Gates Learjet 25B accident near Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, February 21, 2004
On February 21, 2004 at about 2:57 am local time, a Gates Learjet 25B, registered N24RZ, was substantially damaged in an accident near Ft. Lauderdale, Florida (Fort Lauderdale Exec. Airport). It was flown under charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135). 1 person was seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt. The weather was visual conditions (good weather).
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The NTSB's probable cause their words, unchanged
The pilot in command's misjudged distance/speed while landing, and the flightcrew's failure to follow prescribed emergency procedures, which resulted in a runway overrun and subsequent collision with a building. Factors associated with the accident are the flightcrew's inadequate in-flight planning/decision making, which resulted in a low fuel condition; an open hydraulic relief valve, and inadequate maintenance by company maintenance personnel. Additional factors were an inoperative (normal) brake system, an unactivated emergency drag chute, the flightcrew's failure to engage the emergency brake system, and pressure placed on the flightcrew due to conditions/events.
Source: NTSB aviation accident database, copy made October 4, 2026. Docket and reports at the NTSB.
What the record shows
- Date
- February 21, 2004 · about 2:57 am local time
- Place
- Ft. Lauderdale, Florida · Fort Lauderdale Exec. Airport · map
- Type
- Accident
- Injuries
- 1 person was seriously injured and 1 person had minor injuries; 2 others were unhurt.
- Weather
- visual conditions (good weather)
- Aircraft
- Gates Learjet 25B · all 25Bs on the register
- Registration
- N24RZ · registry record · serial 159
- Damage
- Substantial damage
- Flight
- Flight · charter and air-taxi rules (Part 135)
The NTSB's narrative final · quoted from the NTSB record
The captain and first officer were conducting a CFR Part 135 on-demand charter flight, returning two passengers to the accident airplane's base airport. The multi-destination flight originated from the accident airport, about 16 hours before the accident. On the final leg of the flight, the flight encountered stronger than anticipated headwinds, and the first officer voiced his concern several times about the airplane's remaining fuel. As the flight approached the destination airport, the captain became concerned about having to fly an extended downwind leg, and told the ATCT specialist the flight was low on fuel. The ATCT specialist then cleared the accident airplane for a priority landing. According to cockpit voice recorder (CVR) data, while the crew was attempting to lower the airplane's wing flaps in preparation for landing, they discovered that the flaps would not extend beyond 8 degrees. After the landing gear was lowered, the captain told the first officer, in part: "The gear doors are stuck down.... no hydraulics." The captain told the first officer: "Okay, so we're gonna do, this is gonna be a ref and twenty...All right, probably not going to have any brakes..." According to a ATCT specialist in the control tower, the airplane touched down about midway on the 6001-foot long, dry runway. It continued to the end of the runway, entered the overrun area, struck a chain link fence, crossed a road, and struck a building. During a postaccident interview, the captain reported that during the landing roll the first officer was unable to deploy the airplane's emergency drag chute. He said that neither he nor the first officer attempted to activate the nitrogen-charged emergency brake system. The accident airplane was not equipped with thrust reversers. A postaccident examination of the accident airplane's hydraulic pressure relief valve and hydraulic pressure regulator assembly revealed numerous indentations and small gouges on the exterior portions of both components, consistent with being repeatedly struck with a tool. When the hydraulic pressure relief valve was tested and disassembled, it was discovered that the valve piston was stuck open. The emergency drag chute release handle has two safety latches that must be depressed simultaneously before the parachute will activate. An inspection of the emergency drag chute system and release handle disclosed no preaccident mechanical anomalies.
The complete narrative as the NTSB published it. The NTSB's docket holds the report as a PDF and any photographs, statements and other documents from the investigation.
The factual record from the NTSB's investigation tables, in plain English
Pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instructor: airplane single-engine; instructor: instrument airplane; instrument: airplane
- Flight time: 4,500 hours in all; 100 in the last 90 days
- Last flight review: September 28, 2003
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: left
- Injury: serious injuries
Co-pilot
- Certificate: airline transport pilot
- Ratings: multi-engine land; single-engine land; instrument: airplane
- Last flight review: September 1, 2003
- Medical certificate: Class 1 (valid medical--no waivers/lim.)
- Seat: rgt
- Injury: minor injuries
The aircraft
- Airframe total time: 4,104.1 hours
- Last inspection: 100-hour inspection, March 21, 2003; 3,880.9 hours since
- Maximum gross weight: 13,500 lb
- Seats: 8
- Landing gear: retractable
- Engine: General Electric CJ610-8A (turbojet); 0 hours total
The flight
- Departed from: TJSJ San Juan PR
- Destination: KFXE Ft. Lauderdale FL
- Flight plan: IFR
- Runway 08, 6,001 ft by 100 ft
- A second pilot was aboard
Weather at the time
- Light: night
- Wind: from 150° at 4 knots
- Visibility: 10 statute miles
- Sky: overcast at 7,000 ft; a few clouds at 4,600 ft
- Temperature: 72°F (22°C), dew point 61°F (16°C)
- Altimeter: 30.02 inHg
- Observation at 2:57 am from FXE
Injuries
| Fatal | Serious | Minor | None | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Crew | 1 | 1 | ||
| Passengers | 2 |
About this page
Everything above comes from the NTSB's public accident database: the narrative, probable cause and findings are the NTSB's own words, and the coded tables behind its report (pilot, aircraft, flight, weather, injuries, sequence of events) are written out in plain English. Pilots' ages, home towns and medical details are left out on purpose. The docket at the NTSB holds the report as a PDF and the investigation's photographs and documents. This site never names pilots, passengers or anyone else involved. A preliminary report describes what is known soon after the event and can change; the final report, with the probable cause, usually follows one to two years later and this page is refreshed when it does. Case number ANC04FA026.