

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD

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Investigation of:

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SECURITY AVIATION ACCIDENT

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COOPER LANDING, ALASKA

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NOVEMBER 29, 2019

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Interview of: JEFFREY McMILLAN
Chief PilotTuesday,
December 17, 2019

APPEARANCES:

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National Transportation Safety Board

PAULA HUCKLEBERRY, Investigator in Charge
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(On behalf of Security Aviation personnel)

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I N T E R V I E W

MS. PRICE: Okay. We're here conducting interviews at Security Aviation for accident ANC20FA007. I'm Noreen Price, aviation accident investigator with the NTSB and investigator in charge.

MS. HUCKLEBERRY: I'm Paula Huckleberry. I'm with the FAA. I'm the investigator in charge from the FAA side.

MR. McMILLAN: I'm Chief McMillan. I'm chief pilot for Security Aviation.

MR. RICHMOND: My name is Bob Richmond.

MS. PRICE: Okay. Jeff, NTSB is an independent federal organization that investigates accidents to determine probable cause and make recommendations so these tragedies don't happen in the future.

We're making a recording of the interview today. It's going to be transcribed by a professional service and then that transcription will be part of the permanent public record. You're allowed to have one person here to help represent you. Who is that person?

MR. McMILLAN: Bob Richmond.

MS. PRICE: Okay. Bob can't answer any questions but if you need to take a break to confer with him, you're welcome to do that.

MR. McMILLAN: Okay.

MS. PRICE: Before we get started, do you have any questions?

1 MR. McMILLAN: No.

2 MS. PRICE: Okay.

3 INTERVIEW OF JEFFREY McMILLAN

4 BY MS. PRICE:

5 Q. So, if you would spell your name.

6 A. Jeffrey, J-E-F-F-R-E-Y, McMillan, M-C-M-I-L-L-A-N.

7 Q. And you go by Jeff?

8 A. I go by Jeff.

9 Q. Great. Thank you. So how long have you been with Security
10 Aviation?

11 A. Almost 3 years, January of 2016.

12 Q. Yeah. Okay. And what positions have you held here?

13 A. I've been a line pilot. I was the safety coordinator for a
14 period of time. And then, in, I believe it was November of last
15 year, I took on the chief pilot duties.

16 Q. Can you give me a brief background of your aviation
17 experience with your current certificates and total flight time?

18 A. I've got an ATP, multi-engine ATP, single-engine land,
19 single-engine sea commercial, commercial helicopter, commercial,
20 helicopter instrument rating. I've been flying commercially for
21 40 years.

22 I've got about 28,000 hours, 5,000 multi-engine, 7,000 hours
23 helicopter, the rest is single engine, crop dusting and bush
24 flying Alaska. I came to Alaska in 1985. Flew here for 12 years,
25 owned and operated an air taxi in Willow.

1 I went back to New Zealand and had a business in New Zealand
2 for almost 20 years. Sold that and came back to Alaska in 2016.

3 Q. Wow, that's a lot. So, currently, as the chief pilot, what
4 are your duties and responsibilities?

5 A. My duties have been basically to help Glen. We've had --
6 Glen liked to do everything himself. I'm the fourth chief pilot
7 in as many years, and Glen was used to doing a lot of things by
8 himself, but I tried to help him as best he could. I would assume
9 operational control if Glen was at a training course or anything
10 like that. And -- yeah.

11 Q. So you would assume operational control only if he was away?

12 A. If he was away, yeah.

13 Q. So POAs had operational control?

14 A. Glen had operational control, but if he was out, the -- I
15 call them dispatchers -- flight followers would call me and say,
16 what do you think about this, you know, as they would do with Glen
17 if he was here.

18 Q. So while Glen is out flying, who has operational control? I
19 know he does of his own flight, but how about all the other
20 flights out there? Does he maintain that or does he -- do you,
21 pass that to you or do you have delegates?

22 A. Joe Kapper would assume it if we were both out of the office.

23 Q. So was anyone delegated operational control below yourself
24 and Joe and Glen? That was only the three of you?

25 A. That has been just the three of us.

1 Q. Okay. Are you responsible for training at all as chief
2 pilot?

3 A. The duty was to be responsible for training, but Glen wanted
4 to assume those duties, and he maintained the records and did most
5 of the training.

6 Q. Why did Glen do most of that training; do you know?

7 A. I believe he wanted to do it himself. It was his choice. He
8 wanted the pilots flying his way.

9 Q. He just liked doing it himself?

10 A. Yeah. Yeah.

11 Q. Okay. So do you have adequate resources to fulfill your
12 duties as the chief pilot?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Do you believe Glen had adequate resources to fulfill his
15 duties?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. DO? Did you have a good relationship with Glen?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. How would you describe his work ethics and practices?

20 A. He was extremely hard working -- yeah, an extremely hard-
21 working guy. An incredible work ethic. Yeah.

22 Q. Did he work long hours?

23 A. He would -- not particularly. He would come in around 8
24 o'clock in the morning -- he had a pretty structured routine --
25 and leave around 5 o'clock at night, I believe. You know, I

1 usually come in about 8:30 and would leave about 4, if we're both
2 in the office. So Glen had it pretty structured. He wasn't here
3 at 6 in the morning and still in the office at 9 at night. He had
4 a pretty structured day.

5 Q. Was it typical for him to be called for a night flight out
6 after his workday?

7 A. In this situation, he was the only Navajo pilot on call
8 available. So that would be typical.

9 Q. Okay. And what's the maximum duty day that --

10 A. Fourteen hours.

11 Q. Okay. So what's the -- how's your relationship with your
12 POI? Who is your POI?

13 A. George O'Connor.

14 Q. Yeah. How was your relationship with the POI? Before the
15 accident of course.

16 A. My relationship or Glen's relationship? Glen and the POI had
17 a working relationship that wasn't -- you know, they didn't --

18 Q. Are you saying they --

19 A. They didn't butt heads, but they -- yeah, yeah, it was a --

20 MS. HUCKLEBERRY: It's hard to put it into words, isn't it?

21 MR. McMILLAN: Yeah, it is hard to put into words. There was
22 stuff that George wanted done and Glen was trying to do, you know,
23 there was --

24 MS. PRICE: Um-hum.

25 MR. McMILLAN: Yeah.

1 BY MS. PRICE:

2 Q. Did you ever meet with the POI or was it Glen to the POI?

3 A. It was pretty much Glen.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. I had met with him at times, but it's pretty much Glen.

6 Q. When was the last time you saw the POI here?

7 A. I've seen him three or four times since the accident.

8 Q. Well, before the accident, like how often?

9 A. There was a meeting about -- I just can't -- maybe a week
10 before.

11 Q. Are you aware of any of the initiatives maybe that Glen was
12 working out with the FAA? Were there any big --

13 A. I know what they were with special approaches and electronic
14 flight bag.

15 Q. Flight bag? Okay.

16 A. Yeah, yeah.

17 Q. How many full-time and part-time pilots are assigned to the
18 company?

19 A. Full-time, we have now -- we have four full-time and I
20 believe three part-time. I stand corrected on that, but I believe
21 three pilot in commands. And then we have Luke, who you met
22 before, and two other SICs. So we're --

23 Q. Is that -- and how many airplanes? How many --

24 A. We have four Conquests, and Navajos I believe are six.

25 Q. So do you have enough -- at the time of the accident, did you

1 have enough pilots to fulfill the business needs of the company?

2 A. Yes, we did. Yes, we did.

3 Q. What -- how many hours did you have in November; do you know?

4 A. I think about 90.

5 Q. Is that pretty typical, 90 a month or so?

6 A. Yeah.

7 Q. And are pilots paid by -- are your full-time pilots paid by
8 salary, flight hour? How is that --

9 A. Salary and flight hour, I believe. I believe. I'm not sure
10 what arrangements Joe has, but I believe it's salary and flight
11 hour. That's how I'm paid.

12 Q. Okay. Are pilots paid differently for certain types of
13 flights, such as air ambulance flights?

14 A. No.

15 Q. So describe how pilots are assigned to a specific flight.
16 Who assigns a flight and a pilot together?

17 A. In the afternoon, say now, we would meet in the office,
18 whether it be Glen or I, and they would look -- the flight
19 followers would look at the board for the following day and there
20 would be, say, a flight to Cape Romanzof, which is a one-way
21 gravel runway. And we've got certain pilots that aren't checked
22 out on to those, so we would assign a pilot based on the
23 experience and the job that was being required.

24 Q. Okay. So either you or Glen assign for the next day --

25 A. Well, we'd just --

1 Q. -- whatever --

2 A. -- we would talk with the flight followers with regard to how
3 it would go. You know, and then Glen would have ultimate, he
4 would have the ultimate say.

5 Q. And how would Glen or whoever's assigning the flight
6 followers know who is current and --

7 A. The training records.

8 Q. Is that with the flight followers, so they have that, or was
9 it Glen that would have all that?

10 A. No, there's a -- we have a sheet, a pilot schedule sheet that
11 has what the pilot's qualified. We have a system, a tiered
12 system, Tier 1, 2 and 3. A pilot starts off when he comes as Tier
13 3, which is pavement to pavement. Then after 50 hours, they can
14 move to Tier 2, which is pavement to a 5,000-foot gravel runway,
15 and then a Tier 1 is the -- after at least 100 hours pilot in
16 command is the radar sites.

17 Q. Okay.

18 A. So -- once they're checked out.

19 Q. So, but the flight followers themselves are not assigning the
20 pilots to the specific --

21 A. No. No.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. That's the suggestions which are assigned.

24 Q. Okay. Now what about ad hoc flights? Does a -- do you have
25 duty pilot during the day and night? If you could describe how

1 that works.

2 A. The pilots -- we usually have one pilot that's assigned as a
3 night call, and they make themselves available. They don't run
4 duty during the day. They make themselves available at night,
5 that if anything comes up, that they will be available.

6 The other pilots are basically day duty. Pilots don't come
7 in if they're not flying. If they're not assigned a flight, they
8 don't have to come in. And so if they're assigned a flight the
9 next morning, they have to be here an hour before the flight to
10 flight plan. But if there's no flight for the following day, then
11 they're not called in.

12 Q. Okay. So on the night of the accident, there was a night
13 person on call. Why were not they called for the flight?

14 A. Because they weren't Navajo qualified.

15 Q. Okay. How come another -- why was a Navajo assigned to the
16 flight?

17 A. I don't know.

18 Q. Who assigned the Navajo to the flight?

19 A. I don't know. I think it was requested.

20 Q. Any idea why the Navajo would be specifically requested for a
21 flight?

22 A. No, I don't.

23 Q. All right. Can you describe operational control, how you
24 guys perform it again, who has it and how it gets --

25 A. Glen had operational control. He had the power to assign and

1 say no on a flight, and he would. I've seen him, you know, say
2 that that's not the right pilot for the job. Him and I -- I would
3 assist him in that. As I said, we would talk about who was doing
4 a flight the next day. We have, as any operation does, we have
5 stronger pilots and weaker pilots. And yeah, the operational
6 control was based on Glen saying that, you know, that pilot is for
7 the job.

8 Q. Did you always have a flight follower out even at night, the
9 night --

10 A. That would follow you from home? Luke was here, but that --

11 Q. Right.

12 A. -- this level we're kind of talking about, I wouldn't have
13 called it a night flight.

14 Q. Night. Yeah, it was during normal working hours. Yes.

15 A. The night flights -- night call is 11 o'clock at night you
16 get a call to go, usually medevac or something to (indiscernible)
17 and drop something off. That's more a night call out.

18 Q. Okay.

19 A. A 5 o'clock at night call is -- would be, you know, as long
20 as it didn't exceed duty times, would be --

21 Q. So, but there would be a flight follower at home watching --

22 A. Absolutely.

23 Q. -- the flight?

24 A. Absolutely. Yeah.

25 Q. And then if they needed to terminate for some reason,

1 whatever that might be, they would have to call Glen?

2 A. Yeah. They would do, they would do that.

3 Q. Does that sound right?

4 A. Um-hum.

5 Q. Okay.

6 A. Every flight -- and now I'm seeing it every flight at night
7 or out of hours, there's a phone call to say, hey, this flight has
8 come up, can we do it? So, and Glen I know got all those -- would
9 get a phone call if there was going to be a night flight to
10 somewhere.

11 Q. So when Glen flew, though, who -- did he positively pass
12 operational control to you or Joe, or was it just the flight
13 follower kind of softly had it and --

14 A. It was -- no, not positively. It was a -- we talked about
15 it, yeah, but not positively. It was not a signature on a piece
16 of paper to say that you have operational control. But it was an
17 understood agreement.

18 Q. So when Glen left that night, who had operational control?

19 A. I wasn't here. I was -- I landed -- I presume I would have.

20 Q. Oh, you were flying?

21 A. I landed just as he taxied out. We -- I pulled into the
22 hangar and he was taxiing out. So I assumed operational control.
23 I was looking at the tracker and --

24 Q. Okay.

25 A. Yeah. So -- but that wasn't a formal handover.

1 Q. Yeah. I was going to ask you that question. What -- why did
2 you look at the tracker?

3 A. The night VFR to Seward. And when we talked about it in
4 here, what he was doing, I was interested and just wanted to
5 follow on the tracker what was happening.

6 Q. So you knew he was going out?

7 A. Yes. Yes.

8 Q. You knew, yeah --

9 A. I came in and I talked to Luke in the office as Glen taxied
10 out.

11 Q. Oh, you did. I see. I understand. Okay.

12 So who trains the flight followers?

13 A. It's -- they do it themselves, within -- Justin's been here
14 for 6 years, 7 years and Jason has been here for 20 years. And
15 they do that.

16 Q. Is there an internal evaluation program, an audit program
17 that audits things like are the operational risk management forms
18 being filled out and all that?

19 A. Yes. Yeah.

20 Q. Who's responsible for the IEP or --

21 A. Debra.

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. The SMS safety manager.

24 Q. So would I be able to find records of audits done on the
25 operational paperwork for releasing flights?

1 A. I believe so.

2 Q. Is that available, do you think? Okay. Are pilots required
3 to file flight plans before departing on a flight?

4 A. Obviously on any IFR flight plan. We do very little night
5 VFR. The one that comes to mind most common is over to Beluga and
6 back, which is a night VFR flight that, you know -- and that's
7 done as a company flight plan. And there's a couple of other
8 times we go to the villages. Emmonak and a couple of villages
9 will call in here and just say, you know what, we're going to go
10 down to Emmonak, drop four people off. So we call in that flight
11 plan and they'll follow us on the tracker.

12 Q. So on the accident flight, there was no flight plan filed?

13 A. A company VFR flight plan.

14 Q. Okay. Is there a piece of paper that has that?

15 A. I'm not sure.

16 Q. Or is it just called in?

17 A. No. No, it was written down, I believe.

18 Q. Okay. We'll check that. Who developed the operational risk
19 management program that the company uses?

20 A. I don't know. I'm not sure.

21 Q. Is it not Glen? I thought --

22 A. Well I -- I'm not, I'm not --

23 Q. Or are you not sure that it was Glen?

24 A. I'm not sure that it was Glen. I presume it was Glen, but I
25 don't know. And I think it probably was.

1 Q. And are pilots required to use that --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. -- form before going flying?

4 A. And they will be called out. If there's not an ORM done, the

5 flight follower will call them out that it hasn't been done.

6 Q. I was reviewing some of the recent risk assessment numbers

7 that are assigned on Glen's flight records, and he had a flight to

8 Dutch Harbor that was a zero.

9 A. Um-hum, that's entirely possible.

10 Q. Is that possible?

11 A. I had a zero.

12 Q. To Dutch Harbor? Really? I mean --

13 A. Well -- yeah.

14 Q. I mean it's mountainous.

15 A. Yeah, yeah.

16 Q. Mountainous terrain.

17 A. You get a minus 2 if it's too --

18 Q. It's remote.

19 A. -- if it's too (indiscernible), you get a minus 2. I

20 actually had a zero. When did I go yesterday? Somewhere -- to

21 Seattle, and it was -- it came as a zero. But the weather was

22 good at both ends and we're in the jet.

23 Q. In the jet, yeah.

24 A. So, and it is possible. Yeah. I'm not --

25 Q. Okay.

1 A. Yeah.

2 Q. Do you know how long those records are kept for?

3 A. I don't.

4 Q. Who updates the navigation databases on the airplane?

5 A. Glen did them.

6 Q. And now that -- who does them now?

7 A. I will. Between --

8 Q. Do you, are you --

9 A. Between maintenance and myself, yeah.

10 Q. Okay. According to your GOM, it says the pilots update the

11 nav databases, but that's not the case?

12 A. No.

13 Q. Okay. If Glen had a flight where the risk value from the

14 flight risk analysis was high, above a limit or within that you'd

15 need to consult with, who would he consult with? If anybody.

16 A. Obviously nobody on this night. If I'd been here, I think we

17 would have talked about it. But I don't know. That's -- yeah.

18 Q. Okay. But aside from this accident, in general, what do you

19 think he would do? Would he reach out to somebody or would he

20 say, I'm the DO and it's --

21 A. We would, we would -- no, no, no.

22 Q. -- I'm consulting with myself?

23 A. No. No, he would not do that. We would talk about it. If

24 we were both here, we would talk about any instances like that.

25 Q. Okay. All right. Could you describe the company's CFIT

1 avoidance training? And are you responsible in any way for that;
2 do you play a role in the CFIT avoidance?

3 A. No, not at the moment.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. This one will be an ongoing change, but we did CFIT training
6 -- my initial training was Glen. We did CFIT at Medallion, did
7 the special approaches and then, and then CFIT training.

8 I think the second to last check ride I did with Glen, we
9 performed a chandelle maneuver to avoid -- Glen got more
10 excitement out of it than anyone. It was designed to avoid, you
11 know, a terrain.

12 And then I go to FlightSafety twice a year, or actually once
13 this year, but -- and we do CFIT, for CFIT training, where you're
14 just flying along, and they get the "Terrain, Terrain." And so
15 we've done that. And Glen did that as well at FlightSafety, so --
16 and there's videos on the Dropbox. You'll hear people talk about
17 the Dropbox. A lot of videos in that. Yeah, there's one or two
18 that we've watched: one in southeast, going southeast with Alaska
19 Seaplanes and -- there's a couple of videos on there as well for
20 the --

21 Q. So do you cover various scenarios like flat light, white
22 light, or is it simply --

23 A. In the initial indoc or initial training we did. Yes.

24 Q. How long has Security Aviation been flying air ambulance
25 flights for Medevac Alaska?

1 A. I don't know for sure. I could -- an estimate would be 18
2 months.

3 Q. Okay. Have there been any problems with the business
4 relationship or regulatory issues with the air ambulance flights?

5 A. Not that I know of.

6 Q. Who generally dealt with the business side of it? Is that --

7 A. Joe or Jason.

8 Q. Okay. Have you conducted any medevac flights with them?

9 A. Um-hum.

10 Q. And how would you characterize the flight nurse and paramedic
11 and --

12 A. Professional.

13 Q. -- the dispatch process? Did it all go --

14 A. The dispatch process was good. Yeah. It was -- the whole
15 thing was very professional.

16 Q. Did you fly with the flight nurse and paramedic who are
17 deceased from this accident?

18 A. Um-hum.

19 Q. And would you characterize them the same, as professional?

20 A. Absolutely.

21 Q. Were either one of them maybe the type that would share the
22 patient's condition with the pilot?

23 A. No. No, and that's -- you were referring to that about Glen
24 knowing about a pregnant woman, right? They would not. I don't
25 believe they would. I don't think so, no.

1 Q. Yeah. We'll get to that in a little bit later --

2 A. Yeah.

3 Q. -- in the questions. How about, how many flights a month are
4 you doing medevac-wise; do you know?

5 A. Quite a lot. Maybe 15 to 20. Yeah. We could get those
6 facts.

7 Q. And what airplane are they usually done in?

8 A. The Conquest or the Lear was predominant. The Navajo was --
9 this was I think the third or fourth medevac at the time. So it
10 wasn't, it wasn't common.

11 Q. Oh, why is that?

12 A. I don't know.

13 Q. You don't know why the Navajo was not common?

14 A. Well, I presume because it's not pressurized and the flights
15 we do to Fairbanks or whatever --

16 Q. Is the decision for a pilot and/or a flight follower to
17 accept an air ambulance flight any different than your other
18 charter flights?

19 A. No. The air ambulance are strictly charter flights to the
20 pilots.

21 Q. Is Security Aviation compensated more for an air ambulance
22 flight than a regular charter flight?

23 A. I don't know.

24 Q. Who would know?

25 A. Joe or Jason.

1 Q. Okay. Do you know if the flight follower is notified of the
2 patient's condition?

3 A. No. No, I don't believe so.

4 Q. Okay.

5 A. Yeah.

6 Q. All right. Do you have any different procedures for
7 dispatching a night air ambulance flight as opposed to a day air
8 ambulance flight? Before the accident.

9 A. Yeah. No. As I said, we treat it as a charter. It's -- if
10 Conoco rang up and said we wanted hot power on the slope, it would
11 be treated exactly the same way as a medevac charter.

12 Q. So Glen was 75 years old. Was the company management
13 concerned at all with, you know, his fitness to fly?

14 A. Not that I know of, no.

15 Q. Okay. Or his fitness to perform his duties as DO?

16 A. Not that I know of.

17 Q. Are you aware of any health or medical conditions that he
18 had?

19 A. Not that I know of, no.

20 Q. Did he ever seem fatigued at work or --

21 A. No.

22 Q. -- complain about aches and pains?

23 A. No.

24 Q. Because I do and I'm not that old.

25 A. Right. So, do I. No, he did not.

1 Q. Did you ever see him wear glasses?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. When did he wear glasses?

4 A. For reading and writing, I believe. I cannot remember with
5 regard to flying. I'm thinking that when he wore glasses for
6 flying, he was writing stuff. He had good eyesight.

7 MS. HUCKLEBERRY: Can I jump in quick?

8 MS. PRICE: Um-hum.

9 MS. HUCKLEBERRY: Did you do any night flights with Glen?

10 MR. McMILLAN: Um-hum.

11 MS. HUCKLEBERRY: And did you notice if he wore glasses
12 for --

13 MR. McMILLAN: I don't --

14 MS. HUCKLEBERRY: -- reading plates or maps?

15 MR. McMILLAN: Yeah, I don't remember. He did not wear
16 glasses all the time. It wasn't like that. And but no, I don't,
17 I don't know. I don't remember.

18 BY MS. PRICE:

19 Q. Did he have any financial problems that you know of that
20 might inspire him to fly more?

21 A. Not that I know of.

22 Q. How about any personal or family issues that might have been
23 affecting him or --

24 A. I don't believe so, no. Or not that I know of.

25 Q. How would you characterize him as a pilot? You have flown

1 with him, correct?

2 A. Um-hum. He was a good, he was a good pilot. A very
3 experienced professional. Yeah.

4 Q. So on the day of the accident, do you know what time he came
5 to work?

6 A. No, I don't.

7 Q. When did he usually come to work?

8 A. He usually came at around 8 o'clock in the morning, 8 to 8:30
9 in the morning, 8 o'clock in the morning.

10 MS. PRICE: Did he eat a healthy diet; do you know?

11 MS. HUCKLEBERRY: Did he like Vegemite?

12 BY MS. PRICE:

13 Q. Describe Glen's diet at the company for me.

14 A. Yeah, he --

15 Q. Come on, spit it out.

16 A. Glen would -- yeah, no, he ate fine. He'd have a can of Coke
17 and, yeah, and he'd have a sandwich or whatever, whatever he could
18 find in his drawer. I spent a month with him at FlightSafety and
19 he ate well. Yeah, he -- yeah.

20 Q. Okay. Why do you think Glen turned around from Eagle River
21 to perform the flight? I mean, he was done with his day. He's at
22 home. He gets a call for another flight. And then he turns back
23 and goes all the way back to work --

24 A. I don't know.

25 Q. -- to take a flight?

1 A. I have no idea.

2 Q. You did say that pilots don't get compensated more for the
3 charter flights, right?

4 A. No.

5 Q. I mean for the air ambulance flight?

6 A. I can tell you how it works --

7 Q. But, and you don't know if the company gets more money for
8 air ambulance flights?

9 A. No. I do not know that. I can -- I know that the pilots, if
10 we get in the Lear and fly at 450 knots, we get paid the same
11 amount per hours if we get in the Navajo and fly it 100 knots. So
12 there's no difference in compensation.

13 Q. So, if you would describe the events of the evening on the
14 accident as you know them, how they -- you knew he -- you were
15 coming in as he was going out. Okay. If you would describe --
16 you came in, talked to Luke. Tell me what you guys discussed and
17 then what happened.

18 A. So I had been in Shemya. I came in and Glen was just -- as
19 we got out of the jet, Glen was starting up. I came in and talked
20 to Luke, asked where Glen was going. He said to Seward. He told
21 me the weather. And it piqued my interest that, you know, that he
22 was going under VFR. I did my paperwork, went home. I've got the
23 tracker. I stopped at a traffic light and looked at the tracker,
24 and saw where he was and the altitude he was at, and didn't like
25 what I saw. But didn't think anything of it. I went to the next

1 traffic light and looked again to make sure that, you know, he'd
2 got back up. And it was in the same spot, and then I looked and
3 the recording -- the point was from 15 minutes before.

4 Q. What altitude was that; do you remember?

5 A. Whatever it says on the tracker. I think it was --

6 Q. You don't remember?

7 A. -- 2200 feet or something like that.

8 Q. Um-hum. Okay. Yeah.

9 A. So, and then I called Luke. I started -- well, I pulled over
10 to the side of the road and called Luke. And he answered the
11 phone and said, are you calling about Glen? And I said, yes. And
12 he said, well, I just had Medevac Alaska. So we put in the
13 emergency response, and I called Jason. And put in the emergency
14 response plan straightaway, and I turned around and came back
15 here.

16 Q. Okay. So what is it about the flight as you, as -- the
17 details, the 2100 feet, surprised you about this flight? Where
18 the accident occurred, the night in a mountain pass, is that
19 surprising to you?

20 A. Yes. Very.

21 Q. What's surprising about it?

22 A. The whole thing's surprising, is surprising to me. That the
23 flight was accepted.

24 Q. So, you don't -- you would not have accepted it if you were
25 provided with the same information --

1 A. No.

2 Q. -- that he was? Why not?

3 A. It was not, it was -- I wouldn't have been comfortable. I
4 wouldn't have flown VFR through there at night.

5 Q. Do you remember what the weather conditions were being flown?

6 A. I knew what the Seward -- Seward was 4200 or, what Luke told
7 me, it was 4200. And --

8 Q. And what would be suitable weather for going into Seward at
9 night?

10 A. VFR?

11 Q. VFR, yeah.

12 A. 9,000-foot overcast layer, maybe. Yeah, which would give you
13 the 2,000 feet above the terrain.

14 Q. And when you talked to Luke, the flight follower, before
15 leaving the company spaces that night, was he concerned about the
16 flight?

17 A. No. Not that I took out of it. He said that he had talked
18 to Glen. It's in his report there. He had talked to Glen and
19 Glen had an answer for everything that was -- an answer for every
20 question.

21 Q. So the ADS-B data and radar data that we have clearly show
22 that he flew into the canyon at 2,200 feet at night VFR. But
23 would you agree that, that's outside of the FAR limitations --

24 A. Yep, absolutely.

25 Q. -- for a VFR flight at night?

1 A. Absolutely.

2 Q. Have you ever known Glen to violate a FAR or --

3 A. No, I haven't.

4 Q. -- company procedure before?

5 A. No. No, I have not.

6 Q. Do you have any idea why --

7 A. I have no --

8 Q. -- on this particular night he would --

9 A. No. I have no idea.

10 Q. -- he would do this?

11 A. It baffles me. I have no idea.

12 Q. Okay. If Seward allowed for instrument approaches, do you

13 think he --

14 A. In the daytime.

15 Q. No. If -- let's just say if it was a night IFR airport,

16 would he have --

17 A. I don't know.

18 Q. -- filed IFR? Or is that --

19 A. I don't know. I would presume so, but I do not know his

20 thinking.

21 Q. In your opinion, if Glen knew that the patient was a pregnant

22 woman who was in labor with complications, is he the type of

23 person that would take a challenging flight, continue a

24 challenging flight?

25 A. No, I don't -- I do not -- I don't believe so. And I also

1 don't believe that we would have known that it was a pregnant
2 woman.

3 Q. Yeah. To your knowledge, did the company know --

4 A. No.

5 Q. -- before going that night?

6 A. No. Luke would be the one, and he did not know.

7 Q. Do you know if the Seward medical emergency clinic has
8 routine ground ambulance service available in Seward?

9 A. I don't know.

10 Q. It does not.

11 A. It doesn't?

12 Q. There's no ambulance service.

13 A. Okay.

14 Q. There's a voluntary service but there's no full-time
15 ambulance service.

16 A. Okay.

17 Q. Do you know if Medevac Alaska is usually the last company to
18 be called or --

19 A. No. I don't, I don't know.

20 Q. If Security Aviation had known about the other refusals for
21 the flight that night, do you believe that would have changed the
22 outcome of the flight?

23 A. I don't know. I would hope so, but I do not know.

24 Q. Does the company have any policies about asking for previous
25 declines or taking a declined flight, either for air ambulance or

1 other chartered flights that clients might be looking for?

2 A. No. We would often know that a flight had been -- we would
3 know that a flight had been turned down. Not a medevac, but we
4 often get asked that, you know, can you take -- go to Kodiak
5 straightaway? And why? Because Ravn can't get in there, and so
6 and so can't get in there. And so, no, so we don't do it. But --

7 Q. Do you have a policy though? Is there any written policy
8 about taking --

9 A. There is not a written policy, but it is a -- the flight
10 followers know that. Often a pop-up flight is because someone
11 else isn't getting there or whatever, so they do it -- they do
12 good checking.

13 Q. Um-hum. So you don't believe the flight followers had an
14 understanding that in the air ambulance world that hospitals go
15 from company to company looking for someone to take that?

16 A. No.

17 Q. The weather information that was available to the company was
18 the same information that was available to the other companies
19 that turned down the flight. Why -- do you have any insight as to
20 why that flight was accepted when it was turned down by other
21 companies?

22 A. No. I never talked to Glen before then.

23 Q. Why do you think Glen did not fill out his risk assessment
24 that night completely? He obviously went into the computer and he
25 came up with an 8, but he only filled out two blocks or just a few

1 of the blocks instead of filling it out completely, which would
2 have resulted in a number that would have meant he needed to
3 confer with somebody. Do you have any idea why that would --

4 A. No, I don't.

5 Q. Is that typical behavior for him when he goes out on a
6 flight?

7 A. Not that I know of, no. I don't check his ORMs exact, so I
8 don't know.

9 MS. PRICE: Um-hum. Okay. Do you have any questions, Paula?

10 BY MS. HUCKLEBERRY:

11 Q. Do you check, say, a representative sample of his risk
12 management sheets?

13 A. No, I have not. I have not.

14 Q. Are they available?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And then, so would there be a brief description of the
17 flight, like what time of day, where it's going, and then a
18 numerical value on that flight for risk?

19 A. So this is how it's filled out here. It will say the pilot,
20 the date, the aircraft, who you're working for, where it's going
21 to, the log number, if they can, and then usually the --

22 Q. Okay.

23 A. -- it's filled in.

24 MS. HUCKLEBERRY: That's all I have.

25 MR. McMILLAN: Yeah. Okay.

1 MS. PRICE: Is there anything else you want to add that you
2 think might benefit the investigation?

3 MR. McMILLAN: No. I don't think so.

4 MS. PRICE: Thank you very much. I appreciate it, Jeff.

5 MR. McMILLAN: Thank you.

6 MS. PRICE: That concludes the interview.

7 (Whereupon, the interview was concluded.)
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the attached proceeding before the

NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD


IN THE MATTER OF: SECURITY AVIATION ACCIDENT
 COOPER LANDING, ALASKA
 NOVEMBER 29, 2019
 Interview of Jeffrey McMillan

ACCIDENT NO.: ANC20FA007

PLACE:

DATE: December 17, 2019

was held according to the record, and that this is the original,
complete, true and accurate transcript which has been transcribed
to the best of my skill and ability.



Romona Phillips
Transcriber