no, let's go. I would feel that pressure so I could relate with that,

but it makes a lot of sense with what you're saying. It's like more of the pressure is from like well if I don't do it, the next crew's doing it.

A. Because they are -- all of these patients will get moved. It just depends on timing, available crews. I guess I have been able to disconnect and not feel like I need to be the hero rushing in to get all of the patients to where they need to be. I also feel like they still need to get somewhere better, higher level of care, but they're still in a -- we're not doing scene calls. They're still in a safe and controlled environment in a medical facility. Whether or not that medical facility has everything that they need to take care of them, no, that's why they're being transported. But they're safe and they're okay for the time being. So I don't, I personally don't have pressure in that sense. I have more of a pressure of then who's going to have to step up and take my fatigue.

Q. And if that pressure was to be relieved somehow, how could that be done?

A. Resources, crews, staffing, airplanes. I mean we just don't have -- we have Hawaii Life Flight is the one and only company in the State of Hawaii to move patients around. We have a lot of weight, especially since Air Methods stepped down from Hawaii operations.

Q. So more air ambulance operations, more airplanes, more flight nurses and paramedics. They just need more of everything. And

that would relieve the pressure how?
A. It would relieve the pressure of having those resources able to move those patients when the call comes in and not have a -- I'll give you an example because it might explain it a little bit better.
Q. Okay.
A. My last shift that I worked, it was just a 24-hour shift and I came on and because we only have three fixed-wing planes that are currently moving patients around right now, it's basically on our dispatch and just a list of patients that need to be moved. And it's just kind of like okay, start with this one.

If we had more aircrafts and more teams, you wouldn't necessarily have that whole list. I wouldn't have to be flying to Kuai to go pick up a patient. The Kuai team would have an aircraft and a team there, and they could be moving those patients. Maui could be moving their patients. Hilo could be moving their patients. But because there's only three aircrafts, we're bouncing around and trying to get all the patients to where they need to be with limited resources.
Q. That makes sense. Okay. So after the accident I'm sure that for you, you had just flown with Brian, so I'm sure for you that was difficult. What did -- how long was it before your next flight?
A. It was a long period of time. I went back, I've only done two shifts back. I believe the beginning of this month was my

first shift back. There was, we stopped all Hawaii operations in the sense of our crews and our aircrafts. Those were downed and our crews were downed. We did have sister companies bring over aircrafts and crews, and so there was still air medevac happening in the state but we were not responsible for that.

And there was no pressure ever of going back to work. It was just more of a supportive, everybody get together, here's the resources, here's the therapists, and the grief counselors, and the trauma, all of the resources that you may need to work through this to either be ready to go back to work or not. But I never received any communication of this is your next shift, better be ready.

Q. You yourself were in control of that?

A. It was completely my decision and, yes, I was in complete control of that.

Q. And so you gave it a lot of time then?

A. I did. I did.

Q. So basically all of January?

A. All of, yes. And most of --

Q. Half of December?

A. -- yes half of December and all of January.

Q. Okay. And so when you did go back, were you able to talk to peers, other people, about like what happened and like, you know, is this something I should be concerned about like you were?

A. Yes, absolutely. We've had a lot of those conversations. It

usually just lands on we don't know, wish we did know so we could prevent it from happening again. But yes, there's been conversations between coworkers and speculation and all of that but, and a lot of help in working through whether or not going back to work, how that feels. It's a very individual decision.
Q. Right.
A. But there was a lot of communication between all of us and it helped blow some air through like, oh you're going back. What did you do to help get to that decision? Like what is your thought processes behind that? So there was a lot of conversations like that.
Q. So what story did you tell yourself in your head about the accident to make you feel like it was safe enough to go back?
A. I still go back and forth. It's still a struggle. Sorry.
Q. No rush.
A. How I landed on this decision to go back to work is I love my job. And that there's a huge quality of life that comes to looking forward to going to work. I worked in a hospital for years and years and years, got super burned out, COVID was awful, you know, all of those things and I absolute dreaded work. And this is the first time that I like enjoy going to work again. So that was a huge part of my decision-making. Okay, I'm scared. I'm still scared when I go to work, and I'm feeling that out of whether or not that's going to kind of subside with more time and experience or not. And if not, then I'll go from there. So that

was a factor in my decision-making.

Talking with family, everyone getting on the same page. Talking with my husband. Making sure that we all feel okay with it. That was huge. Sometimes I wish that they had just been like nope, don't want you to do it, because it would have made the decision way easier to walk away from.

And then I think seeing the company's response to it, and the support that they provided. The things that they are trying to do to improve on safety and knowing that our maintenance is beefing up. I guess I kind of justified in my head like now is probably the safest time to fly. And it's horrible that it takes a situation like this to happen to feel that way, but I do feel like this is probably the safest time to fly because everything is so fresh and under such a microscope that we're not going to be missing anything because we're all scared.

Q. Yes, everything's being scrutinized because everyone's looking like what happened, why did it happen, how do we prevent it, yes.

A. So that gave me a sense of security. It's still hard.

Q. Yes. I'm sorry.

A. No, that's okay. It's just a process.

MR. GARRISON: Go ahead.

MR. ETCHER: Do you need a break or anything? Do you want to take a break?

MS. JONES: I'd love some water. Is there a cup that I can?

MR. ETCHER: All right, the second round is always quicker.

MS. JONES: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: I've got like five or six questions, and then I'm sure Sabrina has probably no less than 150 but that's okay. But anyway.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. When you're working your seven-24s or whatever you call that crazy schedule -- to me it sounds crazy, sorry. I guess I have a princess schedule maybe. But anyway, when you're working that, do you stay at the crew house? Do you stay home?

A. I am able to, with Hawaii Life Flight if you are within a 20 minute response time to the hospital, you can take call from home.

Q. Okay. So you don't even use the crew house, go there?

A. I've gone there a handful of times just in my education side of things. Like go through our equipment, know where things are, you know, just get the lay of the land. But I don't spend a lot of time there, no.

Q. Okay. Do you feel everybody on-call from home, I shouldn't say everybody's on-call, but I assume quite a few are. Does that disconnect the crews a little bit?

A. Sure, yes, definitely.

Q. Is that a good thing or a bad thing in your profession?

A. I haven't had too much experience with it because with my previous company we were all at the crew house. And so I can say that it does feel like there's a little bit more of a disconnect

where I'm not sitting with my partner stuck in the house for 24 hours which, you know, sometimes that's a better thing, work husband. But yes, there's more of a disconnect. I feel like you're not talking as frequently, you're not checking in as frequently. Although, you know, there's nothing saying you can't. I mean I usually, well actually Seth is actually calling me a lot, he likes to talk. So we're not with each other as much.

Q. Okay, all right. I mean I know since this event you've done some flights and stuff, but have you ever hear pilots complaining about the airplanes or anything. Complain is such a big bad word, I know.

A. Complain, no. I mean I've heard them talk about all the little things, the finicky things like getting written up or maintenance, or this needs to go down for that. The aircrafts that I've flown in, the pressurization has been an issue. I know that we've gone down for maintenance for that a couple times. They've always made sure that the crew knows like it's not that at least the issues that they said that they've been coming up on, and I can't speak to what those issues might have been.

But it's never been like a safety issue where the airplane can't fly, but it does need to be written up and go down for maintenance and have the maintenance team check when we get to Oahu, but it's not that it's unsafe to fly the aircraft. They've always made sure that we know that. Again, I can't speak to what those issues were because I don't know the terminology. Air

pressure, the air pressurization was one of them.
Q. Okay. Did you feel the pressurization issue in your ears too?
A. I did, yes, absolutely.
Q. Okay. You were talking about the risk assessment form and you fill it out, and you said like flights from 0100 to whatever time, early morning, gives it a higher score or something, but it's never put you in the red.
A. No.
Q. So, and maybe it, I just want your opinion. Do you feel like the risk assessment really assesses what it -- I don't want to say what it needs to -- but adequately assesses?
A. In my opinion, I think that it takes a lot to actually hit the red.
Q. Okay.
A. Usually I am fatigued prior to hitting the red personally.
Q. Just hearing you talk about seven 24s makes me fatigued, so okay. And I know you said you can just say no, what's the saying, three to go, one to --
A. One to say no.
Q. Okay. But do you see people doing that?
A. No.
Q. I mean, I don't want to know what -- why would you not? If you were feeling a reason to say no, why wouldn't you speak up? Or would you?

A. I haven't. I think there is some pressure, and if for me seeing all my crew members, you know, pilot, and nurse or medic, oh yes, we can do this, it just kind of beefs up like, okay, I can do this too. I think it's just more of an internal pressure that I put on myself which that's not a good thing. You should speak up, but that's kind of where I come from. Like okay, I can do one more kind of thing.

Q. Okay. Now, and I'll go back to your 6-year-old on a skate board with a brain bleed. You guys got the call and you did your risk assessment and you felt good to go, and you get out to the airplane because you know you had to go from here to some other island, and take them from there to Honolulu. I don't know, maybe that's what you had to do, I don't know. But you get out there and you take off and you fly and you land to pick them up and you're just like, I just don't feel it. Can you say no?

A. Yes.

Q. I mean anybody can say no, I get that. But I mean the pressure, you know, it's mission-oriented, Type A personalities kind of. Could you say no?

A. Myself?

Q. Sure.

A. I think I would struggle with saying no.

Q. Why? Just why would you struggle?

A. You already have started the mission. Knowing the acuity, I think that's where an acuity thing would come into play knowing

that that little kiddo needs to, I mean, get brain surgery. And then going back to what I discussed of, you know, then what other crews are going to have to pick up the slack.

Q. Okay. It makes sense to me, but I just wanted to kind of understand, you know. I know what I would be thinking, but I'm not a clinical person so I'm probably thinking wrong. All right. When you've repositioned from here to another island to pick up somebody, and it's just you and another medical person, and then a pilot. Do you guys have the lights on in the back at all lit up? Do you have to?

A. No, we don't have them. Usually I've experienced like if we're, if someone's starting the chart because you can kind of fill in a lot of the blanks on the iPad as you're on those dead-legs to go get a patient. If the crew members want to have a light on, we ask the pilot are you good with the lights, and usually they'll say yes, and/or they'll close the doors, make it dark in the cockpit for themselves. But it's kind of just up to us, but we just communicate if lights or no lights.

Q. Okay. And the last question I have and then you're done with me, so be happy. What would you do if the pilot had a medical event? Have you guys ever been trained to have a pilot with a medical event in flight?

A. We have been trained on how to, not specifically a medical event for the pilot, but like if we need to get into the right seat and tap in to the emergency COMS and to communicate on the

headsets, we've been trained in that sense. How to shut down the aircraft, yes, we have been trained on that.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you again for coming in today and talking with us. I appreciate it. Sabrina?

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. A couple more questions. So I know we've kind of been back and forth about that go, no-go decision and where and when patient acuity might come into play. But do you have those conversations with the pilot? To what level is the pilot aware of patient status or are they at all?

A. Not very aware. I will communicate with the pilot if there's -- I mean I guess particularly like brain injuries of elevation, and how high you can fly for safety and pressurization, all that kind of stuff. Like those are typically calls where we loop them in on patient status. Also just depending on how critical they are, we'll let them know. But for the most part, I don't feel like the pilots know really what's going on with the patient. They could probably put it together given how much equipment is with the patient or not. But we're not having conversations with them about it.

Q. I'm sure from their point of view from that risk assessment and I know the changes that have been made, I'm just wondering how much really did that ever factor in their risk assessment if they weren't super knowledgeable about like what the patient's status is.

And then I know you said in this environment from your previous, you're a little more disconnected from your peers. But like I know, you know, like Shawn, Millicent, and I, we don't live in the same areas. We live geographically in complete opposite parts of the United States, but we'll chat or whatever. And sometimes with chatting there's a little workplace gossip, a little communication about what's going on. In the short time that you've been with Guardian, have you ever had conversations with any of the flight nurses or paramedics about the other half of the aircraft? About the pilot-side and like oh this person prefers, you know, don't talk to them ever because they really don't want to, they're super-focused, they don't want to be involved, don't have those conversations. Or hey, you know, this pilot over here is maybe a little more communicative, you know, feel free to strike up a conversation. Or conversely, concerns, like hey watch it with this, be aware of. Have you ever had those conversations about this pilots at Guardian?

A. I have not with the pilots at Guardian no.

Q. Have you experienced that your past?

A. Yes.

Q. And was it kind of -- was that just word of mouth?

A. Yes, word of mouth and I mean I guess I have also kind of struck up because I know that I don't know a lot about the aviation side of things that I typically try to ask those questions of like the people who have been working for a long

period of time. Like what is your experience with this pilot?
Q. I experienced this, I didn't feel as comfortable?
A. Right.
Q. But since you've been at Guardian have you ever -- I know we did touch on this earlier, but just for confirmation have you ever felt uncomfortable?
A. No. It's such a limited period of time.
Q. Sure. But to also confirm, if you were ever put in that unfortunate situation, do you feel confident you could raise awareness and get it addressed?
A. Yes, I do feel confident in that.
DR. WOODS: That's it for me. That's all I have. Thank you so much.
BY MS. HILL:
Q. What have you been told or what was the conversation about the maintenance program since the accident?
A. I've been told that they're working on onboarding a lot more maintenance. I don't know in what positions the mechanics are, or whatever those positions are, but they're working on getting resources and help for our aircrafts when they do go down for maintenance, because I think that our maintenance side of things has been quite overwhelmed, just kind of like all staffing in our company. So that's what I've been told and kind of heard.
MS. HILL: Thanks.
BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. After you make the go, no-go decision, you decide to go, when do you get the patient's information and all their status? Do you get it immediately after?
A. Yes.
Q. In what form? How do you get it?
A. It's a text message.
Q. Oh it's a text message of okay, this is what's going on. And that's the information you're using to fill in the charts on the way over? You were talking about filling in the blanks.
A. Yes, exactly. Filling in the blanks that way, and then depending on then we get the paperwork from the patient and we have all of the documentation. But it's just a very brief, usually diagnosis, age, weight, sending doc, receiving doc, the hospital phone numbers.
Q. Okay. And with the pilot, has the pilot ever come to you -- like is there communication on the go, no-go decision between the whole crew? Like I know any of you can say no, but is there communication as far as the pilot saying, like I could imagine, like hey the weather, it's all right, how critical is this patient? Is there like conversations that happen like this?
A. Not typically. Previous company a little bit more weather talk than I've experienced with Guardian Flight. I have not had conversations like that with our pilots here of really getting briefed that much on weather situation or how the flight might go. I guess it's kind of just an assumption that if the pilot's

accepted the flight, we're good to go kind of a decision.

Q. Sure. Is there anything that, any information you have or any information that you've heard that you feel like since the accident that you feel would be important for us to know? Or relevant?

A. I don't think so. I think that all of your questions kind of dove into everything that I know so far about the company and my experiences.

MR. GARRISON: If something does come up later, which can happen and is common after interviews, right? Like oh, I wish I would have said that or wish I had said that, you have his contact information --

DR. WOODS: Now you do.

MS. JONES: Now I do.

MR. GARRISON: He already gave you that.

MR. ETCHER: I forgot.

MR. GARRISON: You have Shawn's contact information. Totally feel free to send an email whether you think it's factual, opinion, whatever, it doesn't matter. We'll determine the relevance. We can do that part of it. But if anything does come up.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Well again, thank you so much. Sorry to take up so much of Valentine's Day for you, but I appreciate it and we will call this ended at 1545 Hawaii time.

(Whereupon, at 3:45 p.m., the interview was concluded.)


CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022 Interview of Brookanne Jones
ACCIDENT NO.:	ANC23FA008
PLACE:	Maui, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Jennifer Allen
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*
	*
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL	*
ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII	* Accident No.: ANC23FA008
ON DECEMBER 15, 2022	*
	*

Interview of: SETH KRASNOW, Medic

Hawaii Life Flight

Maui, Hawaii
Tuesday
February 14, 2023

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SABRINA WOODS, Ph. D, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MILLICENT HILL, Investigator-In-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

DYLAN GARRISON, Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. ETCHER: Well good afternoon. My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an Operational Investigator for the NTSB. All that means is I typically look at anything that interacts with the pilot and everything along that lines. We're going to go around the room here and have everybody introduce themselves. But just to let you know that we have a party system here where we have other entities besides NTSB who are subject matter experts. That's why we have somebody from the FAA here as well, to help us kind of figure this whole case out.

MR. KRASNOW: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Kind of figure out what happened. That's why you're here, kind of help educate us and see the insights that you have.

MR. KRASNOW: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So I will go around the room starting at -- have people introduce themselves. Sabrina?

DR. WOODS: Hi again, Seth. Dr. Sabrina Woods. I am a human performance investigator with the NTSB. And so, I know you expressed a little earlier like hey, not entirely sure why I'm here. We deal a lot with the pilots, which is absolutely true. But fundamentally like, things don't happen in a vacuum and you know, it takes a team of people to keep the mission going, keep the Guardian mission going. And you're very much a part of that team. We are not. We don't know. We've never worked in those

capacities. So in order to learn more about what this mission is, we have to talk to everybody so we can get their pieces of the puzzle all together.

MR. KRASNOW: Okay.

DR. WOODS: So that's why you're here. I look in kind of a -- those -- where all those points intersect. So essentially, the people, how the people interact with each other --

MR. KRASNOW: Yeah.

DR. WOODS: -- how the people interact with the system which is what -- the policies that Guardian puts in place for you, and then how the people interact with the aircraft, and the equipment onboard the aircraft as well. So essentially that's why you're here and that's what I'm here to do. Millicent.

MS. HILL: I'm Millicent Hill. I'm the Investigator-In-Charge.

MR. KRASNOW: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Dylan?

MR. GARRISON: Dylan Garrison. I'm with the FAA and I'm the Investigator-In-Charge with the FAA.

MR. KRASNOW: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: And so that's everybody who's going to be interviewing you. So now that you kind of got faces and names --

MS. HILL: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: -- and all that, we'll -- we can continue on. Just to let you know, we do record these interviews. These

recordings will be transcribed and that will become part of our public docket later on. Are you okay with us recording and transcribing?'

MR. KRASNOW: Sure.

MR. ETCHER: All righty. And also as part of the regulations, you are entitled to a representative to be here. I see you came in by yourself. Do you want a representative? Are you --

MR. KRASNOW: We weren't told. We -- we weren't told anything about it, so.

MR. ETCHER: Well, that's sad. But you are entitled to have one if you wish. And if you need to stop --

MR. KRASNOW: Sure.

MR. ETCHER: -- for some reason, you just say.

MR. KRASNOW: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: All right? Is that okay with you?

MR. KRASNOW: Sure.

MR. ETCHER: All right. So just a few little ground rules, if you will. If you need a break, just say so.

MR. KRASNOW: Mm-hm.

MR. ETCHER: We'll take one. If you don't understand a question, ask. It's okay. Because if you give me an answer I don't understand, I'm going to ask.

MR. KRASNOW: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So it's a two-way street. And if you don't know

an answer?

MR. KRASNOW: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: I don't know is perfect.

MR. KRASNOW: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: I, you know, whatever. We just want to -- I want to learn what I can about how this all works here.

MR. KRASNOW: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: And that's what your subject matter is going to help me with, all right? So, everybody ready to continue?

MR. KRASNOW: Mm-hm.

MR. ETCHER: All righty.

INTERVIEW OF SETH KRASNOW

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So for the record, could you state your full name and spell your last.

A. Seth Steven Krasnow, K-r-a-s-n-o-w.

Q. Excellent, and how old are you?

A. 67.

Q. All right. And what is your job title?

A. Here are a flight nurse.

Q. And who is your employer?

A. Hawaii Life Flight or Guardian Flight or GMR, I think is where the checks are coming from. But it's all a part of the same company. Locally, Hawaii Life Flight.

Q. Okay, thank you. And are you based here at Maui or -- how is

your bases?
A. I work at Maui. Yeah, I mean they've -- they can throw me to other bases by I primarily based here in Maui.
Q. Okay, excellent. And what is your role with Hawaii Life Flight?
A. Flight nurse.
Q. Flight nurse. Help me understand, what is that What is a flight nurse? What is your job duties?
A. we provide patient care across different patient populations in the air medical transport of a patient. For here, it's strictly inter-facility transports from one hospital to another.
Q. Okay, perfect. How long have you been working for Hawaii Life Flight,GMR, however you want, and Guardian?
A. Seventeen years.
Q. Very nice. All based here in Hawaii?
A. No, mostly Alaska.
Q. Oh, so Alaska.
A. And then Hawaii, been here since the end of 2018. And then going back and forth. And really since sometimes last year I just transferred here, so.
Q. Okay, and going --
A. I'm still on the books at both places but here is primary.
Q. Okay. But going back and forth, you mean between here and Alaska?
A. Here and Alaska, yeah. But now, just here.

Q. Okay.
A. For the last year or so.
Q. All righty. So kind of give me a broad scope, if you want. A typical -- if there is such a thing as a typical day for you all. I mean, what kind of -- how long is your shifts? Are they 12 hours?
A. We are scheduled for 10 days and 20 days off.
Q. Okay.
A. And so when you're there, you are there. And then you'd have to look into the books side (ph.). It -- so we have a fatigue policy on the -- on the EMS side -- 16 hour mandatory 10, anytime you're tired you can -- you just call up dispatch and say, I'm timing out. They might ask you how many hours, or you just say I'm timing out and then you are -- then they can't call you and you're in -- it's supposed to be an uninterrupted rest. And then you show back up to work.
Q. Okay. Have you had to do that?
A. Oh occasionally, yeah.
Q. Occasionally?
A. Yeah.
Q. Yeah.
A. We stay busy enough that we -- we're on 24s where the pilots are on there. They're 12s and we know the rules to get the 14s and come onto -- stay too late. But where they do that and when we're on for 24s.

Q. Okay. Okay, all right.
A. Yeah.
Q. Seems like a lot of hours to work straight. So it's a -- one of those things I'm not so used to, so thank you. So if you had to call in fatigued or whatever, who do you call, just dispatch?
A. Oh, dispatch. And they typically -- the book says call them, you call the program director. We just call dispatch and say, I'm taking 10, I'm off for six. And then you fill out a thing. I don't know, their section in ninth (ph.). There's a -- another form they use that you put in that you're taking time out so they can track the fatigue and the time out policy. But normally just call -- call dispatch. They let the program director know.
Q. Has there been any issues --
A. Nope.
Q. -- with someone calling in fatigue?
A. Nope.
Q. All right, all right. So when you come on duty do you just call on duty? How do they know when you are on duty?
A. Well, they've got the schedule but a lot of times is I'll call in if I commute so when I come in, I get there the night before and when 8:00 comes I pick up the phone, whichever phone we have, or you can use your own phone or crew phone. You typically call up, call dispatch. Hey, I'm here. I've got this phone for the next two weeks. They go, okay. And then you -- then you just wait for a call.

Q. Okay, and where do you wait? Do you -- do they put you up someplace or do you have a place?
A. We have a crew house. If you were commuted, there's crew houses in all of the -- at all the bases. In Honolulu, there's rooms upstairs. Or if you're close enough you can respond from home. You can -- that doesn't matter. Just you have a phone, you're there and the expectation is depending on where you'll be, anywhere betweenhospital and field, respond to the -- be at the hospital or be at the airplane within about 20 or 30 minutes, depending on where you're at.
Q. Okay. So do you have to be -- so do you do both helicopter and fixed wings?
A. Yes.
Q. So that's why you have to be at the hospital -- to respond to the hospital or the --
A. Well, no. I mean, if the patients are -- if we're taking them out of Maui and I'm based on Maui you'd go to the hospital in Maui to meet the patient, get the paperwork. But if Maui is tasked to go to North Hawaii, then we'll all meet at the airplane, fly over to North Hawaii and then get the patient over there.
Q. Okay. So when you -- how far in advance do they give you notice? Or is it usually pretty quick that you're going to be going?
A. Most of them are going to be pretty quick. You get -- you get there, you get the -- you get a text. Here you get a text and

it's got information, the airplane, a couple of things about the patient. Not much, mostly just the way -- where you're taking him from, where you're bringing him to, and maybe the ascending diagnosis that they'll have on there, a few other tidbits and that's really about it. And then you go, all right. We got to call, you get your stuff together and you -- maybe there was a partner with you. Maybe the partner's going to meet you at the hospital, or if we're taking off base to go pick up somewhere else, we'll all meet at the airplane.

Q. Okay.

A. And then --

Q. Okay.

A. -- yeah.

Q. Is there always two -- two flight nurses onboard and a pilot? Or is it one pilot and one flight nurse?

A. Two flight nurses or fly -- two medical crew and one -- and one or two pilots, depending on which trip they're doing.

Q. Okay.

A. There may occasionally be two pilots if they do a trip out of -- you know what? There's single pilot. Make it easy, single pilot and two -- two medical providers.

Q. Okay, so there's always two medicals in the back.

A. When there's a patient there, there's always two.

Q. Okay.

A. You may get dispatched from Maui because you don't have a

partner. You get in the airplane with the pilot, you then fly to another island, pick up the partner, maybe that's where the patient is, well then you'll have two, and then you'll go get the patient there.

Q. Okay. So when you get notified of a -- someplace you have to go. Take a patient somewhere, we'll pick up a patient or whatever. Do you guys have to assess if it's -- if you're capable of doing that?

A. As far as -- as what?

Q. Assess you personally. Assess your comfort with the flight. Assess your -- anything with the patient?

A. If you don't call it, and my expectation is and I don't know about the companies. If you don't call off at 7:00 in the morning or 8:00 in the morning when we start, you implicitly and you can't explicitly anymore say I'm ready to go to work. And therefore, that's -- that's it for the day. The pilots will say hey, it's gonna be bumpy. It's gonna be rainy. We talk at the -- only until we see the pilot and we usually get it. It's Hawaii. So for the most part, it's good weather. There's only one or two places to go. In Alaska it was different. In Alaska, they call the pilots. They tell them what the mission is. They check the weather, and they accept the mission then we get told that. And we go, pilots are going, we're going.

Q. Okay.

A. So.

Q. Can you ever say --
A. Yeah, absolutely.
Q. Oh, so walk me through that.
A. It's the expression everybody has said here. It's, you know, three to go, one to no. Anybody can say at any of the time, I don't feel comfortable, and the flight's not going to go.
Q. Okay, I like that little phrase.
MR. GARRISON: Me too.
MR. ETCHER: I'd never heard of that, so excellent.
BY MR. ETCHER:
Q. Generally speaking, with Hawaii Life Flight, Guardian, however you want to call.
A. Uh-huh.
Q. How would you consider that work environment? Do you consider it friendly, hostile, challenging, all the above, every day is different?
A. Yeah, I mean I can't -- I'm not gonna give you an answer for that. I've been here for 17 years. So it works for me.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And that says a lot, just saying you've been here 17 years. So I just want to make sure.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do you guys have a process here of -- let's say I was a pilot with you guys. And you're like, oh, I so don't want to fly with

him. Can you say I don't want to be on schedule with me?
A. I -- it's, and I can't -- I don't -- I don't know, it's never come up, so I'm not, you know, once again if he doesn't want to fly then he goes I'm not comfortable taking that flight and they would do that probably all just through dispatch.
Q. But like if you and I had a -- a personal -- a personality conflict.
A. Right.
Q. And you're like, I just do not feel comfortable flying with Shawn. I just don't want to do that. I just don't trust him, whatever.
A. Yeah, I mean, you would just go and say --
Q. Can they --
A. -- you would just go and say, I'm not taking the flight.
Q. Okay.
A. I mean, I don't know that it's happened. And it hasn't happened in my career, so I couldn't tell you what the process would really be, and it doesn't really come up. It's just if you don't feel comfortable, you don't want to go, you don't. But once again, it's the kind of thing that you know that at 8:00 in the morning usually or you have to schedule with the pilots. So you could easily make that judgement in the morning, before anything happened. Before you actually had to turn something down you -- I think they would -- you'd let them know there's an issue and I'm sure they'd go and correct it as best they could.

Q. Okay. If you had an issue with me -- hopefully you never do, just during our conversation.
A. Yeah.
Q. But let's say you had an issue with me. How would you address that? Who would you address that to? Kind of help me understand how that would occur?
A. Directly to you first. We're adults. That's -- that's how it goes. If it gets anything more than that, if you can't do it like adults then it would be their boss would -- I don't know. It, once again, I'd -- probably Kaleo.
Q. Okay.
A. The chief pilot. If it's a question that it was something that had to do with that as opposed to doing anything else, it might be him first, some sort of personality. We could go to the program director. Mark is my boss, so that's where everything goes.
Q. Mark?
A. Mark Leggett, seemingly that's where it should go to.
Q. Okay. Have you ever heard of anybody having to go that far?
A. No.
Q. -- I guess that's most important.
A. Yeah.
Q. Can't do by hearsay. I assume being based here at Maui is kind of a small little group --
A. Mm-hm.

Q. -- base, so everybody probably knows everybody.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. So I would assume you knew the accident pilot, Brian.
A. I did.
Q. Did you fly with him? Can you remember the last time you flew with him?
A. Might have been the night -- might have been the night before. I can't remember what it was. It -- I probably was I think the night before. Either the night before or two nights before.
Q. Okay.
A. But you have -- but you have that already, so.
Q. Actually I don't have your guys' schedule.
A. Okay.
Q. I have his. They just don't have me matched up with yours.
A. Okay, well that's easily obtainable I'm sure. Yeah.
Q. Probably is, we just haven't gotten back to it yet.
A. Okay.
Q. So it's okay. But I had you here so it's a good time to ask.
A. Yeah.
Q. How did that -- kind of think back. I know that's been a couple months ago, but kind of think back. How did that flight go? Did you guys have a lot of legs (ph.)? Not very many?
A. I couldn't. I don't remember last week.
Q. Okay, all right. You say it was night, that you thought?

A. It == we'd been flying a bunch of nights, I think, if I had seen him. I think he was the -- he was the night pilot. I know that because what happened. I got off in the morning. I got dropped off at the airport. We didn't get off the night before or two nights before. I was at the crew house. They dropped me off. I said goodbye. Saw -- okay, said goodbye to Gabe, and Courtney drove me to the airport, and then I went to Honolulu that day. So it was just another night. I had flown a bunch in advance (ph.). I mean, I'd flown a whole lot prior to that for a long -- a longer stretch than the -- that the 10 days. So yeah, it was just another night --

Q. Okay.

A. -- for me.

Q. Nothing rings a bell. That's -- that's always --

A. None of them do.

Q. They all run together.

A. None of them do, yeah. it's --

Q. Yeah? Okay. So you've obviously flown with every pilot in this base, I would assume.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. I'm -- to me it seems hard to run day shift for a while and then switch to night shifts. Is that -- do you hear the pilots complaining about the switching?

A. You'll have to talk to a pilot about that.

Q. I just wondered if you heard that.

A. It's strictly with speculation that I --
Q. Okay.
A. -- they tell -- those guys can tell you. But that's better for them to answer than me to answer, because I -- I'm not flying it.
Q. No, and I know you're not flying it.
A. Yeah.
Q. I was just wondering if they verbally had said anything about it, and it's --
A. Some guys don't say anything. Some guys enjoy nights. Other guys probably would prefer to work days than nights.
Q. Okay. So when you get a flight and you're going to pick up a patient somewhere, you know, ferrying out there to get them or whatever.
A. Okay.
Q. Where do you as the medical personnel sit? You sit up in the front with the pilot? Do you sit in the back? Lay out on the gurney?
A. It depends on all of them. All of the -- all of those things.
Q. Okay.
A. Depending.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you recall the last time you sat up in the right front

seat?
A. Yeah, the other day I flew with Ed -- Eric Johnson, because he was filling in. And post (ph.) (indiscernible) came down, everybody on headphones and we think we -- some of the pilots want people in red (ph.) seats on dead legs (ph.).
Q. Okay.
A. So that was the last time I was there, would have been last week sometime on one of the legs.
Q. All righty. So help me kind of understand. When you have a patient, you guys are back there dealing with a patient, I assume.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. If it's turbulent, how do you guys deal with a patient? Are you still strapped in or do you have to unbuckle and kind of -- kind of just try to help me. That -- that's the stuff I don't know either.
A. Both.
Q. Okay.
A. You are buckled in as much as you can. But occasionally certain times call for to be unbuckled. They're usually pretty good about saying hey -- once again, it's Hawaii, totally different. So they go, we're gonna hit some bumps. Though most of the pilots will just turn around and say look, we're gonna hit some -- hit some bumps. And if they really say yeah, it's really gonna be bumpy then we make sure we have everything. The nets up in the back and the monitors secured, and we'll just make

everything -- look around, make sure everything in secured and put an extra, you know, strap them down on the patient. Then we just tell them, so.

Q. Okay.

A. But occasionally you're required to be up if something goes on. Occasionally be up moving about the cabin, so.

Q. All righty. And do you have to announce to the pilot when you're going off --

A. We do it in the helicopter, and I don't know if it's because they can feel it a bit more.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. It's just a matter that for them, that's the way it's always been that we usually say, I'm up or unbuckled. And more so than in the plane. The plane we can, I know. I think they just -- they just know what we're gonna do I think, and so it seems to be a bigger thing. They -- they can half (ph.) the time look over their shoulder if they want to to maybe -- to maybe see what's going on where the helicopter, you can't.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. So we just tip. And I don't know. Like I said, I don't know if they can feel it a bit more when we're moving into the back and they get a little bit more than in the airplanes, you're not gonna -- you're not gonna feel it.

Q. Okay.

A. So around here, yeah. They're not -- though some of them

will announce. They can turn -- move -- there's a switch that'll turn the light on and, you know, no smoking, seatbelts, fasten, that kind of thing. So occasionally they'll put that on and they may say oh, well we're gonna -- gonna hit some bumps or something like that, but.

Q. Okay. Typically how long are your -- from the time you get notified that you got a flight until -- and I know it's very --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- just generally, until you return back to base? Is that --

A. It could be hours. For us, if we're going off base it's -- we are airborne within 15 minutes to an hour and five minutes almost like clockwork, from the time the pilot shows up, they're just walking around, we get there until the time we takeoff. With a patient, it's hard to say. Airplane -- if the pilot goes to the airplane, we go to the hospital, could take us three minutes to get the patient and have the ambulance there. We could be there for two hours. If we're leaving here, it's really by the time we're -- the wheels are going, it's about 35 minutes until we're wheels down. We need fuel over there, sometimes you have to go in with the patient, sometimes the ambulance just takes the patient. We can turn as quick as 20 minutes some, if there's nobody's there and the fuel's going. And then we're usually there just for a while. But it's -- it's every bit of probably, seems to be three or four hours --

Q. Okay.

A. -- for a simple flight here.
Q. Okay.
A. And that's just strictly Maui. Because if you're working out of -- if we got to go to Hilo, it's 50 minutes to takeoff or an hour to takeoff. It's 40 minutes over there, get the patient. Could be anywhere from having the patient there to an hour or more to get them. Hour and five minutes in flight, and a turnaround time. So it's -- it's hard to tell you what the average. I mean once again, the numbers are there that if they wanted to, I'm sure dispatch could run a number and say what's the average -- the average flight time. But for us, usually a couple hours.
Q. Okay. But then once you return to base you can go back to your crew house and sleep or or --
A. Yeah, yeah.
Q. -- until there's a call?
A. Yeah, pilots do their thing. We unload the airplane, all our gear out of the airplane and we take off.
Q. Okay, all righty. Instead of me sitting here looking over my list to go through, let me have Sabrina ask questions --
A. Okay.
Q. -- so you can talk to her instead of me.
A. Okay.
BY DR. WOODS:
Q. Yeah so, stupid question, I apologize.
A. Okay.

Q. But is it the same -- the dispatch that would call, is it the same dispatch as the pilots are calling?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, so you don't have two separate --
A. No.
Q. -- okay, just making sure.
A. For fixed wing operations, it's the same.
Q. Oh, so the -- I guess rotorcraft have their own dispatch that handles just the rotorcraft side?
A. They're getting toned (ph.) out from the call from I think from this -- from our dispatch.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. But they -- it's a vended operation through REACH. So REACH does, I think -- as far as I know it's REACH does the flight following, I think. We can do it here too, but I think REACH does their own flight following and it keeps records there. But you'd have to talk to a REACH pilot about the real particulars about that.
Q. Okay.
A. Fixed wing, everything is done through dispatch on Holloman (ph.).
Q. Okay, and all the coordination from a managerial level is either Kaleo/Mark, right -- Matt?
A. Mark is the program director.
Q. Okay.

A. And we have no other real management for the clinician side. It's just everybody just works for Mark.
Q. Okay. So if you have an issue, you're going to Mark, not necessarily -- you're just aware that Kaleo is there.
A. Yeah. If it was an issue, if it -- well, I probably still, because I know Kaleo and stuff like that, if it's a pilot thing and we couldn't -- it was adults or grown-ups, and it hasn't happened. And Kaleo I think -- Kaleo's the chief pilot. He's the one that's going to take, kind of. And I'm not even sure how that whole flow chart. You'd have to find the flow chart for the pilots. I'm sure it winds up at Kaleo and safety, and safety and other people there. I don't know how much it actually winds up going underneath Mark. Eventually, because I don't believe he's scheduling them. He takes care of clinical side schedules, so I couldn't tell you exact. I mean, I should know but I couldn't tell you what the whole flow chart looks like. But once again, it's going to be available to you guys, I'm sure.
Q. And how far out is your off/on schedule planned out for? Is it quarterly or six months or?
A. In Hawaii? You know, maybe monthly.
Q. Maybe.
A. Yes.
Q. Subject to change.
A. What's that? Oh yes.
Q. Yeah.

A. Everything's like -- eventually with the 10/20 it could be marched out, but that's a managerial thing here.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. At this particular base. If you're looking for operations it's different at different places.
Q. But with your 10/20 that is with the option to possibly like take additional shifts up to your crew rest requirements.
A. Well, there's really no crew rest requirement, unlike a pilot thing that had --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- that has quarterly, you know, hourly and weekly and quarterly and yearly hours. We don't have any of that.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. So you can just, you can just keep working.
Q. Okay.
A. So.
Q. Okay. So for focusing on the accident for my next set of questions.
A. Okay.
Q. I know that you do have reservations about like hearsay and things like that. But the fact of the matter is that Brian's not with us any longer.
A. He's not.
Q. I can't ask him questions.
A. Right.

Q. So this is why again, we need to know, to talk to the people who have worked and who have known him to build a picture. So I guess, how well did you know him in general?
A. I mean, I -- we're friends.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. But you'll have to give me better details on what you would expect a good friend -- it's, so I was at his house two weeks prior to that, for Thanksgiving, so I know him and his long-term partner.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And I've gone hiking with him. We'd talk all the time. We'd -- he's been around for a couple years, I believe. So we've -- I've flown with him.
Q. So yeah, I would qualify that as a friend.
A. Yeah.
Q. Or as like he, in other words, did the relationship extend just beyond --
A. Yes.
Q. -- meeting in the aircraft?
A. Yes.
Q. What would you describe his personality as being like?
A. Yeah, I don't even what words of what would be the words. I liked the guy. We had a lot of the -- a lot of the same self -- a lot of the same interest.
Q. Mm-hm.

A. So I never had any issues with him at all, flying or personality wise or anything. He's thick-skinned and so you could say stuff and he'd say stuff back. And so I, like I said, he was a friend.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. I got along with him fine. And I mean, we -- we were just good friends. We traveled a lot. He traveled a lot, so those were the same interests.

Q. Yeah.

A. I could tell you that he was some of the happiest that I'd seen him a week prior. He'd gotten a new -- he got a big raise and I think a promotion or something where he was helping with the -- the helicopter company. And it's expensive out here. And so all of a sudden, him and his partner -- and they're taking care of her dad's stuff. And he was telling me about it. He said, this is great. So as far as any of that stuff going, he was --

Q. Mm-hm.

A. -- he was good. And he was here. He had already flown other airplanes and big airplanes and cargo and jets. He's done all the other stuff, and he spent six years as a helicopter pilot, flying in Kauai and doing all that stuff. But he chose it here because it was a -- for him, like the other pilots here, it's mostly a lifestyle job.

Q. Yeah.

A. So.

Q. Yeah, that's great.
A. Yeah.
Q. So I mean, that was actually really super, super important.
A. Yeah, he was here. He was happy. If he wasn't here he's with his girlfriend, he's hiking, biking, kite-boarding, surfing, that kind of stuff, so.
Q. What about the company itself? Did he seem -- I know he's happy with here, the location, all things Hawaii.
A. Yeah. Hiking, I think, I know --
Q. Always (ph.) value the company?
A. I mean, I don't know if he was -- certainly not enough to -- to want to quit. I do know that we had flown maybe two weeks prior and he -- when we landed he said, that's it. I'm writing this thing up. Because -- and I think it was just the -- I don't know electrical stuff or radios and stuff like that, whether it's the push to talk switch that kept saying hey, it's -- they said they wrote it up and fixed it. We wrote that up last week. It was supposed to be fixed. They said they fixed it, and typical things like that.
Q. This is aircraft side.
A. On the aircraft side. I couldn't tell you which airplane it was. You'd have to go back. But yeah, I think I -- I think I flew a 135 for 12 years or so prior to changing careers. And everybody starts out the same way.
Q. Mm-hm.

A. If you're a pilot, you did it too. You guys are all pilots here. All did, I guarantee, every one. You were in school. Your first pilot and you say wow, you're getting -- I would do this job for free, when you're a student. You all said it, you all did it, and everybody needs to be smacked in the back of the -- and that sets up the thing. And then your first 135 job, if you ever flew a 135 air taxi job, you knew you wanted to do the good job and you just wanted to fly and build the time and be a good pilot. So now, that's okay. That one's a little -- it's a little wonky. We don't really need it. We're flying VFR, and you do it you do it. And then when you write something up they all like yell at you. It's like, oh man, and you're in -- and so there's that balance until you get enough time and you realize you need to get paid for the job and you know what it takes and then you start saying it's broken. I don't want to fly a broken airplane anymore.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. But you buys have done thousands of these and I'm sure this is not the first time you've ever heard that, of people saying yeah, it starts off with a little thing here and a little thing there. But that is not indicative of just this company. But I can tell you half a dozen companies I flew for before that.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. And every one of those has little things like that. But as far as him complaining or whining -- not really. I think it's --

Q. Mm-hm.

A. -- sometimes you get a little frustrated, and then he got frustrated and we said hey, we don't care, we'll stay here. They wrote it up and they fixed it and, I don't know. We stayed in the room, we stayed in the thing. We flew home couple hours later. They gave us another airplane and he's back to work the next day, like we all were.

Q. So that is aircraft side, and I appreciate that. But I guess what about the -- the intangibles. So aircraft has the stuff that you can fix, you can see, you can look at, you can touch. But the intangibles, like company policies or duty schedules or just the way things are done operationally. Did he ever complain about any of that?

A. Not that I recollect. I mean, not more than we all complaint about oh, we're going here again. We're covering for these bases again and stuff like that.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. Certainly never enough that he said that's it, I'm looking for a new job. So if it's just a workplace whine or complain, I didn't hear it. Like I said, he was that -- I think the week or two before that, this guy was just as happy as can be, so.

Q. So that's actually a great segue way. What did he like -- what did he love about the job or the company? Did he ever say?

A. Like what - like what most of us love about it.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. The schedule and the time off.

Q. Mm-hm.
A. And there's no mistaking that. Everybody says they love it because they love the job. It's either their first job or they're full of shit for the most part because it's 35-minute legs and they like it. They like working here because the lifestyle and they're living in Hawaii and they're making livable wages and they can support their families and then they're fishing and doing all those things here. So that's why the job is great. It's a decent schedule. Nobody is overworked. And then you wake up in Hawaii every day.
Q. Yeah.
A. But I could say the same thing, people in Alaska love it there, and much different conditions.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. But they wind up having decent enough schedules and they wind up still being in Alaska, at least the guys that I flew for the one time. And so that was worth it for right there, but.
Q. So you said you'd -- so you're friends, just like doing some of the same things. So what did he like to do, I guess? So work aside because you know, there needs to be a work/life balance. What did he enjoy doing with his day when he wasn't flying for Guardian?
A. As far as I know he'd ride over, him and his wife -- or his girlfriend, mountain bike. So he was out hiking, mountain biking and in the water.

Q. Mm-hm. So in that I guess, working relationship. But how -- well, I know here, I think that we were told that there's four pilots based at Maui?
A. There were four pilots based at Maui, yeah.
Q. So I guess how often do you come up on the same pilot, would you say?
A. Keep in mind that we all have rotated schedules.
Q. Okay.
A. They weren't the same. There were days, nights and then off.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And I'll either work a bunch and take a lot of time, take a big block of time off. Now with the 10/20 it's -- you just never know how it's gonna shake out, who's gonna be there, who's --
Q. Okay.
A. -- who's on vacation and -- and not.
Q. Okay, and the reason I'm asking you.
A. Okay.
Q. This is the lead up. It's like the preparatory question is that obviously people have very different personalities.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Very different styles to how they approach work. So as comparison, like how was Brian's style in how he managed work versus like, any one of the other pilots? What is consistencies that you've seen across the pilots and then what might make him different?

A. I don't know how they do it, you know, everybody's -- today. They come in, they're taking care of the airplane, I've always said it. You guys take care of the front, we'll take care of the back. They do their flows, everybody does them a little bit differently. Everybody will do a little walk around. They're all doing the same stuff, so everybody's style's a little bit different. Some guys will be really, really quiet. They get in, they just do the other things. Other people will start chit chatting about your day and stuff like that.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. So they're all a little different, but so is everybody else.

Q. Yeah.

A. But I -- nothing that I would see that I could think of that he was any different really than anybody else. And then again, I might see him, if he's on for two weeks and those happened to line up with my two weeks that I'm working. Theoretically, I could see him every day for a week and then every night for a week. And see him every day for two weeks. But I don't think, you know, oh we might not fly at all. He might be on days and we -- any of the pilots could be on days and we won't see them for -- I could not see him for three weeks because they're off for two weeks. They work a week of days and we might only work nights.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. And then we see him the following week for nights.

Q. Understood.

A. Yeah, so it's hard to say. I mean, I could -- couldn't picture out how much I -- I would see these guys at work.
Q. So again, that was kind of a preparatory question for my -- my next is that is there anything that he did that you really appreciated? Like, you know what? He's the one guy who does this thing for us every time and that's --
A. No, but I wouldn't -- I don't think I would say that about any of them.
Q. Okay.
A. I mean, not just me. They come in. They do -- I trust everybody I get in the airplane with, everybody. It's always been that way. They get in there. Some of them have been friends in other places. I've flown with these guys and so -- I've known for a long time. Other guys, I came down there. I was the new guy. I didn't know anybody. But I know how -- I kind of know how the system works. They went, they get check rided, somebody else does the work. So I get in, we meet him. You like some people more than other people, but that has nothing really to do with -- with flying so much. So I don't really put much into -- into that, so.
Q. So I guess --
A. I mean, I don't know -- really know why, where that question is or what -- or --
Q. So no, I'm just saying like --
A. Like, there's nobody that I -- but then again, I do it in my own job. I don't need -- I don't want the atta boys. I don't

want -- I don't need the atta boys. Our best is -- the best we do is just what should be expected.

Q. Yeah.

A. So I've always said that thing. Oh, he's a great pilot, okay. Well, makes him a great pilot. I don't -- I don't know.

Q. Yeah.

A. For hey, you feel comfortable? Yeah, I feel comfortable with all of them. Was a great pilot. They -- they go -- they take off from -- maybe (ph.) they do a job. They go from day to day.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. And the same thing with a great nurse. It's like, I haven't quite figured it out yet. We sit in the back, we take care of patients.

Q. Yeah.

A. And some guys are a little quicker than others, and that's always nice. Some guys we joke around with more than others. It's just their personalities. But as far as what they're done, that, I appreciate that. I don't think that's -- yeah, I wouldn't know how to answer that I wouldn't say for any of them.

Q. Okay.

A. So.

Q. So then I mean, the converse would be then is there anything that he did that it was like man, I wish he would stop doing this one thing versus --

A. No, not -- not really.

Q. Was there anything that gave you pause or concern?
A. But once again, if there were little things like that with any of them I would --
Q. Yeah.
A. -- usually pretty sarcastic and I would be a dick and say something first in that sarcastic joke. Hey, what are you doing this for?
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And sometimes they'd tell me if they can, I mean, the same thing. Hey dude, it's nice out let's just -- we got a patient here. Can't we go and just pick up the -- just pick up your -- your clearance en route (ph.). Let's just go. Just go VFR and pick it up, pick up your ride (ph.) (indiscernible) say, okay. Hey, can we go on the north side of the -- of Molokai? No, no. We can't little cloudy. We got to fly (indiscernible). I said -- that kind of stuff we'll do, but.
Q. And have you ever had the sarcastic conversations with Brian?
A. Oh, probably more than once. We hit it off right -- right from the get go.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. But never, never -- it was just, yeah. We -- we came -- we became friends like as soon as he was there and we started chit chat. Oh, you were there? I was there, and you did that? Oh great, I did that, stuff like that. So we just sort of -- like everybody else, we just sort of became friends and then you just

know what you can -- you can get away with saying and stuff like that.

Q. Okay.

A. But nothing to the point where I said well, I think I have to write a Baldwin or go talk to Kaleo about it, stuff like that.

Q. Okay, perfect. Thank you. And then so going back to the aircraft. I know you said there was one -- or there was a frustration moment with Brian like, that's it with this aircraft.

A. Well, I mean with everybody.

Q. And have it --

A. I just remembered that one night that he did --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- a couple of weeks ago. But other pilots were, were flying in -- they know they were flying with stuff that was either hit in the elbow (ph.) or just saying well, we'll just get it later. If it's anything big and bad they'd go -- they'd call up and say we're not going, that there's a leak over here.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. Or whoa, that doesn't look good. How'd they miss that? But they did. So then we'd go -- that happened too the other day. We said no, plane's down. Okay. Like, they wouldn't fly anything grossly broken. But once again, if it's lights and things like that, I think it's what anybody has done. And anybody who say that they haven't done that is probably being less than honest, so.

Q. So from your impression, when those things happen and when it's like no, I'm not taking this aircraft. Is that received well by the company, or do you end up -- do you know if the pilot ever gets flak about it?

A. I don't think they ever get flak about it. I don't think anybody gets flak about anything.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. However, that's -- that's been my -- the nature or the culture of this company since I've been here. You call out time out they go, okay. But and pilots go, that's broken. They get more frustrated when the pilots finally say yeah, we're just not flying. Because when they -- when the pilots say oh, this happened here. Happened up in Alaska. Finally you're look, not flying this broken stuff anymore. Fix it.

Q. Yeah.

A. We're not doing it anymore and they go oh, okay.

Q. Okay.

A. But I think they struggle like every other company. They're trying to get maintenance and try to do things like that. That's certainly not on the pilots. If it wasn't for the pilots I mean, obviously, planes wouldn't be flying at all.

Q. Mm-hm, absolutely. Understood.

A. You know.

Q. Well but yeah, if it weren't for you guys though, you would all -- you also wouldn't have a mission.

A. Yeah.
Q. This is an off, random question --
A. But --
Q. -- that really doesn't have much to do, but I'm very curious.
A. Yeah.
Q. So I know -- I know everything to do with like aircraft side when it comes to maintenance issues. But what about interior like medical equipment that comes? Who's responsible for that?
A. Oh, medical equipment's on another side. We do that clinically. If the bed is broken, the only thing that's in there bread -- the bed, the oxygen system.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. Early (ph.) suction. So anything with the life support (ph.) goes to maintenance. If it's our equipment, our beds are -- has nothing to do with the airplane and that goes to clinical.
Q. Okay.
A. So --
Q. And that's portable. It comes off and on with you.
A. Portable, yeah. The bed I know is STCd (ph.) and so when there's things about the bed, the nets and stuff like that, that's all on the aviation and maintenance side.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. So it's a lot of times this happens. Hey, the bed -- the sliding bed that we have, you know, the cables become loose, a cable breaks, a pin is not coming out. They have -- they'll swap

it out. But that's all -- that's all on the maintenance side.
Q. But who writes it up? Do you as the clinician or how do you write it up?
A. No, we tell them. We tell the pilot.
Q. Okay, and the pilot writes it up.
A. Yeah. Hey, it's broken. Have them look at it.
Q. Yeah.
A. And some of that stuff is -- and that -- they take care of anything with that, with the -- anything with the maintenance. Even if it's little knickknacks like, well now they're doing all new interiors and it's -- they're getting better. But the old airplanes, when there's tape coming and things are falling off airplanes, you know, the inside trim and stuff like that. Hey, we need more tape or finally the guys just needs to be fixed.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And so then they -- they'll figure ways to write it up. So that stuff is -- if it's malleable (ph.), there's nothing we can do, you know, other than that. But the pilots take care of inside, outside and any maintenance issue we have. Whether seats are broken or any of that kind of stuff that -- that's all on the aviation side, and the pilot.
Q. Okay, perfect. And then one last question and I'll pass it on to Millicent is --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- do you yourself have an aviation background?

A. I do.
Q. Do you have a pilot's certificate?
A. Yeah.
Q. Well okay, two questions. What is a pilot certificate?
A. I have a -- my -- I have a double -- I haven't even done it in a long time.
Q. Yeah.
A. I have multi-engine instructor license there. I have an A-T P (ph.) and I'm a licensed dispatcher.
Q. Okay.
A. But I flew full-time into the late 90s as a full-time profession, and then part-time for another dozen years or so after that.
Q. Okay, that's good. So that means you have a good eye for understanding how the whole system works.
A. Well yeah, and I think that's why if I say stuff to needle them and stuff like that they -- but that's that. They know where it's coming from and stuff like that.
Q. Yeah, okay.
A. So.
Q. All right, thanks.
A. All right.
Q. Millicent?
BY MS. HILL:
Q. You mentioned sometimes they'll sit in the right seat?

A. Mm-hm.
Q. Medics, with the total crew. Is that at the pilot's request?
A. Either or. When we're new, when people come down here and they're new and they want to look out the window and stuff. They say hey, can I -- can I look? Can I sit up front? And they go, yeah. Other people want them up front. Fam (ph.) rides. Eric's real big on it and he's always been it's, you know, anybody who's up there. He'll take the time to show them, here's how to get the auto pilot on if something was to happen, here's the buttons. Here's what it looks like. He can point to the green lights, do that. He'll tell you. He'll show different things. He'll talk about the radios, what you need to do and stuff like that. And sometimes him more than some of the other ones want them up there at night, especially if maybe they're at the tail end or you know, they came on early at 3:00 and it's now 3:00 in the morning and they're going home or whatever. And they say -- or they're 91 and all this stuff like that. So they may say. But it's not a -- it has never been a company like -- like a thing that everybody was doing. And we know. You guys are pilots. You know what it's like. If you're flying single engine, the only thing you want on the front seat is your bag. You want your stuff nearby, we know that, everybody does. Because that's your stuff, that's where it is. And so, and a lot of times we've been up. We can sit in the back, you know. With the new configuration there's a bed and there's a -- there's a new bench. The other seats are kind of

uncomfortable, you know. One guy could always get the bed, and the other one you just kind of hunker down, so -- so that. So, and because we -- sometimes we're doing 24s they may just be coming on maybe. They may be on flight one and we're on flight three, and we know that there's more. And so if they ask, they say hey, somebody sit up front? Absolutely. Some of the bigger guys really don't want to climb up there. Uh-huh? And they, they don't and nobody wants them up there.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. But yeah, if he asks? We all -- we all go up there. That's --

Q. Are they performing any flight duties or just watching, learning?

A. Watching and learning. Nobody -- nobody's there that -- nobody's reading checklists to them and pulling gear and, you know. Every once in a while, oh, with me it's a little different. They know that I -- that I flew and I was doing it. And so if something's (indiscernible) I just go over and say, just tell me when the airspeed's up on that one, right, just there. Or yeah, I just know something to call out, so that. He'll say let me know in 100 and, and then -- but he's the only one. Other ones you could sit up there, they'll be more than happy to tell you. Sometimes you're sitting up there because you just want to look out the window because it's crappy windows in a C-90 looking out the windows on the side, right? And if you're brand new you want

to see all the stuff there, so. But nobody's doing flight duties. Nobody is performing as an SI today (ph.).

Q. Okay. Outside of work with Hawaii Life Flight and air -- the helicopter air tours. Did Brian fly personally, Cessnas or flight instructing or on the side?

A. Not that I know of. I mean, I don't know. He didn't happen to tell me. Nobody I know here has a, you know, I don't think he had -- he didn't have an airplane here. And he was -- he was doing more than enough. It's not that you want to, he just wanted to go and he'd just be kite boarding if he could, or mountain biking. He's done a lot of mountain biking, so.

Q. Have there been any policy changes since the accident?

A. I don't know that anything's come -- been written. No, I haven't -- if it was there I didn't see much of it. But I know there was some talk and probably some emails that came out, said hey, we got headsets for everyone. Everybody on headsets. Okay. And then I think there was something about possibly just sitting in the front seat. They don't know if that's like hey, there's somebody's always going to be in the front seat on a -- on a dead like, on a dead head (ph.) flight. I don't know if that actually came out as a company-wide policy. I think it's just kind of discretion on there and stuff like that.

Q. Are there any changes that you think they could or should make?

A. I think that's premature knowing that if nobody knows what

happened. I mean, I would -- this is not my first accident to go through. So I was there in Alaska for that one and as a firefighter and working for this company, and flying, seeing my friends. I mean that just -- Southeast Alaska. Happens way more than it ought to. But having gone through the -- been around when the Alaska one happened, which is four years ago last week or two weeks ago. I knew those people as well and I had flown with that pilot. And you know, it's like nobody knows what happened. Now, you know, nobody wants to speculate was it medical, was it mechanical. You always hope it was mechanical because they could fix it, and they'll never figure that stuff out. I think there's been very few other than like in Alaska Airlines where they can say oh, it's the jackscrew and stuff like that. So I, well I get it, I just understand that's kind of where it goes. But I -- and I've been there for all the arguments, you know. People are still saying oh, you know, two pilots. And people are going well, you know, then we could have lost four. So I get it. Interestingly enough, the way the system works we need lights on in the back. So some planes have doors, other planes have the curtain. Okay. Too much light? Want to put the curtain up? Okay, fine. And we still can't see what's going on. So but that has always been like that. And it's the same thing that could have possibly happened in -- in Alaska. I won't speculate. I just know that airplane. I know how everybody sits in the airplane, so you're never looking up front. So I have to -- you couldn't see if the pilot was to

slump over anyway. So if there was a change I certainly knew -- wouldn't know how to do it. But oh, red lights in the -- what, we need more light, and whether that affects. Some pilots is not affected by. Hey, you want us to -- we always ask them, do you want to close the curtain? No, no. I'll be okay. Other ones are okay, other ones no, like close it at least on takeoff. And we try that. Say hey, we'll have him off in a bit. So I don't have an answer for that I just know that it's part of the -- part of the airplane and if they want to close it because they need to do one thing and we don't see them. But most of the time we're facing backwards anyway, so we'd never see what would happen anyway, so.

Q. Thank you.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. Well, I didn't know you were a pilot. I would have given you more of the FAA pilot's spiel I have here on this but --

A. Okay.

Q. -- I will go back to that now and just say that --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- I don't know what your past interactions are with the FAA. But I want you to know that I'm here in a safety capacity.

A. No, it's okay. I got you too. I did 296 (ph.) ride. I've -- I had both sides of -- with the FAA at the time.

Q. Okay. And I just want you to know that it's --

A. No, no. It's all cool. That's --

Q. -- any of my questions are your a check ride at all.
A. It's --
Q. Because this is an investigation. This is information gathering.
A. And I'm cool with it. No, I get it.
Q. Right.
A. No, I know the purpose of it and what happens. Almost went to work for them at one point. But so I -- no that, that's fine.
Q. Great, let's see.
A. Plus, I wasn't the pilot. I just know, you know, exactly that, right.
Q. Exactly. Well, I know.
A. I -- I get it. I have --
Q. I also want you to know too, we are talking about pilots, you know.
A. Right.
Q. So I just want you to know too that -- in what capacity I'm here, you know. Because I know these are people that you know, you know?
A. Right.
Q. Maybe worked with. Could be your friends outside of work.
A. Yeah.
Q. So I just want you to know this isn't about, you know, my role here is not enforcement. My role here is --
A. Oh no, no. And that's great if something happened and it's

all good. I mean obviously you're done -- the FAA and NTSB has done thousands, unfortunately thousands.

Q. Yeah.

A. And it's still -- it still happens. Hopefully it's not always the same way because then obviously that's a bigger thing. So if it could stop one more thing and put another safety thing -- I get-- I get all that. That's, I don't have any -- any real issue about that, so.

Q. So as far as the King Air. I know you've -- so you fly King Air and you also fly rotorcraft here too?

A. Mm-hm.

Q. What's your opinions of the King Air?

A. My whole first part of this flying career with this company, I was lucky enough to be in Alaska in a place where we had Lear-35s.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. Occasionally we had a Beech-400 for a while. The pilots didn't like it. We loved it in the back. And then -- and then 45, but we also had King Air-200s.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. So, I find the 90 uncomfortable.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. I mean it just -- it's kind of good for what we do. I don't think there's anything else that -- that would take place of it. They're old. I flew Beavers for a really long time.

Q. Uh-huh.
A. I know what old airplanes are. I had a 1947 PA-12. I know what old airplane. So when these -- there's just -- that's what they are. I get it and we have maintenance and in 50 hours and 100 hours and stuff like that. So I've never really questioned any of that stuff with it. The little annoying things just happens. And I think because I had that background of flying, pilots are trying to balance it up. Well, we could do it. It's not mission critical. It's -- becomes more of a pain in the ass. And we could do the job or not do the job and then everybody else is doing it and they're scrambling around. And then everybody starts grumbling. I think that's just the nature of it here. But they, I mean, it's you know, the King Air is old. If I have been talking to people. I wish we had the Pilatus. It's easier to load. It's quieter. It's faster. I don't care that it's a single engine. Everybody's going, oh man. Like the pilots, you know what it's like. Oh no, now I got to have two engines over the water. Okay, why? You understand, Mokulele flies every day in there, and the caravans. And the Pilatus' are flying people with net worth's much greater than mine on a daily basis, just back and forth to -- and they're flying them everywhere else. So but they -- and I think it's a cost thing. I don't know.
Q. That was the last thing I was flying before I went to that base, Pilatus PC-12, so yeah.
A. You know? And then in Alaska, there's 12s up there. And in

Alaska, we don't have them. But the North Slope Borough is a PC-24. So to fly with some (indiscernible) would be great to have. But I don't think -- they're too big. Anything is. But I think Pilatuses would probably be good. We have time. We just don't think they can get them. And it's not my decision anyway.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. But the -- they're fine. They're old. They got new interiors on them. And we're in there for 34 minutes. Everybody's just used to it. It's the platform we have so, you know. I've flown older and more -- it's just a 90. I don't think it's nearly as comfortable as a 200. I think the 200's probably too big for the mission here.

Q. Sure.

A. You know? There it was two beds, your stuff is spread out, plenty of seats. It's a way more comfortable thing. Has nothing to do with the mission though.

Q. Yeah. So in your years of flying in the back, can you -- have you experienced like where a pilot scares you at all like with the -- with what the flight he takes you on or anything like that?

A. No. I'm pretty oblivious. When I'm in the back I'm, you know, doing my thing.

Q. Sure.

A. Like I said, it's always been like that. And once again, I was lucky enough that a lot of my career, I knew the -- I knew who

the pilots were that I was with. And it started with these guys and I'd known them for a long time. I just get in the back and I go -- the job is inherently dangerous.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. I make no bones about it. I just bury everything really deep. If I thought about what it would be like, I wouldn't want to do it. And I like the job. It is inherently dangerous. It has to be. We're in an airplane, in a sewer pipe, flying around. And so I just don't think about it. So the pilots get trained here and I'm just on good faith saying well, these guys. I know the FAA, they got to do the check rides, they got to do this. Somebody checked them off and I go, okay. And it really is one thing I -- I don't worry about. I have changed a few things on certain places, even with pilots that have been doing it way longer than me. And I -- I will trust all the time. But I go, if you go missed (ph.), don't go back. Well, we almost -- yeah. But it's different here. We have a patients that's just -- we're going to get a patient. We're going to get somebody nobody knows in a -- that's already in a hospital surrounded by nurses and doctors. They're warm, dry, they're comfortable enough. They're broken and they can't be fixed where they are, that's the only reason we're moving them somewhere else. If you go missed, let's just go somewhere else. That patient was waiting for us to get there to begin with. They'll wait a little longer. So that's the way I've always looked at it and things like that. But that's --

and that didn't come from just this. That just came from my -- why are we doing -- we all did that, whether you would admit it or not. You -- everybody is not, hey, don't climb it. Don't put yourself in a position where all you can do is land. They're probably airborne. If you flew floats (ph.), you've all done that, right? Hey you've -- but at least once. And then you go, you get older and you're, I don't want to do that anymore. But it's with these guys too. We go through it. Don't go in if you miss, go somewhere else. Yeah, we know you have an alternate. But that's about it on the 90s, so I don't know.

Q. Yeah. That's the second time you've mentioned like the maturing process of a pilot, you know. And I like that. I like the way you're talking about that because then I can relate to --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- to different things that you're saying because it is, you know. You get out of school. The enthusiasm, all that. All the -- but would you say Brian was at a maturity level where he was -- you had mentioned well, you eventually get to a point where if there's a problem you're going to write it up. You don't care anymore. Like, I'm not flying a broken airplane. Would you say he was at that maturity level?

A. Yeah. I mean, he was a -- I mean, he was definitely a grown up in that I don't think he needed to -- he wasn't this brand new eager beaver that was -- that would do anything to please. Like you know, like -- I'm going to do this and they're going to see

what I'm doing and give me the gold star and make me employee of the month and stuff like that.

Q. Okay.

A. He knew what the mission was and he tried his very best to do it and -- like they all do.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. And you know, you do it and it gets to the point where, you know. You know, we wrote it up last week. I wrote it up. He could look in back and said this is -- I don't want to do it. I'm tired of listening to the tower go yeah, you're breaking up. You're (indiscernible). Push the talk switch bell (ph.). So then we just do stuff like that. But he -- I never saw him and, you know, throwing stuff, like throwing the chocks and going, this job sucks. I'm not doing -- he wasn't that guy. He was that guy that said, this is great. I work two weeks. Sometimes I fly, sometimes I don't. And I can be in the water. That's -- anything, he know he had everything to come back to. He did, you know, whether it was flying. And it wasn't like he was saying, oh man, I can't wait to -- yeah, because I got to go get in the helicopter. These were just thing that -- he was at the point where it was a -- I think it was his job. It was his profession. He liked it. He'd been around long enough. He knew what he was doing. He was good. And it was like that point that said wait, there's so much more. Then let's hang out and let's go traveling. Let's do all that stuff, so. Like me. To me, it's a means to an

end. I love the job. I don't need to be working. I still like it. But I love the schedule and it gives me time off to go and do the other stuff.

Q. You mentioned like his happiness with the other job, the helicopter job. That seemed like that was going really well for him. Do you know why he was working two jobs?

A. That's -- no, I'd be speculating. I -- if I had to speculate, I'd say it's them money. It is really expensive to live here. I mean, prohibitively in some places. I don't know how they're doing it. I do pretty well. I have -- I don't know if -- that I could really go out and buy a house. I work here full-time, I have a pension and my Social Security. I'm not sure I could really do it. I don't know how people that live here do it. It -- so I think that that's why. It wasn't --

Q. Mm-hm.

A. -- so I'm just assuming that. And I think he still actually enjoyed flying. He loved being in -- I think the pilots we have are here because they still like flying. There is still great stuff to look out the window, even if it's the same stuff you see every day.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. And I can only imagine that it's kind of cool when you're flying the helicopter. Definitely a cool view and it's -- we did that. But I don't think he, I mean, he -- the toys he wanted. He wasn't financed. Never like oh man, I don't know how I'm gonna

make the bills. He was not that guy. His wife worked and he worked and they were doing -- doing well. It was just why not make it while you can?

Q. Yeah, and you said you were speculating. But you also said that when he was talking to you about how happy he was with that other job. He said that -- he told you about he got a raise and --

A. I think that's what he said. Yeah, I don't know what it was.

Q. Yeah.

A. So I'd go, good for you. That's the only reason we're all working and --

Q. Yeah.

A. -- as opposed to when we started as a pilot where you said stupid stuff like you'd do this thing for free, and we did.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know.

Q. Yep.

A. So.

Q. You had mentioned his avid outdoorsiness (ph.).

A. Hm?

Q. Like his outdoor hobbies and stuff. You said he's hiking, mountain biking, always in the water. How did that -- what adjustments would he have made or were you aware of when he had to work night shift?

A. I can't speak to that? I don't know. Is it -- he doesn't

check in with me.
Q. Right.
A. So, I know what time to show up and they, you know.
Q. Okay, because you're not aware of anything or like you guys never had any conversations as friends about oh, I hate working nights because this, this or that or?
A. No, I think every pilot would -- you talk to them so you'd get a better idea what pilots think about working seven nights when they're on their seventh night and they've been flying every night that they guy like -- they take hasn't had a flight. Well, that's the same as anything I think, so I can't. I can't speak to what he was doing prior to coming to work.
Q. I think I just have a couple more questions here.
A. Yeah.
Q. Have you ever written a Baldwin report?
A. I wrote -- what did I -- I wrote one because I had to. We had a piece of medical equipment that was broken and they said hey, you got to write it up. And I find it was -- I tried once before really and I go, no. Just seems like another thing to get in the way of trying to get something done.
Q. Okay.
A. So, but this time they said hey, you need to write it up and I went in and seems -- yeah. Anyway, I don't know if you've seen the Baldwin or the -- but who knows. It's just seems to be kind of -- for me it was a little unwieldly. But then it turns out you

don't need to answer all the question they ask because it was for a different -- a different thing. But somebody else put that system in there. So to be honest with you, I've written -- since we've had it, I've written one.

Q. Okay. You had mentioned you guys need the lights on back there. I just want to clarify. That's when you have a patient.

A. Run a patient.

Q. Yeah, so on a dead leg, like the one where the accident occurred, there wouldn't be any reason to have lights on back there, would there?

A. No, I don't know what the patient is. It's somebody might be sitting here. Typically, at least in the crew configuration that way. People I've worked with in that fixed wing. There were two rear facing seats behind the -- behind the bulkhead. Well, one airplane -- depended. Now there's a new configuration that you might have one side saddle looking this way, and then the other one behind it is rear facing. The older ones have both rear facing seats. So a lot of times, everybody who's charting would be in the rear facing -- would be in that seat behind the copilot behind a bulkhead.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. Mostly. At least that -- on the flights I've been on. And so you may have the iPad open and so that light is the only light. But all --

Q. You wouldn't have the overhead lights on.

A. -- not typically, unless there was maybe rummaging through your bags. But depending on what you press, some buttons only had one light. And then the new airplanes, you press it and they might light up two of the LEDs, right?

Q. Right.

A. It's like the sun if you hit that one. The other one you're going, is it even on? So, depending on that, but.

Q. Right, okay.

A. And once again, pilots are all different, whether they want it closed or open. And we say we'll have it off and (indiscernible). So on dead head flights like that, somebody may actually be sitting there, might have a light on with the computer on, getting their chart -- as much of their chart done before they get to the patient. But I don't know what either of them was -- where they were or what they were doing on that.

Q. Okay, thanks.

MR. ETCHER: We good?

MR. GARRISON: I'm good for now.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. We just got the second round --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- and it's a whole lot quicker.

A. Yeah.

Q. Are we -- are you good? You need a break?

A. Yeah, yeah. No, no, it's okay.

Q. I just have a few questions.
A. Okay.
Q. I'm just sitting here absorbing it, so I appreciate it.
A. Okay.
Q. I just want to clarify, and I think Dylan asked too and I still don't have it clear in my mind. The pay raise and the promotion that Brian got. That was at the helicopter place or was that here?
A. Yes. Well, I think that was at -- well, that was definitely at the -- that one was at the helicopter place. Here, I think pilots had gotten a raise and were talked about getting a -- for all the pilots getting -- I don't know if they got their raise. I think things were done a little bit differently for them and they were getting a retention bonus that had come out at the end of last year for quite a bit of money to be paid after three years -- over three years or something like that. All's I know is I heard about it. I asked about medical and they said no, it'll never happen for medical. So I go, well that sucks but -- but I thought maybe they're getting a lot. When I started, if you remember this. The industry back then, you were a pilot. You were working at Home Depot to make money because there were -- there's just so many of them you could get jobs or not get jobs. And now, they can't get enough. So anybody -- I mean, everybody's lower in their, you know, their requirements and stuff like that. So from when I started with the company where clinical would make -- did

better than pilots. Yeah, that has -- that has changed. That has -- yeah, much to my dismay. Good for them. Because I don't care what they have on their plate. But I know there was -- there was stuff to put on their plate. I would have liked to have seen a little bit more on mine. But it's the economy and they knew they needed to get people. And here, I don't know if that, you know, you look at the flying that -- that's here you'd think oh, everybody would want to come down here. But I think they've had their -- their struggles to get -- to get pilots here at different bases. And it's the same where's anywhere else. But medical people, they said yeah, We can get them, we can't get them, that's okay. You are not getting the money that the pilots are getting.

Q. All righty. I know you've said you've flown and all that.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Have you ever -- that route, the accident route. Have you ever done that in the past? I assume you have.

A. I don't know where they were -- I don't know where they were going. I was -- I was off. I had nothing to do.

Q. Oh, --

A. And I didn't -- I will tell you, I've heard bits and pieces from people but I have not tracked it on -- on the -- on any of the Facebooks. People say it's there. I don't look at it. I -- I have a whole different reason for not doing that. But so, I don't know where they were going. I don't know if they were going

to Waimea, going around there or going to Hilo or something like that. I know they were going somewhere off base.
Q. Okay, so forget that then.
A. Okay.
Q. You sat in the right seat a few times.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Has it been at night?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. So when you go out over the water, I hear people say it's a new level of dark here. From your experience, I mean, you're -- you were a pilot, you still are. Is it -- help me understand how dark it felt to you, or if you even noticed?
A. I don't. I mean, we're looking. You're sitting up at the front. If you're sitting up at the front the gauges are there. It's well-lit and you chit chat. And once again, I'm not flying.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. It's definitely dark out but then again at the same time, there's plenty of stars. There's -- there's a lot of -- and if it's a full moon, and I don't know what it was doing that night -- it's bright out there. I mean, it -- when there's no moon or the clouds are there, yeah. I mean, you don't -- we do it in the helicopter and it's like we did last night. You come over there, it's -- it's just dark. Yeah, I mean, but it's -- and it certainly is darker than -- than other places. The same thing in places -- in different places in Alaska. You're taking off and

there's -- you don't know where you are. You're just jumping off the end of the runway. It's that -- it's that darkness.

Q. Okay, okay.

A. So.

Q. All right. Last question then I'll --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- I'll hand it off. For your guys' training. Have you ever been trained on if a pilot has a medical episode in flight, what to do?

A. I'm not sure they've -- they've ever truly done that. I'm pretty sure -- I don't. I don't think they have, not to my recollection. Now, it was again different in Alaska. There was always a two-pilot crew, so that was there. They would have flown in. And they've never done the thing like John King used to do where they -- these, you know, the SIC. If you know, what happens if the pilot becomes unconscious or a medical -- where they used to do those courses. They've never done anything like that. Eric, I think, and other pilots now have -- have gone over certain things.

Q. Okay.

A. You know, like I said, the auto pilot, where the switches are, how to identify that it's on, how to make radio calls if you're sitting in the right seat. I mean, if you're sitting in the right seat it's -- I'm not sure we could ever drag anybody out of that -- out of that left seat. Certain people could. I've

been known, if they're big enough they could maybe yard (ph.) some of them out, but other ones -- yeah, you're not gonna do it.

Q. Okay.

A. So what I don't believe that they've -- they've ever done that. And then I think it's, for me, it's also like lots of other training. Great, you get it but how often are you gonna do it? Is it gonna be a video? You really gonna do something? Or you're gonna talk about it and then six months later everybody's forgotten about it. I know exactly how this is. You've seen it too, or maybe you haven't. A couple of months down the road, it is business as usual. That, I've been through. Every other company -- big companies, little companies. So unfortunately, one, it's how we get by. And two, it's the nature of the business, so.

Q. Well, I --

A. But I don't think they've done that. Would it be a bad idea? No, I mean, anything like that would be good, depending on how they're gonna do it, but.

Q. Well, I told you that was my last question.

A. Yeah.

Q. So I appreciate it.

A. Yeah.

Q. And Sabrina.

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. I just have one question actually.

A. Yeah.
Q. And that is, for all the hospital locations on all the islands, is there any one where you get dispatched to where you're just kind of like --
A. Not really. There we have two, Polo Point (ph.), which is on the Big Island, and Hana, which we haven't been to that. Oh, and then there's one other one on Molokai that's listed as a special use. So they need to call the -- they need to call. I think they have to call ops and stuff. But we've gone in there days, nights.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And it's not that bad. The only one -- but strictly from a personal level, nothing to fly into other than Waimea. I don't care how hot it is here, Waimea at midnight, it's freezing cold and windy.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And you're never have your -- the Waimea people always have jackets. We fly in from other islands and then it -- oh, you just freeze to death over there. That's crazy. You wouldn't think it, but.
Q. Yeah.
A. But no. So there's no other ones we -- we go into and fully control them all the time. There's Polo Point. Barking Sands which is on Kauai, daytime only as far as I know. But it's a big military base too, so that -- that's controlled. And, but Polo Point's the only one I think that we go into probably fairly

regularly, that we go into. It's been -- I've been in there day and night. It's long and fine and I think they know to -- they got to run over and make -- they fly over to fly by and make sure there's nothing on the -- on the runway. Other than that, nothing that oh, I don't want to go there.

Q. Mm-hm, all right.

A. Okay.

Q. That's all I have, thank you.

MS. HILL: I'm good, thanks.

MR. ETCHER: Dylan?

MR. GARRISON: I think that that's all I have as well.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Well I -- I appreciate all the time.

A. Yeah.

Q. And is there anything you can think of, you know. Like man, if they could have asked this it might shed some light?

A. No, I don't think it will. I think that -- that's the problem. My fear is -- it's not a my fear because, look, I don't have a -- I don't have a dog in this -- in this fight. I would like to find out what happened. You are really cold. You -- I'd like to find out. But I have seen this before that -- and I think I mentioned it before that anything short of them saying oh, the tail fall is somewhere going to be on pilot error. I'm well aware. Or you know, loss of spatial orientation, all those things. It's every word that's come up in every NTSB and FAA report. I get it. And then doesn't matter how good he was, they

would have done it with Chuck Yaeger had something happened. He's great on -- anybody's who's great on Monday, reports on Tuesday, and Wednesday, people just want to burn him to the ground. I've seen this. I'm sure you've seen it. It -- it's just that nature and everybody will jump. I hope it doesn't happen. I would love to know what happened. I'd heard that, like I said, that's why I haven't followed it for all the speculation. I heard they were talking about, you know, VORs and radios and stuff like that. What's he doing that for? Well, unless the whole thing took a dump and I wouldn't -- wouldn't be surprised if there were issues and it all went black. I don't know, but once again, I don't want to speculate on anything. That's all it is. So that's -- I'm not reluctant or hesitant to do it. I'll answer the questions, I just don't know what I can really add to -- to the whole, the whole -- the whole thing. I wasn't there. And then I had -- by luck, because I had flown almost 30 days. I'd been on for almost 30 days, whatever, doing my deal and flying. And lots of days we don't fly and then I got off in Maui and said, see you guys later. And then my phone started blowing up that night from my friends going hey, what happened? Hey, what are you talking about? I turned my phone off. And then -- so I found out when they -- I found out later than everybody else did.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. And they came back to the base, so. I hope you guys find out, regardless of what it is. I mean, a whole -- because I've

found too many of these things already in there. So if we could find the -- certainly find the reason, that's -- and I get that's the ultimate point of it. So hopefully you can find something. I just don't what -- what anybody could possibly be --

Q. No, but you -- you've educated me a lot, believe it or not.

A. Okay.

Q. I sat there, absorbed it. I'm glad you let us record so that way --

A. Yeah, yeah.

Q. -- in a month, when I go back to looking at it, I can reference this as well.

A. Yeah.

Q. It'll take them that long to give me the transcript back.

A. Right.

Q. But at least it'll help us.

A. Okay.

Q. So I do appreciate that, and we will call this interview concluded at 2:29.

(Whereupon, at 2:29 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022 Interview of Seth Krasnow
ACCIDENT NO.:	ANC23FA008
PLACE:	Maui, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Suzanne Ventura,
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*
	*
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022	* Accident No.: ANC23FA008

Interview of: MARK LEGGET, Regional Program Director

Hawaii Life Flight

Maui, Hawaii

Thursday
February 16, 2023

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SABRINA WOODS, Ph. D, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MILLICENT HILL, Investigator-In-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

DYLAN GARRISON, Investigator
Federal Aviation Administration

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. ETCHER: Good afternoon, my name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an Operational Factors Investigator with the NTSB. All that means is I deal with everything for the cockpit door and how that all interacts with the pilot and things like that.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

Mr. ETCHER: In a little bit I'll go around and have everybody introduce themselves for the recording and for you.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: But I just want you to know that our goal here is just to learn.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: This isn't an inquisition or anything. We just want to learn because if we don't have the whole picture, it's hard for us to understand and you're here to help bring your area of expertise and for us as well.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: I'll go around and have people introduce themselves, and we'll start with Sabrina.

DR. WOODS: Hey, Dr. Sabrina Woods. I'm the Human Performance Investigator with the NTSB on this.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

DR. WOODS: My job essentially is kind of taking into account and making an assessment on all the things that help us make us do our job, and there's a couple things that detract from us being

able to do our job. So some of the questions I'll be asking are definitely -- it's a very unique mission here. There's a lot of what I call man-man interface which is how crews come together with pilots and get the job done. So I'd like to know a little bit more about that.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. GARRISON: Dylan Garrison, I'm with the FAA.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. GARRISON: I'm the inspector in charge assigned by the FAA to assist the NTSB in the accident investigation.

MR. LEGGET: Okay, thanks.

MS. HILL: Millicent Hill, I'm the Investigator in Charge.

MR. LEGGET: Okay, nice to meet all of you.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you again for coming in and educating us today, but that's everybody that will be asking you questions. And as you can see, I have a recorder going. We will record this interview and have it transcribed. Are you okay with that?

MR. LEGGET: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: And just for your knowledge that the transcript itself will become part of the public docket when this case gets closed and once the investigation is all complete.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Also, anytime anybody is interviewed by us, you're entitled to have a representative if you wish. I see you came in by yourself. Do you need one? Want one?

MR. LEGGET: No.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

MR. LEGGET: I'm fine.

MR. ETCHER: If during the interview you decide you need to reach out to somebody, we'll hit pause and you can phone a friend or --

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETHCER: -- whatever you need to do.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: It's okay.

MR. LEGGET: All right.

MR. ETCHER: Before we completely get started, I just want you to -- there's a few ground rules I always like to start with.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: During the interview, if I ask a question because in my brain it may sound great, but it may not come out my mouth the way it's supposed to sound in my brain, but if it doesn’t make sense to you, ask for clarification. That's perfectly fine because if you give me an answer I don't understand, I'm going to ask for clarification as well.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So we both can do that. If you need a break anytime -- bathroom, water, make a -- I know you're a busy man, so if you have to make a -- if somebody calls you, you need something to deal with, just say so.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: We'll pause and resume when we can.

MR. LEGGET: I appreciate that.

MR. ETCHER: Most important rule I always say is if we ask a question and you just don't know the answer, I don't know works just fine. We just -- we like facts of course. Any -- all factual information we can get is helpful but sometimes we'll ask for opinions, or if you have an opinion, just let us know it is your opinion.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Just so we can later on differentiate between fact and opinion, all right?

MR. LEGGET: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: Pretty clear?

MR. LEGGET: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: Any questions so far?

MR. LEGGET: No, is it okay if I take notes?

MR. ETCHER: If you wish.

MR. LEGGET: I mean, I'm just taking your names but I'm just making sure that's all right. I might do that.

MR. ETCHER: If you have to jot stuff down, I get that.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: I have to too.

MR. LEGGET: Okay, cool. Just making sure that's all right.

MR. ETCHER: I always start with the toughest questions

first.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Get the worst out of the way.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

INTERVIEW OF MARK LEGGET

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Can you state your full name and spell your last for us?

A. Absolutely, Mark Anthony Legget. Last name spelled L, e as in Edward, g golf, g golf, e Edward, t tango, t tango. They all sound alike, so that's why I do that.

Q. Perfect.

A. My whole life.

Q. And what is your job title?

A. I'm the regional program director for Hawaii Life Flight.

Q. So in a nutshell, explain to me what that means?

A. So I am the responsible leader for the entire air program here. I support all the teams including the clinical pilot aviation team, maintenance, communications, and business team. Obviously in our 135 -- part 135 certificate we have separate chains of command, but the program director ties all those together, has cross reporting in those leadership chains. And specifically, at least in the Guardian Flight Programs, the program directors have a heavy emphasis on being the manager over the clinical team while the 135 side has the assistant chief pilot and the reports up you know, with like Kaleo that handle the

pilots. The maintenance team has their direct report that handles up, and the coms team actually under the certificate goes up through a supervisor and a director of communications. So I support the whole team but my emphasis is working with the clinical management side and the clinical -- for instance all the clinicians report to me as the direct manager.

Q. Okay.

A. So --

Q. Sounds like a busy job.

A. It is a lot of hats. It definitely keeps me busy.

Q. Okay, just hearing you talk about it made me wear out, so.

A. Yeah, my background also is in clinical. I am a -- I maintain board certification as a flight paramedic, over three decades of ground and air. The last 15 years has been air here for Hawaii Life Flight and I still maintain all those credentials, and I can fly on the clinical side.

Q. Okay, so you've been at Hawaii Life Flight for 15 years? Is that what you just --

A. I started in August of 2008.

Q. Okay, all right and how long have you been in your role now?

A. Program director role, just over -- it's approaching seven years now.

Q. Okay, all right. I know you said you can still be a flight medic or you know, you still take the flights. How often do you?

A. Not often.

Q. Okay.
A. Not often because the administrative role definitely is the primary focus that I have, but I do maintain all of my credentials.
Q. Okay, can you recall when the last time you went flying was?
A. Oh, absolutely. It was -- I'll try to give you the month, but it was last year. I helped -- I tend to get called on more complicated things and so I helped them with an intra-aortic balloon pump transport because we needed on-call team for that transport, so. I don't recall the exact month but it was last year.
Q. 2022?
A. 2022.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Perfect.
A. Yeah.
Q. Close enough. That's good enough for me. Thank you.
A. Yeah.
Q. So you kind of walked us through how it all works here, so that went through like whole bunch of my questions. So I appreciate that. I know you probably looked at my answers already -- or my questions. Just for the record though, are you a pilot at all?
A. No.

Q. Okay, I just wanted to make sure.
A. No.
Q. Okay, so how many clinicians do you oversee?
A. It's -- you know, we just added some so roughly 38 clinicians and we just added a whole group in September in a recent hiring process. But yeah, I mean anywhere from 35 to 38 full and part time inclusive.
Q. Okay, all right. How high is the turnover rate for clinicians? Do you get them and they stay for years and decades or is it in turnover quite a bit?
A. They stay for years.
Q. Okay.
A. They stay for years. I mean and beyond that, there's a few that have stayed beyond that.
Q. Okay, all right. I kind of want to get in just a little bit to clinicians, their interactions with you and the pilots and all that, and kind of what -- I don't want to say what their role is but how they deal with being on flights and stuff. When the airplane is airborne, do you know if the clinicians are required to remain seated? I mean how do they administer help to the patient and things like that?
A. They're required to remain seated in the critical phases of flight. That is the training they receive and expected to maintain. When they are not in critical phases of flight, if they're cleared to get -- you know, un-belt, if they need to like

get a bag or you know, move to do treatment, they may do that but there are critical phases of flying. And then as much as possible or when the PIC tells them they need to like if there's turbulence.

Q. Okay, so when they remain in their seat, do they have to have their seatbelts on or just be seated? Just kind of help? Do you -- I mean help me understand what a clinician needs to do if they're in their seat. Do they have to be belted in?

A. They are supposed to be belted in their seats.

Q. Okay, so --

A. Unless -- yeah, they're supposed to be belted in their seats unless it's not critical phase.

Q. Okay, so during that critical phase of flight, you have a patient. They've got to administer something. I mean who knows, take whatever you want. Can they do everything they need to to their patient from their seat or sometimes they have to get up?

A. They for the most part can do everything they need to from their seat in the configurations that we have. The exception would be if they need to you know, access any of the -- not the cardiac monitor because it's actually within hands' reach but if they need to access any of the medical bags, they're located in the aft of the cabin in all the aircraft. But yeah, they should be able to do most of it from their seat. Even belted.

Q. Okay, so if they had -- during that critical phase of flight, something goes wrong and they have to get a bag, or they need

something out of a bag and they have to get up, can they do that or do they need to wait no matter what?

A. They're supposed to wait.

Q. Okay.

A. They're supposed to wait.

Q. How about on the dead-legs? Do they just have to stay in their seats? Can they stretch out on the gurney? Can they sit up in the cockpit? Do you know? Is there any protocol for that?

A. They're supposed to follow regulation and stay in their seats with seatbelts unless they're permitted in one of those situations not to wear their seatbelt.

Q. Okay, even on dead-legs they can -- if they're allowed in cruising, get up and stretch out on the gurney? I don't know if they do, but --

A. They're supposed to stay in their seats.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay, all right. In your position, how often do you have clinicians reaching out to you and saying you know, I flew with this pilot -- we'll say me. I flew with Shawn and I just -- I don't feel comfortable flying with them. Does that happen often?

A. Not often in my experience.

Q. Okay, how -- can you just give me a ballpark? When was the last time it happened? Or how many times has it happened? Anything along those lines.

A. Less than a handful of times in my 15 years with this program.
Q. Okay, can you kind of give me a ballpark? Just kind of a general idea of what the concerns were?
A. Yeah, sometimes it may be not necessarily aviation concerns. It may just be interpersonal interactions with crew, or patients, or family in which case you know, we can deal -- we have to deal with that and reset the expectation. The other case would be you know, maybe something with their confidence in the pilot as a aviator. So it may be they don't understand the procedures or something they did and they have to debrief later on it but it -- whatever it was, they were not -- they lost their confidence in that particular instance. So yeah, either a behavioral issue or something may be causing them to lose confidence in the pilot.
Q. Okay, as far as our investigation, we have to ask. Did you have any of those complaints with Brian?
A. I did not.
Q. You -- no clinicians ever had reported complaints?
A. No.
Q. Okay, just wanted to make sure so that we knew.
A. Yeah.
Q. We've heard this term. It's a great term I just heard here. Three to go one to down. When it comes to taking a flight.
A. Yeah, three to go one to say no.
Q. Thank you, see I can even mess up the term.
A. No, I knew what you meant so it's okay.

Q. But it sounds like you guys' job is you know, very mission oriented. You know somebody is in trouble, they need help. How much of a challenge is it for a clinician to say no.
A. I guess rephrase that? What do you mean by a challenge to say no?
Q. In your experience how was easy was it for you if you, you know maybe you didn't like the weather, maybe you were tired or whatever. Man, there's something that's happening. Somebody needs our help. How hard is it to say no, I can't from your experience?
A. As a -- when I was in clinician side?
Q. Mm-hm.
A. It was not hard.
Q. Okay.
A. I just talked to my partner -- in that case, talked to my clinical partner and whatever it was making us feel uncomfortable, we'd tell the pilot no, no go.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, so that's from the clinician side.
Q. Okay.
A. I didn't perceive it to be difficult.
Q. Okay, and is it still -- I know that was you. You know, when you were doing it but how about now? Have you ever had clinicians like man, it's just hard to say no I mean, you know? If there's help -- I've got to help these people. You know, you have that

mind -- clinicians seem to have that mindset. They want to help.
A. Yeah, I mean so what is that question? I'm sorry, rephrase that?
Q. No, and that's fine. In your position now, have you ever had clinicians coming up to you and say I really -- it's hard to say no. I might be tired or you know, that airport always gives me concern or whatever but it's hard to say no because somebody needs me. How do you deal with that, or do you have to deal with that?
A. I mean I haven't had them come up and say it's hard to say no. When I have a situation as a program director, it's more I'm notified that they said no. And what I mean by that is the policy to be three to go one to say no or even the policy for fatigue, it's removed the program director from having to be consulted to say no.
Q. Okay.
A. And it wasn't always that way. Years ago, with different company ownership, the policy -- you had to get final approval from the admin on call to say no. But that's been removed for years now and at least in Hawaii, it's rare. I'm just notified when a crew has said no and then we later on just ask what's going on or find out. But it's not them coming to me and saying they're having a hard time saying no or can I say no.
Q. Okay.
A. The other side to that is -- not the other side, but just the additional side to that is when we talk about that in training or

in safety meetings at least for myself, I constantly try to reinforce for them that they can say no and I support that. Trying to promote that.

Q. Okay.

A. So, yeah. I don't know if that answers the question.

Q. It does. It helps, thank you. We've heard during all these interviews -- and your crews have been -- you know, your clinicians have been very helpful. So thank you by the way.

A. Yeah.

Q. We've heard though that you know, some people might be wondering why do we go pick up a psych patient or something at three in the morning.

A. Right.

Q. Why can't we wait? Do you ever run into those questions from your clinicians?

A. Mm-hm.

Q. And how do you handle that?

A. So is there like a specific instance, or?

Q. If you had a psych patient -- I don't know, I assume you pick those up too, right? That's kind of the --

A. Absolutely, yeah.

Q. And you know, schedule to go at three in the morning. You know, do crews come up to you and say this isn't really an urgent thing, is it? Why do we have to go out in the middle of the night to do it? Do they come to you and ask to talk about that?

A. Not in the moment. There has been discussion like outside of it. I'll just give a recent example of that. There was a discussion with the Maui crew. With Brian and the Maui crew about you know, why do we have that policy or what is our policy. And that was the week before -- and that was the week of the crash ironically but they were talking about. They were thinking about it and I was here you know, in the hanger and I -- you know, downstairs in the break area and I go out there to check on them while they're waiting in maintenance or whatever. And Brian actually asked that question in front of the whole crew. And you know, what is the stance on that? What is the policy on that? You know, why do we do it that way? And my answer was you know, you have to keep your risk assessment regardless of whether it's a psych patient or any other patient. Your risk assessment is separate from the patient condition and that's how you decide whether to take the flight. Not being motivated by the patient condition and the pilot has to do a risk assessment and the med crew has to do a risk assessment both at the beginning of shift and prior to each mission and then we take the flight based on that. You know, afterwards we take the patient information -- they get the patient information and take the flight. Then the question was, why can't we just do those in the day time? And you know, because it would be easier to wait until the day time and my answer was this is a 24/7 operation but you have to mitigate your risk assessments first regardless of it's a psych patient or not.

And secondly, if you're fatigued -- which is part of your risk assessment, you should not take any flight. You should not be on duty and so it's applied to every patient. It's not -- you know, not singled out. So yeah, that's the most recent time it's come up. That's usually the discussion though and the other side of that discussion is if they're not really as sick, should we be doing them at a certain time of day or at night. But that's the answer.

Q. Okay, so you say the clinician crew does a risk assessment as well. Do they turn that in anywhere? Do they -- how is that looked at?

A. They report it to dispatch and then do a post-flight debrief. Our software platform that we use is called Ninth Brain and they go into Ninth Brain and do -- well they do it before hopefully. They can do it like in their I-phone or app but if they have an issue doing it before, they can record it afterwards. But they verbally will say it to dispatch.

Q. Okay.

A. A risk of, and then give their number.

Q. Do you remember for the accident crew what their risk was? What their risk number was?

A. No.

Q. Is that stored or archived anywhere?

A. It -- if it's accessible in the recordings back that far, it could be in the dispatch recoding.

Q. Okay.
A. And then the other place it would be if they recorded it before the mission or transport, it would be in that Ninth Brain in those -- in their lower risk assessments.
Q. Okay, now what's recorded, is that just the number they come with or is it them filling out all the questionnaires or whatever you have on that?
A. The audio would just be the total number which would be the score inside of the Ninth Brain app. It actually -- you know, they tick through each of the sections and then it adds it up, so you would be able to see it there.
Q. Okay, I've heard you have -- forgive me, I can't remember the exact term. I've heard so many new terms this week, so forgive me.
A. It's okay.
Q. But you have patients that are -- you know, like a psych patient. A transport type thing and then you have other ones that are like urgent. Like they need to get somewhere really quick. And forgive me, somebody used the term and I'm drawing a blank now.
A. It's okay.
Q. But do you know --
DR. WOODS: Early activations?
Q. Oh, yeah.
A. So yeah, our time sensitive --

Q. Yeah.
A. -- and those are early activations.
Q. What she said.
A. Very good.
Q. So of those, how many are those early activations and how many of them are just standard transports that you do? Do you guys keep a track of that?
A. Yeah, well there's a databank and the clinical databank which is ImageTrend . That's the charting software. It also has the reporting data and stratifies the transport types. It doesn't -- I don't -- I don't have an awareness of it having a specific how many times was there early activation piece done but I mean I helped write the early activation guideline and trained internally and all the facilities externally on it. And it is time sensitive patients and it includes specifically stroke, cardiac, like STME, ST elevation, myocardial infarction, other neurologic emergencies, trauma, or any other cases deemed critical by the sending physician. And those are the pretty much -- well they're evidence base accepted across the country in air and ground early activation for time sensitive cases. The way you would go back into ImageTrend and try to pull that data, which I don't have the exact percentage. That was your question. Is you go in and you would look at those types of patient demographic. So it's accessible but I wouldn't want to speculate on it without going back and looking.

Q. Okay, it's nothing you track yourself on a regular basis? I'm -- or do you?
A. So -- well myself, I don't but our clinical management side, and that's what I was talking about in the beginning. How I oversee the program and help tie it together. I do have more involvement with the clinical side. We do have a clinical manager and a clinical educator. They report to our director of clinical services for the region. They do the QI piece for the clinical informatics and so they are the ones that will pull that data and then we do report it for our accreditation.
Q. Okay.
A. And so yeah, we can get the data.
Q. Okay, just for the record, the accident flight. They were going to pick up a patient when it occurred. Was that patient -- do you know what the reason was they were going to pick up that patient was for?
A. I'm drawing a blank. I did know what it was.
Q. Okay, do you remember if it was an urgent need or --
A. It wasn't an early activation.
Q. It was?
A. I don't believe it was an early activation.
Q. Okay, all right. If a pilot has an issue with a clinician, I know they have an assistant chief pilot but do they come to you at all about that or do they just go to the assistant chief?
A. Both.

Q. Both, okay.
A. They can do both.
Q. Just give me an example of why a pilot would come to you. Help me kind of understand --
A. With an issue for a clinician?
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah, it just may be interpersonal interactions. You know, like if -- I guess both ways, I already explained that that happens the other way.
Q. Right.
A. A clinician with a pilot. Same way, with pilot with a clinician. You know, if they're short with each other perhaps or you know, the day-to-day -- sometimes even if they notice the behavior with a family member or a patient they may come and say hey, I have this concern. Come to me -- a pilot would come to me. So that's one example.
Q. Okay.
A. Have you ever had a pilot come to you, and I use the phrase backseat driver. But saying man one of your clinicians is being a backseat driver. Can you, you know -- have you ever had that happen?
A. Not that term, but I guess explain to me what you mean exactly so I don't have to --
Q. Have you ever had a clinician try to tell the pilot --
A. I don't like to guess.

Q. -- how to do his job?
A. How to fly?
Q. Yeah.
A. Years ago I had, yeah.
Q. Okay, nothing recent?
A. Nothing recent, but no. I had when I was still flying the line and when I initially was here, I guess probably the first three years. I knew of a paramedic that -- one of the flight paramedics that was taking pilot training and then trying to like tell the pilot what to -- you know, what was right and wrong. A very experienced pilot.
Q. How well did that go over?
A. Not well.
Q. Okay.
A. Not well at all and it -- and that pilot -- I mean that pilot, I don't think he's in any of our companies now but he ended up becoming an FAA -- doing what you're doing, yeah. You know, he already was probably at the top of his experience and everything but yeah, he didn't take too kindly to it. Yeah.
Q. How did you handle that?
A. I mean, I thought it was amusing. I just -- you know, I'm his partner and I just kind of watched it and steered clear of the whole thing. I mean we watched that whole interaction but I mean, yeah. I mean there wasn't anything where they crossed the line you know, from like a -- I was going to say behavioral and I

thought of you but you know, they -- yeah, you could just see the tension. But yeah, I don't think anyone had to report each other on that.

Q. Okay, I have one last question and then I'm going to pass it around to --

A. Okay.

Q. -- to Sabrina. Are you involved with any pilot hiring?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. I wasn't sure. Sometimes -- you know, because your crews interact with them so I wasn't sure if they --

A. No.

Q. -- bring you in to the interview as well.

A. No, I'm involved with clinical hiring. I was more -- you know, I had been involved at all levels as we've gotten busier, it's -- I've delegated. Like the recent hiring process, I've delegated to the clinical management team and base managers. They did all the interviews. I do the final review, and hire, and offer.

Q. Okay.

A. But not pilots.

Q. Okay.

A. That's -- that would be Kaleo and then the folks above --

Q. Okay.

A. -- in his hierarchy.

Q. Perfect. That's all I have for now, so I'm going to let --
A. Okay.
Q. I'm going to start --
A. Okay.
Q. Unless you need a break. Do you need a break?
A. No, I'm good.
Q. Okay, all right.
A. I'm just sipping coffee and then I'll warn you too, I've -- not COIVD or anything but I'm -- I've had just this for like -- since November. I thought it was RSV or something. It has never gone away, so my voice may go completely or if I have a little coughing fit, I'll just go off in the corner. But you're all safe. I haven't made anyone sick in months at least. I probably made someone sick in the beginning but I've got water and all this. Anyway. All right, sorry Sabrina go ahead.

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. How would you rate -- because you have a very dynamic distinctive job here and so does the assistant chief pilot. How would you rate the communication between you two in managing all things Hawaiian Life Flight?
A. Between ACP -- between the ACP?
Q. You and Kaleo, yeah.
A. Oh, it's -- I think it's great communication. Part of that is because we fostered a relationship before we were in leadership. I mean we flew together, so I mean --

Q. Okay.
A. -- when I first was here flying full time, he was flying while I'm full time and was not in any kind of leadership role and so you know, later on when we were in leadership it just -- that allows it to flow more freely. So yeah I mean, we don't seem to have any barriers unless he tells you that we did. I don't feel like we do. Yeah.
Q. So what about up the chain? So between you and all things South Jordan?
A. Yeah.
Q. How would you rate that communication?
A. Soon to be Dallas. It's going to move after all these years, but I felt like it's been better in the most recent years since it's become GMR. Even though the certificate -- the players in the certificate have been pretty much the same people. I feel like that it's improved, and what I mean by that is it does start with Kaleo as the ACP and we really are part of a core team here. And we try to foster that as our local leadership and that includes myself as our director, our clinical manager that I mentioned. Will, Kaleo, our dispatch leader, and then Cy whose our maintenance manager, and then Kat who's our business development manager. And then -- so as a local group we meet regularly with that group up there. We have a Monday meeting and then in between that time, there's crossover communication really constantly as needed. I mean I -- if Kaleo's not available, I can

crossover to the pilot manager on call which is Kaleo -- usually Kaleo's direct report or one of the other ACPs, and have that dialogue. And I feel like too that you know, the next person above Kaleo who's the chief pilot Andy Munion, he is included and participates in our regular weekly core local team meetings, and listens in and gives feedback. So the distance is always a barrier. Sometimes the time difference could be but really we're all 24/7 so I feel like it's been -- I feel like now it's better, and in the last few years it's been better.

Q. Okay.

A. Compared to my long -- my tenure here which has been like I said, almost 15 years.

Q. Yeah, that's good experience. Thank you. You talked -- you dropped a word earlier. You said you know, like the core team and things like that. And so definitely again, in this kind of mission teamwork is everything.

A. Yeah.

Q. What role do you feel the clinicians play in CRM?

A. In CRM yeah, I feel that the clinicians and the pilot equally are CRM.

Q. How so though?

A. How so?

Q. Like what do the clinicians bring to the fight?

A. Oh my gosh, there's two clinicians to one pilot. That's one thing but you know, what they bring to it is they -- besides their

awareness and looking out for their patient and that's two more individuals that are eyes for the pilot you know, for the conditions of the aircraft, for the situation, for each other, and checking each other you know, for fitness for flight for instance. But I mean it's all part of the CRM still. So I don't know if that's really answering it or if --

Q. Yeah, it actually is a great segue into your full disclosure. We've been told that there is now an added kind of wellness check that's going on you know, between the crew and the pilots, and so I guess where do you think that comes from and do you feel that it's warranted?

A. Mm-hm. So I said mm-hm meaning broad in front, yes. Where that comes from is we just had a catastrophic event where we lost three souls so the wellness check before was the -- you know, the crew doing their -- of course, their risk assessment, their paying attention to pre-flight together, calling something out three to go, one to say no. This added layer really is from a behavioral or from a social emotional standpoint, that you're dealing with an event like we had is an added layer. I think I believe that it is needed and really to help just give one extra check at least right now in the short run before they take a flight, that they are all good to go. And you know, whether we keep that in place, that remains to be seen but in the short run, it's -- from the experience of our Alaska program, that's something they did and that's the other reason that our leadership encouraged us to

implement that here. Because it was something that they had good experience with there and we hadn't been through this before. So we followed that lead.

Q. How do you --

A. But yes, I think it was warranted.

Q. Okay, have you received any feedback from your clinicians? Has it been well received by them?

A. Yes, it -- so it's been well received by them. The initial -- the ones that came back online initially when they -- you know, we gave them all time off across the board and then we have a wellness briefing to return to duty. That same format then is used for the -- once they're cleared to duty to still check themselves prior to taking a flight in addition to doing risk assessment. Has it been well received? It's been well received more strongly initially. We're now finding that we're after the event -- you know, now that we're a month and a half after the event, some of them are -- they feel like it's redundant. Not necessarily a bad thing but they're asking do we still keep doing it, because it's quite redundant. But then we have some clinicians once again, that just came back online at the tail end that just did their first flights last week. They're glad we're doing it. So there's that spectrum I think. And the initial part, how's it been received. My perception is well in the beginning. The longer they go, they'll like -- they want to -- they ask hey, is this -- is there a way to abbreviate it and still

do it? We haven't got there yet. We're still asking that they do it, so.

Q. Yeah, you did say earlier that it remains to be seen if it will remain in place. So first let me back up. Was this something that was mandated to you by Guardian? Like the mother ship at South Jordan? Or was that something that was suggested and then you made a local decision to implement?

A. It was the former.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean it was suggested but also mandated --

Q. Okay.

A. -- as a safety measure.

Q. Okay, so then going back to you know it remains to be seen if it stays in place, do you feel that that's something that you can help to inform that decision?

A. Absolutely.

Q. Like you check in and you're like we -- you know, maybe you and Kaleo have decided that this isn't necessarily something that we need anymore. Do you feel comfortable giving that feedback back?

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Okay, so I asked you was it well received by the clinicians. Have you heard any rumblings from the pilot side? Has it been --

A. Yes.

Q. -- well received.

A. Yeah, through Kaleo -- not directly to me but like that's a connection. Sometimes we'll hear it. Like they'll raise the question. They'll come to me -- a pilot will come to me but you know, if they come through their traditional reporting chain, we do share concerns and so I've heard -- he's heard of some rumblings of it. That's why I know about it. But I haven't had any pilots directly come to me and rumble. I have heard it from clinicians.

Q. Okay, just curious about that and how you're managing it. So going back to --

A. Do you want to know how I'm managing it?

Q. No, I just said thank you for --

A. Okay.

Q. -- criticism and how --

A. Oh, yeah.

Q. I'm very curious as to how you are managing that.

A. Okay.

Q. And again, I recognize it's very new still.

A. Yeah, I mean the short answer again to managing it is that reenforcing that we want them to still do it.

Q. Yeah, okay. So going back to the compliant before, or the concern, or the inquiry if you will from Brian about like why are we -- why does this patient need to go now. From the clinician point of view, how much are they informing the pilots as to the nature of the patient's status outside of those early activations?

A. Yeah, so the early activations where they're not informed, I mean they're -- the -- I'll try -- okay, rephrase that for me.
Q. So I guess what I'm saying is how --
A. Sorry.
Q. How much do the pilots know about what's going on in the back of the aircraft?
A. Yeah, I mean that's totally subjective and I think it's variable. The crew tries to keep that separate. I mean they -- so first of all -- and that was my -- in the whole spectrum, dispatch deliberately keeps it separate and they -- it's like here's the flight information you know, point A to point B. Can you assess that in your risk assessment to take the flight based on the weather and based on the condition. And really the only information they get -- they were getting was patient weight for a period of time. And then this is before the crash. But then we realized even weight could sway them because if you give a low weight number, they could think it's a pediatric case and that could raise either anxiety or also make them feel like they need to do it, right? So that was removed. So that's the first layer with coms to protect the pilot in making their risk assessment. But to your question, the clinicians then, they don't overtly share it but it's impossible when you show up with a patient and the pilot can see the patient and what's happening for the pilot to know if it's a very sick patient or a not sick patient.
Q. Okay.

A. And I would say for our early activations standpoint -- back to that question too. If they -- you know, if it's an early activation that they may perceive that.
Q. Okay, so you think it's because of obviously the nature of how you know, the patient arrives and what's going on with the pilot can deduce oh hey, this is --
A. Absolutely.
Q. Okay.
A. And you know, that's the feedback I get from pilots too.
Q. Okay, because the next thing I was going to ask was then how did Brian know that this was a you know, maybe psych -- a less, you know --
A. Yeah, so -- and again in the context of that conversation I was telling you all about, that was -- it was a discussion about that kind of situation. They weren't going on a psych flight then.
Q. Yeah.
A. That was just an open discussion.
Q. Yeah.
A. But then back to your question, how do they know it is. They definitely have hindsight or in the flight when they may have no information of what kind of patient it is from dispatch or from the clinical crew, as soon as the patient shows up, it's obvious that it's that kind of patient.
Q. Okay.

A. Because that is usually -- it's usually an adolescent that walks on the airplane. That's very stable.
Q. Okay.
A. Usually. There are some cases where they're not you know, and they're agitated or something and sedated, but that's how they know. And then in hindsight, they keep track of that and later on they're like we're doing this -- we do these all at night all the time so why are we doing it. They ask that question.
Q. Okay, I understand. It makes sense --
A. That's how.
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah, absolutely.
Q. So you hear things. I had a Game of Thrones moment, I know things. But you know those water cooler chats, so overall prior to the accident -- so you've got to think back a bit.
A. Okay.
Q. What are some of the concerns? Just general concerns that you're hearing from the clinicians?
A. About?
Q. Anything. Any concerns that trickle up. What are the most common things you hear -- heard, past tense?
A. Yeah, I mean that's one. The --
Q. The timing of flights?
A. Well --
Q. The time of --

A. Yeah, well trying to delineate or trying to like decide -- what's a better way? Trying to you know, separate critical versus non-critical and what tie you take the flight in a 24 hour shift. Yeah, so that is not a new discussion. Whether I've been clinical or you know, as a front line clinician, then I was a clinical manager, before I was a program director at all levels, that comes and goes with this type of work. The other one would be -- and it's frustrating for them, is when they have delays because they are here on maintenance. And it could be 24 hours a day. It's just because you want your plane to be fixed but you're just having a delay, you know and so you're kind of stuck. So those are probably. I mean that's probably one of the more common ones that we will here now on the admin side because we're here and we'll go see them and talk to them. Like how's it going? It's like oh, we're having -- we're waiting on this or that or the other. We don't when it's going to be ready. But yeah, it's pretty common.

Q. Okay.

A. You know, I don't really hear a lot of water cooler discussion like that out there, so.

Q. So same question but post-accident. What are the concerns you're hearing now?

A. Oh yeah, I mean those too.

Q. Still?

A. Well yeah, absolutely. The one about should we -- the word I

was thinking for was stratify and place different emphasis on what types of patients we take and when. Okay, so that's one. Psychiatric is one example.

Q. Yeah.

A. But we could also just say low priority versus high priority, okay? So that discussion has come up. The other discussion has come up about just you know, are we -- maybe not the -- well, the maintenance delay is because now planes are being written up more and so now that's an added reason. The crews are glad they're being written up more but it's just more delays. And so we've mitigated that you know, a little bit better just by -- you know, if it's at night we just try to be sensitive and put them in a hotel or something.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right, thank you.

A. Yeah.

Q. That's all I have now for now.

MR. GARRISON: I don't have any questions at this time.

MR. LEGGET: Okay.

BY MS. HILL:

Q. For your structure would it be accurate to say that the pilot stuff is delegated to Kaleo? And then if you have a clinical manager that some other clinician stuff is delegated to?

A. Yeah, okay. Yeah, so definitely pilot issues are delegated

to Kaleo. If it is -- there is some overlap so if it is like an aviation operation, or them flying the plane, or there's something in the GOM, or OPS specs, for sure Kaleo and pilot hierarchy. We share behavioral issues if there's some sort of behavioral type of thing but even that, it would tend to lean more on the pilot hierarchy like if it was an HR issue and they deal with it typically unless it overlaps something with clinical and then I'm part of it. On the clinical side, there is a clinical manager. I mean those clinicians direct report to me but they also side report to the clinical manager and so we take on behavioral issues either together or myself. And if it's clinical patient care, it is the clinical -- it's the clinical manager and the director of clinical services, and the medical -- we also have medical director physicians that are involved but I am also involved in those as a program director because those are my employees that direct report.

Q. Who's the clinical manager?

A. His name is William Moser, (ph.). M-o-s-e-r.

Q. And is there also a maintenance manager who oversees the --

A. Yes, so Hawaiian Life Flight, his title is regional maintenance manager. His name is Cy Nishihira (ph.) and he's here. He's part of our local leadership and he reports up.

Q. So those three, Kaleo, the clinical manager, and the maintenance manager all report to you?

A. No, that's what's confusing probably. So Kaleo reports up to

Andy Munion (ph.), chief pilot who reports up to the DO. Jeremy Salveson (ph.) at this point, and we have a new DO coming on and Jeremy will be assistant DO. Cy reports to -- he reports to George Thomas (ph.), who's director of maintenance, DOM for Guardian certificate. And then Will reports to -- I've got to see if I can keep this straight because they've -- we've realigned it at different points. Keely Bennett (ph.), and she is director of clinical services for the Pacific Region, California and Hawaii. And so how do they report to me? Will, he co-leads with me essentially on the org chart for clinical. He handles clinical issues with the clinical team. I handle OPS issues with the clinical team. That's how the program directors function now.

Q. Okay so it's you, Kaleo, William, and, Cy. Is there any other managers over any other groups here?

A. Yes, sorry. I left off Kevin Richard (ph.) is the dispatch manager. He's technically called dispatch supervisor and -- or communications supervisor over our dispatch center and then we do have a business development manager that she supports both internal and external customer. Her name is Kat Mia (ph.).

Q. I think we met Kat.

A. Yeah, and so that's extensively the local leadership team.

Q. Okay, is there any --

A. We have one more, sorry. We do have a safety officer, Derek. It's pronounced beam, but it's spelled B-o-h-e-m. Derek, D-e-r-e-k. And I -- we write that last name B-o-h-e-m. It looks like

bome but it's -- he says it beam. And so he's actually -- he's a fulltime clinician flight nurse at our Waimea base and he serves as safety officer and he reports up through a safety hierarchy at the Guardian Flight. Would you like that?

Q. Sure.

A. Yeah? So he reports up to Michael Koenes (ph.) who's our director of safety. Daniel Johnson (ph.), he is our safety officer -- or he's our program safety officer so he's not like the life flight local but he's over Hawaii, California, and Alaska OPS. So he like kind of assists Michael Koenes and supports Derek, and supports us and our safety program.

Q. So Daniel Johnson is in South Jordan, or?

A. He is actually -- I think he's in Oregon or something right now. I don't know if he's in South Jordan or not. He's remote but he was added new. There was another person that he took her place, that was our instruments administrator. Tara Medina (ph.), she left last year and then when he hired in, he's not an SMS administrator. He has a different title but they're both remote, so that's -- I still haven't met him in person. I've met him in Teams.

Q. Okay, so what role does Derek have as a safety manager here in Hawaii.

A. Safety officer, yeah so -- so yeah, he -- so Derek's role, he is a representative for the overall program for all departments. The bases don't all have site safety officers at this time but

they all -- the ones that do -- and when they have site safety officers they report and work with the safety officer Derek. And then he basically -- he helps promote and also hear feedback and then work with the whole safety team. Which is all the leadership are on that team, local. And then all of our -- those ones I just mentioned that are above -- well, they're above Kaleo. Aviation, maintenance, clinical manager, the director of clinical services, and then Michael Koenes. We comprise the safety structure, leadership structure for Hawaii Life Flight. So it's the Guardian leadership plus the clinical, plus us. So Derek is like the local person that is on the front line as a safety officer.

Q. Okay, and what kind of safety stuff does he do as that?

A. He participates in the monthly safety leadership and the companywide safety meetings and helps lead those meetings. He is a -- if you will, like a go to for all the clinical teams, the base leaders -- base managers on any concerns or issues that they have with safety. So he's like an advocate besides each of the managers. He is a specifically for safety advocate locally and then he also represents Hawaii Life Flight on the Guardian Flight. You know, the safety leadership. All the safety officers meet regularly with Michael Koenes and Daniel, and you know they're updated on new safety initiatives and they brief on that, and they discuss any concerns here and then he helps with implementation of new safety initiatives here, helps support me with that.

Q. And he's a clinician, does he also work the line regularly

too?
A. Oh yeah, so he's a flight nurse fulltime. So he works at the big island at the Waimea Base. He's fulltime and you know, he's based in Waimea.
Q. Okay, and Daniel Johnson, what kind of safety stuff does he do?
A. So Daniel Johnson -- so our company -- the safety -- one big thing he does is -- the safety platform that we use is Baldwin Safety (ph.) so it's our reporting -- it's not just for safety issues. It's for operational concerns, positive, negative. It's for -- some of it's for compliance items like doing survival bag checks for instance. So it's not just safety reporting but it is the primary vehicle for safety incident reporting. For documenting it and then documenting how we receive, address, and find resolution to it. And Daniel is one of the main administrators for that and helps facilitate as we get reports and help as a leader because those reports come in and their either -- their related to one discipline or all disciplines and he helps collate that. It's quite a bit of work. He helps support you know, the IT side of that and helping us with navigational issues with that platform for instance. And then too, he helps -- he's helping just with safety. If there's any safety initiatives here, he's a resource for Derek.
Q. Okay, thank you.
BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. You made it through round one. Do you need a break or anything?
A. I'm good right now.
Q. Okay.
A. I haven't started having a coughing attack, so.
Q. Well, you've been going for an hour so I just wanted to make sure.
A. I'm amazed. No, I'm good as long as you all don't need a break. I'm good, yeah.
Q. No, we're good. Everybody good? All right, I just have a few questions. You've really helped fill in some of the --
A. Okay.
Q. Blanks I had, so I appreciate it. I have a few questions.
A. Okay.
Q. Let's go back to what Millicent was talking about with the base safety person. We'll go with that. I don't want to call him a manager because he's not, right?
A. Okay, so -- oh, you mean Derek?
Q. Derek, yes.
A. So safety officer.
Q. Safety officer. So let's talk about that for a little bit. Does he look at safety items for pilots too or is he strictly clinicians and --
A. He's -- no, he has eyes on all of it.
Q. Okay.

A. I mean, back to the Baldwin System is a good starting point to explain the answer to that question, I think. And the Baldwin System has evolved over time. It's when teams -- when employees have a concern or you know, positive or negative. Sometimes they put employee kudos in there but when they have a safety concern let's say, we encourage them to come to us first so we're aware of it and especially if it's urgent so we can take you know, more quick action and then if they haven't filed the report about it, we instruct them to go into Baldwin and file their concern. They don't always do it but we ask them to do it because it's definitely a way that helps us track it. It holds us accountable and then unless it's an HR issue, it's transparent when it's all resolved and all the programs can see it. All of our programs, so we can learn from one another. So back to his visibility to that. He has visibility to all of it. He doesn't necessarily get all the reports per say in the beginning when they come in. Even I don't see all of them. With the other role that Daniel does is he helps with that system to collate where they go to, so if it's an operational program wide type of situation, I get those reports. If it's aviation, OPS, clinical, coms, it goes to those respective managers. That's for initial awareness, visibility, and then for them to respond and start the investigation, and then make resolution, and then report those actions back. That process Daniel's -- Derek is aware and in that process with Daniel and I think they're roll and their involvement is evolving because

Daniel's role is new to it and to be able to facilitate more as a safety person for Derek to go to. But the other side of it is when -- you know, in real time all the leaders as we get those reports to us in person through Baldwin, we work through them during the month. If it's something that we need to involve Derek with to help us, we will if it's something he can help with but at minimum, we meet monthly. The safety leadership, it meets. It's all of us and we have an Excel if you will. I mean it's a share point but it's all of the ready reports and we track them constantly and report on every single one of them. So Derek has eyes on all that. Every discipline along with Daniel and Michael Koenes and we do that meeting and then we follow it with the company wide safety meeting which is in Teams. And it's every employee and every department is involved in that and we review you know, what's new safety business, what are new safety bulletins that have been in Baldwin that everyone should have already seen but we review those, and then we review open Baldwin cases that we can review. Some of them are confidential and then we'll review closed cases, and then we do new business. So as a safety officer he's new to it last year and I would say that he and I co-lead those meetings. I probably lead them more right now but Derek has eyes through the whole process and then he attends on our behalf the higher level meetings with all the other program safety officers that are led by Daniel and Michael Koenes.

Q. Okay, you said he's been doing that since last year?

A. Yeah, he's been --
Q. Do you know when he started it?
A. I'd have to look. I don't remember. It was earlier last year but I don't remember --
Q. Okay.
A. -- the exact month. But yeah, a majority of the year.
Q. So out of these safety meetings and everything if there's something that is a safety concern, a policy change, a procedure change or you name it, whatever. How is that information or is that information transmitted out to the end user? The pilots? The clinicians? Whomever it may effect. Does Derek do that? How does that do --
A. No.
Q. How does that happen?
A. Yeah, it depends on what discipline. If it's a program wide situation, then you know it effects -- for sure if it effects the standard operating policy, the Baldwin bulletin has been used increasingly for that regardless of the discipline because the Baldwin bulletin is transmitted first in an administrative email to every employee and it's instructing them to go into Baldwin and read the bulletin. And then they also have access and they're encouraged to use Baldwin and read the bulletin and go do it, but I mean there's -- we have to like remind and do it that way. If it's an important -- I mean if it's really a wide sweeping thing, I will send it out as a program director you know, to draw

attention to it. If it's individual discipline items, those likewise, those individual managers whether it's aviation, communications, clinical, they will share it individually just with their group along with Baldwin and the bulletin.

Q. Okay, you send --

A. Multifaceted.

Q. Okay, you send it out. How do you know a pilot or clinician actually looks at it?

A. Yeah, so -- yeah, right so I don't always do read receipts on the -- not, I'm sorry -- read receipt, we do. I don't always do respond, right? But I do read. But the Baldwin System, when you go in -- have you all ever seen the Baldwin System in this while process? I mean you probably should because it sheds light into what questions you're asking. But the Baldwin System when you go into it, it's got -- you can access reports. You can see your current ones that you haven't -- from an administrative standpoint. From a user standpoint, it has a list where you have a new bulletin and when the employee acknowledges that and opens the bulletin, that's how we know they've read it and we can go in -- any of us can go in and look and see how much they're accessing it. Are they reading their bulletins.

Q. Okay.

A. Are they ignoring the bulletins and we need to ask them to start reading the bulletins because they need to start doing it. All those things.

Q. Okay, so you have a way of registering when they open it and that's assuming -- you're taking in assumption --
A. We're assuming they read it.
Q. Yeah, okay.
A. Yeah, I mean you're right. I can't tell you if they processed it in their brain.
Q. Right, okay.
A. But we're giving them the benefit of the doubt.
Q. But you have at least a way of tracking that they opened it?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Okay, that helps.
A. Yeah.
Q. Can a clinician file an anonymous report?
A. Sorry, yes. Anyone can file an anonymous report.
Q. Okay.
A. Anybody, and so we encourage -- I encourage it. I mean the -- I would rather them do an anonymous report than nothing at all and you know, the only frustrating thing about anonymous reports -- and we explained this to them, is that with anonymous report we can't go back directly to them and tell them how specifically to that person yes, we resolved it this way. But they way we handle that is when we have anonymous reports, I go back and report it to the whole safety team. When we have our monthly safety meeting, I say we have this anonymous Baldwin, SB1732, on this and this is what we're doing to mitigate it, and it was anonymous so we're

telling all of you. That's the only way we know to do it. But yeah, they can do an anonymous one absolutely.

Q. Okay.

A. And we do get them.

Q. Okay, that was my next question too.

A. We do get them.

Q. You do, all right.

A. Yeah, and you can usually tell who wrote them, but they're anonymous.

Q. Okay, all right.

BY MS. HILL:

Q. Last Thursday's flight, at this time, this happened. And you can figure out it's one of your --

A. I mean we usually have an idea. It doesn't matter because we want them to feel like they can be anonymous.

Q. Yeah.

A. But I think the point is yeah, we want it somehow. We encourage it. We want -- it's like just -- if you don't tell us, we don't know sometimes. You know? You have to help us out and tell us if you want us to help fix it.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. All right, I don't remember who asked the question but you know, about the hierarchy you talked about right now, the current director of OPS is getting -- you're getting a new director of OPS.

A. Yeah, as it's growing. That was just announced companywide.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, so since all of this has started, that was a new announcement that just -- like two weeks ago or something like that.
Q. Did they say when that's going to take place?
A. I don't recall. I mean, I think this year.
Q. Okay.
A. But I don't -- unless it's already happening.
Q. Okay.
A. You can ask Jeremy.
Q. Yeah, well we get to go talk to him next month, so.
A. Okay, yeah.
Q. I believe Sabrina was talking to you about CRM?
A. Yes.
Q. Do clinicians and pilots do CRM training at all together?
A. Yeah, I mean it's varied ways but one together way is -- and we haven't had one since -- in this format since before COVID but they do water egress training together. Where they do dive back, get in, and then they pull, and then they do it all together. It doesn't really matter who they are, they're all together doing it. The other way they do training together that's CRM but it's also aircraft safety related is their annual one ADM briefing for the fixed wing. I mean in a sense, it's pilot led to the med crew, teaching them you know, initial but also them reviewing with them

their ongoing recurrence of aircraft safety. But that's -- they are training together and that's -- I mean it's really the pilot leading the training so they're not training as peers really.

Q. Okay, and I'm sorry, is that a yearly training?

A. That's yearly.

Q. Okay.

A. Well so it's -- so yeah, the one ADM is initial for the clinician and then it's annual recurrent.

Q. Okay.

A. And I was thinking of one more thing. Well, your question is together? Yeah, so those are the main ways together.

Q. Okay.

A. There's other ways they train.

Q. Okay.

A. They're not necessarily together but they're doing the CRM training.

Q. Okay, together --

A. Those are the primary ways they train or together --

Q. Okay, perfect.

A. -- is the key word.

Q. Do you ever have clinicians -- I don't want to say concerned but bring to your attention single pilot versus multi pilot crew?

A. Yes.

Q. Are they concerned going single pilot? Would they rather --

A. Some --

Q. Some are?
A. -- and some aren't.
Q. And what is some of the concerns that you're hearing?
A. You know, the obvious concern that they say is an obvious concern is what happens if a pilot becomes incapacitated. Who's going to fly the plane? If we have two pilots, we have you know, a co-pilot.
Q. Okay, how can you address those, or can you? What happens if a pilot is incapacitated? What do you guys tell them?
A. So you know in the one ADM training, it is touched upon that if you have an in-flight emergency and the pilot can't handle that in-flight emergency, here's -- physically, here's where you go and how you put on the emergency frequency and ask for help, and should you need to potentially get assistance flying the plane or navigating. But they don't get flight training.
Q. Right.
A. That has been brought up, but they don't get -- I mean, it's been brought up in different companies and even -- yeah, I think it's been done somewhere. You know, not here but yeah, so they get training. That's one of their concerns and they do get some training and guidance on that situation.
Q. Okay, perfect. You've mentioned several times now the chain of command goes up to Utah, South Jordan. Are you -- forgive the phrase, micromanaged from Utah or are you guys kind of autonomous out here? You can kind of do what Hawaii Life Flight needs done?

A. So we have SOP -- well we have standard operating policies regarding flight that really cover everybody, all departments that we use to you know, to set the roll. We have obviously the OPS specs for maintenance and aviation. We have the clinical patient care guidelines. We are allowed to manage our own operations within the confines of those guidelines.

Q. Okay.

A. So I would not say we're micromanaged. We're accountable for following those guidelines and we do get guidance and support from Utah but it's not just Utah. That's the aviation certificate. Some of it's from California for our clinical and then our regional VP and President is in California. It's for the West so I mean, we're in the West. The Pacific region is California and Hawaii. So some is from Utah for aviation at this time and the others come from just our region.

Q. Okay, but as long as you keep within the confines or even more restrictive than what they have, that's acceptable? Or can you no, this doesn't apply to us so we're not going to worry about it?

A. We make every effort to adhere to those policies and guidelines.

Q. Okay, all right. I just wanted to make sure so that's clear, thank you.

A. Yeah.

Q. You guys transport patients at night and obviously your

clinicians have to see the patient. I assume they don't do it all in the dark you know, hands on. Has there been complaints about the lighting in the back for the crews? Have you heard of any of those -- any complaints?

A. Yeah, in the past there has. We've been addressing it one aircraft at a time. We've been -- it's been -- we're over two years into the process now but totally redoing the whole interior package of each aircraft. And so we're a little over half of our HLF fleet. Part of that is new LED lighting inside of the aircraft.

Q. Okay, all right.

A. Brighter lights.

Q. Well that -- so brighter lights will help the clinicians but will the brighter lights cause problems for the pilots? Have you had any pilots complaining about dude, those lights are way too bright?

A. No, because -- I mean, no.

Q. Okay.

A. No, I would assume -- and I hate to assume why, but no. I haven't really heard it with the new lights.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Perfect, no works just fine, so.

A. Yeah, okay.

Q. I just wanted to make sure. The last questions I have is I

know you guys got new risk assessment forms recently. You've changed risk assessment. Have you reached out and had any feedback from the clinicians about these new forms? Are they better? Worse?

A. Which forms? For clinicians or pilots?

Q. Did the clinicians' risk assessment change?

A. It was the pilot risk assessment.

Q. So the clinicians' has stayed the same?

A. Essentially, but the pilot's format changed and the way they enter them.

Q. Okay.

A. And so the question is would the change --

Q. So we've heard how the pilots, some -- how they kind of think of it. But I guess I didn't realize that the clinicians form didn't change. It's still the same way. How is it different than a pilot form?

A. The -- well yeah, so the concerns I've heard are with the pilot forms from pilots.

Q. Okay, so you've not had any concerns with any risk assessment forms of the clinicians?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. I haven't heard any concerns.

Q. Okay, all right.

A. But I have heard pilots about the pilot --

Q. Right.
A. -- risk assessment change.
Q. Okay, perfect. That answers all of my questions.
A. Okay.
Q. Sabrina?
DR. WOODS: I'm good. I don't have anymore. Thank you.
MR. LEGGET: Okay.
MR. GARRISON: I don't have any more questions.
BY MS. HILL:
Q. I have just a couple.
A. Okay, that's fine. I mean I'm here so yeah, go ahead.
Q. So setting up all the interviews we've done for Tuesday, Wednesday, and today. We had a schedule blocked off. Our eight to ten spot this morning was for a base safety person. We never got a name. How is that possible?
A. I don't know. I would blame Jeremy. I don't mean that in a bad way. It's just I had no part in the coordination and no one asked me who it should be. I don't know.
Q. So who would it be?
A. Which base is it? There's seven bases.
Q. Is there one for Maui?
A. There was. I don't think there is currently.
Q. Is this a --
A. Some of them are vacant and we're actually in the process of filling them but --

Q. So a response we got that there was a safety person who was not very engaged, who was no longer a safety person, and that's why we were not given a name.
A. For where? For Maui? Interesting.
Q. And if it wasn't for Maui then would it be for all of Hawaii?
A. Well so there's a safety officer and that's Derek that's for all of Hawaii. A base safety rep -- we were calling them base safety rep but now that word -- I think they've changed it to -- they've changed it to site safety officer, SSO. So some of the bases, it hasn't been filled. It's voluntary. When they don't have -- the base does not have a safety rep or SSO, the base manager essentially is expected to step in and take the lead until there is one. So they do have a base manager.
Q. All right, because we weren't given Derek's name or a base -- a safety base officer in Maui.
A. Yeah.
Q. We got neither.
A. I would have to ask Jeremy why. I didn't -- yeah, if I would have been asked why I would have -- if I would have been asked, I would have told you Derek is the safety officer. We could schedule that or whichever base you wanted. Either the safety rep SSO or in their absence the base manager.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, so.
Q. We also asked for an org chart. Is there one for Hawaii Life

Flight and or Guardian?
A. Yes, and I'll have to get it for you but yes, there is and that would help you. All those questions about how we all report are all on that and it helps visually to make a lot more sense.
Q. That would be great.
A. Yeah, I just visualize it in my head when I'm answering it but I can't imagine.
Q. Well and I get you've been here 15 years so you know --
A. And of course, it's changed a bunch too, but.
Q. But for a new hire coming in or for us coming in --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- yeah, we didn't.
A. Yeah, so for the new hire coming in -- and this is a good questions for our -- and each department if different, right? But you know, you have aviation, maintenance, clinical but the ORB chart is the same, you know? To share. Pardon me, on the clinical side Will Moser has shared that chart with the clinicians coming in. I'm not sure what Kaleo and Cy do, yeah.
Q. Okay, that's all I had. Thank you.
A. Yeah.
BY MR. ETCHER:
Q. Great, thanks. You've been a big help. We appreciate it. You can breathe a sigh of relief. You made it through. But is there anything -- we've asked you lots and lots of questions but we're always afraid we're going to not ask maybe the right

question or if you go oh, if they just looked into this area, it might clear it up. Can you think of anything like that would help us look where you guys see needs for us to look?

A. No, I mean -- no.

MR. ETCHER: Okay, all right. Well we will call this concluded at 14:45 local and we apricate it.

(Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022 Interview of Mark Legget
ACCIDENT NO.:	ANC23FA008
PLACE:	Maui, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Keeley Rupert
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	*
	*
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL	*
ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII	* Accident No.: ANC23FA008
ON DECEMBER 15, 2022	*
	*

Interview of: STUART NISHIMURA,
AATD, Line Pilot, Training Captain
Hawaii Life Flight

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday
February 15, 2023

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SABRINA WOODS, Ph. D, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MILLICENT HILL, Investigator-In-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

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Federal Aviation Administration

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. ETCHER: All right, so good morning. My name is Shawn Etcher, again, with the NTSB. I'm an Operational Factors Investigator. Just all that means is I just look at everything that interacts with the pilot kind of forward of the cockpit door and how it interacts with the pilot. Looking at the pilot and his whole history and everything. So that's why you're here is to help educate me on all of that.

MR. NISHIMURA: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: In just a little bit, I'm going to go around the room here, have everybody introduce themselves to you and what their role is. But just to let you know. With an NTSB investigation, it's not just NTSB folks. We invite a -- we have a party system which we invite other subject matter experts to help us make sure we look at everything. And in this case, we have somebody from the FAA here to help us understand, make sure -- doesn't do us any good to do something -- go down the wrong avenue and we have it wrong. So that's why we have other subject matter experts here just to make sure we capture everything correctly and we look at everything correctly.

MR. NISHIMURA: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So I'm going to go around the table here and have everybody introduce themselves. I'll start with Sabrina.

DR. WOODS: Hi. Dr. Sabrina Woods. I'm also from the NTSB. I'm a human performance investigator, so helping to augment the

case. Just kind of looking at like those human factors issues taht might be associated with the accident. So that's what I'm doing.

MR. NISHIMURA: Okay.

MR. GARRISON: Dylan Garrison. I'm with the FAA. I was assigned as the Inspector-In-Charge for the accident investigation. My role here is for the safety investigation. I am not here in a role information-gathering role of enforcement investigation, so I just want to make that clear. And also, this is not in any way a check ride style meeting, right? So any questions I have, there's not like oh, that's the wrong answer, you know. We can definitely just have a conversation because it's about information gathering. So I don't want you to feel that I'm looking for the right answer, because I'm not here in that role as the FAA, as you may have experienced in the past with FAA.

MR. NISHIMURA: Mm-hm. Okay, good.

MS. HILL: I'm Millicent Hill. I'm the Investigator-In-Charge.

MR. NISHIMURA: Okay. Nice to meet you guys.

MR. ETCHER: Good to meet you. So that's everybody that'll be interviewing you today, asking questions. Because what we're going to do is we typically do two rounds. I'll start with questions and then we'll move around to each and everybody to have their chance to ask questions as well. And then we'll do a follow-up round just because there's always some follow-up

questions. The last -- the second round is a whole lot faster than the first, so just keep that in mind. And I don't know how much you know about us, but we're here primary to figure out what happened with this event. And then if there's any change that can be made to prevent his from happening ever again, that's our ultimate goal.

MR. NISHIMURA: Mm-hm.

MR. ETCHER: So that's why we want to look at everything so we have a clear understanding, so any changes that we can make, they're for the benefit of everybody as well. So as you can see, I do have a recorder going. We record and transcribe all our interviews, so that way for accuracy and everything like that. Those transcripts themselves will actually become part of the public docket for this event. But I just want to make sure that you're aware of it and to ask, are you okay with us recording and having a transcript?

MR. NISHIMURA: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. You also, anytime you're interviewed by somebody from the NTSB you're allowed to have one representative here. I see you didn't bring anybody. Are you okay without one at this point?

MR. NISHIMURA: Sure.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. During the interview, if there's ever a point that you need to ask somebody a question, it's okay. We'll let you do that. It's perfectly fine.

MR. NISHIMURA: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: So there's just a few ground rules before we start, I always like to give. During the interview, if you don't understand a question that's been asked, ask for clarification. It's okay. This, as Dylan said, is not a check ride. This is an education for us. I like to consider it like a conversation. We just want to learn all we can.

MR. NISHIMURA: Mm-hm.

MR. ETCHER: So if you don't understand a question it's okay, just ask. Because if you give me an answer I don't understand, I'm probably going to ask a follow-on question just so I have it clear in my head. We ask for facts that you know, but if you have an opinion it's okay. Just let us know that that's your opinion so we don't think oh, well that's what the facts are.

MR. NISHIMURA: Mm-hm.

MR. ETCHER: It's an opinion. So we just want to make sure we can understand there's -- will be differences and that's okay. Just helps us later on. If you need a break at any point, just ask. We'll pause the recording, take a break and come back and conclude or whatever we need. If you need to talk to somebody, whatever, it's okay. And the most important rule is if you don't know an answer, it's okay. I don't know works perfect for an answer.

MR. NISHIMURA: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: Unlike a check ride, I don't know is a good

answer if you don't know it, all righty?

MR. NISHIMURA: Mm-hm.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Anybody have any questions or -- before we get started? Okay.

INTERVIEW OF STUART NISHIMURA

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. As I always say, I always start with the toughest questions first. So if could give us your full legal name, and spell the last for us.

A. Oh, tough one.

Q. It is. And they get easier now.

A. Stuart, middle name, Shigeto, and last name, Nishimura, N-i-s-h-i-m-u-r-a.

Q. And is Stuart spelled with --

A. S-t-u-a-r-t.

Q. S-t-u-a-r-t, thank you. Since there's multiple spellings I want to make sure we get that correct.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. And what is your job title?

A. My main title here is just a line pilot.

Q. Okay.

A. But I'm also the -- one of the training captains here.

Q. Okay. And training captains here at?

A. Hawaii Life Flight.

Q. Okay, thank you. I just wanted to make sure we were on the

same page here --
A. Mm-hm.
Q. -- so I appreciate that. Now you said you're a line captain and a training captain, right? So we'll get into the differentiations of both of those in just a little bit. But if you kind of in a nutshell tell us the difference between a line captain and a --
A. Well my, like I said, my main job here, I'm just one of the pilots.
Q. Okay.
A. I'm nothing more than any of the others. But I've been asked to also be the training captain here, so do some of the training here.
Q. Okay.
A. Not the main stuff like Utah, the office does. That's where the main training happens. I just do some of the recurrent training for or remedial stuff, but just minor stuff that needs to be done remotely here.
Q. Okay. And do you do that training in the airplane, in the simulator?
A. Both.
Q. Both? Okay, great. How long have you been employed at Hawaii Life Flight?
A. Believe it's seven years now.
Q. Okay, great. And how long of that have you been as a

training captain?
A. I'm not certain, but it's like five or six years of that.
Q. Okay, and just for the record. A training captain in the helicopters or the King Airs, the fixed wing?
A. Just the King Airs.
Q. Okay, I just --
A. C-90s.
Q. -- I just wanted to make sure for the record we had that all correct.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. All right. What kind of airman's certificates and ratings do you currently hold?
A. ATP, fixed wing, multi engine and CFI.
Q. Okay, do you have any check airman letters or anything?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. Oh wait, let me back up here.
Q. Sure.
A. I've been a training captain for four years now.
Q. For four years, okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Perfect, thank you for clarifying that. That's great, I appreciate it. Yeah, I always say this is probably the toughest question of all of them. Do you have an idea of your total flight hours, just ballpark?

A. (Laughs.)
Q. See? I told you. This is the toughest one. They get easier now.
A. Someplace around 5,000.
Q. Okay. And how much of that time has been in the King Air?
A. Oh.
Q. Okay, I lied. This would be the toughest one, so.
A. Maybe 1,000, 1,500, something around there.
Q. Okay, all righty. So kind of if you could, just kind of give us a nice Cliff's Notes version, if you will. Just a nice synopsis of your flight experience history when you, you know, kind of when you started, what you've done. Help us kind of understand you as a pilot.
A. Started flying in 1991, I believe, off and on. Got serious about it in about -- couple -- about a year before the 9/11 tragedy, because I was stuck in the middle of that. I remember being -- sitting here on the ramp and wondering what my future will be. Got a job flying freight and passengers, all 135. And about seven years ago ended up here.
Q. Okay, all right. Perfect. So I know you said you're both a line pilot and a training captain. How often do you fly the line here?
A. That's my --
Q. Like --
A. -- that's my regular shift. We're two weeks on, one week

off. So that's -- that's my main job.
Q. Okay, so how do they pull you off your mainline -- main part of the job to do training?
A. They'll either pull me off shift or if -- or bring me in on my days off.
Q. Okay.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. All right. And you know, we're all pilots and we all kind of understand. But when they pull you in on your days off, is that at an overtime rate? Is that just expected part of your duties?
A. We have an instructor rate here, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. So depending on the circumstances, they'll either -- if it's a real short one their -- they may just leave me on my shift and just say hey, can you do this real quick?
Q. Okay.
A. It depends on the situation.
Q. So it's kind of -- and please, don't ever let me put words in your mouth. That's why those -- you kind of wear two hats on some shifts then?
A. Rare, it's very rare.
Q. Okay.
A. I mean in fact, in the past year or two I -- I've done almost no training.
Q. Okay.

A. It's been shifting more toward Utah.
Q. Okay, all righty. So what kind of -- dig in just a little bit here to Hawaii Life Flight and Utah even. Who's in your chain of command? Who do you report to? Kind of help me understand who's in that line.
A. Again, it depends on what role I'm playing. If I'm a line pilot I report to Kaleo.
Q. Okay.
A. Our assistant chief pilot here. And if I'm in my instructor role, it's Randy Ostman.
Q. And is he based here as well, or is he in --
A. He is Training Direction. He's based in Utah.
Q. Okay. How often do you have to interact with Utah?
A. Nowadays? Rare.
Q. Okay.
A. Because I don't do much training anymore.
Q. Okay, so it's only when you're dealing with training, that's when you interact?
A. Usually, and even that it's minimal because it's kind of an interaction between Kaleo, me and Utah.
Q. Okay, all righty. As a line pilot, how would you categorize staffing, from a pilot's standpoint. Are you guys -- do you feel like you're adequately staffed? Are you short staffed? You know, are they calling you in to do flights on your days off? Kind of help me understand from your perspective?

A. Oh, as far as pilot staffing?
Q. Yeah.
A. No, I think we're fine.
Q. Okay.
A. There is -- yeah, we're fine.
Q. Okay, how about from a training staff standpoint?
A. Training staff as far as?
Q. I know you haven't done training in a little while.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. But when you were doing training, was there enough instructors, check airmen here to accomplish the training or were you guys really busy doing training and flying the line, you know, all the time? I mean, just kind of --
A. As far as we was concerned, we were fine with -- there's me and Landon.
Q. Okay.
A. And yeah, between the two of us we were more than able to handle what came our way.
Q. Okay, perfect. That helps. That's what I wanted to hear, so I appreciate that.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And again, I realize this is not -- you haven't done training in a little bit. But when you were doing -- as a training captain, did you see any more common training issues, you know, ones that kind of -- you always kind of -- I don't want to say

always. That's always a bad term. But you saw more often, you know, training issues or concerns or anything like that?

A. Yes, mm-hm.

Q. What were some? Just kind of give me some ideas.

A. I got to think back. It's, like I said, there's so much going on I just -- give me a minute.

Q. Take your time.

(Pause)

A. Let's try with --

(Pause)

A. Can't think of any good examples for you right now. But I know there -- this is a common situation because I'd always talk to Utah and say hey, this is happening. And we'd get together and they'd always say yeah, it's happening up here too. And then we'd figure out a training scenario for that. But for example like checks -- checklist usage, you know. I'd say hey, you know, I'm noticing guys are not using the checklists as much as they should. And we'd go back and forth and then so the next training session we'd have we'd start saying, you know, let's get on the checklist. Stuff like that.

Q. Okay, all right. No, that kind of helps. So for the checklist part, is there a checklist actually in the airplane? Is on your guys' iPads? Where is the checklist?

A. It's both.

Q. It's both, okay. Since you guys started doing all that

training and emphasizing the use of it, have you seen pilots using the checklist in the airplane or the checklist on the iPad more? Has it improved?

A. Yes, it's improved.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean, we push it.

Q. Okay, but do you know? I mean, what do you use? Do you use the paper or the electronic?

A. Both.

Q. You use both.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Can you kind of help me understand why you use both? I mean --

A. Oh.

Q. -- I'm a creature of habit so if I use one I'm typically going to go back to that.

A. When you get old, you'll understand. I can't see. So at night, I'll use the iPad because I can blow it up and -- a bigger picture of it.

Q. Okay.

A. But daytime, I'm fine with just using the paper one.

Q. Okay, all right. And when I get older. I know exactly what you're going through. So I appreciate that. Kind of you just say when I get older, that makes me feel better. All right. So you had a, I don't want to call it a concern. But you saw a trend in

training, people not using checklist. How quick was that to get addressed by Hawaii Life Flight or Guardian or whoever addressed that?

A. The situations that I've experienced, I mean, it came up regularly. I'd have a conversation mainly with Kaleo. And we'd bring in Randy if it's important enough, and it usually was. I'd usually send him an email, and it's almost immediate.

Q. Okay. Okay, all right. That's great. Do you guys here a Hawaii Life Flight, do you guys have like an ASAP program? Some will have something different.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. How long have you had that?

A. I think it just started this year.

Q. Okay, have you used it?

A. I did.

Q. And I don't want to know the details of it because that's the purpose of ASAP, right? But kind of give me a general idea. How did it -- the process work for you?

A. It -- when I used it, it was like the first week it came into effect.

Q. Okay.

A. And I'm not sure what the result was because I didn't hear anything about it. It was not a big deal.

Q. Okay.

A. So it just, it was almost like let me go through it and see

how it works --
Q. Okay.
A. -- kind of thing.
Q. Okay.
A. But yeah, I'm not sure the results on that.
Q. Okay, all right. Have you heard any pilots discussing? I know you guys are kind of odd shifts and maybe not flying together as crews often. But have you ever heard pilots discussing the ASAP program?
A. No.
Q. No?
A. No.
Q. Okay, that's all right. Excellent. So we'll kind of start digging in just a little bit more into the training world and kind of line flying here. Do you know how many pilots Hawaii Life Flight has, ballparkish?
A. 20 -- is it 27, something like that?
Q. Okay.
A. I forget the exact number.
Q. And just for the record, are they all based here at Honolulu, or are they at different bases?
A. Different bases in the state.
Q. Okay. And is that 26 fixed wing only or is that also the helicopters?
A. We don't deal with helicopters. That's just fixed wing.

Q. Okay, great. And where are you based?
A. Here in Honolulu.
Q. You're here, right here in Honolulu. Okay. So kind of help me walk through the life of a line pilot here. How do you, you know, what's your kind of normal shifts? How do you come on duty? Do you have to come in here? Do you -- just kind of help me understand. Let me be the fly on your shoulder so I can kind of see what a day in the life of you, of what you do is like.
A. Oh, okay. Well in Honolulu, we have one, two, three, four -- six, six bases. Yeah, we have six bases here and we're split half and half. Some of us run two weeks on one week off, and some of us run two weeks on two weeks off. It depends on the base. So here in Honolulu we run two weeks on one week off. So that -- and it's broken down further into one week of days, one week of night shifts, and then one week off. And then for Honolulu only we're broken down again, half that week again to hangar shift or on call.
Q. Okay.
A. So it kind of gets a little bit convoluted, but if you look at the schedule it makes sense.
Q. Okay.
A. So we spend basically one week working in a hangar, one week on call and one week off.
Q. So, help me understand working in the hangar. Does that --
A. So --

Q. -- what does that mean?
A. -- so basically what it is is we have two crews working at a time in Honolulu. So we have a hangar crew that's -- that does our regular flights with our crews and all. And then we have another flight -- another crew. We run two crew members on that one. And they deal with one of our hospitals here, Kapiolani Hospital. And all they do is work with that crew. So they -- Kapiolani brings their own medical crews and we fly them around.
Q. Okay.
A. And that's a two-man crew. But that's the crew that stays on call. And so they just have to check in in the morning and find out what's going on with their crew is -- who's their airplane and wait for a call, all day.
Q. And so, I just want to make sure. You said that's a two-man crew. Are you normally just a one single pilot op?
A. Normally, yes. Everybody else is a one-pilot operation here. So we fly one pilot and two med crew members.
Q. So why is that one special enough to have two pilots?
A. Don't hold me on this. But my understanding of it is that the hospital requested that.
Q. Okay.
A. That from what I understand, the medical crews there want a two-pilot crew when they come fly with us.
Q. And as a line pilot, do you mix if you're a single pilot or dual pilot?

A. Mm-hm.
Q. So you could come in today and you get on the, you know, as a two-man crew or a single-man crew?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. How far in advance do you know that?
A. Well, if it's a Kapiolani flight we know it's a two-man crew.
Q. Okay, so that's -- that to you is automatically that's going to be a two man. Okay.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. All righty. How often do you do single pilot ops versus two-pilot ops?
A. I've never run the numbers, but I'd say half and half.
Q. Okay. And when you're here at the hangar on your hangar duty, or hangar -- I can't remember. Is what, hangar duty? What did you call it?
A. I guess, yeah.
Q. Okay. Well let's say when you're here at the hangar.
A. Yeah.
Q. How's that?
A. Yeah.
Q. Is there a place you get to stay?
A. Yep.
Q. Okay.
A. We have rooms right there. They give us a room.
Q. Okay.

A. Mm-hm.
Q. And how long is those shifts? I know you said you had a day and a night.
A. It's a 12-hour shift.
Q. What?
A. So, in Honolulu we run seven o'clock to seven o'clock.
Q. Okay.
A. And then the night shift comes in, takes the other half.
Q. Okay. Is your schedule based on seniority or is it --
A. No, it's a set schedule. Everybody has their own turn.
Q. Okay.
A. Everybody's, it's just spread evenly.
Q. Okay. How far in advance do you guys get your schedules?
A. I would say two weeks on two weeks -- one week off, and forever.
Q. Oh really. So it's not every month it changes a little bit?
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. It's set.
Q. All righty. And how many pilots do you have here in the Honolulu base, do you know?
A. Nine.
Q. Nine?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. All right, okay. So kind of walk me through when you're a

line pilot. What is your duties? I know, to fly the airplane. I understand that. But kind of walk me through what's expected of you. When you come on shift, what's expected of you?
A. Well first thing in the morning, we go and check the airplanes, of checking with dispatch, find out what's going on, who's my crew, what airplanes am I assigned. And then I'll go out and check the airplanes, make sure they're ready to go. And after that, if everything's in line and everything's good then you go to sleep.
Q. Okay, all right.
A. Or whatever, you know? It's we just wait for the call.
Q. Okay.
A. We check in with our crew, see how they are. If you know, they -- our crews here run 24 hours. So we try and be quiet because we don't know if they're sleeping.
Q. Okay.
A. So you know, if they're around we'll talk to them, see what's going on. If not, then we'll just go hide and wait for a call.
Q. Okay. And so I -- when you said your crews are 24.
A. Oh, I'm sorry. That -- the med crew. Yeah.
Q. Med crew, the crew in the back for you?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Okay.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Pilots are not, right? They're just --

A. Pilot, no.
Q. Okay, I just want to make sure that was clear on the record so somebody didn't misunderstand.
A. No.
Q. So, thank you.
A. Understand, got it. Yeah.
Q. Okay, perfect. So you come in. You go preflight to the airplane or check the airplane out. How many times you went out to the airplane and it's not -- it's not able to fly, you find something wrong with it or it's down?
A. What do you mean how many times?
Q. Just a ballpark. I know you don't count it. But how many times, you know, in your impression that you come in, you go out and do the preflight and somebody says oh, it's down for maintenance? Or you go out and you see, pick anything -- some fluid leaking or a NAV light out, you know, whatever. How many times has that happened that you have to, I don't want to say down the airplane because I know pilots don't down it because you just write it up.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. But how many times do you have to do that on a preflight? Just a ballpark -- five percent of the time, all the time?
A. I -- I'm not even going to try and answer that one.
Q. Okay.
A. I -- I've no -- I have no idea.

Q. Okay, no problem. When was the last time you went out to preflight an airplane and you had to write it up?
A. Yesterday.
Q. Yesterday?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And what did you have to write it up for?
A. A screw came off the collar ring (ph.).
Q. Okay, and maintenance? Is maintenance right here with you guys?
A. Yep, they were right there.
Q. Okay.
A. So I talked to the maintenance worker and he said, yep, write it up, I'll fix it.
Q. Okay.
A. So I wrote it up and he fixed it right away. That's good.
Q. Oh, okay. So it really wasn't down long. It was --
A. No, maybe an hour.
Q. -- oh, okay. Excellent. Okay, that kind of helps me understand a day in the life of a -- what you're -- what's expected of you when you come on.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. When you get a call or a page out or whatever they do to you. Do they call you or they just send you a message?
A. Depends on who's the dispatcher. It can be either a phone call or a dispatch or a text.

Q. Okay, so they give you a call. You're in your room or you're doing whatever you're just hanging out for.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. You get the call that you have to go somewhere.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. You pick any spot. What do you do? What is -- what do you do as a line pilot?
A. Currently, we are doing a little bit extra. So was this before the accident or after the accident?
Q. Let's start with before right now and then we can -- then we can compare what the difference is. How's that?
A. Okay.
Q. I know, it's been two months. So if you can kind of think back to right around the accident, right before. What were -- you get that call there was an accident.
A. Yes, okay. So before the accident what we do is dispatch would just text the entire crew. Hey, you got a flight. You're going here, you know, go. And so we just get ready. I'd do my paperwork. Crew would get set -- set the airplane up. Talk to the dispatcher. Make sure, you know, I gave them my flight plan and stuff, jump in the airplane and start up and go. Now, they've added a little bit of extra steps in there. So I would get the text now or a phone call and say hey, I've got a flight for you to go, whatever. I would have to contact our medical crews and double check with them, say hey, you know, this is what's

happening. This is where we're going. This is what the weather is, and are you guys okay? And they'd have to tell me, yes we are. Then I go back to the dispatcher and say we are good to go. And now the dispatcher would send us all the information and then it's the same after that.

Q. Okay, okay. So they send you the information. What kind of information do they send the pilot?

A. Where we're going, weight of the patient and my release number is basically all they give me -- and the airplane tail number.

Q. Okay. So and I know you said you call them and you give them your flight plan.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Is there anything else you give them as part of -- I mean, a flight plan I assume is this is our route of flight, this is how much fuel still is onboard.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Is there anything else you give them?

A. No.

Q. Okay. Do you just get into an airplane after that and go or do you guys have to assess, like?

A. Well okay, the -- before we can go on any flight we have to be -- the dispatcher has to release us. That's why you know, we give them the flight plan. We give them what we're going to do. It's very similar to the FAA flight plan, but we have the company

one.
Q. Okay.
A. So we have to give them some information that hey you know, this is where we're going, this is what we're going do. And in return we have to hear from them, you are released. Now we can take that airplane.
Q. Okay, all right. And I just want to make sure. Does dispatch do kind of a risk assessment on it or do you assess?
A. We do.
Q. You do.
A. We do.
Q. And how does that work?
A. We have a website now that we have to go to and there's this whole list of things that we have to go through.
Q. Okay. Does it give you a number?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Okay. And you know what the number scale is? Is it like one to a thousand, one to 10?
A. Offhand it's one through five.
Q. Okay.
A. And it's different colors and --
Q. Okay, so for my knowledge is it one good, five's bad?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So how many times have you done it that you've gotten a five or a four?

A. So far, never. We've just --
Q. Okay.
A. -- we just started this a couple of months ago.
Q. Okay, was it right before the accident, right after, do you recall?
A. Oh, you know what? I don't even remember.
Q. And that's okay. It's fine. Remember, I don't know the -- this is not a check ride. I don't know works great, so don't think twice about using that if you don't know.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, so couple months ago. What do you -- when you fill this out what is -- what kind of a score do you, I don't want to use the word normally. But what --
A. Normally --
Q. -- what kind of score do you usually get?
A. -- it's about one or two.
Q. A one or two.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And that's acceptable to go, right?
A. Mm-hm, yes.
Q. One -- a one or two.
A. I believe it's up to four or five is when we have to make -- start making phone calls.
Q. Okay, and you've never gotten a four or five then I guess?
A. Not with this program, no.

Q. Okay.
A. I mean, this system. No.
Q. Okay, the previous system did you ever get a -- did it have the same numbering scale?
A. No, it was way different.
Q. Oh.
A. It was a lot simpler and, yeah.
Q. A lot simpler, how so?
A. It was just a few items and basic questions and you add so much -- so many to your score. And once you get above a certain point, that's it. You call our PMOC.
Q. Okay, and this one, it's not that simple?
A. No, it's a lot more intense.
Q. Okay.
A. And they ask you all kinds of questions.
Q. Okay.
A. It's, to me -- oh well. Shouldn't say anything, but to me it's a little overboard.
Q. Okay, so it's not a --
A. They -- let me qualify that. It -- they do ask a lot of questions and some of them make you sit down and think, you know. Hm, okay.
Q. Okay.
A. So it does take a lot more thought.
Q. Okay. Okay, that helps. I'll mull that over in my brain a

little bit so don't be surprised if I or somebody might ask another question on that, just because we want to make sure we understand how these risks are dealt with. So let's kind of get into the training world. When was the -- you said it's been about a year since you've done training?

A. Well no, not necessarily. It's I don't do it too much anymore.

Q. Okay, not to much. All right. And you guys have a, I'll call it a SIM here. But I think it's -- is it a fixed training device kind of?

A. It's a -- it simulates the RC-90s.

Q. Okay.

A. It's actually the hull of a C-90.

Q. Okay, excellent. So do you recall it? Did you ever do any of Brian's training?

A. Mm-hm.

Q. About how long ago did you do that? Just I know it all -- they all merge together, I get it but.

A. I don't remember, but it was a while.

Q. Okay.

A. I think.

Q. Can you recall anything about his training? Like wow, this guy's the Chuck Yaeger of all or, you know, this guy took a little bit more to get me through or he was average? Just kind of help me understand what your impression that you recall.

A. I know that I did -- my forms are in our records.
Q. Okay.
A. And I know I put some notes there.
Q. Okay, do you need those to -- as we talk through?
A. Yep.
Q. Do you want to go get them?
A. Yeah, it's on the computer. It's accessible.
Q. Okay.
A. Have you guys seen the forms?
Q. I've seen some. I've requested some and I think we've got some. But to say we've seen them all I would never guarantee that.
A. Okay. Yeah, I know I did two SIM sessions with him.
Q. Okay.
A. Now, our simulator is not approved by the FAA. It's just a training aide.
Q. Okay.
A. So, let's see.
(Pause)
On January 21st, I did a SIM session with him. And on February -- oh, okay. So it's January of 2021, and February of 2022 I did a SIM session with him.
Q. Okay.
A. So the first one. So some of the notes -- oh yeah, I remember this one. So the notes I put on here is he landed gear

up and he needs to confirm, you know, you got three green (ph.) before he touches down. He was with -- weak on checklist use and call outs. His GPS programming was weak but his situational awareness was good.

Q. Okay.

A. He always knew where he was.

Q. Okay.

A. That's what I've got for his first SIM session.

Q. So before you move to the next one. Since you were talking about that and you said oh, I remember this one. I assume something triggered you that you remembered it. What?

A. Yeah. So his land -- he landed gear up. We were doing some -- you know what engine cuts on take off is?

Q. Mm-hm.

A. Okay, single engine. We were practicing some of that. And I had him take off on a short runway. And he got it in the air. And I failed -- I believe I failed one of his engines. And he didn't put the gear up. But as he came around he made a U-turn and tried to land back on that runway. And as he came back around he actually put the gear up instead of making sure it was down. So he went backwards and he landed gear up, that's why I remember that one. Because I thought that was like, wow.

Q. All right. Now you talked about GPS programming was -- I'm sorry, don't let me put words in it.

A. Yeah.

Q. But GPS programming was weak or something?
A. So his -- when programming from en route to an approach, he had trouble understanding what a transition was and how it related to the Garmin GPS system. And so I had to explain that to him.
Q. Is that something you see consistently with other pilots?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes. That -- that's a good example of, you know, the training stuff that we see and where it -- hey Kaleo, I'm seeing a problem here. We bring Randy in and say okay, we're going to bring that up. We're going to start pushing that now.
Q. Okay, so how did you get -- do you recall how that was addressed or fixed? How did you help Brian deal with that?
A. How I usually do it? I don't remember how I dealed with Brian.
Q. Okay.
A. But how I usually work with it is I'll put them on -- Garmin makes a simulator on -- for the computer, with a GPS system. And so we'll just go over how, you know, how -- what it does on the computer, to work with them on that.
Q. Okay, and did that -- have you seen that help people?
A. Usually, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. A lot, yes.
Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.
Q. All righty. Is there anything else you recall about that training event?
A. No, it's -- other than what I see on the notes here, it's -- I don't remember much.
Q. Okay.
A. It's -- couple years ago, yeah.
Q. Yep, okay. so then the next one I think you said was in February of '22?
A. I think, yeah, this is about a year later.
Q. Okay.
A. And on this one I put he's unfamiliar with the company checklist. What we were talking about earlier, the checklist use.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. He could not perform any cockpit preflight checks. It says I did review the procedures with him. He had poor knowledge of aircraft systems. He was unable to successfully a nonprecision approach due to -- and there's a list here. He had an unusual procedure turn. He had poor knowledge of the indicated air speed function on the auto pilot. He had the inability to descend in a timely manner to the MDA and could not maintain altitude in the circle-to-land maneuver. Also listed here is emergency checklist knowledge, weak. And the use of VOR/RMI for navigational orientation is poor.
Q. Okay. Okay, anything else besides what's in the notes that

you can recall?
A. Nope.
Q. Okay. I know that's been over a year ago.
A. Yeah.
Q. And you've probably done one or two since then, so.
A. Yeah.
Q. So, I appreciate that. Let's kind of dig in to you said he had -- forgive me. Again, don't let me put words -- poor knowledge on indicated air speed function on the GPS? What does that mean?
A. No, that is on the auto pilot.
Q. On the auto pilot, okay.
A. So that's a function on the auto pilot --
Q. Okay.
A. -- where when you engage that mode, the air -- the auto pilot will maintain your air speed. And that's -- that's what we usually teach, to have our pilots descend on the next step down, from one altitude to the next. By using that, that function, that mode, pilots are able to maintain their speed -- air speed better. Any other mode and they kind of lose control of the air speed and it just gets away from them, in general.
Q. Okay.
A. So we found indicated air speed is -- usually works the best to step down to the next level.
Q. Okay. And because I don't know how your procedures are

specifically. Do you use that en route or just on an approach?
A. It's the pilot's choice.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So they can -- if they don't use indicated air speed on an approach or en route, whichever.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. What other modes do they have that they can use?
A. Oh, there's a bunch of them. There's a descent mode.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. There is a vertical speed mode, and there's even a pitch mode. You just pitch it down and --
Q. Okay, all righty. Since it's dealing with the auto pilot, I'll ask those questions later on but I'll ask this now because we're kind of talking about it. Does the company want pilots to use the auto pilot, or do they want -- do they really prefer either way?
A. I don't know that they push either way. But we do emphasize that you need to know how to use the auto pilot.
Q. Okay. So let's say you were my training instructor and I came in to do a training session, and I wanted to hand fly it the whole time. Is that a -- I don't want to say is that allowed. Is that acceptable?
A. If you can use the auto pilot, it is to me.
Q. So you're still going to make me show that I can use the auto

pilot, is that?
A. Oh, definitely.
Q. Okay, okay. All right. So here in the notes that you had on Brian. Overall how did he, in your mind, how was his abilities maybe compared to what you see typically? Is that -- those things normal that you see people having challenges with? Was this one kind of maybe not so normal?
A. Based on this, maybe not so normal.
Q. Okay, all right. So let's say this was my SIM session. I had those notes, and you were my instructor. And you said man, you got to know how to use the indicated air speed. You're got to know how to do this. And circling to land, you got to know how to do all this. And so obviously I'm going to go with the assumption that that session was not satisfactory.
A. For the most -- well, okay. So the simulator, as I told you before. It is not approved for FAA to be loggable and stuff like that.
Q. Right.
A. So my -- I was told it's a training aide, you know, we use it to aide in training and none of this is a required -- is required by the FAA because it's not legal for us to log time on it.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. So all of this, I always consider it as sort of extra credit.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. So I always kept that in mind, you know, if the pilots

were willing to come in and jump on a SIM, I'll help you all I can. And I was however told that fill in this form and put it in the records.

Q. Okay.

A. Even though it's not, you know, legal to use, I was told to fill it out.

Q. Okay.

A. Which is why I have this here. But my understanding is that none of this was mandatory, and I will cover whatever the pilot wants as much as I could with the time we were allowed.

Q. Okay, so let me go back a little bit then. Let's say this was my SIM session. You were teaching me and you wrote these notes on me.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Is it okay if I go fly now or is there going to be any additional training that --

A. This -- if it's like this I -- I'm certain I went to Kaleo and Randy and said here, this is what I'm seeing.

Q. Okay.

A. And they take it from there. But I do train as much as the time allowed to, to you know, work with the pilot on this stuff.

Q. Okay.

A. And I know that I wouldn't have left him like this. I know we've like, for the approach for example. I would have run him several times through and until he could do it.

Q. Okay, all right. So how long are these sessions?
A. Usually a day long.
Q. A full day?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So if this was my session and you saw that, you would have me do the approach and the circle-to-land and all that over and over and over again until I -- or whatever I needed to work on. But in this case we'll say that, until I grasp it better or?
A. Right, yeah.
Q. At what point will you say okay, you've gone as far as you can here?
A. I've never gotten there.
Q. Oh, okay. Okay, all right. And I get it. Some days we all have training issues, you know. Just training is training. It's a good time to learn and it's a great opportunity. If this was mine and we went and you know, we retrained and everything. Would you be comfortable with me going out flying? Just in your own personal opinion. Because you know, in training you see things.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And as a training person you kind of go him, would I be comfortable with them getting in an aircraft or whatever.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. So seeing that and would -- what would make you comfortable to let me go fly?
A. I'm not sure I understand that question.

Q. And that's okay. That's okay to ask for clarification. So, we did the SIM.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. This session.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And you know, I did the circle-to-land multiple times.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. You walked me through it multiple times. Helped me get more comfortable with it. Is there a certain level where you're like okay, I know he's had a bad circle-to-land at the beginning or he had three or four. I don't know -- whatever, whatever I did. Let's say I had three bad ones.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Is there a -- comes to a point when you're like okay, I feel comfortable with him going out. Do I have to do so many to make you feel that way?
A. Usually it takes me maybe one, one or two times to say okay, I'm going to walk you through this. And we go through it and they get it.
Q. Okay.
A. So that's why I said I'm not quite understanding what you're saying.
Q. Okay, so that kind of helped me there a little bit. So I -- you helped me learn it a little bit better, get more comfortable with it. Let's say that happened early in the day. Were you

later in the day having to do that again just to make sure that it's cemented in my brain?
A. Pretty much throughout the day, yeah.
Q. Oh you'll -- it won't be just that one more take a peek? It's throughout.
A. No, no, no.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. No.
Q. Okay, all right. Does a whole training event, a whole day of simulator, is that a lot to do?
A. It's pretty intense -- yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And what things do you look for on this whole day of training?
A. Oh, there's so many things --
Q. Okay.
A. -- I don't even know where to begin, yeah.
Q. So it's a -- is it a long list? How long? Let me rephrase that. Is there a list of items that need to be accomplished?
A. Not necessarily. Well, Our -- like I say, I got to go back and say this is not required.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. So as far as requirements -- I'm sorry, I don't --
Q. Yeah, let me not use the word require. You know, just what

would give you that comfortable feeling? I know it's not required by the FAA or anything like that. I get that. But what would -- how many times do I have to do it well for you to be comfortable and say, you know what, he's got this now, he knows it?

A. I can't say there's some -- a number of times as to when you watch. When you watch a pilot you just know.

Q. Okay.

A. As an instructor you just know.

Q. Okay.

A. Okay, this guy gets it. Let's move on.

Q. Okay, all right. That's -- that helps. You know, I wasn't sure if you're like oh, he messed that up twice so this little graph tells me I need to do it three more times to see success or something.

A. No.

Q. I just wanted to make sure it was nothing like that. It's --

A. No.

Q. -- it's your, you as an instructor look at it and make that decision.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Okay.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. All righty. So let's say that was yours and -- mine and yours session and that was my outcome. But you remembered oh, he was in here a year ago and he had other issues. Does that play

into your mind? Do you --
A. Sometimes, yes.
Q. -- okay.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Did that on -- could you recall? Would that -- would your previous landing gear up, would that have played into your mind on --
A. Oh yeah.
Q. Okay, all right.
A. And I didn't see it in -- and it's not in here in the second time. So it's I said, you know, I would have checked for that.
Q. Oh, would you have? Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So you go -- and forgive me I don't mean to make up words. But would you go back if you see, oh golly, Shawn's coming in for training. Would you go back and look at my previous training records?
A. Always.
Q. Oh, always.
A. Always, yeah.
Q. Okay. Do you and the other instructor, do you guys talk about the pilots? Like oh, man, I just had Shawn in the SIM and he did this.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. We need to, you know, that we need to watch.

A. Sometimes, yes.
Q. Okay, all righty. Excellent. So if is there any standard procedure, policy, whatever you want to call it if somebody is not -- they have issues in the SIM and you correct them. But do you have to report that to anybody above?
A. I always do.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. You do as a matter of your policy or is it a company policy?
A. I don't know if it's company policy, but it's more the request of Kaleo and Randy. They want to know what's going on.
Q. Okay, okay. Have they ever come into the SIM if you've had a challenging pilot?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, all righty. Was that abnormal or is that kind of the normal thing?
A. For them to take over the session?
Q. Or take over or just come in and observe or --
A. Oh, they come in and observe all the time. Everyone does.
Q. Okay.
A. But as far as taking over? No.
Q. Okay. Have they done that, taken over for you?
A. No.
Q. Okay, all right. Excellent. So I understand he was in in January of '21. He came in about 13 months later. Is that kind

of a normal timeframe?
A. January --
Q. Was he in late grace, early grace (ph.)?
A. Generally what these guys will do is just before their check ride they'll come in and say I, you know, can you put me on it?
Q. Okay. Oh, so it's a request.
A. It's a request, exactly.
Q. They -- it's not scheduled.
A. No.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. Now it is. We've been starting to, in the past couple of months, we've been starting to push that. We have all the pilots come in here and do a SIM session before we check ride.
Q. Okay.
A. But when we were doing these, it was a request.
Q. Okay, all right. So he comes in. He requests SIM time. So he comes in and gets it. Do you then go an do his -- do you do the check ride in the airplane?
A. No, I'm not a check airman.
Q. You're not a check airman. So that goes to a check airman specifically.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Okay, all righty. Perfect. I know you said he had some challenges with indicated air speed on auto pilot use. Was there any other challenges that you noted or could recall on his auto

pilot use?
A. I don't recall.
Q. And just for the record and for my knowledge also. Do the King Airs, are they auto throttles or?
A. No.
Q. So indicated air speed, he still has to manipulate.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Okay. If he's descending down is there any tones that -- to let him know he's getting ready to level off so he can bring that power back up?
A. There's a 1,000-foot alert tone.
Q. Okay, all righty. Is their an auto pilot disconnect tone?
A. Yes.
Q. What's that, do you know? Is it like a buzz? Is it a --
A. Yeah, it's a -- like a beep.
Q. -- a beep?
A. Or yeah, a tone. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Is it the altitude alert, is that a similar tone or are they different, totally different?
A. I don't remember.
Q. Okay. That's okay. it's all right, I just want to know so I kind of know if there's going to be a difference for him to pick up.
A. I fly it every day and I can't tell you right now.
Q. It's okay. It's all right.

A. It's different though.
Q. Is it? Okay. Let's go back a little bit now to the line pilot side. Do the aircraft have videorecording devices?
A. Yes.
Q. How does that make you feel, to being recorded?
A. Nowadays, I don't even think about it.
Q. Okay. Kind of like, to see, you don't even notice type of thing?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Do you know what they use that for at all? Did you ever use it in training?
A. Nope.
Q. No.
A. I've never seen video off of it ever.
Q. Okay. Do you guys have a safety person here, their job is you know, flight safety type person that their job is to manage the safety aspects of the airline?
A. In Honolulu?
Q. Honolulu or with Hawaii Life Flight.
A. (No audible response.)
Q. There is none?
A. None -- well no, not that I know of.
Q. Okay.
A. Not right now.
Q. I -- oh, there -- not right now, so was there?

A. Yeah. I don't even remember when. I know -- yeah, I don't remember.
Q. Okay, do you remember who that was?
A. I believe it was Eric Johnson (ph.).
Q. Eric Johnson?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. It was just a real little while though, and so I don't know what became of that.
Q. Okay, all right. So I guess, and please, don't let me -- I just don't want to assume anything because that's not going to help us. Did he -- did whoever, Eric Johnson, did he give that safety stuff to you guys as line pilots, things that they're seeing or anything?
A. I don't think he was on long enough to do that. I mean, it was if --
Q. Okay.
A. -- don't hold me on this.
Q. Yeah.
A. But I think it was just a couple of weeks.
Q. Oh.
A. I don't remember the details.
Q. And is he a line pilot here? Or is he --
A. Okay.
Q. -- is he still here as a line pilot?

A. Yep.
Q. Okay, all right.
A. I want to -- let me back up a little more. And I'm not even sure that was safety -- the safety position. It was -- I know it had something to do with safety but I don't remember what it was.
Q. Okay.
A. But he was there so short that it was like almost he wasn't there.
Q. Oh wow, okay. And are you a safety -- I'm not sure what terms you got. Some places will use like a director of safety or a manager of safety. Some will use like a base safety officer. Everybody has their own terms so I don't know what that would have been.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. So I just, I use safety as the general term, so okay. Do you -- does any of those terms ring a bell?
A. Nope.
Q. No? Okay, excellent. I know we've been going for just a little over an hour. Do you want a break for a little bit?
A. Nope, I'm good.
Q. You're still good?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. All right. I've got just a few more.
A. I think somebody wants to get in.
Q. I got just a few more questions and then I'll pass it over to

Sabrina --
A. Sure.
Q. -- and let her go. Do -- on the also (ph.) Appareo, or the videorecorders. Do you guys have any preflight checks you do on that or is just you don't even know it's -- I mean, with all due respect, you forget it's there.
A. Yep.
Q. Okay. Have you ever seen them written up in the log books?
A. Nope.
Q. So you don't even know what they do to them, do you?
A. No.
Q. And that's a -- okay. I just want to make sure that there was no -- you've seen things happen with these, so all righty. I believe that's all I have for right now. I'm going to let Ms. Sabrina take over for a little bit unless you -- you're sure you don't need a break. You're good? You're all right?
A. No, I'm good.
Q. All right. Just let us know if you do.
A. Okay.
Q. Sabrina?
A. Oh boy.
BY DR. WOODS:
Q. Why oh boy? Just I don't have -- I don't have as many questions as I think Shawn and likely Dylan have. I just for a couple just kind of personality-based questions. How well do you

feel you knew Brian?
A. Oh, I barely knew him.
Q. Yeah. Did you ever interact with him other than during those training sessions?
A. No.
Q. No, so you wouldn't be able to -- I guess during the training sessions, can you try to remember like, what was his personality like?
A. Oh, he was a nice guy.
Q. Yeah.
A. a real nice personality.
Q. Was he fairly receptive to like, your training critiques and the (indiscernible)?
A. Oh yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Oh yes.
Q. Essentially I guess, so how did he take it? Was he just like of like oh, okay? Or did he --
A. Oh no, he tried hard to -- to understand what I was trying to teach him.
Q. Okay. So after you were done though with those training sessions, did you ace -- feel good about the end result or was there still a little bit of like, you know. Boy, he might want to come back in here and work with either yourself or Landon again?
A. That's kind of a trick question.

Q. Is it?
A. Because everyone wants to come back to the SIM.
Q. Yeah.
A. I don't care how long you're are -- you're in the SIM. They always want to come back.
Q. But I'm not asking you about what he wanted. From your point of view as the training instructor, did you feel comfortable or did you feel like maybe you should come back tomorrow or the next week or whatever?
A. Okay, I got to say the same answer.
Q. Okay.
A. From my perspective, everyone could come back, and so it's kind of a mutual thing. It's like, let's get back in here. It's a nonstop thing. You never can get enough SIM.
Q. Okay, understood. No, that's great and I -- I definitely understand that. Can you remember again, after the training sessions? I know Shawn touched on this a little bit. But like maybe, if he were to leave your -- that training session and go fly the next day. How comfortable would you be having him fly one of your loved ones?
A. If he was able to do what I wanted him to do in the SIM then I'd be okay with it.
Q. Was he able to do what you wanted him to do in the SIM by the end of that day?
A. In the end, yeah.

Q. Okay. As compared to maybe some of the other people you've trained. I know Shawn also touched on this. But in a generic rating, would you say average, slightly below average or slightly above average?

A. That's too long ago. I don't really remember.

Q. Okay. Are you used to documenting as like -- because it seemed like there was a lot of notes there.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Is that typical for you? Do you typically have that many documented notes on the individuals you trained?

A. Sometimes. It depends on the circumstance. Sometimes they do real good and I write a lot of notes.

Q. Mm-hm, so for areas of improvement though, is it common to have like the lists that you had?

A. It's a little more than normal.

Q. Okay. But again by the end you felt competent, that --

A. He -- it was a while ago.

Q. Mm-hm.

A. But just based on the notes and what I'm thinking here. It's I felt comfortable that at least he understood what we're trying to get him to do.

Q. Okay.

A. And that, I mean -- yeah.

Q. And you said that he seemed receptive to the input and was willing to make the change.

A. He always was, yes.
Q. Okay. That's important, thank you. So for access to the training sessions. Would you say that all of the different bases can access it equally, or do maybe the Honolulu based crews have a little bit of a leg up because you're all right here?
A. They have a huge leg up.
Q. Yeah.
A. It's -- it can be difficult to get the outer island pilots here.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And just looking at the dates. This was during the pandemic and at some -- at one point we couldn't even travel inner island. So the outer island pilots had no access to the simulator.
Q. Okay. How does Hawaii Life Flight I guess fill the gap in those moment where, if those outlying bases, outer island, if they can't get here? What's the stop gap? What do you do to kind of Band-aid it or plug the hole in the meantime?
A. That was a very big problem during the pandemic.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And I think right now that's why you know, I'll go back. I think I mentioned this that we're mandating now everybody get on simulator.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. It was because of that. We couldn't get on the simulator and we started noticing problems.

Q. Mm-hm.
A. So we want everybody on the simulator now. So it's almost a requirement, company requirement, that we put them on the SIM before you check ride.
Q. Okay, and so that's averaging once a year then?
A. At least, yes.
Q. Okay. And is it always about a day long for each individual?
A. Maybe one or two days sometimes. I -- I got to go look it back and see.
Q. Okay. So when it's time for you and you need your training, who does that?
A. Either Landon or Kaleo.
Q. Okay, so you guys can interchange and run with each other as well?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Got it.
A. Oh, they have fun in that.
Q. I'm sure.
(Laughter)
A. Payback.
Q. I can -- I can only imagine. A little like coworker rivalry?
A. Oh yeah.
Q. When did you find out about the accident, about what was the timeframe after it occurred?
A. I was in dispatch when we got the phone call.

Q. Oh, you were?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, were you on call at that time?
A. Nine -- I can tell you the time. It was about 9:15.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. I was working that night.
Q. Okay. Can you just do a high level? Can you walk us through essentially what happened as soon as the call -- you say the call came in and presuming is that from air traffic control?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, can you give us a high-level walk though of then what happened?
A. Zoey took over from there.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. I mean, there's not much I could do.
Q. Yeah.
A. I made a phone call to Kaleo.
Q. Okay.
A. And wheels started spinning and I had to get out.
Q. Okay. Did they kind of shove you out or --
A. Yes.
Q. -- did you just realize it's time for --
A. Protocol.
Q. -- it is protocol.
A. Protocol, yeah.

Q. Okay, for you to --
A. They got to lock the door. Yep.
Q. -- okay, understood. And so at that time, you're on call though. So did you already understand that essentially you were done for the night?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Is it part of the plan to ground the fleet when a situation like that occurs?
A. I'm not sure. I'm -- I think it is.
Q. Okay.
A. I'm not sure.
Q. So I guess, how did you know that you were done for the night?
A. I just -- you just know.
Q. Mm-hm. Did you remain here or did you go back home or?
A. Kaleo did come out to talk to me for a little bit and he needed help with moving crews around in the morning, so I stayed the night. And in the morning we had a crew here from Hilo.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And he wanted me to take them to the airport in the morning.
Q. Commercial, you mean.
A. Commercial, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. So that's basically --
Q. yeah.

A. -- yeah. I guess you wanted to know how when you were shut down.
Q. Yeah.
A. Yeah, that's how we knew.
Q. Okay. In your like your protocol, is there anything written about like going out and looking at the training records and starting to pull those and kind of maybe sequester some of that kind of information for pilots or over the aircraft side going in, like somebody collects the maintenance records and sequester those?
A. As far as my job? Nothing --
Q. Okay.
A. -- of that sort.
Q. So the line pilots switching hats. So a line pilot perspective there's nothing that, you know, okay this is my role post accident or significant incidents. I have to do this, this and this?
A. None that I know of.
Q. Okay, that's fine. Again, we're just trying to figure out how everybody's role and what they do. And it's, since you were actually here that night, I thought you might have some insight. I think that's all I have. Yeah, that's all I have for this round. Thank you though.
MR. ETCHER: Dylan?
MR. GARRISON: Hey, Stewart.

MR. Nishimura: Hey.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. You had mentioned that you used to do more training, but now people are going to Utah, pilots are going to Utah for training.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Are you doing any type of training right now?

A. A little bit, not much.

Q. In the simulator or in the airplane or both?

A. Actually, it's been a while since I've done either.

Q. Okay. What type of training are you doing now that they're sending more people to Utah?

A. All of it.

Q. All? All -- what do you mean by all of it?

A. Everything. Oh, let me -- okay. So what's happening is our simulator downstairs have been giving us trouble.

Q. Right.

A. And it's technically not working. So management wants all of the pilots here now to go to Utah for their recurrent training.

Q. Uh-huh.

A. So they're doing everything we used to do.

Q. So is that the reason they're going to Utah is because of the simulator situation?

A. Yes.

Q. Oh, it's not --

A. Well, that's what they told us. Yes.

Q. -- okay, all right. And so, are you doing any flight training still here?
A. There is no need right now.
Q. I mean any -- any training in the airplane is what I should say. There's no need right now? That's still --
A. No need right now.
Q. -- okay. Is there any required flight training that you know of for recurrent training?
A. Okay. As I understand it, it had -- there is required flight training, but you can use the previous check ride as that, to count for that or something like that.
Q. Okay.
A. Randy Ostman can explain that to you.
Q. Sure. So there's something about being able to use the check ride as flight training.
A. Something like that, yeah.
Q. Okay. Yeah, and again -- not a check ride. There's no right answer. I -- that is all I'm looking for is your understanding, right? And it's not meant to like be a test of your knowledge. I'm not interested in that. I'm just, I want to know what information we can gather from you.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. How many other instructors are there like you at Hawaii Life Flight?
A. Me, Landon.

Q. Landon?
A. Landon Honeychurch.
Q. Okay, right. And then Kaleo. Can he do the instruction as well?
A. Kaleo, and Ed Cavanaugh can do it too.
Q. Okay. And correct me if I'm wrong. Kaleo and Ed are the check airmen?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So they're primarily the check airmen. So there's two of you training and two of you checking. Is that --
A. Yes.
Q. -- okay. But those were -- sometimes the check airman can do the training.
A. Yes.
Q. You guys aren't available. And that happens?
A. Rarely, but it does.
Q. Okay. And are you a company instructor according to Part 135, do you know?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Are you -- did you have any kind of observation done?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, all right. And do you know what the last one you had?
A. Two years ago.
Q. Two years ago? Okay. And did you go through any special training for that, the -- when you were first designated a company

instructor?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You had mentioned earlier, steer to fly. I want to know, are you also an MEI and a CFI-I?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. I assumed that was the case but I just wanted to make sure. You mentioned you have about 1,000 to 1,500 hours in the King Air, correct?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. But you've been flying it that last seven years, yeah?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. So I mean, does that -- if you think about your monthly average of like how much you're flying. Does that equate -- does that make you -- since that the -- I guess, what do you think your monthly average is of flying?
A. That's about right.
Q. That's about right?
A. Medevac flying, you don't make a lot -- you don't fly a lot.
Q. Especially out here, is that?
A. Anywhere.
Q. Anywhere.
A. Well, at least here. I can't speak for the mainland.
Q. Sure.
A. But in general we do about maybe two, 300 hours a year.
Q. Okay.

A. It's not much.
Q. Okay. All right, that makes sense. I just wanted to check out this base.
A. Yeah, hard to believe. Yeah.
Q. Right. No, I just wanted to make sure that the -- estimation.
A. Yeah.
Q. Wind up. Okay, tell me -- I want to talk about the CAP team. Is that what you would refer to them as?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Okay, this is the crew. The CAP team always has two pilots.
A. Yes.
Q. So why would -- you had mentioned that the hospitals want two pilots. Why would the hospital want two pilots per flight? Isn't that cheaper to fly one?
A. Yes. It's -- for the details you're going to have to talk to Mark Leggett on that.
Q. Okay.
A. Or Kaleo.
Q. Okay. What would be you opinion of why they would want that?
A. What I was told?
Q. Sure.
A. It was a request by the medical crew that actually fly.
Q. Oh, the medical crew.
A. Yeah.

Q. That work at that hospital?
A. Yep. So I -- my understanding is it's some kind of contract --
Q. Right.
A. -- between the hospital and us that they want two pilots for this, flights.
Q. Yeah, no. And I'm trying to understand why. I was just curious what the understanding is amongst you pilots of like why they want two pilots for it. Like, what makes those patients -- is it --
A. What I was told? Nervous fliers.
Q. Oh, that the people in the back are nervous fliers?
A. Yep.
Q. Okay, so it doesn't have anything to do with the patient --
A. No.
Q. -- or the patient needs.
A. No.
Q. If the -- because those are NICU?
A. NICU and PICU.
Q. And PICU?
A. Yeah.
Q. Commonly?
A. Always.
Q. Okay. Oh, always.
A. Yeah.

Q. And so it has nothing to do with that.
A. No.
Q. Okay, all right. And so what if -- are we not in -- are there not nervous fliers elsewhere? These medical crews were not having the nervous fliers elsewhere? Like why -- why aren't we putting two pilots on every flight?
A. That's what the crews are asking now.
Q. Okay. And when you say crews, you --
A. Our medical crews.
Q. -- the medical?
A. Yeah.
Q. What about the pilots? Is there any consensus among the pilots of what --
A. Most of us pilots are -- we're happy flying single pilot, that's why we do this.
Q. Right, okay. So many of the -- so now you're getting more nervous fliers, you're saying, since the accident? Like, more people are requesting two pilots? More medical crews are requesting two pilots?
A. Well, I wouldn't say requesting, they're asking.
Q. They're -- okay.
A. I'd say they're asking about it.
Q. Okay, they're asking about it. And is that request being fulfilled? Like when -- can we put -- are they putting two pilots on any of these flights?

A. I have no idea where that is right now.
Q. Or is it just the CAP team that still has the two pilots?
A. The CAP team still has. Yes.
Q. Okay. Do we -- do you know of any others that have two pilots or?
A. Nope.
Q. Okay. And do you know why they're not putting two pilots on?
A. That, like I say, you'd have to talk to management about that.
Q. Sure.
A. I don't know.
Q. Yeah, I'm just curious about your understanding.
A. It's an ongoing discussion right now and I don't know where that is at.
Q. Okay. The pilots that fly SIC. Are they -- are they also captains? Can they also fly in the captain position?
A. The ones we have now are low time pilots.
Q. Okay.
A. So no, they -- I don't think they qualify for PIC.
Q. Oh, they don't. Okay. So they're in a SIC position only.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Okay, do they have any training for that position?
A. Oh yeah.
Q. Okay, and is that -- is there required training for that, like?

A. Yes.
Q. Okay, and that's in the training program --
A. Yes.
Q. -- for SIC position? Okay. You had mentioned when training Brian in the SIM session that he had difficulty in switching from en route to approach using the Garmin unit.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Is that correct?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Okay. Can you -- and you said that you have to explain that to pilots to help them understand that better?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Could you explain that to me and help me understand that better of what common problems are there and how we correct that?
A. So en route. Setting up the Garmin unit for an approach requires you to know where you're going to start that approach from. And where you're starting that approach from is determined from where you're coming from. And so it starts, you know. I guess it starts where, where are you coming from? Which FIX do you start this approach from? Because that FIX is -- will determine how you program your -- the Garmin unit. So you have to be able to know which FIX you're gonna start off with, and that's what people have trouble understanding -- which FIX do I go do first? And so that's what I mean by that. I don't know if that makes sense.

Q. Sure, I have a follow-up question of that. That makes sense. So like which FIX to select on -- like if they're cleared for an approach?
A. Yes.
Q. Which one to FIX at?
A. Yes.
Q. So what are the common problems, that of?
A. That the good one is when you're being vectored.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. And so they'll sit there like oh, which one do I pick? And you know, the easy one is yeah, keep scrolling down and you'll see. Vector's the final.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. But not all of them know what and they don't play with it enough. And at that time, I don't remember when we switched over to this, new units. But a lot of them weren't used to it, so they were trying to figure out how do you intercept? Where do you intercept on the -- being vectored to final you know, there's different FIXes along the way. And if you don't select vectors to final, you have to actually pick that leg, which one you're going to intercept in, and they were trying to figure out how to do that.
Q. Activate the leg?
A. Yeah.
Q. Yeah, okay.

A. So that's where you know, you got to sit them down and say well, there's this easy button here. If you scroll a little bit more down you'll see vector is the final.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. Or sometimes intercepting an ARK. Where in the ARK do you intercept where, how you set it up, stuff like that.
Q. Okay, that makes sense. Yeah, that makes sense. And so you felt, or in your training, you saw that Brian struggled with that, just like knowing how to set up?
A. Yes, I think so.
Q. Okay.
A. It was a very common problem at that time.
Q. Okay. What about at that time, I mean, being cleared to an initial approach FIX, would that present any problems? Like, would that present any difficulties or is that the -- what's the level of difficulty, I guess, with that?
A. I think that actually made it easier for them. Because now they know, okay you know, pick the FIX there and then.
Q. Right. In that situation, if they were expecting vectors to final and then they were having to go back to the initial approach FIX. Then they were then cleared for the initial approach fix. Would that present problems, having to reprogram that approach? Or is that -- what level, degree of difficulty would that be?
A. That? That was another common problem.
Q. Mm-hm.

A. So for example, on check rides, you know, when they go approach after approach. They wouldn't know what transition to use.
Q. Oh.
A. Because they're in the middle of it. I'm like oh, what do I do now?
Q. Right, having to reprogram the approach --
A. Right.
Q. -- to get back to initial approach FIX.
A. Right.
Q. You got it set up on vectors.
A. Right.
Q. Yeah, that can just take some attention focused on that.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. I guess that brings up another question. Is that, with a new unit being installed and people trying to figure it out. In the simulator did you -- or in training -- did you experience any fixation? Like, pilots getting fixated on that and not keeping up their scan?
A. Well, everything's easy on auto pilot. So it's not so much that. It's confusion. A lot of times they'll program something wrong.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. And then the airplane would just start turning and it's like, what do I do now?

Q. And the airplane would start turning --
A. To whatever was programmed?
Q. -- ah.
A. It's usually not the right way.
Q. With the turning (ph.), okay. And so --
A. You're a pilot.
Q. -- so they would have -- they would have it programmed. So I'm guessing that it's in NAV mode that (indiscernible) was in NAV mode if they have it programmed.
A. That depends. Yeah, it depends.
Q. Uh-huh, because if it was in heading mode then it would --
A. It would just keep going straight.
Q. -- it would just keep -- stay on the heading, it wouldn't turn when they programmed it wrong. Right?
A. Right.
Q. Okay. I kind of -- I guess that -- I'll move on. You had mentioned when you have a training session that is less than ideal, it's something you feel you got to take to Kaleo. You said, you know, I hand it off to them. They take it from there, you know. What does that mean? What do they do from that point, do you know?
A. That depends on the situation.
Q. So like a situation like the one we're talking about, where you read these notes about Brian. You go talk to Kaleo about it. What might they do in that situation?

A. I don't remember on this one.
Q. Okay.
A. I don't remember what we did.
Q. A situation similar, what do you think they might do?
A. I'm not sure.
Q. Okay.
A. It's usually a day or two before the check ride.
Q. Right.
A. So sometimes I -- they'll just take them on a check ride and double check.
Q. Okay.
A. And say -- go, is this what we're seeing?
Q. That's what I was curious about. Would Kaleo get in a simulator with them and fly again or would they just go out and say well, we'll see how he does on his check ride since?
A. Sometimes a little of both. But usually it's just we'll see on the check ride.
Q. Okay, and I don't recall in this situation. But do you recall if he was satisfactory on his check ride?
A. I don't recall.
Q. Okay.
A. No.
Q. Okay. But you don't remember anything coming back to you of like oh, we need to train more or anything like that.
A. I don't remember.

Q. Okay. When you were doing this training with Brian and we had the -- you had the gear up incident, where you came back -- he was circling and you put the gear up and then landed. Can you recall his reaction to that when that occurred? You let it happen, it sounded like.
A. Oh yes.
Q. Did -- you knew.
A. Yes.
Q. You knew it was about to happen --
A. Oh yes.
Q. -- and you let it happen.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Can you tell me why you let it happen? I know it's in a simulator, but.
A. I think it's a good learning lesson there.
Q. And can you tell me what his reaction was, like?
A. Oh, he was very upset with himself.
Q. Okay. And how did you determine that?
A. His -- just watching.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. I mean, he was shaking his head. I can picture that. I mean, he was. He was very upset.
Q. Okay. Did the SIM session continue from that point --
A. Oh yeah.
Q. -- or was that then ended?

A. No, we kept going.
Q. Okay. Okay. And you had mentioned by the end of training session, they demonstrated everything that you wanted them to demonstrate to an acceptable level.
A. They usually do, yeah.
Q. Yeah?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. You mentioned that. But you did also mention with Brian that he had more notes for improvement, we'll say, more than normal.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. More than you typically see.
A. Okay yeah, I think so.
Q. Okay. That's what I understood you said earlier, so if it's wrong you can correct me. Yeah. I don't want to put any words in your mouth.
A. I can't remember all the check rides I did, but yeah. That's a little high on the notes that I've written there usually.
Q. Okay, sure. So obviously, if someone has more room for improvement than some other pilot. That would present higher risk than other pilots, right? So if we have the best pilot on a flight, that's a lower risk than having a pilot that's less than average. Agreed?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Is there, from your perspective, from your job, from what you've done as training. Is there anything that can be done to

mitigate that risk further, in your opinion, or that should be done?

A. That's usually a discussion that I have with Kaleo after every session. And we talk about where this pilot stands and what his weaknesses are and we discuss that.

Q. Okay. And you had these discussions about Brian with Kaleo.

A. Every pilot, we do.

Q. Okay.

A. Every session, we do.

Q. And can you recall how those discussions with Kaleo went when you were talking about Brian and these deficiencies?

A. I don't remember.

Q. Okay. Can you recall if it felt -- or can you recall if you were -- felt that the resolution was satisfactory, in your opinion?

A. I --

Q. Like, whatever Kaleo decided?

A. -- I don't remember.

Q. You don't recall.

A. No.

Q. Okay. The Appareo? Are you -- the camera that they put in there?

A. Oh, okay.

Q. I know. I didn't -- I hadn't heard the name until this investigation too. I just -- I didn't know if what -- how you

guys referred to it.
A. Now I know the name.
Q. Yeah, so let's call it the camera --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- that was in flight. Did you ever have any interaction with it at all?
A. Just a couple of dents on my head.
Q. All right. That's all I -- that's what I've heard.
A. That's it.
Q. People always say bump their head.
A. Yeah.
Q. They said that -- we've heard that it's been used for training. Did you ever use it for training?
A. I've never seen any video on it.
Q. Okay.
A. Anything. I've never even heard of it being used.
Q. Okay. Shawn asked you earlier about a safety officer out of Hawaii Life Flight, and we talked about that. I just wanted to follow up and say, are you aware of a safety officer at Guardian?
A. We have somebody now. I don't -- John, somebody -- something Johnson, I think.
Q. Okay.
A. Don't laugh.
(Laughter).
Q. If you had a safety concern, do you have a way of -- I know

you could go to Kaleo.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. That's been -- but if you felt for whatever reason that Kaleo wasn't handling it the way it -- do you have a way of communicating this to upper management?
A. We have a Baldwin system.
Q. Oh.
A. Baldwin reporting system.
Q. Okay, have you ever used that system?
A. Oh yeah.
Q. Okay, and was that to report safety concerns?
A. All kinds of things.
Q. All kinds of things? But you have used it for safety?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. You had mentioned that the pilots request to come to the simulator and then it gets scheduled before their check ride. Could a pilot be like no, I'm fine. I can do my check ride. I don't need to go to the simulator?
A. Yep, several of them have done that.
Q. Okay, and you could just do that indefinitely, so there's no -- no training that is required. You could just do your six-month check.
A. Not anymore.
Q. No, okay.
A. But around that time, yes, especially during the pandemic

because we couldn't get them over here.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. We even had time -- trouble just getting them a check ride.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. So at that time, yes.
Q. Okay, but that's changed since the?
A. Yeah, now they're mandating that we all go up to Utah for training recurrent training.
Q. Okay. Was there any explanation given of why that change was made?
A. What they told us was the simulator here is broken.
Q. Right, but some pilots weren't using the simulator here anyway.
A. Yeah, and then we went to mandate. We went to mandate the simulator.
Q. Uh-huh.
A. Then the simulator broke. And so now they're saying everyone goes up there.
Q. Okay. And was any explanation of why they mandated simulator time?
A. Nope.
Q. Okay.
A. At least not that I recall.
Q. Is there an assumption that you made of why that was mandated?

A. I don't know.
Q. All right.
A. My thought was oh, we have the simulator, why not use it? Put everybody, you know, get everybody to that next level.
Q. Next level, safety.
A. Yeah.
Q. Mitigate risk.
A. Competence.
Q. Competence, understood. Yeah, that makes sense. I just wanted to get your perspective on it. When you did basic training sessions, did you ever do partial panel training?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. What did that look like?
A. Usually it's just failing the, what do you call those?
Q. EFIS?
A. EFIS, there you go.
Q. One of them or?
A. Sometimes both of them.
Q. Both of them?
A. Yeah.
Q. So you said failing the EFIS. Do you recall the recovery for that? It's not -- again, not a test. I'm just --
A. The recovery?
Q. When an EFIS fails, what -- where do you go from there, what the pilot's supposed to do next?

A. Oh, well they usually have to resort to the copilot's seat instruments.
Q. Okay. So how often would you do that in a training session of -- have the pilot fly off the copilot instruments?
A. Maybe once.
Q. Maybe -- maybe once per -- every time a pilot comes in they're doing it at least once? Is that what you're saying?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, so you made sure that that was covered. Is -- so as a line pilot. So taking off your training hat now, putting on your line pilot hat. When you did check rides, did you do partial panel on check rides?
A. I don't do check rides. I'm not a check airman.
Q. Right. When you are having a check -- like, when you're a line pilot and you're having your six-month evaluation.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And your 12-month evaluation.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Are you being tested on flying partial panel?
A. Oh yeah, mm-hm.
Q. Okay, and what does that look like in the airplane?
A. Well, not much they can do. So we'll turn the dimmer down. And on a sunny day you can't see it. So that image EFIS.
Q. Dimmer down on?
A. The dimmer on the EFIS deuce (ph.).

Q. Okay.
A. So you'll just look at a black screen.
Q. Okay. So they just dim one of them?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And then you're flying.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. So maybe is there one that they would usually fail over the other?
A. No, whatever they can reach. Because you got to reach all the way over.
Q. Okay, so they might reach over and dim HSI or the altitude indicator, and then you just fly from there.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Can you recall ever them dimming both of them and you having to fly from the copilot's seat on a check ride?
A. Not for me.
Q. Or have to fly from the copilot's instruments, sorry.
A. Not for me.
Q. Okay, just one.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. When you receive -- when you're on call here as a line pilot and you receive a call for a flight. How is that information currently -- how does that currently happen? Tell me about that process.
A. Please say that again?

Q. When you receive a call.
A. Okay.
Q. Do they call you and relay what information?
A. They just ask me hey, we've -- like for example -- hey, we got a flight to Maui.
Q. Okay.
A. And so from there, I'll just say okay. I'll check the weather, then I'll check my crew. And if I don't know the crew I'll ask them you know, hey, whose my crew? And then I'll call them up say, you know, we got a flight to Maui. But it's like today, weather's good. You guys good to go? And we'll discuss it and if they're okay, then I'll call dispatch and say we're good to go.
Q. And you said that they tell you where you're going. How often do you get where they -- do you get an early activation flight where they don't tell you what the destination is?
A. Never.
Q. Never?
A. They always tell us where we are going.
Q. Okay. Are you familiar with the term early activation flight?
A. In what sense?
Q. Are -- is that a term that rings any bell with you or any -- means anything to you?
A. It --

Q. If dispatch was to say this is an early activation flight, does that mean anything to you?
A. It can mean two things.
Q. Okay.
A. Early activation can mean hey, we may have a flight. Can you get ready?
Q. Okay.
A. Or it can mean hey, I know it's -- you haven't started yet, but can you start early? So it, to me, it can mean two things.
Q. Okay, I understand. Have you flown the new class cockpit airplanes that you guys are getting?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, are you trained on that and --
A. Yes.
Q. Are those operating here out of Honolulu?
A. We have two of them now, yes.
Q. That are operating?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Okay. And are you -- have you done any training on that?
A. Yes.
Q. I mean, have you -- sorry. Have you as a trainer -- company instructor, conducted any training for other people?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Both.

Q. Okay. That's all I have for now.

MR. ETCHER: Thanks. Millicent?

BY MS. HILL:

Q. These SIM sessions, excuse me, weren't mandatory. How -- what percentage of pilots opted to do it?

A. I didn't -- I'm not even going to try that one.

(Laughter)

Q. How -- would there be an average number of time that you would spend in the simulator with one -- have a day, two days?

A. It's usually an entire day at least. I've always asked for more than that, but it depends on the situation. This was entirely voluntary, so most of them would just spend a day.

Q. Okay, thank you.

MR. ETCHER: So you made around -- made it through round one. Round two is usually quicker.

MR. NISHIMURA: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: But do you need a break before we start?

MR. NISHIMURA: Nope.

MR. ETCHER: You sure?

MR. NISHIMURA: Yep.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

MR. NISHIMURA: I'm used to sitting for -- for long times.

(Laughter.)

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. True but you know, there's still different versions of

sitting, you know. I have some questions but there's not as many as I did to start with, so.

A. Okay.

Q. So this probably will go a little quicker. Seatbelt usage. Are you guys -- do you guys wear your seatbelts?

A. Always, in flight.

Q. If --

A. Or moving? Yeah, always.

Q. -- okay. Do you have to wear just the lap belt?

A. All of it.

Q. The shoulder harness and -- is it a three point, four point?

A. One, two, three, four.

Q. Okay, so you know what's it called, the Z-strap? Nothing between your legs to strap you in it's just --

A. No.

Q. -- okay.

A. Yeah, just the sides. Yeah.

Q. Okay, all righty. How about your medical crew?

A. They always strap in.

Q. They always do?

A. Yeah.

Q. Do -- I know it's Hawaii, so it's beautiful in paradise. But I'm sure there sometimes is a little bumpy.

A. Oh, always.

Q. Okay.

A. Always.
Q. Well that's kind of like a sometimes but more like always. So considering it's bumpy, what if they have to get up and deal with a patient? Do they tell you they're going and?
A. Yeah, usually. Well, not always but you can feel them moving. I'll look behind, say what's going on.
Q. Oh, okay. So you can really feel them moving around?
A. Oh yeah.
Q. Okay, all right. Is that -- I know you can feel it, but does that give you any -- as a pilot is that concerning, problematic now?
A. No.
Q. No.
A. They kind of know when they can get up and when they cannot.
Q. Okay, all righty. Excellent. You mentioned now a few times the pandemic and how it was -- well, it was a challenge for everybody but how it was really a challenge for you guys as well.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. But I know during that pandemic you had at least one SIM session with the accident pilot, in --
A. One in 2021 and 2020?
Q. '22, so I --
A. '22.
Q. -- and it depends on where you called the end of the pandemic, right?

A. Yeah.
Q. So let's go back to 2021, kind of --
A. Okay.
Q. -- pandemic's been around for 10 months, whatever. But how did you get him from Maui to here? Because you said something about it was really challenging.
A. I know Brian had asked several times. He was one that kept asking.
Q. Okay.
A. And we at that time -- and we were in lockdown. We could not move even between the islands. So I forget how he did it, but he was able to get here. I don't know if that was a time when we were on the simulator.
Q. Okay.
A. But we were having a hard time getting between the islands.
Q. Okay.
A. And so that was very restricting.
Q. All right. As a company training captain. When those heavy restrictions were relaxed a little and people could start getting training again, did you start seeing -- forgive me. This sounds like a weird question to ask. But were there any concerns you started seeing coming in, consistency issues or people getting kind of out of the procedures and had to kind of bring them back to the SOPs?
A. I don't remember.

Q. Okay.
A. Yeah, I don't remember.
Q. Okay, that's okay. I know is was -- it's been a while. I know. I personally have tried to put that time behind me --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- and forget about it, of course. So, it's all good. Let's say I came in and I said you know, I want some time -- when it was voluntarily, or even now. And I come in and do the SIM session. Then I'm like man, I really don't feel comfortable. I want more. Can I get more as a pilot? If I request it, can I say I need another day?
A. We have a standing -- I don't know if you can call it an invitation. But there's three of us here in Honolulu. There's Kaleo, me and Landon that can run the simulator. And it's, you know, if any one of us are free and that SIM is open, it is. It's an open invitation.
Q. So if I was let's just say, Maui based.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Just because that's the airport we're kind of dealing with. And I'm like man, I want some SIM sessions. I can just pick up the phone and say I want some SIM sessions and it'll be granted?
A. I won't say granted. I always say, go to Kaleo.
Q. Okay.
A. And have him see what he says.
Q. Okay.

A. The one I usually recommend to them is that if they're here and they have maintenance problems, they're going to be here for hours. So I -- that's your opportunity. Call us.
Q. Okay. And so if I come here and I have a maintenance issue, so I'm going to be hours. But you're not here. It's, you know, how would I get in there?
A. It doesn't always work, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. But that's why -- call us.
Q. Okay.
A. And if somebody's free, you know.
Q. Okay.
A. We'll try and make something happen.
Q. All righty. I know you said the simulator is not working correctly. Is there talk of fixing it or are they not going to use it anymore? Because --
A. I've been. I've been trying to fix it for a while now.
Q. Can you give me an idea what's wrong with it?
A. The simplest way is the GPS is not working.
Q. Okay. Okay, all righty. So during those SIM sessions, that day long maybe whatever SIM session. Is it all in the SIM or does that include some like ground school systems, talk?
A. There's some systems before I usually talk with them, maybe an hour, maybe two before. And then we'll jump in the SIM and then just run hard after that.

Q. Okay. And I know we all have different terms of an all-day long SIM. Are you talking six hours or -- you guys do 12-hour shifts. Are you talking 12 hours in the SIM?
A. It depends on their flights. Because usually they're from the outer island if they're coming in. Kaleo will put them on the earliest flight he can and send them home on the latest flight he can.
Q. Okay.
A. It can be anywhere from, you know, they'll -- sometimes they'll show up at 9:00 here and they have to go home at 3:00. Sometimes they show up at 6:00, 7:00 and stay here until 6:00 at night. It depends on the flight schedule.
Q. Okay.
A. Whatever they can get is your ride.
Q. Okay, and is that on company time do you know? Or is that on their own off time volunteer?
A. With this recurrent training it's on company time.
Q. And before the mandatory recurrent training was it?
A. It was kind of gray.
Q. Okay.
A. It was if it's voluntary, if you want to come in on your own time, then you don't get paid.
Q. Okay, okay. Doing all your training that you've done, how often did you ever see the FAA come in and observe you or observe any training?

A. I think only once.
Q. Okay. Was that just you or was that --
A. It wasn't for me. That, I -- they were doing somebody else.
Q. Okay.
A. So yeah, I went -- I ran and hide. Sorry.
Q. I've been there.
(Laughter).
All righty. How do you like the airplane versus, you know, the airplane itself. How does it fly?
A. Oh, I love the King Air.
Q. Okay. Easy to handle?
A. Yeah.
Q. Now being single pilot, you work loads a little bit more than maybe a dual pilot. But is it not much more? I see you kind of nodding your head sideways like man, it's not bad.
A. I've always -- I've always flown single pilot.
Q. Okay.
A. So I don't really have reference for a crew environment other than what we do at our SICs here.
Q. Okay. So you've always flown single pilot, which is great. That helps me. Have you ever had an emergency --
A. Oh yeah, mm-hm.
Q. -- in the King Air?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. How is that to handle single pilot?

A. Like any other airplane, I guess.
Q. Okay. I just wasn't sure like, you lose an engine, if it's more work.
A. In the King Air, it's a lot less work than any other piston.
Q. Okay, all right. That's good to know. What if you -- have you ever, well first of all let me ask this. Have you ever canceled a flight and said nope, I can't do it.
A. Oh yeah.
Q. When you do that, do they pay you for it or do they dock you?
A. No, there's nothing to do with pay.
Q. Oh, so you still get the same pay whether you --
A. Mm-hm.
Q. -- okay.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. I know as a pilot that's always something that I figure runs in everybody's minds. Maybe just mine, I don't know, but.
A. Cargo pilots?
Q. Since you've flown here a lot, I've -- I heard a new term this week that I never heard before. So I want your impression. It was dark, dark -- as flying over the water.
A. Yeah.
Q. Help me. What does that mean to you? I mean, let me rephrase that. Have you ever experienced flying over the water at night first? Let's get that on.
A. All the time.

Q. All the time.
A. Yeah.
Q. Is there any challenges to that?
A. It can be, but I'm used to it.
Q. Okay. Is it, as they say really, really dark over the water at night? Is it easy to --
A. Oh yeah.
Q. -- oh yeah?
A. It's dark.
Q. Okay. Is it hard to -- if you're hand flying would that be a challenge to you? And just from your perspective.
A. No.
Q. No? Okay.
A. No.
Q. All righty. It was just a new term I'd heard, so I was like oh, I haven't heard that term so I want to see how everybody else feels about it. During training do you do unusual attitudes or any things like that?
A. Yes.
Q. In the SIM or in the plane?
A. Mostly in the SIM. They work so much better in the SIM.
Q. Okay. How do you -- kind of give me an idea how you do unusual attitudes.
A. We'll play with the air speed mostly, that works the best. So I'll drop them down to like 50 knots all of a sudden and you

just -- they're just in a stall.
Q. Okay.
A. And then they just go nuts.
Q. Okay. Do you find any challenges with pilots recovering from unusual attitudes? I mean, let's face it. We don't ever want to have an unusual attitude in flight, so it's not something we go practice.
A. Right.
Q. But do you see any challenges?
A. For the most part no, they do pretty good.
Q. Okay, can I ask? Do you remember doing any of that to Brian?
A. No.
Q. No?
A. I don't remember.
Q. And that's okay. That's why I just wanted to ask. When you're flying, have you ever had any auto pilot issues?
A. Oh yeah, mm-hm.
Q. What kind?
A. You name it.
Q. Oh, all right -- doesn't engage, disconnects?
A. Yep.
Q. All that?
A. Yep.
Q. So if it disconnects does it -- does it alert you first?
A. Depending on the airplane -- not always. We had two

airplanes that we just retired. We nicknamed the Alpha-Mikes (ph.), the 947 Alpha-Mike and 948 Alpha-Mike. They had a different auto pilot, a different generation I guess you could say. But yeah, they would disconnect or do weird things all the time. We were just used to it.

Q. Okay. How about in the accident airplane or any of the current airplanes? Do you --

A. The auto pilots now that they have, I mean, they work fine.

Q. Okay.

A. I have no complaints about them.

Q. You've never had one just disconnect in flight for -- not with you taking it off but.

A. Not that I can recall.

Q. Okay, that's all right. Perfect. Do you guys do ground school here? I know you're an instructor captain I mean, and training captain in the SIM, but do you do ground school also or is that all --

A. That's all on the mainland now, everything.

Q. Okay.

A. That's why I don't have much to do now.

Q. Okay, all righty. How's that going to work for -- in your mind, you know. Well first of all, have you done the training though on the mainland

A. Not yet.

Q. Not yet.

A. No.
Q. Do they actually -- for the ground school part, do they actually fly people up there or do they just promote it, Zoom it?
A. In the past we were remoting it, during the pandemic.
Q. Mm-hm.
A. You couldn't move.
Q. Right.
A. But now they want everybody up there for everything.
Q. Okay.
A. All of it.
Q. When do you get to go?
A. November.
Q. November.
A. I just missed it, yeah.
Q. Oh.
A. Thanks.
Q. Well, but that's a cold time of year up there, so I don't know if it's really a benefit. All right.
A. Well, we like the snow. We never see it.
Q. Okay, makes sense. Currency. How do you maintain currency here? I know nighttime you guys fly every other week, so you're probably getting your night landings of course. Do you have to maintain any instrument currency?
A. Yeah. Six approaches, right?
Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.
Q. So how often do you guys actually shoot approaches?
A. More than you think, you'd be surprised. We -- but yeah, we get our weather now and then.
Q. Okay.
A. I just did one yesterday for an ILS into Hilo.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. So you guys are, it's -- I don't want to use the word easy to stay current, but it's --
A. It's not easy, but it's doable.
Q. -- okay. If somebody -- is that requirement on you to maintain --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- or does the company track it for you?
A. Company. Oh you know, I don't want to say the company tracks it but they do require us to log in.
Q. Okay. So what happens if -- it never happens to me. But what happens if I go fly and it's beautiful VFR for months and months and months. How do I get -- stay current?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay. Never happened to you?
A. No.
Q. Okay. That's okay. Just wanted to make sure I understood because I always thought Hawaii was sunshine. That's all I ever

see, so yeah.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. I didn't figure you guys ever had to worry about approaches, but you have to maintain currency.
A. Mm-hm. We have an airport we go -- miss regularly.
Q. Oh, really?
A. Yeah.
Q. Really. I never would have guessed, so.
A. Yeah.
Q. See, you're teaching me all sorts of great things, so I appreciate that. The last question I have for you. You do your check rides in the airplane, right?
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Where do you go do that at? I assume you can't do it in the pattern here in Honolulu.
A. No, no. Usually, well it depends where we are. Usually it's in Lanai.
Q. Okay.
A. Because they got everything you need there. But it depends where you are.
Q. And do you fly from here up there to do it or do you just --
A. Oh, it depends on where you're at when the -- where the check airman is available.
Q. Okay. So do you -- and again, please don't let me put words in your mouth. But let's say the pilot's -- is based here and the

check airman are here. Do you guys just get in an airplane and take off and we'd go fly to some other airport and --

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Okay, all right.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. Well, I promise you that was the last question. So I appreciate all the help you've given me to so far. But let me pass it on and make sure nobody else has questions. Sabrina?

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. One last question I think for me, and that is that when you're helping to inform like for instance, Kaleo, like post-training sessions, things of that nature. Have you ever been, in your time here, a part of a conversation or helped to inform a decision to where the pilot was asked to no longer work for Hawaii Life Flight?

A. That's way above my pay grade.

Q. Okay. I know you're not making the decision. But have you ever been asked to provide information that you know eventually led to that decision, in regards to training?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And about how many times in your time here has that happened?

A. Once.

Q. Okay. Not to get too into the details. But what was it about that individual that just didn't make it conducive to this

sort of flying and this kind of mission?
A. There was a whole list.
Q. Oh really?
A. I'd rather not get into it.
Q. Okay, understood. All right, okay. But on average it just doesn't -- it doesn't happen very often.
A. No.
Q. Okay.
A. No.
Q. Okay, all right. That's it for me, thank you.
A. Sure.
BY MR. GARRISON:
Q. When you said there's a whole list, is that -- we don't have to get into it. But is that like flying ability? Is that what you're talking about?
A. Not only that, there's a whole list.
Q. Okay, but that's on the list is flying ability.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. Other things might include like --
A. Personality -- the whole list.
Q. -- right, right. That makes sense. It's rarely just one thing, huh.
A. Mm-hm.

Q. What is your understanding of why they made the change after the accident to, instead of just texting everyone to then instead contact you first and then you contact the med crews and then you contact dispatch and say okay, we're all good, we're ready and we go that way? Why did they make that change?
A. It had something to do with a wellness check, is what they call it. They wanted to make sure everybody is comfortable going. Looking at the whole picture and making sure everyone is okay with doing that flight.
Q. And was that not being accomplished before? Do you feel that wasn't being accomplished before?
A. I've always thought it was.
Q. Okay, all right. So I guess that management thought that it wasn't and so they implemented this. Is that what's --
A. I have no idea.
Q. Okay, but that's what you understand. Or that was explained to you, I guess?
A. Yeah.
Q. And that's the reason for it.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. And it was like just to make sure everyone feels comfortable.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. Okay. Do you feel that it's any safer? That change has proved -- mitigated risk in any way?
A. No.

Q. Are there any changes that have been made that you have observed that might prevent an accident like this in the future?
A. Well, I don't even know what caused the accident so I don't know how to answer that.
Q. Okay.
A. But I can tell you from just allowing speculation, you know. Just to look at our mechanics out here and they're doing a lot of avionics modifications. I'm just going to let that speak for itself.
Q. Okay. Have you observed any changes since the accident that you believe were made -- that you believe were made to help prevent an accident like this in the future? Like, the motivation behind that decision to make a change?
A. Not sure I understand what you're saying -- you're asking.
Q. Okay, I'm just saying -- yeah. I'm just trying to understand what changes you've seen since the accident and if those were the -- changes were related to that.
A. I don't know if there's anything specific to the accident. But there are some changes and it's more to do with making sure the crews are all comfortable going on a flight.
Q. Right, okay. From based on your experience, you've done this for a long time. Do you -- seven years.
A. Well, okay.
Q. It's a long time.
A. Okay.

Q. That's more than most, you know. Like it's -- it's a lot of time. It's more than the average, I would say. You have -- you have a lot of experience and more than that, you're a company instructor and so you see different caliber of pilots that come through here, right? So based on your experience, are there any changes that could be made to help prevent an accident like this in the future?

A. Again I got to say, you know, without knowing what happened I really -- I don't have a clue.

Q. Okay, understood. Let's see. I think we went over to -- we covered that one. Auto pilot. We were talking about problems and you said oh, all kinds. We're talking about getting it to connect only. Did you ever have problems with it not disconnecting?

A. Nope.

Q. Okay. You've always been able to disconnect it and hand fly?

A. Mm-hm.

Q. You never had to wrestle it or anything?

A. Nope, never.

Q. So those aren't like, lock (ph.)? Okay.

A. No.

Q. Okay, so I just wanted to eliminate that as a possibility when we're saying all kinds. Wanted to make sure we're not having auto pilot try to fly the plane for us when we're trying to fly it.

A. No, it's usually the other way around.

Q. Right, yeah. Which airport is it you typically go missed at?
A. Waimanalo (ph.).
Q. Waimanalo, that's right. That is what I was going to ask you in there. If a line pilot from Honolulu was called out, goes to Kauai, picks up the patient and they're scheduled to come back to Honolulu. You get in the airplane and the auto pilot is inoperative, like they can't for whatever reason. Maybe it disconnected on the way over there, okay? And they're like, they know it. They cannot reengage it. Would it surprise you to learn that a pilot flew a plane back from Kauai with an inoperative auto pilot just saying well, I wanted accomplish the mission and I wanted to -- and I knew maintenance base was here, so they can get it fixed once we get home. Would it be -- surprise you for them to do that flight?
A. Be very surprising.
Q. Really? Okay. That's not something you hear about the pilots will do.
A. They will not do it.
Q. Thank you.
BY MS. HILL:
Q. As a line pilot, other than this was optional now required simulator training and your required recurrent training. What other training is there?
A. Well we do a monthly online training program. So every month they give us at least two modules that we have to complete.

Q. Is there safety stand downs or safety meetings or?
A. Yeah, about once a month. Yes.
Q. All right, thanks.
MR. GARRISON: I'm sorry, I do have one more. You were done, right?
MS. HILL: Yeah.
BY MR. GARRISON:
Q. Would a pilot ever be encouraged to hand fly an airplane for currency, to stay sharp? So the auto pilot's functional. But would they ever be encouraged to hey, just hand fly a flight every once in while?
A. I do, and I can't say for anybody else.
Q. You will hand fly flights once in sometimes.
A. Once in a while, or at least part of it.
Q. Just to stay sharp.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. And I know of a couple other pilots who will do it. But as far as companies saying to do it? I don't think so. Nobody's going to come on and say that.
Q. Right. Like in -- with the training. Like when pilots come through here, is that something that would ever be encouraged of hey, every once in a while.
A. I kind of hint at it, I don't really mandate it. I just --
Q. Right, there's no mandate.

A. Right.
Q. I'm just saying encouraged.
A. Yeah.
Q. Yeah.
A. I kind of tell them a little. But not necessarily suggest it. But more like hey you know, this is what I do.
Q. Mm-hm, okay. Thanks.
MR. ETCHER: Good?
MR. GARRISON: Good.
MR. ETCHER: All right. You made it through the check ride. No, just kidding. But before we quit, I just want to ask because we asked you a ton of questions. But I'm always afraid there's always that one little thing you're like man, I wonder if they're going to talk about this. Is there anything in your brain that's like man, I wish they would have talked about this because it might have helped at least, get a better picture or understand something better. Is there anything like that you can think of?
A. You know, everybody -- everybody asked me what I think happened with that crash. And the only answer I can come up with is I got to wait for you guys to come up with the report because I really have no idea. And until that happens, I've got a million questions that just cannot be answered.
Q. Right.
A. And so you know, thank you guys for you know, working through all of this and helping us figure that out as best you can.

Q. Well, and I'd say it's our honor but we'd rather it never happened, right?
A. Yeah, mm-hm.
Q. But yeah, we have questions too, that's why this whole process is -- it's a slow process because we want to make sure when we come up -- when the upper board comes up with a probable cause of what happened, that's it's correct best as we can tell. And your information you've given us today has helped me. I can speak for me. But it has helped me understand the training and what a line pilot does. And it helps us get a better picture. Because you guys are -- call you subject matter experts of what you do. And you know, if I don't know exactly how you do what you do it makes our job even harder and then we're just kind of guessing.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. So your honesty and your helping us today has really helped us start filling in some pieces.
A. Yeah.
Q. And so that's -- it's a slow -- it's a million-piece puzzle, I always say. And we still only got like 100 pieces on the table.
A. Mm-hm.
Q. So we're still putting them together. But I appreciate that and you have my card. So if you have any questions or you think of anything please reach out. Because every little piece that we get is one more piece of that puzzle we can start putting

together.

A. Mm-hm.

Q. And it does help us, so I do appreciate it.

A. Okay.

MR. ETCHER: But if you have nothing else, we can call this interview over at 11:53, and you are free to go. Thanks.

(Whereupon, at 11:53 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022 Interview of Stuart Nishimura
ACCIDENT NO.:	ANC23FA008
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Suzanne Ventura
Transcriber

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022	Accident No.: ANC23FA008

Interview of: ZOEY STREADBECK, Dispatch

Hawaii Life Flight

Honolulu, Hawaii

Wednesday
February 15, 2023

APPEARANCES:

SHAWN ETCHER, Operational Factors Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

SABRINA WOODS, Ph. D, Human Performance Investigator
National Transportation Safety Board

MILLICENT HILL, Investigator-In-Charge
National Transportation Safety Board

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Federal Aviation Administration

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I N T E R V I E W

MR. ETCHER: Good morning, Zoey, again. My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an operational factors investigator for the NTSB. All that means is I look at everything that is forward of the cockpit and everything that interacts with it. So that's why you're here today to educate me. I'm going to go around the room here in just a second to have everybody introduce themselves to you, but I just want to let you know, part of our process is, when we investigate events, we have what we call parties onto our investigation. And it's not just NTSB. In this case, we have FAA with us as a subject matter expert to help us make sure we don't overlook something, and we get everything 100 percent correct. So, I'll go around the room. Sabrina, would you be so kind?

DR. WOODS: Hi, Zoey. Dr. Sabrina Woods. I'm a human performance investigator with the NTSB. Essentially what that means is I'm looking at kind of all the different things that make up how we do our job, and just to make sure that everything that's in place, that should be there, is there, and that maybe if there's something that is preventing people from being able to perform at their best, is something else we want to look at so we can make sure that we can get that corrected. So, part of what I'm also doing here is just kind of understanding how the operation is supposed to work, because like I said before, we don't know. So, we're looking to you to help kind of teach us your function in the operation, and how that relates to the

accident flight.

MR. GARRISON: Dylan Garrison. I'm with the FAA. I'm the inspector in charge with the FAA for the accident investigation. So, my role here is for the safety. Right? So, it's not -- I don't know what your interaction with FAA may have been in the past, but I just want to let you know, like, I'm not on the enforcement. Like, that's not my role here to take any enforcement action. My role here is to figure out what happened, and the safety side.

MS. HILL: Millicent Hill. I'm the investigator in charge.

MR. ETCHER: So that's everybody that will be talking to you today and asking questions. As you can see, we're recording the interview, and we're going to have it transcribed. That transcript will become part of the public docket when this accident closes out. Is that okay if we record and transcribe?

MS. STREADBECK: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you. Anytime anybody works or interacts with us, they have a right to have a representative during the interview process. Do you wish to have one? I see you don't -- didn't bring one in, but we want to make sure you are okay not having a --

MS. STREADBECK: Yeah, I don't need one.

MR. ETCHER: Okay, great. Thank you. So, during this interview, like I said, we're going to ask questions. But there's a few ground rules I always like to give. If you don't know an

answer, I don't know works great. So, don't -- we want to learn the facts that we can because you're here to educate us. If you have an opinion, that's okay. Just let us know that it's an opinion just so we make sure we know what's an opinion and fact, we can keep that clear in our brain too. If you need a break, just say so. It's okay. If you need to go talk to somebody about something, that's fine, too. Just say so. We'll pause, take a break as needed. All right? The big question, the big concern is if you don't understand the question, ask for clarification. It's okay. Because if you give me an answer that I don't quite understand, I'm going to ask for some clarification. So, it's kind of a two-way street that way. All right? All right. If you're ready to begin -- everybody else ready? All right.

INTERVIEW OF ZOEY STREADBECK

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So, I always say I start with the toughest questions first. They're the toughest ones. Can you give us your full legal name and spell the last?

A. Okay. Full legal -- okay. Zoey Carmichael Olay (ph.) (indiscernible) Streadbeck. Last name, S-t-r-e-a-d-b-e-c-k.

Q. Excellent. And what is your job title?

A. Communications dispatcher.

Q. So, what does that mean? Help me understand what a communications dispatcher is. How's that?

A. So, basically, we get the information from the hospitals. We

call intake and delegate and decide which crew and pilot to send out to get the patients out the fastest, the quickest, most efficiently.

Q. Okay. And you work for Blue Hawaii -- or I'm sorry, Hawaiian Life Flight, or you work for Guardian. Who do you work for?

A. Hawaii Life Flight.

Q. Hawaii Life Flight? Okay. Excellent. And how long have you been doing this job?

A. I started in April of last year. So, what is that, ten months?

Q. Okay. Don't make me do math this early. It's okay. Great. So, kind of help me understand your leadership structure here. Who do you report to report to?

A. I report to Kevin Richard (ph.).

Q. Okay, so he's your supervisor or boss?

A. Yes, supervisor.

Q. Okay. And who's above him? Or is there anybody?

A. It would be Mariah (ph.). Sorry. I don't know her last name.

Q. Okay. That's okay. Perfect. All righty. And from your viewpoint as a communications dispatcher, does that -- how is that staffing to you? Does it seem like you guys are staffed enough or do you have to work a lot more extra hours?

A. No, I don't have to work any extra hours. We definitely do need more dispatchers, I feel. Sometimes having one person on one

shift can be a lot for one person. But I don't overwork, or we're not put on any extra hours. Yeah.

Q. Now you used the word dispatcher, so I have to ask. You have an FAA dispatching cert?

A. No.

Q. No? So, as a dispatcher, I know you kind of told us your day-to-day job, but do you deal with flight plans for pilots or weather or anything like that?

A. We don't. The pilots will give us a flight plan, which is how many souls (ph.), their cruising altitude, their highest obstacle, if it's IFR, VFR, how much fuel they have on board, and their estimated time in route, but that's it. But they do all the planning. We don't, we don't do any planning for the pilots.

Q. Okay, perfect. You already got through quite a few of my little questions here. So, how many dispatchers, communication specialists, work at Hawaii Life Flight?

A. Five. Three of us are full time, two are part time.

Q. Okay. And that five includes you as well?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay, perfect. And do you interact with them often?

A. Yes. At least the people that, like, brief me or relieve me. Yeah.

Q. All right. Perfect. So, as a dispatcher, communication specialist, do you, do you get to go fly with any of the flights or have you ever been on any of them?

A. I have not.
Q. Did you interact with the accident flight crew?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay, great. So, on that night of the event, can you kind of recall back? I know it's been about six, eight weeks ago. Can you kind of recall back anything, you know, your interaction with them. Did they call you? Did you call them? Kind of help us understand. Let me be that fly on your shoulder, if you will, so I can see and hear what you're.
A. Yeah. So, I can just go, like, step by step.
Q. Please.
A. So, North Hawaii Community Hospital called maybe around 19:45 around, for a patient. I took down the information and then I dispatched the Maui crew, which, you know, for that flight. So, I page them out, which is like a text template. We just say where they're going, their flight number, where they're dropping the patient off, the patient's weight, if there's a rider, which we send to the pilot and then all the patient information we send to the medical crew. I paged them out around 20:00. They all responded. They just said, okay. And then about an hour later, around 21:00, the pilot called me, gave me his flight plan, said we're good to go. I said, okay, you're released. And then they took off. And then maybe about 20 minutes later, that's when the air traffic control facility called me and said -- asked if 1 3 Golf, Zulu was our plane. I said yes. He said, okay. And it was

this guy named Mike. It was around like 21:23, he called. He said, oh, this plane dropped off our radar. How many souls are on board and what color is the aircraft? So, I said, white. And there's three souls. He said, okay, we're sending out Coast Guard. We'll keep in touch. And then that night in the room, Stuart, he's one of the Honolulu pilots, he was in the room in the dispatch center with me, and the phone was on speaker when I answered. So, he called his chief pilot, Kaleo , to advise him. And whenever, like an incident, any incident occurs, we have this like event thing online that we basically just fill out, you know, what aircraft it is, what's happening? Are they in-flight, not in flight? Is our patient on board? And it shoots out to all the managers so they're aware of it. So, I did that. Then I proceeded to text the crew whenever something happened, you know, maybe they'll respond. And I think Kaleo called, tried calling the pilot. And then my boss, Kevin, he tried calling the medical crew, but no answer. And then kind of from then on, all the managers were in. And, you know, it wasn't really much after that.

Q. Okay. So, let's go back a little bit if you could. You paged the crew out. You paged the pilot, and you said you only gave him where he was going.

A. Yeah. So, the pilot, we have the flight number, you know, to keep track of every single flight that we have where they're going, like picking the patient up from, where they're dropping

the patient off, the patient's weight, if there is a rider coming along and the tail number, which aircraft they're taking, which most times they already know which aircraft they're taking. But yeah, and then the medical crew, they'll get the, you know, patient information as far as like the diagnosis, equipment, the doctor we spoke to.

Q. Okay. So, the information you sent to the pilot does not include patient's info?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. Just the weight.

Q. In general terms, do you remember what the reason for the late-night flight was? I mean, I know it was to pick up a patient, but was it a critical patient or not critical? Do you remember?

A. I don't remember what the diagnosis was, but I know the patient had to be transported. I don't think the patient was like unstable or anything where, you know, but the patient did have to, have to go. Yeah.

Q. So, was there -- I don't want to put words in your mouth, so please don't let me. But was there a sense of urgency that the patient needed to go or was it one of those, it needs to be at some point soon, just not --

A. Yes, it wasn't -- we have these flights called early activation flights as well, which they want us there as soon as

possible. It wasn't, it wasn't like that. It was just a regular, we need this patient out, what's you guy's ETA, kind of thing. So, it wasn't like a rush. But of course, you want to get there as fast as we can. Yeah.

Q. So, what's an early activation mean? I just want to make sure I know in my brain what you -- what those terms are.

A. So, basically, for example, a hospital will call. They have a patient that's coming in. Sometimes they don't even have the patient in the hospital yet, but the patient is so unstable like they need to go, but they don't have any receiving doctor, or they didn't even know where they're going to send the patient yet. Basically, that's what that means.

Q. Okay. Do you guys -- I don't want to say normally, because normally it's such a general term.

A. It's not often. It's not on a daily basis.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, no.

Q. So, you knew what I was asking. Just look at you and you know. All right. So, let's go back to that night again and you page out the pilot and he texted back.

A. Yeah, they just text back, okay, just saying that -- it's just like acknowledgment knowing that they got our text.

Q. Now, once you get that okay text, how long is it until you expect to receive a call from them?

A. One hour.

Q. One hour?
A. Yeah.
Q. Is that a procedure -- a policy guidance or is that --
A. It's kind of both.
Q. Okay.
A. Any outer island fixed wing that's not on Honolulu, they have an hour, 60 minutes, to take off. So, that's when they will usually call. They're like, oh, we're about to take off or take off in five minutes, and then they're up in the air.
Q. Now, here in Honolulu, that's different, then?
A. Honolulu, 30 minutes.
Q. Okay.
A. Just because the pilot and medical crew stays in the hangar and the planes are right there, a lot of times the outer island people, they either respond from home or respond from a like a crew house, which is not near the planes. It's away from the hangars.
Q. Okay. That helps. Thank you. So, you texted pilot, he texted you back. And then you said, forgive me, it was 50 minutes or something like that later he called you?
A. Yes.
Q. And so, when he called you, what did -- what did he say? Help me understand what he was saying.
A. Basically, was saying, hey, it's Brian, we're ready to go. I said, okay. And he gave me his flight plan. You know, three

souls on board, his fuel amount, his ETA, his -- you know, how long his flight would be, his highest obstacle, he's flying IFR, and then his cruising altitude. And I said, okay, you're released (indiscernible) to end of the conversation. And then I don't know if you guys been in the dispatch center, but there is a TV on the left side that, like we use Sky Web that tracks the planes so we can see when they take off. Yeah.

Q. So, you follow the flight, then, when it's enroute.

A. Yeah. So, we know, like when they take off and then went to, like to the hospital, we'll be bedside at this time or what time to tell an ambulance to meet our crew kind of thing.

Q. Does he have to turn in to you any, you know, how they're feeling, any risk assessments or anything like that?

A. Oh, sorry. On their flight plan, there is also a risk number. They do their -- I'm not 100 percent sure how they do it on their side. But I can't remember -- I don't -- I can't remember what his risk was. But they do tell us a risk number. And I think it changed now. But I think at that time it was -- I can't really remember what the number was, but they do tell us a risk number. So, it's in, like our computer system before they take off.

Q. Just general terms, what kind of risk numbers do you, do you typically hear or see?

A. Normally a one or two.

Q. And that's -- one's good, two's good?

A. Yeah. Yeah. I think now if it's above a four or if it's a four, they have to call their PMOC (ph.) or chief pilot to say like, okay, are we okay to fly because the risk is too high.
Q. Have you heard any fours or above?
A. I have not.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. All right. Do you know how big that scale is? Is a one to four, one to five?
A. I think, now, it's a one to five. It used to be like a 1 to 17. I can't remember when it changed. I can't remember if it changed before the crash or after. That part I can't -- I don't remember.
Q. That's okay. Perfect. So, he called you. He gave you his number, whatever the number was. I'm guessing it didn't seem abnormal.
A. Uh-uh.
Q. Okay. What if he would have said it was a four? Just using the term for, you know, what's in current place? I don't remember what was there at the time, but what if he would have said it's a four?
A. We would ask, oh, did you call PMOC? And he would either say yes or no. And if he says no, oh, you have to call PMOC, make sure you get approval to fly. It's kind of -- or sometimes if it is a higher number, most times it's because pilots are just flying

the whole night. And they'll say, oh, I already called PMOC. We're good to go.

Q. Have you ever had a pilot text you, okay, that they're going to take the assignment and they call you and say, yeah, we've -- we're down or we're not flying it for whatever reason. Have you ever had that happen?

A. Yes. And it can include like something's wrong with the plane that they've noticed or sometimes, you know, pilots are like, you know, I'm just, I'm too tired. I can't fly. I'm fatigued. I'm like, okay, that's fine. Just let -- they just have to advise their Kaleo, the chief pilot, that they're fatigued out.

Q. Is that just the pilots to do that or does the medical crew --

A. So, the medical crews, they have timeouts, and they just advise us, oh, we're timing out after this, starting this time for this long. And they have mandatory. So, they can't do flights for more than 16 hours. Like they can't be consistently working for more than 16 hours. Once they hit that 16-hour mark, they have to time out, go into rest for 10 hours.

Q. So, when a medical crew goes into rest for 10 hours in Maui, just for instance, is there another crew to cover them or how does that work and -- from your world?

A. Yeah. So, there is a basic -- I mean, do you guys know where all the bases are in Hawaii?

Q. I think I know where some are, but I wouldn't guarantee I know them all.
A. So, there's one in Kauai, a fixed wing. There's a crew in Honolulu, crew in Maui. There is a crew in Molokai. But that base is not normally staffed. There's a rotor in Kona, a fixed wing in Waimea, and fixed wing in Hilo. So, for example, if a crew in Maui times out, you know, the medical crew is timed out and we get a call out of Maui, we would just send someone from off base to pick up a patient from there.
Q. So, when the medic medical crew times out the pilot doesn't fly either, or --
A. We can still use the pilot. There are times where a pilot -- or if there's a crew, kind of like with our situation now, since our staffing is still kind of -- a lot of our planes are down right now, sometimes we'll have, for example, a pilot in Honolulu, but no pilot in Maui, but there is a Maui crew in Maui. We can send a pilot from another island to pick up a crew from another island and then send them on a flight. So we can, like, pair them up from different islands.
Q. And do you have that ability to do that or do you have to go up a level or up to your --
A. We have that ability. And if a pilot thinks that that's too many legs for him, they can always decline.
Q. All righty. So, back to the accident flight. You said they were going from where they were down to -- forgive me, I don't

remember the name of the island, but they were going to a destination. And then from that destination, after they picked up the patient, where were they going to go?

A. Come to Honolulu. They were supposed to come to Honolulu.

Q. Okay, so help me -- I'm just trying to figure it out. You have a crew in Honolulu. Is there a reason they didn't go pick up the patient and come back?

A. So, I think that night particularly, I can't remember, like, I just know I only had a Honolulu crew available and a Maui crew available. I think everyone else was either timed out or they're at their mandatory already. It was one of those, you know, I just didn't have much people. And Honolulu, they have like the quickest takeoff time. They take 30 minutes to take off and they can go anywhere. Also, since Kauai was timed out, they -- I typically like to try and hold Honolulu if I have to for any Kauai flights. And Maui is like really close to Waimea. So, they're like right next to each other. It's only like a 30-minute flight. So, I sent the Maui crew.

Q. That helps me because now that I know where it was coming, I just wanted to make sure -- it makes, it make sense to me. So, I appreciate that. So, the pilot called once he got to the plane, said he was ready to go, gave you the number. From what you can recall, did it sound -- anything sound abnormal? Everything sound normal? Kind of help me understand what you heard, besides just his words.

A. Just normal. Nothing out of the ordinary that would make me think anything.
Q. Do you ever know if the airplane's got some kind of a mechanical, a deferral, something's not working on it, but it can still fly. Do you ever -- re you ever aware of that?
A. So, we have this, like, aircraft status board that has all, like, you know, the aircrafts and there is aircraft that's, oh, you know, there's a MEL on it, but there's no flight restrictions. And each aircraft has like a little note that -- so we are advised of it. Yeah.
Q. Excellent. So, was that the last communication you had with the pilot?
A. Yes.
Q. Could he call you in the air?
A. So, we have -- we do have a radio, but normally from Maui to the big island, the radio communication is not the best. And we do have a satellite phone that we have it just it doesn't work very well sometimes. We always try to test it, but it doesn't work the best. But normally, once they're past Maui, that radio -- we don't normally -- can't pick up anything if we try to reach out.
Q. Have you ever had crews call you in-flight?
A. Yes. So, normally, any time a crew is coming into Honolulu, the pilot will always advise they are 20 minutes out on the radio. Just say, oh, 20 minutes out. That's it.

Q. But they don't ever call you like, hey, we're diverting to another airport going somewhere else because whatever? Do they call you and let you know that?
A. They -- sometimes the pilots will text. But also, a lot of times, normally a pilot -- or at least the airports -- there's like (indiscernible) the big island -- north of the big island. And in Kona, Waimea always has like a lot of weather there. And sometimes the pilots will say, oh, if we can't get into there, then we'll divert to Kona. And as a dispatcher, we kind of like watch. And once we notice them starting to turn and say, okay, yeah, they're going to Kona. And normally the dispatchers, we try not to text the pilot, we will text the medical crew because we don't want to bother him flying. And we'll ask, are you guys going to Kona, or if we have anything that we want to ask the pilot, we can't get through the radio, we'll text the medical crew, can you ask the pilot this?
Q. So, just for the record, I have to ask, did you text the pilot or the medical crew that night? Any response?
A. I texted them. I texted the medical crew after I got the call from air traffic, but no response. I just asked, you know, are you guys okay?
Q. And you didn't hear from the medical crew prior to that either, I mean, other than them accepting the assignment?
A. Yeah, no.
Q. All right. So, you said, you know, they're getting ready to

take off. How quickly does their flight pop up on your, on your screen downstairs after -- I mean, do you pick them up pretty quickly?

A. Yeah. I mean, you can see all the aircraft. They're orange when they're on the ground. So, there's still a tag. As soon as it turns blue, that means they're airborne.

Q. All right. And how many flights do you have up at once? On that night -- let's just take that night, for instance. Did you have the Honolulu crew up as well, or --

A. They were up and available. They weren't flying.

Q. So, you just had just that one plane up flying, then?

A. I had that plane flying. There was the Hilo crew with the Hilo pilot here in Honolulu that dropped off a patient. And then there was a Kapiolani flight. So, we have a CAP team, or we pick up the CAP team, which they do the neonatal PICUs and NICUs, you know, that deal with the babies and stuff. And in Honolulu, we always have two pilots that operate that. So, we have a hangar pilot, and we have two CAP pilots, a PIC and a SIC. And every time Kapiolani calls, they'll say, oh, we have a baby or a pediatric or kid out wherever which island. And then the pilots will come in and we take the Kapiolani team to that island. And so that night there was a CAP team there picking up a baby in -- out in Kauai. So, they were already in Kauai when the accident went on. And whenever, like, an accident like this -- I mean, it's never happened before -- but we don't -- we continue any

current flights going on. So, the CAP flight was going on. We finished it, but we don't page anybody or dispatch any more flights. We can take, you know, information from hospitals, but we're not allowed to dispatch anybody. Everyone is pretty much grounded at this point. And so, the Hilo crew that was here, they never went -- they never flew back home, back to Hilo, they commercialed [sic] the next day.

Q. Was that, was that night, was it a normal busyness for you guys? Was it excessively busy? Kind of help me understand the night itself.

A. No, it wasn't, it wasn't busy. I think that day it might have been busy because a lot of crews were timed out already. But that night, no, it wasn't, it wasn't crazy or anything. It was a pretty relaxed, lax on call volume at that time.

Q. Okay, perfect. That helps. Thank you. So, did you see the -- go back to the accident flight now. They called, they departed. Did you see them pop up or, I'm sorry, turn blue?

A. Yes.

Q. At what point did they -- I know you said the air traffic control called you. Do you remember looking up to the screen to see if you could see them?

A. Yeah. So, they were right off of Maui and their tag just -- it just stood still. It didn't move. It was kind of like just stuck on the screen.

Q. All right. Did you relay that info to anybody?

A. No. I mean, all the managers were in the office within like 15 minutes from when I told them, but I knew like, they could either -- if they're, you know, still flying, they would either have landed at Waimea, diverted to Kona, or turned back and went back to Maui, you know. And by then, like 30 minutes later, they still haven't heard anything. And air traffic control never did call back. So, it was kind of -- I mean, you know --

Q. All right. So, you got the call from air traffic control. I just want you to kind of walk me through a little bit after you got that call, what you, what you did. Was it a policy or something you just thought needed to be done? Kind of help me walk through what occurred.

A. It's a policy. It's called a PIAP event, post incident accident plan. And there is this online, like, website that we use. It's called an Everbridge (ph.), and it fills -- you fill out what type of aircraft it is, or which aircraft it is, where they're going, if there's a patient on board, if they're still in flight. And we just click send and it shoots out to the managers. And then when that did happen, my boss called me Kevin Richard, just asked if I was okay. I said, yeah, I'm fine. He said, okay, I'm going to try to call the medical crew. And then within 15 minutes they were all in the office. And I know Kaleo was -- the chief pilot was talking to air traffic control at the time, asking, you know, what happened or what was their last altitude and stuff like that. But as far as my job goes, we just -- we

don't take any more flights. Everyone is grounded at that point.
Q. Is that a standard policy, though, to ground everybody?
A. Yes. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So, how do you -- so for your job after that, then obviously you had to notify the hospitals or --
A. Or so the managers notified the hospitals. I didn't do that. And as far as like the whole -- our fleet, like all of the other medical crews, I -- you know, they're not aware of what's going on. We don't tell them. And if they do call in -- because I did have, you know, other pilots from other bases call asking what happened. But I just tell them, you know, I'm not I'm not supposed to tell you, you'll have to hang up. They just -- they understand. They said, okay. And that's kind of -- we don't -- even though they're -- even the Hilo crew that was here on that night, they had no idea what was -- I'm sure they had an idea something was going on, but they didn't know what was -- what happened.
Q. All right. I got one last question for now, and then I'll pass it around to Sabrina next. But in your mind, after -- you hope nobody ever has to go through an event like this again, but is this -- did the plan that was in place, from your perspective, work well? Could there have been something done differently?
A. I don't think so. I mean, all -- I mean, once the managers are aware of everything and we don't send anybody anywhere, I think, I think it's good.

Q. Now, you said, I don't think so. I don't think so that it worked well, that there could be something done differently. Help me understand what --

A. I don't think, I don't think there could have been anything done differently that would have made it better or more efficient.

Q. All right. Well, thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Do you need a break or anything? You doing all right? I'll let Sabrina --

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. All right, thank you, Zoey. So far, you've been great. You are incredibly knowledgeable. This is a great wealth of experience for us. And you said you've only been doing this for ten years. So, out of curiosity, did you do something similar for another company before?

A. I've been doing it for like ten months.

Q. I did say ten years. I'm sorry. I meant ten months.

A. I was a ground dispatcher for AMR, American Medical Response, for about like eight months. I started in -- sorry, October of 2021, and then I left August of 2022. I was a dispatcher there.

Q. So, did you -- when you came to here to Hawaii Life Flight, did you -- did they train you?

A. Yes.

Q. Or did they send you somewhere to be trained?

A. No. They trained me here.

Q. And a part of that, presumably, were these kind of emergency

action, like what happens in the event of --
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. But as you said, this is the first time that you've seen it run through, and that you've had to experience it directly. Okay. Just curious about that, because, like I said, very, very knowledgeable. So, when a flight is dispatched, I guess, presumably, it's the hospitals that are making the determination as to when it needs to go?
A. As soon as they get an accepting doctor and room at the accepting hospital, they'll call us and activate it.
Q. But I guess what is your -- like you had a word for -- I forgot what you called -- for like the most urgent of patients --
A. Early activation.
Q. -- the early activation. What are the other tiers of levels of how -- what's the hierarchy for how soon the patient needs to be moved?
A. Yeah. So, I mean, we -- before the crash, we never did triaging. We never did move patients around or divert any planes depending on the patient's condition. As soon as we get a call, we just send whoever can get there the fastest. Whatever is going to be the most efficient, we just send somebody. And for example, if I don't have anybody, even though it's an early activation flight, you know, we advise the hospitals like we don't have anybody right now, even if the ETA is going to be like 14 hours. The hospital just either they just have to take it kind of thing.

Q. But I guess what I'm trying to ask is do the hospitals have like a ranking system and do they tell you, do they communicate with you, this patient is -- okay, early activation, we know that that's pretty much as soon as possible right now. What are the other -- are there other levels after that to where like, okay, it's cool if you can get to this in a day or so many hours.
A. No, there's no tiers or they don't -- we just give them an ETA. And because there's no other flight company right now, they just -- they have to accept it. I mean, yeah --
Q. So, I guess what I'm getting to is then, what makes it so that we want this patient moved overnight versus waiting to next morning?
A. So, we -- I mean, we don't ever wait for anything, even if it's just like a not critical, like, for example, psych patient. We will still send somebody that's available as soon as possible. Whatever we have, we just try to get the flights done as soon as possible. Try to knock it out as they come. But there's never -- there was never an order to do it in. If there is, for example, patients that are coming out of the same hospital that they're coming out at the same time, the hospital can be like, oh, we want this patient out first instead of this one. But we always went in the order that they come in and they never -- they don't -- they just give us the diagnosis and there's not really a tier of anything, or like, oh, this one is like really critical or not. Yeah.

Q. So, regardless of the patient's acuity [sic], essentially, you're -- if you have it, you're going to dispatch it.
A. Yes.
Q. And again, that's regardless of time of day.
A. Yes.
Q. And for the patient information, I know you said that you pass on to the pilot, like, you know, this is where you're going and, you know, the patient weight, and that's kind of it. And then the medics receive quite a bit more information about the patient. So, are you also passing on that information to the medics?
A. Yes.
Q. But in a separate text?
A. In a separate text.
Q. So, is that patient information kept anywhere? Is it archived?
A. Yes, it's in our, in our CAD system that keeps track of all the flights. So, everything that we -- all the folks that we do, it's all kept. And you can search up any flight that you want.
Q. Can you help me with that acronym? CAD, C-A-D-S?
A. C-A-D.
Q. C-A-D? What does that stand for?
A. To be honest, I don't know.
Q. Okay. That's fine. Most of the acronyms in my life are the same way. Okay. So, but so they are archived and kept somewhere.

A. Yes.
Q. So, if we wanted to look up this particular flight, we could do so.
A. Yes.
Q. Thank you. So, moving to that -- kind of that information passing, you're kind of communicating on two fronts. So, you're giving a specific set of information to the pilot, which is a different -- is different than the set of information giving to the medics.
A. So, the medics still get the same text as a pilot just in addition to the patient information.
Q. I see. Okay. So, as far as you know, outside of the weight of the patient, unless there's a communication between the medics and the pilot, the pilot is unaware of what's actually going on with the patient.
A. Yes.
Q. Working it around here, I know that you have a place for the crews to stay when they're, when they're waiting and they're on call here. Do you kind of get to have those cooler side conversations? Do you run into the pilots and the medics at all around this area?
A. Yes.
Q. Did you ever, like, meet or get to interact with the pilot, Brian, from this flight?
A. Yes.

Q. I guess first impressions. What was he like personality wise?
A. I didn't know him that well. He was more -- he was quiet. He didn't really talk, like, have much conversation every time he came in here because we would see all the crews, even if they're on a different island. Every time they would come into the hangar, they would always, you know, talk story, the dispatchers. Brian, though, he didn't really talk much. He kind of just kept to himself, type of person. Yeah.
Q. So, you didn't have any impressions as to kind of what his personality or what his general mood was like?
A. Not really. He was, he was a really nice guy, if that helps at all. He wasn't, you know, rude or didn't get any bad feelings from him at all. I just didn't really know him that well.
Q. Understood. Did you happen to see how he interacted with other crews that were around here? And crews, I'm kind of using that as an all-inclusive of other pilots and other medics.
A. Not really. No. That's all right.
Q. And then typically when those off island crews come here, how long are they here for before they go back to where they actually live?
A. So, it depends. If a medical crew comes here and they have to go in bedside to the hospital, you know, that could take an hour. If the ambulance that is picking them up can just take the patient and our crew doesn't need to go into the hospital, then

they could be here just for like about half an hour. Soon as their fuel -- plane is fueled, you know, they can go back to their base.

Q. And that's presumably they're essentially dead legging back to the base.

A. Dead-legging, unless I send them somewhere else. Yes.

Q. Exactly. You talked about that night itself, you know, it wasn't like super busy. I guess, for you, what constitutes busy? Like how many call outs in a day where you feel like, okay, I was run off my feet today? That was a lot.

A. I mean, I think the most busiest night I had was -- I think I did maybe like five to six calls, like from start to finish and going into like the daytime, like passing on to my reliever, there were still like eight pending flights that needed to be done. And it was really busy when Life Save (indiscernible) went out because we were getting all the calls. And then I think by that time we were doing like almost 20 flights a day. Yeah.

Q. And so now has it evened out a bit since then, or --

A. Yeah. For some reason, it it's not as busy as it used to be when that company went out of, out of service or stopped being a company.

Q. What are the schedules like for the dispatch side of things? What are your hours and shifts and how do you move? Like, I know how the pilots and how the medics kind of move around, but --

A. Yeah, the dispatchers work -- the day shift is 7:00 to 19:00,

and then overnight it's 19:00 to 7:00, just two shifts every single day. And then the two night dispatchers, which is me and this other dispatcher named Marie (ph.), so she works every Sunday, Monday, Tuesday. I work Wednesday, Thursday, Friday, and we switch off Saturdays.

Q. Oh, okay.

A. The day dispatchers are different because two of our dispatchers are only part time. So, they kind of decide like what days they can work amongst themselves. Malcolm (ph.), he's another dispatcher. He works four days a week. And then the two part timers cover the other three days of the week during the day shift.

Q. So, at most it's typically four days on three days off for most of the --

A. For the most part.

Q. -- dispatchers. Except for the part timers.

A. Yeah.

Q. And so, you were -- you said you were at night. Do you ever move to day?

A. There were times that I moved to day, if the day dispatcher for whatever reason, oh, can you cover my shift? But it's not, it's not frequent. And I don't ever -- I think I've only worked day shift maybe two times since I've been here, but I'm solely overnight.

Q. Out of curiosity, is that your preference?

A. I don't mind working overnight. I was an overnight dispatcher at AMR, but I was -- I'm the newest dispatcher, so of course, you know, I get that shift.
Q. Exactly. That was my next question. Is that because it's based on seniority?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. So, I guess looking forward, is there opportunity for you to move shifts in the future, if you get more dispatchers in?
A. Yes, there is -- I know my boss also wants to make a midnight shift from 12:00 to midnight to maybe try and have two people in the dispatch center just for one extra person there in case it gets busy.
Q. Understood. So, going back to kind of the scheduling of things and, you know, how busy it gets, have there been any policies -- I know you've only been here for two months, but have there been any like policy or efficiency changes based on that traffic volume that you have that you've experienced in the last ten months?
A. No.
Q. So, you're still doing things exactly as you did ten months ago?
A. Not after the crash. After the crash happened, we do triaging now. So, we do have a medical control doctor that's on call. And for example, if we have, like patients from different islands or from the same hospital, all coming in at the same time

-- and right now, we don't have that many assets up because most of our planes are out of service right now. We ask the medical control doctor, which patient needs to go out first?

Q. Okay, so out of all of the -- sorry, where is that person housed?

A. I think they're just at home.

Q. Okay. So, essentially, are they getting the same list of patients you are and then they're letting you know, okay, this one first, that one next. Or do you get all the patients in, and then you have to have that conversation with the doctor?

A. Yes. I get all the patient info from the hospitals and then I call the medical control doctor. I'm basically like, hey, I have a patient coming from here with this diagnosis, this equipment. And I also have a patient coming out of here, this equipment. They are like, okay, yeah, send this one out first or this one needs to go out first. Or sometimes they might call the hospital to get more information to see which patient is more critical. And then they'll call us back and let us know.

Q. And that's only been in place since the accident?

A. Since the accident happened.

Q. So, in your opinion, do you think that's a result of the accident itself, or is it a result of the fact that you lost an asset and now you have less to work with?

A. Yes, I think it's the result of we don't have much assets up now. We only have a little to work with.

Q. So, as your assets come back up, do you think that that position will go away?
A. I don't know.
Q. Okay. Just curious. So, the medical consult is determining which patient you might be moving first, but it's still as soon as you can --
A. Yes
Q. -- at any time of the day.
A. And for example, if I'm sending a crew like, for example, Honolulu, I'm sending them to Maui for a patient. And I got a like an early activation call out of Kona that needs to go out that's more critical, we can always divert that plane to go to a different hospital.
Q. While they're up?
A. While they're in air. And we can either reach them through the radio, tell the pilot, oh, I need you to divert here, or we'll text the medical crew, can you tell your pilot they need -- you need to divert.
Q. Okay. And then you also coordinate with the hospital who's now not getting a crew coming in?
A. Yeah. Pretty much.
Q. Wow. There's a lot of moving parts here. Okay. Okay. I think that's it for me for now. Thank you. I got to digest some stuff and move on.
MR. ETCHER: And. Are you doing okay? You need a break?

MS. STREADBECK: I'm good.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. So, when you, when you call a crew to accept a flight, walk me through what happens when they say no for any given reason.

A. I've never had that with a crew yet.

Q. Sorry. I mean, the pilot.

A. Pilot? Okay. Yeah, I just say okay. I don't -- normally they'll say, like, why. I don't think I've ever had an incident where a pilot was just like, no, I'm not going to do that. Normally it's because they're fatigued. I just say, okay, sounds good, did you call PMOC? They just said, yeah, I'll call him, and I say, okay, sounds good. And then I just don't use them for the rest of the night.

Q. Okay. And then what do you do with that call?

A. Either -- so I'll just send it to the next, to the next crew that's available. Or if I don't have anybody that night, the calls is going to have to wait till I have someone available. Sorry. I mean, things has changed since, like after the crash. Like now after the crash, when I page out a crew for any flight -- or actually we call the pilot first for a flight, say, oh, they're going from here to here, can you check weather? They check the weather advisories. Oh, weather is good. Okay. And then we text them the who the medical crew is, and they'll contact the medical crew and ask them, are you guys good for this flight? We're going

from here to here. I don't know exactly what goes on in that conversation. I think there's like a preflight briefing list that they have now. And the pilots are just like asking everybody, are you guys good to fly kind of thing? And then the pilot will call us back. Okay, we're good for the flight. And then I send out the information and they implemented this after the crash.

Q. And why do you think they implemented those changes?

A. I think one of the biggest reasons is I think some of the medical crew members were, you know, scared to fly again. So, they want to make sure that they're good, mentally ready. And I think they want to, you know, hire -- or sorry, not hire. How do I say this? I guess just make sure we make sure everything is good and in place and like put more steps before accepting a flight into place to, I guess, lessen the risk of any flight that might go on.

Q. Was an explanation given to from management or anything of why these changes were made?

A. No, they just said this is how we're going to do it.

Q. They just told you that's how we're going to do it. And then, and then you're thinking that that's just to add more steps. And those steps -- how does adding steps help?

A. I think it's just because before we, you know, the pilots and the medical crews never did check in with each other. They would just meet at the plane kind of thing. I guess now the medical crews can also be sure that the pilot is good to go. They're not

tired or anything like that. It's just that extra step of safety, in my opinion.

Q. You had mentioned, what's the call up time in Maui once the pilot is notified? How soon until they have to take off?

A. One hour.

Q. One hour. Okay. Let's say that there is a pilot in Maui. Have you ever had them not take off in an hour? Has that ever been the case that they haven't been able to make the call out time?

A. I haven't had that. I mean, it may be like an hour and five minutes or -- but I've never had something drastically like an hour and a half or anything like that.

Q. Okay. So, when they're over that hour, so it's an hour and five minutes or something, is there anything you have to do?

A. I don't know, to be honest. I've never been advised that we have to --

Q. You don't have to document it or anything or --

A. We do document in our calls. So, the system that we use that, you know, we take all the patient information, and we assign it to a unit, there's like notes that, you know, you can notate anything. And of course, we have to update the hospital of their arrival time.

Q. Okay. So, that's never been a problem then, where the pilots are like not showing up on time or something like that.

A. No.

Q. Okay. You'd mentioned that, like now there's triage happening where we're prioritizing. But before, when we were -- there wasn't a long list, there was none of that. It's just like once you get a call, you do it as soon as possible. Do you know why that is? Like, why there's not a prioritization of like, for example, with this flight that we're talking about the accident. Like, do you know why there's not, hey, can this wait till morning?

A. No, there was never -- I mean, they never did advise me that we would do it that way or there was never prioritization of flights.

Q. And the hospital never says anything about that, like, hey, we don't need this flight till 8:00 a.m.?

A. No.

Q. Or this flight can wait if needed or --

A. No.

Q. It's just always call and go?

A. Yeah, they always want their patient out as soon as possible, regardless of how critical or not it is.

Q. And do you know why that is, of why they want to go -- is there any reason that you know of that they would go just immediately if resources are available instead of --

A. Most times it's because either that hospital, their beds are getting full or their ER is really full, like we need patients out because we can't really take much patients in most times. And

every time they're sending a patient to another hospital, it's because they can't do whatever the majority bigger hospitals in Honolulu can. Yeah.

Q. So, that -- the patient that was there in Waimea, you know, there was no -- this flight didn't make it to pick them up and the fleet was grounded, so no one else was sent to pick them up. Do you know what happened to that patient?

A. Either that patient ended up getting transported to, I think, Hilo Medical Center. I didn't, I didn't talk to them or ask what happened. I also didn't call the hospital to tell them, hey, we're not going to pick up your patient tonight because, honestly, I didn't know what to say. So, Kevin Richard, my boss, he actually, he communicated with them.

Q. Okay. But that patient, you think that patient was transported to Hilo Medical Center(indiscernible)?

A. That patient was transported.

Q. To Hilo Medical?

A. Yeah.

Q. You had mentioned there's some flights that are operated within SIC.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Tell me more about that.

A. So, those are Kapiolani transport flights. So, the CAP team, we call them the CAP team, they're the nurses out of Kapiolani Medical Center, and they handle mostly NICUs, which is like the

neonatal babies that are first born that our crews can't take or any pediatric patients that for whatever reason, the doctors at the hospital want the KAP team to take. So, the CAP team will call us, say, hey, we have a kid or a baby out of this hospital. Say, okay, sounds good. And before the crash, we would, you know, okay, sounds good. And we would always have at least two planes in Honolulu just in case we got a Kapiolani flight. And there's always a PIC and SIC on duty for the KAP flights. We page them out, just text them the pilot information, which is, you know, flight number, the hospitals, the baby's weight. If it's a NICU or PICU, because the NICUs, they have isolate. You know, it's heavy. Yeah.

Q. Yeah. Tell me about that difference between NICU and PICU.

A. So, NICU is a neonatal so they're like babies, a PICU is a pediatric, so like kids. Yeah.

Q. Understood.

A. And most neonatal need to isolate. It's like a, you know, that big thing that has the babies inside. And then we text the pilots and we also advise what team members of the CAP team are going, because there's only a certain crew that takes all these flights so they can know the body weight and then the pilots have 30 minutes to get into the hangar and, you know, they get the plane ready, whatnot. The CAP team arrives, and they take off.

Q. Why are there two pilots with these flights?

A. From what I know is that we have a contract with Kapiolani,

and they want two pilots operating their flights.
Q. So, you understand that the contract requires two pilots?
A. Yes. Yes, there is -- it always needs two pilots.
Q. And that's not the case anywhere else?
A. No.
Q. And do you know, these SICs, are they the -- are they also PICs? Like, can --
A. They're solely SICs.
Q. Okay. They can't switch seats like as in sometimes they're not assigned to a PIC shift and sometimes they're assigned SICs?
A. So, we do have SIC pilots that are solely SIC. But for example, if an SIC calls out that night, we can always pair up two PICs together if we need to, or we can, even if we have a Honolulu pilot here, we can bring another pilot, another PIC from off base and bring them here to do the flight as well. Sometimes a Kapiolani transport team will have two calls, like already know, you know, our CAP team is on this flight. Can you guys do another one? And if not, then they'll just wait till that first one is done.
Q. Why do you think the contract requires two pilots?
A. I don't know.
Q. You don't know?
A. No.
Q. In your opinion, have any changes been made since the accident that would that, in your opinion, would prevent an

accident like this from happening again?
A. I think the whole -- the pilot -- first off, we make sure that the pilot checks the weather before they take a flight, because we never did that before. That's, you know, an extra step. And just, I think the crew checking with the pilot is positive, a positive thing that happened or change that happened after the crash. But as far as changes, I think that's the only things that really did change is that. And as far as also triaging, seeing which patients is more critical, that's kind of the only change that was implemented.
Q. Do you feel like the triage change might prevent an accident like this in the future?
A. No.
Q. And do you feel like the other change you're mentioning might prevent, like, an accident like this in the future or.
A. I'm sorry. Oh, prevent? Yes, I think it would prevent an accident. Like the whole medical crew checking in with the pilot. I think it's a preventative strategy or implementation.
Q. Thank you.
A. Yeah.
BY MS. HILL:
Q. Do dispatchers -- or do you ever check the weather before reaching out to a pilot?
A. No.
Q. Like, if you know the weather now is awful, you still send

the info and let them --
A. They will decide. Yes.
Q. Do you check the dead legs on your flight tracker? Do you check the flights going back or did they give you their flight plan, ETA fuel, all that stuff on the dead legs, too?
A. Yes. And we still, we still track them. So, on our TCS system, every time they take off, we have a button that says depart. Every time they land, we have a button that says arrive. So, everything is, like, timestamped.
Q. Do you -- you said they give you the highest obstacle in route, do you have that information in the dispatch center?
A. Yes.
Q. So, you check it and make sure that that matches that they didn't say it's 1,800 feet, and you say actually, it's 2,300.
A. Oh, sorry about that. No, we don't double check. We just take what the pilot gives us.
Q. Do the hospitals ever pressure you as a dispatcher or do they -- if you, if you have to decline a call because you don't have a crew, are they calling back saying, do you have one now, do you have, you know, we need to get this patient out or --
A. Yes. All the time.
Q. Really?
A. Yeah.
Q. Do they train you for that or tell you how to deal with that?
A. Not really. I wasn't trained to do that. Especially now

since after the crashes, you know, we don't have as much assets or ETAs might be really, really long. And most hospitals now, they understand why, but they do, like, you know, oh, do you have an ETA? Do you have ETA? Oh, well, why aren't you guys coming? Why aren't you guys available? You know, they'll ask. As far as my response is always, I'm sorry, I don't have anybody right now, and we're not allowed to say the reason. Like, we can't say, oh, this crew is timed out for this long, this plane is down. You know, we just say, I don't have anybody available right now. This is my estimated ETA. If anything changes, I'll for sure, you know, give you a call back.

MS. HILL: All right. Thanks.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. You doing good? You need a break?

A. I'm good.

Q. Usually, we go around two rounds because we all have just a few follow up questions, but it's always a whole lot less time. So, you're almost done with this. I'm sitting here listening to all you do, thinking -- I just picture you juggling flaming swords all the time. How exactly do you guys manage that? I mean, how were you trained to deal with all -- I mean, I'm sitting here listening to all you do, and I'm in awe. So, kind of help me understand how you guys do that.

A. So, I mean, to be honest, there's more downtime than anything in the dispatch center. There are times like, for example, the

phones won't stop ringing, but it's only for like a little amount of time or some, you know, maybe 20 minutes, the phones won't stop ringing. I'm like, oh, my gosh, it's going on. But it's never like that the full 12 hours. There's way more downtime than anything. Yeah.

Q. Because I was going to say, if you had 12 hours of doing all this all the time, right, you're a better person than I could ever be. So, I was impressed. But did they train you how to do this? What kind of training? Let me ask that. What kind of training did you have to kind of do all that you do?

A. So, the first days of training, of course, is introducing, you know, what the bases are, where each fixed wing is, their response times, and then introducing, you know, our TCS system, as far as, you know, what information, patient information we have to take. And then just like, you know, the step-by-step process of what we do as far as paging out a flight. And then later on training gets into, you know, the whole PIAP event, what we have to do when that happens, and then just like being creative with crews and pilots on how to be most efficient. And I think that just comes with, you know, doing the job, a lot. It becomes really simple and easy.

Q. I'm impressed. So, just know that. What is a PIAP event?

A. PIAP.

Q. PIAP? What is

A. Post incident accident plan.

Q. All righty. Excellent. Do you make the decision, or how is the decision made on do you dispatch a helicopter or a fixed wing, or is there any decisions ever made?
A. So, the fixed wing is -- stays in Kona. And for the rotor there, even before the accident there, the way that we dispatch them, the only thing that was different was we always had to call the pilot, I have a flight from here to here, can you check the weather? And then they would advise, oh, yeah, we can take it just because, you know, the flight minimums are different from a fixed wing and a rotor. But with the rotor, we -- typically we wouldn't send them all the way across the state to Kauai. It's really pretty far. But typically, any Kona flights, because they're based in Kona, because Kona has a helipad, so -- I mean, we can still send them. They just have a, you know, a longer flight time. We can send them just anywhere as a fixed wing. They just might need more fuel, may take more time. That's about it.
Q. Do you make that decision?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, and please correct me because I'm probably wrong, but isn't there a helicopter over in Maui?
A. So, the Maui medevac is not under us. We've only been implementing it after the crash. The governor allowed us to use it because our assets are so low. So, we never did use the Maui medevac for anything. They're not a part of our company.

Q. Oh, okay. Okay. That clarifies it. So, thank you. I don't remember who asked about diverting a flight, you know, flight's airborne and there's something more urgent. How many times have you had to divert a flight?
A. I have never had to divert a flight, like from one flight to another, but I have diverted like the dead leg going home, for example. You know, they'll come, and I'm like, no, I don't have any flights pending right now. You guys just can go back to base. Once they get in the air, I'm like, oh, no, I have -- you guys have to go here. So, that has happened a couple of times. And yeah, I would just try to reach them on the radios the first thing. It also kind of depends where they are. Like if they're way past that island, I'm like, oh, I don't want to turn them around, you know, or I'll just text a medical crew, hey, can you tell your pilot I have a flight here? Can you guys divert?
Q. So -- and I just I need to -- I have to visualize things in my head for me to understand a little bit. So, you have a flight. Let's say this crew came into Honolulu that night and they were just going to dead leg back to Maui. And they get airborne, and something comes in and you divert them. Has there ever been concerns on fuel?
A. No.
Q. No? Do they, do you know, do they always just top off the fuel tanks here?
A. They always top off. The only island that -- when they're

trying to, like, for example -- I mean, as far as diversion, no, fuel is never a factor. The only time a dispatcher ever thinks about fuel is if a plane comes here and they have a flight to Molokai, will tell them like, oh, I have a flight in Molokai, make sure you don't top off. You know, they're going to have to burn fuel. Or, for example, if I have a Hilo based crew and I'm -- they're the only ones up, and like, I have a flight in Kauai. They have to come to Honolulu first, fuel up and then go to Kauai. But as far as diversion, fuel is never an issue.

Q. All right. Perfect. Just for my education. How many passengers -- or patients can you actually put on an aircraft at once?

A. One.

Q. Just one?

A. One, and if it's a -- we do a lot of riders. Most times it's either a parent, a caregiver, or a translator, and only one rider is allowed.

Q. And that's policy or is that -- is there a reason it's only one.

A. I think it's policy. I think there has been incidents where like a kid who's coming on board and they ask, like, can both parent -- I've never had it happen on my shift. But, you know, can both parents come along? And of course, we just always ask the pilot and, you know, they make the final decision. They check the weight. But we do allow riders, but we only take one patient

at a time. We never take two.
Q. Have you ever had have you ever heard or had a pilot say, no, I can't take a rider?
A. Yes.
Q. Did they have to give a reason, or they just say no?
A. Usually, it's because of weight. They don't have to give a reason, though, if they don't want to.
Q. The last question I have, and again, you've educated me more than -- I can only hope to retain just a fraction of what you have done. So, I appreciate it. I know you said ever since the event -- you've got to forgive me -- a medical doctor, triage doctor. I don't remember the term you used. Is that actually -- help me understand. Is that actually a benefit for you guys or is that just one more thing you got to go check before -- just in your own words. Your own opinion, even.
A. It's both. Sometimes my way, like I don't want to do it a certain way because I think, you know, this way is going to be more efficient. You know, the ETAs might be only like, not that far apart. Well, we should do it this way, you know? But they think, no, this patient needs to go first. Send this crew here. So, it can be challenging at times. And a lot of times the med control doctors like to check in with us. So, it's you know, it's one more extra call that we have to deal with. But it helps as far as, you know, because I don't -- you know, medical is not my -- I don't know anything medical. So, you know, if I have two

patients, I'm like, yeah, I don't know which one should go out first. That helps. That does help. That side. And these med control doctors, they were always med control doctors for the medical crews. If the medical crews had any questions, they would call that doctor. But now they're also triaging for us.

Q. All right. I lied. I said, that was my last question, but I have one more. Sorry. Can the medical doctor whatever -- forgive me, whatever term you used -- can he override your decision on where the airplane is going?

A. I have to be honest; I don't know. It's like -- most times I'd say, okay, yeah, sounds good. Obviously, you know, we want to get -- it's all about patient care. This patient needs to go. It sounds good. But as far as over -- I mean, because before the crash happened, we call it operational control, like the dispatchers have a say in everything and no one can override us on what we say. It feels different now, obviously, with the med control doctors. And I've never asked I don't really know where that line stands.

Q. Excellent. I appreciate it. Thank you so much.

MR. ETCHER: Sabrina.

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. I really just have one more question, and that is, have you heard of -- well, I guess it's depending on your answer -- I have one more question. Have you heard of a Baldwin report?

A. Yes.

Q. Have you -- I guess first, give me a quick explanation in your own words, of what that is.
A. So, a Baldwin report from my understanding, you can report anything that you think needs to be -- or given attention to. Also, every time we do an Everbridge, we have to do a Baldwin follow up as well.
Q. So, that is something that dispatchers are able to use as well?
A. Yes.
Q. And have you ever done one?
A. Yes.
Q. What would be the sort of thing that a dispatcher would use a Baldwin report for? You don't have to tell me about your exact one if you don't want to.
A. Anything that we think, at least for me, that interferes with safety or interferes with like how things are being ran. Anything that I think is like changing or making it hard to dispatch or be efficient, I think a Baldwin is good to write it because it's going to, you know, get attention to it. Manager will seek it out and -- yeah.
Q. Do you know where it goes when you submit it?
A. No.
Q. Okay. But, you know, in your past experience, that it has gotten a response.
A. Yes. Every Baldwin I've written, I've always gotten a

response.
Q. Okay. About how long does that take? Days or --
A. Yeah, a day.
Q. Oh, okay. So, fairly quickly.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And do you know where those are stored and are they archived as well as some of your other reports?
A. I think they are archived in the Baldwin's. I think they keep every report that's written.
Q. Okay. Yeah. Okay. All right. Thank you. Again, That's all I have.
BY MR. GARRISON:
Q. The Baldwin reports are -- the ones that you filed, are they safety related?
A. They are safety related, but it can be about anything. So, but as dispatchers, we don't - there's not much safety that we do because we don't, you know, deal with any planes issues or anything like that or medical stuff. But it is like a safety, I guess, related report.
Q. We were talking about hospitals calling and saying, hey, can you get this, or we need it now. We already called once, you know, when are you going to do this? And telling you -- I'm assuming they're telling you about the status of the patient, too. Do they ever tell you like whether, like, if it's trending worse than we need it now or anything like that?

A. Yes, it does happen.
Q. Okay. Have you ever come across a situation where that's going on and, you know, the pilots don't know this information, right. So, they can't, like, add it into like, their calculation of like of needing to go. Right?
A. Yeah.
Q. And so, like, sometimes, you know, like, how often do you feel that it's that critical that the patient needing to be moved is that critical?
A. It's not often that it happens that a doctor's, like, pressuring me, like this patient needs to go. It doesn't happen a lot. I mean, it does happen. I mean, that's one reason why we don't tell the pilots the patient information is, one, we don't want them to be like, oh, we don't want to take this. You know, we don't want them to decline a flight and we don't want them to feel pressured that they have to take a flight, you know, if they're tired.
Q. Yeah. And that's what I'm wondering, too, because I could imagine as a pilot that you would you know, you're making this decision and it's kind of like you just you -- since you don't have the information, you're just assuming that it's another normal one.
A. The only time they get like a patient info is if a patient is COVID positive, if they have to, you know, like mask up or, you know, PPE themselves. That's the only patient info that they'll

get besides the body weight.
Q. So, I could imagine as a pilot that you would that they would you know, they would just calculate it the same every time of like, well, I'm just going to look at weather, I'm going to look at this. And I mean, and if it's marginal, I'm not going, you know, because they're just assuming that it's -- or they could just assume that it's just a normal flight and the patient's just in the same situation.
A. There is, for example, the early activation flights. We do have, like, you know, in the texts, there's in parentheses, that says early activation. And they are aware of it because there's no receiving hospital. So, when they pick it up, they don't know where they're going yet. But that's the only time that --
Q. So, when they see that, they know it's more critical?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So, I mean, doesn't that go around the policy that we would just like put in place of like we don't want --
A. Yeah, we don't want to pressure them. I mean, I've never asked the pilot. I don't -- I would assume that they know what early activation is. Most times it's just a hospital doesn't have a receiving hospital, or the sending hospital doesn't have a receiving hospital yet, sometimes.
Q. Have you ever ran across a situation where the pilot's like, weather is this or that or like, and it's just like, marginal? And so, they don't really know. But you know that like the

patient's trending worse, the hospital is -- is there like any way you can communicate to the to the pilot of like, hey, this is -- if it's possible, this is important.

A. I've never done that. If it's anything is weather related, the pilot, you know, we'll check the weather and if they do say, like, hey, we can't take this flight because of weather, we have to wait an hour and the pilot will check the weather again. And we ask them again, are you guys ready to take this flight, kind of thing.

Q. All right. So, there's like no way to communicate that to the pilot?

A. No. We don't ever tell them like, hey, this patient, like, needs to go. We don't ever do that.

Q. But they might be able to figure that out because they know it's early activation.

A. They might have a sense. Yeah.

Q. So, if they know what that means -- okay. KAP team is what you called it, right?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. The KAP team, is that all King Airs, or is there rotor wing in that as well?

A. No, we only use our fixed in King Air.

Q. Okay. And it's just the Honolulu base?

A. Yes.

Q. And is there one designated just for KAP or is there two King

Airs here, one for CAP and one for normal?
A. So, there's normally one for CAP, one for normal. But there are times like, you know, if a plane goes out of service, especially now with all our planes out of service, we have to share. And most times, if it's a neonatal, a NICU newborn baby, that one has to go out first. But we can also triage if the KAP team needs to go or if another patient needs to go. Because right now, since the crash happened, we've been using one aircraft, sharing with, sharing with both. Or if we want to, we can always bring another pilot over from another base. It just takes a little while longer to do that.
Q. Okay. And with -- okay, so normally there's two airplanes here. And so, three pilots on shift?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And then so right now, there's two pilots on shift, with only one airplane here. Is that correct?
A. There's still three.
Q. Oh, there's still three?
A. There's still three. If the staffing is right, there's still three -- no matter how many aircraft there is, there's still always three pilots on shift.
Q. Okay. And so, is there still designated KAP team --
A. Yeah. So, this -- yeah.
Q. Okay. Is there special training that the PIC has to have or like to fly the normal or the -- or designation? Or is it just

like what they're assigned that shift?
A. As far as training, I don't know if they'd do anything different with that. But it's always -- because the Honolulu pilots, they all rotate. So, each hangar pilot will always do a KAP shift.
Q. Oh, okay.
A. Yeah. So, they're all really -- like they know the KAP team very well as well. The KAP team knows who the pilots are.
Q. For the PIC, is there a difference between the KAP shift and a normal shift?
A. It's the same hours.
Q. Same hours?
A. Yeah.
Q. Anything else is different?
A. Nope.
Q. Okay. And with just the one aircraft here, so if you get a normal dispatch, can't you just -- can you send the SIC out, too?
A. We've never done that. Also, we use the KCAP pilots, the PIC and SICs, solely for KAP flights only, and we've never used an SIC to put on flight. Yeah.
Q. You know, we were talking about operational control and the medical doctor now that's on call and communicating with. Would you ever have a reason to disagree with their, what they have to say? Like this one should go first. Would you ever have a reason to say that?

A. Not medically, not at all. But they also -- they don't have like a full understanding of, you know, they'll ask like, oh, send this person. I'm like, like I can it's also, you know, too late for a pilot to fly a patient this time. They're not going to make it back in time. Our pilots work on a 12-hour shift. And they can fly two hours after their end time with a patient, you know, and they can fly Part 91 (ph.) with no patient any time after that. She doesn't -- I mean, the med control doctors don't understand that sometimes. And for example, like the Maui medevac that we've been implementing, their shifts are from 8:00 to 8:00. And at 5:00 in the morning, you know, she's asking me, oh, send this. I'm like, I can't. It's too late for the night pilot. It's still too early for the day pilot to come on early. I'm going to have to wait for an hour to see if the pilot could come on early. They don't really understand, like the pilots and their duty times.

Q. So, how did the conversations go? They say, hey, send this one first. You say, hey, I can't do that. And then where do they go from there?

A. It's kind of just like, okay, well, what do you think? What is next available? And I'll say, oh, my plan is this, to send -- and most time it's like, okay, yeah, that sounds good. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And what if they disagreed with you? What would you do? What if they said, no, I don't care, do this one first.

A. I just listen to them just because I know it's about the

patient. So, yeah.
Q. And then what decision would you make as far as -- would that change your decision?
A. It's just whoever, you know, I'll tell them, oh, this plane is up first. And they're like, well, this patient needs to go out first. Okay, Sounds good. I'll send that patient. But for example, if I have, like, multiple flights going on and I think something is like, more efficient, even though we might not get to the more critical patient, but there's only like a 20-minute difference, my way of dispatching might be a little bit different than what she wants, and I've only had that happen once where I was kind of like, oh, I would rather do it this way. But I understand that the patient needs to go out more critical than the other one. So. All right, sounds good. Yeah.
Q. But you don't ever feel like there's a compromise in safety and them staying -- and their prioritization.
A. No.
Q. Like, because you feel like you could still make those decisions to make sure that things are --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- operating. The Part 91 flights that you're talking about at the end of the day, so they're over their 14-hour-duty-day, and then they could fly Part 91 back. Is that just always assumed that that's available?
A. If a pilot -- well, when that does happen, they're past 14

hours, they do have to call PMOC and get approval that they can fly. And there has been times that a pilot gets here with their medical crews and they're like, you know, I'm too tired. I can't fly. We end up commercial-ing them home and we commercial the other pilots coming on shift here to pick up their plane, yeah, if they're too tired to fly.

Q. Okay, that's all.

BY MS. HILL:

Q. When you filed the Baldwin report, you felt like you got a satisfactory resolution?

A. Yes.

Q. How often do pilots decline a flight because of a mechanical issue with the airplane?

A. It's happened more recently after the crash. It's been happening kind of a lot. I'd say, I mean, at least like twice during my weeks, every week, something with the plane that has happened, you know, they get into like, oh, sorry, something happened. Or when they're on their way back, you know, I'm already preplanning like this crew can maybe go here. And then I find out, oh, no, the plane's down. So, it's been more frequent lately.

Q. Why do you think that is?

A. I don't know if the pilots are like being extra careful because of the crash, but as far as mechanical, it's not my area at all. Yeah.

Q. That's all I had. Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Well, thank you very much for educating us today. We've asked you a lot of questions. Is there anything you can think of that's like, man, I wish they would have asked me this. It would really -- might help them.

MS. STREADBECK: No.

MR. ETCHER: No? Okay, well, let me get you one of my cards. So, if you think of anything that might help, please feel free to reach out anytime and let us know because we're trying to figure it all out. And you -- I can speak for myself. You helped me understand the -- I don't want to call it the chaos you guys deal with. It sounds like it gets a little bit crazy sometimes and you guys seem to handle it quite well. So, I appreciate your honesty and helping us understand and educating us. So, unless you have any questions for us -- all right. We can call this interview concluded at 9:32. Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 9:32 a.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII DECEMBER 15, 2022 Interview of John Smith
ACCIDENT NO.:	ANC23FA008
PLACE:	Honolulu, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.

[redacted]

Melissa Bousquette
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022	Accident No.: ANC23FA008

Interview of: CJ WETZLER, Maui Pilot

Hawaii Life Flight, Maui, Hawaii

Maui, Hawaii

Tuesday
February 14, 2023

APPEARANCES:

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:39 a.m.)

MR. ETCHER: All right. Well good morning. My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm operational factors investigator with the NTSB. So, all that means is, I look at kind of everything before the cockpit door and how it interacts. I'm going to go around here in just a minute and have everybody introduce themselves as well, but I also want to tell you a little bit about our investigative policies that we have.

We usually have parties to an investigation. FAA is a party as well. They help us. They bring a subject matter expert into all sorts of different things as well. So, that's why he's here with us today as well. But I'll go around the table this time. I'll start with Sabrina. Would you introduce yourself and your role?

DR. WOODS: Hi. Dr. Sabrina Woods and I'm also with the NTSB. I am the human performance investigator assigned to this case and so essentially what I'm doing is I'm looking at all the human factors that are involved and that includes kind of man-to-man interface which is how people get along with one another, man to machine interface which is how you get along with your aircraft and then man to environment, and by environment I mean like the company and so that's why you're here.

You're a subject matter expert on the company and we have no idea and so we kind of have to rely on you to fill in a lot of

those holes that we have so we appreciate you being here for that.

MR. WETZLER: All right.

MR. ETCHER: Thanks Sabrina.

Millicent?

MS. HILL: Millicent Hill, I'm the investigator in charge.

MR. ETCHER: Dylan?

MR. GARRISON: Dylan Garrison with the FAA. I'm the investigator in charge with the FAA assigned to this accident investigation. And my role here today -- I don't know how much interaction you've had with the FAA, but my role here today is in regard to safety, right?

So, that's what my intention here is to find out as much as we can about this and how it impacts safety. I'm not on the enforcement side of things. Today that's not my role that I'm assigned to today. So, that's not what I'm attempting to do. So, I don't know if you've had checkrides before in the past with the FAA, but I want you to know that that's not the interaction we're going to have today.

This isn't a, did you get the right answer, you know. This is an informational, we all have the same common goal here which is safety and so that's, that's what I'll be doing today.

MR. ETCHER: Sounds good. Thank you. All right. So, that's everybody that's going to ask you questions today. Typically, what we're going is we'll go, I'll start with questions. We'll go around the table. Usually, we do two rounds, but I assure you the

second round is almost always quicker than the first.

So, it's just kind of us just following up with a few questions. So, just so you're aware. As part of our interview process, we're going to record and transcribe this interview. Is that okay if we do that?

MR. WETZLER: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you. Also, as part of this, our regulations you are entitled to a representative to be here with you. I see you don't have one. Is that -- do you not wish to have one here?

MR. WETZLER: That is correct.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. All right. Before we get started though, I'll set a few ground rules for you, if you will. If you need a break just say so. This is not a checkride like Dylan said. This is you're educating us. You're helping us understand the operation, flying around here.

I mean I always thing Hawaii is all sunny, but I've been seeing now it's not necessarily. So, you're going to help us understand that and I appreciate all the education you can give us. If you don't know an answer, I don't know works perfect. Don't worry about it. It's like I said, it's not a checkride. There's no right or wrongs.

And a big question, too, a big thing for you to think about also, if I ask a question or any of us do and you don't really understand it, ask us to clarify it because if you give me an

answer that I don't understand I'm going to be clarifying it with you. So, it's a two-way street that way.

MR. WETZLER: Sounds good.

MR. ETCHER: All right? Is everybody ready?

DR. WOODS: Mm-hmm.

MR. ETCHER: All right. I always start with the really tough questions first.

INTERVIEW OF CJ WETZLER

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. So, for the record, could you please state your full name and spell your last?

A. Yes, it's Carl Joseph Wetzler. And it's Carl with a C, and then I spell -- the last is spelled Wetzler, W-E-T-Z-L-E-R.

Q. Thank you. And do you want us to call you Carl, CJ, what --

A. CJ is the preferred.

Q. CJ, all right. Perfect. And how old are you?

A. Thirty-nine.

Q. All right. And what is your job title?

A. Currently an EMS pilot with Guardian Flight.

Q. Okay. And do you fly for Guardian, or do you fly for Hawaiian Life Flight?

A. Technically I guess under the GMR, Global Medical Response but work for Hawaii Life Flight is my current brand I fly for, correct.

Q. Perfect that's for that little clarification there for me.

When did you get hired on with Hawaii Life Flight or Guardian?
A. Hawaii Life Flight was one year ago. Guardian Flight was now three years total, so February 2nd of 2020 was the initial hire date.
Q. Okay. Excellent. And before you came to Hawaii Life Flight where were you before?
A. So, I took ten-year hiatus actually from flying because I was in the regionals in the early years and got burned out not unlike most pilots did and so it was a part 121, in my early 20s and then left that about 2010 and then came back in 2020.
Q. And when you came on at Guardian in 2020, where did you -- you said you worked here at Life Flight, at Hawaii Life Flight last year. Where did you work those --
A. Oh sorry. So, the last full year was of course here at Hawaii Life Flight in Hawaii and then the previous two years it was Guardian Flight out of Blanding, Utah with the same GMR company, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. And then there's the ten-year break, so before that.
Q. Okay. Perfect. Thank you so much. What kind of airman certificates and ratings do you have?
A. So, I'm ATP, which a CL-65 type rating is where the ATP came in from. Of course, all your standard single engine, multi-engines, some commercial from the early days and then an A&P certificate.

Q. Okay. Excellent. And these are always the toughest questions now. Your flight time?

A. About 5,600 hours.

Q. Total?

A. Total time.

Q. How about in the King Air.

A. The King Air, I think I'm pushing about 1,200.

Q. Okay. Excellent. And current medical?

A. Yes, first class.

Q. All right. Excellent. If you could, could you kind of start me a little bit understanding the structure here at Hawaii Life Flight, Guardian, that whole interaction? Kind of help clarify that because it kind of seems like you've, you've been throughout the Guardian system so maybe you can help me understand how the whole system works.

A. Okay. So, initial impressions are the company really does have a mission focused, so I was a little bit gun shy coming back into an, you know, aviation environment but I was very impressed with they were ready to book our hotels, make sure we got to our interviews, you know, very easily.

Like I said rental car, all the things that maybe the regionals were -- like when I was in you had to pay for -- I mean like they didn't even kiss union employees. Like you got through your checkride, no hotel, no payment through training.

So, it was, you know, a unique experience coming in and them

offering on day one you employee ID and saying, you're a part of us. And so, that carried over then to very nice crew facilities. So, when we were actually in our initial training I was very impressed by having a house to go back to, not just a hotel.

But kind of big in doing that crew camaraderie at the local crew houses. And then while my time, my two years in Blanding what I really valued was, we did longer missions so where we might have to do a pickup in let's say Gallup from Blanding, which is an hour flight down, we might then take a patient to Dona Ana which was another hour and a half flight.

So, on a return flight you're looking at, you know, two, two and a half hours back. And so, one mission might cost you six to eight hours and so when you're with your clinical team there's a lunch somewhere in there. We're going to get out and go have a bite to eat and so there's a lot more crew camaraderie.

It's built over a six-to-eight-hour mission versus, you know, the main difference here in Hawaii is that there's a lot more float positions. So, like I mean I'll work with the same nurse or the same paramedic. They might float in from another island for a couple of days, if not the traditional seven on, seven off for our clinician here as it was back on the mainland.

And so, you don't build quite the same rapport but now having been here, you know, it just took longer to get to know the crews and they fly with them, you know, when you picked up trips at another base and that kind of stuff. So, maybe in short, mainland

longer missions, you build the crew camaraderie much quicker, everyone's kind of in their crew houses.

Hawaii, everyone kind of lives in their own space. People want to live here. People don't typically want to commute into Hawaii. They want to live here. So, it's a little more scattered as far as, you know, everyone has kind of their lives and we kind of just come together for the mission and then everyone kind of goes back to their lives a little bit.

So, it takes a little bit longer maybe to build that camaraderie that we had on the mainland.

Q. Okay. And since you worked at the one there in Utah and then you transferred out to here. Transferred?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. When you transferred out here did you see any difference between how things were done on the mainland versus here at Hawaii Life Flight? Was it all kind of similar? Was there a difference? I mean I know you're flying over islands here versus mountains.

A. Yeah.

Q. But is, was there -- what kind of difference or was there any difference?

A. Different-wise, actually there wasn't a tremendous amount of, as far as like operationally. So, of course that's the beauty of all being under the Guardian Flight umbrella is that it wasn't like I had new manuals or new operational procedures to learn upon

arrival here.

So, the difference is let's say from mainland to here was on the mainland, you're of course crossing different ARTCC, air traffic control facilities, operating within different like multi-different centers like Phoenix Center and Albuquerque and, you know, and Colorado, which I felt that because coming out here you have what's, you know, you know, Honolulu control facility.

Now you just have one group and they run everything you know. So, it was, that was the main difference was learning how they like to run their approach control, their departure control, their air track, you know, their tower and such.

So, that was the only difference that when I came here the initial operating experience was to learn. Well, I mean the mainland kind of operated very similarly. HCF (ph.) operates a little bit differently.

So, that was the procedure that I had to learn was a little initial call-in difference where maybe on the mainland we might fly Chimney (ph.) direct to Phoenix and Phoenix had no problem with the direct routing because there was nothing between Chimney here versus obviously I can't fly, you know, Maui direct to Honolulu.

We obviously can see the mountain out there so again just so those difference as far as operationally but not as far as like company policy procedure. There were not differences.

Q. Okay. So, in my brain, I just want to make sure I have it

clear. When you moved out here it was still the Guardian --
A. Still Guardian.
Q. -- procedures.
A. The same.
Q. Did your manual still say Guardian?
A. The same FOM, same GOM, same employee handbook as far as that. So, just the differences were actual operational versus company operational.
Q. Okay. Okay. Perfect. So, kind of walk me through considering that whole -- the way that whole set up is with Guardian and Hawaii Life Flight, who is in your chain of command? Who do you, who do you report to or, you know, with a couple above you.
A. Great. Yeah. So, my initial report on Hawaii Life Flight would be Kaleo and forgive me for pronouncing the last name wrong but Wehrsig. So, Kaleo but then of course we have an overall lower 48 chief pilot which would be Andy Munion. So, then that's our chain of command.

So, assistant chief pilot to our chief pilot, Andy Munion. And then we have access to our director of operations, Jeremy Salveson.
Q. Okay. All right. How often do you have reach out to any of those?
A. On the mainland actually, we had a really good and solid relationship because we operate to a lot of airports and have, you

know, weather reporting or, you know, intermittent approach procedures and so we actually -- those particular roles operate as our pilot manager on-call.

So, I was actually calling Jeremy and Andy quite regularly to talk about, hey, there's a weather system out here, what are your thoughts on us, you know, beginning this mission, we're going here? And he might offer, well catch a few more radar loops to build a better picture or such.

So, on the mainland I actually had a lot more call with my bosses. Here in Hawaii, we're back usually pretty regular. Things are pretty much what's happening in Honolulu is happening, you know, here.

So, not as much calls to Kaleo but as of the transition from the mainland, less calls with Jeremy and Andy and definitely my call volume has increased with Kaleo of course.

Q. Okay. That helps a lot kind of visualize it, kind of. I'll probably still be confused a little bit.

A. Of course.

Q. I may have to ask some clarifications here in a little bit. Perfect. So, let's talk a little bit out here with Hawaii Life Flight. We're kind of sticking to that for a little bit. How do you classify staffing out here? Are you guys adequately staffed with pilots? Are you guys kind of a little lean and required to work extra a lot?

A. I would say -- it's tough because I haven't had to pick up a

lot of trips. I would say maybe we're obviously a little leaner I mean but that's market wide, right. That's every -- so I mean let's be honest to say, like there's not a place that's a lot needing pilots would be a complete understatement of course.

So, are we, you know, overstaffed, where you're like concerned that they're going to start layoffs? No. Are we so understaffed where I'm having to pick up time on my two weeks off? No. So, we obviously have a few open pilot positions but that's not impacting how much time off I'm getting between trip schedules.

Q. Okay. All right. Do they ever -- I hate the word, forced. Junior manning, we'll go back to --

A. No, we have no junior manning, which is wonderful. So, no, they -- usually they'll kind of -- now the difference to be fair is with junior manning, right, that was an immediate operational need in the moment. The pilot got sick. You're the one landing. Like, hey, can you go back over, and out and back, you know.

So, you know, I mean junior manning within the 121 world, it makes sense. Versus here traditionally most of our staffing, if let's say another Maui pilot has a vacation. Kaleo knows those four days are uncovered. And so, there's more time for him to begin asking around and saying, hey, guys, anyone want to pick up shift work prior to.

So, definitely there's a little more schedule in the 135 medevac versus obviously 121. But if there has ever been a time

it's always, would you like to. It's a request and if not, there's no like repercussion or, well we really need you to be a team player. We really need -- there's never any of the pressure to pick up.

Q. Okay. Has that ever happened to, the would you, would you pick up, would you be willing? Have they ever had to reach out to you for that?

A. No. Actually, some of our managers on the mainland preferred us just to be straight and honest. That way if there was a staffing issue, we were continuing to enable a staffing issue. So, yeah, if we keep everything and running ourselves crazy, then there's no reason to bring in more pilots.

But if we're just, if we pick it up, great. If not, don't feel bad about it. Let's just get more staffing.

Q. But have they -- how often would you class, or quantify them calling you and asking you if you could or would you pick up?

A. I would say my year here they've asked no more than like three times total in the whole year. Yeah.

Q. Okay. I was just -- it kind of helps me to --

A. Yeah. Absolutely. No, no. We're pretty well covered.

Q. Okay. All right. While you're working and you have a concern over anything, you tell me, I don't care, whatever comes in your brain, what do you do about that? How is that addressed or is it addressed, who do you report it to? Do you report it?

A. So, our first order of business is of course getting to

understand which of our mechanics is on call. So, if I do have an issue that comes online, I'll talk to my dispatcher who will then let us know which of our mechanics is not in rest to make sure we're getting the correct mechanic and not interrupting their rest as well.

And then they'll begin to work with maintenance control whether it's MEL-able item. So, can we go through the paperwork through our approved MEL list and defer that for a period of time? Is it, you know, can a mechanic -- is it going to require a mechanic or is it a pilot operating, you know, issue.

And if it's a mechanical issue we'll then what, you know, of course it means Control will take the aircraft out of service and we'll make the write-up. They usually send us back. That of course leave an open spot for a mechanic to have to, you know, finish the log page and defer the item and then get the aircraft back in service.

If it's a -- if a pilot can defer it then I'll continue to make the corrective action, if you will and then go to our front log page and make the notation of the new MEL. And then that of course means control put that aircraft back into service. And then we're ready back for dispatch.

But it's -- in short, it's contact dispatch, the dispatcher lets us know, what you mean is it manager's on-call. Maintenance manager then talks to maintenance control and then we either determine if it's a mechanic issue or a pilot issue. And then we

make the write-up.

And if it's a mechanic only, and we don't have a mechanic in the area, the unfortunately the aircraft is out of service until they can fly one over on Hawaii Life or Hawaiian Air.

Q. Okay. You mentioned dispatch. Do you guys have dispatchers?

A. Well technically legal term is a comms specialist, right? So, a dispatcher would be a licensure point for -- would be helping with us -- with our weather planning and legality such. So, technically it's a misnomer, right.

The term is comms specialist, and they work more with the hospital. So, their specialty is more in the dispatching of the assets, not necessarily dispatching of the aircraft.

Q. Okay. All right. So, they don't help --

A. They have zero oversight on any kind of weather or decision making, yeah. There's no -- like we, you know, right, like in 121, right, I would be paired with my dispatcher. We would make a decision collectively.

While I still, you know, as a PIC still maintain full operational control. Here they speak none into weather or airport conditions or NOTAMs there. So, they just, can you, and then I make that decision.

Q. Okay. And if they ask you, can you, and you say, no. Is that okay?

A. Yes. So, there is -- again, because again that they're -- I would say I had a little bit push back in 121 because they might

have said, hey, well I've looked at this. We've run through this. And so, there might be a further conversation on that.

But here they've been instructed of course to, if the pilot is unable there's no authority that they have to push us further into the next thing. So, they might inquire for their own paperwork when they call their managers but it's not an issue of like, well we really need you to get this done.

Can you, can you take another look at it. And they just kind of say, yes, okay, thank you and move on.

Q. And since you're kind of talking right through on that little line has there ever been any pressure? I mean you guys are hauling patients around that obviously have medical needs. They need to get it addressed whether it's an emergency or perhaps not.

Is there every that undue pressure implied or personally on you? Help me understand that.

A. Right. So, there are, there are definitely pressures that you as a person put on your list. This is a very different type of flying where -- I mean, you know, in the 121 world you definitely want to get your passengers on a Christmas, right, when you're the last flight out of the hub.

And, you know, you have a mechanical issue you feel really terrible about not getting people to their family dinners and such but, for Christmas morning. Here that pressure, you know, that was not fully, you know, able to understand right away is, you know, if you land in Molokai and you've got a guy on a ventilator

and they just wheeled this guy out and got him onboard the aircraft and all of a sudden a system breaks, there is.

There's an internal pressure of like, holy smokes, like there's, there's a lot more direct, you know, interaction. And so, I would definitely say if there's any pressure, it's our own knowing the importance of the mission.

Like I know sometimes in the 121 world some guys might want to try to get out of a flight. Here we really do want to complete our missions, but we have to really remain on our own selves, keep ourselves in check that we don't allow the situation to dictate our decision. So, that's personal. That's just your humanity.

When you see a two-year-old with head trauma, that's your own personal pressure to want to make a mission happen. But secondary as far as company, what I've been very impressed with from day one is that with the example I gave you earlier about calling my boss.

It was a small airport with again, with no, you know, weather reporting. Kind of sits down in a little bit of a hill and so we might be able to look at Grand Canyon's weather. We might be able to look at sort of the weather Kayanza (ph.), but they're not going to get a really great picture.

But there was some weather possibly moving in. And which might have been below our minimum descent altitudes and, you know, or vectoring area with air traffic control. I've heard horror stories from other companies. They might say, go take a look. Try to get in there.

But my boss really valued that he was like let's look at a few more radar loops and then make the decision. Like he wasn't pushing like let's get out there and just get it done. It was, why don't you give yourself 30 minutes and yet we can get a few more radar loops to get a better picture of what's happening.

And so, I just really valued that our bosses have never pushed me to make a decision or, you know, put me in a situation where, you know, I obviously can't fly out of it. So, no, I would say, if there's pressure it's your own personal humanity.

You have to keep that in check. As far as company-wise, I have not felt between the main three bosses I've worked with they seem very cordial on that.

Q. Okay. So, how do you keep yourself in check for that personal pressure?

A. Well one is, is that remembering that even though it's a King Air, I think sometimes we think in terms of jets and airlines. There seems like there's a greater pressure, like oh, I'm flying a bigger and more impressive aircraft then the airlines.

So, I think sometimes it's easy to think, oh I just fly a King Air. But it's important to remember that how many lives that are stake and as we're seeing now that not just is it personal lives at stake but how much everyone's livelihood, and what that did to the state of Hawaii.

So, just remembering that while it might seem like a smaller operation, the smaller aircraft, I have to remember that there's a

reason we have rules and regulations and that there's, there's a -- those rules keep us, if I can stay within those boundaries even if I don't -- even if I want to get something done I need to stay within those boundaries because it's not just my airplane.

It's not a fun joyride, like I'm still a professional even though I'm not in the uniform world that's out in the airlines, this is still my job. It's not my, it's not my place to think I'm better than, you know, what's been usually written in blood, right.

Q. Okay. Do you have to any kind of an assessment before a flight? Everything, a risk assessment or a --

A. So, we do have a risk assessment which we just switched to a little more complicated, a little more lengthy risk assessment. I kind of like though the previous one because it was a little bit shorter and you could really run through your head a little more, like it was less of a task.

Like I think sometimes now there's a little more of like there's so many factors you're thinking that you might -- being like what is it that our brains can only hold like four things in our head at a time.

So, as you're getting down you've already -- if you overlooked a few or it just becomes a standard thing. So, we do have a risk assessment that is just trying to get us to think about, okay, you're operating at night. Is it VFR or IFR, you know.

So, I think if anything it's, it's -- we a pilots need to make sure that we are not rushing through that as a task but of course actually thinking, okay, what are the -- what, you know, factors increase when it becomes night versus mountainous terrain. Is it low ceiling?

So, yes, we have a risk assessment, and it is designed to make us think about, you know, all these factors being add up, is it still safe to go? The only thing I've seen is that margin, you can check off quite a few of those items and it's still says you're good to go.

So, it's a little bit to me, a little -- that's why I think why it sometimes is treated as a task is because it's almost like, mountainous, IFR at night, you know, ceilings, thunderstorms, and you're like, oh we're still good. You know, all of the things that really you're supposed to be thinking about but you're still good to go.

At the end of the day, it's still going to say you're good to go, so, you know, again I think that's where you just have to acknowledge your skills and abilities and have a plan before you take off, like a private pilot would.

Q. Okay. And you kind of mentioned the IRF at night or VFR at night or whatever, I mean --

A. About the same actually out there.

Q. I was going to say, is there a difference out here. But have you flown that route, the accident route --

A. Yes.
Q. -- before?
A. Yes.
Q. So, help me understand that. It's night. It's dark between the islands. It's water. How does that -- what is that like flying for you? I mean do you hand fly it, autopilot it? Help me kind of understand. Just put me in that, put in the right --
A. Yeah, absolutely. So, in the Four Corners areas on the mainland, we had terrain and we a lot of sparse areas were you're flying over the mountains let's say at 2:00 in the morning and you're right there's not a lot of light anywhere.

So, coming out here I was little shocked at how dark dark can get. I was like how does dark get darker? I'm like I was little confused how that, you know, even played in. And so, on a moonless night, let's say you're taking off out of Upolu Point off the tip of Big Island and you're out over -- as soon as you cross the barrier, there's no light.

There's nothing. I mean a little bit of -- you know, especially if there's like a haze blocking the stars, it is, it's essentially -- it's almost like if you close your eyes you still see like kind of the brightness in your eyes. It's almost like it seems like a void, like a black hole.

And so, out here in Hawaii that has been an area where you just have to treat even if it's going to be VFR, you have to treat it as IFR. And part of class 2 navigation that we're required to

be under is I mean and not only using our GPS.

But we're also backing up with our VR ground-based navigation at least once within an hour. So, with that particular routing, as you turn that corner, we're going to be under GPS direction. However, we, you know, can have a VOR backed up even on the standby VOR or on our screen.

So, again everything about situational awareness. The iPads add tremendous amount of situational awareness. So, we have of course right there on our control yoke. You can even set this particular aircraft to show if there's going to be a directional change based on -- so like as I'm beginning to make that turn I can even have it set where I can see a line turning.

So, again if you're in this black hole and, you know, you're, you're beginning under -- you know, maybe something goes out and you're beginning to try to understand what's going on, you have a quick situational awareness tool to see if the aircraft is beginning a turn or not.

Also, with your VOR backed up you can begin to see if you're leaving your GPS course, so you have your, you know, your class 2 navigation, your VOR rocking out. So, in those black voids I guess I would say if I had a short and a concise is, yes, it's very dark but we have our iPads to give us some great situational awareness.

We're of course navigating via our GPS. But at that particular turn it can even have your VOR dialed in and so make

sure that your ground base navigation is jiving with your GPS navigation.

Q. Okay.

A. So, you're operating IFR even in VFR, correct.

Q. Okay. You mentioned iPads. Does everybody have a company-issued iPad? Is the plane issued it?

A. The planes are issued, yes. So, each aircraft will have, you know, two iPads just in case one has a failure, you have a secondary iPad to go to with all of our navigation as well as our required, you know, manuals and such.

Q. Have you ever had an iPad go out on you?

A. Actually, I have not, no.

Q. Have you ever heard of anybody?

A. I don't think I have. No.

Q. Okay.

A. I mean I have, I mean, you know, those things are pretty -- I think that's why they're now approved of course. I mean I didn't have it back in the airline days. This is like mind blowing technology when I came back like so.

Q. Okay. So, put me in your seat again, taking that accident route.

A. Yes.

Q. When you take off out of here we head that way.

A. Correct.

Q. At night, do you hand fly? Do you autopilot?

A. So, I usually do hand flight for the first 1,000 feet. That's just, you know, to make sure all things working and such. But typically, we're on the Anohi 2 (ph.). They're quickly getting you over to air traffic control and since we're single pilot I need to really kind of start to offload some tasks so I can begin communicating.

So, no, we're going to be on autopilot pretty much from the 1,000 feet all the way over what -- so in my role I'm really going to monitoring systems at that point. And so, making sure the procedure calls for a turn at 2,100 feet and I want to make sure that of course as it -- if you were to not make the turn intercept the radio outbound you've got the mountains.

So, again I'm less worried about, oh and hand flight fun and I am much more, I'm monitoring and making sure that my systems are doing what we're asking them to do, and it does intercept the course and begin outbound in the inner most side of the island.

So, autopilot is going to be on. Watching the turn. It's a tight turn so I'm making sure the autopilot doesn't overshoot too, you know, ridiculously at the, at the point to intercept the next inbound course in and when we get past the point, we're about 20 minutes out from touchdown in that area so this is when you're going to start getting the descent phase.

So, ATC is going to start giving you either vectors, either direct to the, our nav approach, I believe it's TAMMI or to start, you know, maybe vectoring in for the visual approach. And so,

this particular our autopilot would still be on because now we're beginning to set up our approach, make sure we're getting weather because a line of sight you can't always get the weather report right away of course to kind of get around that other little hill.

So, again it's a busy time at that turn point in descent so this would be an autopilot area and the it just depends on if it's a true approach, I'm going to leave autopilot on a bit longer. If it's not may at the last, you know, 5,000 feet or more I might go -- you know, once I get clear of the visual approach is usually when I click off my autopilot.

And again, that's just because I don't want to get a surprise if my autopilot has been trimming a particular way because of winds so. Usually when I take over the visual approach that's when I click off my autopilot, make sure my systems are maybe still backed up and hand fly in. But at that particular point, no, that's going to be autopilot.

Q. Okay. And, you know, you said -- I have to ask because you mentioned, you know --

A. Absolutely.

Q. -- you want to make sure you don't get a handful when you disconnect the autopilot like it trimmed something weird.

A. Right.

Q. Does the autopilot ever give you that? Does it ever have -- I don't want to call it issues but kind of help me understand. Obviously it's a concern --

A. Right.
Q. -- if you were to consider.
A. No, I mean it's, I mean it's happened. I think that was issue that happened with a FedEx aircraft I think over if it was in Japan maybe four or five years ago, you know, like the autopilot in this when you clicked off, they started off sailing, right, because the aircraft was -- wind and such.

And so, I don't think it's an aircraft or a maintenance issues. Just it is if you've got strong winds, it's going to want to try to maintain that course and so it might start trimming, you know.

And so, if you clicked off that autopilot it would say, at 200 feet it's going to, you know -- also now you've got, you know, a left turn and it's, you have to kind of come back in so you're destabilizing yourself.

So, once in a while you might have that if on a strong wind day, but essentially speaking most of the time when I click the autopilot off our aircraft are pretty well trimmed out even in autopilot mode and it's not much of a bump.
Q. Okay. Has there ever been any issues with the autopilot disconnecting on its own or challenges getting it connected up?
A. We do have the occasional, you know, issue with our autopilot. I mean these are, you know, C-90s from the 2000s. And that, you know, that's a thing that I learned in this particular cockpit, you know, that I'm not one of the -- you know, I feel

sorry for anyone that's been only a G-1000 graduate.

And then comes to our planes like, okay, never mind, you know. So, these are course 2000 and little bit later models. And we -- I mean we're talking about taking them seven times a day up and down into some of the most, you know, hot and cold and salty air, so of course we're going to have some issues.

And again, just part of that is our system, our Collins autopilot of course is a little bit older model and so you're talking about input to your Collins, Collins to your DPU, right, and so you've got a few more systems. It's not quite so linear as you might think with like new ProLine type autopilot system.

So, do we have some issues? Yes. Is it -- has it gone past error like this is unsafe or having this happen consistently? No. When it does happen, usually you can reset the autopilot so it just might be a gremlin or some kind of, you know -- I mean I don't even know how old those cards are in the -- you know, it's the DPU.

And the autopilot somehow they're on like, those like actual cards like on an Atari almost. So, again, you know, you're talking about some systems that it's impressive they work 98 percent of the time in my opinion as an A&P. Right, I'm like, wow, it does.

So, the only other issue you might have that's outside your autopilot is again you're talking about an older system, the inverters we have, right. So, we have two inverters on our

aircrafts. So, we have our back up system.

And so, there are times if your auto -- sometime your, you know, if your inverter kicks off a power surge or just an inverter failure, you might experience a loss of power. Just like in some similar instrumentation work into through autopilot your autopilot might kick off in that particular case.

But it's not attached to the inverter so you can just have to -- basically autopilot is kicking off because it's lost its information. So, all I need to do is reestablish my information to get the autopilot back online and we're good.

Q. Okay. When the autopilot kicks off does it -- how does it tell you? Is that an audible?

A. Yes. So, thankfully the law after that terrible crash out in the Everglades, is that where it was at where they had the light blinking, right. So, we have our audible horn and a red flashing light in your face to let you know that your autopilot has been disconnected.

Q. Is it a horn or --

A. Charge, what is it the --

Q. -- is it the cavalry charge?

A. The cavalry charge, correct.

Q. Okay.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. All right. I'm going to assume and so please correct me if I'm wrong because assumptions are always bad, you've flown

the accident airplane?
A. Yes.
Q. What was that airplane like? I mean I know when I flew we had airplanes I liked, and I had airplanes that hated me. So, I wasn't sure, you know, how was this airplane? Was it, you know, the one that everyone on the base thought, oh golly, it's possessed or is it one that you never heard much about?
A. Never heard much. Actually, that's kind of the sad part, right. You feel weird being attached to an inanimate object, but it was one of our actual better aircraft. I really enjoyed -- I had actually -- I'd flown it on actually my last checkride I believe.

And I was like, oh, yes, I've got Gulf Zulu, you know, or got, you know, yeah, Gulf Zulu. And yeah, it was actually it was, it had the new interior. It seemed like the engines were synched up pretty well as far as the, you know, the power level quadrants, things like that. Yeah. I never had any problems with that particular aircraft. That was a good one.
Q. Okay. And you said you flew that on your last -- I don't know, one of your checkrides?
A. I believe it was my last checkride before, yeah. Because we were in a -- I don't know which one it was, but it was, not like one of the pretty painted ones and, you know, that was one of our nicer painted ones as we're moving through the fleet and stuff.

And just, I guess I'd flown it enough and really, yeah, you

begin to know, you know, as you fly the same aircraft over you really get to know how it handles a little bit better and those kinds of stuff and so that one, yeah, it just seemed solid.

So, well if I've got to do a checkride, this is the one I want to do my checkride in and I got lucky, and it ended up back at our base and got to do my checkride in it.

Q. Okay. All right. Let's talk a little bit about the work environment here. You know, how would you classify it? Is it a -- was it in the Maui base itself. Are you guys -- do you guys hang out together? Do you all get along? Do you hardly ever see each other? Is it hostile? Is it friendly?

A. I would say disconnected. That might be a similar word. So, again you're not operating long flights and meals together. So, naturally that alludes it's not going to build the same teamwork environment. Again, a lot of float positions again so you're not -- like on mainland it was the same nurse and medic.

They work seven days. It's the same nurse and medic the next seven days. And so, those were like true teammates. They literally lived together half their life, you know, so it was a true work-wife, work-husband type situation for some of our crews.

Here like I said, they don't work the seven and seven and so I only say that and preface that context because if there's a little bit of disconnect or maybe not the same level of relationship it's just some of our environmental factors might playing into that.

So, again you become closer if you have to share a meal three times a shift together versus here or closer when you work the same crew every time you're on shift. Like I said, here I never fully know who my medic or my nurse will be.

Sometimes they're paired. Sometimes they float in from Alaska. Sometimes they float in from the mainland. So, is it as close as the mainland? No. Is that necessarily the fault of anyone? No.

However, there are some local things I did notice my first year here I was a little bit disappointed in as far as we probably could have eaten out outside of work more, had some more -- and I could have always been better at, you know, initiating that as well.

But there was a little more of a philosophy of like I just want to come to work, do my job, go home. So, a little less of like, let's be a team out here. We're like a firehouse out here and a little more of like, let's all come together. Let's do our thing.

But when that door opens on the, you know, when you get back from a mission, you know, they're ready to get -- and I understand, let me back home and get to bed, you know, so they can be rested for the next mission.

But yeah, that's why I go with the word of a little disconnected, not quite as cordial as I experienced on the mainland.

Q. Okay. But you're a small base so I'm sure everybody has their opinions of each other and maybe that voiced a little bit. Does that happen here?

A. Yeah, that was a new experience. Yeah, people are a little, yeah, okay. And I'm sure you guys will eventually dig into all of the Baldwins. You guys have access to all of our documents and submissions. Correct?

Like as far as like write-ups and those types of things, as far as like interpersonal things. Will you guys be able to access all of that during the investigation?

Q. We can request it, yes.

A. All right. So, you'll probably notice there's a few more Baldwins. Not me personally didn't initiate it but we had a float nurse come in and so they got to kind of observe our base from an external, you know, perspective and saw some of the -- in this case I might use the work dysfunction.

And so, this would be there's a lot more, you know, kind of foul language or cursing if it's not done a particular way. So, it was even new for me to, you know, used to making a decision and then maybe being, you know, chastised about the decision when it really didn't impact anything.

Like it would be one thing if I pointed the nose of the aircraft down and was like, hey guys, how fun is this, and then pulled everybody fun, and got them some Gs, and like, dude, don't ever do that again, that's one thing.

But parking a couple of aircraft spaces over to, you know, limit your, you know, I don't want to knock a wingtip and then getting, you know, some, you know, serious grief from our clinician.

It was new for me out here because I'm not -- like I said on the mainland we kind of let each other stay in their lane. Here there's a little more of lane crossover and, you know, like hey like what did, you know, what did you file for? I filed just -- oh, yeah, file this, this is way better, you know.

Well, it's, well it's not as a hot up there. It's cooler down, you know, like, hey man, we just here for takeoff. It's time to be, it time to sterile cop that we need to be. You know, these are things you can discuss and talk about later, you know, either pre or post-E, but not when moving and taxiing.

So, that was unique. It was a little more crossover during our mission, yeah. Not the most clear, not if that was helpful but --

Q. It helps fill in some of the areas, yeah. So, I appreciate that. I'll mull on it a little bit.

A. Okay.

Q. We'll go from there. I have a few more questions and then I'll others have because you've got to be, you will get tired of talking to me. Trust me. And it's all good. Did you guys have a do not pair together list? Do not fly list together? Like, can you refuse a medic?

A. I know of crews that have said, hey, I'm not going to maneuver, and I think they do try to accommodate that in some capacity. But we're too small to really, you know -- like in the airlines you have preferential bidding systems where you can actually type in the employees number, you know, avoid flying with. I would love to see that list if I had my own airline.

So, but, you know, but here no, we're, I mean we're four pilots strong and typically we need four to six cliniticians (ph.) so it would be impossible to, you know, to continue to work everyone's schedule around interpersonal issues.

Q. Okay. Being that small how do you guys -- what's your normal schedules? I know you talked about the week and week and different things. Kind of walk me through what a normal schedule is for you guys?

A. Yeah, for us we as pilots are, you know, two weeks to -- you know, two weeks on, two weeks off. The first half is your day shift which is your 5:00 to 5:00. And then of course the next would be your seven days of night shift.

And then of course you're going to have two weeks off and that's when the next crew kind of comes in. As far as the clinitician, I believe they're now beginning to switch to more of a five on, ten off.

And so, that might begin to build some more consistency that we haven't seen necessarily where some clinitician might have work, try to work 10, 15, 17 days in a row, that way we could have

like 10, 17 days off, you know, and so that's where some of that inconsistency I think.

So, we're going to start to see -- it was early in the works prior to the incident which was allowing our cliniticians to work less shifts and still make the same, you know, finances and so we are at least moving to like I think a five and ten for them.

They work 24 hours though, so that is I think what maybe the pressure is different for us as pilot is that once I get close to my time I have, you know, regulations that allow me to say, I'm done.

For them, while they have a hard 16-hour duty as far as like once they're going to go over they do have to take mandatory rest. There's plenty of times where I'm coming back at let's say, 4:00 in the morning and they're, you know, prepping to go out for another mission.

You know, they have, they're going to have to continue going on. So, that's where, you know, maybe some of the difficulty comes in why they might be tired and wanting to get back in is they don't have a consistent sleep schedule whereas we as pilots, you know, even on nights you know you can sleep during the day.

You have a guaranteed, you know, break whereas they don't always have that.

Q. Okay. And so, kind of run me through what a day schedule or night schedule. It's your choice. What would it be? I mean do you call on duty. Do you have to go in and sit at the airport,

kind of ready reserve? Kind of help me understand.

A. Yeah. So, our GOM facilitates we're at the aircraft within the first hour of the -- so basically I'll wake -- a normal day for me, I'll wake up and usually get a cup of coffee or something going and that's when we start looking at our weather. So, it's a little bit easier here in Hawaii versus the mainland.

The mainland you just never knew where you were going to go. So, you'd look at a couple of close bases. Here, my first thing is, I actually have an iPad. I went ahead and bought the same software we use on the, on the aircraft.

And so, that allows me just to really begin my day looking at all of the particular NOTAMs, all the particular weather patterns and such so that when I call in at 5:00 a.m., all call in and be like, we have the first 20 minutes probably just trying to get it out of the way, get the call in, up.

And then I'm coming on, what is the weather is like, specifically Maui and Hana for us and then just being, you know, again cognizant of the other area. They'll give me my staffing for the day, whether you know any crew has timed out, who is on board and our particular aircraft.

So, that's, that's my little pre-brief. And then I'll head into the airport and that's where I need to get my first of the day pre-flights done. And so, my goal is to try to get that done because it's long before a call comes in. I hate having to rush through, you know.

It's never fun to get a call right at 5:00 a.m., and you still have do those checks and your crew is kind of confused why it's taking long at 5:00 a.m., versus, you know, 3:00 p.m. It's like what's different, you know preflight when it's the first flight. So, I try to get there. Like I said I get it, get that done and knocked out. And then I might hang out.

We need to be within 20 minutes, but traffic out here can get kind of crazy. So, for me I just go to Starbucks and hang out. I'm sure they think I'm unemployed. So, like, how does this guy come in every day and just sit around. But it is a great place, you know, they got a -- or on bad days I'll go to Krispy Kreme and enjoy a nice -- I always seem to get one donut -- I always get two.

So, and I've got to be truthful on the record, right. So, two donuts and a coffee. You know, and then we have a beach that's eight minutes away so also if I just want to kind of relax, so again I try to stay in the area because when the call comes in my goal is to not be rushed.

I don't want to be thinking about throwing things on, trying to get through traffic. My goal is to be able to really process everything. So, I try to stay in town. And that usually leaves time to lunch, so again another embarrassing day going -- and I'll walk across from Starbucks and walk out and walk over to Dominos, you know.

So, again kind of living the Friend's life. And then usually

by around 2:30 though, I mean we're talking, we've -- I've had my coffee, I've had my lunch, probably a little bit. And usually by then we're actually getting a call. So, most days it's an afternoon thing on day shift.

And so, it's kind of consistent with the other hospitals start to fill up or whatever. So, but yeah, and maybe towards the end of the shift when the other pilot can come on early that might be when I head back home, you know, and maybe the rest of the shift I might hang out at the house knowing they're probably going to call the other pilot on early in that case.

But on nights, it's not too much different. It's just I might actually, you know, spend a lot of time resting at the aircraft. You know, like again not that there's traffic. But, you know, I've had my rest during the day, but again like between watching TV at your house or watching TV on the aircraft, it's cool at night. It's not like it's super-hot like in Phoenix.

So, I could just, you know, watch some of my television shows or whatever, movies right there on the ramp that way when the call -- again when the call comes in I'm already at the aircraft and such.

So, again not every time but for me personally that's just -- I'm not married. I don't have kids. So, for me I try to say kind of in the vicinity of the aircraft and minimize how much rush I have to do so that I can be more focused with the flight.

Q. Okay. The last question and then I'll pass it pass it off to

Sabrina. But do you -- do they have a crew room, a crew house, a crew base right here at the airport where you can come in sit, or do you have to sit on the actual aircraft?

A. On the aircraft. This is my only unfortunate part is I really do wish -- and I understand why. It's Maui and airport authorities, and difficulties of getting things so I understand that's not necessarily as a possible. But our crew house is just, it's further than my house, you know.

So, it's not really applicable to me. I mean I could go sit at the crew house but it's the same drive time. So, unfortunately that's the only downfall is we don't have -- I do wish we have like a ready room, you know, on property. That would be like a super cool thing to have for sure.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Before I pass to Sabrina, are you doing okay? Do you need a break?

MR. WETZLER: Absolutely.

MR. ETCHER: You're doing good. All right.

Sabrina?

DR. WOODS: Thank you.

MR. WETZLER: Yeah, sure.

DR. WOODS: Appreciate the answers so far. I'm going to circle back. I'm going to ping-pong a little bit because Shawn has reminded me of things.

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. For your flight risk assessment, I'm going to shorten it

colloquial to go/no-go. So, if you hear that, that's what that's what that means.

A. Okay.

Q. Have you, have you ever no-go?

A. Yes. So, there are certain times. Very rarely but there have been certain times where -- especially more on the mainland when we're talking about ice, icy conditions, right? And so, but or we're going to go over our flight time for instances, when we're looking at the weather conditions, oh, I'm going to go over my 14, so it's a no-go because of flight time considerations.

You're looking at the weather. It's going to be longer than normal. So, yes, there have been time where I've got to call PMOC, and we've agreed not to. It's very rarely we have had to, you know, to say no to a certain flight because of weather either at the destination or the departure airport.

Q. So, since here being in Hawaii?

A. In Hawaii, I don't -- there hasn't been a time where I haven't wanted to go. But there are times I've had to call our pilot manager on call. So maybe if I'm going to apart from new one reposition after my 14 back to base.

That might be a time where, you know, I might have to call PMOC, but we've haven't been able to complete that. The latest one it was going to be so long they just airlined us back in. So, that was a no, but that was just because it was going to be so ridiculously overtime, they just airlined us back.

Q. In, I guess, in those instances have, you know, does it feel like it's an amicable discussion or do you ever feel like you're going to get a little grief about it? Are you going to -- you know, is there a concern I'm going to be labeled, that guy?
A. No. Actually, I remember my first ever call I had no idea what to discuss in those calls. And I was like, well, I'm all good. I just downed a Mountain Dew. I think I'm ready. He's like well I need to know a little more than just having a drink and that. I didn't know.

I was like brand new. We didn't do this in the airlines, you know. I was like, well how about a Mountain Dew? He's like, well let's talk about conditions and how many legs have you flown and what's the weather like, and what's wrong, are there any MELs in the aircraft that might be a challenge?

So, no, they are excellent about walking us through and then always, you know, prefacing with it's your decision. You know, they are, yeah, again no pressure. Just a bit of very nice. I know that's not always the case in a lot of medevac companies so. Or so it's what I've heard.

I've not been a part. So I don't want to throw all of medevac under the bus. I only say I have read some horror stories on the internet I think when I was looking at coming to a medevac, you know, flying, so.

Q. So, since coming to Guardian dba, Hawaii Life Flight --
A. Yes, all the different names.

Q. -- what do you like most about your job?
A. I would say that it is, you get to really be involved in the overall operation. I feel like in the airlines you close the door. It was, you know, a reinforced door. I was armed. I was an FSDO. So, it's like, if you come into this cockpit there is going to be a problem, you know.

You know, so it's very much hands off, leave the people alone. But I'm kind of, you know, an introvert so I like having more meaningful connections with people and such. And so, I really value that we just don't fly the aircraft, but we're actually part of loading the patient on and so you're one of the first faces that you see, and like that they see and it's a very scary moment of their life.

And so, it's just been excellent to not only get to fly again but to use those skills to actually help people get them to higher care.

Q. Okay. Subtle shift in the question, what do you like most about the company?
A. I have been treated very well 180 opposite from the regional airlines and so I'm trying like as a joke, like, it's like man, I was traumatized by the regionals and I had to like, you know, grow out of that, you know, past trauma.

So, sometimes I'm surprised like when they're kind. They're hey, like, hey, we bought you guys new jackets. And I'm like, okay, what's the catch, you know. And it's not -- no, we actually

got you -- it's not coming out of your paycheck, you know.

And so, I guess I've just been very impressed from day one that it's, A, they -- when I initially submitted my application this was a company -- I had been off like I said for ten years doing ministry and teaching. And instead of saying, well, we're not quite sure.

Our director of operations was immediately like, hey, we like -- like this is a, this is a human type environment. Actually, we value that experience. And so, from the get-go they were already discussing things they valued about my past versus it being like a, being out of flying so long being a negative.

And then like I said, anyone who get me from out of, you know, being gone for ten years back to training. I was very impressed with our training program, that it was a really good ground school. It modeled and kind of similar after our 121 program, so I was thankful it wasn't just a self-study, go out there help you get it.

They gave us all the time we needed. So, I valued that they invested in us. So, they believe in us, they invested in us and then I'd say now, yeah, I'm just kind of impressed at like they just don't, they don't seem adversarial.

I know that sounds weird but like I feel like in the airlines like maintenance is kind of against the pilot, the pilot kind of against maintenance, or someone against the air traffic control, or this guy, the management is against the pilots, you know,

contract and I think I just really enjoy the, like there's not that adversarial kind of community.

And it seems like we're all working for one similar goal, and I feel supported by our managers. That's kind of unique I guess. Unique I think in any corporate setting in all honesty. And I worked in ministry so that's a little it --

Q. Flipping the script, a little bit then, with the job what could be better? What might frustrate you just a little bit?

A. And I - this is what I've gone over. I've always said I think in other past roles just in fun conversation I might have said, you know, you spitball how things could be better. Well, this is frustrating you.

Here I've always said, well there are things that can be better. It's like I don't, I don't envy our managers. I'm like well I don't necessarily know how that might be changed. So, for instance, it's a very solo job.

You know, I mean like obviously that's part of being a single pilot but again you have a day shift and a night shift pilot, so we're not even hanging out during the day together. Like there's not even that little bit of camaraderie you might have with the first officer or your flight attendants, you know.

And your cliniticians are back resting and such. So, the think I would like to be better is I do wish there was little more human interaction within our own teams but that's not, I'm not -- like I haven't figured that one out, right?

I mean it's, it's -- that's the only thing that could be better is like when you're pre-flighting at 2:00 in the morning or post-flighting at 2:00 in the morning by yourself. It's beautiful to look at the stars and it's very peaceful but it would be nice to have a little more like human interaction at your job, you know, laughing a little more. I don't know so I don't know if that answered it or not but --

Q. It does.

A. Okay.

Q. So, the same thing though with the company what could be done a little bit better from a company level?

A. From a company level? That is -- I hope in my delay actually is the answer. I don't have something on the tip of my tongue to be frustrated about. I think the only thing is and I think they're working towards that is we have new training.

Like so we have a lot of our monthly trainings with PowerPoints and those types of things. And so, and I've heard it's, it's transitioning to more realistic scenarios so that's the only thing that I would like to see better is we hit a lot of like the typical questions you might have on a checkride but those are things you're not dealing with every day.

So, I'm hoping to see in -- I mean that could be something I could sort of speak into more as now I've been here for a year is we discuss a lot of the usual things you have to know of course, you know, how does the system work? What happens if the system

fails.

And we need to know those things but also maybe just some more training on like here are the day-to-day things that you may not think about that come up which is something as simple as you land in Waimea, and it was clear skies. Now your patient is in route and the ceiling dropped to 700.

Can you, like, let's walk through, do you need to take an alternate? What would that look like? So, we know we may or may not need to take an alternate. That's a fact. But as a pilot it would be nice to have a little more training on, I'm beginning to feel that pressure to go.

Now the patient is in route how do I quickly get to take an alternate and refile with let's say HCF that like one time I had, you know, I had to add a passenger to our manifest and I made all these phone calls. And at the end and HCF was like, oh yeah, we don't care. I'm like, all those phone calls.

Thank you, you know, like it would be nice to know in those situations maybe more things we run into, scenarios that are not gotcha or jeopardy scenarios but just here's how we can handle some of those odd ball things that are necessarily in the FARs and not necessarily breaking our policy but do happen on the flightline. We've got a patient in route from the hospital.

Q. Okay.

A. So, maybe a little more realistic scenario training. How about that? That's--

Q. Okay. Scenario based training is always great.
A. Yeah.
Q. So, we talked a little earlier about like there's been a recent change with your flight risk management and it went from --
A. Yes.
Q. -- kind of something that was pretty straightforward and maybe a little more comprehensive and easy to understand to kind of more of a drawn-out process which can sometimes have the unintentional consequence of feeling more like a chore.
A. Correct.
Q. But in general, how does, how does policy changes like that, how does information get -- come down? What is the typical way that you receive policy/we're going to do it this way, SOP changes from the corporate level?
A. Okay. So, initially what we'll get -- traditionally what we'll get is maybe a pre-email. Hey, there's a changing coming to the way we're doing these things, be looking out for a Cornerstone training, which is the new program we just launched maybe six months ago which is, like where our online training would be, would be housed.

And so, if it's a major change such as like we're adding new standby adjudicator in our aircraft. That immediately becomes a Cornerstone training environment. And so, again that's our self-study, right? So, that would go back to the question, I wish there was a little more hands on, not just, you know, our digital

study but yeah so email comes out.

We log in unique with Cornerstone training by due date, go to Cornerstone, complete the training and so it's in your record, you completed the training would be kind of how our information system is.

If it's something that maybe needs some more discussion that's where they might try to, you know, discuss more in our, like our pilot town hall meetings that occur usually monthly or our safety meeting that occur kind of that same timeline like a month, each month. But if it's immediate critical, maybe our director of operation might actually call us, make a phone call.

But by in large I would say it's email, new training is created, please have it completed by and then you have the training in your Cornerstone. It's kind of self-study versus disseminated from any type of individual person I guess.

Q. So, sorry to confirm, Cornerstone is like, is your, like your intranet that your training is housed?

A. Correct, our online digital training. Correct, yeah. It's like online college I guess in a way, right? So, we've got to log in to access our digital training and records.

Q. And then those town hall meetings are they asynchronous or are they all -- like is it a set aside time, all people though shalt be there? Or is it asynchronous and it's like recorded and then you can go watch it whenever you get to it?

A. So, that might be, but the main thing is we don't really have

the post if you miss it, because again our sometimes pilots and cliniticians are on calls and such. So, if you miss it, you miss it. So, if you're on shift, they're wanting you -- of course there if you're off shift they don't of course necessarily force it, but it is a live Zoom and greeting since we're all on different islands.

Q. Okay. But they don't record for later viewing?

A. Not that I'm aware of at this time.

Q. So, that's a good question then, I know you just said Cornerstone is where you have your training but like things like policy, SOPs, GOM, FOM -- if I'm a new guy rolling in off the street, where do I access all this stuff? How do I get information to get up to speed on how we do things here?

A. So, I think when -- this is where we've probably been maybe weak in this particular area is -- and they're beginning to make, you know, changes already which is, that would be more the lead pilot at the bases role.

And so, which we haven't already participated in. And so, the lead pilot role is really going to be charged with taking some of that responsibility off the assistant chief pilot in the region and so whomever is in that role really is supposed to be like, okay. So, here's how we do things.

Here is the information you'll need to be on the aware of and so I think -- and we're, I guess they're about to begin the interviewing process, you know, interviewing for lead pilots at

each base now. And that will be the person that, you know, will help disseminate some of that information if they weren't able -- and they're beginning to email out the minutes from the meeting.

And so, now if we miss a meeting for whatever reason we're now getting at least, you know, the highlights of, you know, what was going on. But I would say traditionally now the lead pilot would be that person, a point of contact for any new pilot coming in or transitioning pilot is to go to the lead pilot at the base and get the information.

Q. Understood. So, the lead pilot is the keeper of all things.

A. Yeah.

Q. But where is it, where is the information physically held though?

A. That would probably be even at the South Jordan location in Utah. But I'm, I'm not, I'm not saying there's any kind of like transcripts or like tapes or whatever. It might just, that might just be collected with the knowledge of the trainers, instructors and management there on their system.

As far as like documents though, I mean we do upload all our legal documents and so that would be in our flying duty tracker. And so, all current things -- so any pilot coming in -- and again so right, like you may not have a manager telling you to download this, this and this.

But you are trained on all your most up-to-date information

in flight duty tracking. You got to, you know, the documents and access all the legal required information would be all there, you know, if you can sift through all of the information.

Q. Control F. Okay. That's more of --

A. Oh right, yeah.

Q. -- what we're looking for. So, where --

A. Okay. So, we do, we do have like all these centralized, correct, yeah, in our -- where we're logging in and then you can't proceed to the next screen until you've accessed those things.

Q. And then presumably the lead pilot would be the one to help kind of sift through the chaff --

A. Correct.

Q. -- for a new individual coming in --

A. Correct.

Q. -- once that role comes on board. Okay. So, pivoting in a little bit, so and this is, this is kind of two-part question but I'm going to break it down for you. So, the first part is like the world according to CJ is here.

A. Okay.

Q. How do you define safety culture?

A. Like it's -- oh, just like a definition? Okay.

Q. For you.

A. Okay. For me?

Q. Yeah. What do you think makes for a good safety culture?

A. Not talking about it but creating the systems that the end

result is safety. So, example is like how we don't get any patient information until we've said, yes to the mission. So, I'm not factoring in if I see a weight of 35 pounds I kind of know we're talking a pediatric patient.

So, again so we don't just talk about safety. So, for me I like that there are those types of things in place where I'm not trying to operate safe. I'm either studying on my own time or I'm, you know, practicing on my iPad the little approaches before a checkride.

I'm doing the things that -- what is it that they say, right. You don't try to stop behavior. You try to figure out what is the root of the behavior. I think the same thing for safety, right. Is there something I'm doing that the end result is unsafe behavior.

So, my goal is to identify in my own life am I studying enough? Am I practicing enough? Am I hand flying enough? Am I thinking through scenarios while I'm flying? So, doing the things that result in safety. Not just talking about it.

Q. So, now applying what you think makes more an effective safety culture to the organization to -- since you're here now at Hawaii Life Flight, how would you define Hawaii Life Flight safety culture?

A. And that's a challenge because I believe we're like as a corporate organizational level, those are, again those are policy that are in place whether it's Alaska, the lower 48 or the

specific region, right? So, again those -- like that's what I've loved about our safety director and some of the policies and things they put out.

I think my only maybe struggle is -- so corporately I think that information is there but sometimes I'm curious if that culture is on a personal level enacted by all of us as pilots, right? I mean there's always some level of drift and we have to get by ourselves back in.

So, no one of course have heard but I'm -- sometime I do wonder in Hawaii if there's a little level of drift. So, again not corporate drift but drift within us as a pilot group.

Q. Do you feel if you had an issue like, hey, this thing here that I'm seeing really needs to be addressed, do you feel that there's an adequate process in place to get that addressed going up the chain?

A. Yes. Yes. It is in my opinion again anytime, like I said I come from a 121 environment and the nice thing was is there was no pressure. Like you call me and say I'm out of service, that's it. Coming in 135, I was a little bit hesitant.

I've heard, you know, in part 91 operations sometimes, you know, if you own a $70 million jet and they're paying you $120,000 to fly that, you're like, oh, this inverter went out. They're like, why didn't you fix it?

So, I was a little nervous coming into a 135 environment as far as like what pressure would be there. And I've been impressed

with Guardian Flight as a whole that if something is not mechanically sounds, we are able to write that up. The aircraft is ground, and the asset is still until it is fixed.

Q. So, that's easy because there is a process in place for aircraft. But what if it's more interpersonal? Like what if you feel like there are behaviors that go against positive safety cultures or positive safety practices or if -- or even if there's a policy in place that you're like oh, this could probably use some thinking.

There could be some unintentional consequences here particularly since I know that the bring is in Utah, right? But --

A. Oh right.

Q. -- obviously there are things that are very like, indigenous too; the islands that they may not be aware of. So, for things like that, the intangibles because the aircraft you can touch and if you find that there is a change there how would you address that going up the chain?

A. And okay that might be some of the areas like that I'm hoping they're improving on now, so which is there hasn't always been -- because there's so many disconnected parts, right. I think in a traditional hierarchy you have multiple -- you singularly linear chain of command whereas like the cliniticians answer to different bosses than the pilots answer to.

And then there's, you know, kind of goofy overlap and maybe some convoluted overlap. It's like well who is really at the end

of day. Like we know the very basis the PIC holds all the cards for the operational control. But to your question, it's a little difficult when you've got maybe some of those issues, they might actually be in a position of leadership so you would be reporting but then, you know, so yeah.

I would say that might be our area of weakness is there's not a lot of resources as far as if there is interpersonal issues happening within a base to begin to -- and that could be, but that could be our fault for having not spoken up more, right. So, that might be we need to communicate to our upper managers about here's what's going on.

For me because I fault myself a little bit on that is that, you know, wanted to kind of take a year to try to understand how things do operate. And so, like I said we had our first final write-up that had to be, you know, bring in HR then to the interpersonal thing. So, the issue was happening.

We didn't necessarily have a thing in place that said, okay, we're stopping the mission. But at least there was follow up after to begin understanding, unpacking what's actually happening on the, on the ground.

Q. So, I guess in your year here are you comfortable in the knowledge that if you did have something that needed to be addressed that you would at least be acknowledged and then that somebody would look into it?

A. Yes. Yes. We definitely have that in place, and it happens

quickly.

Q. Okay. What are the quality control measures under Guardian that are in place for pilot performance?

A. Oh, our standard of course are check-in events and monthly training but and we're, of course we're going to, assuming it's not up, we're going to South Jordan to our training facilities. But it's kind of just the standard things you see.

Six months checks, monthly online training and then, you know, our yearly training event in the simulator. Where maybe it differs from a 121 environment. In 121 you may have more line checks. It's not necessarily a checkride. It's just someone riding along observing the operation.

So, here we don't necessarily have line check but again in the official paperwork for the lead pilot, that actually falls under the, you know, one of the things a lead pilot is to occasionally ride along and that's where you're going to catch if someone's not necessarily doing all the checks either correctly or whatnot.

Right. Like on a checkride you're on, you're trying to do everything perfectly. As soon as you let your guard down a little bit on a regular flight, you'll be like, hey, did you know the inverter check is actually like this, not this.

So, I think that we don't necessarily have a line check in place, but I think we're moving toward that direction.

Q. Okay.

A. So, six-month online training monthly and simulator training.
Q. And you briefly touched on like the cliniticians, they kind of have a different line of authority versus the pilots and things like that. But when it comes to that flight risk management or inflight risk assessment process at what point if you, do you intersect?
A. I mean in the perfect scenario is we really should be having pre-briefs and debriefs. And so, you know, a pre-brief would be discussing, you know, if any of types of situations are happening or any kind of beef is happening, that would be where we could talk about like what's going on?

Do we need to continue, which again has been a new policy post where we actually are trying to maneuver that. But there's really not -- I guess that's been my, like when I used the word, disappointed, like I'm kind of disappointed this is my first year realizing like everyone just operates so independently. There's not a lot of cohesion I guess at this point.
Q. So, aside from interpersonal issues, if the cliniticians have a safety issue, concern with the flight, who are they taking that up with? Are they bringing that to your attention, or do they have a different chain of command in which they go through?
A. Oh, all right. Sorry. Yeah, so they'll talk to me first. Like if they would say there's something in the back that, hey we're on this flight over we could really hear a lot squeal. You know, like we might have to have the door seal checked, like that.

So, we might not hear with our headsets on. So, yes, if there's any kind of maintenance issue or maybe they walk around the aircraft and they said, hey, they got to the aircraft first. They said, hey, what do you think about this. So, yes, they would first come to me.

And because of our relationship, I mean I want them to trust me, and they want to be able to trust me as well. So, I'm not going to ignore their request. And so, that might be where then I go to my next chain of command, which again talking to main control.

But if a pilot is maybe dismissive, they can go right to their program director, and he can speak right to like our assistant chief pilot. So, yeah, there's -- they never have to get into an aircraft if they're not comfortable. And if we dismiss them they can, they always have a person to go to that's above us.

Q. So, they have a, they have a say in the go/no-go process?

A. Correct, yes.

Q. Okay. This is going to be an off the wall question. But I want to get it out of the way now. Talk to me about restraints in the aircraft. What is the policy for use of restraints?

A. So, of course for as pilots it falls to the FAR. So, we need to have our, not just our lap restraint on but our shoulder as well in taxiing unless it interferes with your duty but as far as cliniticians, we definitely push forward for the significant

parts, take off and land, that type of seated in it.

I prefer -- I've been using the seatbelt sign a little more just because it's -- sometimes you can't always get in touch with them if they're busy. So, if I know there's going to be turbulence and they're up and about, you know, I'll be trying, I'm trying to be better about alerting them in advance for turbulence but of course it's an operation where they're not always going to be belted down.

They're very similar to flight attendants so in route unless I've given them the heads up, they're usually unbelted and very much right there with the patient. But if we're talking taxi ground operations, the policy is they need to be really in their seats, seat belt fastened.

And then we even have with the new seating configuration they actually need to have the shoulder harness, the correct way not just over the, you know, opposite direction. But, you know, there's some placards to let them know which is the correct way, based on which side of the aircraft they're sitting on to make sure they're getting the maximizing, they're maximizing the shoulder harness as well.

Q. So, I know that you said that that's what's in policy. What about in practice? What do we see?

A. In practice it's probably a little less, you know -- again I don't, again I don't fly a ton with other guys so I want to be careful on not throwing anyone under the bus, but we can

definitely have a stronger, you know, seat belting in on those critical -- I mean really anytime.

You know, Hawaii is, we saw with a Hawaiian Airlines flight they were just coming in over the mountains and got 35 people popped to the ceiling, right. So, really, you know, even if they're, if they're not in patient care we could probably be better about even being buckled in, even though it's not required because we're operating in very turbulent things.

So, culturally it could be improved being seat belted in more during the flight times.

Q. Okay. Thank you. Okay. I'm going to pivot a little bit more to now accident specific. How well did you know Brian?

A. Only the year but we -- so as far as professionally, not a whole lot. So, like I would be fuzzy on how much, like where he built his flight hours and so those things. But personally, he was kind of the first ones to say, like when I came to the island he was the first to really say like let's get you plugged into different hikes and surfing.

And so, most of what I know and came to understand about the island he was kind of that first point of contact to doing any hanging out and that kind of stuff so. So, professionally not super high but personally we had a good solid year under our belt.

Q. So, I guess for your first impressions then what was his personality like?

A. He was the, he was, he was the point of contact. He was the

extravert. He was like everyone, let's get everyone involved. I think that's what's very sad about the accident, you know, is that some of our most connected crew was unfortunately the ones involved.

But yeah, Brian and his family were always like, they were ones having Thanksgiving, having everybody over and making sure that everyone had a place to belong. He was the central point of getting people together and creating that camaraderie and was very good to me as far as making sure I began to know all the things around the island. So, a very great personality, easy going, laid back, just a good guy.

Q. And as a pilot, I know you weren't around him like you said as much professionally. I know you guys are sort of like when one's on, one's off sort of thing but --

A. Right.

Q. -- were there any impressions there or did you know anything about that?

A. Unfortunately, really, yeah, nothing that could -- yeah, because we, again, we never really overlap and the only time we semi-flew together he was just sitting right seat, helping me again the policies when I first came over.

So, actually, never saw him even him operating, right. It was just him making -- helping me, hey, what, like what's HCF expect in this situation. So, even then on those few flights he was actually in operation. So, it was just me.

Q. Do you know about how many flights that was?
A. We did at least three to five maybe. So, I did some with John, which was the pilot before as well. So, we swapped out whatever shift was, they were on. I just kind of rode it like, I was the PIC, but they were just there to help with the, oh we route, this is our routing. This is what we like to do.
Q. Okay. But not --
A. Not operational or checking, no.
Q. And no training I guess?
A. No training. Yeah.
Q. In the I guess the sociable moments when you, you know, I call it watercooler talk although I know you guys aren't really structured to have a system in place for that, however watercooler talks about the job, and did he ever express to you like the things he loved about the job or the things that he didn't like as much about the job?
A. So, again and the context is two buddies on a trail hiking and like how anyone might vent some doesn't always mean it doesn't rise to the level, right, because if there was -- if he, if he voiced serious concern I was like oh, no big deal and I was dismissive that would be bad on me as a friend, right?

So, if there was complaining it was that general like banter between, just out hiking and like and so there was definitely a level of like I think he was kind of getting frustrated of the schedule, you know, and Hawaii is very expensive to make that

happen.

And just he'd been doing it a lot longer than I'd been doing it. So, there was a little bit of, you know, expression of being -- I would maybe use the term like getting close to like burning out a little bit. Like oh, I'm just kind of over this type of environment and working and flying, you know.

Q. And by schedule you mean the --

A. Just the two weeks on and like you're on call. Like you really don't know, like, you know, am I getting called today, am I not getting called out today, you know, like so yeah, you could be sitting at home, but you're not really off, you know, your brain is still engaged.

So, there was a little bit of like I kind of miss maybe as much as airline pilots, you don't necessarily have to be gone a lot but sometimes it is nice to know at least I'm going to be gone and doing these legs this particular day.

So, if there was any kind, you know, any kind of frustration talk it was more just, you know, he'd been, he was ten years older than me and I think was maybe looking for something a little more, you know, consistent.

Q. Stable?

A. Yeah.

Q. What about the operation, flying environment itself? So, like the uniqueness that is the islands and flying in and out of this area, did he ever express any concern over that or --

A. I would say, yeah, nothing on the actual terrain and type, because he also did tour flying, right, so he was a, you know, a rotor pilot as well. And so, that's going to be putting yourself in a lot closer to terrain and changing weather conditions.

So, no, he never expressed any kind of like, oh I don't like Hawaii, it's too dark or this is an unsafe environment. I mean he flew for us and then like I said a tour company.

Q. I know you said he was one of the first to kind of like, hey, let's get you plugged in. Like, this is life along the area. But in general, was there a high level of camaraderie with the other people that you worked with, or did you ever see any issues there between him and other employees under Guardian?

A. I mean he did I would say it was probably more specific cliniticians may be plugged in a little more. Our opposite pilots they don't, their -- like I said, they have their own lives. They have kind of things going on. And so, I don't see too much -- and again I've only been here a year, you know, but and they're a little older and they kind of have their set ways, right.

So, they have their friend groups and so that's nothing to say. But I would say my opposite pilots, not super always engaging to the things that Brian would do but like our cliniticians, yeah, like I said for Thanksgiving, he like cliniticians and all of us were over there, you know.

So, but yeah, so I would say he had a good relationship with even the cliniticians as well.

Q. We talked a little -- I think one of the first things we talked about was like a staffing and, you know, and of course everybody -- it would not be aviation if there wasn't a staffing issue in general.

But with that and then maybe some of the frustrations about this type of like of consistency in flying, did he ever express anything along the lines of like hey, you know, maybe it's time to bounce to something new, go to maybe, you know, part 121 world or anything like that? Did he ever express that kind of interest?

A. Yeah. He'd started to put out some applications and kind of -- because he'd come, I think he spent a little bit of time at our regional carrier and then came into this area. I think now that, you know, the mainline carriers were beginning to really hire I think he definitely put a few applications out.

And was being interviewed a little bit. And was finally open maybe to going to Alaska or something like that, you know, Alaska Airlines. So, yeah there were some applications out.

Q. Okay. And then with that again that schedule, the uniqueness of your schedule, your two weeks on, two weeks off, I guess let's circle back to first like you, what do -- how dialed into, in are you to everything that Hawaii has to offer?

I know you said you went on some hikes, but was there anything else that you were aware that he did or that you did with him outside of the workplace?

A. No. I mean I probably would still only know half the island

if it weren't for him. You know, I'm just kind of an introvert, right. So on day's I'll wake up be like, I could go outside but, you know, it's beautiful, let's sit at the beach, you know, like I know that.

So, no I mean I'm just now starting of course to get the few, I've had a few family and friends that visited now so now I'm starting to, but I tend to like to visit new areas when I have someone kind of with me to explore that. But we actually did a lot. I mean we'd try to hit all of the major spots when he was around so.

Q. And the reason I'm asking is because I know a lot of people -- like because unfortunately I will never get the pleasure to know him for myself so I'm trying to gleam from other people like who is Brian Treptow. A lot of people have said obviously, and you've mentioned it too, very extroverted, very athletic, very like dialed into all things adrenaline.

A. Yes.

Q. And stuff like that. And so, I'm just trying kind of get a determination like what did he like to do during the day when he wasn't flying? You know, what was he into?

A. Okay. Yeah, okay. Sorry if I didn't catch that earlier. Yeah, we probably were like 180 opposites, right. I mean yes, he is -- I remember one of the first things I was told is like don't try to keep up with Brian.

You know, he's got the motorcycle, he's got the windsurfing,

he's got the canoes and all the things. You know, I'm like well I just downloaded this book on my, this new book on Kindle, right. So, yes, we were -- in that sense, yes, he was very adventurous.

I remember one thing -- well actually one of the last times I get to see him he -- we were at a stoplight, you know, and of course he's that guy, it's like -- it's like sometimes I'm the kind of guy in the grocery store that kind of like will go down a different aisle if I don't know how to engage the conversation.

Right. I might avoid someone I kind of know, so to avoid an awkward situation. He's the kind of guy like banging on his windows, hey -- you know, like oh, hey Brian. He's, he's off to go do a quick solo hike, you know, just real briefly, you know.

So, he was the kind of guy that, yeah, I mean if there was -- I would say if the sun was up he was out doing something. But the truth is, you know, he was even a morning bird. You know, he would, you know, anytime the water was good or smooth, yeah, he wanted to be engaging in some sort of either water activity or hiking activity.

And usually brought people into that and then his off time, him and his long-term girlfriend, I mean they were inseparable, right. So, I mean like you can hopefully, yeah, if his Facebook is still available you can go and you can just look at some of their, you know, trips to the Pacific Coast Highway to -- because, you know, she had a travel job as well.

She could take time. Yeah, they were ones that never shied

back from an adventure. So, almost any kind of outdoor activity you could think of Brian was probably a part of it. And he was probably asking people to come. He wanted to show them how to do it.

Q. And that's great. And this place definitely lends itself, I mean for that kind of, that adventure.

A. Yes.

Q. But I do have to ask then were you ever aware of kind of that high level of activity possibly interfering with the job? Because I mean it takes a lot of energy to go windsurfing at 7:00 in the morning.

A. Right, right.

Q. And then switch to a 5:00 p.m. show, you know what I mean, for flying.

A. Right.

Q. So, had -- were you ever aware of that being an issue or did you hear any rumblings?

A. And that's the thing, you know, I mean I think it's, it's easy to want to speculate based on the previous but honestly I mean because of our opposite shift, like we might have hiked in the morning, but I don't know what the rest of the afternoon part.

He could have went home and slept the rest of the day and then woken up, you know, like as if it were 5:00 a.m., you know, but it being 5:00 p.m. So, I don't want to speculate on -- we did things in the morning and so I don't know what the timeframe -- we

weren't close enough to know what he did in between maybe our early hike and his show time.

Q. I'm just -- no, and that's perfect.

A. Yeah.

Q. Like I said, I'm just trying to kind of figure out what normal day is for you, for each of you and this kind of shift, switching work.

A. Yeah, right.

DR. WOODS: But that's also a lot of my yakking. So, I'm going to think over some of your answers and then I'm going to pass it off to Millicent.

MR. ETCHER: Before you start, do you need a break? We've been going about an hour and a half. You doing all right?

MR. WETZLER: No. I'm good.

MR. ETCHER: All right.

MR. WETZLER: Yeah, thanks.

BY MS. HILL:

Q. Did Brian ever fly outside of for work or for the helicopter tours, did he fly personally like a Cessna or flight instructing or --

A. No. I'm not aware. It's all, yeah, all corporate environments, yeah.

Q. Other than Kaleo, what, who management-wise or Hawaii Life Flight or Guardian would you interact with on a regular basis?

A. Occasionally through Mark, which our program director, but

again it's mostly through just Kaleo because Mark is kind of in more on the cliniticians side. Well, I mean he's a program director and does oversee, Kaleo is more of the, yeah, the day to day.

Q. And the PMOC would then traditionally be Kaleo?

A. Correct. On the mainland it switches out but here on the islands it's Kaleo. And so, we're now beginning to switch that out to where Kaleo won't always be the PMOC so he can have a break as well.

Q. And the monthly training or safety, what all is included in that?

A. So, our monthly training would be, one would be a systems training, so it could be you know anything in that area. And then also the other one would be like an actual, like an operation, so like FOM, GOM type stuff. So, you're getting both the systems review and a policy review.

Q. All computer-based though?

A. Correct.

Q. Just click through the slide show?

A. Correct.

Q. Take a quiz at the end?

A. Correct.

Q. And just say you did it?

A. A quiz at the end, correct.

Q. Had there been any policy changes since the accident?

A. Well there had been as far as our spool up time is now going back -- oh that's a difference from here versus the mainland is on the mainland it was always phone call from dispatch or comm center to the pilot first to do the weather check. And then we would let the cliniticians know if it was a go/no-go.

My first route in Hawaii was like the techs came in so everything is already moving and so you're doing your weather checks and such while you're, you're on the clock now with that departure time.

So, one of the policy changes here has been to go back to what we do on the mainland which is a call comes into the comm center. The comm center reestablishes contact with the pilot. I do my weather checks. I also call now my clinician crew and make sure that they are feeling good to go.

They want to do this mission. They haven't been over warn out or extended, or they just feel comfortable going since we're kind of in a unique situation, you know, it could be 2:00 a.m. And then after that that usually takes about ten minutes.

Then I'll reestablish contact with comms center, give them the go/no-go and then they'll send out the dispatch text which will then have all of the information as far as where we're going, as far as the hospital for them. I already know where we're going of course because of planning.

And then our patient weight for our weights and balances, those types of things. And then now we're on that clock. Now

we're all moving towards the aircraft to get things going. So, that's a big policy change is I get to now know first where we're going to begin the planning and checking and then we'll get everyone else involved.

Q. Do you see any room for other policy changes that could improve safety or efficiency outside of the operation?

A. And it was discussed in a recent meeting which is extending a little bit of the ETAs that we give to our hospital systems. So, I think we often have operated with some maybe -- not dishonest, just what we're hoping for, right, good goals.

Like we do want to make sure. I mean it's if person ventilated, you're not like, well within three hours, you know, hey guys, grab lunch on your way to the airport. I mean obviously we can't lollygag. Obviously we need to give correct ETAs to the hospital and those types of things.

But I think we're now beginning to realize that maybe where there is a difference in Hawaii versus mainland is again housing is not super easy, right. So, like I wouldn't choose to live 15 to 16 minutes away whereas like on the mainland all the crew houses are right on the airport. I mean so you don't need a local place on the airport.

Your house is pretty much there. So, they are beginning to have those conversations with the hospitals that maybe we need to add a little more time, you know, where we might have been there traditionally in 30 minutes, it might be 40 minutes.

And you'd be surprised what ten minutes can do and that can take doing the risk assessment from being a task to I'm actually going to really process through this. So, there are those changes that are coming as far as, you know, more realistic ETAs.

Like I said earlier I do wish we had a place on property that I could kind of relax in and not have to be attached just to the airport. I'm sure it took security a little while to realize that, like what's this weirdo doing in the airplane all night, you know. Like, I'm at work.

This is my dayshift, right, bro? Just like you're at work, I'm at work, you know. I'm not going to steal this airplane, you know. So, it would be nice and maybe that would be an incredible thing to have is like an actual ready room.

But again that's -- they haven't had that because that's the point of being on call from home. It's just home is a little different on Hawaii versus, you know, you get stuck in that Hana traffic and, you know, that could be not -- it could be a problem.

And the thing we've added, and I want to see more of is just more getting the crews together. So, unfortunately it took this incident for us all to get together for a lunch and see everyone and talk and so I hope that that's an increased thing where if we're not maybe seeing each other as much on our day-to-day operation.

It was very awesome to get everyone together, have a big bus take us down in the beach area. Had a meal for all of us to talk

and tell stories and it was good see the whole operation and not feel so disconnected from -- you know, it went from being a very small operation -- like we're already small, within the big picture but now you don't feel like you're Maui and this is this team.

Because you know, I mean you study like travel mentality, right. It's easy to begin, you know, feeling like you're in competition with other bases versus being a team with them that are base side like that, that increase of actually we're not against each other, we're together.

Q. You said you liked this airplane. Do you feel like the fleet as a whole has maintenance issues or unresolved maintenance issues? Do you feel like they're dealt with in a reasonable time? Are your complaints heard?

A. Yeah. I would say by and large as a captain in the airlines my job was to come and read all the MELs and make sure I could take off with all these particular deferrals, right. So, I'm sitting there, and I could have this out, and this out and this out.

And it is super nice to come here and generally speaking we have no MELs, no deferrals on the aircrafts. So, I would say at least 70 percent of the time when I show up to a new aircraft I'm just reviewing the logbook to make sure checks have been signed off, previous things have been recorded correctly and signature is done.

But there's traditionally not a lot of deferrals that I'm having to get into our MEL and really understanding if these things -- you know, even if you do have an MEL, it's usually just one MEL so again you're only reviewing that particular issue.

By and large I was based at a maintenance base in Blanding, so I did a lot of the operational check flights, so unfortunately when I graduated A&P school that was 2004 so I think sometimes people will think, oh you're A&P. This must be amazing to have.

And I'm like, man, I hadn't used it in forever and so I'm -- there's probably a lot of technical things. I'd be embarrassed if you started asking me few things on schematics. I might be like well I think that's a diode, you know. I'd have to get back in a little bit.

But there is that little bit of foundation and I value getting to be a part of the process in seeing -- I had really great access to our head mechanic there and even if I had question I called them. I was like, I might be asked this, like can you help refresh me?

And he, like, he's on, he's in Blanding, Utah still allowing me to call him in the middle of the day and provide some information. So, I've just been incredibly impressed that he's not like, oh, are you kidding me. Come on, man. Like you should know that. Like he was, you know, always been cordial.

And so, the mechanics there were often times apprentices and so they were learning under, you know, an expert. And so, they

wanted to be there. I just have -- it was so refreshing to be at a base where like -- I started hanging out with him. We went to the movies one time like all of the mechanics and myself.

Like usually, like I said there's an adversarial role and I was really impressed that in Blanding there was this camaraderie even amongst the pilots and the mechanics. And so, because of that that lends itself to conversation. Hey, what are you doing? What are you working on? They would pull the schematics out for me.

They would if I'm about to go do let's say a check on the stall system, it wasn't just like hey go run through this particular checklist. They would include me in the conversation of what went wrong, how they replaced it and then what really, like what we're actually checking when we go on that process, and they would come with even.

And so, that was really cool as a pilot to be part of the overall mechanical process as well. And then get to check it. And then if I didn't like it, I didn't sign it off and there was no, like come on, man. We really need this aircraft out there.

It was, they really trusted because that relationship that I had with maintenance staff they trusted my opinion. Overall, by and large I think there might be some complaints pilot-wise as far as how good these aircraft are, and I use air quotes in that because we all have a different tolerance and understanding of the aircraft.

And I think if you're expecting that these aircraft are brand new Teslas that just rode off the flightline, you know, that you're right, everything will operate excessively perfect. But we all know in aviation that those standards after the first flight, you know, if your cruise ceiling is 41,000 feet, trust me, we're not taking the CRJ-200 up to 41,000 feet on a regular basis. It may not even make 38,000, right.

So, we had a limitation of like 34,000, right, so we know that some of those cases, these are like I said, later model aircraft. And so, while there might be some complaints around it I felt that one, maintenance is always address.

Two, we had a very competent staff and if they were training up that staff I believe his shop had like the least turnover like in any part of our company and that's great when you have consistency in maintenance.

And then if, and then myself personally while we might have an issue here and there, there's never been a time where I've questioned the safety of an aircraft. I mean not that I would take it, but, you know, we're curious of course of what happened in this particular, you know, case.

We want to understand like was it, you know, when we're operating in a high salt environment was it corrosion, was it, you know, a catastrophic component failure. Of course, but by and large having seen the sausage made it's pretty impressive the level of checks and so yeah, I feel 100 percent confidence in our

aircraft and our fleet. Even if they might have some gremlins and bugs at times, the King Air is a flying tank essentially.

Q. Do you ever show up to a shift and find issues with the airplanes that haven't been documented?

A. Not that would be rise to the level of like an MEL. Like so we have never had none of our staff or pilots would ever land back with let's say with a broken component and be like, well, let the next guy get it. We have -- while our crossover briefings and briefings could be better.

Every pilot understand the responsibility here where -- matter of fact our last incident we had the pilot got back late. He had an issue with the trim and instead of just saying, hey, I've been on shift all night, you take it because he had actually operated the flight, he's like I'll continue with maintenance control so actually he -- I was there with him.

But he actually continued the entire process even though he could have technically clocked out and went home and be like, hey, well why don't you call. But I don't know 100 percent what had happened so instead of it being secondhand knowledge to the mechanic, he stayed on shift late to make sure that he could deliver the firsthand information.

And then I stayed then for the follow up maintenance of course but that is one thing that, you know, if we've had some issue it might be cosmetic and I might be like, how did we not catch it, you know, and then I have to like call maintenance

myself, you know.

But there's never -- that we have a strong culture of. We don't leave broken planes for one another.

Q. So, are these crossover briefings mandatory and what is all included in them?

A. So, they are mandatory per our manual of course but they are very brief. It's meant just to communicate that, you know, the correct amount of fuel is onboard, the correct amount of oxygen is onboard for our patients.

And again, if there was anything to be aware of weather-wise or NOTAM-wise. So, for instance if I know a runway is closing in two hours, it'd be helpful for me to say, hey, I know you've probably checked it but just a reminder that this airport, you know.

So, they're very brief, just to kind of communicate very simple things about the past operation. Hey, the Med crew's been -- we did two legs, two flight or two missions, you know, so they might be timing out soon.

So, very -- nothing significant that would be like if it didn't happen there's nothing like super critical of safety that's missed in that. Most of that is when you communicate with your comm debrief so.

Q. Are those documented in any way, that it was done or what was briefed?

A. Not within the pilot group, no. Of course, on the comm

center's recorded line that's all there. The thing that some bases have been doing and I might consider suggesting is when I covered in Hilo for a couple of days what they were doing at their based and I liked and might try to bring back to our is they just have an ongoing email thread.

And so, that way if someone's in rest it's not interrupting their rest. I may not know if that pilot, you know, flew late or whatever. And so, they can just wake up and kind of see some of the things and so that was kind of nice to have an ongoing, almost like a message board which then you would have things documented as far as here's what we encountered during the flight.

Here's some, you know, here's what I'm working on maintenance-wise. When you get out you'll be expected to see the mechanic for such, you know. So, that could be added to our program for sure.

MS. HILL: I think I'm done.

MR. ETCHER: I could use a break if that's all right with everyone.

DR. WOODS: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Let's take a break. It's 14 past noon.

(Off the record at 12:14 p.m.)

(On the record at 12:20 p.m.)

MR. ETCHER: And back on the record at 12:20. Okay.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. So, is, I was just curious, you were talking about it earlier

with them, is Blanding, is that hometown area?
A. No. I grew up in Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma.
Q. Oh really.
A. Yeah. Broken Arrow like specifically but just where I was crew-based first.
Q. Okay. All right. So, the Four Corners area my hometown area.
A. Oh really, okay.
Q. Yeah. I just moved to Hawaii about a year ago so.
A. Oh really. Okay.
Q. Yeah, Farmington.
A. Yeah. I went there plenty of times.
Q. Yeah. So, I grew up in Aztec. Do you know where Aztec is?
A. I do not, no.
Q. That's the very next two from Farmington.
A. Okay. Excellent.
Q. Anyway.
A. I guess they have a Chipotle at least. That's nice.
Q. Yeah. And a Chick-fil-A.
A. Yeah.
DR. WOODS: You've got it all then.
MR. GARRISON: Right. What else do you need? Yeah, I was just curious.
BY MR. GARRISON:
Q. But were you flying the King Air there too?

A. Yes, same model.
Q. Okay. You mentioned having iPads. Are they assigned to the airplane?
A. Correct, yeah, two aircraft, or to iPads to each aircraft.
Q. Two iPads to each aircraft. Okay. And is there procedures for setting them up before flight?
A. So, just on initial, right, we want to get there and make sure that there is, obviously they work. Before a flight I'm making sure they, in most bases, all the iPads have cellular service so we can also make sure that there's all the charts and all of the -- so the company pushes a new, a beta document, make sure that's downloaded in for a flight document section.

But also making sure, if like I said, there's a new nav database or something like that, an update. So, the initial part of preflight is making sure your iPad not just work but that all the data is updated as well.
Q. Okay. And what about setting it up before takeoff?
A. There's no -- we have our initial training but that is probably more each pilot has kind of their own desired usability level maybe, right. So, for like me I want to maximize all the functions but not every pilot enjoys, you know, sets up the same way.

So, like I might scale down some of the routings where other pilots might, you know, want to see all the particular fixes along their route. So, there's no standard like your iPad has to be

this. Just minimum, which is like depending if we're taxiing right, so of course you need to have your taxi diagram out if you're shooting your approach, when you're shooting your approach.

So, just the legal things that are required but as far as like all the other availability options there's no real singular strategy in that case.

Q. Okay. What about where its physical location?

A. Just per our manual it just has to be secured or attached in some capacity. Some pilots won't -- still pull out the knee board and the attachments and have it on their leg. But the most common area you'll see it is attached to the control yoke. So, we use that mechanism. It's been approved to have our control yoke be the station.

Q. And where do you put it?

A. Right there on the control yoke.

Q. Okay. What about the co-pilot instrumentation? Is there procedures for setting that up?

A. So, again same thing that is we need to make sure that those after, you know, roughly five minutes to start up, making sure your gyros have come online. Making sure your RMI and those types of things. So, again making sure that, you know, like at nighttime, you're not going to turn on your lights down that side to make it better.

Actually, we want to make sure we have, you know, visibility of those lights. So, you're checking to make sure that they've

come up and are working correctly and that you can still easily see them in nighttime. So, everyone sets it up to where it's like a true backup system basically.

Q. Okay. Is there, is there a CDI over on the --

A. Yes.

Q. -- co-pilot HSI?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. So, there's not a lot of procedure on that. That's just more of my own personal -- because you know when things are going to go wrong, everything is going to go wrong. So, for me I would rather just have the heading bug and my CDI from my VOR or whatever set up just in case I lose everything I've got an immediate, not only am I looking at altitude indicator, actually on navigation as well. That's just a personal thing I like to add.

Q. So, you set it up?

A. I set it up, yeah.

Q. And that's just person --

A. That's just a personal.

Q. That's not -- is there any company policies --

A. I mean I think that it's, it's desired probably to, you know -- I mean maybe. I haven't seen anything specifically saying, hey guys do this. But so, I don't know how widespread that is, but I can't give any particular policy that dictates that action.

Q. Yeah. Or if you get like a flight right at the start of shift, 5:00 p.m. shift, yeah.
A. Right.
Q. Like is there, is there anything you're think about like with the lighting on the instrument, I mean like, I don't know, would you ever have flights where you're flying from -- just take off at day, land at night?
A. Yeah. That happens consistently where, you know, throughout your dayshift or vice versa. But much more of an issue in your day to night. So, it' just being familiar with all the real stats up top and you're just, as you're going you're -- there's a kind of -- again, it's a personal preference of when you want to switch over from basically day version of the lighting to the night version of lighting.
Q. Is there any required checks on that, like if you're doing that like from a day to a night, like to check the lighting to make sure it's actually going to work when you get into night?
A. That, actually, yeah, I've not seen anything on that particular case. You're right, as far as, you know, routings. That would be, you know, difficulty to kind of even see to some of that backlighting, so you're right, there's really not a -- right. We've not -- it might, there might be but you're right, in my case I have not even actually thought about that in cases as far as checking to make sure your lighting will work. That's a good point.

Q. Yep.
A. I'll add that now to my checks, so thank you.
Q. What -- let's say you are in flight and that happens to you, day/night, you flip, you flip on the lights, and nothing comes on and your lighting is not working for whatever reason. What could you do that point?
A. So, I think maybe why it hasn't been maybe super discussed is most of those lightings operate on a different system each, right. So, it's not one switch controls everything. So, honestly the likelihood of all of your backlighting being out --
Q. Let's just say some of the co-pilot instruments or something, something that you're wanting to look at is out. Do you have anything -- how would you --
A. Oh yeah.
Q. -- repair that lighting?
A. Most of it, we have emergency lights.
Q. Okay.
A. So, we do have a backup of a completely separate system or two lights. And then of course most of us have our headlamps as well. So, you're going to have not just because a flashlight is too bright but most of us carry a headlamp as well which gives you, gives you a red light.

So, you've got your emergency lights, which are green. Pop it on. That does cover your panel. And, you know, if that didn't happen you still have your headlight which is either on your head

or right next to you, so there's again almost a triple redundancy when it comes to lighting.

Q. Okay. And is that policy or is that just your personal like having a headlamp?

A. I would say that's again personal, but I think after everyone has, you know, a week on the job here they realize like, I need headlamp.

Q. Okay. You -- let's see. You were talking about the autopilot. As far as write-ups on that, have you seen, have you seen write-ups on that? Is that normal in this airplane? Is it, is it a problem or is it really reliable?

A. I'll bring in two responses. One is is it a reliable system in the way that, like I said 90 percent of flights, maybe 99 percent of the flights, autopilot works as described. The second part of that would be is but there are sometimes issues with some of the servos operating.

So, what you might get is, right, a little bit of lag to the left or to the right, so a little bit of oscillating either on the pitch a little bit or it would oscillate on the right and left, so that would be what we would have to write-up. I mean autopilot would still maintained direction and altitude correctly enough, we'd still be saying we'd go into then maintenance to have the servos, or the computer checked out.

So, still held it's altitude. It didn't click off completely. But it didn't function as smoothly as it should be.

But that's a servo issue not obviously an autopilot issue.
Q. Okay. Like disconnecting in flight? Is that a --
A. Very rare.
Q. Very rare?
A. Very rare. I mean I can -- I don't know if I can even -- there was like maybe one time that that was, it didn't engage and that was on an older aircraft that's now been, you know, decommissioned. But I can't even recall in a year and my two years there like an actual autopilot like true failure in flight.
Q. Okay. But you did have one you said?
A. It wouldn't engage. It was the older system and it just --
Q. Oh, it wouldn't engage.
A. I was trying to hit autopilot, engage and I climbed out and it just didn't want to -- it must have been a, you know, a computer fault, right.
Q. You mentioned the Baldwin reports. Can you tell me about those?
A. Yeah, so, you know, obviously this is kind of our beginnings of any kind of -- so if there's an interrupted flight that we would have to -- if we were responding to a call or coming here in a call and basically if anything happens that's going to be our first thing to begin our legal processing of reporting.
So, if you did an autopilot failure that would be where we'd, you know, initially, after we've talked to maintenance control and

in that sense we'd have to then begin filling out a Baldwin report. If fell from the range it might be a part 135, responding to a part 135 operation.

But yeah, that's just our -- we can report human factors to our Baldwin report, but we also report any kind of mechanical interruption reports as well. It's the beginning of that process. And then maintenance control would then send out, if it's an NTSB form we need complete or such like that. But the Baldwin is the, you know, like the beginnings of the internal company process system.

Q. Okay. So, a Baldwin report is required when?

A. Basically, any time -- we're able to write it any time we think something rises to the ability of, you know, outside of normal operations. So, there's a little bit of loose wording. Like if you think this -- you did a, you know, you did a go around and you want to report the weather and the go around.

But a go around typically is a normal operation in a weather so that doesn't always require. A Baldwin report is if you, of course any kind of incident or accident, any type of mechanical failure or interruption of flight. And it would be also any kind of beginnings of self-reporting.

So, let's say you missed having a manual onboard and so you're beginning that process. We now have a NASA -- or the -- we now have the ASAP program now which is some of that -- some of those Baldwin reports are now going to be in the -- I don't

remember what that one was called I just mentioned. But --

DR. WOODS: ASAP?

A. But ASAP Program. Yeah. So, now some of those things are going into the ASAP versus this but there's a list in our GOM basically that talks about irregularities in flight that rise to the level of reporting to our management and again like I said, just some failures and non-standard events.

Q. Okay. Let's see. But you had mentioned earlier that the -- some of the medical crew had written a Baldwin report saying that you parked in the wrong parking spot?

A. Yeah. So, again that was like personal. So, again that was just to begin -- so it goes in the main center point and then whom every is the gatekeeper of that, then just submit it to their main control standard. Or in that particular case it went to human resources.

And so, the base gets like -- Baldwin basically takes all the things that happen operationally whether interpersonal or mechanical and then it gets disseminated out to the correct department. And that department then follows up on that report.

Q. So, it could really be about any --

A. Yeah. Yeah. I mean yes. It's like our, just our complete internal --

Q. So, they're making --

A. It could be like, we're not getting enough food. We need 20 more minutes on the ground. Like hey we did two flights

back-to-back and we didn't get to get lunch, or you want, or you want document that you went to lunch.

Like hey we did two missions and then we took an hour off to go get lunch so that there's documentation saying like, you know, this is what needs to happen in the future. There's needs to be more -- yeah.

Q. So, correct me if I'm wrong here, but it sounds like it would be required for anything that you feel is serious in nature, but it could be filed for anything you feel like --

A. Correct.

Q. -- complaining about.

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. Which is --

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So, I know you talked about, you know, like everyone staying in their lane and but that was interesting to me that medics are telling you like how you should file, which routes you should file and all that? I'm even surprised they have that knowledge. Is that common?

A. That is common of our guys that have like their beginning, like have done some flight training and now they're, in the nicest way possible maybe, you know, yeah, just trying to insert some of their knowledge maybe or they like want to -- it's no different than the, you know, the 172 pilot gets on the airliner, it's like, hey, Captain, if you need anything let me know. And the captain

is like, okay, you know.

Q. Yeah.

A. So, I think in that kind of situation maybe a little bit, right. Like oh I fly airplanes. I know what's going on. I'm like, okay.

Q. Do you ever have any of them ride up front with you?

A. On occasion we have had them, especially the new ones, giving them some orientation so they can understand a little bit of what we do. I think sometimes there is, to the interpersonal thing, I think sometimes there's a lack of understanding of what we do and all of the things that are happening. It's almost like driving a car.

And so, there are times where we are able to have them up front to really kind of understand what we're going through from start up to finish so they have maybe an appreciation. So, we get to see theirs a little more as we're loading and doing that kind of stuff.

So, yeah, on the occasion they are able to sit up front and kind of observe the operation.

Q. From what we've been talking about and listening to you, interpersonal relationship, like that stuff is -- you highly value that. I can tell. Did you have any good relationships with the medical -- or do you have any good relationships with the medical crew like are any of them excited to fly? Like when you guys see each other, is it like, hey, yay, we're on the same --

A. Yeah. So, unfortunately, the nurse in this situation, she was that. I mean it was like literally I just had checked my schedule, like oh, this particular team was the team I was really looking forward to spending the next two weeks.

Unfortunately, they let one of the, like the medic unfortunately had just lost his job the week before this incident but they were kind of the team that, we were, like we did, we worked well together. You know, if it was going to be a long night and they were driving in, like hey, we're stopping at Starbucks. What do you want?

It wasn't like what can I get you. It was like what do you want? You know, so yeah, the nurse in that case, yeah, I really enjoyed getting to that --that's kind of what this, kind of a bummer since I value those things. It was a little bit of a bummer of like this was the team that was kind of building those relationships.

Here now I think we're all going to be more intentional and try to build that even if there is some head-butting. But generally speaking, so far like I have not found what I found on the mainland per se, you know.

On the mainland it was, it was like you really looked forward, you -- we still text each other over holidays or whatever or suggest videos to watch and that just has not necessarily materialized as much, as easily here, yeah.

Q. And what about in the opposite? Like did you hear of these

medical crews that you've created a relationship with like, was it every like a, oh thank God, it's you and it's not so and so?

A. No. I mean I think as far as -- that's the nice thing here is that even with some interpersonal issues the truth is, you're not going to get in an aircraft of this size if you don't trust the crew member.

And so generally speaking even if there is some like personal words shared I've never heard any of cliniticians be like, oh, I don't like that pilot. They trusted us.

Q. You mentioned you're hanging out in the airplane, you know, at night, are you sleeping at all? Like do you get, do you get to sleep?

A. I sleep during the day but then that's just my nap time at night. So, --

Q. Okay. So, you can get some naps in the airplane?

A. Yeah. It is, yeah, especially when we have the long bench one, you know.

Q. Right.

A. So, I'll do my actual rest during the day and then I just go bring my pillow and hang out in the airplane and kind of relax a little bit. I mean I'm sure one day if I'm married and I have kids that will be a very different story.

But like right now like I said, it's -- I mean it's a pretty peaceful place, right. It's 2:00 in the morning, stars, hanging out on the ramp. It's a great --

Q. I imagine the nicest thing about that, too, is when you do get called out, you're like, you're ready.
A. I literally -- yeah, I just throw my flight suit on and --
Q. Because it's not like leaving from your house, a 15-minute drive --
A. It's not. And so, there's so little stress of like, the clock, it's like all right. Here we go. Let's just kind of --
Q. Wait for everyone else show up?
A. Yeah. Getting things going and --
Q. Right.
A. Yeah. And like I said, I've already rested during the day so it's not like I'm relying on that to be my -- like I'm not, I'm not hoping to sleep all night, you know. Like I'm still resting during the day. And then that's just bonus resting so.
Q. Tell me about recurrent training at Guardian?
A. So, in the past on the mainland we all would go to South Jordan and so that would be again bringing the teams together. We're going to go back over all the systems, all your policies and procedures.

And then you're going to get some simulator time and then the goal would be then to go out and do your six-month proficiency check. As in Hawaii, they are trying to build a simulator and get those things out here, but we're still going to have to go back. I'm scheduled to go back in March all the way back to South Jordan and still do that.

As far as the actual training goes, it's again very regiment as far as like kind of going over a lot of the PowerPoints that we've already experienced throughout the months. So, I guess that goes back to my earlier thing I'd like to -- that might be a better time for something like, hey we've already got all this information.

This is pretty straightforward. We can studies these things. But that might be where there's a little bit lacking is during recurrent training it might be a great place for those real conversations since we're actually physically together now with our instructors in the simulator.

But as far as like what happens, very straightforward PowerPoints on all the systems, all the operations. Standard training as far as like raw data, approaches, GPS approaches and then we'll go out and do our checkride.

Q. Okay. So, you're doing the training in the simulator in South Jordan?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. Have you trained here in Honolulu?

A. I have not yet, no. Just my initial experience here.

Q. Okay. And is that, has that been true in the past as well? So, you've been with Guardian/Hawaii Life Flight, we'll say, we'll say you've been with Guardian for three years, right?

A. Right, correct.

Q. So, and that's true every recurrent training that you've been

to so far?
A. Yes. So, far I've had --
Q. You to South Jordan and you're doing simulator training and then --
A. Yeah. So, it kind of came right at that line. So, yeah, like it's my first time to really be up for recurrent. So, I think in the past I think they were trying to do in-house. It's just, it's just how it gets worked out where I'm going to be on my third time now it's going to be back in South Jordan.

So, I can't speak too much as what happened to my arrival here. But yeah, my -- so now my entire three training will all have been in South Jordan.
Q. Okay. What about your 297 six-month check?
A. That will be here locally, yeah, with our check airman here.
Q. Okay. And do you do that in an actual airplane?
A. We do, yes.
Q. Okay. And do you do any, do any training before that, before --
A. We do not, no.
Q. Okay. So, it's just a check?
A. Right.
Q. Right. Understood. Tell me about -- is there any partial panel training? It's like --
A. Yeah. So, we are supposed to do -- what's up? That's one of our nurses. I guess he's probably next to go.

DR. WOODS: Mm-hmm.
A. We do a lot of composites, so like, you know, it would be like composite training. So, learning should one of our screens fail --
Q. Okay
A. -- you know, make sure we quickly identify that, get to composite mode and then maybe finish the approach with just one screen.
Q. Okay. So, when you do partial panel training it's -- the extent of it would be, would be the composite mode?
A. Correct. Yeah.
Q. Just switching back and forth.
A. Right.
Q. What about have you ever had both those fail in training and have to fly off the co-pilot instruments?
A. That we've not done, no. Now in my OCF experience get to do a lot of, I got to do a little, you know, I got to do a little more hands on, checking different things. But as far as our per training no, most of it's just one failure.
Q. OCF?
A. Operation Check Flights back on the mainland when I would check aircraft off. I had a little more freedom to check systems and turn things off and check, you know. So, for me personally I got to do a little more of that, but not in our training program.
Q. Okay. You were, you were talking a lot about the -- or not a

lot. You were talking about the DPU earlier.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Tell me what you know about that component?

A. Yeah.

Q. Again, not a checkride. Just as an informational base, yeah?

A. Yeah. No worries. So, essentially we're operating on like 1940's technology. Just kidding, you know. But (indiscernible) rate, too. I mean we're talking, you know, this is nothing like, this isn't a traditional screen so again we're just shooting laser beams, data that's sent from our display processing unit basically shooting up our adjudicator or our paint command bars.

And so, kind of the -- I've been called the main brains of the situation, right. Because you have your Collins, which speaks to the autopilot computer which speaks then to the DPU. So, I think there is any, you know, what makes the DPU reliable is that it has internal checking, right.

And so, I'll know if my, if my VOR or my ILS or or my navigation isn't correctly working, it's going to flag it for me. And we have a check right. Even before we depart we can check and make sure those warning flags will pop up and display if there's a DPU failure of a particular component.

So, gain a DUP, if you consider all, each being different cards, just because you have a heading failure of the DPU it doesn't mean you're going to lose your adjudication (ph.), you know, and that kind of stuff.

So, again just being aware of what each particular flag means and if there's a complete failure of the system, right, it will still display DPU failure on the screen, so you'll have at least -- yeah, and not always. Obviously the screen can go complete hot but if you've lost all of let's say your actual input from the instrumentation then it might say DPU failed on the screen.

So, just in short it's an older system that helps us display our information that is semi-disconnected from the autopilot but they both communicate with one another to run the servos for the autopilot flying.

Q. Okay. We talked about the risk assessment. There's a new one that's come out now. I would just want to know like pilot to pilot here like how useful do you feel like that is for you?

A. I mean not very useful in all honesty. Yeah. I mean one of the beginning things is the -- I am safe, right. And so, and you're sitting there like, I mean if you write no on any of those things, that cancels -- you know, it's like okay, we'll call PMOC. Like you're not going to go. It's a no-go.

You should really know that before -- because, you know, like private pilot you might show up and you're not thinking about those particular things. And so, I am safe works, where you kind of sit down, oh, I mean my dog died.

I'm having a bad day. But really at 5:00 a.m. when I'm calling in I should already know if I'm going to be, you know,

willing to go to work or not. So, that, and that -- and I should be self-monitoring that particular area, right?

If I get a phone call at 3:00 in the afternoon that a parent passed away. Like I don't need to go to that thing and be like, okay, am I safe? Oh, am I experiencing any kind of -- yes. Oh, I can't go. Like I should be mature enough and so that's why I might say that some of those particular questions.

Maybe where it gets more useful is, you know, if you start thinking, it does, it's supposed to get you thinking more about the terrain and environment you're flying in but again the difference between a private pilot and us is we operate in this environment every day, multiple times, you know.

And so, every time I go to work I'm operating in mountainous terrain environment, you know, so like by checking that box, mountainous terrain environment. Like that's a new surprise to me. Oh, I didn't think about the mountains on my route. Like obviously Hawaii is a designated a mountainous terrain area.

There's no where I can go on this island. And again, we have to type in where we're going. So, I've got to sit there and like POOG. You have to know whether it's the P or it's just OGG, right. So, it's like you're sitting there typing out your routing even though you've already put in the dispatcher release number and if you pull up the dispatcher release number like everyone knows where we're going. Like no one is surprised.

Like me typing that thing in does nothing to increase

like -- like it's not making me think, I know where I'm going, right. Like what's important is I filed to the correct destination on my for flight with air traffic control. Here it's not making me think like oh, am I typing the wrong thing.

So, it's just waiting for that screen to populate, you're waiting, you know, time and brain power. I don't know. So, I'm not -- I know it's required. I know it's something that's there, but I've not been super impressed as far as actually it stopping you from not going, right. Like to catch you on something.

Q. Have you voiced your concerns about the current risk assessment?

A. It's super brand new. I think we just started rolling this one in so we have not yet had the, you know, broken in yet. Like we're still kind of getting down. So, maybe I'm not doing the best that I should be.

Maybe that could be where like, you know, I guess I'm getting a little bit of time and making sure I understand it more fully before I guess I saw something. You know I'd had to like immediately -- just because sometimes we don't like change, right? So, I'm making sure it's not, just not liking change. I just need to understand the system.

Q. And if you do decide that this is something you want to bring up, who -- how will you go about that?

A. So, we go to of course our management. I think the struggle is is that this is not, this is like an industry type program, not

necessarily like a Guardian Flight. You know, I think the initial system was, I mean created by Guardian Flight, which to me felt more organic and applicable.

But this I think goes back into, like, the who certifies areas in these type, you know, so it's not going to be quite so much room that Guardian's going to have to -- like they're trying to -- like with these, you know, certification process of air ambulance, not necessarily FAA or NTSB type things.

Q. So, I want to, I want to hear your thoughts on -- okay, first of all, in Blanding when you flew the King Airs, are they, were they set up the same way, the avionics package?

A. Yes. Correct.

Q. Okay. So, we have EFIS on the left-hand side and we have gyros on the right hand side.

A. Correct.

Q. Yeah. What are your thoughts on that system?

A. So, actually I know we're moving more toward the ProLine, all glass. But as an old school guy I kind of like having -- I mean like the obviously the EFIS is a great, having some level of digitalization has been incredible.

But as we know all types of systems have issues so I kind of enjoyed having a traditional panel on the right-hand side through your, you know, typical gyros and such available to me. So, I kind of -- I mean I'm going to learn them and enjoy the ProLine. I'm sure I can't wait to have all that stuff accessible but in the

current situation actually I really like EFIS on the left and traditional back up on the right.

Q. You do like that?

A. I actually like that, yeah.

Q. As opposed to just having glass on both sides or gyros on both sides?

A. Right.

Q. You like the --

A. Yeah. I think the EFIS and having the two screens gives you a lot of good situational awareness as far as like shooting approaches and stuff and having command bars. But then again like I said, what happens if you blow your power, it's nice that like in some capacity to have a little bit -- not all because obviously your gyros start spooling down and that becomes corrupted data but just it's nice to have some things that have worked for, you know -- those don't tend to fail as much as our newer things, you know. So, I like the longevity of those instrumentations.

Q. Have you experienced failures with the EFIS?

A. Yeah. I've had an inverter fail here and there and that, you know, you just switch to the other inverter. But so, you lose the top screen, and you have to kind of get things back online. But, you know, it's nice to have a -- it's nice that all of it didn't blink out, right. And not that they would.

They're going to be on separate systems. I understand. I know it's not all one system of course, you know, there will be

backups of course.

Q. When the inverter fails is that -- a screen goes out, what else happens there? Any noise that's made?

A. So, you're going to get the same things. Most -- in this particular case autopilot disconnected. It lost, it lost its data. So, you get your charge horn, and you get your red flashing light for your autopilot disconnect.

So, I mean I immediately was aware that a system or something had happened. Of course, you get the inverter light of course as well, which is what sparked your master warning. So, yeah, you get an immediate identification if your inverter fails and your screen goes out.

Q. Okay. If -- what is -- what do you recall from training and elsewhere as a 135 pilot again not checkride. This is for information. But as far as like having to write things up. When is it a requirement to have to write-up a mechanical issue?

A. I mean so I'd say as a pilot, right, there's anytime it's a system component. I mean and we of course can go to our MEL quickly and see like, all right, is this something that's insignificant?

So, I have my MELs. So, if there's ever a question about like is this rising to a level of a write-up. I can go to my MEL and begin to kind of dissect what's going on. As far as like reporting.

And sort of that like anytime we have like a system failure

like in that particular case of losing an inverter, because it was a, what we call a mechanical interruption and I had to return back. That of course would probably need to make my write-ups about, not only in the logbook but begin the company process write-up of the failure.

So, I mean basically I guess in short it's -- I'm going to write-up any kind of mechanical irregularity that would need to be either addressed by maintenance and then deferred or grounded or any kind of inflight instance that require like if I'm going to make it to my destination or there was, I struck something while taxiing or departed the runway surface, those types of things, any kind of then operational irregularity.

Q. So, a scenario your completing a flight, the autopilot disengages, you check, you don't see anything. You reengage the autopilot. Everything's working properly for the rest of the flight. I mean if it completely failed, right, that's a clear instance of --

A. Right.

Q. -- like we need to write this up.

A. Right.

Q. But if it was like, if it was that intermittent do -- would we move forward with a write-up --

A. I'm going to ask you a question. Yeah. I mean I think and that's where I think a little bit of discretion comes in. It's where depending on where we're at because there's once in while

you might, you might have a -- I don't know, I feel like you're right.

I mean there's probably been a time where something minor happened once and you're reengaging. You have nothing. I think where that, where it rises you try to think through am I able to recreate this and discuss it in an event like on the ground.

So, are they going to come out and go, could not duplicate on ground and sign it off. And so, if it's a brief thing that immediately is correctable and it's just maybe a -- because we get surges of power, right. You get little surges and that's what a -- our system is supposed to do. It's supposed to shed a load and get you back online.

But as long as all systems are operating normally, we don't have any procedure that says, okay. Even if it's just once, you've got to immediate -- there might be room for like I'm going to check it, you know, on a, on the part 91 part of my mission or something like that.

Q. Okay. And if that was to happen would -- is that like an example of something that you would tell the next pilot about?

A. No, I mean yeah, hey, hey, on my way back in like, you know, the trim seemed like it didn't engage right away but then I turned trim off, trim back on and the entire time I ran a few things and yeah. I think the trim was definitely --

Q. Yeah. Just watch after that.

A. -- where it's supposed to be, yeah. And then that -- and

I'll kind of be in a watch of that.
Q. Okay. And is -- has that happened to you? Like when you take a plane from another pilot switching out shifts, is that like something that they would communicate to you?
A. Yeah. I would say the most common one is just, again these are older airframes, so it would be like pressurization. So, that might be the most common one we're talking about. Like, hey, it seemed like it might have spiked a little bit on takeoff.

And so, you know, but then it operated flawlessly the rest of the flight, right? There was no, it held it's confirmed (ph.) information. It didn't go past any limitations. It just, you know, there was a little sticky outflow valve for a momentary, I don't know the big boost on that.

But on the next leg if it happens again now you know, okay, maybe our left safety switch is beginning to fail. So, we've got some data to then go to maintenance and, and say, okay, hey. We've now had multiple times where this is getting a pressure spike. We don't think it's this. We think maybe it's this.
Q. Is there a difference between -- have you heard any changed in policy or anything as far as writing things up before the accident and after the accident?
A. Yeah. I would say previously again we're mission minded. We do -- we never want to be unsafe. But we definitely -- they're airplanes, you know. And like I said, the guys that come on it's like air conditioning as well. Sometimes it doesn't blow the

coldest air.

You know, maybe our comms were, it's a little bit lighter when we heard our crew versus, you know, ATC, right. So, we might not have written up a -- well ATC is not as loud as they sounded when I have, you know, the crew un-isolated, right. But now it is definitely where even if it's something as simple as a discrepancy in volume between air traffic control and our comm in the back, write-up.

So, yeah, we have definitely become even a minor, I mean a blip like we just talked about. The blip like that it's an immediately, like let's not check any further. Let's just -- like, yes, from here on out guys like I'll buy you pins. Yeah, so.

Q. Would there be any reason for a pilot to -- or maybe you do this to fly without the autopilot, a functioning autopilot?

A. Oh yeah. Yeah, absolutely. So, I mean like for instance we had a trim failure that particular case on Hilo where the pilot was having some issues with the automatic trim. And so, it called for a mechanic to come out, isolate the system, but because there's no automatic trim the autopilot has to be disengaged.

So, in a part 91, I was on shift and so I had to, you know, reposition part 91 from Hilo back to Honolulu where I mean is that, which is full legal for us part 91 to operate without autopilot, so we do. There's some situations where you might reposition the aircraft without operating autopilot.

Q. What about under 135?
A. No, that is required. That's why we don't have our first officer. So, any kind of autopilot issues, the plane is grounded.
Q. Right. But if there's no issue, like it's functioning would there be a reason that a pilot would hand fly the airplane?
A. Again there's -- I mean I do sometimes, you know, on visual approach so it's smoother. You know, I don't want like a lot of the dips and deeps, and on the autopilot. So, I do -- will hand fly on the -- after I'm cleared for the visual approach so we're making more shallow turns in a sense.

So, in terms of environments guys might hand fly to keep things less bumpy for our passengers but physically speaking, you know, most of our guys actually enjoy autopilot from, you know, as soon as they can get up at the last possible second as well.
Q. Okay. Did you ever experience receiving an airplane that was grounded due to a write-up that Brian had written up that you can recall?
A. I can't because again we were just opposite schedules. Yeah, so I don't think I ever, I don't think I ever received an aircraft from him. I think it was always the other two pilots. So, I don't think I had any crossover.
Q. Oh, you were opposite schedule?
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay, right. So, when you were off he was working --
A. He was on, yeah.

Q. -- and vice versa? Okay. How does this autopilot compare with others that you've flown?

A. I mean it's -- I know it's not everyone's favorite because it's an older system and it's not, you know, the ProLine gives you a much more streamline, everything's all kind of housed in one spot and then run out to your autopilot system.

Here you've got some clunkiness in between two different computer systems and then out to the servos. But I mean I've trained in aircraft that didn't have an autopilot and I flew 1900s that didn't have autopilots. They just had two pilots. So, you didn't have an autopilot.

So, the fact that we have something and like I said, it is reliable. It's -- I'm trying to compare it to the CRJ200, you know, and a traditional FMS system, there's not a lot of differences.

I would say the only thing that I would say that is different between maybe what, where I think there is some clunkiness is the location of, you know, the panel in which you select the operations, right. So, if you think about a CRJ or other modern aircraft, most of it's up top.

So, if I'm hand flying on my climb I want to go indicate air speed and heading mode, I can still maintain some level of, whereas with this, you know, the selection is down low, right. So, there's a moment where I might have to, like, bring my focus away to engage autopilot or a functionality. So, there's a --

Q. The control head is down --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- here in the center panel?
A. Right.
Q. Or the center console.
A. Yeah. If it's meant to be right, it's meant to be ergonomically for your, where your hand is at but like I mean come on. It's like 12 buttons and you're not going to be like, you still have to kind of look and see, all right, where is heading mode, you know.

So, I mean it's, even though you touch it a thousand times you still want to make sure you're getting the correct SEP, you know, function. So, that might be the only thing I don't necessarily super like. Where I had to learn a little more about it was, I was used to having a first officer and you just make the call out.

So, I thought autopilot was a little bit less sophisticated than our CRG. And then it made me realize oh no, you're so you just call it out and someone touches it for you. So, I was learning to actually to have to manipulate the tactile of my own picture (ph.) but as far as the autopilot system goes, I mean that's a little older system, but it handles just fine.

Q. I want to talk a little about the inherent pressures that we talked about earlier just being an air ambulance pilot.
A. Right.

Q. That come with the job, right. And I know that you've mentioned that it's mitigated with things like not knowing who the patient is, what the mission is, right, like the criticalness of it.

But there's still some pressure, right, as opposed to the charter pilot who is flying someone to vacation or something, right? You feel that pressure?

A. I mean I've never done that side, but I mean I wonder what happens to the other guy.

Q. On 121 work?

A. Yeah. Okay, yeah. Because I was like well I don't know. If a guy is paying that much money I'd be like I don't --

Q. Yeah, yeah, let's just stay --

A. I'd be like, yeah, I was like --

Q. Let's go to what you, --

A. -- that might be higher pressure.

Q. -- what you know, the 121 part.

A. You when Elon Musk shows up, and you're like, oh, yes, sir. Bursts, yes, and there's definitely more inherent pressure at 135, air ambulance than part 121, absolutely.

Q. What are, what are some ways that the company has since the accident, is there anything, any changes that have been made to relieve any more of that pressure, mitigate that pressure anymore?

A. I mean it's hard to say because the pressure really wasn't, like I said, I've been very impressed there wasn't that pressure

before. So, I think all they've done is just continue to reiterate that it's not lip service. Like, hey maybe you didn't trust us prior to this so there's no pressure.

So, please continue to call us with any concern you might have just in case you do feel some pressure. So, I don't know if there's anything operationally that's changed, more than maybe they're just communicating more like no, we're serious like, you can stand down. Like we promise you you can stand down. And guys have. Like I mean I think that might be it is we've seen people stand down over, you know, whatever it may be.

Maybe they didn't like the weather. Maybe they did like doing two or three missions versus just one mission. And there was no repercussions from that. So, again, it goes back to operationally did anything change.

Maybe not but now we as staff are seeing that people have made decisions to live out what's been communicated and there's been no repercussion for that from them.

Q. Okay. So, since this pressure does exist, you know, and there's a certain amount of it that is there, if you, if you had the power to change, to relieve some of that pressure as a manager and policy or everything, what changes might you make to help relieve pressure from the pilots in that regard?

A. Wow, if I, if was that good I'd be in a management position. I'm just a lowly line pilot trying to surf on off days. Wow, give me like ten seconds --

Q. Yeah. No worries. Take your time.
A. Because that's kind of the beauty in this role it's like, you know, like there's -- when you're off, you're off, you know so. Oh, okay. I have -- okay, there's one thought is -- this isn't the correct term like an air boss.

Like someone to run -- like, you know, you don't always have to call the manager on call, you know, and bother then in the middle of their -- because an on-call position. You might presume unless you are on call it's never fun to get interrupted between dinner and that kind of stuff.

And it would neat if there was like maybe a person in the comm centers and I know that's probably not, you know, you know, possible but to run those, sometimes those stupid questions you have, like hey, am I reading this correctly and it's not boss you gives you check right going, oh you don't know this, right.

Like, oh, how did you not. So, it would be maybe nice to have someone who is not maybe in an administrative or regulatory role that we could kind of having access to to say hey, I'm wondering about this and they're not going to be like, well you're dumb for not knowing that.

They're going to be like, oh yeah, let's walk through that real quick and so like become an air boss you kind of talk to that, you know, when there's situations that come that, you know, -- because the pressure comes when it's not a standard day. Like normally in Hawaii it's, I mean Honolulu never has any, like

any real stuff.

There's hardly ever -- when I have questions it's, you know, it's irregularities in the weather or whatever and that would be nice not to have to call my main boss. So, he rise like, you know, like calling him at 2:00 in the morning.

But maybe if someone is early up that'd be kind of cool, you know. Like someone who's not -- there we go, that might be it. Someone available that I know is not sleeping, you know.

Q. Oh right, that's not sleeping.

A. There we go.

Q. If we were ignoring the sleep part of it do you have, do you feel that there's someone that you can call?

A. Oh yeah. I mean you can. And they do their best to sound chipper when you call them.

Q. Sure.

A. Like, good morning, Kaleo. I know that this is your bedtime.

Q. Is there anyone outside of management? Like do you have peers that you can --

A. I mean no because again we try to be, you know, cognizant of other people's rest and that kind of stuff. So, yeah, that's part of it, is we don't ever call cliniticians or pilots because you never know who is on or off.

Q. Okay.

DR. WOODS: So, Dylan, I'm going to have to interrupt you and I apologize and thank you again for your time. But we do have

Seth here. He is on a time crunch. He was flown in for this and we're an hour over schedule through no fault of anyone here.

Just that's kind of the nature of the beast sometimes. So, we're going to have to go to a rapid fire round, like one or two last questions at the most so that we can be respectful of Seth's time. I didn't realize he was flown in for this and he doesn't live here so.

MR. GARRISON: Not a problem. Go ahead, we can start round 2 but then.

MR. ETCHER: You know, I've, I've -- you've answered every question I could think of and then some, so thank you. I appreciate it. So, I don't have any at this point. Sabrina?

DR. WOODS: I'm also going to defer because there's a couple of other people and I think we've got a lot of good information and we appreciate your time.

Millicent?

MS. HILL: That's it. Thank you.

MR. GARRISON: Okay. Let me see. The last question.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. The Appareo, do you know what that is?

A. Oh, the -- yes, yes. Our camera system.

Q. Do you have, did you have any interaction with that at all?

A. Just minutely. I just know that it's not an external type. It's all housed internally on small SD card that's only accessible to those that have the program. So, for instance when we do

operational check flights I once was like, hey, we've got the camera, why based it off my opinion of what I think happened.

Let's go pull the camera. Unfortunately, it's a regulatory type, like nobody can. There's like only certainly people have access to actually being able to, you know, view the footage that's on that. But I just know it's housed internally, not broadcasted, you know, live. It's got to be recovered on the SD disk and then input into a program specifically able to read that data.

Q. Okay. And is there any preflight checks to make sure that it's functioning or anything?

A. No, just that we were aware of the new circuit breaker and those types of things. And that, and that there was, you know, of course, you know, basically being aware of it in case, you know, it's a new system and any time you add a new electrical you going to be in a new area for smoke in the cockpit that time of thing.

It would just being aware of where that breaker might be in case we need to pull it if that might be the problem.

MR. GARRISON: Okay. I'm done.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Well again thank you so much. Sorry to take so much of your time.

MR. WETZLER: No worries.

MR. ETCHER: But I appreciate it. You've definitely -- I know I can speak for myself you helped me understand it. So, I appreciate it and we can call this interview concluded at 1305

Hawaiian time.

MR. WETZLER: Excellent. Thank you guys.

(Whereupon, at 1:05 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022 Interview of CJ Wetzler
ACCIDENT NO.:	ANC23FA008
PLACE:	Maui, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Romona Phillips
Transcriber

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

Investigation of:	
RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022	Accident No.: ANC23FA008

Interview of: GABRIEL KALEO WEHRSIG, Assistant Chief Pilot

Hawaii Life Flight

Maui, Hawaii

APPEARANCES:

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I N T E R V I E W

(10:17 a.m.)

MR. ETCHER: Good morning. My name is Shawn Etcher. I'm an operational factors investigator with the NTSB. All that means is I look at everything forward the cockpit door if you will and how it interacts with the pilot. Since you are in his chain of command that's why you're here to talk to us today.

Just to give you a little awareness I'm going to have everybody here in the room, we'll go around the table, have everybody introduce themselves to you as well. So, you can understand their position and what they're doing.

But we typically when we do an investigation we have parties to an investigation and in this case a party to our investigation is the FAA. They're bringing their subject matter expert stuff in as well to help us with it. So, we cover everything we possibly can.

But I'll go around right now and have everybody introduce themselves. I'll start with Ms. Sabrina.

DR. WOODS: Hi, I'm Dr. Sabrina Woods. I'm the human performance investigator from the NTSB assigned to the case. So, my function here is I'm kind of looking at everything that helps a person perform and be able to do their job. So, I'm looking all at thing that help them perform better and then some of the things that might be a detraction to that performance.

So, essentially some of the things I'll be ask you about is a

lot about kind of the organizational aspects so we can learn more because we don't know, we don't work here. And so, we appreciate your expertise in that.

MR. GARRISON: Dylan Garrison with the FAA. I was assigned to the investigation as the inspector in charge for the FAA to assist the NTSB. The biggest thing I want to get out there with you is like I'm here in a safety role. I'm here today gather information, document this stuff, try to figure out what happened.

I'm not here in an enforcement role. That's -- I know in past, maybe some past interactions you've had with the FAA, maybe it's, you know, you have checkrides or something like that where it's like, well you've got to have the right answer and all this. That's not what we're doing here today at all.

So, I don't want you to feel that you have to have the right answer. You know, just let us know what you know. We want to know your perspective. We want to know the information you have. We're not going to hold it against you if you don't, you know, you don't remember air speed or whatever information you feel that you need to have or you might need on a checkride or something.

MR. WEHRSIG: Okay.

MS. HILL: Millicent Hill, the investigator in charge.

MR. ETCHER: So, that's everybody who will be interviewing you today.

MR. WEHRSIG: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: I just want to let you know our role here is

strictly to learn everything we can so it can help us kind of understand what could have caused this accident with the ultimate goal of preventing it from every occurring again to you, to your company or to any company.

So, you're here to help us formulate and get a better picture of everything that goes on. Also, just for your awareness as you can see we do have a recorder going. We're going to have this interview transcribed.

The transcript itself will become part of the public docket when this case opens up publicly towards the end of the investigation. Are you okay with us recording and transcribing?

MR. WEHRSIG: Yes.

MR. ETCHER: Thank you. Also, for your awareness anytime anybody is interviewed by us they are entitled to a representative. I see you came in here by yourself. Would you like to have a representative at all or are you good to go?

MR. WEHRSIG: No. Not at this time.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. And if that changes during the interview just say so. We'll take a break, pause, you can phone a friend, whatever you need to do and that's perfectly fine.

MR. WEHRSIG: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Before we get started I just -- there's a few ground rules I like to set. Most of, you know, one of the most important ground rules is during this interview if there's a question you don't understand or you're a

little confused on it, it's okay, ask us.

You know, as Dylan said, this is not a checkride. You know, we're just here to have a conversation. So, if there's something you don't understand, it's okay. Ask a question, you know. As for clarification or whatever. We're happy to do so.

You give me an answer that I don't understand, I'm going to ask a few more, you know, clarifying questions so I can understand it better. If you need a break at all, just say so. We'll take a break at any time. If you need water, bathroom, to talk to somebody that's okay.

I know you're also a pretty busy man around here so if something comes up and you need to take a pause for that's fine too. Just let us know.

MR. WEHRSIG: Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: The most important rule I always have is if we ask a question and you don't know the answer, I don't know works just fine. You know, we like to deal facts as much as we can but if you have an opinion about something that's great, too.

Just make sure you let us know that in your opinion or something like that. We will sometimes ask questions about in your opinion as well, but we just want to make sure we can know the difference between a fact and an opinion.

MR. WEHRSIG: Got it.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Any questions before we get started?

MR. WEHRSIG: No.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Then if everybody is ready we will get started. I always start with the first bank of questions. They're usually the toughest and then they get easier after that.

MR. WEHRSIG: Okay.

INTERVIEW OF GABRIEL KALEO WEHRSIG

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. The first question is can you state your full name and spell your last?

A. Gabriel Kaleo Wehrsig, last name is Wehrsig, W-E-H-R-S-I-G. And I go by my middle name, so most people know me as Kaleo.

Q. Okay. And we will try and remember to pronounce -- call you by that as well.

A. I'll go by Gabriel. I'm called, I'm called many names.

Q. Well I am too but we won't go with -- I was just kidding. What is your job title?

A. I am the assistant chief pilot for the Hawaii region.

Q. And is that for Hawaii Life Flight, Guardian? Help me understand --

A. We're under Guardian certificate. We got bought out. So, we're under Guardian certificate but we still kept the name as Hawaii Life Flight. And my role is assistant chief pilot and check airman and training.

I don't do too much training anymore but yeah, check airman and assistant chief pilot.

Q. Okay. About how long ago were you hired by Hawaii Life

Flight or --

A. I actually started -- it's, you know, how companies keep getting bought out, so I've been doing this since 2008. I first got hired at AirMed, when AirMed was out here with the first King Airs, in 2008.

And then we got bought out by Joe Hunt with Hawaii Life Flight. And they combine and they called it Hawaii Life Flight. It was Hawaii Ambulance and AirMed and then they got bought out and we became the name Hawaii Life Flight in this hangar and came together, yeah.

Q. Okay. So, --

A. I'm not sure when the -- maybe I think it was in, maybe a year after I got hired. I'm trying to think right now. I did, I did some bouncing around before that flying cargo. I did it for a little bit at AirMed, so I'd have to look at the dates exactly. But I know I started in 2008.

Q. 2008. Okay.

A. Yeah. I'm not sure when the merge was exactly.

Q. Okay. That kind of gives --

A. It's been a while.

Q. -- me an idea. So, that's perfect.

A. Yeah.

Q. So, I have a vision of what an assistant chief pilot does but can you kind of help me understand what you role actually involves. What is the day-to-day life for you?

A. Day to day life is schedule, average maybe three to four checkrides a month.

Mainly schedule pilots, supervision over the pilots, their needs and support for our pilot group out here. Any questions they have they call me. There is operation control for other things of if you need to move aircraft around here and there and things like that. That's, that dispatch is, ordinarily what dispatch would do or anything like that. Yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. So, as an assistant chief pilot do you fly the line often or is it just for checkrides?

A. Rarely do I fly the line. But just prior to December 15th, I did help out and I was flying the line at night helping out.

Q. So, you were flying on the night of the event?

A. No, I was not. That was my first week off, yes.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. How long have you been in that role as an assistant chief? I told you these are the tough questions early. They get easier.

A. We've got two -- I'm going to, I'm going to say I've already did two checks so four years, at least four years now.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah, I want to say. I'd have to look back on that though, yeah. It's a blur when you're a check airman, you know. You're just looking forward to you next observation with that. So, yeah,

I'll say four. I have to look back. Yeah, it's a good question.
Q. Okay. So, about four years.
A. Yeah.
Q. We'll go, we'll go with just a general four years. How's that? Or about that, fine.
A. Yeah.
Q. I assume you have a check airman letter from the FAA?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. When is your next time to be observed by the FAA?
A. I just did mine in -- I have to look when I did mine. I did, I just did mine not too long ago. So, I want to say I have like about a year and a half left in mine. Yeah.
Q. All right. What other certificates and ratings, type ratings, anything like that do you have?
A. No. Just my ATP and I still hang on to my flight instructor certificate. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Excellent. Now these next two questions are typically the toughest.
A. Okay.
Q. Ballpark, total time? See, I'm not lying to you.
A. Yeah. If I was -- I haven't looked for another job, so I haven't been keeping track of my time or nobody's pushed me out the door yet. I want to say 3,000 in the ballpark of, maybe

3,500 -- between 3,000 to 3,500 around there, something around there.

Q. All right. And the last really tough question, how much is that in a King Air?

A. Most of all. I want to say 80 percent of it has been King Air, yeah.

Q. Okay. Excellent. See those are the tough questions. Now it's, now it gets easier.

A. All right.

Q. So, you're an assistant chief pilot and you're a check airman so let's look at your assistant chief pilot position first. How often do you interact with the crews as their assistant chief?

A. Very often.

Q. Okay. I mean and let me re-quantify that. I'm sure they reach out and talk to you, text you, call you, something like that if they have questions. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. How often do you do base visits?

A. Once a month.

Q. To each base or --

A. To each base once a month and then I think we do maybe two months out of the year, two or three months out of the year we'll do it, not a visit but via Teams. But we do at least once a month.

Q. Okay.

A. Yes.
Q. All right. And do you remember before the event that happened, do you remember the last time you did a base visit to Maui before that?
A. Yes. Yes, I do. I can't remember the date. I'll have to look back at it. But yeah.
Q. Can you give me just kind of week before, a month before, Teams two months before? Just kind of just help me.
A. It was a month before. I want to say. I'd have to look at my schedule when we did go there. That was December. I want to say October 20th. Yeah. I know this, yeah, October 20th I believe is the last time I was there at a base meeting.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And I know that was -- I hate to do math this early in the morning with only two cups of coffee in me but that was about four months ago, give or take.
A. Yes.
Q. Do you remember -- can you recall back then? I know lots has happened since, but do you remember if everybody at that base came or was it just a few you met?
A. No, I kind of -- I get -- I can't recall, yeah, who was everyone there.
Q. Okay. And that's okay. I don't know is fine. It's perfect fine.

A. Yeah.
Q. All right. So, you go around to all of the bases and how many bases are there that you visit?
A. We have Hilo, Waimea, Maui, Molokai, Honolulu, Kauai, six. There is a Kona base but that's rotor, so I usually skip those. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So, since you're talking about rotor, do you oversee any of the rotor operations?
A. No, I do not.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. Is there another assistant chief that does that then?
A. Yes, there is. Yes.
Q. Is he based there or here with you?
A. I'm not sure. I think -- he might be based there. I think. His name is Steven (ph.). I haven't, yeah, I don't do too much with the rotor guys but yeah.
Q. Okay. So, you don't interact with them?
A. No, no.
Q. Perfect. So, as an assistant chief pilot how do you -- help me understand if I was a pilot working for you how do you help me come to you if I have a problem? Is there like an open-door policy here? Is it --
A. It's a very open-door policy that pilots will -- I try to do even when my schedule permits a weekly meeting every Wednesday.

It's called like a pilot town hall kind of deal and keep pilots up to date of what's going on. That's not as consistent as every Wednesday but when my, when my schedule does consist, but it's, it's very open door, my phone. Especially in the evenings for some reason, my phone is very open. You can ask my wife that, yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. We'll try not to ask her. We'll take your word for it.

A. Yeah.

Q. So, pilots reach out and talk to you then?

A. Yes, they do.

Q. Can you kind of help me in general terms, what do they reach out and talk to you about?

A. Anything from A to Z, from parking an aircraft if there's not enough parking space. Yeah. Anything with safety hazards that they're seeing with the flightline. Yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. Let's say I was a pilot for you, and I had an issue with maybe a medic, maybe another pilot, is that something you would expect me to come to you for or how do you expect me as a pilot to deal? What is your expectations?

A. If you had an issue with a med team, a crew, kind of?

Q. A med team or another pilot or, you know, another crew of some kind.

A. Right. And we've had, I mean, we've had that in that in the

past and what we do is I get together with the program director who over sees the medical and get a report from them. And we get two reports and then we try to see if there's any personality or if it's a 2:00 a.m., fight, you know, when then sometime it's not, maybe they just need some rest, the crew needs some rest if it's a 2:00 a.m., 4:00 a.m., kind of disagreement on something.

But usually, I just deal with it and make sure that the pilot was professional through the whole thing and doing the, doing their, he or her was doing their job professional. That's all I follow up on.

Q. Okay.

A. If not then I push it on to the program director to go over, that oversees the medical side and see what was it that really bugged each other on it, you know, that who was maybe not unprofessional or something they didn't like and maybe we can correct it, yeah, that they weren't aware.

Q. All right. So, when -- maybe on a little different view, what if a medic crew had a problem with me, would they go to their supervisor I assume, would that -- is that Mark?

A. Yeah, Mark.

Q. Would he come to you and ask and then --

A. Yes.

Q. Has that ever happened here?

A. Yes. It has. In fact, my door is pretty open policy. I'm here in the hangar and their supply room is right across from my

office and there's been a few times that they'll come down and sit down and we'll talk about a pilot, and certain things to see what we can fix.

And nine out of ten the pilot is just not aware of what the pilot was doing that was, you know, maybe turning the AC on too late and they're sweating back there, you know, the crew, things like that, you know.

Small things like that we usually be able to hash it out. It's always communication to me though. It's always the biggest route, good communication.

Q. Okay. So, we always have to ask, did you have any of those communications or things you had to deal with with Brian?

A. Between him and crew members?

Q. Anything. Anybody have any issue with whether it was a crew member, maintenance, anything?

A. No. But Brian was, Brian was vocal about the avionics, the age of the avionics and thought maybe that salt air, you know, salt air and things like that. He was always concerned about that. And the aging fleet, the Alpha Mikes, the older straight C90As that are parked out in front here. Yeah.

He was, he was vocal about those planes, you know, retiring them and moving on. That's basically what he brought to my attention a lot.

Q. Okay. So, help me, help me understand what vocal about the avionics and what was some of his concerns? And we're dealing

with the, like the accident here but maybe not the Alpha Mike. We'll talk about that and more about the kind of like the accident airplane or that kind.

A. He was, he would just -- you know, he had, he filled out I believe F-417, he left. He had an autopilot failure one night and then came back and maintenance worked on it, went out and he had another failure and had to come back and fill out another 417.

And I remember him sending me even the email with all capitals, another one. He thought he was frustrated with -- which every pilot would be too on the same write up to come back and fill out all that paperwork again, you know, after returning.

The requirement for the 135 417 to be filled out, the MIR. But yeah, that's basically what he, you know, on the avionics stuff. He thought the avionics was just aged you know. You know, age. You know, he made some claims about maybe salt air and things like that. But yeah.

Q. So, what about the Alpha Mikes. You mentioned those. Was there -- was that a similar thing or was there different concerns he had about those?

A. He thought the Alpha Mikes were breaking down, becoming inoperative often, more often than our B models that, besides the Alpha Mikes, yeah.

Q. Okay. So, that puts you kind of in a -- I guess you're trying to help him rectify or at least understand the problems. So, how did you deal with that?

A. I told him on the horizon I like to end this. We're already retiring one. We've been trying to retire them for, you know, you know, whatever given dates they're out there. It seems like it got pushed down a little bit more, you know, until we could get another plane in, or cycle down here and things like that. So, I told him it's, it's -- they're being pushed out, you know. It's looked at as being pushed out. They're going to be phased out.

Q. And that's the Alpha Mikes, right?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What about the Gulf Zulus or, you know, like the accident airplane?

A. No, no, no. Those were --

Q. You didn't have any issues with those?

A. No. In fact, sometimes he -- in fact I remember him once, I ran into him. Any praise? I can't remember what tail number, but he says, leave that plane there in Maui. I remember his -- I passed him in the hallway or something like that. We had a conversation. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. I think he was happy after that we swapped out the -- you know, we move planes around to slow down times, you know. Molokai is the closer based so it's only a .4 on the hops versus a Hilo plane is going to be a one-hour hop, just one way kind of deal.

So, planes have to be moved around to slow their time down getting ready for phase, you know, so, in that kind of strategic

line up. So, when his, when his Alpha Mike got switched out to another plane I remember he was, he was happy about that.
Q. Okay. All right. Let me mull that in my brain just a little bit because it -- well you guys have given us lots of great information and it takes my brain a little bit. We'll move on just a little bit.
I know -- I assume, I shouldn't say I know. I assume part of your duties as an assistant chief pilot is hiring new pilots or terminating others. How often do you guys hire new pilots?
A. For me, for our region over here at one point not very often but now we have been a little bit short, and the shortage of pilots has been, has been even harder to pick. So, yeah, it's been, it's been slow going on on hiring. But I'll have to look back at that. Yeah.
Q. Are you directly involved with the hiring or are they just sending you names, like oh here's new pilots?
A. No. Usually, most times I'll do an interview first. There's a filter that needs to go through, you know, how much hours do they have, this and that. A lot of times other pilots will reference.
Brian was referenced by another pilot here as friend. And I remember -- I don't remember, I don't remember too much of his interview, but yeah.
Q. Okay. Now on the worst part of your job I'm sure is the asking a pilot to maybe seek employment elsewhere. I assume

you're directly involved with terminating pilots, too?
A. Yes. Usually with the chief pilot and HR on the line when we do something like that.
Q. So, they deal with -- you don't deal with the terminations. They do?
A. We as a group discuss of why we should go separate ways --
Q. Okay.
A. -- with that in play.
Q. All right. Have you had -- I mean it's always a tough question to ask. Have you done that?
A. Yes.
Q. When was the last time?
A. Just recently, maybe about three or four weeks ago.
Q. Okay.
A. But --
Q. I'm sorry, go ahead.
A. No, no. Go ahead.
Q. How far -- let's think the accident. Had you -- before that when was the most recent before the accident?
A. Actually, I'd say -- I'd have to look at the date but maybe about -- it was within four or five months --
Q. Okay.
A. -- we had someone. Yes.
Q. Can you give me just kind of an understanding of what would cause a pilot to be asked to leave?

A. Training, one was training. I mean I'm not -- training would be one. Training and checkrides and things like that. Yeah.
Q. Okay. Have you ever had to terminate somebody for a personality conflict?
A. I'm trying to think here. I'd have to look. I'm sure, yeah. I've probably just blocked it out. I move on. I might go through therapy and erase it or something but yeah, for some reason just personally for me, and this is my opinion, my personal, for some reason I forget and forgive pretty fast.

I don't know how I got that gift. But when I'm getting ready to maybe rehire somebody somebody has to remind me of why this person, you know, why we should -- yeah.
Q. Well that's a good trait to have.
A. Yeah. Yeah. I will admit that. Yeah. My wife reminds me of that that I forgive and forget pretty fast.
Q. Well that's a good thing. So, pilots, you have an open-door policy, they reach out to you via phone call, text, maybe face to face, do they send, do they have a way of emailing you concerns? They have it easily so you can read it?
A. Yes. Yes. So, most of the time I encourage them to document it. To send me an email to document. But actually, the first choice I always give them is to use our safety reporting and especially if I think it's in the lane of being some safety issue.

So, I tell them to use our Baldwin system either a share report or fill out a Baldwin report on it. So, I always encourage

pilots to do that.
Q. Okay. Let's say I am your pilot and I have a concern and I fill out one of your Baldwin reports. Do you give me feedback on that or should I anticipate any feedback on that?
A. Yes. Yes, you should because we can't close it until we all agree that we fixed it. So, and we go to our meetings, and it comes up in our base meetings and company-wide meetings of -- we have our safety meetings, I'm sorry once a month. And those come up that we're working on.
Q. So, we all have to agree, who is the we all?
A. It's usually, because we -- I can't close it even though I'm assigned to it an investigator or anything like that. At the end -- I'd have to follow up, but I know I can't close it. Yeah. There's a, there's a pack agreement kind of deal that we can forward on the meeting. Are we good with this, are we good with that?
And the person, if they didn't file it anonymous they will see the remarks that we added in how we addressed it and moving forward to close it. And then anytime the person who submit it doesn't agree with what we did, they can reopen it. Yes.
Q. All right. Have they -- has somebody ever reopened one?
A. Not to my knowledge. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And so, I'll ask, do they know they can reopen them? How would I know if you've closed one and I didn't necessarily agree that you answered my question. How --

A. They would call me and not agree about it, and I would tell them to reopen it. Yeah. Yeah.
Q. All right.
A. But they should know through our safety, yeah.
Q. Okay. I know you said you have -- forgive me, I think you said a base safety meeting once a month? Please don't let me put words in your mouth.
A. Not based. I'm sorry, not base. But a regional, we have all the regionals, yeah.
Q. Okay. So, it includes -- is that just Hawaii itself or does that include the mainland also?
A. No. Just Hawaii itself but other higher ups with the safety are all invited also. They're usually on. Michael Koenes (ph.) and things like that, yeah.
Q. So, do you have a safety officer here in Hawaii that can kind of address Hawaii concerns easily?
A. We have a, I believe Daniel Johnson (ph.) is the current one right now, but yeah, mostly it's just, right now it has been just going through me in the morning report.
Q. And who is it current?
A. Daniel Johnson I believe, yeah.
Q. Okay. Is he a pilot or is he just -- is he here in Hawaii or is he mainland?
A. I believe he's here. Yeah.
Q. Okay. I'm going to guess by that that you probably don't

interact a lot with him or --
A. No.
Q. -- at all?
A. No. Yeah, he's -- I just file through a Baldwin and then help the investigator as it goes through.
Q. Okay. Okay. All right. We understand all your planes have video recordings. Do you guys use those for any reason?
A. To troubleshoot. I've heard to troubleshoot. They've tried ones to troubleshoot to see an engine, troubleshooting an engine so maintenance will pull it to do it. But that was, that was a little bit after they installed it.

Other than that, I rarely hear it be used, we use those video cameras for anything else. Yeah. There was, I mean there was, there was some push back obviously from the pilots. Nobody wants, you know, big brother in there but we did push that. We weren't using it against a pilot or anything.

And then we actually used it, there was an incident a while back with when, we didn't even install it yet. I think we had a rotor in a crew claiming how low the rotor was flying and see if they -- they looked at the video and noticed that he wasn't even that low, so that leaning.

So, we told pilots, you know, if anybody -- if you're not doing anything bad you don't have to worry about the camera. In fact, it will validate you of anything that somebody's claiming in the back that you did. So, that calmed a lot down, yeah.

Q. And so, I just want to make sure I have a clear picture in my brain, the video recorders, you guys don't download them every so often just to look to see, oh, we're seeing, you know, not specifically to a crew but oh generally we're seeing, you know, 80 percent of the guys are coming in too fast or we're seeing you guys are making excessive turns. You're not using a check list. You don't use it to educate.

A. Not to my knowledge, no.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. Have you ever had a look at the videos?

A. I would like to know who has opined to what you're all that over here, because yeah, I want that job whoever has that much time to sit down and go through that because most of us are busy, yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. Do you happen to know how often the recorders are actually -- not looked at the recording itself but how often they're maintained or --

A. No idea.

Q. Okay. I didn't figure you would, but I figured out if I don't ask I'll never know. I can only assume. All right. Let's take off your chief pilot hat now for a minute and let's put on the training line check airman hat.

A. Okay.

Q. So, you do -- you don't do training as much anymore. I

assume that's a time issue.
A. Time issue and because I'm the check airman, we try as a company to avoid that as much as we can. Check airman training and then doing the checkride after, you know, so at all possibly we try, and it rarely happens where I'll train them.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. Now I can pause during a checkride and train and that's one of the reasons why I hold on to it so that I can take off my hat and train. Now if I'm just a check airman alone we're going to have to come back and get a trainer to jump in.
So, I'm checked out in both where I can pause the checkride, we can train up on it and then, and then, you know, start up the checkride again as a check airman. Switch my hats inside there so it's --
Q. Right. Okay. How many times have you had to pause a checkride to put on your training hat?
A. Very rare. I'll give the option and it's in the brief before the checkride is if you screw up something I'm going to, you know, if you miss on something or exceed or something like that I'll point it out at as soon as it happens.
And then we'll proceed, calmly proceed of whatever we're doing but I just want to make sure that we both agreed that say for example, you're at the wrong altitude at this certain portion of the flight, so I'll point that out.
We'll both acknowledge it. We can pause and redo another

approach, you know, to be at the correct altitude again. And then we can start it up again, but you can't fail on it one more time again on something like that, on the same thing.

So, usually it's very rare that they'll let me pause it. They're like, I know what I screwed up on. I'm not doing that again. Keep the checkride going. I don't want to all -- they just don't want to add more to their checkride time or anything like that. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. So, I -- and then it's very clear, if you, if you mess it up again that's it. That's all. We're going back, you know. It's like that, very clear.

Q. Okay. So, I assume you do the -- I don't want to say the lion's share but most of the checkrides here I assume?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay. Can you give me an idea, would you do -- are you saying you do half of them, 80 percent?

A. Right now, the check airman at the -- we have two out here. At the beginning it was just me. And then we finally have a second check airman, but he's been out. Ed Cavanaugh is the other check airman.

But he's been out so I've been solo since -- I'm not sure, last month. I mean October. So, I forget when he, when he came offline. So, it's just been doing the check now.

Q. Okay. So, let's just say since October, when you've been

doing all of them, how many times have you had a checkride not be successful and you have to unsat it?
A. Are you, are you saying in a certain time from within a, what like a year? What are you doing?
Q. Well let's, we can start with October. If a year is easier for you that's okay, too. But since October, since you've been doing all of them, since then how many have you had that have been unsat?
A. I don't, I don't think I have any --
Q. Okay.
A. -- unsat, yeah.
Q. Okay. Do you remember when the -- let's go in the last year, then, have you had any?
A. Last year I had I know at least one.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. What caused that one to be unsat?
A. I would have to look at my records and my notes, yeah.
Q. Okay. Did you ever do any of Brian's checkrides?
A. I did his second and third one, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Because the initial was done up in the mainland and then I did his second and third one.
Q. Okay.
A. Or maybe a fourth. I know he one unsat with me. I'd have to

look at it too.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Can you kind of think back in the gray matter how long ago that was, the unsat?
A. Two years ago, I want to say. I would have to, I would have to look it up. Yeah.
Q. I know it's been a long time ago but, you know, usually when you have an unsat, if you don't have a lot of them, it kind of sticks out what caused it to be unsat. Do you remember on his?
A. I think one was a missed approach, he messed up on a missed approach twice and then there was something else in there if I remember right. Yeah. The one that I did unsat him, yeah. There was -- I have it in my records. I can look at my notes. But yeah, I know it was -- there was some other hiccups that I wrote in there on on some, on another checkride but he passed, yeah.
Q. And if you need to look at your notes feel free.
A. Yeah.
Q. This is all open book.
A. Okay.
Q. We just -- I'd rather get all the information, so we have a nice picture, if you want.
A. So, my first one was in July 2020, he open all up. That was my first checkride with him. Let me make sure. Yeah. So, this one I had, I had two unsat maneuvers on it, but he -- we corrected

it to satisfactory on the two. The first one was an unsatisfactory non-precision RNAV three approach.

Failure to follow correct approach procedure. Descent below authorized altitude before the final approach fix. And then I put satisfactory on the next non-precision approach, correct altitude procedure on the next approach.

His second on my notes that I wrote there was another maneuver that was unsatisfactory. Landing from a circle approach, bank angle exceeded 30 degrees from base to final. Satisfactory on the next landing from circle approach. And then that was a satisfactory check.

Q. The checkride itself was satisfactory?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. But just those two was. I noted that we had to -- he didn't -- I don't remember retraining on it. I'd have to -- yeah. I don't recall that we retrained. Like I say it's very rare when pilots see what mistake they did they don't want to do it two more times, you know. But some will -- very rare, some will do that.

Q. Okay.

A. And then here is my second checkride with him. This is the unsat checkride. Yeah. It was a missed approached. Unsatisfactory missed approach. Failure to stop climb at authorized given altitude.

The second unsatisfactory I put in there was ILS power plant

failure. Improper airplane configuration before DA or DH. Yeah, I remember he went full flaps before that. He put full flaps after the final approach fix. Pilot selected full flaps. With one engine it was tough too to go full flaps.

And so, that was, that was in our procedure how we do it single engine landing on ILS. And a third one was again on the second missed approach failure to ensure proper airplane configuration during missed approach.

So, we were at miss on that one and he didn't clean the airplane up. We were, we were already headed out with the hold and the gear was still down and everything was still configured for landing. So, I -- that was an unsatisfactory checkride. We headed back to Maui after that.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And when they're unsat do you just stop the checkride then or do you continue and let them knock off all they can?

A. No. It's once it's unsat it's over it. It's a very tough time because I take over the controls, you know, we're the PIC.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. It's a suck part about the job. And it's, you know, it's -- I take unsats pretty serious because it's, it's -- it goes on your record when you land, so. So, I remember we landed in Maui, and I was okay. We talked about it, and he was, I remember he was upset which anybody would be and then I told him we were

going to fly to Maui.

I'll fly Maui and then if I'm going to unsat anybody I call, I try to get in touch with either Chief Pilot Andy Munion or the head trainer is Randy Ostman and make sure we confirmed that, yeah, this is an unsat and a game plan moving forward for that pilot.

Q. Okay. So, this was unsat because he did two busts on the missed approach or because he had --

A. Two busts and I kind of usually a three -- I usually like to go by a three strike also. Yeah, in the brief too, I was like if you have three things going on that's, that's a really bad day or, you know, that's some flags.

So, usually I've been trained, I've been trained by the first FAA inspector that it's almost like a three-strike rule. But you can kind of, you can kind of get a feel of a pilot too at the beginning that it's, that it's, it's a solid unsat with just certain other things that you're feeling.

That they're just barely there and not as comfortable, yeah, besides nerves, I should say.

Q. Okay. So, let's go to the, let's talk about that unsat a little bit. You came back and you, I assume you debriefed why it was unsat and all that. What was, what would typically be or maybe you know what was the plan going forward to get him back qualified?

A. We call a trainer and that's when we're using our sim here

and then usually I'll let the trainer know off of my notes of what I saw and what needs to be worked on. And then we airline -- back then we airlined them when our sim was up, we would airline the pilot here for that training, with that training captain that we have here.

Run them through the sim over and over of what they've been doing and then if satisfactory to the trainer and then they'll go out and then honor the FAA by doing the flight. That's just extra we do with the sim. It's so much easier in the sim than how busy Lanai can, or an airport can get, and you can't really get in what you really want to work on because you're worried -- there's so much distractions.

So, then you go out and do the maneuvers that the applicant failed at, you know, the pilot failed at then come back and then I get a report from the instructor pilot saying, yeah, he's, he's good to go. He's not, you know, make another checkride with him then. Yeah.

Q. And then would you have done the next checkride with him or would you --

A. Yes, I did.

Q. -- have sent out --

A. I did the next checkride.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Is that how you always do it as if you busted him, you go out

and do the second one or if -- Ed that we interviewed yesterday if he busts somebody will he go out to the second one or will you do that?

A. No. It depends on schedule. We can do another check airman. Yeah. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So, there's no --

A. I think we've had a least -- I know once I think Ed had to do a -- I'm not -- I have -- I don't recall. I have to look back if Ed did one for me that unsat and then he had to go because I schedule then I didn't have enough time in my schedule for, you know, in the near future to get another checkride going with this person. Yeah.

Q. Okay

A. But again, you just give them a thorough brief to the other check airman when I saw him. They're looking at everything and they talk to the instructor.

Q. Okay. Do you guys have instructor, check airman meetings to go over things you guys are seeing, challenges, problems?

A. Yes. We do with South Jordan with the head training department once a week on what we're seeing, drift and things like that. Yeah.

Q. Okay. How about here locally, do you guys -- let's see I think if I remember right, you have two sim instructors or two instructors. And then you and Ed are the line check airmen so there's four of you. Do you four get together and talk and say,

hey here's some things we're seeing or --
A. You know we don't put on the side a meeting. The only time we actually get together is if we're upgrading a system, like say the Garmin 625s are coming in then we'll all get together and be the first ones all hands things. That's basically the only time we get together. We don't have -- we just have that one in South Jordan they put together for us to get together, yeah.
Q. Okay. Excellent.
A. They're on opposite lines. It's pretty hard to. Stu and Landon, one will be on night, one will be on day, or one is off and, you know, you have to try to respect their days off. So, it's, it has to be something, a new system or something to bring them to, to bring them altogether kind of deal.
Q. Okay. And so, going back to Brian's unsatisfactory checkride, you did the recheck. I'm going to assume that went satisfactory as well. What kind of -- did you make any notes on what kind of improvements you saw or if there was any other --
A. No.
Q. He was passed but there was something that would have been unsat?
A. No. I'm looking at it right now. It was clean and I remember it was, I remember congratulating Landon and them the solid work they did.
Q. Okay. When you go do the recheck do you just recheck the stuff that was wrong or do you do the full thing over again?

A. I do the full thing again.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. Both confidence in me and then that person.
Q. Okay
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. I just got one more question because I know you're tired of looking at me and talking to me.
A. No, no.
Q. And everybody -- Sabrina has much better questions than I do. They're easier too I'm sure, yeah. But you got him satisfactory. Do you have to do an oral too with your line checks or --
A. No. Usually, I skip the oral because we already did the oral on the first one. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So, you always do one on the first checkride but not --
A. On the other one, no. But we're -- there's just a thorough brief of what is expected again. Yeah, But the oral is usually, is like if the pilot was satisfactory on that part of the oral then I usually skip the oral again.
Q. All right. I kind of lied. I have one more follow on that then.
A. Sure.
Q. Have you ever had a pilot not satisfactory do an oral?
A. No.
Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Like I promised that was my last one. I lied once so I promised now. Before I pass you off to Sabrina, do you need a break or anything?

MR. WEHRSIG: Nope.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Ms. Sabrina.

DR. WOODS: Thank you, thank you.

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. I'm still trying to understand the structure here. I apologize if some of these seem like pretty obvious. So, for you and Mark Leggett, are you, do you consider yourself, are you guys like equal in management supervision responsible for different aspects of the mission or how does that relationship work?

A. I think we just communication, ever communicate where crews are, where the aircraft is, where the pilots are. Like today for example Mark and I communicate a lot when he’s short staffed somewhere would it make more sense to move a plane and where a pilot will be short staffed. But in the medical and pilot field we usually stay in our field, I mean stay in our lane on that part.

Q. Okay.

A. But equal-wise he's a program director. Yeah, there's certain things that would like say if a pilot had an issue with maybe like the crew housing or something like that, not enough rooms, then I would run that over to Mark and run it up to Mark on

his side kind of deal. Does that make sense?
Q. It does. Okay. And then I've got to ask because of your response honestly so the safety guy situation here I know you said you think it's this Daniel Johnson.
A. Yeah.
Q. But if this person is physically located here why isn't there more interaction there? I guess what do you feel the role of the safety officer should be in this operation here in the islands?
A. What I think the role should be for the safety guy here?
Q. Mm-hmm.
A. That's a good question because I, you know, I kind of just fall on the Baldwin reports and all of us getting together and through our safety Baldwin reports, that we get together and do it.

But I think that person should be more point on those issues instead of, you know, whoever is assigned as investigators on these Baldwin reports.
Q. So, is that not happening right now?
A. He's, he's on, he's on the meetings. But yeah, I just can't, I can't say what if it's happening now or not actually too for me. What's on, what's on my plate, you know, kind of deal.
Q. Yeah.
A. You know, yeah.
Q. I guess for level of engagement given what you do, and the importance of your job like on a rating of one to five, one being

like if I ran past this guy in the middle of Costco I wouldn't know what they look like, to five, super engaged and always understanding what's going on in the operation. What would you rate the safety officer's level of engagement?

A. Two.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. That I know of him. Yeah, that we never talk personally. I'll just put it there.

Q. Do you feel that a higher level of engagement is warranted and needed here? Because arguably, you know, sometimes there's positions like, oh that's not really needed. But I mean you are obviously very dialed into the day and day mission.

A. That's, that's --

Q. Do you think it's needed?

A. Yeah. It falls back on us at the end of the -- anyway as investigators. So, for us to -- and we hold ourselves accountable in that monthly meeting of where we're at on these reports. So, I can't say.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. That's fair. It just seems like you're a busy guy and maybe if this one thing belonged to someone else --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- it would open you up to do others but just something I'm curious about again the structure here. So, you talked a lot

about communication and like those Baldwin reports and, you know, talking, you know, talking with the program director and talking amongst the pilots and getting things done.

But how would you rate the communication going up from you? So, not island-based communication but like communication between South Jordan and Hawaii Life Flight.

A. Between me and my chief pilot?

Q. Mm-hmm.

A. We talk once a week and I let him know the beat of the ground over here. Yeah. If that's what you're asking. I don't understand the question.

Q. It is. But if you could expand on that meaning like --

A. We have weekly ACP meeting also with all of the ACPs for each region that we all come on. We have the director of operation on, Jeremy Salveson and Andy, the chief pilot and then we all give the beat of what we're going through in our area, short handed or anything like that. Yeah.

Q. And so, for that do you feel if there is something that like you really need like let's say staffing were seriously becoming a legitimate issue here and you needed to take that up to South Jordan, do you feel like it's -- people are listening to you? Is it being received?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay.

A. But I do believe also these issues, the ones that we always

bring up, I mean we're not going to bring up -- it's all hard ones. They don't fix them. It's not an overnight deal, you know.

Q. How often does any of the management or leadership level from like the South Jordan site come down here to get eyes on to what's going on here on the islands?

A. Average once a year if that, yeah.

Q. Okay. Okay. So, again being as dialed in as you are and in the role that you are, can you give me a high-level understanding of what the safety culture is like here at Hawaii Life Flight?

A. Much better than any place I've been before.

Q. How so?

A. The training, the simulator, the money that they invest in the training. Fatigue policies that we have, a pilot can call out fatigue anytime, get paid, no questions asked. That's a difference from places that I used to work before. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Mentioning fatigue, do you, do you guys have like a fatigue risk management plan on file anywhere?

A. Mm-hmm. So, we ask them -- I don't ask the pilots then to fill it out as soon as they call out fatigue. I tell them, you've got 24 hours to fill it out. But we've just changed to the policy that now they don't even have to call a supervisor if they call out on fatigue. Just let dispatch know.

But they need to call a supervisor to come back on and then that's when we'll ask them, you know, and we, and we -- I explain to the pilots it's not, it's not like an HR file, you know, to put

in or anything like that. It's for us to better track our fatigue, what base it is, what's the hours there and then things like that. Sorry.

Q. So, like where are those reports stored then?

A. In Baldwin.

Q. Oh okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So, if I were to want just a blank copy of one it's there to look at and just to see what kinds of things that are on there? Or is it just a explain to me what happened, fill in the blank?

A. No. It's, it's pretty thorough. In fact, yeah, it's, it's a pretty, it's a form, it's an extensive form to fill out. Yeah.

Q. Okay. But that is accessible through Baldwin?

A. Yes, it is.

Q. Okay. Going back to kind of the hiring practices here like once you said, you know, feel bought since they fell under Guardian. Who would you say has the most authority for hiring of new individuals for Hawaii Life Flight for the pilot side right now?

A. Our chief pilot, Andy Munion gives the last word on it.

Q. Okay.

A. The letter of offer.

Q. So, who is the initial word on it then?

A. Usually, me.

Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. So, when people are --
A. Oh, I'm sorry. Could we go back? HR could. The initial word on accepting the person? Is that what you're -- is that what the --
Q. Who is the hiring manager?
A. Jen Tate in HR. And Andy Munion gives the okay. And she moves forward all the paperwork. She organizes everything.
Q. If I'm a pilot coming in off the street who am I sending my application to?
A. You can send it to -- some of them will send it directly to me and then there's other ways on our website to send it in and the HR will filter out and then let me know about.
Q. Okay. And then you're like, okay, this individual is interesting who is doing the first set of interviews?
A. Right now, we just changed that to -- because of our time is, how busy we are as ACPs. So, there's an initial phone call that HR will give out.
Q. Okay.
A. But then after that we'll have the, us, pilots, ACPs, if it passes through HR on that then as pilots, as ACPs we'll, we'll give them another interview and have the technical questions because it's better for us to do the technical questions than anybody in HR.

Q. Okay. And I think you said when Shawn asked you similar questions that did -- were you the one who all of this for Brian?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Do you remember anything in particular about that process? I know it was a while ago.
A. Yeah. I can't, no, I can't. I just remember he lived down in Florida at the time. He was friends, he was referred by Brian Fitchitt and he wanted to come back too. He wanted to come back to Hawaii. Yeah.
Q. That was actually a great segue because that was my next question is you said he was referred by somebody. Is that person, is that individual still here?
A. Yes, sir. Yes, he is.
Q. Okay. Okay. And do you know --
A. He's out, he's our Lihue based pilot.
Q. And do you know how they knew each other?
A. I don't know if they worked together. I don't recall prior then that.
Q. Okay.
A. Oh, I believe Brian Fitchitt lived in Florida before. That's how they knew each other.
Q. So, when new applicants are coming in, I have to ask, how much of their history is researched prior to extending like an invitation to interview?
A. So, like I said, HR will kind of filter out, making sure that

they have the -- they'll send us the resume and they have any -- at least they're a pilot, you know, and have all those credentials and then after that I'll start looking at flight time and making sure they have the -- I like to look at pilots at least 2,500 hours.

But actually, HR just feeds me the resume that they think will be fit and interested in the positions out here, which isn't much, you know, it's very -- it trickles in. There's not too many out there.

And then after that I look at that flight time and see if I know any of the companies they worked for, you know, before things that got that -- I could get a beat on somebody else, you know that, I can ask somebody, hey how was this guy working? Did you work with this person before?

So, if it's in Hawaii, it's a very, very small community of pilots. Everybody knows everybody. Yeah.

Q. So, is it -- it sounds like along the lines of a references check. Do you ask for and then check references?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. Well, I -- the reference that they put on their resume I don't check. But if I find out a company or something that the person adds and then I know, I know the, I know somebody that I can refer over there then usually I'll follow up and ask.

Q. So, I guess what I'm asking is that is this all just based on

what's put on the resume? Are there any other external checks you make beside phoning a friend if you happen to know the companies they work for --

A. I would have to ask

Q. -- that are made?

A. Yeah, I would have to -- my part is just I'll call into a video and or an in-person and I'll do two things. I'll do most of the technical and then if the simulator is available where we're at, we'll simulate, will put them in a simulator and I'll do an observation on that. Other than, HR takes care of everything else.

Q. Okay. Okay. Perfect thank you. And then you just mentioned one of thing that you would like to see come through is hours. Right? And how many hours was that you said, 2,500?

A. 2,500. Yeah. I like to look at 2,500 and at least, at least 800 multi time in there and if they have turbine time, you know, anything with -- if somebody has a King Air then I strongly look at that resume and start -- yeah.

Q. Okay. You actually answered part of my next question with that response, which is that like what if I'm a, I'm a pilot coming in here with, you know, 3,000 hours but, you know, 2,900 of those are in rotorcraft. Am I still an interesting candidate?

A. No. No.

Q. Okay. How well do you feel you knew Brian?

A. We were professionals together.

Q. So, and that's a great lead into my next question which is was it just a working relationship or did you hang out at all outside of the workplace?
A. Never hang out outside of the workplace. Yes.
Q. Okay. Your initial impressions just like him as a person, what was his personality like? What was he like?
A. A great guy. In fact, when his friend Brian Fitchitt referred him I remember just the start with Brian was already, we were already having a good laugh and everything. It was for the Maui position, and I was in the middle of interviewing already for the Maui position.

And Brian Fitchitt said, you'll really like this guy, though. And so, I asked him to forward me Brian's resume and I had a long week of resumes looking for the Maui one and I said if Brian's picture is on the resume I'm not giving him an interview.

And so, Brian Fitchitt called me back. He said I have his, I have his resume and his picture is on it. And so, I said, okay. Well, you know, we'll move forward with that but we just, we just had a, we just had a good joke.

And when I talked to Brian, I could tell that he wanted to come to the islands, and he would have been -- he had a great personality. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So, switching from personality, what were your first impressions of him as a pilot?
A. The first time I flew with him I want to say was a checkride.

So, it's kind of hard to know a pilot off of a checkride because they're nervous. It's just, you know, I can't judge anybody on a checkride. Yeah. Even just me in my position, I can't judge.

I really don't know the pilots until other pilots tell me because when I'm there it's, there's, you know, they're nervous when the check airman is there or a supervisor. I understand that.

Q. Have you ever flown with him outside of the checkride capacity?

A. No.

Q. Okay. So, what about watercooler talks, what about other pilots impressions? Have you ever been or overheard what other people think?

A. No.

Q. Okay.

A. Not that I recall.

Q. In that checkride capacity how would you compare his performance to other pilots being like averageness is about how it goes for everybody, or slightly above average or slightly below average?

A. With the times just I got to fly with him I'd say slightly below average.

Q. Okay. That's fair. But was it ever to the point where you were concerned in --

A. No.

Q. -- him continuing to fly for the company?
A. No. No. After that last checkride and I saw, yeah, it was a clean checkride on that last one. So, but there is -- we do brief each other, you know, check airman to check airman, you know.

We let him know, hey, I'm going into this and just to see if there's any drift on this one. This one -- some pilots have more drift than others and this time I, this time I just make sure this pilot didn't drift again and things like that.

Q. We've actually heard that terminology a couple of times now, the word drift. And I know it means something very specific to me as a human performance investigator. What does drift mean to you?
A. Drift is just like cutting corners, starting to move away. Maybe not doing a run up on an aircraft as an example. Not it -- nobody's looking and then I'm not going to do run up every time.

And then when you do a checkride you can tell in a, in a run up this person hasn't, this person is going word for word on a check list instead of having the flow already down. You can tell that. I call that drift, yeah.

Q. Okay.
A. That's my example of drift.
Q. Yeah. Why do you think that happens?
A. Complacency and you get too comfortable.
Q. Yeah. Okay. So, what are some of the things that as an organization you try to do? Like you don't want to get to the

checkride, right to catch that and then start trying to fix it there. That's not the place. Are there some other things that the organization is doing to try to, you know, course correct before we get to where it's obvious in a checkride?

A. Our director of operations, Jeremy Salveson and Andy Munion was just down here a few months prior to the, to the accident and they came down here to talk about drift and telling pilots how to identify drift and some of the smaller accidents that we were seeing that could have been avoided and they think drift is, drift was in there.

Q. Okay. Okay. Going back to Brian himself, obviously, you know, getting an unsat on a checkride is probably a devastating experience but he's going to be disappointed. He's going to be upset. But overall, how did he take it? Like was there a willingness to just like, okay, I've got to get this right next time.

Like was there -- did you perceive a willingness in him to do what it takes to get it right the next time? How was -- yeah, how did that interaction go after the fact?

A. Initially he was upset, which anybody would have been. He was disappointed, upset, visibly upset and all that. And we went back and then accepted it and held himself accountable at the end, kind of attitude. We were in Maui and trying to find out how to move him, how we were going to go forward from it.

Q. Yeah. Okay. And essentially it sounds like --

A. He didn't blame --
Q. -- a good attitude.
A. He didn't blame anybody or anything like that. He, yeah, he was, all right, let's do what we have to do.
Q. Okay. Thank you. And so, earlier I know you said that there was some concerns he had. There were some reports maybe about, you know, I've heard, I've heard a lot about the notorious Alpha Mikes in general.

Where outside of aircraft performance were there any other complaints or concerns that he expressed about -- well let's start with the mission first?
A. Complaints about doing the mission?
Q. Mm-hmm.
A. Not that, not that I, not that I recall anything with him. I know the multiple legs to pick up a crew here and do another medevac here he was, he vocally, you know, expressed that. He got a fatigue and when he, when he talked to me about the fatigue he actually had a crew from two different bases that he had to pick up to do one mission. And then he was headed back.

And so, he had to drop those crews off and all that. Very understandable but on the mission part that's the only complaint that comes to my head about on a mission, the multiple legs.
Q. Okay. So, let's flip the script on that and did he ever express what he absolutely loved about the mission?
A. I don't, I've never -- I know he liked to be in Hawaii, the

job in the Hawaii and surf and everything like that. Yeah. I know that. Yeah. I know that he loved Hawaii, and he was here and that was the benefit of the mission that you get to live in Hawaii.

Q. Yeah. That's a pretty good benefit. What about to -- that was the mission. What about the actual operating environment? Flying here in the islands is a very distinctive type of flying, like obvious -- I would say that the people in South Jordan, that's why I asked if they come to visit. It's a little different than flying in Utah.

A. Yes.

Q. So, did he ever have any concerns or complaints about that style of flying?

A. No. Not to my knowledge.

Q. Okay. Was there anything that he said that he loved about that style of flying?

A. Not to my knowledge, no.

Q. Okay. Do you know of any other types of flying he was doing here in the islands outside of Hawaii Life Flight?

A. He did ask to work as a rotor pilot on his off time. Their base there has a lot of, they have a lot of days off. They're two weeks on, two weeks off. So, on his days off he was asking, he asked if he could fly rotor again as a, as a part-time job on the side.

And I asked him to email our director of operations, Jeremy

Salveson and get his, get his, get his okay and he can go forward from there. And as long as we're the primary job and it doesn't affect here, as long as you understands that then we have no problem. Yeah.

And then, and then later on and the logging of the time and things like that, making sure that he would put in the, in the, in our flight duty tracker the times that he was flying there.

Q. In general, is there like a generic policy on kind of like moonlighting for Hawaii Life Flight or for Guardian?

A. No. Not that I know of.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah. It's usually just get the permission from our director of ops. Yeah.

Q. Is it common for people that work here to moonlight in other gigs?

A. No. No, it's not. Out of what 27 pilots at one point I only can think of maybe two.

Q. Okay.

A. Maybe one is flight instructing, or not even flight -- yeah. Yeah, it's very rare.

Q. Okay. How would you classify the working relationship in between the crews and the pilots here?

A. It's -- some of them -- it's, yeah, you get to know them at base meetings, their relationships that they have with each other. And I want to say for the most part they're 95 percent is pretty

good the relationships they have. Yeah.
Q. So, what about that five percent? What are we doing about those guys?
A. The five percent that just falls on the end of the day. Like I said, it's communication skills. Pilot is not -- or the med team are not, they're not having the best CRM going on there. Yeah, they're -- and the more quiet it gets, the more less-trust it gets between them, so it, you know, the rest is 95 percent are the ones that talk to each other kind of deal, yeah.
Q. Understood, understood. Has there ever been a situation or is there a process for like these guys absolutely cannot get along. They need to not work together. Is there any sort of process that you guys have I place for when those scenarios might arise?
A. We usually have a meeting and talk about it separately. Mark and I will talk to the med team and maybe involve our chief pilot, Andy Munion. And then we'll follow up with the pilot after to see what, you know, is confirmed what this is and, you know, have a meeting with the pilot.

And then by then we can, we can identify, all right, you know, here's, here's the, here's the missing piece in this communication. It's usually that. It's always that, it has been so far.
Q. So, you -- has it ultimately been fixable?
A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Just a couple more and then I'll pass on so you can stop listening to me as well. But we've heard there've been a few policy changes, things that are recent. So, I'm going to track down from a six-month period because in that six-month period you have kind of like before accident and post accident.
So, in the last six months can you tell me, have there been any changes in policy or the ways that you have done business?
A. Since?
Q. We're going to start with six months. The last six months.
A. Six months?
Q. Yeah.
A. If I changed anything?
Q. Has anything changed in the way you guys do business or policy changes?
A. Policy changes we do a wellness check with each crew now. The pilots do that. That has changed. There is a, there is kind of like a -- on the medical side, something like a triage with psych patients and things like that, that has, that has changed a little bit where we're finding more critical using our assets for more critical patients. Yeah. Other than that. I mean we've, we haven't been doing as many flights as we did after December. Yeah.
Q. So, these two changes, the wellness check and the triage were

they before the accident or post-accident?
A. They were right after the accident they came out when we started bringing them on, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yes.
Q. And were these like South Jordan down implemented changes or something that maybe you and Mark came up with as changes for --
A. It came --
Q. -- here on the islands?
A. It came from South Jordan down.
Q. Okay. So, what do you think, Chief Pilot?
A. What do I think about?
Q. The changes.
A. The changes?
Q. Mm-hmm.
A. The triage, I think the triage is a good, it's good thing. I want to say the wellness, the wellness has been good. It has been helping us be more mindful of our crews in better communicating.
Q. Okay. Why do you think those changes -- let's go with the wellness check. Why do you think that was implemented?
A. Some of, some of from a prior accident in Alaska, it seems like a lot was learned and doing wellness checks and making sure everybody was good and keep following up on employees after, you know, after a crash.
This was just better to follow up. I'm not sure -- I mean

actually to tell you the truth, I'm not sure if Alaska did it. But it seems like there was some past experience from South Jordan that knew how to handle things much better since the Alaska. And the wellness was to keep following up on our crews, their checks, their wellness checks.

Q. But correct me if I'm wrong, the wellness check sounds like it's happening between the pilot and the crew.

A. Correct.

Q. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. So, I guess what is the pilot supposed to do about it?

A. Well if the crew -- it's, you know, we like a treatable one is just say no.

Q. Yeah.

A. You know, kind of deal. So, if the, if the pilot finds that it's just a screening and find if they're maybe something different came up that day and maybe that crew member should be checked on before he accepts flight and move forward.

Q. So, if that's the case then what's the pilot supposed to do? Are they supposed to deal with it themselves or are they supposed to elevate it?

A. No. No. They'll elevate it. Yeah. They'll let the program director, Mark, know.

Q. Oh okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Do you think -- do you not think that that was happening before on maybe not as formatted?
A. It wasn't in depth of so much of emotional-wise to check up. Before it was kind of like a brief of where we're going and what we're doing kind of deal. But it wasn't, yeah. It wasn't as in depth as the CRM is now with the wellness training.
Q. Okay. So, I guess what I'm trying to get at is prior to the accident for the crews if they weren't feeling it for whatever reason, do you think that they did not feel that they were empowered to call knock it off at that point on their own without having a pilot have to check with them for that to happen?
A. No. They always have the power. We always -- in each meeting we'd always say treat everyone to say no. Yeah.
Q. Yeah. So, I guess I'm just trying to figure out the benefit there. I mean it's great the communication, I'm all for instill more lines of communication. I just, I'm trying to figure out what was the intent for this change and if it was well communicated why the change was being implemented to everybody here coming from South Jordan.
A. Yeah. I mean there was a lot of -- it was, it was tragic. There was a lot of emotions there and I think before we get in a plane everything has to be straight before you get into the plane. Everybody's -- yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. This was, this was something way out of the ordinary that

happened in December, and we need to check up, keep checking up on everyone.

Q. Absolutely. But there is, correct if I'm wrong, a flight risk assessment. Correct?

A. Correct.

Q. On both sides of the curtain?

A. I'm not sure on the medical side what goes on there, but I know on the pilot side we have a risk assessment to fill out for a mission.

Q. And things like this personal wellness are taken into consideration on that?

A. Yes. There is an I am safe questionnaire, that's right, at the beginning of, at the beginning of the risk assessment.

Q. Okay. But you're not sure if the medics have something similar?

A. I don't, I'm not --

DR. WOODS: Okay. Well, we can, we can ask those questions. Okay. All right. I'll stop bugging you for now. And pass it off. Dylan?

MR. ETCHER: Before we pass off to Dylan --

DR. WOODS: Sorry.

MR. ETCHER: -- we've been going about --

DR. WOODS: Oh, that's true.

MR. ETCHER: -- an hour and 20 minutes and I saw your phone when you flipped it over. Do you need to break or something?

MR. WEHRSIG: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: We can take a break. It's --

MR. WEHRSIG: No, it's good. It's good. Yeah. It doesn't need to be --

MR. ETCHER: Are you sure?

MR. WEHRSIG: Yeah, yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. I just wanted to make sure. When I saw people flip their phone and wait, I think uh-oh, that's not good.

MR. WEHRSIG: Yeah, yeah. No, no. I just, I didn't want to distract her too. You know, it keeps blinking on and off on her or whatever. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Well, if you need to take it that far you can just --

MR. WEHRSIG: No, that it can wait. Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Okay.

MR. WEHRSIG: Thank you though. Thank you for the offer.

MR. ETCHER: Sure.

MR. GARRISON: Well, my brain is tired and I'm not even the one talking so I do think we should take a break.

MR. WEHRSIG: Okay.

MR. ETCHER: All right. Let's take a five minute.

(Off the record.)

(On the record at 11:34 a.m.)

MR. ETCHER: And we're back on the record at 11:34 local. Dylan?

MR. GARRISON: Yes.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. Let's start with the camera that's on, in the airplanes, the Appareo, who can access that data? Like you're the assistant chief pilot, you're saying like you're -- that's not something you really have access to.

Like how high up do you have to go to -- like if you wanted to -- like hey we ran into this. I'd really like to see the video on this. Who do you have to contact -- what would, what would that be like?

A. I would probably run up the chain to the director of operations on that. I wouldn't just dig into it through maintenance or anything like. Because they're -- honestly though I really don't know how that, it works. Yeah. The only thing I know is I conk my head on it, that's, that's about it. That's as much as I know about that.

Q. Right.

A. But on -- if the protocol, I would think -- we don't even have a protocol on anything like that. We've never done it in the, in the past.

Q. Yeah, that --

A. I'm not even, I'm not even, I'm not even aware if maintenance has even used it yet here in our region. Yeah.

Q. Okay. So, what is the -- it doesn't really sound like it's been used at least not at Hawaii Life Flight. I mean for example

if it's one or two instances maybe but what was the policy for putting it in there? Like what was driving that?

A. You know, it was, it was years ago from my, from my understanding years ago, it was prior before even GMR and all that. It was when Joe Hunt owned it. And we've had -- back then I think there was, something happened when somebody over temped an engine or something like that.

And they wanted to find out who was the guy who over temped. That was a very different company back then. Yeah. So, they wanted to who over temped and figure out that kind of --

Q. Okay. That makes a lot more sense. So, like as in a --

A. That's what originally started up. And then the mechanics started saying, well we can troubleshoot better too with this because the pilot is explaining to us this, and we can see that.

Q. Oh okay. Okay. So, that makes a lot of sense. So, like if they're like, it was engine damage or something on an airplane maintenance is like hey this has been over temped, you know, and the pilot is like, no, it wasn't me. It wasn't me. But like that would be an instance, an example of somewhere where we, like let's pull that data.

A. Yeah. That has changed and but by the time it got budgeted and put in, it was a different company. It was bought out by, you know, by the time, when it was all -- you know how things take for budgeting and to come through the channel, you know, down the tube.

When it finally came out that owner to my recollection, Joe Hunt already sold us. And that was, that was under him and then now it's like, now it came out and now the deal, the new deal, I mean Jeremy understood the deal was like, this is not used for that purpose. This is used for troubleshooting and things like that. Yeah.

Q. So, would Hawaii Life Flight do any pilots, managers, maintenance anyone ever do any checks on it or like make sure SD card's in there or anything like that?

A. Not to my, not to my knowledge, yeah.

Q. So, when you hire new pilots here and they're coming in for training, could you explain to me like common difficulties they have or common -- or focuses you do in training of like, oh I know, like everyone who comes in and flies these King Airs inpatient rehabilitation -- you know, because I know every King Air is a little different. Right?

It doesn't, it doesn't matter if it's a 90. They're all set up a different. The avionics package is different. Even avionics package with you guys, you know, you have different configurations. So, what are like the common problems or like the emphasis in training? Like what are you focusing on --

A. The Alpha Mikes, when the Alpha Mikes were online, the Alpha Mikes we had a different training and when an Alpha Mike got swapped out at a base and the pilot would know, they would actually go down there and study.

We had a placard in there. The major and minor differences of the Alpha Mike in there and they would review that.
Q. Okay.
A. But that was the biggest ones when the guys came out was the Alpha Mikes. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So, like what about now with -- and those ones are offline, right, those, the Alpha Mikes, they're no longer flying?
A. Nowadays -- what is the question is the challenge you said or what is it?
Q. Well first, the Alpha Mikes are offline, right?
A. Yes. They're done. Yeah.
Q. Do you know the last time one of them flew?
A. No, I don't.
Q. Around about? Like was it months ago, years ago?
A. Months ago.
Q. Okay. Weeks ago?
A. No, months ago.
Q. Months ago?
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. So, they're offline now. So, like, so now when you're bringing in pilots you don't have to worry about the Alpha Mikes. But you with all of your experience, based on your experience what are you expecting to have to emphasize in training with these specific King Airs for a new pilot coming in?
A. There's so much when they, when they come on. You know, it's

drinking out of a firehose when you start in any aviation job, you know. So, there's a lot that's running through my mind that I could choose from.

But a lot of them is there's a lot of procedures that, you know, risk assessments have to be followed. Wellness checks have to be followed. And things like that and then it just takes it -- now there's even more of a delay if you're a fresh pilot to do a check list and now this pilot even has to do all these wellness checks and risk assessments and weather to get back to dispatch.

Kind of, where before was you got given the mission, crew, you know, just said we're going here. We all agree that we're going to -- we're all on the same page. We're going to Hilo or something like that and then leave.

But now it's, to me it's a longer page even some of the vet pilots are expressing how the process now how a little bit longer it is. I can see that now as adding more to the firehose of procedures of, before you just start up and go now kind of deal. Yeah.

Q. 13-GZ had a Garmin 625 installed if I remember correctly.

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. Okay. Were you around when they -- when Hawaii Life Flight installed 625s in the airplane?

A. Yes.

Q. Okay. And can you tell me about that transition as far

as -- specifically pertaining to training, like how that went with pilots, the transition, common errors you ran into?

A. It actually was a, it was an upgrade. Most pilots welcomed it, you know, with a transponder and everything in there. Yeah, it was actually, it was actually a welcome of an upgrade on that. Yeah. That I can remember.

Q. And as far as like checkrides and training and stuff, was everyone able to just like -- did everyone like have an easier time or was there some that were --

A. Because we flew --

Q. -- struggling more?

A. Because we flew Garmins already and we had the Garmin concept of how Garmin works besides like another FMS in there or a GNG (ph.) or anything like that the same issues that they had before was the same issues if we did a checkride, you know, in programming it.

But once they knew the pages and how Garmin works that was a huge head start already in switching over to the 625s. It was just an upgrade to us. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Did you -- with your interaction with Brian, did you ever run into any issues in training, checkrides? I know you didn't do the training so I should say more with the checkrides, any of your interactions, any common problems, or any problems he was having with Garmin units or autopilot or --

A. No. No, to me it was, it was -- what I identified was just

basic IFR, basic IFR procedures kind of deal in there. That's it.
Q. He -- to clarify he -- you would say that his deficiency was pertaining to basic IFR operations?
A. Yeah. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. You know the basic stuff with the chart, approach charts and basic IFR, you know. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah. That's what I can remember.
Q. Okay. When you're doing checkrides what do you check for in regard to partial panel training or partial panel?
A. I will dim one of the displays, EHSI and then they'll go, they'll go to composite mode and fly with that.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. Do they shoot approach like that?
A. Some will. Depending on, you know, if we're actually flying the plane and in composite mode is everything is so scrunched up so if it VFR day I'll go on my discretion if I'm going to shoot an approach on it.

If not I just want to see how they will, how they react to it. Will they go to the composite, will they go to a check list, you know, that's basically what I'm looking at on a partial panel on that. That's the most partial panel that I do.
Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.
Q. That's the most that you do?
A. Yeah. I don't -- other than that I don't cover or fail anything else on the six-pack.
Q. Okay. One of the unique things about the King Airs here at Hawaii Life Flight is the EFIS on the left-hand side, the pilot side and then on the right-hand side you've got the gyro instruments, you know.

Many configurations will either have EFIS on both sides or gyro instruments on both sides where you've kind of got to mix and match. Is there anything that you want to focus on when you're checking pilots, when you're talking to company pilots in regard to that specific setup?
A. No.
Q. That needs to be trained for or common problems that a pilot could or could not expect?
A. No. But it's basically just don't trust everything in there. Yeah.
Q. Okay. You were talking about the partial panel you can have one EFIS fail.
A. I can't fail it, but I can just dim it, dim it out, yeah.
Q. Right. You're simulating a single --
A. Simulating, yeah. A screen out.
Q. -- a screen?
A. A screen out. Not DBU failure. It's just a screen out.

Yes.
Q. Right. And what would a DBU failure look like?
A. Complete, to my knowledge a complete loss of both.
Q. Okay. Tell me more about that? What exactly does that look like?
A. Two blank screens and I believe a loss of the autopilot.
Q. Mm-hmm. And so, in that situation how would the pilot continue to fly in IMC conditions?
A. We have iPads. Normally we have an iPad on the yoke that I usually like to do because I like the iPads talk to a Stratus and you have synthetic vision of outside which I always thought that was a great add on, that's why we kept those Stratus.
I forget the exact name of the Stratus but it's on the, a suction cup on the windshield. You have that as back up and then you have the copilot attitude indicator as a back up if you were to lose those two.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. And so, do you ever train this scenario like --
A. On both out? No.
Q. Okay.
A. I've -- I'm not trained. I don't do too much training I should say. I do the checkrides and it's, I won't, I won't fail, yeah, full DBU on the checkride. Yeah.
Q. The company instructors come to you, right, like you're

overseeing them?
A. Mm-hmm.
Q. And so, like that, do you have oversight over training?
A. No, I do not.
Q. You don't have oversight?
A. Randy Ostman has oversight on the training, yes.
Q. Okay.
A. I do add on a list of what I'm seeing on the line though. I won't, I won't, will not communicate. Like I'll say, I'll say, you know, I've seen two or three pilots take a little longer than usual programming the approach in or something like -- or a hold. If I ask them to do a different hold load in there and then I'll say, can we focus on that a little bit more in your guys training.
Q. Sure.
A. And try and pick on that a little bit.
Q. All right. So, when you're seeing common problems you're sending it back down the line to training --
(Crosstalk)
A. Send out or in our weekly meeting in the, in the meetings that we have when it, when we do have our group meetings. Yeah. With South Jordan. And all the other ACPs or check airmen or trainers will share with what we're seeing also.
Q. Okay. Are you aware of Hawaii Life Flight -- well even like with you flying in the line, your own experience has Hawaii Life Flight/Guardian done any training for this partial panel? Like I

know you said you didn't, but does that extend --
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Okay. They don't do that --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- partial panel training? Of like you mentioned like oh we could fly with the iPad. Do we ever -- has any training been done to your knowledge of like flying the airplane via the --
A. Well I just want to be clear that I don't tell them to -- we don't fly with the iPad. It's not in our policy or procedures or anything. I was just answering your questions was like the backup kind of deal, you know, kind of knowledge. Yeah.

But yeah, to my knowledge the list that they go through, yeah, I haven't trained in a while, so I really don't know. I just give them feedback on what I'm seeing on the line on the check in.
Q. But you're currently qualified to fly the line, right?
A. Correct.
Q. Okay. Oh, Randy is the --
A. Randy Ostman is our, is our head trainer, yeah.
Q. And where does, where does he live?
A. He lives in South Jordan also.
Q. Okay. Okay. So, if your company instructors here have an issue in regard to training or they receive -- like who do they, who do they go to?
A. They go to, they to Randy.

Q. Okay. So, they'll go talk to him?
A. Yeah. They'll, they'll communicate me. They'll, you know, but they're just keeping me in the loop kind of on it. If we can, if we can handle it here then we will but if not, if I see that that's a, you need to take it up to Randy, up that line.
Q. So, would you say that the, they may pull you in for help, but the chain of command is clear, and they will go to Randy for problems or --
A. Yes. Yes.
Q. Okay. That makes sense. And that's where they're receiving all of their guidance in how to conduct training, what type of training, it's all like through Randy?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Except for deficiencies you were talking about like you might say, hey guys, let's focus on this. I've seeing a lot of it.
A. I've seeing a lot of this. Yes.
Q. Yeah. That makes sense. Okay. So, we mentioned -- well let's see. If a pilot is coming through for his six-month check, his 12-month check and you're seeing -- you look back in his record.

You're seeing more than one, not necessarily a complete unsatisfactory on a checkride but like areas of unsat, maybe some retraining needed on the checkrides, things like that. What considerations do you have when you see that?

A. Considerations? You mean --
Q. Yeah, as far as like --
A. -- the next time --
Q. -- doing their next checkride.
A. The next time around when I see, I definitely know the personality of, you know, of just about each pilot here and like it's, it's pretty open. And so, I know which pilots are very thorough and which pilots are maybe not as strong as thorough and things like that.

But they, each pilot will say that follows in a checkride, you have the policies and procedures in their SOPs when they fly. That's, that's a standard already here, you know, right. So, I want to say now most of them -- all of them, not most of them.

All of the do follow the SOPs when they do a check. That's a first flag and we correct that. So, ever since -- I mean ever since I've been a check airman and that has been the standard, I've hardly seen too much drop off.

Just a little bit of hiccup in nerves kind of deal most of the time on guys who are -- or like I said, like you can tell which pilot's that does the drift, you know, yeah, you can tell kind of like I said earlier in the run up.

You know you can see in a run up if they have drift if they're going word from word or man, they're doing it like they're cooking their favorite recipe, you know, they have it down kind of deal.

So, those are the pilots but actually of the bat on some of the things you start picking up already like -- because another pilot could be different, he struggled the last time but hey, man, maybe it was nerves or something.

I've had, I've had strong pilots actually stumble on checkrides and I'm backing up thinking what's, what's going on here, you know, and this is not the day to have a bad day when you're having a checkride for sure, right. We all know that as pilots.

So, it's hard to say but it does -- I do brief Ed if he's going to do one that I've seen something, you know, and I'll let Ed, just keep an eye on this. This is what he had a little bit of a hiccup on. We do send an email chain too of notes of what we saw on the checkride to each other on each one and say, hey, I saw this.

Strong flying skills. Kind of weak on this or something. I keep, you know, just for your attention for the next time you jump on so make sure they've been working on that, that skill that maybe they're weak on.

Q. That makes sense. Yeah, what you're saying about the run ups that too, that makes sense. Like if a pilot is out there doing a run up every day like they're supposed to when they come in it's just another day. Right? But like when they stumble on the run up it's like, oh so you're not doing it.

Q. Yeah. So, you already see one flag. All right. This person

is already drifting from something that's on the check list that's supposed to be done everyday kind of deal, yeah. And if you're going word for word, I mean it could be in all honesty I can say that's completely what it is.

But it could be checkride nerves and I don't want to miss something and screw it up already. So, I could be wrong. That actually could be, that's my opinion. Yeah.

Q. Right. Yeah, it's just like something you start to look for at that point.

A. Yeah.

Q. You had mentioned that, you know, pilots have been let go in the past for drift for performance on checkrides, unsatisfactory on checkrides repeating. What's the threshold for that? Like when does that, when does that become a consideration?

A. It doesn't happen very often but if we do a checkride and it turns to an unsat, try to train up that pilot. From my understanding is we've, we've done, in South Jordan they try to train and if the pilot comes up to par, to the standard that we want and, you know, is ready for another checkride, then we'll bring them up.

But if the instructor is saying, yeah, this is, this is beyond. We're trying. We tried our best. We're going to have a sit down talk with this pilot on how we're going to move forward, maybe separation. But if the instructor brings them up and they pass the second one then yeah.

Q. Okay. That makes sense in my mind because, so we get an unsat. They go to, they've got to go to retraining. They go to retraining and as long as they're making progress there, like, okay, we're good.

We're going to, we're going to keep moving forward. But if they start struggling there and they're not making progress and the instructor is like, this isn't working out. That's when you're, okay, we've got to go a different route?

A. Yeah.

Q. And consider termination?

A. Yeah. Yep.

Q. Okay. Okay. That makes a lot of sense. What about another scenario where it's like get an unsat, go to retraining, make progress, pass the checkride. Six months later same pattern, you know, six months later same pattern. Is that something that would like --

A. If there's like another unsat, like two unsats -- I can't recall anybody who has two unsats. Yeah. I'd have to -- I can't recall anybody that has two unsats but definitely if somebody unsat twice that's still here I would have to look it up. But yeah, I --

Q. Oh, that would be surprising to you?

A. Yeah. I'm thinking of one pilot that did have two unsats and that person is not here, in fact two pilots that had two unsats, they're not here.

Q. And for clarification, when you have to do retraining on the checkride I mean is that -- you document that on the 8410, yeah of the retraining?
A. No, the -- yeah, if they select to retrain, then I document it. But if you look at my 8410s I'll put the unsat and I'll put satisfactory on the next one because we didn't pause or retrain. I didn't pause it for retraining or anything like that.
Like I said, I've never -- I can't recall anybody that says, let's pause, I want to train up on that. We have paused in the past when the pilots say I need to take a breather, can we, can we hold it a while. That's it.
Q. So, what you're saying is like, so what it, think about in these steep turns, I usually mess it up. So, and they say, no, I don't want to be retrained. I just want to do it again. Then you just let them do it again and if they do that one --
A. I tell them, if you, if -- yeah, if you want to, if you screw up the second one that's, that's --
Q. And they say, no, I've got this. I can do it.
A. Yeah.
Q. I just messed that up, you know, whatever. They spend that, you know, they do the second demonstration of steep turns and that ones satisfactory.
A. We'll pause the checkride. And then that person will take a break or whatever. And then they'll figure out like my scan, it's always the scan and then they'll say, yeah, I don't have to train.

Just put it back on. I'm going to get my scan better.
Q. Oh okay.
A. That's been almost like 100 percent on each one that the steep turns. It's like, I've got to get my scan going again.
Q. Okay. So, then they, then they demonstrate. They go back and if, I mean if they are unsat again then it's like, okay, now this is an unsat checkride?
A. Yeah. Because it's two of the same things again.
Q. Okay. But if they get it satisfactory now we're just documenting it on the 8410 and be like, it was unsat, but in the end it was sat.
A. I would, like I would word it unsat on a steep turn. The next steep turn was within ATP limits.
Q. So, basically they get two opportunities to do a steep turn? And then one of them has --
A. Yeah.
Q. -- got to be good. Yeah.
A. Multiple can't be, yeah. But they can pause, and they can, they can, we can train or, you know, we'll train, and I'll say, okay, here's a training. Let's, let's do a couple of left, right ones. Yeah. And then we're going to put the checkride back on. You can't, you can't screw this up now. Right.
Q. So, do they just get two opportunities for, to mess up everything? Like can it, like if they mess up anything the first time, they just get another opportunity?

A. It can't be not just anything. There's some hard fails. If I have to take over the controls, I've done a hard fail on one applicant who when I first started as a check airman. That was a hard fail. I had to take over the controls.

Another one that would be a hard fail, I would call it unsat, but I'd probably call Andy or Randy, the chief pilot or the head trainer, would a pilot comes all the way in and forgot to put the gear down, you know. And kind of like those hard fails are very alarming to me.

Q. Because then we're moving out of like, oh you didn't, you didn't demonstrate performance and we're moving into the safety, like that was unsafe?

A. So, like a steep turn, how often do we do a steep turn? Right. So, you know, pilots rarely do a steep turn, only for checkrides. Coming into land with a gear, you do that every day. It's like, wow, this is -- we need to --

Q. And that's safety, right. Like you're --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- you mess up a checkride, or you mess up a steep turn it's like, well, you know, you're 50 feet off, let's go do it again.

A. Yeah.

Q. Yet if you mess up the gear, now you've got an accident.

A. Yeah. Yeah.

Q. Yeah. Okay. So, as long as it's not safety related like they messed up an approach or something like that, they can just,

they'll get a second attempt on it at the checkride if they want it?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. And can they mess up the steep turn and then demonstrate the steep turn correctly and then mess up an approach and then demonstrate the approach correctly, and then mess up the next approach and then demonstrate it correctly, and then that's still satisfactory?

A. Like I said, I like to do it three. The first FA observation told me, there's kind of like three strikes. And to have that three, how long you just took you to talk about that, that was a bad day already and let's, let's head back and we're going to have to unsat. I mean three is pretty hard.

Q. Okay. So, on that third one --

A. Three is uncommon I should just say.

Q. Right.

A. I see one and twos but three is, yeah.

Q. Okay. So, mess up steep turns, demonstrate it satisfactory, messed up a missed approach, demonstrate it satisfactory and then that third time mess up the holding procedure, you're like, okay. We're done.

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. That's like, that's what you're saying is the third

strike then?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Understood. I want to talk about the pilot's schedule the two weeks on. I know it's a little different in Honolulu. I just want to talk about Maui.
A. Sure.
Q. And how it's, how it's being done there and how it was being done -- nothing's changed since the accident, right?
A. No.
Q. As far as schedules?
A. No.
Q. Will you just explain the two-week schedule in Maui?
A. Sure. The two weeks on is one week on days, so you start from 5:00 a.m. and you end at 5:00 p.m. And then after your one week of days, then you go into nights, so you basically have a 24 hour off, because you just finished Tuesday.

It starts, always starts on a Wednesday. So, if you finish on a Tuesday, you don't return back till Wednesday night and then you do a 5:00 to 5:00, 5:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m., one week of nights. And the followed by two weeks off.
Q. When in that cycle do you feel that it's the highest risk for a pilot in regard to flipping schedules and fatigue and --
A. My opinion on that?
Q. Yes.
A. Usually, the first night because you didn't, you know, your

body is not trained to sleep yet during the day. You need a good first all nighter or, you know, like a late night to, you know, start swinging your body to nights. That's my opinion. Yeah.

Q. So, the transition to nights?

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. But probably, we're all wired different. Right. Once I flip my body I'm, I'm pretty good. I just have to through the punishment of not flipping my body back to days on the Wednesday morning when I finish and coming off stay up now the whole day and switch to sleeping back at nights.

But there is sometimes where it could be some challenging nights of finishing late, you know, flying all night and finishing late and then that I could see personally for me. Say I'm supposed to finish at 5:00.

We finish late till we had a mechanical issue or something like that and I didn't get home until 9:00 or something like that. And then right off the bat, after my 10 hours rest my phone rings, I'm going right back in it and then after something like that, I'm not even sure if I'm just tired.

Maybe just mentally too it's starting to get to me and then I will start getting tired from there a little. Just for that night and then maybe ask for a reset which a lot of pilots do, ask for a reset when they call off. A lot of pilots that call out fatigue, you --

(Off the record.)

(On the record at 12:05)

MR. ETCHER: My apologies about that. We're back on the record at 12:05.

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. Okay. So, we were discussing schedules. We were talking about transition when the highest risk was when you transition around night. The question I want ask and this is an opinion-based question.

This is like the perfect world. You've got all the power to make the policy change here and the only consideration you have to make in this decision is safety. Okay? So, if you were to design a schedule for the pilots, purely around safety, what would that look like?

Because I know like the two-week schedule is a lot about pilot retention. Right? Like people -- no one wants to be on all nights. No one wants -- so that's kind of what I'm getting at like what would a schedule look like if it was just -- if safety was the only consideration in your opinion?

A. You mean versus the two weeks, two weeks off, versus a two week on, one week off?

Q. Whatever. Whatever you think. Like if you, if you were designing a schedule for pilots and like they were just, this is going to be the lowest risk safety and that's the only thing I have to consider because I've got pilots --

A. Well I did, I did design most of the times, you know, to see what times would be like, you know, back before there were some 10:00 to 10:00 schedules and things like that. And that was, that was just brutal with the sun come and you've still got another flight to do after you've been on all night.

So, I think on the hourly, I don't think I would touch anything on the 6:00 to 6:00. Kind of like the sun comes up. The company doesn't own me anymore. I'm done after this. You know, so I love that feeling of the schedule. On the days off, two weeks on, two weeks off, it's hard to say because I've never had two weeks off.

So, my opinion is that I'm not sure how I would react with being off for two weeks versus one week off and getting back into it. You know, so yeah, I really, I really can't say because I've never worked a two week on, two weeks off schedule. I've worked all my life for one week off schedule.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. Yeah I was just curious to get your opinion on that. There's no right answer, you know, on this.

A. Okay.

Q. You have way more experience in that than I do.

A. Yeah. I've just --

Q. And I've just --

A. I've always worked with one week off and that was, that was

great.
Q. Yeah. I was just curious if there was an ideal in the air ambulance world of like man it would be great if we could this, but we just can't hire enough pilots, you know, to do that or something.
A. And some of the schedule in Guardian too are one week on, one week off, you know, still a 50/50, a 50 percent schedule of the year working 50 percent versus our 66 percent schedule of two weeks on, one week off kind of deal.
Q. And as far as keeping the pilots sharp, right and fighting fatigue, is there, is one of those schedules better than the other or is there one that's more ideal? If that's the only consideration we're talking about?
A. I always -- to me it's another opinion answer. One week was good for me and I'd be back in it. Yeah. It would take me sometimes two days to recover if we had a rough one week of nights, you know, it would take me probably till Thursday to start enjoying my days off.
Q. Okay. That makes sense. When you hire pilots from the mainland, right, they're coming over from the mainland, do you have any special emphasis areas that Hawaii Life Flight goes over with them as far as like, hey, this is what's different out here --
A. Yes, we do.
Q. -- as opposed to the mainland?

A. We have an IOE program when they come on. We have a folder that has the information of the ins and outs of each airport. For one maybe flying into Hilo and Hilo approach is going to say, switch to the tower at Pepeekeo. Nobody from the mainland knows where Pepeekeo is, you know, coming in.

So, we'll tell them, I mean you can always say on, you know, I'm not here. But I will say that the most point that sticks out this is Pepeekeo that you can switch over to to tower as, you know, just a heads up if you ever want to -- this is what they're going to tell you so don't get pulled off.

Yeah, so there is an IOE pamphlet that we go through at the beginning and then we go through it's called like Hawaii advisory PowerPoint that we go through at each airport. Given the fact that they've already been through so much training and a lot on their plate, they're not going to remember all the ins and outs of each airport that we went over.

So, we do have a folder that has, you know, that information and then in IOE we try to get them at every airport that we can to know where they park and everything like that. At the end of IOE sometimes it takes one to two weeks, but everybody agrees the captains who flew with the new hired pilot and the new hired pilot says I'm ready to fly solo. And we all agree up on it. Yeah.

Q. And then those pilots will, they're are flying with them on their IOE and stuff, like they're going over like here's the common things and like here's the, you know, what you want to be

concerned about.

A. This is where we park and things like that, yeah.

Q. Okay. What about like common hazards, are there like any unique hazards? Like I know like one thing that's been mentioned often is like, hey there's a next level of dark out here. Like it's not like the mainland. Is that like a --

A. I don't know if we have any -- I can't recall if we have anything dark in it. But like Upolu would be one, there's birds. And then there's jumpers out there. So, that's some of the things that I've had multiple bird strikes in Upolu and you end up getting stuck there, you know, because now your plane has to get inspected in the middle of nowhere.

So, things like that is like unique to bird strikes and, you know, where there's a higher case of birds. Lanai has a higher case of student pilots and things like that, you know, flying in and out of Lanai. You've got to be on it. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. But as for, as for dark, I mean Hawaii is, you know, it's, it can get pretty dark, you know, out there. You know, I know like pilots are aware of certain black holes, you know, you know. Taking off Kauai is one.

You're just straight out to the ocean and it's, if you go right over a cloud deck or something it's black after that, you know. Kauai has no reference once you take off. It's all instrument, yeah.

Q. Okay. And are there other areas you'd call black holes as well?
A. I'd say almost the whole island of Molokai is one because there's not too much lights in Molokai. Not too much people live there. And you never see, I mean it's had its history in the mountains of crashes there, you know, at Molokai. But I don't have a list in my head pretty much.
Q. Sure.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay. It's not that like, that much of an emphasis?
A. Yeah. It's, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. It just comes to your mind after you actually take off, like, oh yeah, I remember this place is, this place is dark, you know.
Q. Yeah. Okay. You brought up that you've ran some safety concerns up the chain before and thing you said about it was, you know, there's some hard ones, you know, like they're asking if, you know, you feel like effective change has come and they're properly address, and you said there's some hard ones.
It's not overnight changes. What do you feel like those top safety concerns are that are hard ones that are not overnight changes?
A. Psych patients is one I hear a lot from the pilots. Yeah, psych patients and I could see it's hard ones because, you know, we're here to serve, you know, everyone. If you're on the clock

let's just fly and do it. But the risk does go up, you know, at night, you know, between 2:00 and 5:00 especially to go to a psych patient and things like that.

Yeah, then that everybody wants a G-600. They're screaming for the G-600s, you know. But it's hard to get your hands on these G-600s from my understanding so it's not getting fixed overnight, you know. They are looking for it and then it takes time in the process to when we get them and then to bring a plane off like and get the avionics good, you know, avionics is short on, you know.

Even maintenance, I think, I think they're suffering on shortage too around, you know, nationally, you know, as pilots are to get good, you know, have a bunch of avionics guys to switch out things. Those are not overnight things that -- you know, those are the two that come to mind on the top of my head right now.

Q. Okay. You were saying that it's high risk to fly between 2:00 and 6:00, is that you said?

A. 2:00 to 5:00.

Q. 2:00 to 5:00?

A. I think, I think our risk assessment goes up a little bit in the past. I'm not sure what this new one does but I remember 2:00 to 5:00 was, yeah, that was a little bit higher.

Q. 2:00 to 5:00 and then how does that relate to the psych patients. Sorry I just --

A. Oh no pilots will say, you know, why can't we wait until the

morning, you know, when the sun comes up, a fresh crew, you know, has slept all night and do the psych patient in the morning. But it's not an overnight fix.

We hear, we hear things like the hospital beds are tight, you know. And if we wait so long the hospital, you know, somebody else takes up the bed and now they missed their window. So, it's a hard balance back and forth. But it's not an overnight answer. Those are the ones, yeah. And serving the community at the same time too.

Q. Right. You did say after accident now there is some triage going on?

A. There is a, there is a triage going on.

Q. Okay. And so, was that like, so it's like patients being an example of someone who might be lower priority?

A. Correct.

Q. Okay.

A. Correct. Or stable patients, very stable patients.

Q. And I guess I should just clarify, I'm assuming that a psych patient means like, you know, like the suicidal teenager or something that needs to be flown to Honolulu or something.

A. And that is one of the cases in some of them, yeah.

Q. Something like that.

A. Yeah. But I mean they just, you know, they just walk on the plane and sit down and going that then and just you can tell that it's just very stable, very, very stable for them to take.

Q. Right. Yeah, they're not hooked up to monitors and all, yeah.

A. But there's divide. I mean they're just -- and then there's some pilots that they'll just fly, you know, I'm on 12 hours. I'm going to fly. So, it, that's what, that's what kind of drags even the question always because now it's not a whole agreement also too, you know, of this question came up.

Some people are like, well I'm good. Well, I'm not, you know, kind of deal. And we can't fix those ones overnight especially if we have a divided opinion on it.

Q. So, you said it's not an overnight fix but they're doing triage now. What was, what was the reason for doing the triage now?

A. Oh, the triage is because of how -- we have eight aircraft and we're only averaging about three or four up a day. And so we're using our assets for holding them back for the higher ones and when everything is clear everybody's home and then we're going to -- I really don't know the process.

I should stop right there, of the triage. But I know that with the assets, the limited assets that we have right now that we're doing the triage.

Q. Okay. So, okay, so it's about limited assets. It's not about --

A. To my understanding, right. No, they're the --

Q. It's not about the risk of flying 2:00 to 5:00 or anything

like that.
A. That didn't. Nothing else changed. The risk, everything still stayed the same and everything. But from my understanding it that it's the assets. That's my understanding is how much assets we have right now.
We have a doctor doing the triage.
Q. One of the things, a very common phrase around Hawaii Life Flight is three to go, one to say no. How does that process work as far as -- okay, so the medical staff says, no, I'm not, I'm not going for whatever reason let's just say, okay. Maybe it's not a hard line. They're times out or whatever but they don't want to go.
How does that process work now? So, the pilot asks the medical and they say no. The medical says no. How would that work in that scenario. Where does -- what does the pilot do with that information? Where does he go --
A. The pilot goes back to dispatch and says, my crew turned down the flight. They're not good to go. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. And the follow up. Then we'll let Mark Leggett know to follow up with that, check up on that crew member.
Q. And Mark is the medical crew's --
A. Yeah. But he also oversees the medical crew also out here, yes.
Q. Okay. And then the flight would just get assigned to someone

else, another crew available?
A. Correct. Maybe the same pilot. It could be the same pilot. Different crew. Yeah. Now if it's for weather it's a whole different game. That's pilot shopping, right, so if one pilot turns down, the weather's not good in Hilo, I ain't going.
And they move on, and they say, the other pilot say, do you want to go? Yeah, it's within my envelop. They going, yeah, it's not. It doesn't work that way. That's only one where we're going to turn down the flight is for like weather, you know.
Q. Okay. So, the dispatcher doesn't go pilot shopping and just say --
A. No.
Q. -- they just --
A. It's a very strict policy over here about weather, yeah.
Q. Okay.
A. Pilot shopping in weather.
Q. I wasn't aware of that.
A. Yeah.
Q. Interesting. You mentioned that if a pilot says, I'm fatigued. I can't fly. No questions asked. But they need to provide documentation. They have to fill out a report.
A. They fill out a fatigue report and it's national wide. I've looked at it and it shows all the based and all the pilots that have fatigue here and there, you know. So, we just add to that data and like I said, it doesn't go in the HR file or anything.

Yeah, it's just adding to our data.
Q. Okay. And that has to be done within 24 hours?
A. Usually, 24 hours I'll ask them to do it. I don't see a written policy, but I think after 24 hours I know me, I might forget something after 24 hours.
Q. Sure.
A. So, 24 hours is a good number at least to put a deadline on it so it gets done.
Q. And is that the same truth for a medical who cancels and says, I'm not going. I'm, I'm the one to say no?
A. I can't say. I can't say what's on the medical side.
Q. Oh, you don't know.
A. Yeah. I don't know.
Q. Okay. Okay. So, let's just talk about the pilots then. What would you say if someone was saying, hey if you're, if you're requiring the pilot to fill out a form when they're calling in fatigue, couldn't that perceived as a negative consequence, like couldn't a pilot say, well I don't, I don't want to do the paperwork. I'll just push through. Like --
A. If they're fatigued, they're fatigued. And I try to be clear that the reason why we're filling out that form is maybe we should move the shifts around. Maybe your base has a higher volume of flights, and we need to base another aircraft there and have two aircraft supplied there kind of deal.
That -- it's never -- yeah. I mean, I mean, I don't, I know

it would be a new -- I can understand. Like it's a little bit of extra work here and I have to fill out this form for doing it. But I would trade it for a night's sleep, you know, over that, or a violation, you know, that could happen when you're flying fatigued also. Not just the safety of the aircraft but a violation can happen and things like that.

So, I don't, yeah, it doesn't, it doesn't -- yeah, like I said, it doesn't go into the HR file or anything like that. It's just we want to track to see and then sometimes we could, you know, see if maybe if that person -- I don't even know.

But I'm thinking if it's -- it keeps coming up on that person, the same person fatigue then it's kind of, you know, we need to keep an eye on this person. Almost like a checkride, you know, all right.

This person is not doing very well at night. Can we, can we sit down and see how we can help out. You know, a blackout room at the crew house instead of being at home or things like that. How can we help?

Q. And don't you think that increases -- it would be perceived as a negative consequence to the pilot, like that's something they would want to avoid?

A. To fill out that and then fly fatigued? I think --

Q. Like I think they would want to be in status quo and like well everyone else is doing it, I can do it too. They don't want to call in fatigued every week, right.

A. Right. I mean there is -- I've called in fatigued before and it's a very disappointment in yourself.
Q. Right.
A. I think the more disappointment is is if I strand my crew somewhere, which I have done. I stranded them in Honolulu when I was based at somebody's house. To me that's the more negative consequence is telling your crew I'm done or knowing it's a busy night and dispatch has a lot of flights or something like that and I'm, I'm pulling out.

To me that is a more negative, that is more pressure on myself and that is an opinion thing. I'll put more pressure on myself then filling out a form and getting some sleep.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. That makes sense.
A. Yeah.
Q. So, with that in mind like that -- you have the experience here, that being more of like the pressure of like, man, I don't want to do this to the crew. I don't want to strand them in Honolulu or whatever. Or, you know, the pilots not wanting to fill out paperwork.

We talked about that earlier about the mechanical interruption reports that have to be filled, you know, like, you know, we don't want extra paperwork. We've got enough to do.
A. Right, right.

Q. Like has there ever been any considerations to try to eliminate that as a potential negative aspect of reporting fatigue?

A. I can't say. I think it's, that's a more higher up for it to come to their attention. I think more, maybe a more, surveying, you know, surveying pilots or something like that would have to come out.

Q. But you're not aware of any considerations that have been made in that?

A. No, not at this time, no.

Q. And then the same with the three to go, one to say no. Has that, is that, is it always clear who the one to say no would be?

A. Anyone.

Q. I mean like the pilot says, oh, it was so and so. It was this med staff, it was this med staff, or they say, oh no it was the pilot who said no. The pilot said no because of this. Like is it always clear or is there any consideration for like, hey if we make this anonymous, like only one has to say no.

We don't have to know who it is, who says no, if it's, if we're talking about -- has that ever been a consideration of like -- or is it always documented of like, this is the person who said no?

A. It's usually documented because dispatch will let us know the next day of why this flight got turned down and what happened, you know, last night or this afternoon.

Q. So, there's never been any consideration to make that anonymous of like let one of them say no and they don't have to report to management that we don't --
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q. Okay. Has there ever been any consideration for contract training, like I know some other certificate holders will --
A. We did. We did contract training, you know, in the past. I'm not going to say what company it was, but it wasn't meeting some of the requirements of the flying that we do compared to what they had laid out even though they had a check list.

And then it was, we wanted it -- from my understanding from the training I think this is a good Randy Ostman question also, but we just wanted to have confined to what we do every day instead of what a King Air does. Every day we do it a little bit difference than what a King Air, you know, in medevac terms.
Q. Okay. I understand that there was a new policy implemented after the accident in which the med crews are getting on headset and that way they can maintain communication with the pilot. Is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. What was that policy meant to address? What is the -- first of all where did that come from? Was that above your --
A. I heard in a discussion -- well it first came to my knowledge was in the mainland the crews up there in, they most, they use

their headsets a lot. And then we weren't using our headsets over here.

And what really brought it to light was a comment made on one of our meetings with our whole team out here, with our medical team too, is they would like to hear the pilot talking and hearing the pilot work and it would be more comfort for them to hear something like that.

But in the mainland it's not like they were already doing it and they had, you know, a good CRM to watch for traffic and things like that, you know, they're getting much better at their CRM with the headsets.

Q. And I'm assuming you didn't implement that policy. That policy came from above you.

A. Correct.

Q. Who did it come from and how did it come?

A. It came from Jared Sherman when they came down here and they saw, and it's like let's get the headsets in all the intercoms looked at and working and tuned up for it.

Q. And then was there an email sent out to all the pilots of this is what we're doing now or how is it implemented?

A. I can't recall. I'd have to look at all my emails.

Q. Okay. How is policy --

A. There could be, there could be one. It could be but yeah.

Q. How is policy typically implemented then?

A. Yeah. Yeah, it was like a policy coming out of being on

headsets from now on, yeah.
Q. Okay. And then how do pilots receive that policy?
A. They received it as it added on, you know, you know, because how they got, not more training but, you know, they have to educate a little bit more on the headsets.
Q. Okay. Sorry. I'm probably, I'm probably choosing poor words. How were they alerted of the policy change?
A. Oh, through all of our regional meetings that we're having here after the incident, yeah.
Q. Oh okay, in the meetings.
A. Yeah, after the crash.
Q. And there's like, okay, this is being implemented. Everyone needs to do this now.
A. Yeah. Yeah.
Q. What if, what if the, what have you heard of of a PIC that you oversee as assistant chief pilot, a PIC saying no. I'm not doing that. I don't feel -- like I've got too much going on up there in the cockpit.
I don't want to listen to those guys back there on the mic. I'm not, I'm going to tell them not to be on headsets, like or whatever. Like I'm going to throw on isolate switch. I don't, I don't want to hear them. I'm not going to talk to them. How would that be handled?
A. First I would say this policy, we can't move away from policy. That's something that maybe we need to have a higher up

meeting with, you know, and bring your concerns that that's happening. But we need to, we need to stick to policy on the meeting part.

The other thing I would ask is how is your CRM? Are you telling them what time? You know, we train our crews, our crews annually on critical phase of flight and things like that. Are they observing the critical phase of flight of talking, you know, chatter.

Maybe a better CRM. Maybe they should say, we're going to isolate. We're going to talk a little bit. We'll come back on, kind of deal or things like that instead of just cutting them out.

Q. Okay. So, there could be like some implementation if they're like hey, I'm not doing it until we get up in cruise. I've got, I have sterile cockpit until we get up and cruise. Would that be acceptable? Is that still against policy?

A. If it's, if there's a brief and they all understand it and they're good with it then yes. And but they're still using the headsets.

Q. And so med crews are complaining to you, like hey this pilot won't let us, how is that -- this pilot won't -- I'm talking about --

A. We would all come together. I'd probably bring, you know, Mark, like how we did, it sounds like a crew communication kind of deal and maybe we should start communicating kind of like, all right, well, you know, you're chewing gum too loud any way back

there and it's picking it up. You know, things, you know, weird things like that, we find --

Q. So, try to talk it out.

A. -- that it irritate that what's going on and try and fix it.

Q. Okay.

A. yeah.

Q. But if a pilot in that situation and if the PIC is saying, you know, this is for safety of flight, you know, they're not trying to be like, I'm going against policy but they're trying to say I'm, I'm going to have the isolate switch on until we get it -- you know, I have a sterile cockpit until we get up into cruise. Is that something that they would be allowed to do, or could they expect like more meeting with upper management?

A. More meeting with upper management kind of deal. That's not an overnight thing.

Q. Okay.

A. Because we have to -- on one hand you have to follow policy. The other one is we have to be safe, and we have to have everybody jiving together on this.

Q. Thanks. That clears that up. Could you talk to me about the -- there's one contract here where there's two pilots. Could you tell me a little bit about that, that contract and like how you have two pilots and why you have two pilots?

A. From my understanding is the previous crashes they were all when Hawaii Ambulance was here and they had the -- none of their

crews were on it but it was, it did catch their attention that -- I don't recall but I think it both were, it was on the pilot error side of some of the -- I'd have to refresh my memory on that.

But it sounded like they felt safe -- they thought the outcome, if there was two pilots would be better in some of those, in one of the situations at least on those. And so, they moved for two pilots.

Q. So, that's -- sorry, you said that crashes with who?

A. Hawaii Air Ambulance.

Q. Hawaii Air Ambulance?

A. Yeah. They had two.

Q. That's the name of the company?

A. That was the name of the company back then, yeah.

Q. Okay. They had crashes with this same carrier?

A. No. They had -- no, not, I'm sorry. I stepped over you.

Q. No, go ahead.

A. No, they had, they had the two crashes. One on the Big Island and one in Maui. Yeah.

Q. Okay. And it's with the same contract that you guys have now?

A. No. They did not have -- but in the -- after -- to my understanding Kapiolani used to fly single pilot back then. Then after the crashes and even though they weren't on it and they weren't charting the plane, after that they said they wanted two

up front.
Q. Because they felt like it was safer, and it would mitigate the risk of a single pilot --
A. Of the outcomes of what happened, yeah.
Q. -- making an error? Okay. So, why not have two pilots on all your flights?
A. That's a big discussion and it's, it's one of those ones I'm going to put on the list that doesn't get fixed overnight. Yeah.
Q. But you feel like that is a fix to help mitigate --
A. I feel like it's a deviation -- there's a divided answer in some pilots about -- it's actually about being a single pilot and two pilot crews too. It's just one of those ones that there's not a one answer to right now. Yeah.
Q. Okay. And then based on your experience you have a ton of air ambulance experience, what your opinion based on your experience?
A. I've always, I have always been comfortable, you know, by myself. Once I've had my ways in it, you know, and my, how my standard -- I mean following all company standards and policies, but I had my own standard in there.

And I've been in times where an SIC almost put me in a spot that I wasn't comfortable in and I took over and I was glad that I was on it, you know, that I picked up what this SIC was getting me into before.

So, there's goods and bads, you know. I will say that when

I'm in, when I have an emergency like years in that, I wish I had, you know, somebody just to double check my check list for me.

Q. Sure, yeah.

A. You know, that's the times when I'm like, okay, I've got to do this check list on my own and I'm going to have to double check it because there's nobody else. And it's my own opinion and my own troubleshooting here about what we're doing.

Other than that, I have reservation because of the SIC -- you know, there's two different if he -- yeah, I mean the SIC sometimes they can, they can put you in a predicament that you didn't want to be in and you have to dig yourself out, which I've, I've seen history of, yeah.

Q. Right. So, if we were to remove you as the idea of being the pilot of, you know, maybe like you have to go on an air ambulance between islands or, you know, your loved one has to go on an air ambulance between islands.

And then, you know, you don't get to fly it so in that consideration do you want one or two pilots up there? You don't, you don't know them, you know. Like just --

A. I'm good with one.

Q. Okay.

A. I'm good with one.

Q. Okay. That's what I want to know, yeah, just your opinion. That makes sense.

A. Yeah, that is my opinion though.

Q. Do you know if pilots at Hawaii Life Flight are ever encouraged to, you know, like, hey, from time to time why don't you just hand fly a route just to stay sharp because like if you're coming into the simulator and like when we take your autopilot away you're having problem or something. Is that something that would be encouraged here?

A. Yes. I probably haven't been encouraging it enough, but I remember mentioning it in the past. A nice VFR day, you know, take off, hand fly it, you know, out of, out of some place that you're very comfortable seeing everything outside and everything is lined up. Yeah.

Q. This one I hope, I hope we can be honest with the response here because I want you to know again like my role here is information gathering. It's definitely not enforcement, you know, and I've worked 135. I know, so I have a familiarity, you know.

But if a pilot took off out of here to pick up -- took off out of Honolulu, flew to Kauai to pick up patients and they're flying back to Honolulu. And when they get to Kauai, they're maybe in route on the way to Kauai, their autopilot fails completely INOP, right.

They land in Kauai let's say and they pick up the patient. Would you be surprised if you heard that -- if it came to your attention that they continued to fly back to Honolulu because they're like I didn't want to ride -- I just wanted to bring it back to Honolulu and because that's where maintenance is. I

didn't want to be down there.

I just wanted to complete the mission. Would that be something that surprised you?

A. Yeah. That they flew it back with an inoperative? Yeah, with it already INOP and hand flew it back? Yes, I would be surprised, yeah.

MR. GARRISON: Okay. Okay. I'm done for now. Thanks, man.

MR. WEHRSIG: Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: You doing okay? Do you need a break?

MR. WEHRSIG: No, I'm good.

MR. ETCHER: You're good?

MR. WEHRSIG: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Millicent?

BY MS. HILL:

Q. The simulator is getting fixed, right?

A. Correct.

Q. And it will be fixed?

A. Unfortunately, the simulator, the company that we bought it from they -- as soon as we got it they went out of business. So, the IT guys who put this whole thing together they're no longer. So, now we going through IT guys.

They're trying to learn the system. The simulator is actually, it's, I think before an instructor, Stu, I think you guys interviewed Stu, he's got it up, but it doesn't have -- it's just missing the GPS part.

So, we're completely down, the whole thing, because that's a strong part of our flying. So, we decided not to down it until we can get the GPS part fixed.

Q. And because it's not an FAA approved sim training in it was optional for the pilots?

A. Yeah. It was, it was just an added training device, and we could do way more scenarios than we could, you know, out the, out in Lanai with student pilots around us and we use the same airport.

Q. Has there been any talk with Guardian about getting an FAA approved Sim?

A. Not to my knowledge. I know we're in the move right now to Texas, something like that. But they're moving our headquarters from South Jordan to Texas and the training department is moving there but I don't know what the -- I know they're moving the simulators down there but yeah. Not a full motion one or anything, they just kind of did their -- yeah.

Q. There was a few names on some training records I'm wondering if you could help me with. Jace Wilson (ph.).

A. Okay.

Q. Is he still around, a line pilot, check airman who --

A. Yes, he is up in South Jordan.

Q. Okay. In South Jordan.

A. Yes. He's an instructor in South Jordan.

Q. In the training department?

A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And Myles McLeod?
A. Myles McLeod, to my knowledge he's a, he's a line pilot check airman right now up in -- I'm not sure where his base is though but he's still with the company, correct.
Q. Okay. And Matthew Chapel (ph.)?
A. I'm not familiar with where Matthew is, yes.
Q. Sometimes, obviously after an accident there's chatter, whispers, whatever. We've heard some about Brian's rest time or maybe him not getting rest during the days when he's flying, you know, when he should be resting because he's flying at night. Have you heard that? Or has that --
A. There was, there was one incident that some pilots brought to my attention that Brian was flying rotor during the day and then flying -- and then fatiguing or flying at night and the reason why he was calling out fatigue -- I think Brian -- to my knowledge I can only recall maybe two fatigue calls to my knowledge.

I would have to look it up. But that's how much I don't, I don't really follow the forums, you know, or anything like that. But I remember he had two, but to some pilots that's 20 when they had to fly and do all of his legs if maybe they got it twice. I get that.

So, fatigue is a very walk on eggshell kind of thing when you talk to some pilot. I don't want the pilot to feel like he's, you know, getting pressure, fatigue somebody complaining or anything

like that. So, I actually went to Brian and if you -- I asked him and I figured out a way to ask him without, with still walking on eggshells about how I'm going to ask Brian about, you know, this if he's flying during the day.

And I told him that in our flight duty log you have to put other commercial flying. So, that means if you are working another job we can see other other commercial flying. So, I told Brian, which was, which was I mean I set up to her -- and this is, this needs to be done anyway.

And I asked him can you -- are you putting in your flight log times at the, at your rotor job that you're working. And he goes yeah, yeah. I said, have you been putting in? He says, no, I have to catch up on that. So, he said how far back do you need? And I said, three months.

Give me at least three months of a look back so we can, we can see, you know, your commercial flying on the side. I said, how long will it take you? And he said, less than five minutes. I've only worked there three times. He told me so I can do it in five minutes, the dates that I did fly there in the past three months.

So, I was okay with it. And did talk to, address the pilot's concern. And I said I did follow up on Brian's commercial flying and he's only flown three times there in the past three months is what he told me and he's putting it in the log.

Q. I guess specifically was that the medical crew is was, as if

it was a well known fact that amongst the crews that he would be out doing outdoorsy stuff, hiking, surfing, whatever during the day, no resting and then it became challenging to work with him in the evening sometimes. Was that ever brought up?

A. No that was not brought up to my attention.

MS. HILL: Okay. I'm good.

MR. ETCHER: You made it through round one, right? Round two is always quicker but are you sure you don't need a break before we start?

MR. WEHRSIG: No, I'm good thank you.

MR. ETCHER: All right. I think I only have like 18 pages of questions. I'm just kidding. I'm only kidding.

BY MR. ETCHER:

Q. Kind of talking about that external commercial flying and you asked Brian about it. Did you ever follow up to make sure? Is there way -- let me rephrase that. Is that, is that pilot honor or is it, do you follow up to make sure that --

A. I think a lot of, a lot pilot -- everything we do is pilot honor because I mean pilots have to fill out their logbooks. They have to complete them, you know. There's a lot of, you know, so I did trust what he said.

Q. Okay.

A. Yeah.

Q. All right. As a check airman do you ever do just like the surprise line checks? You know, like sometimes in the airline

world a captain might get a line check airman come up to him and say, I'm riding with you today and they observe everything you do. Do you ever do that?

A. No, I do not.

Q. Okay. Is that anything you guys have every considered or is it just one more thing, you don't have enough time to do?

A. We've, we've had to consider it but, yeah, and time is a factor of -- yeah.

Q. Okay. All right. When you do checkrides, do you do any of them at night or are they all daytime?

A. All daytime.

Q. So, how can you assess a pilot's night ability, or do you guys ever assess it?

A. I don't know how we would assess the night ability. Yeah.

Q. Okay.

A. But I will say when I do our majority of the flights I'm pretty sure -- I don't think anybody has the data on this, but the majority of our flights are at night here. I want to say from like 3:30 to 10:30 is a pretty strong hours of medevacs. Hospitals open up like hotels in after 3:30 and then we start rolling through into 10:30 at night. So, the majority of flying is at night here. Yeah.

Q. So, as a check airman, assistant chief pilot, if you do a majority of your flying at night is there -- I'm not trying to sound mean. Is there a reason you don't check them at night?

A. One thing is maybe a bad stall or a spin we get into and there's nothing. It's, you know, Hawaii is a pretty, it's pretty dark out there so I used to fly for a cargo outfit, and we did all our checkrides at night, you know, that's when the plane is available because we all slept during the day anyway, our rest time.

But I remember having a checkride for someone also, I just remember having the checkride at the beginning of your night shift and then maybe flying on from there you're pretty fatigued out because you already had a checkride coming up. You've been up all day studying and now you're going to do this.

So, I think the pros and cons of having checkrides at night doesn't validate most checkrides to do checkrides at night.

Q. Okay. When you get ready to go do a checkride do you ever look back at their past, of that pilot's past training records just to see, what have they had issues within the past? I'm getting ready go to fly with Chuck Yeager here.

A. I actually know almost every personality of most of these pilots. I think my open door is pretty open with a lot of them. You can see my phone records if not how often I talk to pilots every day.

So, I -- and during checkrides I really do get to know the personality of, you know, which ones are, which ones are good. You just know which ones are and they, you know, it catches you off guard sometimes when I'm thinking, all right. I'm going to go

down and do this, you know, do this checkride with this veteran pilot that's very good and then all of a sudden I've got to change my flight home.

It just really caught me off guard. I didn't -- I booked my flight to leave at a certain time, you know, thinking this guy is going to be smooth. He's going to, we're going to check the boxes really good.

I mean we're going to check the boxes with no hiccups. And the we can't check a box. And now it's dragging out through the day of doing this. So, but following up on -- and that's just sticks in my mind afterwards, you know.

Q. So, I know you and Mr. Cavanaugh do, used to do checkrides. Right now, it's all you but a year ago, let's just say. And you're getting to go do -- Ed's getting ready to go do a checkride or you are, but you know, I did his checkride last year or Ed did it. Do you ever go back looking at the training records just to see what issues?

A. I actually memorize them. Like Ed would tell me, Ed would send me an email of what pilot is struggling on what, yeah.

Q. You've got a good memory then. I'm telling you.

A. Yeah. I mean on memory, on work and checkrides for some reason they stick out. I think if you was to ask Dylan, you can remember almost everything that happens on a checkride because of how serious the moment is in checkrides and your record is on the line. So, I take it serious with them also. You know, I remember

what they're doing.
Q. All right. Now I know you said you have -- correct me if I'm wrong, about 27 pilots give or take, right?
A. If we're fully staffed, 27. I think right now we're down to 24 or 23.
Q. Okay. So, for a moment then 24, 23. Is that when you guys are really short or is that like, yeah, we're a little lean but it's not bad, 27 is like supremely, you know, the optimum?
A. You know, a little lean just always feel very short to me, yeah, you know.
Q. Okay. Okay.
A. It's hard to say.
Q. Okay. It's okay. I was just kind of curious. But so, of the 24 pilots or whatever it sounds like you get to know your pilots somewhat in a professional manner or even as colleagues. How tough is that to actually make that decision to, you just, you so are not ready to go on. I'm going to have to unsat this. How tough is that?
A. It's very tough. It's very tough. At the end of the day it's, it's not, it's not my opinion or judgment. It's a check of a box. And if we can't check this box, we just can't check this box, you know.
So, it's, it's -- yeah, it's not, it's not a personal thing or anything. But we have to. It's as easy as just checking a box. That's all. And I always make, I always make it clear we

just have to check these boxes, you know. Yeah.

Q. Okay. You said -- forgive me I don't remember who asked the question, but you said something you do IOE for people that come to the islands.

A. Correct.

Q. Do you do it or does somebody else?

A. If I have time I like to get to know the pilot and so I'll do the PowerPoint of the catch me's and the ins and outs of airports. Because then I'll get to really know the pilot, have lunch and things I get to know better personality, get to, get to know.

It actually is a good update on training, how much training? You know, what'd you guys do in training. Even though we have meetings, but I like to have their opinion on how the training went, you know, up there. And then, yeah, after that I usually let the captain. Yeah, I won't fly. I will be a line pilot.

And I'll most likely I will try but if they're at an outer based -- if they're here for Honolulu or something, I know but, but I'll try and put them with a veteran pilot. We have a couple of veteran pilots and they've been here for a while and they can get a good read on and I, and I, I want to say I trust all the pilots.

But these pilots are very thorough. You know you have those thorough workers and this one is very thorough and I -- the opinion on those I value a lot. They've been around here for a long time and they can tell I'm comfortable with this person.

Yeah.
Q. All right. Do they get, those veteran pilots, do they get any special training to do IOE or is it just, hey, you've been here long enough --
A. It's day to day experience to show this is how we do it, yeah.
Q. Okay. All right. Thanks. I just wanted to make sure I had that in my head.
A. Yeah.
Q. Correct me if I'm wrong. Maintenance is here at Honolulu?
A. Yes.
Q. The main maintenance. I understand you guys send people out or have contracts at out stations?
A. We actually -- no, we just airline them out there or fly them out to where they have to fix it. There is some -- with our sister companies on the Big Island for Reach I think for the rotor but I'm not sure if they're still helping us. Yeah.
Q. Okay. So, since they're here do you interact with the head of maintenance or maintenance personnel?
A. I do, with Cy (ph.).
Q. Okay. Is that often? Just when you have problems?
A. You're -- oh are you asking the conversations that I have with Cy or anything like that?
Q. You know that was, that was a horrible question. My apologies. Let me rephrase that question. Brian for instance was

having issues with, you know, saying the salt water, electric, you know, of the avionics was having issues. Do you listen to him and then go talk to maintenance about it?
A. Yes. I do.
Q. Okay. And is that -- I don't want -- I mean I know sometimes pilots and mechanics kind of butt heads. But is that kind of an open door? Do they listen? Do they --
A. I will say Cy is good at emails.
Q. Okay.
A. To contact Cy is good with emails.
Q. Okay. That makes it pretty clear. So, a few last questions here. How often do you see the FAA pop in or do you? Let me rephrase that. Have you seen the FAA here?
A. Only for my alteration check but I see them, I would say, I say at least two or three times a year they pop in for -- it looks like inspectors for maintenance show up over here.
Q. Okay. So, they don't ever come and sit along for a checkride other than --
A. A red check or anything like that? Is that what you're looking for like when I'm line checking?
Q. Right.
A. No. Yeah, I haven't seen them in -- yeah, I haven't seen them in at least a year, yeah. Only ramp check here.
Q. I assume they come and do your 24-month line check airman quals?

A. Actually it was out of a courtesy that I didn't have to travel but they gave the blessing for an inspector to ride along with me over here. So, I didn't have to especially with COVID and the traveling and all that.

Q. Okay. We've been told that you guys changed or -- how do I say it nicely, modified your recent, recently the flight risk assessment form. Was that the flight risk? The risk assessment form?

A. The risk assessment?

Q. Yeah, sorry.

A. Yeah.

Q. Have you gotten any feedback from the end user on how that works? Is it better, worse?

A. Anything that starts new is always worse. Any time we make a change it seems like it's always worse. And I'm one of them. You make a change in anything that we've been doing for years and if it involves technology it's even more worse it seems like.

But other -- I think it, the chatter kind of died down after about two or three months on this risk assessment. The only back I get is trying to log onto a computer to take it, to take your risk assessment and, you know, before you just had a cheat card, and you go through and then you could do your calculations on it.

This one -- I get what they're doing is for safety they're trying to get all the data in of how much flying is being done this time and all, everybody's risk. So, I get the feedback on it

but there was, yeah there was a good push back. Anything technology like that to start pushing for it on.

Q. Okay. And I get technology, you know, I've got the electronic black powder for my head too, so I don't, I don't like technology either as much. But have you ever got feedback from the usefulness of it?

And you know, do pilots go, I haven't really considered that before? Or, really, why are you asking me this kind of stuff? It just kind of -- have you ever gotten feedback from the end user?

A. No, only just, the only feedback I got was questions, certain questions on there that seem like it was for the rotor, like no crew on board. Now you have to call -- you know, I think those where we found out was more, you know, it was for the rotor side.

Other things was color of the aircraft, the status of the aircraft. There's no orange listed and things like that. So, most of them were just questions. Yeah.

Q. Okay. You said, you know, let's go talk about fatigue for a minute then. If I'm your pilot and I'm flying two days and I call in fatigued. I'm just like I'm tired. I'm sorry. And I call in fatigue.

And, you know, no problem. I go rest and I fill out the form. And then maybe a few days later I'm tired again and I call in fatigued. At what point do you go, hey, Shawn, we kind of have to talk about this? Is there a threshold in your mind?

A. I don't. I would, I would refer to my chief pilot. I think

three times and I'm -- my opinion is probably a third time in like a month or something that's going on it's like all right. I'm going to -- I would first confer with my chief pilot and say, before I even talk about fatigue or talk to anybody fatigue, I want to make sure I do a trial run with my chief pilot, you know.

I don't want to get myself into trouble talking, you know, pressuring or anything. And so yeah, I would definitely talk to my chief pilot and say, do you see this up in, you know, up in the mainland?

You know, how do you guys handle this because this is out of the ordinary, you know. I'll see a couple of pilots do maybe one or two a year. But two or three in a month is kind of not a pattern I'm used to seeing. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Perfect. The last question, I know you can breathe a side of relief now. When you hire a pilot, do you ever look back at their -- I know you look at the resume and their hours, but did you ever look back to see if maybe they were asked to leave their previous employer, or they've not been very successful with their previous employer for training or whatever? Do you ever look back at that?

A. I ask, I will ask in the interviews. This was just six months. This one was just seven months. You know, it's this one was in the middle of training, you know, a month and a half. You know, can you explain to me why the separation, you know, so fast, you know?

Were you planning on moving or something, you know, the, you know just -- so I usually try and get a feel of it, yeah, of the employee of why so early in the separation at certain places. I give them an opportunity to explain to me.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Great. I promised you that was my last one. So, it is but thank you so much. I know we've taken a lot of your time today. I'll go around and make sure everybody else -- they probably have some more questions but it's going to be a lot less time so. Sabrina?

BY DR. WOODS:

Q. I thought I didn't, but I actually do have one. We've been hearing a few rumblings about something called the lead pilot program. Are you aware?

A. Mm-hmm.

Q. So, can you give me a high-level overview of what that will do for you?

A. It will take some off my plate. In the past -- everything on the lead pilot I've basically done, you know, being out here and I really, we don't, we don't have, we don't have snow or icing. That's one of the main ones. Or fuel trucks, you know, we don't even have a fuel truck here.

The fueling, the white bucket checks and the PRIST and all that kind of big stuff that happens on the mainland we don't have that here so the real, the other basic needs that I've been able to cover. But now I think we're looking at trying to take some

stuff off my plate.

And finding what, you know, even if it's a pea, taking a pea off of my plate then whatever helps my bosses. So, we're moving forward with the lead pilots. Yeah.

Q. And are you like -- it sounds like this is something you're on board with, but I want to confirm that. Do you think this is a good idea for you?

A. Yes. I think it's a good idea. I've had a couple of ideas for instance if a pilot goes to cover another base, say a pilot is going to for example just -- this has happened. A pilot just went to Waimea, and we couldn't figure out the code for the key to get into the hangar.

And the base manager was out on -- I don't know if rest, but we couldn't get it. And that would have saved -- that took up my evening eating dinner with my family, trying to find out where is the code and how to get this pilot.

If we had a lead pilot that takes care of all that stuff, I would have snapped it right over to the lead. Call the lead pilot and he'll let you know the code and get you all comfortable over there. So, I could see it helping me in that perspective.

DR. WOODS: Okay. Yeah, good. Right. That's all I have. Thank you.

MR. ETCHER: Dylan?

BY MR. GARRISON:

Q. Have there been any changes made with training emphasis since

the accident? Anything you're emphasizing in training?
A. The only training that I've seen is with the sim down now is everybody's going up to South Jordan four-day training with the sim and I think there's two days -- again you should talk to Rand Ostman on what's solid on this.
But it's two days training and two days sim and then they'll come back here and then I'll get their checkride done over there. That's the only difference is that we're traveling again back up to South Jordan because of the sim.
Q. Okay.
A. Yeah.
Q. But there's nothing that's changed as far as like you're checking on checkrides or any training like hey let's watch for this now or that now?
A. Yeah. I just did a checkride yesterday and I stayed to the checking of the boxes, the boxes on it, yeah. There is -- I mean I do play with some, you know, been thinking about, you know, what could have happened and this and that.
But I'm limited to what I really want to, want to see. So, I'm still doing unusual attitudes and doing some other things. But still checking the same boxes still.
Q. The same stuff?
A. Yeah. I'm just hopeful that something will come out of this and, you know, that we'll know because, yeah, it just weighs on me that one of my, you know, if what did I, you know, if I'm missing

something here too.
Q. Yeah. I can imagine. If you can recall back to Brian's applications when he was first coming in, you know, Sabrina mentioned earlier talking about, you know, a rotorcraft candidate coming in or someone who was also rotorcraft coming in they have most of their time in rotorcraft.
Is -- and you were saying like that's not really an application I would be looking at. Do you recall -- am I correct in that? Sorry?
A. Wait, how'd you say it, that I wouldn't be looking at the applicant, because yeah, it was all rotor time?
Q. Yeah. It's a lot of rotor time?
A. Yeah. If I saw on an applicant rotor is 2,900 and 100 fixed wing, yeah, I wouldn't even print it.
Q. Yeah. Okay. So, do you recall what that was as far as Brian's because he's also a rotorcraft pilot. Do you recall on the application --
A. I don't recall. I remember his picture being on it and then I know, I know I have notes that what had happened. We had -- I believe we had an older application that I had to fill out when I asked him.
And I, and there's a section that I asked him about his total times. And his, and his fixed wing time and all that. But I'd have to ask HR if they have. I know I forwarded it to them in email. I'm not sure if we had, if this is the same email. But

I'd have to look for it.

But I know I do, I do confirm with a check of how much time do you have in what, in what aircraft, yeah. Yeah. But obviously yeah, I would, if somebody had -- the scenario she put in, I wouldn't even print the resume.

Q. And I know they like write in on it, we've seen the application where they write in their hours. I have this many hours and I heard you verify that in the interview.

A. Yeah.

Q. You say hey, tell me about your time in this, tell me about your time in that.

A. Yeah.

Q. Does anyone verify it with their logbook?

A. No. You'll have to ask HR.

Q. Okay. So, HR may --

A. I'm not sure who verifies the logbook. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Are you aware of anyone verifying it with the logbook?

A. I'm not aware.

Q. Okay.

A. Yes.

Q. You had mentioned earlier, you know, I don't really, I don't try to judge pilots on the checkride. They've got nerves. You know, I'm not trying to assess, you know, what kind of pilot they are. What caliber of pilot they are.

I really have to wait until I heard from other pilots and

then I kind of get an idea, a feel of who they are. Can you recall what that feel was for Brian? Like what feedback were you getting from other pilots?

A. I felt -- I remember mentioning that to the trainers when he failed the checkride, he's a very strong VFR pilot. If he has -- for some reason it's like his instrument, his VFR hand flying is maybe even better than mine, good stick, good VFR flying, whatever we did.

But the instrument part seemed a little bit weaker than his, than his VFR, kind of that make sense. You can which pilots are strong IFR and weaker VFR and then stronger VFR. I could tell that. If that makes sense.

Q. Yeah.

A. Yeah.

Q. And that was, you just got that through training? Did you hear from other pilots in Maui, any other feedback?

A. No. I just got that, yeah, I just, I just passed that on.

Q. I know they don't fly together. That's really the only people flying is the training company.

A. No. I never heard. Yeah.

Q. The company, yeah the flight instructors. That's all, really the only other people besides you who were flying with him, right?

A. Correct. Yeah.

Q. Okay. The last time I was here you and I were talking about like the, you know, everything was brand-new and there were

reports coming from the witness that someone was saying talking about VOR failure and I know that you and I were talking about like man, what could that be, you know.

And I know since then -- I don't know if you've seen the transcript but, you know, it's come out as public records that what was actually said it wasn't VOR failure. You're aware of that?

A. Yes. I'm aware, something in the terms of I lost navigation.

Q. Yeah. He says, you know, he was clear, direct the initial approach fix. It appears he wasn't trending towards that initial approach fix. ATC comes back on and says, hey, confirm you're direct to that initial approach fix.

And he says, hang on -- or he says something along the lines of I'm off navigation. And he like clicks off and comes back on, we're going to give this a try he says. You have way more experience with him, with this operation, with these airplanes, with everything.

Just like based on your experience what would you interpret that meaning? Like what could he possibly have been dealing with to say something like that?

A. I don't know. Yeah. I don't know. I mean something to do with navigation. Something to do with -- yeah. I don't know. I don't know if, I mean and I don't want to speculate. My job is not to speculate. But it sounds confusing.

If I'm doing a checkride and somebody says that, I mean off a

little bit. You know, hang on. When I'm doing the checkride that's usually somebody a little bit disorientated. That it would -- I've heard, you know, I've heard that, you know, like hang on, you know, in the checkride.

I'm getting ready to tell them to do something else on the next -- hang on, you know, and they're just trying to get orientated with things like that. That's, that's my only opinion that I know. Other than that, I can't. I don't, I have no idea now what --

Q. So, task saturation is what --

A. Yeah.

Q. Okay. Yeah. And I mean just for clarification I was asking you to speculate, you know, and --

A. Yeah.

Q. -- the reason for that is, you know, you have experience with these -- you have way more knowledge than we ever will with this operation. And so, like if there was one to speculate, you know, that's -- I was asking you that. So, --

A. I would think if speculate, just around -- it's, it's a confusement (sic) and a navigation. Maybe a partial panel? I don't know, something. Something's not lining up the way or something's, something's confusing. I need a moment here and try and figure this out.

Q. So, you said navigation out. That was my next question. You said possibly partial panel. Any other like when you say

navigation, what does that mean to you? Will you help explain that to us?

A. I would -- this is speculation again, right. We're still on speculation page. I would say, I'm disorientated of navigation of where is it? Where is it going, you know. You know, if I did a checkride and somebody said that, you know, I've seen guys get disorient holds or things like that.

You can hear them make a comment kind of close to something like that in the checkride. It's, you know, it's, what's going on here? You know, but hang on, you know, kind of deal.

Q. Okay. Yeah. You just said that problems with navigation and so that's what, like what equipment are we referring to when you say problems with navigation. Like oh I think maybe he could have been having problems with navigation. Which equipment, you said partial panel. Is there anything else?

A. Partial panel. I mean something -- I've seen pilots just at GPS. That's why, you know, it's so important our GPS because I see them, man, you get happy finger on something and you select something and you're at a critical time, you just and your whole thing.

I mean I've seen crashes of programming, two pilots programming it wrong and now you're in a cone of confusion of trying to get this thing to do what I want it to do now and yeah, to me it could be something to do with either the flight plan or something happened that he was trying to get in over there and

started working on that. Or that he's off course now and trying to figure out -- yeah.

Q. Because he was in descent. He was, you know, getting headings. He was on vectors. And then they cleared him to that initial approach fix and that's where that --

A. And some pilots what they will do is that I've seen on checkrides if the first thing they'll do when they get off navigation is they'll kill the autopilot. They'll turn the autopilot off because now I want to do this. I want to go out. I supposed to be going that way.

And it, what I program, I got it wrong program and it's going that way. So, the first thing they do is they'll -- in checkrides I see this, they'll kill -- they'll put all hands on and try and, okay, I want to man this thing from here. And then sometimes it can work for them, or it can go against them, you know.

And sometimes that's the worst thing they could do is turn the autopilot off instead of sit there and think because now they're adding more to their task after they turn the autopilot off.

Q. Yeah. I'm sorry. I know that's difficult to revisit. But I --

A. No, no --

Q. -- really appreciate you input, you know.

A. Yeah.

MR. GARRISON: Yeah. Thanks.

MR. WEHRSIG: Thank you.

MR. GARRISON: That's all I have.

BY MS. HILL:

Q. How often do flights cancel because of maintenance?

A. How often do flights cancel? I wouldn't -- I wouldn't say we cancel flights here. We move it on to the next, the next base, the next, the next person up that will do it.

But we've -- it's, we've had a string of avionics now of issues that we've been having over here with mechanic-wise over here. So, we've been average two planes up right now instead of the four that we're shooting for.

Q. Can this string of avionics issues can you be more specific of what --

A. Avionics, I want to say the one that comes to most of my addition, like I don't have a data sheet in front of me but I know about most of the test flights do, you know, pilots will share with me, it's pressurization issues.

And then, you know, it's not holding up to the specs that we want the pressurizing for it to hold or they're hearing a squeal, you know, somewhere, and it needs to be plugged on a rubber, you know, pneumatic rubber line.

The other one is avionics and some of the avionics, the EHSIs, stuff has been going out on them. Yeah. The screen has been going out or other things. So, we have been downing the aircraft for that.

I mean everybody, I mean if somebody sees a blink now, you know, it's, a flash on the screen or anything, they're down there. Rightfully so. Yeah.

Q. So, would it be typical to have that many airplanes down for maintenance?

A. No. That wasn't, that's not, that's not normal how much planes we have down right now. Yeah. But give or take, there was, there was a, there was some unfortunate -- like they were going to change an autopilot on one that should be online and there was some other unscheduled maintenance.

One was an engine change, you know, something they found in an engine inspection. So, I would say -- it's not 100 percent of -- it's not avionics but man the luck is with -- it's very unusual that you have us scratching our heads.

And all, and fortunately all this maintenance guys are down here from the mainland also, you know, trying to give, help us out.

Q. Since the accident has it been more typical to have more airplanes down or have them written up more?

A. I would say that there's been more writes up since the accident. Yes.

MS. HILL: Okay. That's all I have.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Thanks. Again, thank you so much. I know it's been long. I told you the second round was quicker, didn't I?

MR. WEHRSIG: Yeah, you did.

MR. ETCHER: But I do appreciate it. But I'm always afraid. We've asked you a ton of questions of course but, you know, it's always easy for us to miss an area like, man, I, they just asked about this. I'm -- it might shed some light on something. Is there anything you can think of that we didn't ask about?

MR. WEHRSIG: No. No. I think they did cover everything that's on my mind and you opened up again, yeah. No. I just hope we find out, yeah. I just hope we find out. It's on us a lot, check airmen to make sure everybody goes home safe and so I honestly hope we find out. Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: Okay. Well, I'll give you my card here in just a little bit but, you know, if you think of anything --

MR. WEHRSIG: Yeah.

MR. ETCHER: -- just reach out.

MR. WEHRSIG: You have mine too.

MR. ETCHER: Anything little thing helps because we're just trying to put this million-piece puzzle together if you will. But if you don't have anything else, I'll call this concluded at 1312 local. So, I appreciate it.

MR. WEHRSIG: Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 1:12 p.m., the interview was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

IN THE MATTER OF:	RAYTHEON AIRCRAFT COMPANY FATAL ACCIDENT NEAR KAUPO, HAWAII ON DECEMBER 15, 2022 Interview of Gabriel Kaleo Wehrsig
ACCIDENT NO.:	ANC23FA008
PLACE:	Maui, Hawaii

was held according to the record, and that this is the original, complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed to the best of my skill and ability.



Romona Phillips
Transcriber